August 31, 2018 The Plastic Lobby A thesis on the development and improvement of the Interest Group Influence Framework applied in the political context of the Netherlands

Stijn Vendrik #10247653 [email protected] Master thesis Political Science – Public Policy & Governance Graduate School of Social Sciences University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. C. M. Roggeband Second reader: Dr. R. M. Sanchez Salgado Word count: 27.174

Abbreviations ACF = Advocacy Coalition Framework CBL = Centraal Bestuur Levensmiddelenhandel CPB = Centraal Planbureau FNLI = Federatie Nederlandse Levensmiddelen Industrie IGIF = Interest Group Influence Framework KHN = Koninklijke Horeca Nederland KIDV = Kennisinstituut Duurzaam Verpakken MP = Member of parliament NGO = Non-governmental organization PDMS = Packaging deposit money system VNG = Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten

2 Table of Contents

Abbreviations 2

Abstract 4

Introduction 5

1. Theoretical review 10 1.1 The issues of influence measurement 1.2 The interest group influence framework 1.3 Flaws and improvements

2. Research design 22 2.1 Influence measurement methods 2.2 Research data

3. Case description 27 3.1 The PDMS in a broader context 3.2 Political developments 3.3 A new directive

4. Stakeholder analysis 24 4.1 The non-profit oriented advocacy coalition: political parties 4.2 The non-profit oriented advocacy coalition: interest groups 4.3 The profit oriented advocacy coalition 4.4 The coalition parties

5. Analysis 47

Conclusion 54

References 55

3 Abstract Lobbyists and interest groups form an essential part of a well-functioning democratic society. Their knowledge and expertise provide policymakers with the input they need to make well-informed decisions. However, how influential are these lobbyists exactly and what determines the extent of their influence? Based on the work of political scientists like Andreas Dür and others, the Interest Group Influence Framework is developed; a tool which can be used to analyse a specific policy process in which one or multiple interest groups were actively influencing the outcome. By applying this tool to the case of the extension of the packaging deposit money system in the Netherlands, it provides a valuable understanding and explanation of the influential role these interest groups had within this policy process. The findings of this research do not only provide a comprehension of the different aspects of the case, but also make a first step in the development of an analytic tool applicable to other policy processes and in comparative case studies as well.

Key words: Lobbyists; Interest groups; lobbying success; interest group influence framework; advocacy coalition framework; environmental policy; Netherlands; packaging deposit money system.

4 Introduction “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Report 1987: 37). This was the definition provided in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development in their famous report ‘Our Common Future’, otherwise known as the Brundtland Report. Headed by the former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, this commission was set up as the result of the growing international concern with numerous global environmental threats following the boundless growth-based economic development taking place around the world. The magnitude of issues like pollution, deforestation, desertification, ozone layer depletion and also global warming were starting to get recognized and the question was raised how to protect the environment, while still maintaining economic development at the same time. The Brundtland Commission had the purpose of identifying these problems, raising awareness of these problems and promoting the implementation of sustainable solutions to these problems within the international community. This commission popularized the term ‘sustainable development’ and strongly influenced the public debate, the political discourse and the national and international policies, of which the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit and consequently the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2015 Paris Agreement are some prime examples. The influence of the Brundtland Report can also be seen within the national political context of the Netherlands in the growing focus of its government on sustainable development. The year 2050 marks a special moment in time in the policy agenda of the Dutch government. This is the year that the Netherlands, according to their current objectives, will become a country with a climate neutral society and a circular functioning economy. For the purpose of managing the inevitable resource shortages, as well as diminishing the harmful environmental effects the current consumption patterns have, the Dutch government has started a program in September 2016 called ‘Nederland Circulair in 2050’, which has the objective of transforming the finite growth-based economy into a sustainable and circular one, where waste products are no longer disposed off, but rather reused as new resources in a continuing cyclical process. This program is widely supported by many different stakeholders from different parts of society like entrepreneur- and employee-organisations, environmental protection- and social organisations, municipalities and other governmental authorities, financial and educational institutions and other types of platforms, partnerships and (non-governmental) organisations (NGOs). All of these partners have pledged their dedication to reaching the 2050-objectives of this sustainable development program, when they signed the ‘National Agreement on the Circular Economy’ (Grondstoffenakkoord).1 This national program is focused on five different categories where transitions need to take place. These include ‘biomass & food’, ‘plastics’, ‘manufacturing’, ‘construction’ and ‘consumer goods’. For all of these sectors, transition agendas were developed in accordance with the different participating partners and

1 The title of the document literally translates to ‘raw materials agreement’, but the government of the Netherlands (Rijksoverheid) chose a loosely translated title, namely ‘The National Agreement on the Circular Economy’ (Rijksoverheid 2017a; Rijksoverheid 2017b).

