Engineering Intrusion Prevention Services for Iaas Clouds: the Way of the Hypervisor
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2013 IEEE Seventh International Symposium on Service-Oriented System Engineering Engineering Intrusion Prevention Services for IaaS Clouds: The Way of the Hypervisor Sylvie Laniepce Marc Lacoste Mohammed Kassi-Lahlou Fabien Bignon Kahina Lazri Aurelien Wailly Orange Labs, France {s.laniepce, marc.lacoste, mohamed.kassilahlou, fabien.bignon, kahina.lazri, aurelien.wailly}@orange.com This paper mostly focuses on server virtualization and Abstract—Strong user expectations for protecting their cloud- hosted IT systems make enhanced security a key element for on protection from intrusions at the virtual level, meaning cloud adoption. This means that cloud infrastructure security securing the user VMs. This is an emerging area for security should be guaranteed, but also that security monitoring services monitoring services, going a step beyond traditional intrusion should be correctly designed to protect the user Virtual Ma- monitoring for physical infrastructures, namely Intrusion De- chines (VMs), using Intrusion Detection and Prevention Services tection and Prevention Services (IDPS). A wide variety of ex- (IDPS). This paper gives an overview of available and emerging techniques for building intrusion monitoring services, analyzing isting approaches are applicable [4], ranging from monitoring their ability to address the VM protection requirements in a cloud intrusions from the network (network-based security), from context. While network- and host-based security monitoring are the system (host-based security), or from the virtualization shown not to be well suited for the cloud, this paper makes a layer (hypervisor-based security). Similarly, protection may be position statement, recommending a new monitoring approach, operated by different stakeholders: VM user, cloud provider, called hypervisor-based, as an alternative. This approach benefits from virtualization to monitor through the hypervisor, and from or third parties. Hence the need to get a clearer picture of the outside the user execution context, the security of computing, domain to identify the most promising designs. networking, and storage resources allocated to user VMs. Com- The objectives of this paper are to: (1) give an overview of pared to traditional IDPS designs, hypervisor-based architectures existing techniques for building intrusion monitoring services, are shown to be the most promising, greatly improving user VM and explain their limitations for protecting the virtual layer to security. This analysis also highlights the privileged role of the cloud provider to operate such type of IDPS, since it may perfom handle the change of paradigm induced by the cloud, namely integrated security monitoring as provider of both infrastructure scalability, dynamicity, multi-tenancy, and virtualization at- and security services. tributes; (2) present the emerging monitoring approach based on the hypervisor, together with a review of the associated I. INTRODUCTION monitoring architectures and their benefits; (3) provide an as- sessment of the main IDPS architectural approaches depending Cloud computing has emerged as a durable trend to pro- on which stakeholder provides intrusion monitoring services. vide, use, and manage IT resources and services. Foreseen Based on this evaluation, we make a position statement that benefits are huge, such as cost reduction, increased agility, network- and host-based security monitoring are not suitable and improved scalability. Starting from the idea of opening for the cloud, and that IDPS should be placed at the hypervisor IT systems to third parties, the cloud is either viewed as a level, as that choice provides many security benefits compared revolution introducing a major paradigm shift, or as a simple to other designs. This analysis also highlights the privileged evolution over existing practices. The real novelty of the role the cloud provider may play to operate such type of IDPS: cloud approach may be simply to view IT infrastructures and the cloud provider, both as provider of infrastructure and of services as being provided and used on-demand. security services, is then able to strengthen the security of the Unfortunately, the very nature of the cloud raises a number virtual layer thanks to integrated security monitoring. of concerns regarding protection of computing, networking, Although the paper provides insight about opportunities to and storage resources [1], [2], [3]. Thus, security is often better address intrusion prevention, i.e., reaction to intrusions, viewed as the “number one” barrier for cloud technology when computing in the cloud, we mostly focus our analysis adoption. The main threats derive from: resource sharing in on the capabilities derived from the monitoring techniques, a