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Vývoj, Přítomnost a Podoba Fenoménu Al-Qá´Idy V Bosně a Hercegovině

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Vývoj, Přítomnost a Podoba Fenoménu Al-Qá´Idy V Bosně a Hercegovině MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA V BRNĚ Fakulta sociálních studií Katedra politologie Vývoj, přítomnost a podoba fenoménu al-Qá´idy v Bosně a Hercegovině Diplomová práce Michal Vačkář Vedoucí práce: Mgr. Tomáš Šmíd, Ph.D. UČO: 109796 Obor: Bezpečnostní a strategická studia Imatrikulační ročník: 2008 Brno 2010 Čestné prohlášení Čestně prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně pod vedením Mgr. Tomáše Šmída, Ph.D. a při použití zdrojů uvedených na konci práce. Podpis: V Brně, 12.5.2010 1 I. Úvod .................................................................................................................. 3 II. Teoretická část................................................................................................ 7 2.1 Al-Qá´ida jako teroristická organizace ........................................................................ 7 2.2 Al-Qá´ida jako alianční síť............................................................................................ 9 2.3 Al-Qá´ida jako sociální hnutí; ideologie..................................................................... 12 2.4 Al-Qá´ida jako korporativní nálepka......................................................................... 15 III. Empirická část ............................................................................................ 17 3.1 Občanská válka 1992-95 a infiltrace islamistů do Bosny a Hercegoviny................ 17 3.1.1 Paramilitární skupiny .......................................................................................... 26 3.1.1.1 Sedmá muslimská osvobozenecká brigáda....................................................... 30 3.1.2 Internacionalizace boje proti OSN ...................................................................... 32 3.1.3 Islámský kulturní institut v Miláně ..................................................................... 34 3.1.4 Shrnutí působení al-Qá´idy v Bosně a Hercegovině v průběhu války 1992-95.. 36 3.2 Odkaz válečného konfliktu v Bosně a Hercegovině a jeho důsledky....................... 37 3.3 Al-Qá´ida ve vztahu k NGOs v Bosně a Hercegovině............................................... 41 3.4 Situace v postdaytonské Bosně a Hercegovině .......................................................... 51 3.4.1 Islámská hnutí v Bosně a Hercegovině ............................................................... 53 3.4.1.1 Bošnjačka omladinska mreža (B.O.M.)............................................................ 53 3.4.1.2 Mladi Muslimani (MM).................................................................................... 54 3.4.1.3 Aktivna Islamska Omladina (AIO) ................................................................... 55 3.4.2 Shrnutí působení al-Qá´idy v postdaytonské Bosně a Hercegovině ................... 58 3.5 Teroristické akce spojené s postdaytonskou Bosnu a Hercegovinu ........................ 60 3.5.1 Teroristické útoky předcházející 11. září 2001 ................................................... 61 3.5.1.1 Miléniový teroristický komplot......................................................................... 62 3.5.1.2 Gang z Roubaix ................................................................................................ 64 3.5.2 Teroristické útoky 11. září 2001 a následující .................................................... 66 3.5.3 Shrnutí vztahu al-Qá´idy a teroristických akcí spojovaných s BaH.................... 70 3.6 Wahhábismus jako hrozba pro Bosnu a Hercegovinu ............................................. 72 IV. Závěr ............................................................................................................ 83 V. Použité zdroje................................................................................................ 86 2 I. Úvod Bosna a Hercegovina se v posledních několika letech dostala pryč z agendy mnohých bezpečnostních analytiků i vědeckých pracovníků a pod vlivem růstu „důležitosti“ a atraktivnosti jiných regionů se poněkud pozapomnělo na fakt, že po nejničivějším evropském konfliktu od konce druhé světové války v této zemi probíhaly a stále probíhají procesy, které jsou hodné zkoumání, především pak v souvislostech s již téměř 10 let probíhajícím globálním tažením proti terorismu a jen těžko uchopitelným a konceptuálně nepříliš jasně definovaným fenoménem al-Qá´idy. Al-Qá´ida jako taková naopak zaměstnává velké množství pracovníků ať již čistě vědecké, tak aplikované sféry bezpečnostních a strategických studií. Z dosavadních dostupných pramenů a informací vyplývá, že se al-Qá´ida určitým způsobem zapojila i do konfliktu v Bosně a Hercegovině a to především díky své intenzivní spolupráci