DOCSLIB.ORG

Time and Identity

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Time and Identity Time and Identity edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England © 2010 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or informa- tion storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. For information, please email [email protected] . edu or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cam- bridge, MA 02142. This book was set in Stone and Stone Sans by Westchester Book Group. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Time and identity / edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein. p. cm.—(Topics in contemporary philosophy) “A Bradford book.” Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-262-01409-0 (hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-262-51397-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Time. 2. Identity (Philosophical concept). 3. Self (Philosophy). 4. Death. I. Campbell, Joseph Keim, 1958–. II. O’Rourke, Michael, 1963–. III. Silverstein, Harry, 1942–. BD638.T5437 2010 115—dc22 2009041935 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Index Abelard, Peter, 20 Awareness, judgmental, 32–33, 44 Action(s), 5, 15, 90, 149–150, 152–157, Ayers, Michael, 195 161, 232, 236–237, 239, 241–242, 244–246, 303, 313 Bach, Kent, 126 executable, 232, 237, 239, 244 Bacon, John, 146 normally self-effecting, 232, 236, Baker, Lynne Rudder, 44, 188 239 Barresi, John, 19 responsibility for, 5, 15, 90, 149–150, Bayle, Pierre, 179 152–157, 313 Bennett, Jonathan, 16, 170, 179, 204 Actualism, 13, 97–102, 105–107, Bergmann, Michael, 97 108 Bigelow, John, 95, 280 predicate, 98, 108 Black, Max, 19 property, 13, 97–102, 107, 108 Blanchette, Patricia, 45 world, 99–102, 105–107 Bodies, 5, 165–166, 168–169, 172, 175, Agency, 17–18, 151–152, 160, 221, 176, 178, 180, ch. 9 passim , 222, 237 245–246, 303 Bonnen, Clarence, 179 centers of, 17–18, 245–246 Borges, Jorge, 238 Alston, William, 204 Boundary, 79–81, 91, 202, 206, 212, Ambiguity, 86, 116–125, 225 220–225, 226, 285–286 Anscombe, G. E. M., 17, 209–210, 212, Bradley, Ben, 279, 280, 284, 287, 220, 224, 225 288–291, 292, 293–294, 295 Apresjan, Juri, 116 Brandt, Richard, 266 Aquinas, Thomas, 173, 180 Broad, C. D., 43 Aristotle, 19, 20, 50–51, 54, 56–57, Broome, John, 258, 266 59–60, 62–64, 67, 72, 74, 312 B-series, 2–3, 11, 27–34, 41–44 Armstrong, David, 146 Burman, Frans, 173–174 Arnauld, Antoine, 165–166, 172–173, Butler, Joseph, 5, 21 176 Bykvist, Kryster, 265, 266 A-series, 2–3, 11, 27–34, 41–44 Auden, W. H., 27 Campbell, John, 280 Augustine of Hippo, 1 Carter, William, 66–68, 74, 75, 195 324 Index Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 230–233 Dennett, Daniel, 22, 223 Chalmers, David, 189 Descartes, René, 8, 10, 15–16, 17, ch. 8 Change, 2–3, 7–9, 10, 13–14, 16, 28, passim , 209–210, 216, 220, 222, 224, 39–40, 42, 45, ch. 2 passim , 105, 106, 225 ch. 5 passim , 136, 165–166, 169–170, Desgabets, Robert, 180 171, 178, 188–189, 197, 200, 204, Designation, 98–99, 101, 108 258, 263, 313–314, 318 Desires, 18, 193–194, 239, 241–242, Cambridge/relational, 73, 258, 263 243, 244, 245–246, ch. 12 passim Chesterfi eld, Lord/4th Earl of (Philip Desire theory. See Welfare, desire Stanhope), 249, 254–255 satisfaction account/theory of Chierchia, Gennaro, 91 Determinism/indeterminism, 43, 90, Chisholm, Roderick, 20, 82, 95, 197 162 Clapp, Lenny, 119 Domain, the, 35–39 Clarke, Randolph, 161 Draper, Kai, 279, 280 Class, 58–66, 69, 74, 98–99, 101 Duplication, 10, 