5 presented by the newly formed government Rutte III in January 2018. Although all of these areas are of importance to reach a sustainable, circular economy, one of these areas of transition, the plastics, is especially interesting, for it is not only connected to the intention to deal with the resource scarcity and the consequence of the consumption of these resources on the process of climate change (like it is the case with biomass & food, construction and manufacturing), but also the overall damaging effect these materials have on the environment and its inhabitants, both fauna as well as humans. The effect of plastics on the environment has been a growing concern ever since the production and consumption increased tremendously halfway the twentieth century and plastic debris was discovered in the oceans in the 1960s (Science History Institute n.d.). Although recognized and present on the political agenda, the amount of plastic ending up in the oceans still keeps on increasing. According to research published in 2014, more than five trillion (1012) pieces of micro and nano plastics are afloat in the oceans (Eriksen et al. 2014), where they have a harmful effect on the marine life and a toxic effect on the entire food chain, thus effecting the human health system as well (Gregory 2009; Thompson et al. 2009). Combined with the issue of plastic litter on land as well as the great amount of fossil fuels and energy necessary to produce these materials, society’s demand for plastic is an issue, which is both considerable and complex. The National Agreement on the Circular Economy shows the wide commitment of the Dutch society to deal with this multifaceted issue of plastic consumption. However, the different political and societal stakeholders are in conflict with each other regarding the right methods to reach their goal. “The goal should be central, not the method”, is a phrase often uttered (Tweede Kamer 2018a: 36). On a lot of issues, these methods are subject to discussion within the political arena. Every stakeholder desires the political decisions to be the closest to their own preference and advantage. Lobbyists play an important role in these decision-making processes, for they represent the interests of the different stakeholders and act in an informative manner towards the decision-makers. Decision-makers need these lobbyists because their relevant information, knowledge and expertise enables them to comprehend the situation to the fullest, which allows them to make well-informed decisions. For this reason, lobbyists are an essential part of a well-functioning democratic society in which they fulfil an influential position (Keulen 2017: 260). For a long time, the position of these lobbyists has been and still remains to be a subject of political scientific research. Their activities raise questions regarding the form and extent of their influence as well as the success these lobbyists have in influencing policy outcomes. With regard to the plastic issue and the transition agenda set up in the Netherlands to deal with this issue, the same questions appear. How successful can lobbyists be in their effort to influence policy when it comes to the issue of sustainability? This initial question lead to the development of this research. Climate change and the associated problem of sustainability are considered to be the number one issue of today (Jackson 2017). The extent in which lobbyists can be successful in promoting or opposing sustainability within a policy process is therefore highly relevant. In order to research this, a specific case was chosen which is illustrative for the broader context and enjoys the practical aspect of having relative accessible data as well. The political conflict following the transition agenda regarding the best methods to address the plastic issue is well exemplified in the discussion on the structure and possible extension or removal of the ‘packaging deposit

6 money system’ (PDMS) in the Netherlands. This discussion includes multiple aspects of the sustainable development goals and the circular economy for it addresses the problematic resource scarcity through its focus on the increase in the quantity and quality of plastic recyclate, while also including the issue of the plastic soup as well as the effort to decrease the amount of litter, which ends up in both the urban and natural environment. Lobbyists have been actively shaping the debate surrounding the PDMS in the Netherlands through direct of indirect involvement in discussions and scientific publications for over more then two decades. Proponents favour an extension of the system for it has proven to be an effective tool to address the waste issue, while improving the quality of recyclate. Opponents favour the disappearance of the system because of the financial the costs involved and the possible advantages other strategies might provide. After years of political standstill though, the State Secretary of Infrastructure and Water Management Van Veldhoven, tasked with the topic ‘Milieu’, achieved a breakthrough in the discussion in March 2017, when she announced her decision to conditionally extent the system in 2021. This decision was preceded with months of lobbying activity from many different stakeholders. This activity and the extent of influence and success of these lobbyists is the central focus in this research. In order to capture this focus, the following research question has been formulated: How influential were the different interest groups on the development of the March 2018 policy decision of the Dutch government regarding the extension of the packaging deposit money system? For the purpose of answering this question in a structured manner, the choice has been made to divide the main research question into three sub-questions. Firstly, it is of the utmost importance to identify the different stakeholders and the interest groups who were involved in the policy process. Therefore, the first sub-question to be answered is: Who were the prominent influential interest groups involved in this policy process? As the main research question already shows, the focus of this research has been put on the influencing activity of the ‘different interest groups’. To clarify this conceptualisation, in this particular case lobbyists and other types of stakeholders all acted on account of larger interest groups and therefore the focus does not lie on the activities of individuals. Furthermore, the interest groups discussed in this research are different types of groups (public, private, semi-public). All these types are included within the scope of the research on the important condition that only those interest groups are included who had access to the policymakers and could arguably be considered important or influential in this process. The second sub-question of this research focusses on analysing the activities and amount of access of the interest groups, for the purpose of providing a full understanding of the applied lobbying strategies of these different parties. This sub-question is constructed as the following: How did the different interest groups influence the policy process? Different types of strategies all have their advantages and disadvantages. Based on a theoretical review, these strategies are analysed and their success is evaluated. In addition, not only the type of strategy but also the frequency of access of the interest groups to the policymakers affects the amount of influence they have. A high frequency of contact undeniably says something about the prominence of an interest group and the relationship it has towards the decision- makers. Therefore, the frequency of access aspect is also included in this research. Lastly, after identifying the different interest groups as well as their applied lobbying strategies, the third sub-question of the research

