China’s “Client State”? China-Burma Relations and Burma’s Human Security in a Regional Context

by

Katherine Lindsay Suplick

SIS Honors Capstone

Supervised by

Professors Linda Lubrano and Pek Koon Heng

Submitted to the School of International Service American University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with University Honors in International Studies Bachelor of Arts Degree

May 2009

Abstract

What is the nature of China’s relationship with Burma, and how does this dynamic affect Burma’s human security? In this context, why has Burma’s human security remained low for decades, and how can it be strengthened? The International

Society and human security paradigms employed in unison provide the multi-faceted framework necessary to determine the complexity of this relationship and its implications for Burma’s citizens. The normative project utilizes qualitative, interpretive analysis, including in-depth interviews from the Thailand-Burma border, to ascertain the multi- dimensionality of China and Burma’s ties and their regional context. This analysis necessarily includes the degree to which the interests of other regional actors affect

China-Burma relations. Current Asian and U.S. strategies to address Burma’s repressive regime have not been successful, which in turn perpetuate transnational security problems.

As a result, the capstone explores new ways in which collaborative regional action can increase human security levels in Burma.

2 Table of Contents

1. International Society and Human Security 4 a. Research Agenda b. Literature Review c. Research Design

2. Burma: Background 15 a. Human Security b. Sanctions c. Analysis

3. Burma – China Relations 29 a. Realism: Strategic Security b. Analysis

4. Burma: Regional Geopolitical Context 35 a. ASEAN b. India c. Analysis

5. Policy Analysis and Recommendations 44

3 1. International Society and Human Security

a. Research Agenda

“How is Burma’s human security framed by China and other regional actors, and why has the situation remained stagnant since 1988? In this context, how can Burma’s human security be strengthened? These questions will allow me to ascertain the economic, political, social, and militaristic extent of the China-Burma relationship and how much these ties directly and indirectly affect the Burmese people. I will complement that analysis with an assessment of the roles played by India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the U.S. sanctions policy and how they impact

Burma’s human security. The qualitative, interpretive analysis of these complex relationships will help explain why the Burmese people have continuously suffered for the last 21 years, and will provide possible policy alternatives to achieve the normative goal of improving Burmese livelihoods. 1

I will utilize the International Society and human security theoretical paradigms to tie my research together. 2 The International Society school of thought represents a middle ground between traditional liberalism and realism and rejects positivist approaches to analyze the complexity of international relations in dynamic contexts. Due to the theory’s inclusiveness, it will help interpret connections between the multiple domestic and international forces that simultaneously shape Burma’s human security.

For example, it will account for both the regional stability issues usually explained by

1 The military junta renamed the country Myanmar in 1989 and the UN currently refers to the nation as Myanmar. However, out of respect to the nation’s democracy advocates’ request, I will refer to the country as Burma throughout the capstone. 2 When referencing the International Society theoretical framework, I will capitalize the phrase, whereas when discussing the idea of an international society I will use lower case. I will not capitalize “human security” since this is still a developing theoretical framework. This, also, is not to be mistaken with the idea of human security.

4 realism and the collaborative nature of these relationships oftentimes defined by liberalism. On the other hand, the human security school of thought is an emerging normative concept that prioritizes the well-being of the individual over traditional realist conceptions of state power, and maintains that governments are responsible for safeguarding their people. It also emphasizes the transnational nature of security issues and their international ramifications, which are essential components in an increasingly globalized world. Sustainable development, not only in the environmental realm, but also economically, politically, socially, and culturally, plays an important role in strengthening human security. International Society will serve as the bedrock of analysis, combining traditional interpretive lenses to formulate innovative explanations for

Burma’s situation, and the human security framework will serve to “update” these propositions. In other words, human security studies will contextualize these analyses in our modern, interconnected society.

Since the 1988 protests for democracy, the Burmese people’s security has at best remained the same and at worst dramatically decreased. 3 Despite regional and

international reform initiatives, Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC), has obstinately opposed implementing policies to improve its citizens’

standard of living. As a result of Burma’s history, its prime location, and its natural

resources, many regional actors are stakeholders in Burma’s development. Unfortunately,

for actors that engage the junta, such as China, India, and ASEAN, human rights

concerns are usually superseded by economic and strategic policies that oftentimes

perpetuate human insecurity in Burma. In addition, Western sanctions policies,

3 Indeed, their human security has been low for decades, especially since the military coup of 1962. However, the dynamic has changed since the 1988 events, so I will begin my analysis at this point.

5 epitomized by those of the U.S., while morally laudable have also failed to affect real change in Burma. By utilizing the International Society and human security frameworks

I will analyze these competing forces and search for feasible solutions that could increase the security of the Burmese people.

Along with this qualitative, interpretive analysis, I will incorporate information from interviews of numerous local, state, and international NGOs conducted on the

Thailand-Burma border. Their field experience and advocacy on behalf of the Burmese people will add subjective, yet pragmatic points of view that will complement and enhance my theoretical analysis. These qualitative components will work in tandem with one another to explain the impasse of Burma’s human security situation and to explore policy alternatives that could improve the lives of the Burmese people.

b. Literature Review

To place this research in context, it is important to review the basic tenets of the

International Society and human security approaches that I will use to evaluate Burma’s current human security situation and to formulate possible future policy alternatives.

This will not only involve assessing Burmese human development indicators, but will also include analyzing China, India, and ASEAN’s role in shaping Burma’s situation as well as the effects of U.S. sanctions. Once this context has been established, I will determine what, if any, feasible policy alternatives would increase Burma’s human security. The challenging, normative nature of this research is necessary from a practical and humanitarian perspective – reform in Burma would contribute to regional stabilization, which would benefit all parties involved and would directly help the

Burmese people. Researchers have not yet scrutinized Burma’s complex situation using

6 these theoretical frameworks, and therefore have not explored all possible political solutions to the human security dilemma. My research will attempt to fill this gap.

According to Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, the International Society tradition is a highly normative, historical, and holistic approach to international relations that focuses on individuals and their interactions. Core values like independence and security play central roles in this interpretation, as well as the conception of an

‘anarchical society.’ In this framework, international relations revolve around a ‘society’ of sovereign states, but policy makers take into account rules, norms, and institutions when crafting foreign policy. The International Society school espouses a traditionalist approach, which means that it is “human-focused, interpretive, normative, and historical- concrete” in nature, as opposed to “structured, explanatory, positive, and analytical- abstract” advocated by behavioralism. 4

The International Society paradigm dates back to Hedley Bull’s work in the 1960s and 1970s. Bull claimed that neither anarchy nor a Hobbesian state of war were in and of themselves sufficient to understand International Relations. The society of states should not necessarily be governed by domestic institutions and norms, but rather by distinct and innovative institutions and ideas that are suited to address the unique problems of the community. Society as an organizational framework does not necessarily indicate stable inter-state relations, but is helpful when assessing the role of common institutions in ameliorating or proliferating conflicts. 5 As Bull puts it, “Whether or not there is

consensus. . .depends not simply on the number or intensity of conflicts, but on what

4 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, International Relations: Theories and Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 129 – 131. 5 Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Hedley Bull on International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 4 – 5.

7 these conflicts are about, and whether they are conducted in a framework of agreed rules.” 6 Power, particularly balance of power, is an essential component of Bull’s propositions, without which a viable international society cannot exist. 7 This

characteristic is rooted in classical realism.

The International Society school of thought includes different perceptions of

inter-state relations. Martin Wight classifies these as realism, rationalism, and

revolutionism. The first is classical, Machiavellian Realism, which deals with the

relative power of states. 8 More specifically, according to other realist scholars, like

Hobbes and Morgenthau, international society simply does not exist – states act alone and in their own interests. Another strand of realism, however, validates the concept of an international society to the extent that only the great powers shape it (as manifested in the

UN Security Council). 9 Rationalism comes from Grotius and most closely follows the

International Society framework, since its proponents emphasize an anarchic world community brought together by institutions and traditions. 10 There is an international

society, but it lacks a strong institutional base, for which the centrality of traditions

partially compensates. Rationalists argue that, if customs fail to govern the international

society, force follows. A partial contract, or one that emphasizes the power of sovereign

states but sometimes limits their actions for the greater good, provides the foundation for

6 As quoted in Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Hedley Bull on International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 4. 7 Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Hedley Bull on International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 5. 8 Sam Roggeveen, “Towards a Liberal Theory of International Relations,” Center for Immigration Studies, http://www.cis.org.au/policy/aut2001/polaut01-6.pdf (accessed April 15, 2009), 29 – 30. 9 Martin Wight, International Theory (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992), 30 – 37. 10 Sam Roggeveen, “Towards a Liberal Theory of International Relations,” Center for Immigration Studies, http://www.cis.org.au/policy/aut2001/polaut01-6.pdf (accessed April 15, 2009), 31.

