ARTIGO ARTICLE 51

The Dolly case, the Polly drug, and the morality of human

O caso Dolly, o fármaco Polly e a moralidade da clonagem humana

Fermin Roland Schramm 1

1 Departamento de Ciências Abstract The year 1996 witnessed the cloning of the lamb Dolly, based on the revolutionary so- Sociais, Escola Nacional matic cell (SCNT) technique, developed by researchers from the de Saúde Pública, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz. in , Scotland. This fact marked a relevant biotechnoscientific innovation, with proba- Rua Leopoldo Bulhões 1480, ble significant consequences in the field of public health, since in principle it allows for expand- Rio de Janeiro, RJ ing possibilities for the reproductive autonomy of infertile couples and carriers of diseases of mi- 21041-210, Brasil. tochondrial origin. This article expounds on 1) the experiment’s technical data and the theoreti- cal implications for the biological sciences; 2) the public’s perception thereof and the main inter- national documents aimed at the legal and moral regulation of the technique; and 3) the moral arguments for and against cloning, from the point of view of consequentialist moral theory. We conclude that in the current stage of the debate on the morality of cloning, in which there are no cogent deontological arguments either for or against, weighing the probability of risks and bene- fits is the only reasonable way of dealing with the issue in societies that consider themselves de- mocratic, pluralistic, and tolerant. Key words Genetic Engineering; Cloning; Reproductive Medicine; Bioethics

Resumo Em 1996, a ovelha Dolly foi clonada, valendo-se da técnica revolucionária do nuclear-transfer (SCNT), desenvolvida por pesquisadores escoceses do Roslin Institute de Edimburgo. Esse fato representa uma inovação biotecnocientífica relevante, com prováveis con- seqüências significativas no campo da saúde pública, pois permitirá, em princípio, ampliar as possibilidades da autonomia reprodutiva de casais inférteis e portadores de doenças de origem mitocondrial. Neste artigo, abordam-se 1) os dados técnicos do experimento e as implicações teóricas para as ciências biológicas; 2) a percepção pública no que se refere à clonagem e os prin- cipais documentos internacionais que visam a sua regulamentação jurídica e moral; 3) os argu- mentos morais pró e contra a clonagem, do ponto de vista da teoria moral conseqüencialista. Conclui-se que, no estágio atual do debate sobre a moralidade da clonagem, no qual não exis- tem argumentos deontológicos cogentes, nem a favor nem contra, a ponderação da probabili- dade de riscos e benefícios constitui a única maneira razoável de enfrentar a questão em so- ciedades que se pretendem democráticas, pluralistas e tolerantes. Palavras-chave Engenharia Genética; Clonagem; Saúde Reprodutiva; Bioética

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Dolly, Polly, and others as ‘identical twins’), born of a single oocyte fe- cundated by a single sperm cell, born in the On July 5, 1996, the lamb Dolly was born, a same uterine environment and which thus of the Finn Dorset breed, created from share not only the same nuclear DNA (like Dol- nuclear DNA from a differentiated adult cell ex- ly) but also the same mitochondrial DNA (al- tracted from the udder of a gravid ewe and in- though the role of the latter in vertebrate de- troduced into the previously enucleated oocyte velopment remains obscure) (Kitcher, 1997:59). of another ewe of the Blackface breed, thanks Dolly is also not the first man-made animal to a technique known as nuclear substitution clone, since clones have already been produced or somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), devel- with amphibians, fish, and since oped by the team of embryologist 1952 (Di Bernardino & McKinnell, 1997; Gur- at the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, Scotland don, 1997). But these cases involved the use of (Pennisi & Williams, 1997; Wilmut et al., 1997). the cell mass division technique, also known as Considering that Dolly resulted from the embryo splitting or blastomere separation, con- union of two individual cells, of which at least sisting of manipulating embryos in the first one is a sexual cell (the oocyte of the receptor stages of life. Embryo splitting was also used in ewe), strictly speaking Dolly cannot be consid- an experiment for cloning human embryos in ered a true clone (or an individual born of an- 1993 at George Washington University, by Jerry other individual through asexual reproduc- Hall and colleagues, with the purpose of help- tion), but rather a sui generis clone or a ‘later- ing infertile couples (the experiment was inter- born identical twin’ of the ewe that provided rupted by US government officials). The Roslin the nuclear DNA. researchers had already reported the birth (in However, both the mass media and the spe- March 1996) of Megan and Morag, using the cialized literature presented Dolly as a clone, same SCNT technique, but applied to adult given that: a) Dolly was born without undergo- embryonic cells (Campbell et al., 1996). ing the process known as reproduction by fe- Less than a year after the creation of Dolly, cundation, using male and female gametes; b) Wilmut and his team created the transgenic the researchers have ‘reprogrammed’ a differ- lamb Polly, combining animal and human ge- entiated (or specialized) adult cell, making it a netic material and utilizing the embryo split- . In this sense, Dolly involves the trans- ting technique. There are substantial differ- formation of the very concept of cloning; hence ences between the two experiments: a) Dolly we will consider her a ‘clone’ for the purposes has the same nuclear DNA as her older sister, of this discussion. while Polly contains part of the DNA from the If Wilmut’s experiment is confirmed, Dolly donor ewe and part from human DNA; b) Dolly will open up new possibilities for human repro- was ‘cloned’ from specialized adult cells, while duction and procreative autonomy, inevitably Polly was created from embryonic stem cells. implying a review of moral values consolidated However, one could also conceive of a continu- through a new consideration of risks and bene- um between the two experiments, since Polly fits for human well-being. is aimed at producing a line capable of supply- Since the first data on the experiment were ing milk containing -1-antitrypsin, a human published, Dolly has been the focus of various plasma protein used in the treatment of cystic types of speculation, including the moral con- fibrosis, thereby opening the way for the large- troversy between those affirming the intrinsic scale, low-cost production of other human pro- immorality of (presumed to be teins. In short, one can reasonably suppose contrary to human dignity and human rights, that the experiments at the Roslin Institute will and thus subject to prohibition under any cir- serve to facilitate and universalize the preven- cumstances) and those who favor its regulation tion and cure of various human diseases; trans- after weighing the potential risks to reproduc- genic cloning could also allow for creating a tive health and the benefits for procreative au- sufficient supply of organs for transplantation tonomy. in human beings, with lower rejection rates. In fact, Dolly is not the first animal clone in This interpretation appears to bear out if natura, nor the first produced by man, or even we think about the different public reactions to the ‘closest’ clone to the original. There are the two cases. Dolly caused a huge public com- clones that are genotypically much closer, motion, immediately becoming a ‘case’, while much more common in the plant kingdom, but Polly went virtually unnoticed and became a not uncommon in the animal kingdom, includ- banal fact. This difference in public perspective ing mammals, even in the human . Such appears paradoxical if we consider that Polly is the case of monozygotic twins (also known contains human genetic material, but this can