7 focusses on the core of the thesis by addressing the aspect of influence and answering the question: How successful were the different interest groups in influencing the policy decision of the Dutch government to conditionally extent the national packaging deposit money system? In order to answer these questions, a proper theoretical substantiation of the concept ‘influence’ is required. The question how it can be measured need to be asked and the influential capacity of different types of interest groups need to be understood. Influence is however not a simple concept to measure. Within the political scientific field, a vast amount of literature has been written on both the determinants of the capacity to have influence as well as the right method to measure this capacity. Multiple methods are available and a discussion exists within the academic community as to which method is the best suitable to measure influence (Chalmers 2011; Dür 2008; Klüver 2009a; Woll 2007). By building upon this vast amount of scientific literature on the measurement of influence and by applying a mixed-method strategy, the methodological issues are resolved. In the theoretical review and research design chapter, the issues of and solutions to the measurement of influence are discussed and the choice for the mixed methods approach is explained. The activities of interest groups and their role and influence within in a democratic society has also been a subject of research within the political science for over more than a century (Bently 1908; Odegard 1928; Schattschneider 1935). The research that has been done in the last two decades has contributed to a growing understanding of the determinants of interest group influence (Dür et al. 2015: 953-954). Chapter one of this research will provide a review of the existing theoretical literature. Within the body of scientific publications, a theoretical framework can be identified of what determines the amount of influence interest groups have in a specific case. Within this framework, different types of contextual characteristics are identified. These characteristics include the actor characteristics, issue characteristics, the institutional context and the applied lobbying strategy. (Dür & De Bièvre 2007; Klüver 2009a; Mahoney 2007; Princen 2007; Weiler & Brändli 2015; Woll 2007). These four categories together form the theoretical ‘interest group influence framework’ (in this research called the IGIF), which can provide an analysis of a specific policy case and an explanation of the policy outcome. This framework can be found in some form or another in the publications of political scientists like Eising (2007) and Klüver et al. (2015) and is best portrayed by Andreas Dür (2009). This IGIF is well applicable to some case studies to analyse the different interest groups involved and the amount of influence they have exerted. However, as this research shows, the IGIF also has its flaws. It is not applicable to every context and not comprehensive enough to fully understand the case and the possible outcome of every policy process. In its current state, it is not applicable to the case of the PDMS for it can not explain the policy outcome based on the different determinants present in this case. For the purpose of improving the theoretical framework, this research provides improvements to the IGIF to make it better suitable. These additions include the special attention for the decision-maker’s political background, the presence of advocacy coalitions, contextual model of interest representation and type of democracy. In the theoretical review of this research, a complete insight in the different aspects of the current IGIF is provided, the multiple flaws of the framework are discussed in an extensive manner and the several

8 improvements are presented, which together provide the newly formed ‘extended-IGIF’. This new extended-IGIF serves as the central scientific contribution of this research. Although the primary objective of this research is to answer the case-specific socially-relevant research question, the development of this theoretical framework is the second objective of this research. This theory-building aspect of the research has the purpose of providing a new framework, which is applicable to different cases of policy processes in which interest groups are actively influencing the outcome as well. Based on this extended-IGIF, the policy process of the PDMS and the role of the interest groups within this process are analysed. In other words; the case of the PDMS functions as a test case for the applicability of the extended-IGIF. After discussing the theoretical review in the first chapter and the research design in the second chapter of the research, the case will be described in chapter three. As mentioned before, this case of the possible extension or removal of the PDMS has been actively lobbied by interest groups in the Netherlands for over more then two decades. The scope of this research however is directed on a much smaller time frame. For the purpose of providing a better understanding of the context, a short history of the PDMS in the Netherlands and the political developments of the last two decades are discussed in this chapter. The real focus however lies on the events which took place between November 2017 and March 2018. This is the timeframe in which the cabinet was deliberating on its decision and the majority of the lobbying activity of the policy process took place. This period is discussed in a chronological order and complemented by a stakeholder analysis, presented in chapter four. Within this analysis, certain aspects like the preferences, activities and reactions of the stakeholders in the policy process and towards the decision are discussed. Multiple quotes of the policymakers are included in this section for the purpose of fully capturing their different perspectives. This chapter functions as a direct answer to the first sub-question. Together, both chapters provide a clear understanding of the activities and effects interest groups have on a highly lobbied issue in the Netherlands. In addition, they also provide transparency in the workings of the Dutch national politics and the relationship certain interest groups have towards policymakers. Therefore, these chapters together provide the answer to the second sub-question through describing the activities and the applied strategies of the different interest groups. However most of all, this chapter provides the detailed information necessary to evaluate the applicability of the extended-IGIF and carry out the analysis of the influential activities of the different interest groups in this case. This analysis is presented in the fifth chapter of the research. In this final chapter, both the IGIF as well as the four improvements are applied to the case of the PDMS through which the analysis is made. Furthermore, this chapter will also provide an answer to the third sub-question as to how successful the different interest groups were in influencing the policy decision of conditionally extending the PDMS in the Netherlands. As chapter one and two will discuss extensively, measuring influence is not an exact science. Based on the multiple methods used in this research, this chapter includes an assessment of the extent of influence the different interest groups had as well as an evaluation of the degree of success the different interest groups had in influencing the policy outcome. After this, the research and its main findings are summarized, reviewed and wrapped up in the conclusion.

