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SAR Are to Be Included Project Number 06.08.04 D108 - Single Remote Tower - Safety Assessment Report Edition: 00.02.01 approval review 00.01.01 10th March 2014 Updated Update of section 1.3 clarifying version taking in which other project into account deliverables the results of this SJU review SAR are to be included. 00.01.02 12th October 2015 Updated Update of the list of safety version taking requirements to be in line with into account the latest version of the OSED. OSED update 00.01.03 08 February 2016 Updated Mostly editorial updates. Now version also reviewed by DFS and according to EUROCONTROL. SJU comments. 00.01.04 17th February 2016 Updated Update based on result from version other project activities, in including final particular VP-639 and VP-640. P06.08.04 activities 00.02.00 17th May 2016 Final Final Update 00.02.01 26th July 2016 Final Update considering SJU reservations IPR (foreground) This deliverable consists of SJU foreground. 2 of 149 ©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2016. Created by DFS for the SESAR Joint Undertaking within the frame of the SESAR Programme co-financed by the EU and EUROCONTROL. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly acknowledged Project Number 06.08.04 D108 - Single Remote Tower - Safety Assessment Report Edition: 00.02.01 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 7 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 8 1.1 BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 GENERAL APPROACH TO SAFETY ASSESSMENT ................................................................................... 8 1.2.1 A Broader approach ..................................................................................................................... 8 1.3 SCOPE OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................... 8 1.4 LAYOUT OF THE DOCUMENT ................................................................................................................... 9 1.5 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 10 1.6 ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................... 10 2 SAFETY SPECIFICATIONS AT THE OSED LEVEL .......................................................................... 11 2.1 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................. 11 2.2 SINGLE REMOTE TOWER - OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND KEY PROPERTIES ............................. 11 2.2.1 Airspace Structure, Boundaries and Types of Airspace ....................................................... 12 2.2.2 Airspace Users (Flight Rules), Traffic Levels and complexity ............................................. 12 2.2.3 Aerodrome Layout Characteristics .......................................................................................... 12 2.2.4 CNS Aids ..................................................................................................................................... 12 2.3 AIRSPACE USERS REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................................... 13 2.4 SAFETY CRITERIA ................................................................................................................................ 13 2.4.1 SAfety Criteria related to Mid-Air Collision in TMA ............................................................... 13 2.4.2 SAfety Criteria related to Controlled Flight Into Terrain........................................................ 13 2.4.3 SAfety Criteria related to Wake Vortex Induced Accidents .................................................. 14 2.4.4 SAfety Criteria related to Taxiway Collision ........................................................................... 14 2.4.5 SAfety Criteria related to Runway Collision ........................................................................... 14 2.4.6 SAfety Criteria related to “Landing accidents” ....................................................................... 14 2.5 RELEVANT PRE-EXISTING HAZARDS .................................................................................................... 15 2.6 MITIGATION OF THE PRE-EXISTING RISKS – NORMAL OPERATIONS ................................................... 16 2.6.1 Operational Services to Address the Pre-existing Hazards ................................................. 16 2.6.2 Derivation of Safety Objectives for Normal Operations ........................................................ 18 2.6.3 Analysis of the Concept for typical RVT position in a RTC .................................................. 22 2.7 SINGLE REMOTE TOWER OPERATIONS UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS ........................................... 23 2.7.1 Identification of Abnormal Conditions ..................................................................................... 23 2.7.2 Potential Mitigations of Abnormal Conditions ........................................................................ 23 2.8 MITIGATION OF SYSTEM-GENERATED RISKS (FAILURE APPROACH) ................................................... 25 2.8.1 Identification and Analysis of System-generated Hazards .................................................. 25 2.8.2 Derivation of Safety Objectives (integrity/reliability) .............................................................. 30 2.9 IMPACTS OF REMOTE TOWER OPERATIONS FOR A SINGLE AERODROME ON ADJACENT AIRSPACE OR ON NEIGHBOURING ATM SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................. 32 2.10 ACHIEVABILITY OF THE SAFETY CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 32 2.11 VALIDATION & VERIFICATION OF THE SAFETY SPECIFICATION ........................................................... 32 3 SAFE DESIGN AT SPR LEVEL .............................................................................................................. 33 3.1 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................. 33 3.2 THE SPR-LEVEL MODEL FOR SINGLE REMOTE TOWER ..................................................................... 34 3.2.1 Description of SPR-level Model ............................................................................................... 34 3.2.2 Task Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 39 3.2.3 Derivation of Safety Requirements (Functionality and Performance – success approach) 39 3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE SPR-LEVEL MODEL – NORMAL OPERATIONAL AND ABNORMAL CONDITIONS ...... 58 3.3.1 Scenarios for Normal Operations ............................................................................................ 59 3.3.2 Analysis of the SPR-level Model – Normal Operations ........................................................ 59 3.3.3 Scenarios for Abnormal Conditions ......................................................................................... 59 3.3.4 Thread Analysis of the SPR-level Model - Abnormal Conditions ........................................ 59 3.3.5 Effects on Safety Nets – Normal Operational and Abnormal Conditions .......................... 59 3 of 149 ©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2016. Created by DFS for the SESAR Joint Undertaking within the frame of the SESAR Programme co-financed by the EU and EUROCONTROL. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly acknowledged Project Number 06.08.04 D108 - Single Remote Tower - Safety Assessment Report Edition: 00.02.01 3.3.6 Dynamic Analysis of the SPR-level Model – Normal Operational and Abnormal Conditions ................................................................................................................................................... 60 3.3.7 Additional Safety Requirements (functionality and performance) – Normal Operational Conditions ................................................................................................................................................... 60 3.3.8 Additional Safety Requirements – Abnormal Operational Conditions ................................ 60 3.4 DESIGN ANALYSIS – CASE OF INTERNAL SYSTEM FAILURES .............................................................. 60 3.4.1 Causal Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 61 3.4.2 Safety Requirements concerning system failure conditions ................................................ 67 3.5 VALIDATION & VERIFICATION OF THE SAFE DESIGN AT SPR LEVEL .................................................. 71 APPENDIX A CONSOLIDATED LIST OF SAFETY OBJECTIVES ................................................... 72 A.1 SAFETY OBJECTIVES (FUNCTIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE) ............................................................. 72 A.2 SAFETY OBJECTIVES (INTEGRITY) ......................................................................................................
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