20, 100–102, 105, 106, master, 58–66, 74 107, 141, 192, 314, 316–317. See also membership, 58–66, 69, 74, 98–99, Fission 101 Cogito argument, ch. 10 passim Earman, John, 21 Common ground, 13, 79–83, 85–90, Edwards, Johnathan, 176–177, 179 91, 92 Ehring, Douglas, 146 Conditionals, subjunctive, 82–83, 91 Einstein, Albert, 12 Consciousness, 5, 155–157, 190. See also Endurantism, 9, 14, 126, 150, 162, 179. Self-consciousness See also Three-dimensionalism Contextualism, 12–13, ch. 3 passim , Epicurean view. See Death, evil/badness 120–122, 127, 215 of, Epicurean view Continuants, 14, 15, 92, 150–151, 156, Epicurus, 18, 19, 254, 264, 271, 274, 210, 216, 218, 220 279, 283–284 Coreference, 6, 13, 113, 118, 120, 213, Essence, individual, 16, 95, 170–175, 215 180, 181 Craig, William Lane, 43, 162 Eternalism, 3–4, 9, 11–12, 18, 21, 27, 29, Crimmins, Mark, 241 34–35, 39–41, 43, 44, 45, ch. 2 Crisp, Oliver, 179 passim , ch. 13 passim. See also Crisp, Thomas, 19, 43, 97 Four-dimensionalism Evans, Gareth, 212, 217, 219, 225, 226 David, Marian, 45 Events, 2–3, 11, 28, 31, 32, 41, 44, 45, Davidson, Matthew, 97 52, 73, 92, 130, 135, 136, 143, 146, Death, evil/badness of, 18–19, 192–193, 221, 262–263, 272–275, 300–301, 254, 264, chs. 13–15 passim 303, 304 Epicurean view (EV), 18–19, 254, 264, Every Harm Is a Living State principle 271, 274, 279, 283–284 (EHILS), 303, 304–306 time of, chs. 13–14 passim Every Harm Needs a Condition Demonstratives, 119, 211–212 principle (EHNAC), 305–306 Index 325 Evils/harms, 18–19, 249–250, 257, 259, vs. three-dimensional (3D) frame- 264, 265, chs. 13–15 passim work, 285–287, 290 deprivation, of, 274–275 vs. zero-dimensional (0D) framework, posthumous, 18–19, 257, 259, 264, 285–287, 290 265, chs. 13–15 passim Four-dimensionalism, or the 4D view, prenatal, 290–291 9, 14, 20, 55, 104, 129, 130–131, 141, recipients of (“evil/bad for”), 18–19, 142–143, 144, 145, 147, 152, 179, 201, chs. 13–15 passim 271, 277, 279, 284–287, 289, 290, time of, chs. 13–14 passim 292–293, 294, 295. See also Eternal- timeless/atemporal, 273–274, 277, ch. ism; Perdurantism 14 passim Four-dimensional objects, 150, Existence, 7–8, 11–12, 20, 28, 34–42, 152–158 44, 45, ch. 2 passim , 95–98, 102, 106, Fowler, Gregory, 161 107, 108, 130, 133, 142–143, 167, Freedom, 11, 12, 79, 86–89, 90 173–175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 186, paradox, 79, 86–89 192–197, 202, 205, 209–210, 218, time-traveler, 79, 86–89 220–222, 224–225, 274–275, Frege, Gottlob, 20, 124, 198, 210, 212, 285–286 224, 225, 239 -at-t , 34–42, 45, ch. 2 passim , 205 Fusion, 21, 194, 203, 260 eminent, 174–175, 181 formal, 173–175, 180, 181 Gale, Richard, 43 objective, 173–175 Gassendi, Pierre, 167, 177, 180 simpliciter , 34–42, 45, 66–69, 75 Geach, Peter, 198 Gibbard, Allan, 199 Fatalism, 12, 43, 79, 84–86 Ginet, Carl, 79, 90 Feelings, causes of vs. objects of, Glannon, Walter, 151–152, 161 271–273, 284, 292–293 Gödel, Kurt, 12, 21 Feinberg, Joel, 259–260, 265, 301, 302, Goldman, Alvin, 299 307 Goodman, Nelson, 82 Feit, Neil, 279 Goods/benefi ts, 18, 19, 194, ch. 12 Feldman, Fred, 279, 280, 287–288, 294 passim , 272, 274, 275, 283, 290, 292, Fine, Kit, 97, 99–100, 101 294, 300–301, 303–304 First-person memory. See Memory, posthumous, 257–264, 283, 290, 292, fi rst-person 294, 303–304 Fission, or fi ssion problem, 10, 14, 21, recipients of (“good for”), 19, ch. 12 141, 143, 147, 192–194, 203–204, 223, passim , 272, 274, 275, 283, 290, 292, 260, 317 294, 300–301, 303–304 Flage, Daniel, 179 time of, 257–264 Fodor, Jerry, 