DOCSLIB.ORG

The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1989 The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law Richard A. Epstein Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Epstein, "The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law," 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 711 (1989). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 10 SYMPOSIUM ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENTIALIST ANALYSES HeinOnline -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 711 1989 0Q HeinOnline -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 712 1989 THE UTILITARIAN FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL LAW RICHARD A. EPSTEIN* Contemporary thinking about rights draws a sharp line be- tween deontological and consequentialist ethical theories. De- ontological theories are associated with the natural law tradition as it has developed in this century, while consequen- tialist theories may be conveniently, if inexactly, grouped as utilitarian. The points of opposition between these approaches have been so often rehearsed that it is only necessary to sum- marize them briefly here. Natural rights theories regard them- selves as theories of individual entitlement, not as theories of social good. Their emphasis on the justice of the individual case, the intimate connection between the doer and the sufferer of harm, makes them overtly anti-instrumental in orientation.' They disavow the idea that the consequences of any legal rule could justify its adoption or rejection. Taken to its logical ex- treme, these natural law theories have-or at least ought to have-as their central maxim, fiatjustitia ruat coelum, let justice be done though the heavens may fall: if consequences never count, then disastrous consequences cannot count either. Natural rights theories employ a terminology that often bor- ders upon the obscure. Some special thing, property, quality or attribute is all too often "immanent" or "inherent" in some- thing else.2 While natural lawyers recognize the difference be- tween analytical and empirical truths, they often strive to identify a grand set of necessary empirical truths about human nature that are not made, but rather are discovered through some combination of introspection, observation, and rational * James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi- cago. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the School of Law of The Hebrew University in Jerusalem in March, 1988, and at Vanderbilt University Law School in November, 1988. I thank Randy Barnett, Loren Lomasky, Richard A. Posner, and Lloyd Weinreb for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. 1. "In the common-law world generally, tort law treats the two litigants as connected one with the other through an immediate personal interaction as doer and sufferer of the same harm." Weinrib, The InsuranceJustiflcation and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUmD. 681, 683 (1985); see also Weinrib, Legal Formalism- On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE Li. 949 (1988). 2. "From the first, the idea of a normative order immanent in nature was a funda- mental element of classical Greek speculation." L. WEINREB, NATuRAL LAW ANDJUSSTCE 15 (1987); see also sources cited supra note 1. HeinOnline -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 713 1989 714 HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12 discourse.3 The synthetic a priori of Kant is not, or at least not obviously, an empty category for thinkers in the natural rights tradition. The contingent and variegated elements of human life and experience are subordinated to those elements that are perceived as permanent, general, and inescapable, if not di- vinely revealed.4 The study of differences in culture and laws, first made popular by Montesquieu in his Spirit of the Laws,' is viewed by them with suspicion because of its implicit attack on the universality of the legal order whose basic intellectual sub- strate spans the generations and crosses the seas. A couple of sentences of Leo Strauss sum up the position: By natural law is meant a law which determines what is right and wrong and which has power or is valid by nature, inher- ently, hence everywhere and always.... Natural right is that right which has everywhere the same power and does not owe its validity to human enactment.... Natural right thus understood delineates the minimum conditions of political life ....6 No modesty here. Notwithstanding the breadth of their claims, natural lawyers today are often quite defensive about what they do.7 While they pride themselves in a program that is abstract, ambitious, aus- tere, and rigorous, they recognize that they are the devoted champions of a minority outlook. To them, modem legal and ethical thinking is dominated by a dreaded reliance upon cost- benefit calculations, realism, pragmatism, instrumentalism and social planning. Nonetheless they persevere, stoically confident 3. See, for example, J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 283-84 (1980), which heavily emphasizes the importance of "practical reasonableness." Finnis's posi- tion is criticized for its incompleteness in L. WEINREB, supra note 2. at 112-15. 4. "[C]lassical doctrinal legal science required a deontological theory of morality, and... the deontological foundation of natural law was provided by the idea of the divine will ...." N. SIMMONDs, THE DECLINE OF JURIDICAL REASON: DoCTRINE AND THEORY IN THE LE6AL ORDER 57 (1984). 5. See C. MoNTsE.UIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (A. Cohler, B. Miller & H. Stone trans. 1989) (1748). 6. L STRAUSS, On Natural Law, in STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 137, 140 (1983). Although Strauss is a unique philosopher, his position is widespread in the natural law tradition. Thus Blackstone writes: This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or intermediately, from this original. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41. See also the passage from Gaius, at infra note 41. 7. See, e.g., J. FINNIS, supra note 3, at 120. HeinOnline -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 714 1989 No. 3] Utilitarian.Foundations of Natural Law 715 that with suitable explication their necessary truths about human and legal relations may perhaps in time become our conventional truths as well. Utilitarianism for its part makes light of what it regards as the exaggerated pretensions of natural law theories. Jeremy Ben- tham, for example, regarded himself as the mortal adversary of the lawyer Blackstone,s so much so that natural law was in his view not only "nonsense, but nonsense on stilts"-so as to cap- ture the ungainliness of natural law in a derisive phrase. The hostility towards natural law begins with the obvious point that it is odd to "find" law "out there" like a rock or a stone, or even as a necessary constituent of a human relationship. Laws are something made by men for the governance of mankind. There is a need to escape what Laurence Becker has aptly called "the rigidity and ultimate mystery of seventeenth-cen- tury natural rights theory."' While all utilitarians may not agree with John Austin that law is the command of the sovereign, -they do regard the dominant mark of law as power, not reason. Be that as it may, there is a second truth as well. The survival of past societies has depended heavily upon their choice of laws, just as our survival and prosperity is heavily dependent upon the choices, often conscious and deliberate, that are made to- day. Utilitarianism is thus concerned not only with general principles of right and wrong, but also with historical context and institutional arrangements. Law is more than what is writ- ten on the statute books. Utilitarianism also rejects the intuitionism to which natural lawyers gravitate. In examining this complex of legal and social institutions that surrounds the law as such, modern consequen- tialist theories place heavy emphasis upon the maximization of some social good. The choice of happiness, utility, or wealth raise important controversies within the consequentialist school, but these divisions pale in comparison to the starker opposition with classical theories of natural law and natural right. If the classical philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke lies at the root of natural law, then utilitarianism de- 8. On the rivalry, see Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569 (1976). 9. L BECKER, PROPERTY RIGms: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 4 (1977). Becker is willing to spread the criticism around, for the sentence continues, "as well as of the ruthlessly forward-looking concerns of utilitarian and socialist theories." Id Most so- cialist theories do invoke some utilitarian standard, and fail because the set of institu- tions that they envision fares poorly by any utilitarian criterion. HeinOnline -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 715 1989 716 HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12 pends upon the skepticism of David Hume, the economics of Adam Smith, the indefatigable curiosity of Bentham, and the social cost calculations of Ronald Coase. This brief thumbnail sketch deliberately ignores or down- plays important differences within both the natural law and util- itarian camps. Although for some purposes those tensions might be important, in this context they are not. Enough has been said to indicate that apparently there is fundamental con- flict between these two schools of Western thought that cannot be ignored or papered over.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law Methodology
    The Naturalistic Fallacy and Natural Law Methodology W. Matthews Grant It is customary to divide contemporary natural law theorists-at least those working broadly within the Thomistic tradition-into two main camps. In one camp are those such as John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Robert George, who deny that a natural law ethics need base itself on premises supplied by a methodologically prior philosophical anthropol­ ogy. According to these thinkers, practical reason, when reflecting on experience and considering possible ends of action, grasps in a non-in­ ferential act of understanding certain basic goods that ought to be pursued. Since these goods are not deduced, demonstrated, or derived from prior premises, they provide a set of self-evident or per se nota primary pre­ cepts from which all other precepts of the natural law may be derived. Because these primary precepts or basic goods are self-evident, natural law theorizing need not wait on the findings of anthropologists and phi­ losophers of human nature. 1 A rival school of natural law ethicists, comprised of such thinkers as Russell Bittinger, Ralph Mcinerny, Henry Veatch andAnthony Lisska, rejects the claims of Finnis and his colleagues for the autonomy of natural law I. For major statements and defenses of this position see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, I980); Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus~ vol. I, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, I983);. Robert P. George, "Recent Criticism of Natural Law
    [Show full text]
  • Thomist Natural Law