s rozličnými nevládními organizacemi v BaH působícími. Jejím primárním cílem však dle nejnovějších studií nebyla pouze podpora bosenským muslimům v jejich válečném úsilí. Al-Qá´ida usilovala, jak si v následující práci ukážeme, o poněkud vyšší cíle. Bosna a Hercegovina i dle Jasona Burkeho (2004) sehrála poměrně důležitou roli v určitém vyspívání al-Qá´idy, které se odehrávalo především v letech 1996-2001. V této době al-Qá´ida sestávala ze tří hlavních elementů: tvrdého jádra, sítě kooptovaných skupin a ideologie. Toto tripartitní rozdělení je pak zásadní pro pochopení fenoménu al-Qá´idy i moderního islamismu (Burke 2004: 8). Vnímání a typologie působení sítě al-Qá´idy v různých částech světa není etablovaným teoretickým přístupem a tak jedním z cílů teoretické části následující práce je objasnění typologie vytvořené na základě odborných publikací zabývajících se výzkumem a problematikou al-Qá´idy a v rámci empirické části její následná aplikace na případ Bosny a Hercegoviny v oblasti studia vztahu radikálního islámu/islamismu a al-Qá´idy na jejím území. Analýzou a aplikací předem určených indikátorů vycházejících z odborné literatury a na jejím základě vytvořené typologie přístupu a vnímání al-Qá´idy na analyticky pojatou empirickou část se pokusím určit, jaký modus vivendi al-Qá´ida v Bosně a Hercegovině uplatňovala. To je zároveň i zamýšleným cílem práce. Představeny budou celkově čtyři různé perspektivy a následně bude prozkoumána jejich kompatibilita a možnosti prolínání, protože ani v těchto případech, podobně jako ve většině oborů sociálních věd, nelze tyto kategorie striktně oddělit a vymezit či vyloučit jejich případné vzájemné překrývání. Našimi čtyřmi prizmaty vnímání fenoménu al-Qá´idy tedy 3 jsou: al-Qá´ida jako organizace, al-Qá´ida jako alianční síť, al-Qá´ida jako sociální hnutí, ideologie a doktrína a v neposlední řadě také al-Qá´ida jako korporativní nálepka. Komplexní zhodnocení propojení radikálních islamistů v Bosně a Hercegovině s al- Qá´idou zpracováno ještě nebylo. Existuje mnoho dílčích prací zabývajících se prostým napojením v Bosně a Hercegovině působících NGOs a humanitárních organizací na al- Qá´idu, tyto ovšem neřeší způsob a styl takovéhoto napojení. Použitá afiliace s al-Qá´idou má pak často primárně sloužit k diskreditaci označených organizací a neposkytuje ucelenou a v teorii ukotvenou odpověď na to, jakým způsobem al-Qá´ida v Bosně a Hercegovině fakticky působila (působí). Navrhovaná práce sice nevychází z všobecně přijímané a etablované teorie, nicméně navržená typologie byla vytvořena na základě odborné literatury zaměřené na teoretické uchopení al-Qá´idy. Použitá typologie bude tedy v tomto směru přínosná jinak. Díky determinantům a indikátorům použitým při její operacionalizaci se totiž budeme moci přiblížit odpovědi, zdali současná Bosna a Hercegovina představuje bezpečnostní hrozbu spojenou s šířením radikálního islamismu tak, jak je zdůrazňováno mnohými západními odborníky na témata spojená s existencí islámského náboženství v Bosně a Hercegovině. Při zpracovávání následující práce jsem vycházel ze své bakalářské práce, jež byla úspěšně obhájena v červnu 2008. Některé pasáže v textu jsou tedy totožné s pasážemi v této bakalářské práci a nepovažoval jsem za vhodné a nutné je citovat pomocí druhotných zdrojů, proto uvádím pouze zdroje primární, tudíž totožné s těmi, které byly použity při zpracovávání bakalářské práce a několik řádně ocitovaných pasáží z mé bakalářské práce. Samotná bakalářská práce byla zaměřena jiným směrem, nežli předkládaná práce diplomová, a to na konceptualizaci fenoménu islámského radikalismu v Bosně a Hercegovině a zjištění jeho projevů od příchodu islámského náboženství na její území až do současnosti. Následující diplomová práce tedy prakticky rozvíjí pouze její část a při použití úplně nového teoretického konceptu je s rozdílným cílem zaměřená na odkrytí sice podobné, leč nikoliv totožné problematiky. Pro potřeby detailního zmapování stavu a situace týkajícího se radikálně islamistických skupin či jednotlivců a jejich případného napojení na al-Qá´idu v Bosně a Hercegovině, tedy pro naplnění účelu práce a dospění k relevantním a uceleným závěrům, budu mimo dostupné monografie a odborné články publikované na stránkách mezinárodních think-tanků také čerpat z webových stránek samotných bosensko-hercegovských organizací a z článků publikovaných v internetových verzích anglosaských, ruských, chorvatských, srbských a bosensko-hercegovských periodik. 4 Při používání posledně zmíněných zdrojů bude samozřejmě nutné zaujmout konstruktivně kritický postoj k informacím v nich nalezených a pokusit se je dále ověřit i v jiných materiálech. U těchto zdrojů existuje totiž určité riziko předpojatosti. Neméně důležité je také zmínit se o používané terminologii. Jelikož cílem práce není rozlišit, zdali se projevy toho, co nyní pracovně nazvěme islámským radikalismem,
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