118 Grandfather paradox, 12–13, 80–81, Forbes, Graham, 97, 108 83, 86–87, 88–89 Four-dimensional (4D) framework, Grey, William, 279 277, 284–287, 289, 290, 292–293, Grover, Dorothy, 303 294, 295 Grünbaum, Adolf, 32, 33, 43, 44 326 Index Haksar, Vinit, 153, 158, 159, 161 Indifference (as “middle” or “zero” Hanley, Richard, 298 value between good and bad), Harman, Gilbert, 280 275–276, 279, 289–290, 294–295 Haslanger, Sally, 161 Individuals, past, 95, 97, 104–105, 106, Hawley, Katherine, 20, 161 107 Hawthorne, John, 1, 19 Heller, Mark, 161 Jackendoff, Ray, 127 Helm, Paul, 177, 179 Jackson, Frank, 189 Heraclitus, 7, 12, 49–50, 52, 73 James, William, 212–213, 222, 224, Hestevold, H. Scott, 66–68, 74, 75 225, 226 Hinchliff, Mark, 21, 97, 108, 109 Janernig, Anja, 44 Hobbes, Thomas, 20 Johansson, Jens, 279 Hudson, Hud, 97 Johnson, Samuel, 249, 254–255 Hume, David, 10, 170, 179, 200, 221, 229, 242 Kant, Immanuel, 212, 217, 229, 299 Kaplan, David, 30, 211 ‘I’, 16–17, 171–173, 175, 180, 197–203, Katz, Jerrold, 126 204, 205–206, 210–213, 216–219, Keller, Simon, 21, 108, 265 220–221, 223–224, 236–237 Kim, Jaegwon, 45, 136, 146, 298 -elimination, 236–237 Knowledge, 17, 172, 174, 181, 189, -introduction/addition, 236–237 195–196, 198, 199, 200, 209–210, -thoughts, 16–17, 197–198, 210, 216, 212, 214–216, 217, 223, 221, 224–225, 220–221, 224 226, 230–232, 233–239, 240, 242 Ideas, 173, 174, 177, 196, 204, 214, from the inside, 216, 221, 233–234 216–218, 220, 239, 241–242 from a perspective, 234–239, 240 Identity, ch. 1 passim , 98–99, 101, self-, 17, 172, 198, 199, 200, 209–210, 102–105, chs.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Towards a Methodology for Ontology Based Model Engineering
    Towards a methodology for ontology based model engineering Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty† LADSEB/CNR Padova, Italy {guarino,welty}@ladseb.pd.cnr.it http://www.ladseb.pd.cnr.it/infor/ontology/ontology.html Phone: +39 049 829 57 51 Fax: +39 049 829 57 63 † on sabbatical from Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY Abstract The Formal Tools of Ontological Analysis The philosophical discipline of Ontology is evolving towards an engineering discipline, and in this evolution the Our methodology is based on four fundamental ontologi- need for a principled methodology has clearly arisen. In cal notions, which will be discussed in this section: identity, this paper, we briefly discuss our recent work towards devel- unity, rigidity, and dependence. We shall represent the oping a methodology for ontology-based model engineering. behavior of a property with respect to these notions by This methodology builds on previous methodology efforts, means of a set of meta-properties. Our goal is to show how and is founded on important analytic notions that have been these meta-properties impose some constraints on the way drawn from Philosophy and adapted to Engineering: identity, subsumption is used to model a domain. unity, rigidity, and dependence. We demonstrate how these techniques can be used to analyze properties, which clarifies many misconceptions about taxonomies and helps bring substantial order to ontologies. Preliminaries Let’s assume we have a first-order language L0 (the model- Introduction ing language) whose intended domain is the world to be modeled, and another first order language (the meta-lan- Ontologies are becoming increasingly popular in prac- L1 tice, and the number of poor quality ontologies have made guage) whose constant symbols are the predicates of L0.
