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U.S. ARMED FORCES in VIETNAM 1954-1975 Part One

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U.S. ARMED FORCES in VIETNAM 1954-1975 Part One U.S. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975 Part One. Indochina Studies U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam Part One. Indochina Studies Edited by Paul Kesaris Guide Compiled by Ruth McClure A microfilm project of UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, INC. 44 North Market Street • Frederick, MD 21701 Copyright ® 1983 by University Publications of America, Inc. All rights reserved. ISBN 0-89093-444-4. TABLE OF CONTENTS Reel! The Cambodian Incursion 1 The Easter Offensive of 1972 2 The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse 3 Lam Son 719 4 Pacification 5 Reel II Reflections on the Vietnam War 6 The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support 7 The South Vietnamese Society 8 Strategy and Tactics 8 Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire 9 RVNAF and U.S. Operational Cooperation and Coordination 10 Reel III The RVNAF 11 RVNAF Logistics 12 The General Offensives of 1968-1969 15 Reel IV Leadership 15 Territorial Forces 16 The U.S. Adviser 17 RLG Military Operations and Activities in the Laotian Panhandle 18 Intelligence 19 The Final Collapse 19 REEL INDEX Reel I 0001 The Cambodian Incursion. Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington. D.C. 1979. 0004 Table of Contents. 4pp. 0008 Introduction. 17pp. The Friendly Situation Prior to the Incursion. The Enemy Situation Prior to the Incursion. RVN-Cambodia Relations. 0025 The Enemy Use of Cambodian Territory and Organization for Logistic Support. "PP. The Ho Chi Minn Trail. The Sihanoukville Port Route The Sea Route. The Base Area System. 0038 Planning the Combined Incursion and Early Cross-Border Operations. 22pp. Significant Events. RVN Appraisal of the Changed Situation in Cambodia. Concept for the Combined Incursion. Planning. Cross-Border Operations Prior to 30 April 1970. 0060 The Combined Incursion. 84pp. TOAN THANG 42. The Relief of Kompong Cham. TOAN THANG 43. 44. 45 and 46. Clearing the Mekong and Repatriating Vietnamese. CUU LONG II and III. BINH TAY I. II and III. The Evacuation of Khmer Forces from Ratanakiri Province. 0120 Cooperation and Coordination from 30 April to 30 June 1970.16pp. U.S.-RVN Cooperation and Coordination. RVN-Khmer Cooperation and Coordination. The Tripartite Meetings. RVN-U.S. Plans for Cambodia After 30 June 1970. 0136 Cross-Border Operations After 30 June 1970.7pp. TOAN THANG 42, Phase VI. CUU LONG 44. TOAN THANG 42/DAI BANG. 0143 Khmer Participation. 35pp. Background. Communist Use of Cambodian Territory. The Royal Khmer Armed Forces. Attacks by NVA/VC Forces Against Cambodia After 18 March 1970. Khmer Cooperation with the RVN and U.S. Prior to the Cambodian Incursion. The Status of the FANK on 1 May 1970. FANK Activities during the Incursion. FANK-RVNAF Cooperation after U.S. Withdrawal. Critical Analysis and Conclusions. 0178 Observations and Conclusions. 24pp. General Results. Lessons Learned. Conclusions. 0203 Appendix. 50pp. A. Enemy Losses. Cambodian Incursion (As of 30 June 1970). B. Friendly Casualties. Cambodian Incursion. C. Military Elements of the U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh 18 March to 30 June 1970. U.S. Defense Attache Office at the End of the Sihanouk Period. U.S. Defense Attache Office After 18 March 1970. The Augmentation of the Defense Attache Office. Initial Military Assistance and Lon Nol's First Formal Request. The Office of the Politico-Military Counselor (POL/MIL). Military Activities and Patterns of Coordination by End of the Incursion. The Military Equipment Delivery TEAM—CAMBODIA (MEDTC). United States Influence on FANK Decisions. Critical Analysis. 0254 Glossary. 2pp. 0256 The Easter Offensive of 1972. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979. 0259 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0262 Introduction. 14pp. From Insurgency to Conventional Warfare. General Character of the Easter Offensive. 0276 The Invasion of Quang Tri. 33pp. Situation Prior to the Offensive. The Initial Battles. Holding the Line. The Fall of Quang Tri City. 0309 Stabilization and Counteroffensive. 30pp. The Defense of Hue. Refitting and Retraining. Quang Tri Retaken. Role of U.S. Air and Naval Support. 0339 Defending Kontum. 28pp. The NVA Force Buildup. The Attacks On Tan Canh and Dakto. Pressure on Kontum City. The First Attack Against Kontum. The Enemy's Final Attempt. 0367 The Siege of An Loc. 31 pp. The Enemy's Offensive Plan in MR-3. The Attack On Loc Ninh. The Siege and First Attacks. The Second Phase of Attack. Relief from the South. Mopping Up Pockets of Enemy Resistance. 0398 Enemy Offensive in the Mekong Delta. 20pp. The Setting. Kompong Trach: The Opening Round. The Hau Giang Under Attack. Actions in the Tien Giang. Attacks in Dinh Tuong. The Aftermath. 0418 A Critical Analysis. 18pp. North Vietnam's Objectives, Strategy, and Tactics. The Defense Posture of South Vietnam. RVNAF Performance. U.S. Support. 0436 Summary and Conclusions. 7pp. 0443 Glossary. 2pp. 0445 The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. 1979. 0448 Table of Contents. 4pp. 0452 Introduction. 