DOCSLIB.ORG

Chain-Of-Evidence in Secured Surveillance Videos Using Steganography and Hashing

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Chain-Of-Evidence in Secured Surveillance Videos Using Steganography and Hashing 2020 IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress Chain-of-Evidence in Secured Surveillance Videos using Steganography and Hashing Nadia Kanwal Mamoona Naveed Asghar Mohammad Samar Ansari Software Research Institute Software Research Institute Software Research Institute Athlone Institute of Technology Athlone Institute of Technology Athlone Institute of Technology Athlone, Ireland Athlone, Ireland Athlone, Ireland [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Lahore College for Women University The Islamia University Alighar Muslim University Lahore, Pakistan Bahawalpur, Pakistan Aligarh, India [email protected] Brian Lee Martin Fleury Marco Herbst Yuansong Qiao Software Research Institute School of EAST Evercam Ltd. Software Research Institute Athlone Institute of Technology University of Suffolk Dublin, Ireland Athlone Institute of Technology Athlone, Ireland Ipswich, UK [email protected] Athlone, Ireland [email protected] fl[email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Video sharing from closed-circuit television video They potentially help law enforcement agencies to utilize recording or in social media interaction requires self- the resulting video recordings as proof of a crime or illicit authentication for responsible and reliable data sharing. Sim- ilarly, surveillance video recording is a powerful method of activity. However, due to equally rapid advances in the deterring unlawful activities. A Solution-by-Design can be field of image processing, surveillance data can be easily helpful in terms of making a captured video immutable, as such tampered with. Examples include [2]: regional alteration of recordings cannot become a piece of evidence until proven to be intra-frames, through cut-and-paste; and inter-frame forgery, unaltered. This paper presents a computationally inexpensive by the insertion of video frames. Furthermore, transmission method of preserving a chain-of-evidence in surveillance videos using steganography and hashing. The method conforms to the errors also contribute to the alteration of videos, if they data protection regulations which are increasingly adopted by are not suitably protected with forward error correction governments, and is applicable to network edge storage. Secu- and the like. Consequently, such recordings are not directly rity credentials are stored in a hardware wallet independently admissible in a court of law as evidence until they are proven of the video capture device itself, while evidential information to be authentic through forensic analysis [3]. Unfortunately, is stored within video frames themselves, independently of the content. The proposed method has turned out to not applying forensic analysis is not cheap in terms of time and only preserve the integrity of the stored video data but expense. Thus, an important objective for a Closed Circuit also results in very limited degradation of the video data TeleVision (CCTV) systems is that it should provide a chain- due to steganography. Despite the presence of steganographic of-evidence, according to stated rules, so that the videos can information, video frames are still available for common image prove themselves to be an authentic piece of information, processing tasks such as tracking and classification. avoiding or reducing the need for forensic analysis. Keywords-Video Security, Video Surveillance, Steganogra- A further driver towards self-authentication is the need phy, Hashing, Information Sharing for storage and analysis of huge amounts of multimedia I. INTRODUCTION data, which has propelled companies towards cloud storage for efficient access [4]. However, following on from the It is no longer the case that only special places are European Union’s ratification of the General Data Protection kept under surveillance for security and safety purposes. Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018 (and other similar data Surveillance is rapidly becoming a requirement for almost privacy regulations in other countries), cloud storage may be every house, office, and public place, when smart tracking also be unacceptable, due to the potential for unauthorized can be applied [1]. This development is fuelled by the avail- access to video data by third parties. GDPR focuses on ability of low-cost and small-sized surveillance cameras. reversible data protection [5] via encryption [6] as a data- This paper is part of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Career-FIT Postdoc protection safeguard, which is also employed herein. This Fellowship programme under project ID: MF-2018-0058 funded by the paper presents a multifaceted solution to the problem of European Union’s Horizon2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 713654 and Science self-authentication and the requirements of data protection Foundation Ireland (SFI) under Grant Number SFI 16/RC/3918 and the regulations (e.g. GDPR) in respect to storage. The proposed European Regional Development Fund. solution works as follows: 978-1-7281-6609-4/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE 263 DOI 10.1109/DASC-PICom-CBDCom-CyberSciTech49142.2020.00053 • Captured video data are protected by calculating their Hashing functions, also referred to as message digest hash. functions, work by extracting a fixed-length bit string from • Secondly, these hashes are stored inside video frames a given message (text, image, video). Such functions have as hidden information. found varied applications in database search and compilers • Thirdly, every frame holds the hash of its previous two as well as in cryptography. Over the