    [Show full text]
  • Out of Sorts? Remedies for Theories of Object
    Out of Sorts? Some Remedies for Theories of Object Concepts: A Reply to Rhemtulla and Xu Sergey V. Blok University of Texas at Austin George E. Newman Yale University Lance J. Rips Northwestern University Psychological Review, in press. Out of Sorts? / 2 Abstract Concepts of individual objects (e.g., a favorite chair or pet) include knowledge that allows people to identify these objects, sometimes after long stretches of time. In an earlier article, we set out experimental findings and mathematical modeling to support the view that judgments of identity depend on people’s beliefs about the causal connections that unite an object’s earlier and later stages. In this article, we examine Rhemtulla and Xu’s (in press) critique of the causal theory. We argue that Rhemtulla and Xu’s alternative sortal proposal is not a necessary part of identity judgments, is internally inconsistent, leads to conflicts with current theories of categories, and encounters problems explaining empirical dissociations. Previous evidence also suggests that causal factors dominate spatiotemporal continuity and perceptual similarity in direct tests. We conclude that the causal theory provides the only existing account consistent with current evidence. Keywords: Concepts Causation Sortals Object concepts Out of Sorts? / 3 Out of Sorts? Some Remedies for Theories of Object Concepts: A Reply to Rhemtulla and Xu Many objects persist over stretches of time too long for us to track perceptually. If you attend your thirtieth high school reunion, you’re bound to run into classmates like Fred Lugbagg whom you haven’t encountered since graduation and whose perceptual appearance is no more similar to the 18-year- old Lugbagg than is the appearance of most of the other males at the reunion.
    [Show full text]
  • Parts of Persons Identity and Persistence in a Perdurantist World
    UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences (XXXI Cycle) Department of Philosophy “Piero Martinetti” Parts of Persons Identity and persistence in a perdurantist world Ph.D. Candidate Valerio BUONOMO Tutors Prof. Giuliano TORRENGO Prof. Paolo VALORE Coordinator of the Doctoral School Prof. Marcello D’AGOSTINO Academic year 2017-2018 1 Content CONTENT ........................................................................................................................... 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER 1. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND PERSISTENCE...................................................................... 8 1.1. The persistence of persons and the criteria of identity over time .................................. 8 1.2. The accounts of personal persistence: a standard classification ................................... 14 1.2.1. Mentalist accounts of personal persistence ............................................................................ 15 1.2.2. Somatic accounts of personal persistence .............................................................................. 15 1.2.3. Anti-criterialist accounts of personal persistence ................................................................... 16 1.3. The metaphysics of persistence: the mereological account .........................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: the Possibility of Time Travel
    University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well Honors Capstone Projects Student Scholarship 2017 The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: The Possibility of Time Travel Ramitha Rupasinghe University of Minnesota, Morris, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/honors Part of the Philosophy Commons, and the Physics Commons Recommended Citation Rupasinghe, Ramitha, "The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: The Possibility of Time Travel" (2017). Honors Capstone Projects. 1. https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/honors/1 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Philosophy and Physics of Time Travel: The possibility of time travel Ramitha Rupasinghe IS 4994H - Honors Capstone Project Defense Panel – Pieranna Garavaso, Michael Korth, James Togeas University of Minnesota, Morris Spring 2017 1. Introduction Time is mysterious. Philosophers and scientists have pondered the question of what time might be for centuries and yet till this day, we don’t know what it is. Everyone talks about time, in fact, it’s the most common noun per the Oxford Dictionary. It’s in everything from history to music to culture. Despite time’s mysterious nature there are a lot of things that we can discuss in a logical manner. Time travel on the other hand is even more mysterious.