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probably be explained by the fact that the mass The biotechnoscientific relevance media focused mainly on the threatening side of the Dolly ‘fact’ of cloning with Dolly, while for Polly the thera- peutic potential prevailed, and I believe prop- From the biotechnoscientific point of view, and erly so (Schramm, 1997a). despite the fact that many questions remain The first doubts and criticism from the sci- unanswered, we suggest what the relevant as- entific community only came in January 1998, pects are, assuming that the results of the published in (Sgaramella & Zinder, Roslin Institute experiment will be confirmed. 1998). The critics based their attack on the ob- We will distinguish between the experiment’s servation that there were not ‘more Dollies’ practical (or technical) significance and its the- capable of confirming the ‘single observation’ oretical relevance and then analyze its implica- by Wilmut, and that clones of other tions for biosafety. species, promised for ‘very soon’, had still not appeared (at least publicly). Therefore, went Practical Significance the argument, there were serious reasons to doubt whether Dolly had actually been created If confirmed, SCNT allows to expand procre- in the terms reported by Wilmut or thus that ative techniques in mammals and improve hu- she represented a relevant and innovative sci- man reproductive health, without going through entific fact. Besides, Wilmut and his team were the standard fertilization procedures. For the believed to have committed a series of method- time being, the proportion of viable embryos ological errors: 1) the fact that they had not per- obtained from SCNT is very low (less than 1%), formed the genetic confirmation with the ‘fin- while “the factors determining the success or gerprint’ technique, relatively easy and which failure of the technique, and the long-term de- would have allowed to determine whether Dol- velopment of animals generated in this way, ly was a later-born twin from the donor ewe; still need to be established” (Kahn, 1997:119). 2) the fact that they had not utilized an adult However, it is assumed that SCNT will improve mammary cell, but rather a fetal cell supposed- human reproductive health by controlling the ly present in their cell culture, which could be transmission of genetic traits in women with explained by the fact that the donor ewe was serious diseases of mitochondrial origin (Wal- gravid at the time the cells were harvested. ters, 1997 apud Parens, 1997). In their rebuttal, Campbell, Colman and In short, Wilmut’s experiment included the Wilmut (Campbell et al., 1998: 636-637) recog- following stages: nized that “a single birth from 400 attempted 1) depriving a differentiated adult cell cul- fusions is not an efficient system”, but they only ture of its nutrients, reducing it to a state of admit a remote possibility of error, because at the quiescence (or dormancy), and depriving it of time of the experiment there was only one Finn the nucleus containing DNA; Dorset cell culture in the laboratory; thus, they 2) enucleating the oocyte from the receptor contend, “Dolly can only have been derived from ewe to receive the nucleus of the donor cell; the cell culture established from the mammary 3) fusing, using an electric charge (acting as gland”. Besides, given that this cell culture was a spark), the nucleus of the donor cell with the not planned for the nuclear transfer experiment, enucleated receptor cell; and but for other purposes, there was a valid reason 4) implanting the resulting embryo in the for not having analyzed the genotype of the cells uterus of a third pregnant ewe, which went on used for insemination and for not having kept the to give birth to Dolly. fetal material for subsequent ‘fingerprint’ analy- Wilmut and his team faced a huge challenge, sis. As for the absence of further Dollies, the au- given that before their experiment scientists thors also recalled that only eleven months had thought it was impossible to clone mammals transpired since publishing the first data, which from differentiated adult cells; they believed it was too short a time considering that five months was necessary to intervene in the embryo stem are required for this type of gestation, plus the cells, manipulating their nuclear DNA and run- time for writing up and publishing the results. ning a serious risk of damaging their structure. In order to clarify some terms in the debate, Technically, they thought it was necessary to dis- we will take an introductory approach to the cover the correct phase in which donor-cell DNA following aspects: I) the biotechnoscientific could be ‘grafted’ into a receptor cell without relevance of the Dolly ‘fact’; II) the public per- the DNA killing the cell or generating ‘chimeras’ ception of the Dolly ‘case’; III) the morality of (resulting from the fusion of two embryos). cloning in the context of the secularized and After many unsuccessful attempts (exactly pluralist societies of modern democracies. 277, according to the author), rather than in-