recent past, there has frames and, therefore, creates a chain-of-evidence. been significant interest in employing hash functions in mul- • Lastly, all this data are encrypted and stored on the timedia applications for both indexing and security. A salient network edge. feature of most cryptographic hashing algorithms such as • To further enhance the security, encryption keys are Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 stored in a hardware wallet, separately from the device (SHA-1) is that they are overly sensitive to the contents of holding the actual video. the message. Altering even a single bit of the input changes The power of the proposed method is that it hides the the output hash completely. However, multimedia data such evidential data inside the video frames themselves, with- as digital images go through various manipulations such as out affecting the image content. Furthermore, the proposed cropping, scaling, enhancement, and compression. method makes it easier to maintain, synchronize, and prevent An image hash function therefore takes into account the loss of, evidence. Such a record of the chain-of-evidence is changes in the visual domain and produces hashes based desirable not only in the case of surveillance videos, but the on the overall visual appearance. Such a hash function same could also be very useful in ascertaining the originality is useful in identifying images in databases, in which and authenticity of videos uploaded to social media sites, the image possibly undergoes incidental changes (such as and could also be used for the identification of fake news format changes, compression, scanning, signal processing videos. operations or watermarking). Another application of image hashing is in robust image authentication wherein the hash II. BACKGROUND remains invariant under perceptually minimal alterations to As is well known, steganography refers to the hiding of the image, but detects malicious tampering of image data. information (text, audio, image, video) in another carrier The SHA256 hashing algorithm has been used in this work media (usually referred to as the ’cover’). There are four [20]. essential properties of a good steganographic system, viz. imperceptibility, security, information hiding capacity, and III. METHODOLOGY robustness. There have been several different approaches to achieve the goal of information hiding in the cover In order to create a chain-of-evidence using hashes, a media. The simplest approach works by manipulating the salted hash is first created by concatenating half of the bytes Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the three color channels of the hashes of the previous two video frames. Therefore, (RGB), in light of the fact that the LSBs carry very minimal each frame will store: a salted hash of data from the previous information. This spatial approach ensures that the overall two frames (256 bits); and other optional data such as the visual aesthetic of the image is not altered. Initial works in camera identity; the date and time of video capture; and LSB steganography concentrate on designing the system to the Global Positioning System (GPS) location. We call this increase the payload capacity by utilizing most of the cover information the evidential data. Subsequently, the frame’s image pixels [7]–[15]. However, steganalysis techniques own hash (256 bits), after the insertion of the evidential soon became strong enough to break such systems using data, is calculated and inserted. The size of the data to be statistical analysis. Therefore, sophisticated robust LSB tech- stored becomes 512 bits per frame considering salted hash niques based cryptography-steganography which can evade and current hash as evidential data. such steganalysis attacks were developed to identify the In fact, various ways exist to store such data, including: a regular
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Trends Toward Real-Time Network Data Steganography
    TRENDS TOWARD REAL-TIME NETWORK DATA STEGANOGRAPHY James Collins, Sos Agaian Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, USA [email protected], [email protected] Abstract Network steganography has been a well-known covert data channeling method for over three decades. The basic set of techniques and implementation tools have not changed significantly since their introduction in the early 1980’s. In this paper, we review the predominant methods of classical network steganography, describing the detailed operations and resultant challenges involved in embedding data in the network transport domain. We also consider the various cyber threat vectors of network steganography and point out the major differences between classical network steganography and the widely known end-point multimedia embedding techniques, which focus exclusively on static data modification for data hiding. We then challenge the security community by introducing an entirely new network data hiding methodology, which we refer to as real-time network data steganography. Finally, we provide the groundwork for this fundamental change of covert network data embedding by introducing a system-level implementation for real-time network data operations that will open the path for even further advances in computer network security. KEYWORDS Network Steganography, Real-time Networking, TCP/IP Communications, Network Protocols 1. INTRODUCTION Even though the origins of steganography reach back to the time of ancient Greece, to Herodotus in 440 BC, the art of steganography continues to evolve. This is especially true in the technical methods of digital embedding [1][2]. Digital steganography has been used since the early 1980’s and network steganography techniques quickly evolved with the advent of the Internet and standardized multimedia formats used for data exchange [3].