8 rationalism. 11 Neoliberal institutionalism falls into this category, since it emphasizes not only the sovereignty of states but also their potential for cooperation. 12 Revolutionism is

grounded in normative principles. 13 Scholars that subscribe to this school believe that

international society is in fact a global state, so nations either adopt the same norms, one

entity imposes uniform policies on all of them, or people themselves constitute

international relations as opposed to states. 14 Wight simplifies each perspective’s view

on international society: realists believe, “It is not a society, rather an arena,” rationalists

posit that, “It is a society but different from the state,” and revolutionists claim that, “It is

a state (or ought to be).” 15 Overall, although rationalism most closely follows the

International Society tradition, scholars must also take into account realism and revolutionism in order to find a middle ground in international relations theory. 16

Not only must scholars consider these three perspectives when utilizing the

International Society theoretical framework, but they also must evaluate world events based on the aforementioned principles of order and justice. Jackson and Sorensen break down these concepts into “order in social life, international order, world order,” and

“human justice, interstate justice, and world justice.” 17 Theorists use these ideas to

determine the responsibilities of state leaders, which are primarily driven by national

security concerns (adhering to the realist side of International Society studies) along with

the maintenance of international peace, both of which fulfill nations’ roles as members in

11 Martin Wight, International Theory (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992), 37 – 40. 12 The IR Theory Knowledge Base, “IR Paradigms, Approaches, and Theories: Neoliberal Institutionalism,” The IR Theory Website, http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm (accessed April 15, 2009). 13 Sam Roggeveen, “Towards a Liberal Theory of International Relations,” Center for Immigration Studies, http://www.cis.org.au/policy/aut2001/polaut01-6.pdf (accessed April 15, 2009), 30. 14 Martin Wight, International Theory (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992), 40 – 46. 15 Ibid., 48. 16 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, International Relations: Theories and Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 135. 17 Ibid., 145.

9 the international society. As part of the dominant normative aspect of this analysis, there is a humanitarian obligation inherent in these roles, which most closely parallels the revolutionist perspective. 18 Based on these main tenets, the International Society school

of thought is a complex, all-encompassing paradigm that can help shed light on numerous

inter and intra-state conflicts, and I will use these scholars’ works to analyze the inter-

dependent components of Burma’s security situation.

Human security is an even more recent international relations analytical lens, and

also focuses on people. Its foundation was laid in the United Nations Development

Programme’s (UNDP’s) 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), which established

human security as a quality of life that entails freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Human security analysis focuses on the state of individual’s economic, food, health,

environmental, personal, community and political security. These problems are seen as

global and interdependent. 19 Scholars have extrapolated these tenets into an increasingly viable international relations theory. Pauline Kerr writes that it presents an alternative to the traditional realist paradigm in which state security is prioritized over that of individuals, and that it is an extension of classical liberalism since it emphasizes international cooperation and development and is normative in nature. The theory is useful in that it addresses the transnational nature of conflicts, a characteristic that is notoriously absent from realist thought. Kerr identifies the narrow and broad schools of human security studies, in which the former focuses only on “freedom from fear” or violent threats. The latter addresses both freedom from fear and freedom from want.

18 Ibid., 145 – 148. 19 United Nations’ Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 , http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf, 22 – 40 (accessed 27 October 2008).

10 In addition, Kerr describes the controversies surrounding if and when

humanitarian intervention should take place, questions that have serious implications for

state sovereignty. 20 These discrepancies invite criticisms that the theory lacks focus, but

Kerr develops a theoretical model that addresses these inconsistencies, in which she

identifies the narrow school as a dependent variable and the broad school as an

independent variable. In this model, developmental insecurity can lead to political

violence, and vice versa, which helps take into account the interdependency and

connections implicit in globalization. 21 Finally, she argues that the human security

paradigm can complement realism when it comes to analyzing security threats, since such

a combination includes both individual and traditional state security concerns. 22 I will

take into consideration both the narrow and broad schools of human security studies

when conducting my analysis.

As implied, it is important to consider critiques of the human security approach

when using it as an interpretive lens. In his article “Revisioning Human Security in

Southeast Asia,” Mely Anthony-Caballero stipulates that human security is not as broad

as the UNDP claims, and instead focuses on two aspects of the report: “. . .safety from

chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression” and “. . .protection from sudden

and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in

communities.” 23 He also points out that many countries interpret the framework differently, which results in contrasting practical applications of human security

20 Pauline Kerr, “Human Security,” in Contemporary Security Studies , ed. Alan Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96 – 98. 21 Ibid., 98 – 100. 22 Ibid., 101 – 102. 23 United Nations’ Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 , http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf, 22 – 40 (accessed 27 October 2008), 23, quoted in Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective 28 (2004): 168.

11 principles. For example, ASEAN disagrees with the concept of political security to the extent that it justifies intervention in another state’s “internal affairs,” an observation that helps to explain why more regional actions have not been taken to address the SPDC’s human rights violations. 24 Pauline Ewan also advocates for narrowing the human security field to effectively address firmly established developmental concerns. 25

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy agree that clearly defining the

human security paradigm is problematic, given the emerging struggles between the broad

and narrow schools of thought. They also point out that it is challenging to effectively

link together the three different conceptual areas of development, human rights, and

security studies since scholars have hitherto treated them as distinct fields of study. What

follows is potential miscommunication between scholars and policy makers – should

practical steps be taken to address humanitarian concerns before theorists fine-tune the

human security school of thought? Tadjbakshs and Chenoy argue that human security

analysis must reconcile normative and positivist approaches to be both theoretically

sound and pragmatically relevant. They conclude, though, that the approach’s

individually focused foundation is solid and useful at its core, and that researchers should

utilize its present all-inclusive nature to further explore its ideas in the context of

evolving, dynamic insecurity situations around the world. 26 Although scholars are still

developing the human security paradigm, I will use its humanitarian focus to assess

Burma’s human security situation and its relationship to transnational security issues.

24 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective 28 (2004): 168 – 171. 25 Pauline Ewan, “Deepening the Human Security Debate: Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification,” Politics 27 (October 2007): 182 – 189. 26 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and Implications . (New York: Routledge, 2007), 69 – 71.

12 The International Society and human security theoretical frameworks will help explain the competing domestic, regional, and international forces that shape Burma’s human security. Accurately gauging Burma’s human security level is necessary to evaluate the nature and extent of the problem and lays the foundation for a normative analysis. The realist component of the International Society tradition elucidates the power competitions between China, India, and ASEAN. The framework’s liberal aspect explains ASEAN’s attempts at cooperation and the goals of U.S. sanctions. By using these theories in tandem, I will determine why Burma’s human security situation has remained the same since 1988 and will attempt to craft alternative solutions that could improve the Burmese quality of life.

c. Research Design

I will conduct the research for this policy analysis project by utilizing interpretive qualitative analysis to study the national, regional, and international factors that shape

Burma’s human security. This information will help determine feasible regional and international policy alternatives that China, India, ASEAN, and the United States should employ to lessen the suffering of the Burmese people. In order to accurately research and analyze this dilemma, I will clearly define the International Society and human security theoretical frameworks. I will then study the Burmese people’s human security experience: what crucial components comprise their human security, and how do other states’ policies shape them? To adequately analyze these concepts, I will utilize existing theoretical scholarship and will include information from interviews conducted along the

Thailand-Burma border.

13 It is essential to operationalize human security in order to effectively measure its levels in Burma and the way in which international actors shape it. I will use comprehensive human rights reports, incarceration and torture rates of innocent civilians and per capita GDP, among other sources of information, to measure the various levels of human security throughout Burma. A lack of human security will be primarily defined as a worsening of Burma’s human rights situation and increasing economic insecurity of its people. However, I will also include other indicators, such as infectious diseases rates, since the broad school of human security studies necessitates this holistic approach.

The scholarly literature will provide the foundation for this project and connect all of its components. The International Society paradigm’s emphasis on the convergence of realism and liberalism, combined with its historical and normative aspects, will contextualize the international community’s policies towards Burma and their corresponding interactions with one another. Human security analysis as a continuation of International Society’s person-centric approach will account for the transnational threats that Burma’s situation creates in an increasingly interconnected world. The use of both analytical lenses will provide a rationale for policy change that could increase

Burma’s human security, as well as contribute to regional stabilization. This approach will tie the scholarship to the data in a clear, articulate manner.

To guide my research, I will first discuss the major events in Burma’s recent history, illustrating how the nation’s human security levels have reached their current status. 27 These components will set the stage for a more in-depth discussion of Burmese

precise human security profiles. The effects of U.S. sanctions policy on Burma’s human

security will follow. This information will provide the foundation for discussing Burma-

27 As noted earlier, the human rights analysis will focus on events from 1988 through the present.

14 China relations in depth, including China’s economic stake in Burma based on neoliberal policies and its strategic security considerations. Establishing China’s ties to Burma will segue into analyzing Burma’s regional geopolitical context, in terms of ASEAN’s attempted neoliberal institutionalism and India’s role in shaping Burma’s human security.

I will provide policy analysis and recommendations based on these findings.

My research tools will not only consist of the aforementioned sources, but will also include further theoretical analyses and policy documents. I will research statistical trends, current country reports, ASEAN publications and NGO findings in order to gain a sufficient breadth and depth of knowledge regarding the relationship between Burma and

China. I will interpret literature on ASEAN and India’s relationships with Burma, as well as a history of U.S. sanctions policy and assessments of their effectiveness to accurately characterize these actors’ affects on Burma’s situation. On a more personal level, I will interview NGO members that work in and around Burma. This qualitative research will help expose how and why international actors affect Burma’s human security. By utilizing this collective framework, I will be able to achieve my ultimate goal of crafting feasible policy alternatives that would strengthen the human security of the Burmese people.

2. Burma: Background

The area now called Burma has been inhabited by a variety of ethnic peoples with distinct, rich cultures since 1044 AD. It was colonized by the British in 1885, but, led by

General Aung San, Burma gained independence in 1948. Although he was killed by a rival faction shortly thereafter, the constitutional period in Burma lasted from 1948 –

1962, in which the country was led by an unstable democratic government. This

15 uncertainty paved the way for General Ne Win’s successful military coup in 1962. Ne

Win repudiated the constitution and instituted an isolationist and economically devastating policy called, “The Burmese Road to Socialism.”

In March 1988, students began protesting these repressive policies, a movement that built in strength and reached its climax on August 8, 1988, in which the military murdered more than 1,000 protesters. After the crackdown, General Aung San’s daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, became the political leader of the opposition. As a result of these events, the military overthrew Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) in September 1988 and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).