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sisting on attempting to combine the numer- competent to conserve their functional identi- ous DNA sequences at the right moment (an ty. Beginning with Dolly, one can contend that extremely complex and risky operation), Wilmut at least some types of adult cells (duly manipu- had an original idea: he treated the nucleus of lated) are functionally totipotent (Pennisi & the donor cell like a ‘black box’ and introduced Williams, 1997). In short, Dolly appears to prove it into the receptor oocyte. It worked, despite that there was a reprogramming (although we the fact that we still do not know the exact con- do not know exactly why) of the donor somatic ditions under which the experiment was per- cell, making it totipotent (Kahn, 1997). Thus, if formed, which will only become known when confirmed, the Roslin Institute experiment there are other experiments of the same type represents a significant biotechnoscientific (and probably after the patenting of SCNT). step towards new forms of conserving and re- producing genetic information. Theoretical significance Biosafety aspects From the theoretical point of view, the cloning of Dolly can be considered an important step, Yet Dolly involves a third important aspect, re- indeed a veritable revolution in the field of garding biosafety and legal implications, since biotechnosciences, creating new research per- she was the product of genetic manipulation spectives in both molecular biology and the and hence we can reasonably ask if she is not a theory of (Kahn, 1997), providing genetically modified organism (GMO). Indeed, new conceptual ‘tools’ for the following two- if Dolly were a GMO, she would be the object of pronged issue: specific regulation, considering that in many a) the degree of ‘functional plasticity’ of a countries experiments with GMOs are subject cell’s genome, prone to reprogram and invert to rigorous restrictions. Such is the case with its evolution and making it revert from the dif- the Brazilian Biosafety Act no. 8974 of January ferentiated stage to the stem cell stage; 5, 1995, the first article of which establishes b) the genome’s degree of ‘structural stabili- “safety norms and inspection mechanisms for ty’, capable of ensuring the cell’s and the organ- the use of genetic engineering techniques in con- ism’s identity during the evolutionary process. structing, culturing, manipulating, transport- The two issues constitute the two sides of ing, marketing, consuming, and disposing of ge- one and the same problem, that is, “Do growth, netically modified organisms (GMOs), aimed at differentiation and development of the embryo protecting the life and health of humankind, an- involve irreversible modifications to the genome imals, and plants, as well as the environment” in somatic cells?” (Stewart, 1997:769). (Brasil, 1995:5), further providing sanctions for Upon cloning Dolly from differentiated cells offenders. from an adult female individual, Wilmut and If we view genetic engineering in its nar- colleagues appear to have produced arguments rower sense of ‘recombinant DNA technology’, in favor of the thesis by which the genome of at the Dolly ‘clone’ cannot be considered a clear- least some types of cells (like mammary cells) cut product of genetic engineering, nor an or- do not undergo irreversible modifications dur- thodox GMO, since strictly speaking there was ing the evolutionary process, while the differ- no alteration in the sense of a ‘recombination’ entiated cell under given conditions (to be de- of different DNAs (as in the case of Polly). What termined) can revert to its initial stage of undif- happened was a manipulation in the sense of a ferentiation, thus functioning as a stem cell. transfer of a ‘closed package’ of DNA from a This is theoretically relevant since we knew that donor cell to a receptor cell, but without fusion the genome of other cells, like that of lympho- or recombination of different DNAs. However, cytes, for example, definitely undergoes recom- if we applied the same technique to humans, bination in given regions. we would run up against article 8 of the above- Before Dolly was created using SCNT, mentioned law, which prohibits genetic ma- cloning experiments using separation of cells nipulation of human germ cells in toto. from the blastomere (the embryonic stage with One could thus argue on the one hand that only 4 or 8 cells) appear to indicate that the the SCNT used to make Dolly does not involve DNA from such cells was not altered, while it ‘genetic manipulation of germ cells’, but that was supposed that the nuclear genetic code we can consider it a kind of manipulation, as was. On the contrary, the Dolly experiment ap- the experts did from the Brazilian National pears to have raised arguments in favor of the Commission on Biosafety (CTNBio), based on thesis according to which adult cells can main- a distinction between ontogenesis and func- tain their DNA unchanged, thereby remaining tion.

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Based on this interpretation, the CTNBio ture cloning will significantly affect the genetic stated the following: “a somatic in- structure of the human population, reducing troduced whole into an enucleated oocyte, al- its biodiversity. though giving rise to an embryo, cannot, from At this stage one might ask if Dolly is not a an ontogenetic point of view, be considered a predictable ‘artifact’, especially in light of a se- germ cell; [however] since the oocyte was enu- rious of traits in contemporary Western soci- cleated, and since the nucleus of another cell eties, such as: the simultaneously rational and was introduced into it to make the experiment operational structure of contemporary science, possible, this process constitutes (...) germ cell making it a technoscience (Hottois, 1990); its genetic manipulation” (CTNBio, 1997). evolution towards the ‘reprogramming’ of liv- In other words, from the ontogenetic point ing systems, making technoscience a biotechno- of view, the whole formed by the nucleus of the science (Schramm, 1996); the emergence of a differentiated donor cell and the enucleated re- consumer society marked by a ‘health culture ceptor oocyte perhaps cannot be considered a of desires’ (Pellegrino, 1979), which in some GMO, but from the functional point of view it cases means a veritable obsession with ‘perfect can, since there was genetic manipulation of health’ (Sfez, 1995). One could thus state that the germ cell, which in principle allows one to biotechnoscientific techniques like the cloning consider Dolly a GMO. This ‘hairsplitting’ in of Dolly are part of the very logic of the collec- the definition, although logically and semanti- tive imagination and of the means to satisfy the cally odd, has its reasons. In fact, the legisla- needs and desires of consumers. tor’s concern in this article aimed to avoid by All this helps explain why Dolly, besides all means possible that manipulation of and constituting a noteworthy biotechnoscientific interference in human genetic material be- fact, rapidly became a symbol for a possible come hereditary, passing the ‘manipulated’ and even probable transformation of the hu- characteristics on to the offspring. That is, it is man condition, despite Wilmut himself stating important to know whether Dolly is a GMO be- clearly that it would be out of the question to cause one of the main concerns of biosafety is clone human beings, since “it would be unethi- the possible health impact (i.e, the ‘hazardous- cal to attempt the experiment with people” ness’) resulting from the introduction of GMOs (Wilmut, 1997:4). into the environment, given it would reduce Yet it is through the possibility of affecting biodiversity and therefore the ability to resist this image that humans have of themselves pathogenic microorganisms. However, consid- and the potential for transforming so-called ering that SCNT is an incipient technology, it ‘human ’ (or the human ‘essence’) that will be necessary to ‘let the dust settle’ and wait the social controversy arises over the legality of for other scientists to repeat the experiment this new threshold achieved by biotechnosci- under the proper conditions and as often as entific know-how. deemed necessary in order to evaluate the probability of risks and benefits. What might be the spin-offs of cloning for Public perception: the ‘Dolly case’ humans? In principle, from the purely technical point After The Observer and The New York Times an- of view, cloning applied to humans is merely a nounced the birth of Dolly in their February 23 matter of time and investments in order to: and 24, 1997, issues, the news rapidly became 1) repeat Wilmut’s experiment as often as the ‘Dolly case’. Sci-fi stories about cloning necessary to confirm its feasibility for humans, soon appeared, along with analogies like those which is expected in one to ten years (Nature, published by Newsweek, comparing the likely 1997) and consequences of cloning with those of the nu- 2) lower costs and optimize the risk/bene- clear bomb or chemical weapons (Begley, 1997). fit relationship to make it feasible for health Other analogies, like those in Time, compared policies. Dolly to Frankenstein, with armies of drones, However, it appears unlikely that ‘cloning’ cloning factories producing spare parts, and in humans will become commonplace. It is dictators producing generations of clones of more likely that humans will continue to repro- themselves (Kluger, 1997). duce using the traditional method, which ap- In Brazil, the mass media announced the pears to be much more pleasurable. In other cloning of human beings, highlighting the pos- words, cloning should be viewed as an excep- sible violation of fundamental rights, which fed tional method, to be used when others fail. It fears of authoritarian eugenist policies and appears improbable that in the foreseeable fu- helped muddle the debate. The weekly Veja, for

