Honors Program Information Has Honors? Yes Participated? No Nature of Honors Involvement or Reasoning for Not Participating I did not pursue an honors degree due to the fact that I accepted the role of First Captain, or Brigade Commander, at West Point. As the First Captain, I am the highest-ranking cadet at West Point and responsible for the physical, military, and character development of 4,452 cadets. The nature of this role means that I frequently travel across the country to attend conferences, speak at events, and interact with world leaders. While at West Point, my time is frequently taken up planning events, attending meetings, and serving as a liaison between cadets and senior leadership. Although I originally intended to pursue an honors degree, I recognized that I would not be able to satisfactorily fulfill my duties as the First Captain if I added the additional academic requirement.
Research or Creative Endeavors Participated In For my senior capstone, I am working on a “soft” systems engineering problem focused on recruiting and retaining more women in African militaries. With mentorship from UN Military Gender Advisers and US Army Africa (AFRICOM) Operations Research Analysts, my team developed a system dynamics model which captures the causal relationship between different factors affecting the propensity of women to achieve meaningful participation in the military (meaningful participation defined as reach the rank of Major or higher). Through understanding the quantitative relationship between variables such as sexual assault laws, restrictive cultural norms, the distance of female medical infrastructure to military bases, and physical entry requirements —as well as their cumulative effect on the propensity of women to both join and remain in the military— the model allows for novel policy ideas to be tested. While the research is ongoing, our team has used the model to conduct a thorough analysis of the Kenyan Defense Force and provide policy recommendations to increase the number of female officers . US Army AFRICOM has already expressed interest in beginning to allocate resources aimed at removing institutional barriers like mandatory height requirements, procuring maternity uniforms, building women’s health clinics, and creating a targeted marketing campaign focused on recruiting women with children, which stands to produce the largest increase ever in female recruitment and retention.
Academic Recognitions and Awards -Winner, Rhodes Scholarship and Schwarzman Scholarship -Finalist, Marshall Scholarship and Fulbright Scholarship -Award, Phi Kappa Phi Distinguished Cadet and Honor Society Inductee (2019): Top 1% of class in academics -Award, Superintendent's Award for Excellence and Distinguished Cadet (2017-2020): Top 5% of class and 3.67 average in academic, military, and physical pillars -Award, Dean's Pentathlete (2019, 2020): Achieved a 4.0 and no less than an A- in all graded academic, military, and physical events -Award, George C. Marshall Leadership Excellence Award (2018): Selected as 1 of 275 cadets out of 20,000 ROTC/USMA cadets to be recognized for leadership excellence -Award, 2018 Cadet Leadership Training Best Rising Junior (2018): Best cadet in 200-person company for 3-week training exercise -Award, Brigadier General Lee Donne Olvey Award for Excellence in Economics (2018) -Award, Edwin Meese Award for Excellence in American Politics (2018) -Award (3x), Top Gun for MA103, PL100, EM381 (2017, 2018): Received best overall grade of any cadet in 3 different courses during an academic term: Psychology for Leaders (1250 cadets), Math Modeling (800 cadets), and Engineering Economics (100 cadets) -Award, Master of the Sword (2019-2020): Physical program score greater than 3.6677/4.00 -Award, Top ROTC Cadet at University of Florida (2016): Ranked 1/31 out of freshman ROTC cadets
Undergraduate and Community Activity and Leadership On Campus
Page 2 of 4 4/27/2020 8:59:43AM -Brigade Commander, United States Corps of Cadets (August 2019-Present): Led numerous efforts including revision of the cadet military evaluation system to align with the conventional US Army, acquisition of $200k worth of fitness equipment in anticipation of new Army physical fitness test, alignment of West Point’s sexual assault and sexual harassment policies with conventional Army , and revitalization of West Point’s Respect Committee focused on increased officer mentorship (30 hours a week). -Regimental Command Sergeant Major, Cadet Field Training (Summer 2019): Served as the second-highest-ranking cadet leading 1,400 cadets for 6-week field training focused on infantry tactics (120 hours a week). -Squad Leader, United States Naval Academy (Fall 2018): Led 12 Naval Academy midshipmen as a member of the Naval Academy Exchange Program (20 hours a week). -US Army Special Forces Survival (SERE) School (Summer 2018): Led 12 Special Forces soldiers during 3-week long school focused on survival and interrogation techniques, culminating in 7-day event involving physical exploitation and starvation (120 hours a week). -West Point's Black and Gold CrossFit team (2017-Present): (12 hours a week). -US Army Airborne School (Summer 2017): (90 hours a week). -Military Skills Competition Team (2017): Trained to compete in 48-hour competition against military teams from over 20 different countries (12 hours a week). -West Point Crew Team (2016): Men's Heavyweight (15 hours a week).
