Space and Internal Security
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Sp ace and Internal Security – Devel oping a Concept for the Use of Space Assets to Assure a Secure Europe Report 20, September 2009 Nina-Louisa REMUSS, ESPI DISCLAIMER This Report has been prepared for the client in accordance with the associated contract and ESPI will accept no liability for any losses or damages arising out of the provision of the report to third parties. Short Title: ESPI Report 20, September 2009 Ref.: P44-C20490-04 Editor, Publisher: ESPI European Space Policy Institute A-1030 Vienna, Schwarzenbergplatz 6, Austria http://www.espi.or.at Tel.: +43 1 718 11 18 - 0 Fax - 99 Copyright: ESPI, September 2009 Rights reserved - No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose without permission from ESPI. Citations and extracts to be published by other means are subject to mentioning “source: ESPI Report 20, September 2009. All rights reserved” and sample transmission to ESPI before publishing. Price: 11,00 EUR Printed by ESA/ESTEC Layout and Design: M. A. Jakob/ESPI and Panthera.cc Report 20, September 2009 2 Space and Internal Security TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures 5 Executive Summary 6 1. Introduction 11 1.1 The Setting 11 1.2 Institutional Development 12 1.3 Approach of the Study 13 2. The Policy Area of Internal Security 15 2.1 “Homeland Security” or “Internal Security”? Clarifying the Concept 15 2.2 Risk Assessment 17 2.3 The Three Phases of the Event Cycle 18 2.4 Threats to Internal Security: The three Critical Mission Areas 19 2.4.1 Critical Infrastructures 21 2.4.2 Transportation Security 22 2.4.3 Border Security 28 3. The Space Dimension: Technical Possibilities and Limitations 29 3.1 Intelligence, Early Warning and Risk Management 29 3.2 The three Critical Mission Areas 33 3.2.1 Critical Infrastructures 33 3.2.2 Transportation Security 36 3.2.3 Border Security 44 3.3 Preparedness for Emergency Management 46 3.4 Comparative Matrix 47 4. Internal Security and Space – A Comprehensive Status Report 50 4.1 The Domestic Threat Assessment 52 4.2 Existing Documents and Strategies 53 4.3 The Current Institutional Set-Up 57 4.3.1 European Union Institutions 57 4.3.2 European Union Agencies 62 4.3.3 Other European Agencies and Institutions 65 4.4 Measures for Intelligence, Early Warning and Risk Management 66 4.5 Activities in the three Critical Mission Areas 71 4.5.1 Critical Infrastructures 71 4.5.2 Transportation Security 79 4.5.3 Border Security 98 4.6 Preparedness for Emergency Management 105 4.7 Comparative Matrix 112 European Space Policy Institute 3 Report 20, September 2009 5. Developing a Concept for the Provision of Internal Security with the Support of Space Applications in Europe 116 5.1 Intelligence, Early Warning and Risk Management 116 5.2 The three Critical Mission Areas 117 5.2.1 Critical Infrastructures 117 5.2.2 Transportation Security 118 5.2.3 Border Security 122 5.3 Preparedness for Emergency Management 122 6. Conclusions and Recommendations 125 6.1 Formulating a Common European Approach to Internal Security through an Internal Security Strategy 126 6.2 Issues of Governance and Organisation 128 6.3 The Role of Space in a Comprehensive Internal Security Strategy of the EU 131 Annex 135 I. Funding and Personnel 135 II. Projects and Satellites Related to the Provision of Internal Security in Europe 137 List of Acronyms 228 Report 20, September 2009 4 Space and Internal Security List of Figures Figure 1: From Environment to Security 16 Figure 2: From Security to Defence 16 Figure 3: From Defence to Military Operations 16 Figure 4: Three Phases of the Event Cycle 18 Figure 5: Critical Mission Areas 19 Figure 6: Overview of the Areas under Analysis 20 Figure 7: Maritime Security and the Three Pillars of the European Union 26 Figure 8: U.N. Security Council presentation by Colin Powell's 2003 30 Figure 9: A satellite image of Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility 31 Figure 10: Example of Risk Mapping for Floods 32 Figure 11: Risk map for unexploded bombs of World War II 32 Figure 12: Change Detection in Nuclear Power Plant 33 Figure 13: Satellite Imagery of a Refinery and Derived Map 34 Figure 14: Example of optical imagery capability 39 Figure 15: The same 220 m long ship imaged by SPOT-5 and RADARSAT Fine 39 Figure 16: The AIS overall architecture 42 Figure 17: Coastal Monitoring showing illegal migrants gathering for departure 45 Figure 18: Terrasar-X image showing vehicle movement 46 Figure 19 and Figure 20: X-Band SAR showing vessel structure and enabling identification 46 Figure 21: Comparative Matrix on the Technical Capabilities of Space Applications for Internal Security 50 Figure 22: EUSC's GEOINT Working Structure 68 Figure 23: Categories of Projects for Intelligence Gathering 69 Figure 24: ORCHESTRA, OASIS and WIN Contribution to the Disaster and Emergency Cycle 70 Figure 25: Categories of Projects for Critical Infrastructure Protection 74 Figure 26: Beginning as a VATDIS ACTION : Example of a GIS Analysis as a Basis for a Vulnerability Map 76 Figure 27: Categories of Projects for Land