SLORC members wasted no time in massacring another 3,000 demonstrators and placing

Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest in an effort to quell dissent. They surprisingly held free and fair multi-party elections in 1990 in anticipation of a SLORC victory. Aung San

Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won 81% of the seats in Parliament, results that were promptly dismissed by the military, who instead incarcerated hundreds of political activists.

In 1997, the SLORC became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but has been consistent in its treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political dissidents. 28 To make matters worse, on August 15, 2007, the SPDC suspended fuel

subsidies, and prices increased by 500% in less than 24 hours, leading to higher food and

commodity prices. On August 19, Burmese monks began protesting in what was to be

called the Saffron Revolution (due to the saffron hue of the monks’ robes). 29 The

28 U.S. Department of State, “Burma: History,” United States Government, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm#history (accessed February 23, 2009). 29 U.S. Campaign for Burma, “Saffron Revolution,” http://uscampaignforburma.org/learn-about- burma/saffron-revolution (accessed February 23, 2009).

16 Revolution escalated through September and led to the massacre of over 30 monks and activists (estimated), coupled with the torture and imprisonment of thousands more.

One year later, in February 2008, the SPDC finished drafting a new constitution and decided to hold a referendum in May, with subsequent elections in 2010. This

“constitutional” process began in 1993, and the junta labeled it a “roadmap to democracy.” However, throughout the drafting process, opposition parties were either not consulted or boycotted the meetings due to the junta’s refusal to allow constructive debate. 30 In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Burma, killing an estimated 63,000 –

101,000, and affecting 2.4 million individuals overall. 31 The SPDC appallingly refused

to allow international aid to enter Burma for several weeks after the cyclone hit, and only

fully opened up access to the affected areas in late July 2008. 32 Less than a week after

the devastation, the junta held the constitutional referendum, which apparently passed by

92.5%, with a 98% participation rate. However, the international community dubbed the

election a sham. 33

30 U.S. Department of State, “Burma: Government and Political Conditions,” United States Government, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm#political (accessed February 23, 2009). 31 U.S. Agency for International Development, Burma – Cyclone , Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DHCA), Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), (Washington, DC, 2008), http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/burma/template/fs_s r/fy2008/burma_cy_fs25_07-30-2008.pdf (accessed February 24, 2009). 32 Haroon Sidique and agencies, “Cyclone Nargis Cost Burma $4bn, Says UN Report,” The Guardian UK , July 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/21/cyclonenargis.burma (accessed February 24, 2009). 33 U.S. Department of State, “Burma: History,” United States Government, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm#history (accessed February 23, 2009).

17 a. Human Security

As a result of these policies, human insecurity is a massive, widespread problem

in Burma. The SPDC’s national security agenda focuses on maintaining state unity,

solidarity and sovereignty, and it utilizes mass propaganda to achieve these objectives.

The junta lists four main elements of the “People’s Desire”:

1. Oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding negative views 2. Oppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress of the nation 3. Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State 4. Crushing all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy 34

The SPDC’s current plan to achieve these objectives is to use the newly ratified constitution, which calls for elections in 2010. However, many observers believe that this will merely serve as a formality to further entrench the junta’s power.

Burmese scholar Tin Maung Maung Than describes the development and security

goals of the junta within the context of the human security framework. Than identifies

four key characteristics comprising all strands of human security: it is individualized, it is

broad and comprehensive in scope, it is interdependent, and it encourages preventative

action. In contrast, the national security strategy of the SPDC is very realist in nature. It

is focused on the state, its main concerns are national sovereignty, territorial integrity and

state-wide unity, and national security is equated with regime security. The military junta

has focused on combating supposed domestic, not transnational, challenges such as

ethnic conflict.

34 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity , ed. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 172.

18 Therefore, it is not surprising that human security principles and the SPDC’s objectives have clashed at numerous levels. Than uses the seven dimensions outlined by the UNDP to assess Burma’s human security situation. Economic security in Burma presents numerous problems such as inflation, stagnant incomes, and minimal jobs. For instance, in September 2005, the Burmese kyat to U.S. dollar official exchange rate was

6.42 kyat (K6.42) to $1, but the market exchange rate was K1,365 to $1. 35 These

inflation problems are further compounded by the country’s GDP growth (or lack of it).

The junta claims that GDP has increased by 10% every year since FY 1999 – 2000, but

their statistics are woefully unreliable. The IMF, for example, approximated that the

2007 growth rate was 5.5% and had projected 4% – 5% growth for 2008 before Cyclone

Nargis struck. 36 Incomes are nowhere near sufficient to make up for this loss, neither in the public nor the private sectors. One blatant manifestation of these massive economic problems is widespread migration into bordering countries, in particular Thailand. 37

During an interview with Sally Thompson, Deputy Director of the Thailand-Burma

Border Consortium (TBBC), she estimated that there are currently 145,000 Burmese refugees in nine camps along the border, and over two million migrant workers in

Thailand, many of whom are there illegally and subject to exploitation. These figures, coupled with 503,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Eastern Burma, amount to over 2.5 million displaced Burmese due to the junta’s policies. 38

35 Ibid., 178. 36 U.S. Department of State, “Burma: Background Note,” United States Government, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm#history (accessed April 18, 2009). 37 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 178 – 179. 38 Sally Thompson, “Internally Displaced People in Eastern Burma, Refugees: Thailand Burma Border” (Powerpoint Presentation, presented on January 10, 2009).

19 In the areas of food and health security, Burma’s citizens appear to fare better.

The country does not appear to be experiencing food shortages as a whole, but, due to such factors as ongoing ethnic conflict, the plight of internally displaced persons, and child soldier usage, the World Food Program (WFP) in 2005 estimated that 15% of

Burmese were subject to “food insecurity” and that chronic malnourishment affected one- third of the nation’s children. 39 On a related note, health insecurity is a major problem in

Burma. In terms of mortality, the World Health Organization (WHO) described Burma as a Southeast Asian country “…with high child and high adult mortality” in 2003, and included it in the “high mortality developing” broad grouping. 40 HIV/AIDS is a serious problem in Burma, although the UN AIDS report writes that infection rates are decreasing. 41 The CIA estimates the adult infection rate as 1.2% of the population in

2003. 42 Malaria and tuberculosis also decrease health security. The WHO reported

716,100 malaria cases in 2003 and 2,476 deaths, 43 while tuberculosis affected 169 people per 100,000 population in 2006. 44 The junta has not made any real effort to combat this

problem, demonstrated by the mere 2.3% that the generals spent on health care as a

percentage of GDP in 2006. 45

39 “UNICEF Calls for Support for Burmese Children, Women,” The Irrawaddy , September 8, 2005, http://www.unicef.org/myanmar/in_news_2516.html (accessed April 18, 2009). 40 World Health Organization, List of Member States by WHO Region and Mortality Stratum , (Geneva, 2004), http://www.who.int/whr/2004/annex/topic/en/annex_member_en.pdf (accessed February 27, 2009). 41 UNAIDS and World Health Organization, Asia: AIDS Epidemic Update Regional Summary , (Geneva, 2008), 17, http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/jc1527_epibriefs_asia_en.pdf (accessed February 27, 2009). 42 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Burma,” United States Government, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed February 27, 2009). 43 World Health Organization, Myanmar: Country Profile , (Geneva, 2005), http://www.rbm.who.int/wmr2005/profiles/myanmar.pdf (accessed February 27, 2009). 44 World Health Organization, “Core Health Indicators: Myanmar,” United Nations, http://www.who.int/whosis/database/core/core_select_process.cfm?countries=mmr&indicators=TBInciden ceRate&indicators=TBPrevRate (accessed February 27, 2009). 45 World Health Organization, “Myanmar,” United Nations, http://www.who.int/countries/mmr/en/ (accessed February 27, 2009).

20 Environmental security can be defined as, “. . .the state of human-environment dynamics that includes restoration of the environment damaged by military actions, and amelioration of resource scarcities, environmental degradation, and biological threats that could lead to social disorder and conflict .”46 In this area, Burma’s human security levels are also low. For example the Asian Development Bank cited an approximately 8% decline in forest area from 1990 – 2000. In 2006, the country’s forestry minister admitted that over 100,000 tons of timber was illegally logged and smuggled into China.

Furthermore, dam developments could very well be compromising environmental security. 47 Cyclone Nargis has resulted in the most significant environmental insecurity,

with winds reaching 200 km/hour that completely devastated the Irrawaddy Delta region.

Updated data reflecting specific environmental impacts is not available at this time, 48 but the storm certainly had drastic implications for the country’s larger human security profile. 49

Personal security constitutes safeguarding individuals from physical violence that is perpetrated by the state, other nations, or transnational actors. The SPDC has constantly perpetuated internal personal security threats, which include forced labor, child labor, child soldiers, rape as a weapon of war, land mines, IDPs and human trafficking. External threats most seriously affect migrant workers and refugees. The

46 Millennium Project, “Environmental Security Study: Executive Summary,” World Federation of UN Associations , http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/es-exsum.html (accessed April 18, 2009). 47 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 188 – 189. 48 United Nations Environment Programme, “Myanmar Tropical Cyclone Nargis,” United Nations, http://www.unep.org/disasters/myanmarcyclone/ (accessed February 28, 2009). 49 See U.S. Agency for International Development, Burma – Cyclone , Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DHCA), Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), (Washington, DC, 2008), http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/burma/template/fs_s r/fy2008/burma_cy_fs25_07-30-2008.pdf (accessed February 24, 2009).