multi-tenant environment; new vulnerabilities introduced by namely intrusion detection1. virtualization; and dissolved organization perimeters, bound- The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec- aries becoming logical instead of physical. Hence the difficulty tion II provides background on IaaS infrastructure security and to place perimeter protections when workloads are time- IDPS techniques. Section III analyzes intrusion monitoring dynamic, distributed through the cloud, and internally exposed requirements derived from the cloud attributes. Section IV to co-localized workloads, with direct impacts on the security 1Throughout the paper, the acronym IDPS is used whenever the discussion of the user virtual machines (VMs). In-depth rethinking of applies to both detection and prevention. Otherwise, IDS or IPS are respec- security is thus required. tively used when examining specifically detection or prevention. 978-0-7695-4944-6/12 $26.00 © 2012 IEEE 25 DOI 10.1109/SOSE.2013.27 Fig. 1. Elements of a IaaS Infrastructure. reviews the limitations of traditional IDPS techniques when The virtualization layer enables to deploy and run con- applied to the cloud setting. Section V presents the hypervisor- currently the VMs on a same physical host, through virtu- based monitoring approach enabling to meet cloud protection alization [7]. This task is performed by a specific component, requirements. Section VI provides an overview of how those the hypervisor (also named VMM, for Virtual Machine Mon- principles are applied in current systems with an assessment itor), which manages the allocation of the physical machine of the main architectural approaches. Finally, Section VII resources among VM instances. It notably guarantees strict presents some future directions, notably discussing the most isolation between VMs. The hypervisor can also establish promising technical approach available to a cloud provider to virtual networks (vNetwork) for the VMs to communicate monitor intrusions in IaaS clouds. through a low-level software bus, the virtual switch (vSwitch). II. BACKGROUND ON IAAS AND THREAT MONITORING The physical layer consists of computing (CPU, memory), A. IaaS Infrastructure networking, and storage resources distributed over the cloud infrastructure. Those hardware resources are virtualized and This paper focuses on the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) shared among VMs by the virtualization layer. service delivery model [5]. A IaaS infrastructure lets users rent computing, networking, and storage resources. They may B. Threats then deploy and run arbitrary software (including their own In the cloud, some of the key security concerns are: multi- OS). Hardware and low-level software management remain tenancy, resources being shared among multiple tenants with in the provider’s hands. One of the most emblematic IaaS possibly conflicting interests; new vulnerabilities introduced infrastructures is Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) by virtualization; dissolved organization boundaries, making platform [6]. it more difficult to define the “inside” and the “outside” of a IaaS is the foundation of most cloud services, including: network, and to place counter-measures to guarantee perimeter Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) which lets users deploy in the security – and more generally resource isolation; and loss cloud their own applications, created using development en- of control over outsourced applications and data, resources vironments and tools supported by the cloud provider; and running, moving, and being stored in shared environments. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) which gives users access to For a IaaS infrastructure, those concerns materialize by a the provider’s applications running in the cloud. Therefore, wide array of threats, described next. advances in IaaS security monitoring will also benefit to PaaS a) VM-to-VM attacks: A malicious VM may attempt and SaaS services. to fool the IaaS VM placement strategy to run on the same A IaaS cloud is organized in three main software and physical machine as the attack target (another VM). It may hardware layers, as shown in Figure 1. then take advantage of a flaw in hypervisor isolation to launch The virtual layer is composed of multiple instances of a a side-channel attack to steal / corrupt information from the software stack (applications, middleware, and OS) in the form target VM [8], [9]. of Virtual Machines (VMs). Among these VMs, the user VMs b) Hypervisor subversion: More potent attacks attempt contain the user code and data which may be security sensitive. to take control of the hypervisor itself from a malicious VM The various VMs belonging to a given user viewed as a whole (hyperjacking). Such attacks undermine the commonly estab- is often called the user workload. It may be