    [Show full text]
  • Cybersecurity, IT-Aided Education, and Teles: Nexus, Vistas & Realities
    CYBERSECURITY, IT-AIDED EDUCATION, AND TELES: NEXUS, VISTAS & REALITIES Emmanuel C. Ogu* Department of Computer Science, [email protected] School of Computing and Engineer- ing Sciences, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria. Chiemela Ogu EMINDA Konsults, Yaba, Lagos, [email protected] Nigeria. * Corresponding author ABSTRACT Background The current decade has witnessed rising spates of threats and attacks that have threatened the safety and security of cyberspace, thereby giving rise to contem- porary discourses pertaining the realities that these ominous trends portend for technology innovation and digitalisation, in the emerging global digital society. In the process, the technological capabilities that have been used to effectively harness the efficiency that this virtual space provides for contemporary educa- tion and learning have been defamed. Aim/Purpose This exploratory research interrogates the possible relationships between the contemporary concerns of global cyber security, and the realities and prospects of IAE and TeLEs, while elucidating the crucial factors that impose on such relationship(s). Methodology This research adopts the qualitative research methodology with an exploratory approach to interrogate the various contemporary concerns of global cyberse- curity as contained in existing literature, especially as it affects the proliferation and adoption of IT-aided education and Technology-enhanced Learning Envi- ronments (TeLEs); based on a systematic correlational analysis of key interpos- ing concepts. Contribution The research presents an overview of the current status and prospects of de- velopment of IAE and TeLEs, as well as the nature of the realities associated with contemporary concerns of global cybersecurity; then also discussing how these cybersecurity concerns impact on the wider adoption and implementation of IAE and TeLEs.
    [Show full text]
  • SARS-Cov-2 Vaccine Breakthrough Surveillance and Case Information Resource Washington State Department of Health September 22, 2021
    SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Breakthrough Surveillance and Case Information Resource Washington State Department of Health September 22, 2021 1 Page Break To request this document in another format, call 1-800-525-0127. Deaf or hard of hearing customers, please call 711 (Washington Relay) or email [email protected]. Publication Number 420-339 For more information or additional copies of this report: Disease Control and Health Statistics Public Health Outbreak Coordination, Information, and Surveillance 1610 NE 150th Street, MS: K17-9 Shoreline, WA 98155 Phone: 206-418-5700 (24-hour contact for local health jurisdictions only) Email: [email protected] 2 Page break SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Breakthrough Surveillance and Case Information Resource Washington State Department of Health September 22, 2021 COVID-19 vaccines are effective and critical tools to aid in the control of this pandemic. Large- scale clinical studies found that COVID-19 vaccines prevented most people from getting COVID- 19 illness, but like most other vaccines, they are not 100 percent effective. This means some fully vaccinated people will still get infected with SARS-CoV-2. These individuals may or may not develop COVID-19 symptoms. Vaccine breakthrough occurs when someone gets infected with an organism they are fully vaccinated against. For the COVID-19 vaccine, this means someone tests positive for SARS-CoV- 2 two weeks or more after receiving the full series of an authorized COVID-19 vaccine. Since millions of people in the United States are getting vaccinated, we expect to see some breakthrough disease. Fortunately, there is evidence from research studies that the COVID-19 vaccine reduces the risk of people getting really sick and needing to go to the hospital or dying from COVID-19.