9 1. Theoretical framework “There is no such thing as the model lobbyist; rather, there are varieties of lobbyists” (Holyoke et al. 2015: 9). During the course of this research, this statement made by Holyoke and his colleges has many times proven itself to be true. Lobbyists, advocates, activists, interest groups or public affairs consultants; these are all synonyms of the same phenomenon. But what actually is a lobbyist? According to the Cambridge Dictionary, a lobbyist can be best defined as: “Someone who tries to persuade a politician or official group to do something” (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.). Although this definition covers an important aspect of the concept, it does not fully suffice due to the diverse varieties of lobbyists and the different tasks they are assigned with. The common view of what lobbyists are considered to be, are professional consultants, working at large public affairs offices, available for hire and who oftentimes find themselves in the service of big (profit-oriented) corporations, for whom they represent their interests in the political arena. The concept ‘lobbyist’ includes more than that. It can also be one of those actors working directly (in-house) for the interests of companies, professional associations, federations, unions, NGOs, social movements, think- tanks, academic organisations, (civil or religious) communities or public authorities (cities, municipalities). By this definition, a group of teachers going on strike for better wages can therefore also be considered lobbyists. All of these different types of lobbyists have the same thing in common; their objective. Although they are involved in a range of different activities (e.g. the persuasion of politicians or public officials, steering the public debate or setting the political agenda); all of these activities are essentially expressions of the intent to have the most amount of influence on public policy. According to Chalmers’ ‘information processing theory’, influence should be considered as: “a function of a group’s ability to efficiently process information” (2011: 471). From a rational choice perspective, it might therefore be concluded that the core business of lobbyists is the gathering and transmission of information to the right people at the right time, for the purpose of utilizing the maximum amount of influence on the policy outcome. Their input could be supplied to policymakers or media outlets, in the form of expertise, knowledge or other forms of information. Additionally, in the words of Hall & Deardorff, interest groups can be best understood as ‘service bureaus’, who offer input to like-minded decision-makers (2006). The extent to which interest groups are successful in their effort is largely affected by certain determining aspects like the type of issue and the amount of resources available to the lobbyists (e.g. money and expertise).

1.1. The issues of influence measurement Chalmers’ information processing theory provides a practical definition of influence, which makes it more tangible and measurable. This practical definition is applied in this research, but the more generally accepted definition of influence of Dür and De Bièvre as: “the control over outcomes” is also maintained (2007: 3). Lobbyists and interest groups are influential: “to the extent that they succeed in obtaining policies they prefer while averting policies they dislike, even if the latter are preferred by other actors” (Dür et al. 2015: 954). Although these two definitions are different, they are also compatible with each other. Chalmers’