    The Catholic Lawyer Volume 8 Number 1 Volume 8, Winter 1962, Number 1 Article 5 Thomist Natural Law Joaquin F. Garcia, C.M. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl Part of the Catholic Studies Commons This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THOMIST NATURAL LAW JOAQUIN F. GARCIA, C.M.* N THE Summer 1960 edition of The Catholic Lawyer, Dr. R. D. Lumb, a Lecturer in Law at the University of Queensland, had an article entitled "Natural Law - An Unchanging Standard?", in which he con- sidered the doctrines of two thinkers, St. Thomas and Suarez. It is the opinion of this writer that as far as Thomist Natural Law is concerned, Dr. Lumb could have omitted the question mark. It is an unchanging standard. Dr. Lumb set himself the task of ascertaining whether the traditional Thomist system takes into account the variables to be found in any system of rules or institutions. The Thomist system of law does take account of the variables but through positive law, through the application of the universal Natural Law principles to particular changing conditions. By no means does it replace positive law. Unlike 18th century rationalis- tic Natural Law which often ignored experience, which often contained personal, social and political programs, and which often was not Natural Law at all but positive law under a Natural Law label, Thomist Natural Law offers the widest scope for positive law and stresses the importance of experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Cicero and St. Augustine's Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea Berit Van Neste University of South Florida
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 4-12-2006 Cicero and St. Augustine's Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea Berit Van Neste University of South Florida Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the American Studies Commons, and the Religion Commons Scholar Commons Citation Neste, Berit Van, "Cicero and St. Augustine's Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea" (2006). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3782 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Cicero and St. Augustine's Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea by Berit Van Neste A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Religious Studies College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: James F. Strange, Ph.D. Paul G. Schneider, Ph.D. Michael J. Decker, Ph.D. Date of Approval: April 12, 2006 Keywords: theology, philosophy, politics, patristic, medieval © Copyright 2006 , Berit Van Neste For Elizabeth and Calista Table of Contents Abstract ii Chapter 1 1 Introduction 1 Cicero’s Influence on Augustine 7 Chapter 2 13 Justice 13 Natural and Temporal Law 19 Commonwealth 34 Chapter 3 49 Just War 49 Chapter 4 60 Conclusion 60 References 64 i Cicero and St.
    [Show full text]
  • Mood-Consciousness and Architecture
    Mood-Consciousness and Architecture Mood-Consciousness and Architecture: A Phenomenological Investigation of Therme Vals by way of Martin Heidegger’s Interpretation of Mood A Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER of SCIENCE in ARCHITECTURE In the School of Architecture and Interior Design of the College of Design, Architecture, Art, and Planning 2011 by Afsaneh Ardehali Master of Architecture, California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo, CA 1987 Committee Members: John E. Hancock (Chair) Nnamdi Elleh, Ph.D. Mood-Consciousness and Architecture abstract This thesis is an effort to unfold the disclosing power of mood as the basic character of all experiencing as well as theorizing in architecture. Having been confronted with the limiting ways of the scientific approach to understanding used in the traditional theoretical investigations, (according to which architecture is understood as a mere static object of shelter or aesthetic beauty) we turn to Martin Heidegger’s existential analysis of the meaning of Being and his new interpretation of human emotions. Translations of philosophers Eugene Gendlin, Richard Polt, and Hubert Dreyfus elucidate the deep meaning of Heidegger’s investigations and his approach to understanding mood. In contrast to our customary beliefs, which are largely informed by scientific understanding of being and emotions, this new understanding of mood clarifies our experience of architecture by shedding light on the contextualizing character of mood. In this expanded horizon of experiencing architecture, the full potentiality of mood in our experience of architecture becomes apparent in resoluteness of our new Mood-Consciousness of architecture.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt: the Problem of Evil and the Origins of Totalitarianism
    Narrative Section of a Successful Application The attached document contains the grant narrative and selected portions of a previously funded grant application. It is not intended to serve as a model, but to give you a sense of how a successful application may be crafted. Every successful application is different, and each applicant is urged to prepare a proposal that reflects its unique project and aspirations. Prospective applicants should consult the Education Programs application guidelines at http://www.neh.gov/grants/education/summer-seminars-and-institutes for instructions. Applicants are also strongly encouraged to consult with the NEH Division of Education Programs staff well before a grant deadline. Note: The attachment only contains the grant narrative and selected portions, not the entire funded application. In addition, certain portions may have been redacted to protect the privacy interests of an individual and/or to protect confidential commercial and financial information and/or to protect copyrighted materials. Project Title: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt: The Problem of Evil and the Origins of Totalitarianism Institution: San Diego State University Project Director: Kathleen Jones Grant Program: Summer Seminars and Institutes for School Teachers 1100 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Rm. 302, Washington, D.C. 20506 P 202.606.8500 F 202.606.8394 E [email protected] www.neh.gov TABLE OF CONTENTS The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt: The Problem of Evil and the Origins of Totalitarianism Narrative Proposed Texts 1 Intellectual Rationale 1 Project Content and Implementation 10 Project Faculty and Staff 15 Participant Selection 17 Professional Development 17 Institutional Context 18 Budget 21 Appendices Outline of Seminar Topics 22 Selected Bibliography 24 Curriculum Vita- Kathleen B.