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example, ran a story with the title The Dolly lief in the distinctiveness of each individual” revolution. It’s now possible to clone a human (Gould, 1997:14). being (Veja, 1997) and the weekly Istoé made This is why the ‘Dolly fact’ became the ‘Dol- matters worse by talking about a ‘people facto- ly case’, immediately mobilizing not only sci- ry’ and ‘duplicating human beings’ (Istoé, 1997). entists, philosophers, theologians, jurists, and On the other hand, the scientific awareness mag- politicians, but also the imagination of the azine Ciência Hoje published a balanced report public itself. of the facts and their biomedical and moral im- plications (Pena, 1997; Rumjanek, 1997; SBPC, The positions of the NBAC, the Vatican, 1997; Schramm, 1997b). WHO, UNESCO, and GAEIB Yet the reaction to cloning in the moral field was also essentially emotional and in many Particularly relevant official positions include cases irrational, fluctuating between pragmatic those of the President of the United States and approval (resulting from the hope of having the National Bioethics Advisory Commission found a new panacea for disease and organic (NBAC), the Vatican, WHO, UNESCO, and the dysfunction) and condemnation a priori. European Community’s Group of Advisers on In the United Kingdom, for example, the the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology consequentialist approach prevailed, while in (GAEIB), reacting tempestuously to the Dolly the United States the focus was more deonto- announcement. logical and religious. This type of reaction in The President of the United States immedi- the American imagination appears to contra- ately commissioned a report from the NBAC, dict that country’s pragmatist tradition, but it having 90 days to advise on the risks, benefits, makes sense when one recalls that “the ethical and ethical and legal implications of potential discussion of cloning, however, seems to have human cloning (The White House, 1997). He taken us back in time. And the customary pub- also imposed a moratorium on human cloning lic and media excitement over the latest ad- in public institutions, cutting off funds for both vances in medical technology was eclipsed by research and clinical applications, and request- talk of moral repugnance, evil, wrongness, ing that private institutions voluntarily adopt , and impermissible interventions” the same attitude (The White House, 1997). (Klotzko, 1997:430). In other words, the Amer- Clinton’s position may have been hasty, ican debate involved a sort of Cultural War, in considering the possible benefits of cloning which “the argument about Dolly saw two and the many doubts still surrounding it, relat- camps instantly formed – one was alarmed by ing for example to the role of mitochondrial the development and opposed to any further DNA in defining individual identity and the in- movement toward cloning humans; the other teraction with nuclear DNA; interactions with (seemingly much smaller) touted a potential genetic mutations and the function of telom- gain in health and more reproductive choice if ere length (which allows one to measure the re- cloning went forward” (Callahan, 1997a:24). spective age of the donor, receptor, and Dolly In other countries, like France, there was no herself). As stated by NBAC chairman Harold T. less emotional analysis of the pros and cons Shapiro himself, “several serious scientific un- for cloning, weighing, for example, the prob- certainties remain that could have a significant ability of risks and benefits, and the debate impact on the potential ability of this new tech- was left with petitions of principle, falling back nique to create human beings” (Shapiro, 1997: on the sophism that condemns cloning a pri- 195). ori because it is supposedly unacceptable, Prudence prevailed in the report by the with no more elaborate arguments (Taguieff, NBAC, which published its conclusions in June 1997). In short, and in general, the debate was 1997 after a broad consultation with experts left in a stage of polarization between the fol- from various fields (NBAC, 1997). Yet there was lowing: no lack of criticism for the report’s ‘ambiva- 1) ‘fascination’, resulting from both the new lence’ (Bilger, 1997:17), since the prohibition potential created by cloning for health and only impacted public institutions that depend- well-being and the ‘confrontation with immor- ed on federal funds, and not those using pri- tality’ that has accompanied human imagina- vate capital. The NBAC thus took the middle of tion since time immemorial (Mattei, 1997); the road by stating that “whether the use of this 2) ‘alarm’, probably resulting from humans’ new cloning technique to create children should fear of losing their identity and specificity, giv- be allowed or permanently banned is, for the en that “the aesthetic and ethical foundation of moment, an open question” (Shapiro, 1997:196). modern Western culture rests firmly on our be- In his introduction, Shapiro justifies this stance