21 junta dismisses most of these claims, but says that they are working to resolve the

“minor” issues of forced labor, child soldiers and human trafficking. It has allowed certain international organizations to work in-country, like the International Committee of the Red Cross, but under strict supervision, therefore preventing accurate reporting of personal security threats. 50 However, several human rights NGOs insist that these threats

are real and create dire situations for Burma’s residents. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty

International, the U.S. Campaign for Burma (USCB) and others have cited numerous

statistics regarding personal security threats, such as the fact that Burma has recruited

approximately 70,000, child soldiers, the highest figure in the world. 51

Community security involves allowing groups of individuals to maintain their

customs through protection from external violence. This aspect of security is unique in

Burma since it is home to over 100 different ethnic groups. 52 The Burman majority constitute 68% of the population, whereas the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Chinese, Indian and

Mon populations combine to form an additional 27%, all situated in seven different states. 53 Not surprisingly, this diversity, coupled with the junta’s “unification” agenda,

creates many threats to community security. In an attempt to address this problem, the

ruling junta has negotiated numerous cease-fire arrangements with ethnic groups, the first

of which was with the Wa in 1989. Along these lines, the junta touts its multi-sector,

“border-areas development” (BAD) plan, which includes education, health and

50 International Committee of the Red Cross, “The ICRC in Myanmar,” http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/myanmar?OpenDocument (accessed April 18, 2009). 51 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: World’s Highest Number of Child Soldiers,” http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/10/15/burma-worlds-highest-number-child-soldiers (accessed February 28, 2009). 52 Burma Issues, “Ethnic Groups,” http://www.burmaissues.org/En/ethnicgroups1.html (accessed February 28, 2009). 53 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Burma,” United States Government, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed February 28, 2009).

22 infrastructure initiatives, and covers 18 different regions and 32% of the state’s area. 54

Other than its inclusion on the government’s official website, 55 the plan receives little attention and is overshadowed by entrenched community security threats. Contrary to the junta’s statements, most of Burma’s IDPs are in these areas, and many of the country’s refugees and migrants flee from these regions. In addition, many of the aforementioned personal security threats are perpetrated in these zones, according to independent internal and external sources.

Communities particularly at risk are the Rohingya and various ethnic groups in

Northern and Eastern Burma, including the Karen. 56 The Rohingyas reside in Western

Rakhine state and the military does not consider them to be a legitimate ethnic group, making them “stateless.” Not only is their community endangered in Burma, but they are subject to specific threats in neighboring countries, as evidenced by their brutal treatment and subsequent abandonment at sea by the Thai military. 57 Another illustration of this

insecurity is the world’s longest, ongoing civil war between the tatmadaw (the Burmese

military) and the Karen National Union (KNU), which has raged since 1949. From late

2006 to late January 2008, an estimated 370 villagers had died as a result of this war, and

30,000 have been displaced. 58 The U.S. Campaign for Burma’s estimates are even more

54 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 190 – 192. 55 For the SPDC’s perspective on the BAD, see http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/PBNRDA/b5.htm 56 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Mapping the Contours of Human Security Challenges in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 190 – 192. 57 Peter Gelling and Thomas Fuller, “Myanmar Refugees Rescued at Sea,” New York Times , February 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/asia/04indo.html?_r=1&n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and %20Territories/Myanmar (accessed February 28, 2009). 58 Voice of America, “Army Offensive in Eastern Burma Creates Growing Humanitarian Crisis,” United States Government, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-01-25- voa51.cfm?CFID=117645752&CFTOKEN=32104352&jsessionid=8430c11972dac2f890dd21542b66c711 32e2 (accessed March 1, 2009).

23 dire. According to its figures, the military has razed 3,200 villages and planted the most land mines in the region, making it the world’s most heavily mined area. 59

Than does not directly address political security in his analysis, but discussion of it here is extremely relevant not only because it is one of the UNDP’s seven human security components, but also because Burma’s political situation is very unique. In 1987, increasing economic hardship turned into a massive crisis when the top general, Ne Win, cancelled all currency denominations except K45 and K90 for superstitious reasons. This meant that many citizens’ savings instantly disappeared. As a result, students took to the streets in Rangoon to fight for democracy. Based on this history, political insecurity is rampant in Burma. To quantify the claim, the NGO Assistance Association for Political

Prisoners’ estimates that there are approximately 2,146 political prisoners currently detained in Burma. 60 From 1972 to 2008, political rights in Burma, as measured by the

Freedom House, were given a 7 on a scale of 1 – 7, with 7 representing the lowest degree

of freedom. (The exceptions are 1975 and 1976, in which Burma received a Political

Rights score of 6).61 Based on current trends, the future outlook for political security in

Burma is bleak.

It should be noted that this is by no means a detailed description of Burma’s

human security. It is impossible within the scope of this capstone to analyze every aspect

of Burma’s human security, especially considering the theory’s rather broad definition.

However, one way of holistically considering human security levels in Burma is to use

59 U.S. Campaign for Burma, “Mass Atrocities Against Ethnic Minority Civilians,” http://uscampaignforburma.org/learn-about-burma/attacks-eastern-burma (accessed March 1, 2009). 60 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), “Breaking News,” http://www.aappb.org/ (accessed April 18, 2009). 61 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972 – 2007, Excel spreadsheet accessible under “Country Ratings and Status, FIW 1973 – 2009,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (accessed March 1, 2009).

24 the UNDP’s Human Development Reports. These Reports include “Human

Development Indices” (HDI), which are synthesized from three diverse measurements: life expectancy, adult literacy and educational enrollment, and purchasing power parity

(PPP). In 2006 Burma was ranked 135 out of 179 states. It was 136 th under life expectancy, 66 th under literacy, 146 th under education enrollment, and 163 rd under PPP. 62

This overall ranking and subsequent breakdown is troubling enough, but one must take into account the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis, both of which have greatly impacted the country since 2006. It is hard to imagine that Burma’s HDI would improve after such events, but it is very feasible that it would worsen, perhaps considerably. A reasonable conclusion at this time, therefore, is that Burma has faced, is facing, and most likely will continue to face a dire human security situation.

b. Sanctions:

The breadth and depth of Western sanctions policies have also affected Burma’s human security. Sanctions are revolutionist since they represent attempts by certain countries to frame international society as a global state, or one in which each nation shares common values. This revolutionism fuels the normative concerns of international actors such as the United States, and helps explain the rationale behind U.S. foreign policy towards Burma. 63

U.S. sanctions were first put in place in 1997, and prohibited new investment (on

or after May 21, 1997) in Burma by U.S. companies and/or individuals. The notable

62 UN Development Programme, 2008 Statistical Update: Myanmar: The Human Development Index – Going Beyond Income , United Nations, (Geneva, 2008), http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_MMR.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 63 The U.S. employs the strongest sanctions against the SPDC, so I will use it as a case study of sorts to analyze the role of sanctions in shaping Burma’s human security. Other states’ sanctions policies will not be explored in depth since it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so.

25 exception to this executive order was the UNOCAL Corporation, which participated in natural gas projects inside Burma that generated $400 million to $647 million each year in revenue for the SPDC. In 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, which banned a wide variety of imports from Burma, allowed the president to freeze Burmese generals’ assets in the U.S., required the U.S. government to vote against proposed financial aid to Burma by international financial institutions and to prohibit junta members’ entrance into the U.S. However, at this point the president could have made exceptions for certain Burmese imports if it served U.S. national interests. This Act must be renewed every year, and the government has done so since its inception. The Block

Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 forbids Burmese jadeite and ruby imports, and compels firms that still do business within Burma, such as Chevron, to pull out of the country if the junta does not change its repressive policies. Although certain measures could be taken to strengthen these sanctions even further, they represent the strongest sanctions of any nation against the Burmese government. 64

This sanctions policy is supported by many NGOs and the National League for

Democracy (NLD), but opposed by many scholars and Southeast Asia experts. In a paper authored by the Burma Campaign UK, and endorsed by the National Coalition

Government of the Union of Burma, the NLD, and the U.S. Campaign for Burma, among others, proponents advocate for targeted economic sanctions that pressure the military junta but not Burmese citizens. They argue that humanitarian aid must go hand in hand with political reform, and, because of the junta’s severe mismanagement of the state, the

64 Larry A. Niksch and Martin A. Weiss, Burma: Economic Sanctions , Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 27, 2008, http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs- 10716:1 (accessed April 18, 2009).

26 former will not be effective without the latter. 65 There is also obviously a moral component to the sanctions and an attempt to stand in solidarity with Burma’s opposition groups, which makes it very hard for the U.S. to alter its sanctions policies without first witnessing political progress in the country. On the other side of the debate, scholars like

David Steinberg point to the failure of sanctions thus far to spur regime change, and claim that U.S. assumptions surrounding the efficacy of these policies are flawed.

Steinberg believes that inside forces will generate reform in Burma, and that the U.S. should reconsider its current position, especially given the readiness of countries like

China and India to fill the void created by the sanctions. 66

Interestingly enough, groups on the border, such as the Alternative ASEAN

Network on Burma (ALTSEAN) and the Free Burma Rangers, seem to agree to a certain

extent with both angles. They appreciate the moral underpinnings of the sanctions and

believe that most humanitarian aid does not in fact benefit the people due to

governmental corruption, but they also think that groups within Burma must ultimately

affect change. 67 Sanctions must be taken into account when analyzing Burma’s human security since even targeted sanctions represent decreases in international aid. In other words, even if the government were to siphon off most of this assistance, the citizens would ostensibly at least marginally benefit from it. This means that sanctions do decrease human security to a certain extent. The question is whether or not the tradeoff between this lowering of human security is worth the political isolation that such policies

65 The Burma Campaign UK, Pro-Aid, Pro-Sanctions, Pro-Engagement: Position Paper on Humanitarian Aid to Burma , July 2006, http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/Aid_Paper.pdf (accessed April 18, 2009), 4 -5. 66 David I. Steinberg, “The United States and Its Allies: The Problem of Burma/Myanmar Policy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29 (August 2007): 219 – 237. 67 Interviews conducted in Bangkok and Chiang Mai on December 31, 2008 and January 3, 2009.