    [Show full text]
  • TCAS II) by Personnel Involved in the Implementation and Operation of TCAS II
    Preface This booklet provides the background for a better understanding of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) by personnel involved in the implementation and operation of TCAS II. This booklet is an update of the TCAS II Version 7.0 manual published in 2000 by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It describes changes to the CAS logic introduced by Version 7.1 and updates the information on requirements for use of TCAS II and operational experience. Version 7.1 logic changes will improve TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) sense reversal logic in vertical chase situations. In addition all “Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust” RAs are converted to “Level-Off, Level-Off” RAs to make it more clear that a reduction in vertical rate is required. The Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for TCAS II Version 7.1 were approved in June 2008 and Version 7.1 units are expected to be operating by 2010-2011. Version 6.04a and 7.0 units are also expected to continue operating for the foreseeable future where authorized. 2 Preface................................................................................................................................. 2 The TCAS Solution............................................................................................................. 5 Early Collision Avoidance Systems................................................................................ 5 TCAS II Development .................................................................................................... 6 Initial
    [Show full text]
  • Steganography- a Data Hiding Technique
    International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 9– No.7, November 2010 Steganography- A Data Hiding Technique Arvind Kumar Km. Pooja Assistant Professor Vankateshwara institute of computer Vidya College of engineering, Meerut, India Science and technology, Meerut, India ABSTRACT In steganography, the possible cover carriers are innocent looking Steganography is the art of hiding information and an effort to carriers (images, audio, video, text, or some other digitally conceal the existence of the embedded information. It serves as a representative code) which will hold the hidden information. A better way of securing message than cryptography which only message is the information hidden and may be plaintext, cipher text, conceals the content of the message not the existence of the message. images, or anything that can be embedded into a bit stream. Together Original message is being hidden within a carrier such that the the cover carrier and the embedded message create a stego-carrier. changes so occurred in the carrier are not observable. In this paper we Hiding information may require a stego key which is additional secret will discuss how digital images can be used as a carrier to hide information, such as a password, required for embedding the messages. This paper also analyses the performance of some of the information. For example, when a secret message is hidden within a steganography tools. Steganography is a useful tool that allows covert cover image, the resulting product is a stego-image. transmission of information over an over the communications A possible formula of the process may be represented as: cover channel.
    [Show full text]
  • Defending Against Insider Use of Digital Steganography
    2007 Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law Proceedings Defending Against Insider Use of Digital Steganography James E. Wingate CISSP-ISSEP, CISM, IAM, Backbone Security, [email protected] Glenn D. Watt CISSP, CISM, IAM, IEM, Backbone Security, [email protected] Marc Kurtz CISSP, Backbone Security, [email protected] Chad W. Davis CCE, Backbone Security, [email protected] Robert Lipscomb Backbone Security, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security Commons Scholarly Commons Citation Wingate, James E.; Watt, Glenn D.; Kurtz, Marc; Davis, Chad W.; and Lipscomb, Robert, "Defending Against Insider Use of Digital Steganography" (2007). Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 1. https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2007/session-11/1 This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an (c)ADFSL authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2007 Defending Against Insider Use of Digital Steganography James E. Wingate, CISSP-ISSEP, Glenn D. Watt, CISSP,
    [Show full text]
  • Mass Surveillance
    Thematic factsheet1 Update: July 2018 MASS SURVEILLANCE The highly complex forms of terrorism require States to take effective measures to defend themselves, including mass monitoring of communications. Unlike “targeted” surveillance (covert collection of conversations, telecommunications and metadata by technical means – “bugging”), “strategic” surveillance (or mass surveillance) does not necessarily start with a suspicion against a particular person or persons. It has a proactive element, aimed at identifying a danger rather than investigating a known threat. Herein lay both the value it can have for security operations, and the risks it can pose for individual rights. Nevertheless, Member States do not have unlimited powers in this area. Mass surveillance of citizens is tolerable under the Convention only if it is strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions. Taking into account considerable potential to infringe fundamental rights to privacy and to freedom of expression enshrined by the Convention, Member States must ensure that the development of surveillance methods resulting in mass data collection is accompanied by the simultaneous development of legal safeguards securing respect for citizens’ human rights. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it would be counter to governments’ efforts to keep terrorism at bay if the terrorist threat were substituted with a perceived threat of unfettered executive power intruding into citizens’ private lives. It is of the utmost importance that the domestic legislation authorizing far-reaching surveillance techniques and prerogatives provides for adequate and sufficient safeguards in order to minimize the risks for the freedom of expression and the right to privacy which the “indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of communications” enables.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nsa's Prism Program and the New Eu Privacy Regulation: Why U.S