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by underscoring both the scientific uncertain- would be wrong to do should be wrong to do” ties and the difficulties, on the one hand, in (Capron, 1997:176). deciding “if and when our liberties, including However, according to other researchers, the freedom of scientific inquiry, should be re- this ‘compromise’ is a de facto prohibition, with stricted” and on the other, in weighing the risks serious consequences in the legal and political and benefits of human cloning, including the field, given that it turns cloning into a veritable issue of individual identity, personal autono- ‘political football in Congress’ and ends up my, family ties, and intergenerational relations chilling an important field of research in public (Shapiro, 1997:195). institutions, delaying the development of safe This stance by the NBAC is understandable procedures (Wolf, 1997). considering that it had to ponder the plurality Neither was there consensus over religious of opinions for and against cloning in the dif- aspects, which are also discussed by the NBAC, ferent interest-based and moral communities since some theologians considered human in the United States. It thus proposed legisla- cloning intrinsically immoral, while others tion capable of allowing cloning of embryos for found it morally justified in some circum- research purposes in some cases and main- stances, so long as clearly regulated to prevent taining the prohibition in principle over hu- abuses (Shapiro, 1997). man cloning with regard to the use of embryos Meanwhile, the Vatican, through its official for procreative purposes. In other words, NBAC bulletin L’Osservatore Romano of February 26, experts suggested that scientists relying on pri- 1997, condemned cloning, stating that “in both vate funding be allowed to clone human em- scientific research and experiments there are bryos for research purposes, but that the use of limits that should not be transgressed from ei- such embryos for procreation be prohibited. ther the ethical point of view or that of nature” In addition, the NBAC proposed a sunset (Correio Braziliense, 1997:10) and requesting clause according to which the Congress should its interdiction by the various heads of govern- review its position after a trial period of three to ment. In addition to this deontological princi- five years, based on progress in research and ple, according to which it is always morally il- risk prevention. In the opinion of Callahan, “the licit to interfere with the wishes of the Creator idea of a sunset clause was the perfect via media, and the intrinsic finalism of natural processes, of a kind that commissions traditionally seek the Vatican drew on the consequentialist argu- when opinion is radically divided. In that re- ment known as the ‘slippery slope argument’, spect, it was a good political solution, attempt- according to which we should refrain from do- ing to balance a variety of values and interests” ing something due to the possible abuses it (Callahan, 1997b:18). According to NBAC mem- entails. ber Alexander M. Capron, prudence was justi- The WHO took another approach. Director fied because the issue of human cloning has to General Hiroshi Nakajima condemned the use do with one of most morally conflicting fields of human cloning as “ethically unacceptable as in bioethics: that of human reproduction, it would violate some of those basic principles such that cloning is “genuinely controversial” which govern medically assisted procreation. given that “the winds that roil these waters These include respect for the dignity of the hu- blow from the poles, with scientific and repro- man being and protection of the security of hu- ductive freedom at one pole, and sanctity of life man genetic material” (WHO, 1997a, apud Har- and traditional family values at the other” ris, 1997:354). Later, in its 50th General Assem- (Capron, 1997:173). Besides, by suggesting a bly, the WHO published a resolution stating temporary moratorium on human cloning, the that “the use of cloning for the replication of hu- NBAC also aimed to make a distinction be- man individuals is ethically unacceptable and tween cloning for human reproduction, or contrary to human integrity and morality” ‘making babies’, from cloning as research, that (WHO, 1997b, apud Harris, 1997:354). is, human cloning per se (the real object of the Unesco, in turn, concerned over preserving Commission’s moratorium), and cloning of different types of human endowments, de- other animals and plants. Both this distinction clared that human cloning should be banned and the legal stratagem of the sunset clause under any circumstances, given that “the hu- thus appear to suggest that the NBAC does not man genome must be preserved as the common intend to prohibit cloning in totum, since “just heritage of humanity” (Unesco, 1997, apud as it is a mistake to imply, as sometimes hap- Harris, 1997:354). pens in ethics discussions, that everything we Finally, the GAEIB published its comments have a right to do is right to do, so too it would on the consequences of cloning on May 28, be a mistake to say that everything we believe 1997, stressing the danger of instrumentalizing

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human beings, the risks of eugenist policies, fectly healthy’ (Sfez, 1995). The two positions and the reduction of genetic diversity, whence (which we have caricatured here for didactic “any attempt to produce a genetically identical purposes) can be equally harmful, since they human individual by nuclear substitution from stir up uncontrollable emotions and get what a human adult or child cell (‘reproductive now is and what can actually come to be (the cloning’) should be prohibited” (GAEIB, 1997: cloning of biological characteristics) mixed up 352). with what is not nor can come to be (the However, all these stances, although proba- cloning of individuality or personality). bly ‘politically correct’ (like that of the United States), do not hold water when submitted to a closer analysis. As stated by Daniel Callahan in The morality of human cloning referring to the NBAC report, “the present debate on cloning should by now have made perfectly Before directly approaching the morality of hu- clear an enormous shortcoming in bioethics”, man cloning, we need to make a few prelimi- given that “as a field (...) it simply has few help- nary remarks in order to demarcate the object ful tactics, insight, or even good provisional of our analysis. strategies, to respond to novel biological devel- First, controlled cloning of plants and ani- opments (...) But its political strengths betray its mals does not entail major moral conflict, as ethical weakness”, hence “the report is stronger long as it is considered necessary for human procedurally than substantively”(Callahan, well-being and as long as useless suffering of 1997b:18). animals is avoided (GAEIB, 1997). Obviously Harris, in turn, in analyzing the arguments there are pertinent objections to this position from the other documents, shows how they re- (like the ‘biocentric’ objections of given envi- mained within the sphere of petitions of prin- ronmentalist sectors and the ‘senticentric’ ob- ciple against cloning, the result of ‘instant re- jections of defenders of animal ‘rights’ or ‘in- actions’ and with inconsistently drafted argu- terests’), but strictly speaking these do not per- ments, concluding that “the objections to hu- tain to the field of bioethics, rather in fact to man cloning [are] less than plausible” (Harris, the fields of environmental ethics and animal 1997:358). Accepting the argument of the exis- ethics, which can be considered disciplines tence (in current liberal democratic societies) distinct from bioethics (Mori, 1994). of the right to ‘procreative autonomy’, that is, Second, the debate over cloning is not new, the “right to control their own role in procre- since it began in the 1960s, when human ation unless the state has a compelling reason cloning was proposed for the first time as “a for denying them that control” (Dworkin, 1993 scientific solution to preserving the endangered apud Harris, 1997:358), Harris contends that if species of humanity” (Campbell, 1997:15). we wish to live in such a society, “we should be Third, there is a semantic complicating fac- prepared to accept both some degree of offense tor, given that we are not always sufficiently and some social disadvantages as a price we clear about what is meant by the term ‘cloning’. should be willing to pay in order to protect free- In fact, we can mean different things by dom of choice in matter of procreation and per- ‘cloning’: haps this applies to cloning as much as to more 1) cloning per se, or the production of indi- straightforward or usual procreative prefer- viduals identical with an original through asex- ences” (Harris, 1997:359). ual reproduction, which is common in the Therefore, we should avoid both the feeling plant kingdom and which in principle pro- of alarm which demonizes the ‘Dolly fact’ and duces individuals with the same genetic en- predicts a somber, not-too-distant future, peo- dowment, but not necessarily, since some ge- pled with legions of enslaved human clones, netic mutation can occur during the process; programmed and organized in a kind of society 2) ‘cloning’ by SCNT, producing a later-born of ‘drones’, void of individual will and the feel- identical twin with the same nuclear DNA as ing of fascination, which enshrines the fact and the donor individual but without the same mi- contends that the precariousness and finitude tochondrial DNA; and of the human condition are on the verge of be- 3) ‘cloning’ by embryo splitting, producing ing overcome forever thanks to a new bio-an- genetically identical monozygotic twins, but thropo-social order, consisting of individuals resulting from the recombination of the genet- belonging to a species better adapted to a ic endowment of male and female gametes. world in rapid transformation with healthier Case 1) will not be approached here be- physical and psychological characteristics and cause cloning per se does not refer to human more desirable skills, to the point of being ‘per- cloning (at least for the time being). The dis-