27 afford. 68 This dilemma adds another layer of complexity to Burma’s human security situation.

c. Analysis

What does this data mean in the context of the human security theoretical

framework? Kerr would argue that it underscores the inadequacy of nation-based

security frameworks, since the SPDC’s state-focused approach is not only failing to

ensure its citizens’ security, but is in fact actively perpetuating humanitarian crises.

However, Kerr’s opinion that realist and human security approaches could complement

one another implies the necessary involvement of the military junta in not only securing

the state but also strengthening the well-being of its citizens. To be sure, this is a

laudable and pragmatic goal.

The underlying predicament, though, is not only the military’s continual intransigence, but also the scope of the problem included in the human security analysis.

Scholars such as Ewan would argue that no actor can hope to implement policies that will simultaneously address all seven dimensions, especially not an actor like the Burmese government. She claims that the concept of human security must be understood more in a historical and political sense before it is used as the primary template for addressing humanitarian crises. This analysis will help address the inherent divisions between the developed and developing countries’ interpretations of human security. 69 Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy draw on these critiques to point out the disconnect between scholars and

68 I do not discount sanctions as a viable political and moral tool, although so far they have not solely managed to affect democratic change in Burma.

69 Pauline Ewan, “Deepening the Human Security Debate: Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification,” Politics 27 (October 2007): 187.

28 policy makers: how does a leader begin to craft effective policy without knowing all of the variables at work and their interplays? 70 These fundamental disagreements over human security are illustrated by the military’s continual repression in the name of security and the failed sanctions policies.

Is it possible to strengthen Burma’s human security in light of these inherent difficulties and contradictions? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at how other regional and international actors shape Burma’s situation.

3. Burma – China Relations

China needs no introduction as an economic powerhouse nor as an emerging world power, but it is helpful to include some baseline indicators. From 1999 – 2008,

China’s real GDP growth ranged from 7.6% to 13% in 2007, with a 9% increase in 2008.

It holds close to $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves, and is mainly responsible for financing U.S. debt. 71 China is expected to maintain real GDP growth rates of 7.2% or higher through 2013. 72 Therefore, the main driving force behind China’s domestic and foreign policy is a neoliberal economic agenda “with Chinese characteristics,” which consists of market reforms mandated by authoritarian political leaders. 73 At home,

Beijing’s most important strategy is preserving political stability through Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) rule, which includes utilizing nationalist rhetoric.

70 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and Implications . (New York: Routledge, 2007), 69 – 71. 71 The U.S. – China Business Council, “China’s Economic Statistics,” http://www.uschina.org/statistics/economy.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 72 The Economist, “Country Briefings: China: Economic Data,” http://www.economist.com/countries/China/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Economic%20Data (accessed March 1, 2009). 73 See David Harvey, “Neoliberalism ‘With Chinese Characteristics’,” in A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 120 – 151.

29 a. Realism: Strategic Security

It cannot be emphasized enough that the overarching framework within which

China conducts its domestic and foreign policy is the pursuit of stability. Within this context, Beijing wants to increase trade and gain greater access to energy and resources, a large portion of which will help develop Yunnan and Guanxi provinces. As a result of

Burma’s location and natural resources, China’s relations with the country are crucial in accomplishing these objectives. Scholar Bronson Percival points out that Burma is called a Chinese “client state,” but that, if this is the case, “. . .it is a difficult, xenophobic client.” 74 However, it is a practical relationship that benefits China in a number of ways.

Strategically, China desires a link to the Indian Ocean to challenge India, and Burma can

provide it. On a similar note, if Chinese troops are stationed in Burma, it could extend

China’s range of power to the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. 75

Economically, Beijing is involved in over 62 hydro, oil, gas, and mining projects in Burma to feed China’s growing energy needs. 76 For example, Beijing is pushing for

the construction of an oil pipeline through Burma to bypass the Strait of Malacca, the

route used to transport approximately 80% of China’s oil imports.77 China is currently planning this pipeline, which would stretch from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan

Province. 78 Additionally, the $2.55 billion SHWE gas pipeline from Western Burma to

Kunming has already been approved and construction is scheduled to start in 2009, via

74 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 38. 75 Ibid., 39. 76 The U.S. Campaign for Burma, “China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power,” http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 4 -5. 77 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 38 – 39. 78 International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown , January 31, 2008, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/wps/icg10469/icg10469.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 9.

30 the collective efforts of China, Burma, India, and South Korea, although Burma has chosen China to supervise the project. 79 This is surprising, considering that India’s bid was considerably higher, at $4.76 per million BTU, as compared to the SPDC’s offer of

$4.28 per million BTU, 80 but perhaps this demonstrates Burma’s willingness to go to

great lengths to preserve its good relations with China. The SPDC will earn roughly $24

billion in profit over the next 20 years for shipping all of the oil to China, according to

Tanya Davis, who previously worked for the SHWE Gas Movement, a NGO dedicated to

lessening the detrimental impacts of the pipeline. 81 As a result, Percival claims that

China most values Burma for its ability to serve as a “transportation corridor” connecting

China’s poor southwestern interior regions to the ocean. 82

The two countries have an important trade relationship, especially in the defense sector, since Burma receives the most weapons from China. 83 According to Percival, since 1990, China has transferred over $1 billion worth of weapons to Burma. 84 This is a

gross underestimate, based on scholar David Steinberg’s assessment. He claimed that,

from 1989 to 2006, China had given Burma more than $2 billion worth of defense aid. 85

This included tanks and armored personnel carriers, fighter jets, attack aircraft, coastal

79 China Stakes, “Myanmar-China Pipeline to Start Construction in 2009,” http://www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=843 (accessed March 1, 2009). 80 The U.S. Campaign for Burma, China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power , October 3, 2007, http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 1 – 2. 81 Tanya Davis, interview by author, Chiang Mai, Thailand, January 4, 2009. 82 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 39. 83 Amnesty International, Myanmar Needs a Comprehensive International Arms Embargo , September 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/014/2007/en/dom-ASA160142007en.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009). 84 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 39. 85 As cited in The U.S. Campaign for Burma, China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power , October 3, 2007, http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 1.

31 patrol ships, small arms and light weapons, and logistical and transportation equipment.

As a direct result of this aid, in 2002 Human Rights Watch reported that the tatmadaw had quadrupled its size to 450,000 soldiers, 70,000 of whom were estimated to be children. 86 This military aid, therefore, is one main factor that contributes to decreasing

human security levels of the Burmese people.

In other economic areas, China’s relationship with Burma is also strong. Total

trade between China and Burma doubled from 1999 to 2005. 87 China is Burma’s primary import partner, and Chinese goods accounted for 33.7% of Burmese imports in 2007 (this figure does not include the undoubtedly large amounts of illegal goods smuggled into

Burma). 88 In terms of investment, from April 2006 – February 2007, China’s FDI in

Burma totaled more than $281 million. 89 Based on these statistics, it is clear that Burma relies on China for many of its non-military economic needs. 90 From China’s perspective, although it does not depend on Burma nearly to the same degree, it does benefit in many ways from its economic relationship with the junta. According to the CIA, in 2007 Burma sent 7.1% of its exports to China, consisting of mainly natural gas, wood products, pulses, beans, fish, rice, clothing, jade, and gems. 91 In addition, Chinese companies benefit from

86 The U.S. Campaign for Burma, China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power , October 3, 2007, http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 1. 87 The U.S. Campaign for Burma, China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power , October 3, 2007, http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 2. 88 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Burma,” The United States Government, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 89 The U.S. Campaign for Burma, China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power , October 3, 2007, http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 2. 90 It is not always clear how many of the weapons purchases are included in official economic statistics, so some overlap of data is possible. 91 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Burma,” The United States Government, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed March 1, 2009).

32 over 800 projects in Burma, with a contractual value of more than $2.1 billion.92 Another potential source for additional economic gains is the one million Chinese nationals residing in Burma. The city of Mandalay is estimated to house 200,000 Chinese, who control businesses in the area, use Chinese Renminbi (RMB) as currency, and maintain communication with Kunming, the capitol of Yunnan province. 93 These interests,

coupled with China’s strategic and geopolitical concerns over power and energy access in

the region, dictate its relationship with Burma.

In the political arena, China has consistently condoned the regime’s policies. This

soft power is a key component of China’s diplomatic arsenal. According to scholar

Joseph Nye, soft power “…is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather

than coercion or payments” and “…arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,

political ideals, and policies.”94 This soft power has helped China maintain its strong

economic relationship with the junta. In September 2006, China voted against including

Burma in the UN Security Council’s (UNSC’s) agenda, but was overruled in a vote of

10-4-1. In January 2007, China vetoed a UNSC resolution with the purpose of giving the

Secretary General more power to address the situation in Burma. China also does not

support the Secretary General’s call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other

political dissidents, citing the issue as Burma’s “internal affair.” However, China

surprisingly signed on to the October 11, 2007 statement in which the UNSC wrote that it

“…strongly deplores the use of violence against peaceful demonstrations in [Burma] and

92 The U.S. Campaign for Burma, China’s Support Blocks International Diplomacy and keeps Burma’s Regime in Power , October 3, 2007, http://uscampaignforburma.org/action/ChinaBurmaInfoSheet.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 2. 93 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 40. 94 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., preface to Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x.