    American University Business Law Review Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 5 2013 The SN A'S Prism Program And The ewN EU Privacy Regulation: Why U.S. Companies With A Presence In The EU ouldC Be In Trouble Juhi Tariq American University Washington College of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aublr Part of the International Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons Recommended Citation Tariq, Juhi "The SAN 'S Prism Program And The eN w EU Privacy Regulation: Why U.S. Companies With A Presence In The EU ouldC Be In Trouble," American University Business Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2018) . Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aublr/vol3/iss2/5 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Business Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTE THE NSA'S PRISM PROGRAM AND THE NEW EU PRIVACY REGULATION: WHY U.S. COMPANIES WITH A PRESENCE IN THE EU COULD BE IN TROUBLE JUHI TARIQ* Recent revelations about a clandestine data surveillance program operated by the NSA, Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management ("PRISM'), and a stringent proposed European Union ("EU") data protection regulation, will place U.S. companies with a businesspresence in EU member states in a problematic juxtaposition. The EU Proposed General Data Protection Regulation stipulates that a company can be fined up to two percent of its global revenue for misuse of users' data and requires the consent of data subjects prior to access.
    [Show full text]
  • Image Steganography Applications for Secure Communication
    IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY APPLICATIONS FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION by Tayana Morkel Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science (Computer Science) in the Faculty of Engineering, Built Environment and Information Technology University of Pretoria, Pretoria May 2012 © University of Pretoria Image Steganography Applications for Secure Communication by Tayana Morkel E-mail: [email protected] Abstract To securely communicate information between parties or locations is not an easy task considering the possible attacks or unintentional changes that can occur during communication. Encryption is often used to protect secret information from unauthorised access. Encryption, however, is not inconspicuous and the observable exchange of encrypted information between two parties can provide a potential attacker with information on the sender and receiver(s). The presence of encrypted information can also entice a potential attacker to launch an attack on the secure communication. This dissertation investigates and discusses the use of image steganography, a technology for hiding information in other information, to facilitate secure communication. Secure communication is divided into three categories: self-communication, one-to-one communication and one-to-many communication, depending on the number of receivers. In this dissertation, applications that make use of image steganography are implemented for each of the secure communication categories. For self-communication, image steganography is used to hide one-time passwords (OTPs) in images that are stored on a mobile device. For one-to-one communication, a decryptor program that forms part of an encryption protocol is embedded in an image using image steganography and for one-to-many communication, a secret message is divided into pieces and different pieces are embedded in different images.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: Intelligence Gathering of Prosecution?
    Fordham International Law Journal Volume 6, Issue 3 1982 Article 5 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: Intelligence Gathering of Prosecution? Christine A. Burke∗ ∗ Copyright c 1982 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: Intelligence Gathering of Prosecution? Christine A. Burke Abstract This Note considers the permissible uses of information secured through a FISA surveillance in light of the fourth amendment issue raised by Falvey. It concludes that when information is sought for purposes of national security or foreign affairs, the nature of the investigation and the compelling government interest in obtaining the information require fourth amendment standards in some respects different and lower than in ordinary criminal investigations. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OR PROSECUTION? INTRODUCTION During 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began to investigate an international terrorist organization believed to be operating in New York.' As part of its investigation, the FBI ob- tained a warrant on April 3, 1981 authorizing the electronic surveil- lance2 of two United States citizens, Thomas Falvey and George Harrison, 3 pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19784 (FISA or Act). 5 The surveillance continued until June 19 or 20 1981;6 Falvey and Harrison were then arrested and charged with smuggling arms and equipment from the United States to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland. 7 The government sought to use tapes of the intercepted tele- phone conversations at trial.8 Pursuant to FISA requirements, the government obtained the Attorney General's approval and in- formed the defendants and the court of its intention to use those tapes.