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tinction between 2) and 3), on the contrary, is telligent being, capable of reasoning and reflect- important for the inference of an individual’s ing, who can consider himself the same, (...) identity based on existing data and is pertinent who thinks in different times and places” (Leib- to moral analysis. In fact, in ‘cloning’ by SCNT niz, 1980:176), or “who is aware of the numeri- we have a ‘clone’ whose identity can be in- cal identity of himself in different times” (Kant, ferred a priori (that is, ‘vertically’) based on the 1989:341), or still, “not implying any assertion genotypical identity of the clonable individual, concerning a supposed non-mutant nucleus known previously, while in ‘cloning’ by embryo [and] implying a form of permanence in time splitting we have an individual whose genetic that is not reducible to the determination of a identity cannot be inferred (‘vertically’) based substrate” (Ricoeur, 1991:13; 143). In short, ip- on information available a priori, but only de- seity refers to the distinctive characteristics of termined ‘horizontally’, i.e., analyzing the the individual as such, the fact that the individ- genotype of another genotypical twin. ual is him/herself, distinct from all others (La- If we now consider the argument contrary lande, 1972:257) and in the case of humans, to cloning, based on the right to an unmanipu- awareness of this ‘selfhood’. lated genetic endowment (i.e., non-repro- This logical distinction is indispensable for grammed a priori), as a necessary condition for a proper moral analysis of human cloning. In- respect for individual autonomy, we note that deed, an individual cloned by SCNT in princi- the moral controversy can only pertain to ple has the same genotype (i.e, the same nu- ‘clones’ obtained by SCNT, since nobody would clear DNA) as the cloning individual, and the reasonably think of morally condemning the two can (presumably) be identical from the bi- situation of monozygotic twins. In other words, ological point of view. However, they will never the moral controversy in this case can only per- have the same ipseity, given that they are dis- tain to cloned individuals implying indistinc- tinct individuals with different experiences; tion between cloning individuals and cloned hence, even at best, cloning can only produce individuals. generically identical individuals, reproducing their biological identity but never their person- Identity and ipseity in cloning al identity. But let us suppose, no matter how absurd it The above remarks lead us to logically distin- sounds, that it would be possible to make bio- guish between the two senses of the word iden- logical identity and personal identity coincide. tity: 1) identity as ‘identity’ (from the Latin In this case, we should postulate a highly im- idem, ‘same’, ‘identical’) or ‘sameness’, under- probable synergism of numerous identical and stood as a property of one being belonging to a shared conditions, resulting from the same same class of beings possessing the same char- type of experiences, the same type of environ- acteristics (for example, the class of individuals ment, and thus the fact of spatially and tempo- from the species Homo sapiens sapiens); 2) rally coinciding with one’s other self. In the identity as ‘ipseity’ (from the Latin ipse, ‘self’) case of real objects, this coincidence is physi- or ‘selfhood’, understood as the property that cally and logically impossible, since “we never only one given being possesses in his/her/its find nor could we ever conceive that it would be unicity (for example, ‘So-and-so’). In other possible for two things of the same kind to exist words, if we apply this logical distinction to hu- at the same time in the same place” (Leibniz, man beings, we can use the term ‘sameness’ to 1980:172). In other words, in order for two indi- indicate the point of view that considers any viduals to have the same ipseity we should con- human being as belonging to the species Homo ceive of a paradoxical situation which would sapiens sapiens because he/she possesses all make myself coincide with my other self, which those (and only those) characteristics that de- is logically impossible and practically un- fine the class of beings in question. Meanwhile, achievable, given that the clone should occupy the term ‘selfhood’ refers to the point of view the same space at the same moment (which is considering the human individual not as a physically impossible), while its identity should member of the class of human beings, but as a coincide with its ipseity, confusing itself with its particular individual (or, as it were, as a mem- other self, which is contrary to the premise dis- ber of the class that only contains that mem- tinguishing between ‘identity’ and ‘ipseity’. ber) and who thus possesses reflexiveness, in Summing up, identity and ipseity cannot be the double sense of ‘knowing how to reflect’ confused, and human clones can in principle and being able ‘to refer to one’s self’. In other be identical from the point of view of all the words, in the latter case we have a ‘unique’ be- physical characteristics, genetically deter- ing, that is, a person, who is “a thinking and in- mined, while they distinguish themselves from