33 welcomes the Human Rights Council resolution S-5/1 of 2 October 2007.” 95 Overall,

though, Beijing’s political support for the regime enhances the countries’ economic

relationship, which unfortunately results in lower Burmese human security levels.

There is an adage that when “China spits, Burma swims.”96 If this conventional

wisdom is true, coupled with the demonstrable military, economic, and political relations

between the countries, China has a considerable amount of influence over Burma’s

affairs, which would suggest that a shift in China’s foreign policy could potentially

significantly impact the human security levels in Burma.

b. Analysis

Scholars can better understand Burma-China relations by utilizing various

components of the International Society framework. The most relevant is the realist

interpretation: the importance of sovereignty and power distribution is essential. It is in

China’s best interest to foster and maintain strategic security, and Beijing uses its

relations with Burma to do just that. China’s energy needs and its desire to keep India

and other regional actors in check primarily drive its foreign policy towards Burma.

Burma, on the other hand, needs to counter U.S. sanctions by forging alliances with

powerful, dependable actors, such as China. Normative concerns, such as the welfare of

the Burmese people, have no influence on these power politics and stabilization goals.

Interestingly enough, Wight’s rationalism does play a role in this equation.

Burma and China do cooperate based on their common understanding. China overlooks

Burma’s abysmal human rights records and withstands international criticism for doing

95 ALTSEAN-Burma, “Security Council Statement,” http://www.unscburma.org/UNSCUpdateOctober112007.htm (accessed March 1, 2009). 96 Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 38.

34 so and, in return, gains access to Burma’s plentiful natural resources and its ports. This process, in turn, allows the SPDC to consolidate its own power and to rule the country with an iron fist. Burma and China have not established a partial social contract in the sense that they do not make compromises for the greater good, but they have colluded to gain power strategically. Unfortunately for Burma’s citizens, this relationship is demonstrably entrenched, which creates human insecurity. Furthermore, there are no signs that either government will implement more humanitarian, revolutionist policies.

But is Burma first and foremost China’s “client state”? What other factors can help explain why Burma’s human security has remained depressingly low for decades?

4. Burma : Regional Geopolitical Context

Although there are numerous international actors affecting Burma’s policies, other than China, ASEAN and India are cited as the most important forces. It is beyond the scope of this capstone to cover every additional variable nor to provide a detailed description and background of ASEAN and India, but with the following general overview, I hope to provide a sufficient context within which to assess these other significant actors that affect Burma’s human security levels.

a. ASEAN:

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the region’s primary, and really only, broad-based governmental organization. It was founded in Bangkok in

1967, and its primary goals include promoting economic growth and negotiating regional conflicts peacefully. More specifically, its fundamental principles, as cited in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), are:

35 -Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations -The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion -Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another -Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner -Renunciation of the threat of use of force; and effective cooperation among [the member states] 97

ASEAN was originally designed as a vanguard against communism, but since the

Cold War, the organization’s priorities have shifted from a realist to a neoliberal institutionalist agenda. This involves employing multilateralism to combat regional problems, such as human trafficking, corruption, environmental degradation, terrorism, and intellectual property rights. 98 ASEAN’s non-interference and sovereignty principles have been crucial in crafting its responses to regional dilemmas. Furthermore, the organization has no concrete enforcement authority to ensure compliance with its initiatives. 99 Instead, its leaders have promoted the “ASEAN Way,” which they claim effectively forges consensus between the organization’s diverse members in a non- confrontational way. 100 These ideals fail to adequately address Burma’s human rights situation, which in turn challenges ASEAN’s legitimacy.

Sheldon Simon lists three serious issues that affect Burma’s relations with

ASEAN: the thousands of Karen refugees that annually flee to Thailand, drug trafficking from Burma to Thailand, which amounts to over one million tablets smuggled per year, and the muzzling of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Since Burma became a member in

97 ASEAN Secretariat, “Overview: Fundamental Principles,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed February 24, 2009). 98 Sheldon W. Simon, “ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism: The Long and Bumpy Road to Community,” in International Relations of Asia, ed. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 196. 99 ASEAN Secretariat, “Overview: Fundamental Principles,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed February 28, 2009). 100 Rodolfo C. Severino, “The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law,” ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/2849.htm (accessed February 28, 2009).

36 1997, the organization has tried various, albeit weak, strategies to counteract Burma’s abysmal human rights record and related policies. In 1998, Thailand suggested that

ASEAN consider, “flexible engagement” with Burma, but only the Philippines agreed to such an idea. ASEAN followed with the tactic of, “enhanced interaction,” which amounted to discussing Burma’s problems and the regional security threats they posed, but did not condone “direct interference.” In 2003, Thailand called for a “road map” to democracy and for the junta to free Aung San Suu Kyi, but that effort failed. Malaysia, formerly a vigorous supporter of the SPDC, chastised Burma for its human rights abuses and forced it to concede its organizational chairmanship in 2006. Around this same time,

ASEAN also publicly urged the military junta to begin democratization and subsequently sent an ASEAN delegation to Burma, which failed to affect any change.

This ineffectiveness continued in May 2007, when the junta extended Aung San

Suu Kyi’s house arrest for another year and ASEAN failed to move beyond verbal reprimands. To make matters worse, it reacted mildly to the Saffron Revolution the following year. 101 This was despite the fact that the 2007 Charter called for its members

“To strengthen democracy. . .and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .” 102 In 2008, after another extension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest,

ASEAN leaders urged the junta to release her and all other political prisoners, work with

opposition groups to move towards democracy, and cooperate with the United Nations’

Special Advisor on Burma, Ibrahim Gambari. These statements, while supportive of the

Burmese people in principle, are a far cry from actually addressing the situation. They

101 Sheldon W. Simon, “ASEAN and the New Regional Multilateralism: The Long and Bumpy Road to Community,” in International Relations of Asia, ed. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 202 – 203. 102 ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter , Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Jakarta: 2007), http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf (accessed March 15, 2009).

37 elucidate the discouraging contradictions within ASEAN that make it so ineffective in addressing Burma’s problems: it officially supports democracy in Burma but that conviction is consistently overridden by its decision to respect the junta’s sovereignty at the expense of the Burmese people. Therein lays the failure of ASEAN’s neoliberal institutionalist approach to affect change in Burma.

Scholar Jürgen Haacke attributes these difficulties to member states’ contrasting policies towards Burma, as well as the junta’s resistance to change. 103 He writes that

ASEAN should be more assertive in its stance on Burma to compensate for other actors’

inability to reform the nation. This is necessary because, although ASEAN is still

considered an important Western and UN partner in pressuring Burma, its reputation is

tarnished by the junta’s behavior. 104 To that end, various scholars have suggested

establishing some sort of multi-lateral forum to encourage dialogue between Aung San

Suu Kyi and the SPDC. It would preferably involve countries like the U.S. and Japan,

but must include China and at least some ASEAN members. 105 Asia scholars Michael

Green and Derek Mitchell contend that, while ASEAN cannot solely coordinate such an

effort, with U.S. assistance “. . .it could take a leading role in spearheading a new

coordinated, multilateral approach that neither Beijing nor New Delhi would be able to

ignore.” 106

In fact, China and ASEAN have recently established a collaborative partnership, making Green and Mitchell’s suggestion more plausible. From 1997 – 1998, China

103 Jürgen Haacke, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30 (December 2008): 355 – 356. 104 Ibid., 365. 105 Ibid., 357. 106 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 86 (November/December 2007).

38 developed its “New Security Concept” which reiterated its five components of peaceful relations, including the principles of equality, respect, non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs, and non-violent conflict mitigation. This vision complemented ASEAN’s policies. More specifically, China participates in yearly summits with ASEAN, takes part in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia

Pacific, and became a party to the “Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea,” which works towards peaceful negotiation of territorial disputes. In 2003, China was the first external state to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which solidified

ASEAN’s code of conduct. Beijing has also increased its activities in the ASEAN

Regional Forum, and in 2002 negotiated a free trade agreement with the organization, all of which have increased China’s influence in the region.107

Based on ASEAN’s goals and its close relations with China, it is clear that the organization could potentially exercise more clout in convincing the junta to change.

However, in the spirit of cooperation, its member states must strengthen its enforcement mechanisms and work with China to increase Burma’s human security levels. Despite

China and ASEAN’s strong relationship, China’s realist policies allow the junta to continue its disastrous rule. Perhaps ASEAN’s neoliberal institutionalist practices could help modify realist policies’ impact on Burma and lay the groundwork for a viable international society to improve the nation’s human rights. However, for this to even be considered a viable option, it is essential to consider India and its relations with the SPDC.

107 David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, International Relations of Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 131 – 133.

39 b. India:

With a population of roughly 1.15 billion, India is the world’s largest democracy and an important Western ally. 108 Burma was in fact a part of Britain’s Indian

subcontinent and administered by Indian colonial officials, until the countries were

separated in 1937 and subsequently gained independence after WWII. Burma proceeded

to isolate itself from much of the world (including India), and India supported the

democratic movement in 1988. However, soon after, due to the changing geopolitical

climate of Asia, India initiated a “Look East” policy in order to expand and improve

relations with the flourishing East Asian states. Simultaneously, China was benefiting

from nearly exclusive ties with the notorious SPDC, a relationship that threatened India’s

influence in Southeast Asia.