In the Community
-Leadership, Diversity, and Ethics Conferences (August 2019-Present): Conference speaker and small group leader for West Point's diversity and outreach conferences throughout the US (4 hours per week).
-West Point Out Reach (2018-2020): Led and organized countless outreach programs for the United States Military Academy including Tunnels to Towers 5k Run in NYC, Walk-a-mile-in-her-Shoes Program to Stop Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment, Habitat for Humanity, Boy-Scouts Jamboree, Sexual Assault Stand Down Day, Mental Health Awareness Month, and more (2 hours per week).
-Academy Ambassador (2019-2020): Served as a pseudo-ambassador to the United States Military Academy hosting distinguished guests such as: UN Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, President Donald Trump, Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, LTG Cavoli of US Army Europe, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and more (5 hours per week).
Graduate Study Prospects Did Take Grad Test: No These tests were not required for the scholarships that I applied for. Graduate Admissions Test: Scores and/or Percentiles:
Graduate Study Plans First Choice University of Oxford Oxford, UK Reason For Selection I have been accepted to Oxford's MPhil in International Relations, MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy program, and Master of Public Policy program. I intend to pursue the Global Governance and Diplomacy degree year one and Public Policy degree year two. This institution was selected due to its affiliation with the Rhodes Trust .
I will benefit greatly from the broad curriculum and diverse background of students at Oxford. In the Global Governance and Diplomacy program, I will gain a better understanding of the framework of the international system and the practice of global governance. By studying topics such as globalization, I can begin to understand the challenges associated with future conflict and the role that institutions like NATO or the UN will play. Through courses such as Diplomacy and International Law, I will seek a better understanding of the conditions necessary for states to be held accountable for their actions and the barriers to this accountability—something increasingly important in the age of international rivalries and challenged national borders. Lectures from renowned expert John Gledhill on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding will expose me to the art of negotiation and ensure I confront preconceived notions on the merit of US nation-building missions in the Middle East and beyond.
With resources from Rhodes House and Oxford, I intend to write a thesis focusing on the expanding role of military diplomacy in US foreign policy. Application Status: Accepted
Page 3 of 4 4/27/2020 8:59:43AM Second Choice
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Personal Statement A lifelong lover of mathematics and no fan of ambiguity, I am the archetypal algorithmic thinker. I take comfort in equations and modeling--simple systems taking well-defined inputs to create certain outputs. Simplicity has also characterized much of my life. The combination of high average income and a noticeably homogeneous population in my small town outside of Annapolis ensured that I lived carefree. Although raised by two Dutch immigrants who espoused compassion for others, there was little impetus to strive to understand diverse backgrounds or experiences. My algorithm for success remained unassuming--work hard in school, be respectful to others, and make it to college.
Standing at the podium preparing to give opening remarks to the 4,400 students and 1,000 staff and faculty members at the Sexual Harassment and Assault Stand Down Day this fall, I remembered these previous conversations. I spoke of my own guilt and inaction while witnessing sexual harassment at the University of Florida, and I stood in solidarity next to my classmate after calling her forward to tell the story of her own rape. Emails, texts, and words of praise from cadets of diverse backgrounds and genders highlighted a positive change in the narrative of sexual harassment and assault prevention. A better output due to the introduction of a new input —vulnerability. Not so simple.
Work Sample Rationale This work sample was selected because the course it was completed for was the impetus for my interest in pursuing a graduate degree in social sciences and competing for the Rhodes Scholarship. The assignment was to select a country in Africa that was ranked in the bottom 20% of the Fragile State Index and develop reforms and initiatives to increase political and economic stability.