10 definition helps the study of influence. Measuring the control over outcomes is considered to be rather difficult. After reviewing hundreds of books and articles of interest groups and lobbying literature, Baumgartner & Leech defined the research area of power and influence as: “an area of ‘confusion’ in the literature” (1998: 37). Many researchers avoid the concepts of power or influence as the focus of their research all together, precisely because of the methodological issues surrounding it (Woll 2007: 58). Still, some political scientists pursue this challenge to distinguish the right approach to measure influence. Within this community, the common perception is that, although it may be very difficult, measuring influence is certainly is not impossible (Dür 2008: 560). Chalmers is one these political scientists and it is his perception on influence which is central in this research. Arguably, there are three main difficulties accompanying the assessment of influence. First of all, there is the everlasting problem of proving causality. It is nearly impossible to determine with certainty that a specific outcome is the result of the input of a certain actor, specifically when countless of other (unaccounted) actors and factors might also have had (unintended) influence in the matter and counter- lobbying might have played a large part in it (Chalmers 2011: 475). This problem of causality is an issue which exists in all branches of social sciences. Correlation is no causality. However, when all the different methods provide answers pointing in the same direction, some conclusions can be made. Secondly, influence is a mechanism, which exists in many forms. Lobbyists are often primarily associated with inside lobbying strategies, where lobbyists exert influence through forms of networking and other ways of direct contact with policymakers (Beyers et al. 2008: 1121). However, lobbyists are also involved in outside lobbying strategies, which include for instance media strategies. In some cases, they are influencing the selection of decision-makers themselves, through for example the support of political campaigns. There is also the presence of influence in the form of structural power, which is hard to detect, for it requires no visible activity to take place. (Dür 2008: 575). Due to these multiple forms of influence it is difficult to develop and apply a method which takes all of them into account. This second problem of measuring different types of influence can be placed within the larger context of the ‘three faces of power’ theory. Following the work of Lukes, the first face of power includes that: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 202). The second face of power consists of the potential for agenda-setting and the third face of power includes a manipulative form of power, which influences the wishes and thoughts of others (Lukes 1974). It is arguably impossible to include all three faces of power in the analysis of a single research. Focussing on less than three faces of power is therefore completely justified, as long as the researcher acknowledges the limits of the generalizability of the chosen methods (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 3) This research is focused on the influence expressed during the policy process, making the first face of power the most obvious to be researched. Studying the third face of power is considered extremely difficult and therefore not suitable for the scope of this master thesis research project (Dür 2009: 13). The second face of power will be discussed in the third and fourth chapter of this research, because some lobbying strategies where aimed at influencing public opinion and the political agenda. However, the timeframe of the research

11 lies on the policy process after the agenda had already been set, which makes the first face of power the primary focus of this research. The third problem of influence measurement arises when the effect of influence is approached purely as the difference between interest groups’ preferences and the policy outcome. Determining the exact preferences of interest groups is difficult, especially considering the fact that sometimes interest groups are not fully aware of their own preferences or when they are not honest about their preferences. According to Chalmers, this difficulty can be overcome, when the focus of the research is not on the preferences, but on the input. He makes a plea for his information processing theory, which includes the assumption that lobbyists only lobby their friends by supporting them with information. In this way, comparing the input with the eventual outcome provides an adequate indicator of the lobbying effort. This approach also provides a solution to the problem of measuring the influence of interest groups in cases where there is no conflict, due to the presence of only one interest group or advocacy coalition. (Chalmers 2011).

1.2. The interest group influence framework As mentioned before, the information provided by lobbyists is a necessary element for policymakers to carry out their tasks in an effective manner. Moreover, interest groups provide representation and involvement for their constituency in the public policy domain. Therefore, they should be considered an important part of a democratic society (Braun-Poppelaars et al. 2011). At the same time however, inequality in the amount of resources, access and the extent of influence different kinds of interest groups have, provide profit-oriented lobbyists and interest groups with a bad reputation, specifically because they are acting on account of their private interests at the expense of the public’s. A society where private interests prevail too often, risks developing a democratic deficit and growing social and economic inequality as the result of ‘corporate capture’ (Pabst 2010). To what extent the inequality in influence between different types of interest groups truly exists is a topic of discussion within the scientific community and also subject to inquiry in this research (Dür et al. 2015; Kluger Rasmussen 2015; Van Huisjtee & Glasbergen 2010). The inequality of the capacity between different types of interest groups to successfully influence policy outcomes is considered here to be determined by several categorical contextual factors. These factors are incorporated in the interest group influence framework (IGIF). The IGIF is a tool which can be used to analyse a specific case and provide an explanation of the outcome and the amount of influence different stakeholders had in this process. As a matter of fact, in no publication has it been officially called a framework. Dür calls it: “a large number of hypotheses” in which he distinguishes four “broad clusters of determinants” (2009: 2). These clusters of determinants have been used on many occasions by different researchers either in separate or combined form (Chalmers 2011; Dür & De Bièvre 2007; Dür et al. 2015; Klüver 2009a; Mahoney 2007; Princen 2007; Woll 2007). The acknowledgement of these determinants is a necessity, which will benefit the overall understanding and insight in the specific case and will also provide the possibility for comparative case studies. One of the determinants that has received arguably the most attention are the actor characteristics. As the name suggest; actor characteristics differ greatly per lobbyist or interest groups. Companies, trade

