Democratic Republic of the Congo

Janosch Kullenberg

The Congolese ‘electoral poker’ went into its final round with yet another unex- pected turn regarding the results of the 30 December 2018 presidential and legisla- tive elections. Upon realising that the vote did not allow for his own candidate to be pushed through, the outgoing president, Joseph Kabila, struck a backroom deal with opposition candidate Félix Tshisekedi, in which the latter gained the presidency in exchange for accepting that Kabila’s ‘Front Commun pour le Congo’ (fcc) would claim an overwhelming majority in the national and provincial assemblies and, therewith, also dominate the senate and the nomination of governors. While the first peaceful transition of the drc was therefore flawed, most Congolese and international stakeholders were satisfied with Kabila stepping down and were will- ing to give the new president a chance to address the country’s urgent problems. However, governance was delayed, as control over Congo’s political, security, and economic institutions had to be negotiated between the two blocs and their re- spective constituencies. The impact of the transition on the security situation in the country’s west and centre was positive and many armed groups showed willingness to demobilise, but the eastern provinces remained a hotbed of violence amid the world’s second worst Ebola outbreak.

Domestic Politics

On 10 January, the ‘Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante’ (ceni) an- nounced the provisional results of the 30 December 2018 elections. Félix Tshisekedi was declared the winner with 38.6% of the vote, ahead of opposition leader Martin Fayulu (34.8%) and the fcc’s candidate Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary (23.8%). Kabila’s fcc claimed 341 of the 500 seats in the National Assembly. However, subsequently leaked data from ceni’s electronic voting machines and 40,000 ob- servers of the Catholic Church indicate that Martin Fayulu, whose ‘Lamuka’ coa- lition included Moïse Katumbi and Jean-Pierre Bemba, clearly won the elections with approximately 60% of the votes, ahead of Tshisekedi and Shadary with 19% each. Given this analysis, an fcc majority in the National Assembly appeared very unlikely. Following the announcement of the results, protests took place in many cities across the drc, but the overall security situation remained relatively stable. As ex- pected, security forces repressed protests with excessive force, killing at least ten people and inflicting gunshot wounds on 28 more in Kikwit, Kananga, Goma, and Kinsangani. Ultimately, most Congolese seem to have accepted the arrangement because (a) the political imperative of Kabila leaving the presidency had been fulfilled, (b) the veteran opposition party ‘Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social’ (udps) would finally take on a major role in government, indicating the pos- sibility of some change, and (c) contesting the ‘official’ results could ignite an al- ready tense situation. In short, this limited change was more than most had hoped for, and pushing further would probably lead to violence and chaos. Martin Fayulu showed determination to have the “truth of the ballot boxes” up- held. He organised numerous rallies across the drc demanding a recount of the vote and the publication of the results per voting station. He also filed unsuccessful complaints at the Congolese constitutional court and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. Throughout the year, his legitimate claim to the presidency gradually lost support as it became clear that the electoral arrangement was holding up and Fayulu’s exceptional moment as the main opposition candidate had passed. Slowly, the political alliance behind him started unravelling, as opportunities in the new political reality appeared more important than insisting on principles. His heavyweight supporters Bemba and Katumbi quickly withdrew from contesting the status quo, probably to restore their business empires after years of absence and position themselves for the next elections. However, Tshisekedi’s compromise with Kabila clearly put the new president in a difficult position. In addition to the political majorities gained in their backroom deal, Kabila had previously ensured control over the economy, the security apparatus, the electoral commission, and the constitutional court. Accordingly, Kabila held several cards which he could potentially use to dispose of the new