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The lasting, negative effects of colonization on the continent of Africa cannot be understated. To this day, no single country in Africa has been able to completely overcome the legacy of racial discrimination, economic exploitation, and political volatility imparted by European colonists. Somalia is no exception. Somalia gained independence in the early 1960s after Britain and Italy formally withdrew from Somalia, allowing for the proclamation of an independent state.1 A brief, multi-party democracy followed with the government of Somalia based largely on the political model of Italy.2 This trend, however, was shattered by a coup d’état which installed a military regime that completely eradicated the constitution, legislative branch, and any trace of democratic political activity.3 A civil war beginning in 1988 between competing clans in the region only further decimated any remains of infrastructure and resulted in the deaths of over 350,000 people.4 The country’s most recent election in 2017, the first in over 50 years, represents the nation’s strides towards reestablishing peace and prosperity.5 However, Somalia’s ranking of 1 out of 178 on the Fragile State Index indicates the country still is still far from becoming a fully functioning state.6 In order to bring security and stability to Somalia, the state must first reform its government to reflect its nomadic clan culture, and, once completed, continue to curb terrorism, revitalize economic initiatives and ties with other nations, build infrastructure, and establish government provided services. Years of violent conflict, political instability, and corruption in Somalia has left the country with limited infrastructure and economic resources. Somalia’s current GDP is a mere $18.66 billion, ranking the country at 153rd in the world and resulting in a per capita GDP far below the $9,000 threshold needed for a stable democracy.7 The country’s GDP is comprised primarily of agriculture and services, with the majority of economic activity occurring in Somalia’s informal economy.8 The inability of the government to regulate this sector of the economy and levy effective taxes has caused Somalia’s debt to rise to over 75% of its GDP and contributes to the country’s inability to provide services for its people.9 Today, Somalia is the third largest contributor of refugees worldwide and the ever looming possibility of famine and violence continues to prompt Somalis to seek asylum abroad.10 Unlike other African countries whose tribulations can largely be attributed to a resource curse in which the country’s large number of resources results in the cyclical establishment of kleptocratic governments, Somalia’s misfortune results largely from a lack of resources and competition between the clans for them. Through establishing a legitimate government, steps can be taken to provide for the millions of desperate people in the country. Somalia is currently structured as federal parliamentary republic in which the president is indirectly elected by the Federal Parliament by two-thirds majority vote—using two rounds if
1 "The World Factbook Africa: Somalia," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified November 15, 2018. 2 Paolo Tripodi, "Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence," The International Journal of African Historical Studies 32, no. 2/3 (1999): 359. 3 Ahmed I Samatar, The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994), 120. 4 Ibid, 3. 5 Yasin Ismail, "Somalia's Clan Politics," World Policy, last modified March 13, 2018. 6 "Fragile States 2016," Foreign Policy, accessed November 18, 2018. 7 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” 8 “Ibid.” 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. Van de Wall 2
necessary—for a single 4-year term.11 The Upper House consists of 54 senators indirectly elected by state assemblies, and the lower house, the House of the People, has 275 seats with members indirectly elected by regional delegates.12 While this democratic structure may appear to be sufficient to allow for the promotion of democracy, it fails to account for the nomadic clan culture of the country. It has been estimated that today nearly 70% of the Somali population are still nomads or at least have nomadic affiliation.13 This poses a unique problem in that “a hierarchical pattern of authority is foreign to pastoral Somali society which in its customary process of decision making is democratic almost to the point of anarchy.”14 As in many other African countries, Somalia’s Italian roots prompted Somalia to establish a form of democracy greatly resembling that of its colonizer.15 Unfortunately, this western-style of democracy is inadequately equipped to deal with the culture and history of Somalia and has continuously led Somalia’s politics to become a zero-sum game in which the clan that gains control of the government uses its power to extract economic resources for its own people.16 It is this type of clan conflict that escalated to a devastating civil war in the 1990s which left 350,000 people dead.17 Until the government of Somalia begins to reflect the culture of its people and reforms to mitigate future conflict, the people of Somalia will not adopt the principles of democracy or reap its benefits. One of the first steps in reforming Somalia’s government is to ensure that the government’s structure reflects the numerous clans which make up the country. Somalia’s current power-sharing structure uses a 4.5 system in which the four main clans in Somalia are given equal shares of power and the remaining smaller clans, called the Fifth clan, receive a smaller 0.5 stake.18 The role of clans in controlling business transactions, mediating conflicts, and making decisions in all aspects of Somali life means that the 4.5 system has alienated a large section of the population by not allowing all clans to give input to the government.19 Because the use of a plurality system would likely incite the same winner-take-all system which led to Somalia’s civil war in the 1990s, unlimited party formation with an electoral threshold for representation appears to be the best solution to the problem.20 The current 4.5 system prevents clans outside of the main four from coming into power, but the allowance of unlimited party formation will give each clan an opportunity to gain support for its initiatives. Similar to how proportional representation forces parties to work together to create coalitions to achieve majorities, the smaller clans who are unable to reach the electoral threshold for representation will then have to work together to gain seats in the parliament.21 Reforming Somalia’s