    [Show full text]
  • Bergsoniana, 1
    Bergsoniana 1 | 2021 Reassessing Bergson Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence Questions Florian Fischer Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/448 DOI: 10.4000/bergsoniana.448 ISSN: 2800-874X Publisher Société des amis de Bergson Electronic reference Florian Fischer, “Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence Questions”, Bergsoniana [Online], 1 | 2021, Online since 01 July 2021, connection on 14 September 2021. URL: http:// journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/448 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.448 Les contenus de la revue sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International. BERGSONIAN ANSWERS TO CONTEMPORARY PERSISTENCE QUESTIONS Florian FISCHER Introduction Time is one of the central topics of contemporary analytic philosophy, and Henri Bergson is one of the most important philosophers of time, but still Bergson plays virtually no role in the contemporary analytic debate about time. In contrast to his poor reception,1 Henri Bergson has a lot to offer analytic philosophy, as I will argue. More precisely, I will illustrate what the debates about persistence and ontology of time might gain from incorporating Bergsonian ideas. To do so, I will first investigate persistence, i.e., existence through time. The focal point of the contemporary analytic debate is how to conceptualise change without letting the involved incompatibilities lead to a logical contradiction. This can be called a horizontal way of posing the question, namely, how to reconcile two incompatible properties had by one entity at two points in time. Bergson famously asserted that objects are ontologically secondary, mind- dependent abstractions from an underlying dynamic reality.
    [Show full text]
  • Four-Dimensionalism, Eternalism, and Deprivationist Accounts of the Evil of Death
    Synthese https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03393-0 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Four-dimensionalism, eternalism, and deprivationist accounts of the evil of death Andrew Brenner1 Received: 22 June 2021 / Accepted: 28 August 2021 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021 Abstract Four-dimensionalists think that we persist over time by having different temporal parts at each of the times at which we exist. Eternalists think that all times are equally real. Deprivationists think that death is an evil for the one who dies because it deprives them of something. I argue that four-dimensionalist eternalism, conjoined with a standard deprivationist account of the evil of death, has surprising implications for what we should think about the evil of death. In particular, given these assumptions, we will lack any grounds for thinking that death is an evil for some individuals for whom we would antecedently expect it to be an evil, namely those individuals who cease to exist at death. Alternatively, we will only have some grounds for thinking that death is an evil for certain individuals for whom we might antecedently be more inclined to think death is not an evil, namely those individuals who survive death, in the sense that they continue to exist after death. Keywords Death · Evil of death · Four-dimensionalism · Eternalism · Perdurantism · Stage theory 1 Introduction According to four-dimensionalism, things which persist over time do so by hav- ing temporal parts at each of the times at which they exist. Four-dimensionalism is almost always conjoined with an eternalist temporal ontology, according to which past, present, and future things are equally real.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic Philosophy (PHIL 10197) Course Organiser: Fedor Benevich
    Islamic Philosophy (PHIL 10197) Course Organiser: Fedor Benevich Email: [email protected] Office Hours: Thursday 10-12am, signup via doodle at least 8hrs in advance. Course Secretary: Ann-Marie Cowe Email: [email protected] Course Description: This course will provide a systematic introduction to key issues and debates in Islamic philosophy by focusing on the medieval period and showing its relevance for contemporary philosophical discussions. It will explore the mechanisms of the critical appropriation of the Western (Greek) philosophical heritage in the Islamic intellectual tradition and the relationship between philosophy and religion in Islam. Islamic philosophy is the missing link between ancient Greek thought and the European (medieval and early modern) philosophical tradition. It offers independent solutions to many philosophical problems which remain crucial for contemporary readers. Starting with a historical overview of the most important figures and schools, this course covers central topics of Islamic philosophy, such as (the selection of topics may vary from year to year): - faith and reason - philosophy and political authority - free will and determinism (incl. the problem of evil) - scientific knowledge and empiricism - materialism (atomism) and sortal essentialism - self-awareness, personal identity, and the immateriality of soul - proofs for God's existence Primary sources will be read in English translation. Learning Outcomes: On completion of this course, the student will be able to: 1. Demonstrate knowledge of the central issues of Islamic philosophy 2. Analyse materials independently and critically engage with other interpretations 3. Provide systematic exposition and argumentation for their views 4. Demonstrate understanding of a non-Western intellectual tradition Topics and Readings: Week 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World
    Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World Clare Due A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University March 2018 © Clare Due 2018 Statement This thesis is solely the work of its author. No part of it has previously been submitted for any degree, or is currently being submitted for any other degree. To the best of my knowledge, any help received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used, have been duly acknowledged. Word count: 88164 Clare Due 7th March 2018 Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful to Daniel Nolan for the years of support he has given me while writing this thesis. His supervision has always been challenging yet encouraging, and I have benefited greatly from his insight and depth of knowledge. His kindness and empathy also played a large role in making a difficult process much easier. My second supervisor, Alan Hájek, agreed to take me on late in my program, and has been enormously generous with his time and help since. The community of philosophers at the Australian National University provides the perfect combination of intellectual development, friendship and personal support. I consider myself very privileged to have had the opportunity to be part of that community. My research has benefited from feedback both written and verbal from many ANU philosophers, including Daniel Stoljar, Frank Jackson, Jessica Isserow, Edward Elliott, Don Nordblom, Heather Browning and Erick Llamas. I would like to offer particular thanks to Alexander Sandgren. I learned an enormous amount during the first years of my program, and a great deal of it was in conversation with Alex.