12 unions, public affairs organisations and NGOs are just a couple of the different types of interest groups, which can be involved in policy issues. The identity of the actors affects the possibilities they have to influence policy. Whether an interest group acts on account of the publics interest or for their own private interest influences the level of responsiveness of a policymaker towards this interest group when this policymaker is democratically eligible (Mahoney 2007: 41). The possession of a great amount of resources allows actors to be better able to address policymakers, provide them with information and play a meaningful role in a decision (Chalmers 2011: 472). Dahl defines these resources as: “anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual” (1961: 226). This includes different types of information like knowledge about the publics or constituency’s preferences, strategic political information on the opinions or activities of (rival) policymakers or expertise on policy issues (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 5). These resources also include the political support or legitimacy some groups can provide to a politician based on the constituency the group has. Furthermore, financial resources also play a role for it allows the interest group to hire more manpower to gather, process and distribute their information and expertise or to influence the political opinion of politicians through campaign donations. (Dür 2009: 3). Resources are not the only distinction effecting the amount of influence different types of interest groups have. The size of their membership base also plays an important role in this matter. An interest group with a great amount of members has more political legitimacy and is therefore more likely to be invited to the table and express its preferences to the policymakers. Possible coalitions between different interest groups have the same effect, as has been demonstrated by the Statiegeldalliantie in the case of PDMS (which will be further discussed in chapter four and five). These groups might even form (transnational) coalitions with each other or against each other to improve their chance of effectively influencing a policy outcome (Sabatier 1998). A side note in this regard is the fact that interest groups or coalitions with diffuse interest are often less successful in their effort than coalitions with concentrated interests, because they are involved with multiple issues and have to divide their resources. Due to their diffuse agenda, these groups also might find it difficult to organise in the first place, overcome problems of collective action and have all its members face the same direction (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 6). The type of interest group and the resources at its disposal are important, but the amount of influence an actor eventually has is largely dependent on the other determinants within the IGIF. For instance, an environmental NGO like Greenpeace differs greatly from a public affairs corporation like Business Europe, both in amount and type of resources. However, in a number of cases, Greenpeace can be much more influential than Business Europe, as the next determinant will show. The second determinant which affects the possibility of success for interest groups are the issue characteristics. These characteristics include the type of issue, the complexity, the salience and the level of conflict of the issue. Ethical issues produce a different situation than highly technologically or low salience issues (Dür & De Bièvre 2007). Following the work of the American political scientist Theodore Lowi, three different types of issues can be distinguished. The distinction is made based on the type of policy which addresses the issue. These types of policies are regulatory, distributive or redistributive by nature (Moran 2015: 5). A regulatory policy consists of rules or laws which have the purpose of influencing the behaviour

13 of the citizens. Distributive and redistributive policies are created for the purpose of relocating resources from the government to a societal group or from one group to another. Subsidizing social housing projects is an example of a distributive policy and inheritance taxation is an example of a redistributive policy. The type of policy issue affects the amount of influence an interest group can have. Regulatory policies can produce benefits for one group at the expense of another. Therefore, this type of policy issues is often accompanied by the involvement of multiple clashing interest groups in the policy process. Distributive policy issues can strongly favour one social group, while broadly dividing the costs of the policy across the population. Interest groups favouring these policies are more frequently successful, because they are less likely met by opposing interest groups. In addition, interest groups are less frequently involved and successful in lobbying redistributive policy issues for this policy type results in diffuse costs and benefits for the population. (Dür et al. 2015: 7-8). Another issue characteristic is the level of complexity. Issue complexity is defined by Klüver as: “the degree to which a given policy problem is difficult to analyse, understand or solve” (2011: 487). The level of complexity depends on the both the level of technicality as well as the scope of the issue. Certain economic policies within the European Union might affect the entire internal market, making it very complex, while other policy decisions might only include small, simple legal adjustments to existing policies. Policy issues which demand large-scale solutions result in less influence on the part of the lobbyists, because politicians act more cautious due to their far reaching effects (Mahoney 2007: 40). At the same time however, if an issue is technologically highly complex, policymakers oftentimes require all the help from external parties as they can get. These are the moments when lobbyists as information service bureaus are functioning at their best. Policymakers are in these cases depending on their input to function properly and the framing of the issue and the solution to this issue by the lobbyists allows them to greatly influence the policy outcome. Research on the lobbying success of business interest groups in the European Union has shown that these types of interest groups have the advantage when the issues are technologically complex and without conflict (Dür et al. 2015). The amount of resources these interest groups have allows them to be active in a large amount of policy domains. However, the same research shows that in cases where issues are accompanied by a lot of salience, where business interests are opposed by conflicting interest groups or coalitions counter-lobbying their effort, then they are less influential and usually ‘lose’ (ibid). Increasing the salience of an issue can sometimes have a beneficial effect for interest groups. Salience, the prominence, importance or popularity of an issue, affects the amount of influence interest groups have due to the presence or absence of the publics opinion and attention in the matter, thus resulting in a different handling of a politician of the issue (Klüver 2015: 451-452). These politicians might feel reserved to let the interest groups be to much involved in the policy process due to the negative effect the favouring of concentrated interests might have on the publics opinion and consequently his or her own approval rate and electoral consequences (Dür 2009: 8). The amount of salience of a policy issue also affects the possibility of the interest groups to experience the presence of (strong) competitive interest groups, thus making it more difficult for them to have an influential effect on the policy outcome, then when they remain unopposed. The amount of salience can be affected in numerous ways. One of the ways in which the salience