New Delhi wants to share the wealth of Burma’s natural resources and energy reserves and entice the SPDC by serving as an alternative ally in an effort to curb China’s influence. In addition, it solicits the junta’s help in rooting out rebels that threaten India’s unstable Northeast region, and provides the generals with generous military and economic aid to carry out this anti-insurgent campaign. 109 India faces formidable regional challenges in this quest, including ongoing conflicts with Pakistan and

Bangladesh as well as growing Muslim extremism within its own borders. 110 Not only is

India increasing its hard power through continued nuclear development, including the recently passed U.S. – India nuclear cooperation deal, but it is also bolstering its soft

108 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: India,” United States Government, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (accessed March 2, 2009). 109 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs 86 (November/December 2007): 147 – 158. 110 Sumit Ganguly, “The Rise of India in Asia,” in International Relations of Asia , ed. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 150.

40 power, specifically economically. Achieving this in light of China’s economic dominance requires careful diplomacy and maneuvering. In 1993 and 1996 China and

India negotiated two Confidence-Building Measures, and since then China has almost superseded the U.S. as India’s principal trading partner. However, serious tensions remain, including a border dispute, competition for energy, and sometimes conflicting power aspirations throughout Asia .

This dynamic shapes India’s relations with Southeast Asia. In 1995, India became a “full dialogue partner” with ASEAN and an ASEAN Regional Forum member in 1996. New Delhi wants to increase trade, tourism, and investment in the area, and to achieve these objectives it has undertaken numerous multilateral development projects. 111

India has simultaneously improved its bilateral relations with Burma. Trade ballooned from $62.15 million from 1988 – 1989 to $328.53 million from 1997 – 1998. In 2001, construction began on the $2.58 million “India – Myanmar Friendship Road” to connect

Northeast India and Mandalay.112 Indian loans and grants to Burma have abounded,

including $7 million for telecom initiatives and a $3 million grant for IT developments in

April 2005, coupled with an additional $37 million in loans in March 2005. 113 Moreover,

India began providing arms to Burma in 2002, which now includes radar and other more

advanced technologies. 114 In line with these actions, India did not repudiate the junta’s brutal suppression of monks during the Saffron Revolution, but merely referred to the upcoming elections as a possible means of reform within the country. This response was

111 Ibid., 158 – 159. 112 Renaud Egretau, “India’s Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration Than Success,” Asian Survey 48 (November/December 2008): 942. 113 The Burma Campaign UK, Burma-India Relations: A Betrayal of Democracy and Human Rights , March 2007, http://burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/India_Briefing.pdf (accessed March 2, 2009), 3. 114 Renaud Egretau, “India’s Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration Than Success,” Asian Survey 48 (November/December 2008): 946.

41 particularly unfortunate considering India’s past solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi and democratic opposition movements in Burma, and underscores its current unsuccessful strategy of currying favor with the junta to counteract China’s influence. This Realpolitik focus highlights the complex, realist interplays that collectively ignore Burmese well- being in pursuit of power and regional stabilization. 115

However, based on Egretau’s analysis, India’s objectives in Burma have only been partially successful. Ethnic insurgencies continue in Northeast India, partially due to Burma’s lackadaisical assistance in defeating them, and economic ties are relatively weak. 116 Despite optimistic expectations, total trade between the two countries only amounted to $900 million from 2007 – 2008, missing the $1 billion goal set by the Indian

Vice President in 2003. 117 On the flip side, Indian exports to Burma amount to a paltry

$150 million. To compound these economic problems, China has won the rights to much

of Burma’s natural gas. India has been disappointed in these areas, to say the least, and

continues to frantically compete with China for influence in Burma. Brahma Chellaney,

professor of strategic studies at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, claimed that

“From 1988 to 1998, India burned its interests in Burma by isolating the junta and

supporting democracy. . .” and that India is not willing to risk the possibility of history

repeating itself. 118

Egretau uses four examples to illustrates India’s frustrations with Burma. China’s economic and political leverage in dealing with Burma surpasses that of India (but is not

115 “Realpolitik Rules Asia. View,” Economist , November 21, 2007, 1. 116 Renaud Egretau, “India’s Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration Than Success,” Asian Survey 48 (November/December 2008): 945. 117 Ibid., 948. 118 As Quoted in Manjeet Kripalani, “India’s Role in Burma’s Crisis,” Business Week Online , October 22, 2007, 9.

42 limitless). After the 2007 crackdown, the West requested China’s help in reasoning with the junta, which is demonstrative of its perceived relative influence over the SPDC.

Secondly, the junta’s xenophobic and nationalistic tendencies prevent India from gaining the regional foothold it seeks. Third, India’s unstable Northeast region makes forging continuous and effective physical links with Burma difficult. Fourth, domestic opposition to India’s relationship with the repressive junta partially curbs New Delhi’s ability to forge deeper ties with the SPDC. 119 An International Crisis Group report confirms Egretau’s conclusions, but underscores India’s relative inability to sway the

SPDC, citing that the junta “. . .holds the upper hand in the relationship.” 120 For these

reasons, India does not match China’s economic, political, nor its military clout in its

relations with Burma. However, New Delhi’s attempts to limit Chinese influence

through crafting strategic security is realist at its core, and therefore still contributes to

Burma’s human insecurity since normative values are not relevant in power politics.

c. Analysis

India and ASEAN inadvertently also contribute to Burma’s human insecurity.

Much like China, India’s burgeoning population and energy needs necessitate acquiring

resources from the most plentiful and available sources, and Burma happens to be one of

them. India though, in a historic and normative sense, should take Burma’s human rights

situation into account when dealing with the junta, but its own national interests easily

trump humanitarian concerns. New Delhi also fears China’s growing regional and

119 Renaud Egretau, “India’s Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration Than Success,” Asian Survey 48 (November/December 2008): 949 – 955. 120 International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown , January 31, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/burma_myanmar/144_burma_myanmar___after_the_cr ackdown.pdf (accessed March 2, 2009), 13.

43 international influence and feels a need to counter Beijing’s power. Once again, strategic stability, defined by realism and power politics, dictates India’s policies towards Burma.

ASEAN, on the other hand, approaches the Burma problem from the neoliberal institutional framework. The founders of ASEAN envisioned that the organization would strengthen and unite Southeast Asia, therefore making it a viable international actor.

While ASEAN may have enhanced regional economic cooperation and political relations between some of its neighbors, its attempts at reforming Burma through engagement have failed, partially because of the junta’s stubbornness, but mostly because of

ASEAN’s espoused sovereignty and non-interference principles. Its non-binding resolutions and political slaps on the wrist do not appear to faze the junta much, if at all.

This flaw on the liberal side of International Society studies, coupled with China and

India’s realist policies, collectively perpetuate human insecurity in Burma. Clearly, neither liberal nor realist policies in and of themselves can effectively construct an international society that will help the people of Burma. In fact, it seems that the two frameworks in tandem cannot even adequately address Burma’s situation. This conundrum explains the seemingly endless impasse in Burma’s human rights crisis. In the end, is there any hope for the Burmese people?

5. Policy Analysis and Recommendations

“How is Burma’s human security framed by China and other regional actors, and why has the situation remained stagnant since 1988?” The human security and

International Society theoretical frameworks help clarify this complex, historically rooted situation and give clues as to what effective policy changes could and should be implemented.

44 Essentially, Burma’s SDPC has ruled the country with an iron fist since 1988, depriving the people of basic economic, political, and cultural rights. The disastrous results of these policies are evidenced by the nation’s overall HDI rating of 135 out of

179 countries. The junta shows no regard whatsoever for the welfare of Burma’s citizens and narrowly focuses on a warped vision of state security and the “most effective” ways to achieve it. China’s close relationship with the SPDC, including weapons transfers, economic aid, investment, and political support, literally allows the junta to continue violating Burmese human rights. China is the second fundamental force, after domestic governance, which shapes Burma’s human security. Furthermore, Western sanctions have failed to reverse these trends and have inevitably terminated some flows of aid into the country, a factor that inadvertently contributes to a lack of Burmese security. Human security studies, while still evolving, are people-centric and designed to address individual and transnational security threats resulting from human insecurity. Whether one subscribes to the broad or narrow school of the human security paradigm, the SPDC violates both, thereby compromising its citizens’ and state’s security, as well as the region’s security.

The “middle ground” of the International Society tradition strives to find a practical balance between state sovereignty and international cooperation with the ultimate goal of forging an effective world society governed by international law, order, and justice. Although it is highly normative, International Society scholars take into account the realistic limitations that policy makers face. This framework helps explain the motivations behind China’s foreign policy towards Burma. Beijing is primarily concerned with economic growth, political stability, and maintaining sovereignty and it

45 does not think twice about the ramifications of its policies towards Burma. These actions, rooted in realist foreign policy, expand in scope as competition with India increases.

India simultaneously pursues similar goals, which creates a vicious cycle that worsens the humanitarian crisis in Burma.

While Burma, China, and India see their collective policies as contributing to regional stability, the reality of displaced persons, drug trafficking, and ethnic violence cannot be overlooked. Burma’s situation has created increasing numbers of refugee spillovers, particularly into Thailand, which destabilizes the border region. The U.S.

Drug Enforcement Administration claims that 80% of all heroin in Southeast Asia comes from Burma, which helps spread HIV/AIDS in China, India, and Thailand. 121 On another front, if the large number of Chinese nationals living in Burma became the target of protests, considering their relatively wealthy positions in comparison to, and perhaps at the expense of, the Burmese, those problems would also adversely affect China. 122 Can facts like these be used to persuade China and other regional actors that the SPDC’s policies are indeed creating instability, not just domestically but also regionally and internationally? At the moment, the answer is no.

Neoliberal institutionalism falls within the liberal component of International

Society scholarship. ASEAN attempts to use neoliberal institutionalism to address these transnational issues as well as their root causes in Burma. The Southeast Asian region will never be as influential as East Asia, but its collective action, if implemented

121 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs 86 (November/December 2007): 147 – 158. 122 Ian Storey, “China, Burma, and the Saffron Revolution,” The Jamestown Foundation China Brief Volume 7, no. 19 (October 17, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4485 (accessed February 25, 2009).

