RENT CONTROL MYTHS&REAUTIES International Evidence of the Effects of Rent Control in Six Countries
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ALL RENT INCREASES as® LANDLORDS CONTRIBUTORS INCLUDE MILTON FRIEDMAN \. HAYEK THE FRASE R INSTITUT E RENTGONTROL MYTHS&REALITIES www.fraserinstitute.org RENT CONTROL MYTHS&REAUTIES International Evidence of the Effects of Rent Control in Six Countries Contributors includ e Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Basil Kalymon Co-edited by Walter Block and Edgar Olsen THE FRASE R INSTITUT E 1981 www.fraserinstitute.org Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Rent control, myths & realities (Fraser Institute housing and land economics series; no. 7) Bibliography: p. ISBN O-88975-O33-5 1. Rent control - Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Housing - Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Block, Walter, 1941- II. Olsen, Edgar, 1942- III. Friedman, Milton, 1912- IV. Hayek.FriedrichA., 1899- V. Kalymon, Basil A., 1944- VI. Series: Fraser Institute, Vancouver, B.C. Fraser Institute housing and land economics series; no. 7 HD7287.5.R457 333.5 C80-091222-5 COPYRIGHT © BY THE FRASER INSTITUTE, 1981 Printed in Canada. IV www.fraserinstitute.org Contents PREFACE xiii Walter Block, Senior Economist, The Fraser Institute Unexpected unanimity xiv The role of the economist xv What is the problem? xvi How has rent control worked? xvii The New York City financial crisis xviii A Canadian example xviii European rent control xix Benevolent intentions xxi Notes xxiii PART ONE—THE POLITICS OF RENT CONTROL Chapter 1: The Politics of Rent Control in the United States: A Program at the Yellow Light Ted Dienstfrey, Director of Research and Planning, California Housing Council What will happen to rent control? 5 The rent control political debate 6 The current status of rent control in the United States 10 The future of rent control in the United States 21 Epilogue 22 Notes 28 www.fraserinstitute.org PART TWO—THE THEORY OF RENT CONTROL Chapter 2: A Short Course in Housing Economics M.A.Walker, Director, The Fraser Institute The demand for housing services 38 The supply of housing services 41 Some remarks on owner-occupiers as landlord-tenants 44 Rents 45 A housing shortage? 46 Price controls 47 Summary 49 Notes 50 Chapter 3: The Presumed Advantages and Real Disadvantages of Rent Control Richard W. Ault, Acting Assistant Professor, Louisiana State University Presumed advantages 55 Arguments for rent control 56 Summary 65 Real disadvantages 65 Notes 77 PART THREE—THE PRACTICE OF RENT CONTROL Chapter 4: Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Problem Milton Friedman, Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California VI www.fraserinstitute.org George J. Stigler, Charles R. Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor of American Institutions, University of Chicago The background 87 The 1906 method: price rationing 89 The 1946 method: rationing by chance and favoritism 94 The method of public rationing 97 Conclusions 102 Chapter 5: Questions and Some Answers about Rent Control: An Empirical Analysis of New York's Experience Edgar O. Olsen, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia; Visiting Scholar, US Department of Housing and Urban Development Effects of rent control in New York City 108 Conclusions 115 Appendix 117 Notes 121 Chapter 6: The Effects of Rent Control and Rent Stabilization in New York City Frank S. Kristof, President, The Rent Stabilization Association ofN. Y.C., Inc. Summary 125 Historical perspective on housing policies in New York City 127 Rent control and rent stabilization in 1977 134 Costs of rent control and rent stabilization 139 Conclusions 144 Notes 145 vn www.fraserinstitute.org Chapter 7: The Economics of Rent Restriction F.W. Paish, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of London The history of rent restriction 152 Legal difficulties and injustices 154 Economic effects 157 Chapter 8: Recent British Experience: A Postscript from 1975 F.G. Pennance, McRobert Professor of Land Economy, University of Aberdeen Notes 168 Chapter 9: The Repercussions of Rent Restrictions F.A. Hayek, Nobel Laureate 1974 The unique characteristic of housing 172 Effects on distribution 175 Effect on supply of capital for investment 179 Transition to an open market 183 Notes 185 Chapter 10: No Vacancies Bertrand de Jouvenel, President, SEDEIS, Paris A dollar a month 189 "Bootleg" housing 191 Rent control takes root 192 The busy lawmakers 194 Vlll www.fraserinstitute.org Chapter 11: The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Swedish Rent Control Sven Rydenfelt, Lecturer in Economics, University of Lund, Sweden A "temporary" emergency regulation made permanent 201 Housing and population 205 Theory and forecasting 207 Single people invade the housing market 209 Housing production gross and net 213 The fall and revival of Swedish rent control 215 Rent control—dream and reality 224 Questions and answers about rent control 227 Notes 229 Chapter 12: Apartment