14 of an issue is increased is after the occurrence of a so-called ‘focusing event’ (Kingdon 1995). A focusing event is an event which alerts the politicians and the public to the presence of the issue. This might produce the urge to act on it and develop new policies. Examples of focusing events include a natural disaster, a terrorist attack or simply the publication of a scientific research with remarkable findings. The success which an interest group might have as the result from a focusing event depends on their own agenda and whether they are lobbying in favour or against the status quo (Mahoney 2007: 40). Interest groups might also influence the amount of salience of an issue themselves. Through different types of campaigning or ‘outside lobbying’, the interest groups might increase the salience and therefore their own success. The applied lobbying strategy of an interest group is the third determinant within the framework which analyses and explains the influential effect interest groups can have on a policy outcome. Different types of interest groups use different types of lobbying strategies. Categorically speaking, interest groups can apply inside lobbying strategies and outside lobbying strategies. Inside strategies include the networking capabilities of the lobbyists, where policymakers are influenced through direct contact. This happens most of the times behind closed doors and access is an important condition for the lobbyist’s success. Outside lobbying strategies are usually applied, when this access is not available to the lobbyist or when the strategy to influence public opinion and the political agenda seems to be the better choice. Influencing the public opinion through large-scale media campaigns is one way in which pressure can be put on the policymakers. Strikes and demonstrations are other methods which can be applied for this purpose. The position of the interest group with regard the policymakers greatly affects their choice of strategy. Although interest groups have a choice which type of strategy they apply, this choice is still strongly affected by their insider or outsider status (Maloney et al. 1994: 32-34). When an interest group has the status of a so-called ‘core-’, ‘specialist-’ or ‘peripheral insider group’, they are very likely to pursue insider lobbying strategies. This is also the case for interest groups interest groups, which can be qualified as ‘outsiders by ideology or goal’ or ‘outsiders by choice’. (Idem: 30-32). The choice of strategy has consequences for the eventual outcome of the policy development process. However, the selected strategy is not always per definition the most effective and successful one. As Dür puts it: “If groups always adopted ideal strategies, strategies would only be an intermediary variable that is perfectly explained by a group’s resources, the institutional framework and so forth, and hence could be ignored in attempts at explaining interest group influence. Yet while very little research exists on this issue, it seems plausible that groups sometimes fail to pick the most effective lobbying strategy” (2009: 9). This failure of the interest groups might result from the inability to recognize and grasp the right opportunities. Although this ability can be learned through experience, it still puts professional public affairs agencies at an advantage in respect to young and small NGOs. Furthermore, some interest groups might favour strategies which can be considered less effective for reaching their preferred policy outcome, but are successful in maintaining or enlarging their membership base. Lastly, the choice for a less effective lobbying strategy might also be the result of the institutional complexity in which the interest group operates. This is especially the case when it comes to the context of an international organisations like the European Union,

15 but this also applies to the national context for it includes many different kinds of governmental bodies, actors and institutes. (Ibid). This difference in institutional context includes the fourth and final determinant within the IGIF. This context refers to the multiple levels of governance where the policy process might take place, as well as the composition of governmental- and other types of bodies within these levels. The governmental level in which the policy process takes place also affects the activity of the interest groups in different ways. The supranational institutional context of the EU provides very different chances and obstacles for interest groups to pursue their policy preference than the institutional context of a municipality or the national context of The Hague (Mahoney 2007). The complexity of the institutional landscape of the European Union as an important obstacle has already been mentioned, but these different institutional contexts also provide the interest groups with opportunities. For example, addressing issues on an international scale allows interest groups from different countries who share the same objective to develop a coalition or platform, where they combine their resources and increase their chance for lobbying success. Furthermore, the difference in institutional contexts also provide different regulations, mores and constitutional rules. For instance, in the case of the European Commission, contrary to the nationally elected politicians, the policymakers are appointed. This provides these commissioners with less electoral restraints regarding their activity, thus making them less dependent on the financial support of campaign donors and therefore less receptive to their interest groups (Mahoney 2007: 38). This again results in a more equally divided playing field for the other less well-endowed interest groups. In addition, extra levels of government provide the interest groups with extra access points towards the policymakers. In some cases, interest groups might be very unsuccessful in their efforts to influence policies in their national context due to the presence of an unreceptive governing party or coalition in office at that moment. Through the use of a ‘boomerang effect’, these interest groups might try to achieve the same goal by influencing policymakers at a higher level, like the European Union, the United Nations or any other influential intergovernmental or supranational organisation, which will in turn affect the national policies (Tarrow 2005: 145-147). These extra access points have produced a trend of interest groups who take part in ‘venue shopping’ at both national and international levels (Callanan 2011). Within the same governmental level, the composition of the institutional context might also differ. This is often the case at the national level between the different countries. For example, countries like Switzerland where instruments of direct democracy like referendums are used on a regularly basis enjoy a strong integration of non-profit oriented interest groups. This is in contrast to countries like Germany where these instruments are rarely used and where these non-profit oriented interest groups have a weaker position. Consequently, this composition of the institutional context again affects the behaviour of interest groups and the lobbying strategy they choose to apply. (Weiler 2015).