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each other by the fact that they do not occupy of health and especially for reproductive health the same space/time; the fact that they do not and procreative autonomy. have exactly the same life experiences and can Among the consequentialist arguments make a distinction between one’s self and the against cloning, a prime example is the ‘slip- other. In other words, if we confuse biological pery slope argument’, according to which some- and personal identity, we commit both a ‘logi- thing should not be done because of its possi- cal abuse’ (confusion between identity and ip- ble abuses. But this argument is not pertinent, seity) and a ‘biological reductionism’. However, since abuses are always possible, even with reductionism is not uncommon, since there natural substances and products and tech- are frequent affirmations relating to the genet- niques created with the best of intentions. In ic origin of both organic characteristics and fact the slippery slope argument does not hold dysfunctions as well as character traits, atti- water anthropologically; we would not have tudes, qualities, and personal preferences. In emerged from the pre-hominid stage, since we fact, the clone of a ‘scientist father’ can very would have virtually nothing of what has pro- well be an ‘autistic son’ (Dimenstein, 1997). In vided us with a better quality of life. short, an individual’s personal identity de- Finally, we need to know not only what is pends on biological characteristics, important meant by ‘human cloning’, but also what its ob- for the image individual has of him/herself and jectives are: (1) to clone a genetically compati- for others; still, the cultural and social milieu, ble individual in order to save another? For ex- as well as experience, make this individual re- ample, to clone a brother to donate bone mar- shape the biological patterns that contribute to row, a kidney, or a liver? (2) to clone embryos to the formation of his/her personality. expand a woman’s procreative autonomy, al- lowing her to have healthy children, without Are there arguments in favor diseases of mitochondrial origin, for example? of human cloning? (3) to clone individuals with given characteris- tics, like greater physical fitness for sports con- To begin, one should state that “the ethical im- tests, or greater resistance to environmental plications of cloning balance on a fine line” adversities and diseases? (4) to clone individu- (Kitcher, 1997:58), given that the technologies als in the name of the collective interest or the are still full of uncertainties regarding risks welfare of a community or society? and benefits (as the NBAC report emphasized Such examples raise different degrees of nicely). morality. The first (1 and 2) do not appear to Next, the current debate on the morality of raise substantive moral objections, at least from cloning (as well as other problems in bioethics) a utilitarian-consequentialist point of view; should be seen as a difference between points number (3) is controversial, but perhaps ten- of view as to what is considered good and evil, able in some cases; and (4) is clearly unaccept- that is, as a “difference between moral princi- able in a liberal democracy, where in principle ples” (Stich, 1989:229). Thus, different princi- there is respect for individual rights. ples imply different moral theories providing Indeed, in example (1), the cloning of a us with different pertinent arguments for the new, genetically compatible individual makes analysis. it possible to save the sibling’s life, with no The arguments for and against cloning are harm to the clone (in the case of bone barrow generally of two types: deontological and con- or a segment of liver, both of which regener- sequentialist, each with its own logic. The for- ate), or with limited harm in the case of a kid- mer essentially says that something is good or ney. In both cases the pertinent moral argu- bad in itself (because it is morally repugnant, ment is that the benefit is greater than the against religious dictates, etc.); the latter con- damage. Still, one could reasonably object that tend that something is good or bad depending the loss of a kidney is significant, even when it on its consequences. This paper does not focus benefits a sibling: after all, no one should give on deontological arguments, rather only con- up a part of his/her body to benefit another in- sequentialist ones, since we believe that in a dividual and only does so out of pure benevo- secularized world with a plurality of legitimate lence, which would certainly be welcome, but moral (and oftentimes incommensurable) con- not mandatory. In addition, to raise one child cepts, only consequentialist arguments (if with predetermined characteristics in order to properly argued) can be the object of a rational benefit another runs against the principle of consensus and thus of a contract. This is valid respect for individual autonomy and the right a fortiori when one analyzes the morality of to defend one’s interests insofar as they do not cloning in light of the potentialities for the field jeopardize those of others, given that the