Transportation Security 89 Figure 28: Categories of Projects for Waterborne Transportation Security 92 Figure 29: Categories of Projects for Border Security 103 Figure 30: Categories of Projects for Emergency Management 108 Figure 31: Comparative Matrix on Projects and Services for the Provision of Internal Security 115 Figure 32: Matrix summarising the findings and needs for action 124 Figure 33: Matrix summarising action items for the different actors 134 European Space Policy Institute 5 Report 20, September 2009 Executive Summary In recent years several steps have been The Context for Space taken to increase the role of space in and Internal Security counter-terrorism and organised crime. In this regard the Space and Security Panel of Experts (SPASEC) in 2004 reviewed, inter Space applications for security are being alia, the role of space in meeting the increasingly recognised. The use of space for objectives of the fight against terrorism and internal security, understood to comprise the organised crime. Its subsequent Report handling of civilian threats and terrorism, (March 2005) for the first time considered the remains, however, neglected. There is a support space-based applications could general lack of awareness of the potential of provide to counter-terrorism operations. The space applications for internal security. three year long “Preparatory Action for Consequently, questions and challenges such Security Research (PASR)” (2004-2007) as the coordination of national and European addressed “protection against terrorism” as efforts, the optimum institutional set up, the one of five main areas. PASR’s main objective interface with defence related aspects of was the development of a full-fledged security and the most efficient procedures for European civil security research programme using space applications, still need to be to be implemented as part of the 7th clarified. The lack of a space dimension for Framework Programme for Research and internal security is particularly striking, given Technological Development (FP 7), the first that the European Security Strategy (ESS) EU research programme to include security. identifies organised crime and terrorism as The 6th Framework Programme for Research two of the five key threats Europe is facing. and Technological Development (FP 6) had already included space as one of the thematic In the post-Cold War era Europe’s security areas. The preparation of both PASR and the environment has changed. Large-scale FP 7 Security theme was supported by high military aggression against EU territory has level strategy groups: the Group of become unlikely while new threats such as Personalities (GoP) for Security Research and terrorism, illegal migration and organised the European Security Research Advisory crime have become the main sources of Board (ESRAB), whose strategic advice anxiety for both citizens and policy-makers. shaped the scope and implementation of Thus security is being re-defined moving these programmes. On the basis of the away from the classical security perception recommendations of the European Security that identified actor-focused threats to Research Advisory Board (ESRAB), the territory, towards “functional security” in European Security and Research Innovation which the new threats are mainly structural Forum (ESRIF) was established in 2007, threats that are not “actor/agency”-focused. mandated to propose by the end of 2009 a With the changed concept of security the European agenda for research and innovation borderline between defence and security is in the field of security capable of guiding becoming increasingly thinner and thinner. European institutions, governments and the The concept of “homeland security” is an private sector in the coming two decades. American concept largely unfamiliar to the Composed of eleven working groups, ESRIF Europeans. While U.S. “homeland security” considers, inter alia, security of citizens, has been driven by the counterterrorist infrastructure, borders and the role of space agenda, European efforts to protect society in relation to natural and man-made threats. have largely been derived from civilian In addition to these bodies, both Galileo and emergency response communities working GMES will contribute to the provision of with domestic law enforcement agencies. internal security. European level initiatives Thus the concept of “homeland security” are complemented by national ones. resonates mainly at the country level in Europe, while Europeans rather refer to “internal security” to encompass the full range of domestic security threats. Report 20, September 2009 6 Space and Internal Security • clarify corresponding questions and Methodology and Goals challenges such as (Chapter 4 & 5) of the Study o The coordination of national and European efforts Given the lack of any EU-level policy o The optimum institutional set up document setting out the strategy for the o The interface with defence related provision of internal security, the study aspects of security follows the analytical structure of the issues o The most efficient procedure for areas identified in the U.S.