    [Show full text]
  • Ashley Deeks*
    ARTICLE An International Legal Framework for Surveillance ASHLEY DEEKS* Edward Snowden’s leaks laid bare the scope and breadth of the electronic surveillance that the U.S. National Security Agency and its foreign counterparts conduct. Suddenly, foreign surveillance is understood as personal and pervasive, capturing the communications not only of foreign leaders but also of private citizens. Yet to the chagrin of many state leaders, academics, and foreign citizens, international law has had little to say about foreign surveillance. Until recently, no court, treaty body, or government had suggested that international law, including basic privacy protections in human rights treaties, applied to purely foreign intelligence collection. This is now changing: Several UN bodies, judicial tribunals, U.S. corporations, and individuals subject to foreign surveillance are pressuring states to bring that surveillance under tighter legal control. This Article tackles three key, interrelated puzzles associated with this sudden transformation. First, it explores why international law has had so little to say about how, when, and where governments may spy on other states’ nationals. Second, it draws on international relations theory to argue that the development of new international norms regarding surveillance is both likely and essential. Third, it identifies six process-driven norms that states can and should adopt to ensure meaningful privacy restrictions on international surveillance without unduly harming their legitimate national security interests. These norms, which include limits on the use of collected data, periodic reviews of surveillance authorizations, and active oversight by neutral bodies, will increase the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of foreign surveillance. This procedural approach challenges the limited emerging scholarship on surveillance, which urges states to apply existing — but vague and contested — substantive human rights norms to complicated, clandestine practices.
    [Show full text]
  • Mass Surveillance
    Mass Surveillance Mass Surveillance What are the risks for the citizens and the opportunities for the European Information Society? What are the possible mitigation strategies? Part 1 - Risks and opportunities raised by the current generation of network services and applications Study IP/G/STOA/FWC-2013-1/LOT 9/C5/SC1 January 2015 PE 527.409 STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment The STOA project “Mass Surveillance Part 1 – Risks, Opportunities and Mitigation Strategies” was carried out by TECNALIA Research and Investigation in Spain. AUTHORS Arkaitz Gamino Garcia Concepción Cortes Velasco Eider Iturbe Zamalloa Erkuden Rios Velasco Iñaki Eguía Elejabarrieta Javier Herrera Lotero Jason Mansell (Linguistic Review) José Javier Larrañeta Ibañez Stefan Schuster (Editor) The authors acknowledge and would like to thank the following experts for their contributions to this report: Prof. Nigel Smart, University of Bristol; Matteo E. Bonfanti PhD, Research Fellow in International Law and Security, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Pisa; Prof. Fred Piper, University of London; Caspar Bowden, independent privacy researcher; Maria Pilar Torres Bruna, Head of Cybersecurity, Everis Aerospace, Defense and Security; Prof. Kenny Paterson, University of London; Agustín Martin and Luis Hernández Encinas, Tenured Scientists, Department of Information Processing and Cryptography (Cryptology and Information Security Group), CSIC; Alessandro Zanasi, Zanasi & Partners; Fernando Acero, Expert on Open Source Software; Luigi Coppolino,Università degli Studi di Napoli; Marcello Antonucci, EZNESS srl; Rachel Oldroyd, Managing Editor of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism; Peter Kruse, Founder of CSIS Security Group A/S; Ryan Gallagher, investigative Reporter of The Intercept; Capitán Alberto Redondo, Guardia Civil; Prof. Bart Preneel, KU Leuven; Raoul Chiesa, Security Brokers SCpA, CyberDefcon Ltd.; Prof.
    [Show full text]