17pp. The Sihanouk Era. The Political Strategy of Neutrality. Neutrality of the Left. The Origins of the Khmer Republic. 0469 Cambodia and the Communists. 14pp. Vietnamese Communist Use of Khmer Territory. Khmer Communist Political Origins. Khmer Communist Military Development. 0483 The Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic. 27pp. Origins. The Initial Expansion After March 18.1970. Military Organization. The U.S. Military Assistance Program. The Khmer Krom Units. 0510 The First Two Years of the War. 28pp. The Initial Communist Attacks. The Evacuation of the Ratanakiri Garrison. FANK Strategy. CHENLA I. CHENLA II. Cooperation and Coordination with the RVNAF and the U.S. 0538 The Politico/Military Situation in Cambodia. 1972-1974.12pp. The Political Situation. Enemy Strategy. General Mobilization—The Plan for the Countryside. Condition of the FANK. The End of U.S. Bombing. 0550 Major Military Operations, 1972 Through 1974.50pp. Operations in Military Regions 1 and 2, and Against Phnom Penh, March-June 1972. FANK Efforts to Keep Lines of Communications Open, July-December 1972. The Enemy Dry-Season Offensive, January-July 1973. The First Months Without U.S. Air Support, August-December 1973. Dry Season Operations, January-July 1974. The Wet Season, August-December 1974. 0600 Closing Months. January-April 1975.13pp. Peace Initiatives. Enemy Strategy. FANK Change of Command. Military Operations. The Departure of Lon Npl. 0613 The Final Days of the Khmer Republic. 10pp. Departure of the U.S. Embassy. The Last Government. One More Effort to Negotiate. The 17th of April 1975. 0623 Analysis and Conclusions. 5pp. 0628 Appendix. A. The Delegations to the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples, April 25.1970. B. The Members of FUNK and GRUNK. C. Major Items of U.S.-Fumished Equipment in FANK. D. FANK Order of the Day, 5 October 1971. 0637 Glossary. 2pp. 0639 Lam Son 719. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979: 0642 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0645 Introduction. 8pp. 0653 The Operational Environment. 23pp. The Ho Chi Minh Trail System. Enemy Situation in Northern Military Region 1. Enemy Situation in the Laos Panhandle. The Area of Operation. 0676 The Planning Phase. 26pp. How It All Started. The Basic Operational Plan. Division Planning and Preparations. U.S. Support. Solving Logistic Problems. Observations. 0702 The Offensive Phase. 40pp. Preparing to Cross the Border. Securing Ban Dong. The Enemy Counteracted. The Loss of Fire Support Base 31. Tchepone Was the Objective. 0742 The Withdrawal Phase. 28pp. The Disengagement. The Valiant ARVN 1st Infantry Division. "Lock Its Head, Grip Its Tail". Black Panther Raids. 0770 A Critical Analysis. 38pp. The Balance Sheet of LAM SON 719. United States Combat Support. Observations and Evaluation. Lessons Learned. 0808 Observations and Conclusions. 8pp. 0816 Appendix. 6pp. A. Task Organization, ARVN I Corps, for LAM SON 719. B. Task Organization. U.S. XXIV Corps, for LAM SON 719. 0822 Glossary. 2pp. 0824 Pacification. Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington. D.C. 1979. 0827 Table of Contents. 3pp. 0830 Introduction. 8pp. 0838 Pacification Strategy and Objectives. 24pp. The Enemy Threat. System Evolution. Strategy and Operational Concept. • Interim Objectives and Priorities. The Ultimate National Goals. 0862 Operation and Support. 43pp. The GVN Organization For Pacification. Employment of Forces in Support of Pacification. < U.S. Organization for Pacification Support. The Phoenix Program. 0905 RVN-US Cooperation and Coordination in Pacification. 14pp. The Central Level. The Corps Tactical Zone/Military Region Level. The Division Tactical Area Level. The Province/Sector Level. An Evaluation. 0919 Pacification Techniques and Operations. 20pp. Pacification Techniques. Coordination in Security Activities. Training. The Hamlet Evaluation System. 0939 Social Reform and Economic Development. 23pp. Objectives. The Self-Help Hamlet Development Program. Rural Health. The Rural Education Development Program. The Relief and Resettlement of Refugees. Agricultural Development. The Fisheries Program. An Evaluation. 0962 The GVN Political, Information and Chieu Hoi Efforts. 28pp. Information and Propaganda. The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program. Relations with Ethnic Minorities. Land Reform and the "Land-To-The-Tiller" Program. Village and Hamlet Elections. People's Self-Defense Forces. An Evaluation. ' • • 0990 An Assessment of Pacification: Some Achievements, Difficulties and Shortcomings. 23pp. The Ideological Aspect of Pacification. Statistics Versus Achievements. The Communist Challenge to Pacification. The Problems of Cadres and Territorial Forces. The Impact of U.S. Policies. 1013 Observations and Conclusions. 13pp. 1026 Appendix. 21pp. A. Decree—Military Organization of the National Territory. Territorial Organization. Chain of Command. Functions. Coordination. Special Provisions. B. Decree - Reorganization of Village and Hamlet Administration. Village People's Council. The Village Administrative Committee. Hamlet Management Committee. General Provisions. 1047 Glossary. 3pp. Reel II 0001 Reflections on the Vietnam War.
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