46 effectively, could help spur democratic reform in Burma. Rationalism describes

ASEAN’s attempts to create an anarchic world society bound together by mutually shared customs. Unfortunately, the organization’s leaders have been overly preoccupied with sovereignty, a realist tendency that has created a roadblock in collectively and forcefully addressing Burma’s human rights crisis. ASEAN’s insistence on essentially toothless actions has stymied well-intentioned efforts at cooperation and capacity- building, which has allowed the regime to continue its oppressive policies.

This theoretical incompatibility between the International Society and human

security schools of thought translates into policy clashes with devastating consequences

for the well-being of the Burmese people. How do scholars and policy makers even

begin to build an effective international society to address these inconsistencies? One

possibility is to use the human security framework to enhance and “update” the

normative importance of the International Society tradition, allowing it to address

complex problems arising from globalization and interconnectedness. Theoreticians and

policy makers could not only explore Kerr’s idea of a complementary partnership

between nation-centered and individually-focused security, but also its relationship with

revolutionism. These combinations, driven by human security analysis, could bridge the

gap between the realist and liberal facets of the International Society paradigm.

This is, of course, much easier said than done, which is why the international

community has failed to formulate any pragmatic policy solutions to aid the Burmese

people. There are no mathematical equations or formulas to solve this normative

dilemma. The SPDC believes that it is the only force that can effectively govern Burma,

a view that falls squarely into the realist camp. China and India are also realist actors

47 since they use their relationship with Burma to achieve strategic security. ASEAN strives to be rationalist, with a focus on both sovereignty and institutionalism, and the U.S. is staunchly situated in the idealistic, revolutionary mindset. Since all of these actors significantly affect Burma’s human security, all of them will have to collectively work together towards affecting change in Burma.

One potential, more drastic option to consider is the controversial prospect of humanitarian intervention, which Kerr and other scholars studying the human security paradigm discuss. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

(ICISS) was an independent and temporary commission formed for the purpose of advising the UN and refining its human rights agenda. The members produced a report in

2001 entitled, “The Responsibility to Protect,” which attempted to find common ground between international responsibility to intervene on behalf of the safety and well-being of a particular state’s citizens with that nation’s sovereignty rights. 123 The report developed

and codified several concepts for protecting human security. State sovereignty mandates

that governments protect their citizens, but international intervention supersedes this

principle if a state refuses to mitigate serious conflicts such as, “internal war, insurgency,

repression or state failure.” Internationally agreed upon definitions, laws, practices and

conventions justify these actions, the most important of which is the authority of the UN

Security Council (UNSC) to sustain global peace and security.

Three components are included in this responsibility: “the responsibility to

prevent” serious state conflict, “the responsibility to react” to dire situations using

appropriate measures, including sanctions and even military force as a last resort, and

123 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect: About the Commission: Mandate and Organisation of the Commission,” Government of Canada, http://www.iciss.ca/mandate-en.asp (accessed February 20, 2009).

48 “the responsibility to rebuild,” which includes comprehensive assistance and reconciliation efforts. Prevention is the most crucial element of the three, and every option must be exercised, from least to most invasive, before the international community intervenes. “The Just Cause Threshold” stipulates that only widespread death and/or ethnic cleansing obligates military intervention, and the UNSC should make the final decision. 124 Maintaining and promoting human security is, of course, the common threat that binds these principles and recommendations together.

The report does establish a precedent for future international intervention in

Burma and is part of the discourse surrounding the human security paradigm, so it is important to mention. However, this option is nearly impossible to consider at the present time. China sits on the UNSC and would never endorse military intervention, considering the importance Beijing places on sovereignty and non-interference and the economic benefits the country reaps from its relationship with Burma. In addition, none of the actors pushing for democratic change in Burma seriously advocate this position because it is unrealistic and counter-productive. 125 Furthermore, it is difficult to make the

case that the Just Cause Threshold has been reached in Burma, even though there is

obviously widespread suffering. This revolutionist idea of intervention flies in the face of

the regional stability strategies that China and India employ, and defies ASEAN’s hands-

off approach. Therefore, theoretically and practically the report’s conclusions are not

useful for the time being. If the situation worsens, though, hopefully military

intervention would become more politically palatable and pragmatically possible.

124 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect: Synopsis,” Government of Canada, http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#synopsis (accessed February 20, 2009). 125 For example, the SPDC moved the official capital from Rangoon to Naypidaw in 2006, which many analysts believed was in response to the generals’ fear of a potential U.S. invasion.

49 Moving away from the extreme, there are obvious, smaller steps that could lead to larger change. Rangoon could loosen its restrictions on NGO operations in-country and spend more of its GDP on health care and education. China and India could make their aid conditional on democratic reforms and establish benchmarks that the military junta must meet in order to receive such assistance. ASEAN could threaten to expel Burma if the junta doesn’t engage in talks with the opposition groups and ethnic minorities. The

U.S. could attempt to engage the military more through dialogue, and could facilitate regional approaches to the problem. In such an ideal scenario, China and India could continue to reap economic benefits from their relationship with the junta, but in a more

“sustainable” way, in the sense that outside actors would consider the consequences of their actions on Burmese human rights.

These multilateral shifts in policy seem highly unlikely, if not impossible, according to the national interests of each state involved and the severity of Burma’s human rights crisis. The global space to establish such a framework is increasingly disappearing given the current global economic crisis. However, the International Crisis

Group’s 2008 Report, “Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown,” 126 outlines key goals of

international action and strategies that should be employed to more effectively address

Burma’s situation. First, other countries should try to establish a more resilient Tripartite

Dialogue between the SPDC, the opposition groups, and ethnic minorities. Second,

international and regional actors should help mitigate the economic and humanitarian

crisis that is the main, tangible roadblock impeding negotiations. Third, they should

engage in capacity-building efforts that include the state, communities, and individual

citizens. Fourth, concerned nations should encourage a freer political environment that is

126 This report was written in response to the Saffron Revolution and its aftermath.

50 accessible to all groups in Burmese society. In order to achieve these aims, the Report calls for continued UN involvement and UNSC pressure, more targeted sanctions directed at specific individuals in the SPDC, more flexible “carrot and stick” diplomatic approaches, and increased international assistance. A regional “working group,” comprised primarily of China and ASEAN countries, should take the lead on crafting coordinated regional policies and negotiating directly with the junta. An international

“support group,” consisting of actors such as the U.S., EU, Japan, and Canada, should craft Western responses to the situation based on human rights considerations. 127 Green

and Mitchell agree with the idea of international participation and stress its role in

drafting a “road map” for reform.128 This “road map” would outline changes in the

SPDC’s governing style, promise international assistance in achieving them, and highlight the corresponding benefits such alternatives would afford. They argue that U.S. leadership is essential for this plan to be successful. 129

These goals are all laudable and I agree with them in principle. However, the

Report’s conclusion even points out the difficulties inherent in such a strategy, since it

calls for a high level of coordinated action and widespread participation from a diverse

set of actors. This is difficult to achieve under any circumstances, but especially

considering Burma’s deeply entrenched humanitarian crisis. 130 Furthermore, I am not confident that the U.S. has the necessary clout or the political will to take on such a prominent role at the present time. Burma simply is not a pressing national security issue

127 International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown , January 31, 2008, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/wps/icg10469/icg10469.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 27 – 35. 128 See section 4a, page 35, for an introduction to their idea. 129 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs 86 (November/December 2007): 147 – 158. 130 International Crisis Group, Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown , January 31, 2008, http://www.ciaonet.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/wps/icg10469/icg10469.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009), 35.

51 for America, although the U.S. has certainly stood in solidarity with the opposition movement. Once the world economy improves, perhaps other actors with more of a stake in the matter, such as China and certain members of ASEAN, could assume regional leadership as the Report stipulates. Of course, the U.S. would still play an important role in the process, but it is likely that countries directly threatened by the situation will have more credibility when it comes to promoting viable and adoptable solutions. Of course, all of this depends on the junta’s receptiveness to change, which has hitherto been essentially non-existent.

Not only must the international community work together to address Burma’s humanitarian crisis, but domestic efforts must play an important role as well. In fact, most of the major cross border and in-country NGOs working on Burma stress that change needs to come from within. Throughout our interviews on the border, every group from the Women’s League of Burma to the Shan Nationalities Youth League to the

Network for Environmental and Economic Development insisted that a powerful force on the inside needs to serve as a spark plug. Many thought that the Saffron Revolution was a start, but that more coordinated and widespread action would be necessary to really shock the junta into action. Of course, the prospects of building and maintaining such a movement experienced serious setbacks after Cyclone Nargis. To compound the problem, all of the NGOs believe that if the Burmese elections are carried out as planned in 2010 the military will strengthen its hold over the country and further weaken the democracy movement. The political NGOs such as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the National League for Democracy-Liberated Area were the most adamant on this point. International support is necessary to fund their activities, but they argue

52 that grassroots pressure from the inside is critical to achieving democratic reform in

Burma. 131

The task of strengthening Burmese human security is daunting. The multitude of forces at play and the magnitude of their interests have resulted in perpetual human rights abuses perpetrated by the Burmese military regime. Although it requires rethinking traditional security paradigms, revitalizing regional and international cooperative efforts, and increasing internal pressure for reform, it is a necessary process. The Burmese people have suffered far too much and far too long for the world to forget about them now.

131 Interviews conducted in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Mae Sot, Thailand from December 30, 2008 – January 11, 2009.

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