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clone’s right to chose what he/she wants out of and reducing illness and increasing well-being life would not be ensured. In this case, the ar- for more humans. guments in favor of cloning will bring other Suppose further that this ability to resist factors into play, like affection, altruism, and mortal viruses and other adverse situations is other ‘virtues’, which may be desirable but not the result of nature’s lottery or natural se- which can never be imposed reasonably. How- lection themselves, but the result of human in- ever, it is important to note that this type of terference, and that this resistance could liter- sacrifice may soon become obsolete thanks to ally come to be ‘built’ on the basis of transgenic the subsequent development of cloning tech- modification. This second case is no different nology itself, producing organs rather than in- (mutatis mutandi) from the first, and the type dividuals, which will eliminate the moral ob- of moral analysis is practically the same, since jection. both involve knowing whether or not it is What is at stake in example (2) is the en- morally licit to intervene in normal, natural hancement of the woman’s reproductive health, processes that are ‘predicted’ or which ‘hap- and more precisely, her procreative autonomy, pen’ during evolution. since a woman who wishes to have a healthy The issue is obviously controversial and child will be able to choose the most adequate complex. First, because due to the probable procreative method for her specific situation. evolution of cloning technology itself, it will Morally, this case does not appear to be differ- probably not be necessary to clone individuals, ent from assisted fertilization, a commonplace but only organs and tissues, which can very practice in many countries today, given that well be grown in laboratories and administered the right to one’s own health and that of one’s through equitable health policies. One will also children is a right recognized by contemporary be able to use genetic therapy, intervening in democratic culture, including the WHO. somatic cells (to cure damage) in an individual, Example (3) seems more controversial. To and if the absence of significant risks is proven, understand this controversial side, let us take acting on germ cells (to prevent damage) that an example. Suppose that during the evolution will transmit the ‘resistance’ to future genera- of the species Homo sapiens sapiens, an indi- tions. Regarding this point, one could ask if this vidual emerges with given genetic characteris- type of intervention is not a form of eugenics, tics, proven to be responsible for a reduction in aimed at improving the ‘human race’. It is, but the “probability of threats” (Luhmann, 1996:73), so is any attempt to improve the human i.e., a greater resistance (or lesser susceptibili- ‘species’(in fact, individuals), employing other ty) to given dysfunctions or diseases, like mor- means, like education (in all its variants), eat- tal viruses; or to adverse environmental condi- ing, life styles, etc., to which nobody raises rea- tions, like pollution, radioactivity, ionization, sonable objections, except for the individual etc. In part, this already occurs naturally in the right to choose one’s way of life, which as we process of natural selection thanks to genetic know is conditioned in thousands of ways. An- variability. But in this specific case, one could other apparently relevant argument refers to reasonably ask if it would not be morally licit to the risk that cloning might decrease biodiversi- preserve this characteristic rather than let ty and thus increase vulnerability, given that it things run their ‘natural’ course through the could in principle make all human individuals lottery of natural selection, which would only genetically identical and thus threaten hu- favor carriers of the protective characteristic. mankind with if a new organism ap- The pertinence of this question emerges if we pears against which it is not protected. All consider that nature itself does not always do these objections are pertinent, since they refer what is best for man, i.e., that “before the ap- to potential risks, but they are based on the pearance of man, evolution (including the evo- premise that cloning, rather than serving as a lution of life) had been a highly threatening therapeutic or preventive medium to be used process in itself” (Luhmann, 1996:73), which in cases of actual need or legitimate wishes, could explain the emergence of technique and will become a fad, or even worse, a means to do culture as indispensable factors for human sur- harm, and that cloning would reduce biodiver- vival. In this sense, the respective characteris- sity, which remains to be demonstrated and tic can be considered (in principle) a good, about which there are serious doubts. both for the carrier of the resistant trait and for In short, we are still quite ignorant as to the other individuals who might come to benefit effects that human clones might have on the from it. And if it is a good, its preservation sociocultural life of an entire population, not through cloning can be justified reasonably, to mention the identity-related psychological thereby making this good available to others problems clones might experience due to the

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great social expectations surrounding them, Conclusion which could very well mean a restriction of their freedom and thus contradict the very pur- The cloning of human beings, organs, and tis- pose of greater individual autonomy. But the sues requires much research and forecasting crucial point in this case is the principle of re- on its possible developments in health and hu- sponsibility exercised by individuals who should man terms. In this sense, in the current stage of practice their roles as citizens and struggle to our knowledge, it is worthwhile to recommend reduce the probability of abuses. healthy prudence, including preservation of Another argument against cloning con- the existing biodiversity, resulting from sexual demns the mere instrumentalization of a hu- reproduction. But in specific cases, one could man individual (see the GAEIB), inscribed in well suppose that scientific and cultural ‘diver- the Kantian imperative according to which sity’ itself (like that resulting from the cloning “man, and in general all rational beings, exist of the resistant characteristics quoted in our as an end in themselves, not as a means for example) might come to join, complement, some use according to this or that will; [and and improve existing biodiversity. should] therefore always be considered an end The moral analysis of cloning, in turn, rests at the same time” (Kant, undated:78). Such on two questions: 1) are there good reasons to would be the case of human individuals pro- apply cloning to human beings, such as health duced to serve as mere organ and tissue banks, reasons, regardless of whether or not cloning which obviously is morally unacceptable, just appears intuitively repulsive? 2) what types of as the above-mentioned example (4) would be reasons might these be, and what is their de- unacceptable. That is, in case human clones gree of cogency? actually existed, they would also be persons In fact, the pars destruens of arguments and could thus not be used as mere means to against cloning is an easier task than the pars serve third parties. However, we should also construens (Callahan, 1997b; Harris, 1997), point out that a certain degree of instrumental- since we still have no clear, elaborate ethical ization tends to be a part of any interpersonal position in favor of it, but mere deconstruction relationship, especially between parents and of arguments to the contrary. However, in order children, teachers and pupils, and employers to begin to construct this missing theory, one and employees. should take due notice of the right to procreative There is also the possibility of intentionally autonomy, consisting of people’s right “to con- creating decerebrate human clones, who would trol their own role in procreation unless the state thus not be properly human and would not has a compelling reason for denying them that suffer any pain. But this case is still in the realm control” (Dworkin, 1993 apud Harris, 1997:358), of science fiction, and albeit intuitively repug- which would justify reproduction by cloning nant, it would depend on advances in our for therapeutic ends, and the moral principle knowledge and trends in the morality of future cited by Harris according to which “it is better to generations. do some good than to do no good” (Harris, 1997: Summing up, the risks are obviously many, 355). In short, “In the absence of compelling ar- and we would say proportional to the benefits, guments against human cloning, we can bid but this does not prevent one from beginning Dolly a cautious ‘hello’”(Harris, 1997:359). to ask if there might not be good reasons for In conclusion, integrating the natural sphere the cloning of given human traits, as long as through the cultural sphere, we are merely con- one proves their need for the improvement of tinuing on our path to hominization, which de- quality of life for human individuals and popu- pends upon (amongst other things) biotechno- lations, respecting the dialectic of prima facie scientitic competence and cloning of character- principles of beneficence and non-maleficence istics that may become imperative for the very (which have been the foundation of ‘correct’ survival of the human species and its conquests, health intervention since Hippocrates), respect including the survival of the freedom to decide for autonomy and free, informed consent, jus- on the most adequate forms of reproduction. In tice, and others which may come to be needed this case, cloning would not target immortality, in order to live well. which would only be possible outside the realm of time, since as Emile Marie Cioran suggests, “having fallen into time due to ignorance, we were simultaneously provided with a destiny, be- cause destiny only exists outside of paradise.” (Cioran, 1964:12).

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