    [Show full text]
  • Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time
    Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time 1 Introduction It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission. The possibility of travelling back in time to a period in which one’s earlier self or one’s ancestors exist, raises a number of well-worn problems (Grey, 1999; Chambers, 1999; Horwich, 1975 and Sider, 2002). In this paper I am concerned with only one of these: how is it that an object can travel back in time to meet its earlier self, thus existing at two different spatial locations at one and the same time? Four-dimensionalists have an easy answer to this question.
    [Show full text]
  • Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second1
    1 Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the 1 unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second Forthcoming in Philosophia Naturalis Mauro Dorato (Ph.D) Department of Philosophy University of Rome Three [email protected] tel. +393396070133 http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/filosofia/personale/doratoweb.htm Abstract The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”. In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred. The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”.
    [Show full text]
  • Just What Is the Relation Between the Manifest and the Scientific Images? Comments on Brandom
    Just What is the Relation between the Manifest and the Scientific Images? Comments on Brandom I. Introduction The last half of the (long) first chapter of Brandom’s From Empiricism to Expressivism constitutes an extended argument against one half of Wilfrid Sellars’s version of scientific realism. I say ‘half’ of Sellarsian scientific realism because Brandom agrees with Sellars’s anti-instrumentalism. The half Brandom takes issue with is Sellars’s claim that the “scientific image” [SI] —an idealized, complete scientific framework for the description and explanation of all natural events and objects—possesses such ontological priority over the “manifest image” [MI]—itself an idealization of the ‘commonsense’ framework of persons and things in terms of which we currently experience ourselves and the world—that it will come to replace the MI in all matters of explanation and description. Brandom’s argument against this Sellarsian idea is rather roundabout. First, he traces Sellars’s distinction between the MI and the SI back to the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Then he argues against several attempts to understand identity claims across disparate frameworks. Neither, claims Brandom, will permit us to identify objects across the MI/SI divide. But if we cannot identify the objects of concern across the frameworks, then a shift from the MI to the SI is not a form of replacement of one framework by a better, but simply a change of subject that poses no threat to the MI. The overall argument of the chapter is that, though what Sellars made of the Kantian notion of a category is a very Good Idea, Sellars’s assimilation of scientific realism to a kind of transcendental realism in Kant’s sense, is a Bad Idea with a muddled basis and unworkable consequences.
    [Show full text]
  • P(X)]( Y Exists(Y)]) = 9X Snow(X)
    Existential sentences without existential quanti cation Louise McNally Universitat Pomp eu Fabra 1. Intro duction 1 In a chapter on existence statements in Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Strawson makes the following observation: we can...admit the p ossibility of another formulation of existentially quanti ed statement[s], and, with it, the p ossibility of another use of the word `exists'....We can, that is to say, reconstrue every such quanti ed prop osition as a sub ject-predicate prop osition in whichthe sub ject is a prop erty or concept and in which the predicate declares, or denies, its instantiation. (Strawson 1959:241) In other words, there are twoways to express a prop osition whose truth entails the existence of some token entity (or particular, to use Strawson's terminology). Supp ose we take the following there-existential sentence as an example: (1) There was snow. We might, mo difying slightly the analysis in Barwise and Co op er 1981, inter- pret There was as an existence predicate and snow as an existential quanti er over particulars (represented logically in (2)): (2) P [9x[snow(x) ^ P (x)](y [exists(y )]) = 9x[snow(x) ^ exists(x)] Alternatively,we might (essentially equivalently) interpret Therewasas if it were synonymous with the predicate to be instantiated, a predicate that holds of expressions interpreted as prop erties or as what Strawson calls nonparticulars, e.g. as in (3)a. Presumably,itwould b e true that the snow-prop erty is instantiated i some particular, one that is a quantity of snow, exists (i.e.
    [Show full text]