    [Show full text]
  • Retrieving a Catholic Tradition of Subjective Natural Rights from the Late Scholastic Francisco Suárez, S.J
    Copyright © 2012 Ave Maria Law Review RETRIEVING A CATHOLIC TRADITION OF SUBJECTIVE NATURAL RIGHTS FROM THE LATE SCHOLASTIC FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J. Steven J. Brust, Ph.D. g INTRODUCTION There is good reason to inquire into the Catholic contributions to the foundation of human rights.1 There is a global proliferation of natural rights in nation-states, international treaties, charters and conventions, as well as in political rhetoric, court decisions, law, and even in personal conversation. Furthermore, the Catholic Church herself has emerged as one of the leading advocates of natural rights in its moral and social teachings as well as in its charitable practices. As a result of these omnipresent rights claims, debates have arisen with respect to the origin and nature of, and justification for, natural rights. These debates are not only between Catholics and those outside the Church (e.g., with contemporary secular liberals), but also between Catholics themselves. At the heart of these debates are a number of questions: Do natural rights even exist? If so, what is a right? Are natural rights compatible with or contradictory to natural law understood as an objective order of justice? Are natural rights derived from natural law or is natural law derived from natural rights? Which is given a priority? Do natural rights entail a rejection or diminution of virtue and the common good? For some Catholics, a very important aspect of this overall debate is the supposed break between pre-modern views on natural right/law and modern views on natural rights. They offer a narrative which includes the claim that rights are more of an invention of the modern political philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke, and/or have their g Steven J.
    [Show full text]
  • Natural Law by Gordon Babst
    Natural Law by Gordon Babst Encyclopedia Copyright © 2015, glbtq, Inc. Entry Copyright © 2004, glbtq, inc. Reprinted from http://www.glbtq.com Natural Law refers to the tradition of reading into nature laws that are not merely descriptive, but prescriptive. For adherents of natural law, nature does not merely state natural facts, but also offers a moral code, or reveals a moral order, usually anchored in a god whose intentions can be read in nature. In Christian theology, natural law is that part of God's teaching that can be discerned through nature (as opposed to revelation or grace or scripture). As developed by medieval scholasticism, it became the basis of both sacred and secular law, including laws regulating sexual practices. Top: A Roman copy of a From the perspective of natural law, nature is viewed as the basis for morality and the Greek sculpture of the civil law. Significantly, however, natural law does not refer to the regularities found in head of Aristotle. Above: An altarpiece the natural world as discovered by natural scientists, who, qua scientists, are not depicting Thomas engaged in ethical evaluations of the natural world. Acquinas created by Carlo Crivelli in 1476. Origins in the Ancient World The image of the sculpture of Aristotle appears under the The natural law tradition began with the Stoics of ancient Greece, who viewed reason Creative Commons as mankind's common tool, one connecting human beings to the natural reality of the Attribution ShareAlike cosmos that revealed itself and its objective principles through the natural light of 2.5 License.
    [Show full text]
  • THE TIME of ACTION in HANNAH ARENDT by HANNA LIPKIND A
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Oregon Scholars' Bank BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND PARTICIPATION: THE TIME OF ACTION IN HANNAH ARENDT by HANNA LIPKIND A THESIS Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate school of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts December 2013 THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Student: Hanna Lipkind Title: Between Performance and Participation: The Time of Action in Hannah Arendt This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Department of Philosophy by: Dr. Bonnie Mann Chair Dr. Rocío Zambrana Member and Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research & Innovation/Dean of the Graduate School Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. Degree awarded December 2013 ii © 2013 Hanna Lipkind iii THESIS ABSTRACT Hanna Lipkind Master of Arts Department of Philosophy December 2013 Title: Between Performance and Participation: The Time of Action in Hanna Arendt This thesis takes up the debate between the agonal and deliberative interpretations of Hannah Arendt’s conception of political action. In it, I redeem the model of action as performance found in her descriptions of agonal politics and pull emphasis away from the deliberative model of communicative action on the basis of Arendt’s ontology of temporality and her account of the witnessing and judging spectatorship that preserves the meaningfulness of human events against oblivion. I find the danger of this loss of meaning accounted for by the agonal model in the syncopated relationship between spectator and actor.