Shortages and Rent Control Basil A. Kalymon, Faculty of Management Studies, University of Toronto Sequence of events 233 Historical evidence on rent increases 236 Historical evidence on apartment starts 238 Effects of controls 241 Other influences 242 Current and future developments 243 Possible alternatives 244 Notes 245 Chapter 13: Decontrol M.A. Walker, Director, The Fraser Institute Consequence for rents 249 Excess supply of housing 250 Excess demand for housing 250 Conclusions 260 Notes 261 IX www.fraserinstitute.org PART FOUR—CONCLUSIONS Chapter 14: Alternatives Edgar O. Olsen, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia M.A. Walker, Director, The Fraser Institute The origins of rent control 268 The effects of rent control 271 Alternative means to worthy ends 276 Strategy for decontrol 279 Notes 281 Chapter 15: Postscript: A Reply to the Critics Walter Block, Senior Economist, The Fraser Institute The case against rent control does not rest on the assumption of perfect competition 286 The rental housing market is not monopolistic 287 Excessive profits are not commonly earned in real estate 290 Tenants are not "exploited" in the absence of rent control 292 Rent control should not be part of a comprehensive government housing program 294 Rent control does not halt the "absentee landlord menace" 298 Housing is not a basic human right 300 The market does not place profit above human needs 302 A "windfall profits" tax on landlords is not justified 304 Appendix A 307 Notes 314 BOMB DAMAGE OR RENT CONTROL? THE ANSWERS 320 BIBLIOGRAPHY 322 www.fraserinstitute.org The theoretical analysis of rent control rests on some principles which are quite elementary, indeed distressingly so. They are so obvious that one would feel the greatest reluctance to repeat them on the pages of a professional journal were it not that a great public policy has been erected upon either ignorance or a repudiation of them. If we were to ask a competent sophomore what would happen if consumers' real income increased some 60 percent while the price of a service of more than zero income elasticity were held constant, we should be justified in expecting him to answer that the quantity demanded of the service would become greater than the quantity supplied and the market would be in disequilibrium. And the sophomore who met our expec- tations would thereby have uncovered the central element in the housing problem, about which so much has been written and spoken and over which many families have experienced great annoyance and no little hardship. If our sophomore were something more than competent, if he had a touch of affection for the subject, he would go on to express a doubt that much new investment would be attracted to the production of the service in question, that, instead, investment would look for richer pastures in those areas of the economy where maximum prices were not fixed. He might then, warming to the problem (and perhaps seeing an "A " shimmering before him), go on to say that buyers would engage in a scramble for the service fixed in price with the distribution of it becoming a very haphazard affair. In all this, he would be most correct. But if it then were asked of him whether the theoretical observations applied when rental housing was the service in question, he would, like most members of the human community, draw himself up sharp before the heartlessness of applying the elements of supply and demand analysis to so tender a thing as home and hearth. He would revert to phrases about, 'Housing is a necessity'... 'Rents in a free market would be exorbitant'... 'People would have no place to live'... 'Landlords would make enormous profits out of the poor.' He might so recoil at the thought of free rents that he would go to the library and there discover that the removal of rent control would be inflationary, that it would lead to strikes, that it would reduce the purchases of durable consumer goods and hence lead to unemployment. But for all of his instinctive (and commendable) sympathies, his original remarks still would be correct." (emphasis added). W.S. Grampp, "Some Effects of Rent Control" xi www.fraserinstitute.org Block: Preface Preface In the United States, rent control has been a local phenomenon, except during and immediately after the World Wars and in the early 1970s, when it was a part of the Economic Stabilization Act. It is all too often initiated without clear understanding of its effects or consideration of alternative means to the same ends. Although there is much evidence of the effects of this legislation, it is not easily accessible to concerned citizens and their representa- tives and, hence, has had little influence on the fate of proposed ordinances. Since rent control can have major effects on the well-being of individuals, this failure is particularly unfortunate. The Fraser Institute is publishing Rent Control: Myths and Realities to help fill this information gap. It is often said that rent control is inevitable in a democracy because tenants greatly outnumber landlords.