11 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” 12 Ibid. 13 Mary Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong?: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State (African Arguments) (London, UK: Zed Books, 2012), 22. 14 Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong?, 22. 15 Tripodi, “Back to the Horn: Italian Administration”, 359. 16 Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh, "Somalia after state collapse: Chaos or improvement?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67, no. 3-4 (September 2008): 668. 17 Samatar, “The Somali Challenge”, 3. 18 Ismali, “Somalia’s Clan Politics.” 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ismali, “Somalia’s Clan Politics.” Van de Wall 3
representation system will promote cooperation between clans, stimulate political participation, and, most importantly, bolster the perceived legitimacy of the government. As in many African countries, corruption has plagued Somalia throughout its history. Somalia’s struggles with drought, famine, and civil war has made corruption more than just a means of increasing wealth through the siphoning of resources—it is a means of survival. As Somalia continues to reform and develop economically, combating corruption will need to be at the forefront of its efforts. Establishing a strong judicial system, in combination with anti- corruption laws which force government employees to be transparent regarding governing decisions, can help to increase accountability in government. Currently Somalia’s judiciary system is very weak, with most regions using Islamic Sharia law to solve conflicts.22 While this traditional form of mitigation needs to be respected, federal courts must be strengthened to keep the federal government in check. Somalia’s Constitutional Court and Appeal Courts—now virtually non-existent—needs to be revitalized, with an increase in wages for judges, lifetime appointments to the bench, and an increase in the judiciary budget for the procurement of resources such as legal clerks.23 Only through shaping the judiciary system in a way that provides the courts the resources needed to act and the incentive to remain dedicated to the rule of law can the enduring cycles of corruption be ended. Somalia’s recent history has been plagued with famine, drought, and economic hardship. Providing food, water, and other necessities to Somali citizens needs to be at the forefront of any government initiatives. Somalia’s GDP is currently based predominantly on agriculture, with 32% of exports stemming from sheep and goats, 14% from bovine products, and the other 18% from gold.24 The main problems associated with the agricultural aspects of the economy is inefficiency and the reliance on outdated nomadic pastoralist practices. Agrarian reform needs to be drastic, with initiatives not only focusing on irrigation techniques to mitigate the effects of droughts but also land reform and the implementation of advanced farming techniques. One possible model of land reform that can be utilized is the mediated-state model, where the government provides autonomy to local regions to redistribute land, and the clan elders and local leaders make the final decision.25 Through funds from the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Somalia, which provides $80m yearly for economic development, Somalia must also allocate funds towards bring agricultural practices into the 21st century.26 It is important to note that the long-standing tradition of pastoralism needs to be respected. Any institutions and initiatives that are developed to focus on these issues should not be entirely state controlled but instead funded by the state and made up of locals with expertise in agriculture. This will ensure to not alienate a population already weary of centralized government. After attempting to mitigate inefficiencies with domestic agrarian practices, Somalia must also begin to develop its vast oil reserves. A seismic survey by a Canadian oil company found
22 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” 23 Ibid. 24 "Somalia (SOM) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners," OEC: The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed November 18, 2018. 25 Ken Menkhaus, "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping," International Security 31, no. 3 (2007): 78. 26 "World Bank Group's First Strategy for Somalia to Support Inclusive Growth and Resilience," World Bank, last modified September 25, 2018. Van de Wall 4
up to 4bn barrels of oil off the coast of Somalia.27 The discovery raises obvious concerns regarding the ability of the Somali government to broker fair and efficient deals regarding the use of the resource. While nationalizing the oil is likely an unfavorable move, specifically due to Somalia’s history with kleptocracy and the lack of structure in place, the use of service contracts may ensure maximum benefits for the country. In order to maximize the benefits of the oil, Somalia should seek assistance from international organizations in both brokering the deal and establishing a system to disperse the benefits. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is an organization aimed at addressing the failure of many states in transforming natural resources into sustainable development and prosperity.28 While the use of negotiators from Somalia itself will be valuable in safeguarding Somali interests, the unfamiliarity of the government with these sorts of negotiations means that the country must seek assistance. Once an agreement is established, the most important step becomes encouraging transparency and guaranteeing that the profits from the oil reserves are transferred back to the people of Somalia. Another initiative, called Publish What You Pay (PWYP), needs to be utilized. This organization assists in disclosing payments made by large corporations to the governments.29 By remaining completely transparent during the process of creating oil revenues for the country, the Somali government can continue to increase their levels of legitimacy and ensure wide-spread benefit of the resources. Coupled with a proper plan to disperse the oil revenue to the federal, state, and local levels through options such as direct payments of cash or food to citizens, the country will begin to benefit greatly from its resources.
*NOTE: This is an excerpt of a longer academic essay produced for a Comparative Politics course. The assignment was to select a country in Africa that was ranked in the bottom 20% of the Fragile State Index and develop reforms and initiatives to increase political and economic stability. The remainder of the paper focused on ways to reduce the influence of terrorist organizations, rebuild the education and healthcare system, and solve territory disputes in Somalia.
27 "Somalia Oil Exploration: Drilling begins in Puntland," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News, last modified January 17, 2012. 28 Ibid, 114. 29 “Maximizing the Benefits from Africa’s Oil”, 118. Van de Wall 5
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