    [Show full text]
  • Natural Law in the Renaissance Period, We Must Look Elsewhere
    THE NATURAL LAW IN THE RENAISSANCE PERIOD* Heinrich A. Rommen I T HE Renaissance period is usually associated with the Arts and with Literature; it is considered as a new birth of the Greek and Roman classics but also as the discovery of a new sense of life, as a period in which the autonomous individual, as the person in a pronounced meaning, escapes from the pre-eminence of the clergy and a morality determined by the Church. Nourished by the rediscovered philosophy of life of the classics, an emancipation takes place of the man of the world, of the man of secular learning, and of the artist and the poet, who set themselves up as of their own right beside, not against, the secular clergy and the learned monk. In politics this means the dissolution of the medieval union of Church and Empire in favor of the now fully devel- oped nation-states and city-republics which stress their autonomy against the Church as against the Empire. While the Renaissance, thus conceived, was of tremen- dous significance, it is nevertheless true that as such it con- tributed little for the development of the theory of Nat- ural Law. The reason for this is that the Humanists were admirers of the stoic philosophy and of the great orator, Cicero, the elegant popularizer of the stoic philosophy and of the philosophical ideas of the Roman Law, which, * Also printed in the Summer, 1949, issue of the Notre Dame Lawyer. 89 NATURAtL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS at that time, freed from the Canon Law, conquered the world again.
    [Show full text]
  • Methodological Notes on Arendt
    genealogy Article Genealogy of Experiential Frames: Methodological Notes on Arendt Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, 30014 Tampere, Finland; [email protected] Abstract: This article seeks to add a new theoretical voice to the tradition of genealogical inquiry in political theory and beyond by offering a re-reading of the thought of Hannah Arendt. Going beyond the letter of her thought, in this article I propose that placing Arendt in the genealogical tradition of inquiry (particularly its Foucauldian strand) helps to make sense of what she was “up to” when she turned to history in her work, especially in the analysis of totalitarianism and the account of modernity presented in The Human Condition. I will specifically highlight the historical emergence of “process-thinking” that Arendt traces across her writings. The article seeks to sketch a unique approach to genealogical inquiry that can be taken up by anyone interested in critical analysis of our present age and its politics. Towards the end of the essay, I elaborate this approach methodologically by making a reference to frame analysis. Thus, I articulate a “genealogical frame analysis”, an inquiry into historical emergence of various metaphors and frames that organize our experience of the world. I also highlight the centrality of events for Arendt’s genealogy, as well as its role in a broader set of world-building practices. Keywords: Hannah Arendt; genealogy; method; history; life; process; critique 1. Introduction Citation: Hyvönen, Ari-Elmeri. 2021. Genealogy—the problematization of the present through the study of its historical Genealogy of Experiential Frames: emergence—has arguably become one of the defining methods, or modes of inquiry, in po- Methodological Notes on Arendt.
    [Show full text]
  • A Study of the Pariah in Hannah Arendt's Theory of Action. Tobi B
    University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 1990 A study of the pariah in Hannah Arendt's theory of action. Tobi B. Elkin University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses Elkin, Tobi B., "A study of the pariah in Hannah Arendt's theory of action." (1990). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2486. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2486 This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A STUDY OF THE PARIAH IN HANNAH ARENDT ' S THEORY OF ACTION A Thesis Presented by TOBI B. ELKIN Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS September 1990 Political Science A STUDY OF THE PARIAH IN HANNAH ARENDT'S THEORY OF ACTION A Thesis Presented by TOBI B. ELKIN Approved as to style and content by: , /f ^ , J /y ichoLhs Xeno.Snv.Clv^ir f^bricia MilZfe, Member Jerome King T Department Science ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to my family and friends for their generous support and encouragement while I was undertaking this project. I would have been unable to complete this study without the supportive environment which my family provided. Thanks also go to N. Xenos, P. Mills, and J. King for their interest, patience, and cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • A Law Professor's Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 1997 A Law Professor’s Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights Randy E. Barnett Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1235 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 655-681 (1997) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal Education Commons A LAW PROFESSOR'S GUIDE TO NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS RANDYE. BARNETT* Law professors nowadays mention natural law and natural rights on a regular basis, and not just in jurisprudence. Given that the founding generation universally subscribed to the idea of natural rights, this concept regularly makes a prominent appearance in discussions of constitutional law. One simply cannot avoid the concept if one is to explain Justice Samuel Chase's well-known claim in Calder v. Bull that "[t]here are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power .... An ACf of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority."2 Nor can law professors explain to their students the reference in the Ninth Amendment to the "other" rights "retained by the people"3 without mentioning "the pre­ existent rights of nature." 4 Yet in my experience, when law professors discuss natural rights, they typically run this concept together with that of natural law.
    [Show full text]