1.3. Flaws and improvements These four determinants and the contextual factors they analyse are interrelated and together form the coherent interest group influence framework. As mentioned before, in no publication has it officially been

16 called a theoretical framework. The construction of this framework within this research is based upon the combined work of multiple academics like Mahoney, Klüver and Weiler, who all use and describe some of the determinants of the framework in their own publications. However, the work of German political scientist Andreas Dür and his co-authors has been the most influential in this regard, for they make the same distinction between the “four broad clusters of determinants” (Dür 2009: 2), otherwise called the “factors shaping the influence of interest groups” as used in this research (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 3). This framework is a tool which is well-suited in providing an analysis of a specific policy process, the influential activity of the interest groups involved and an explanation of the eventual policy outcome. However, as the analysis in chapter five will also show, this framework is not applicable to every case. Based on the four determinants, certain policy decisions can not be explained, for the framework would have predicted a different outcome. This implies that the current framework has its flaws and needs to be adjusted or even extended. As mentioned before, besides providing an answer to the main research question, this research also has the purpose of developing a better functioning theoretical framework, which is comprehensive and can be applied as a tool to all other cases in which interest groups were actively influencing a policy process. This is a high standard and chances are that the newly formed ‘extended-IGIF’ is still not perfectly applicable to every other case. This only suggests that developing this framework is a process for which the case of the extension of the packaging deposit money system in the Netherlands is the first step. It allows the possibility of well-grounded future adjustments based on different case studies, which will only improve the framework as an analytical tool. Before all that, it is required to describe the flaws of the current framework and provide the necessary adjustments to improve the IGIF. Within the current theoretical framework, four flaws have been identified which need to be addressed. The first flaw of the framework is the lack of attention regarding the agency and beliefs of the decision-makers. Politicians and policymakers have no tabula rasa. As Chalmers has already stated: “interest groups […] tend to lobby friends, not foes” (2011: 472). Within the IGIF the focus of the determinant ‘actor characteristics’ primarily lies on the interest groups and their political agenda and no attention is paid to the activity and preferences of the decision-makers themselves. This gives the appearance of them being inactive neutral policy brokers, which is not the case (Peters 2009). The determinant ‘actor characteristics’ should therefore either be expanded or the framework should be extended with a fifth determinant called ‘decision-maker characteristics’. This determinant would provide an analysis of the decision-makers, their political position, beliefs or ideological position for the purpose of estimating the accessibility for the interest groups towards these decision-makers and the receptiveness of their input. A second flaw which has been identified within the framework is the fact that the interest groups are oftentimes portrayed as single entities who are acting alone. However, this is in practice often not the case for interest groups frequently find themselves to be a part of a greater advocacy coalition. The ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF) as developed by the American political scientists Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith offers a well-fitting theoretical perspective on the structure and mechanisms of these coalitions, which should therefore be included within the ‘actor characteristics’ determinant, for it contributes to the improvement of the IGIF. The ACF is a framework which was been developed for the

17 purpose of providing a better understanding of the major factors and processes which shape a policy process. As Sabatier states himself, it has been specifically designed: “to explain an exceedingly complex situation involving hundreds of actors from dozens of organizations seeking to influence the overall policy process over periods of a decade or more in situations where relatively technical information concerning problem severity and causes cannot be neglected” (Sabatier 1998: 98). As can be viewed in the diagram on the next page in figure 1, the ACF identifies ‘policy subsystems’. These consist of a variety of public and private actors, who are involved with certain policy issue and who all try to influence the public policy regarding this issue. Within these policy subsystems, coalitions are formed between these actors, which include interest groups leaders, agency officials, politicians from different governmental levels, researchers, journalists and other types of publically engaged actors. Within a policy subsystem, usually one to four advocacy coalitions are active, which are united by the shared set of beliefs and goals and their cooperation. A distinction can be made regarding these beliefs between the broad fundamental ‘deep core’ beliefs (e.g. religion or ideology), the more specific ‘policy core’ beliefs which include their shared commitment and perspective on the policy subsystem and the ‘secondary aspects’ which contains narrower beliefs like the seriousness of the problem or certain specific policy preferences, which might differ between actors within the same coalition. The policy core beliefs and more especially the secondary aspects are more likely to change over a certain period of time than the deep core beliefs. (Idem: 103-104). The composition of advocacy coalitions also changes over time. Certain ‘exogenous variables’ affect the constraints, opportunities and resources of the subsystem actors. The variables can be divided between relative stable parameters and dynamic external system events. These stable parameters are rather solid and only change over long periods of time. They include the basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-economic values, social structures and the constitutional structure of the country. Variables of the second category; the dynamic external system events, are more receptive to change, which can take place over a time period of ten years. These variables are therefore the main cause for changes in the composition of the advocacy coalitions. These events include changes in socio-economic conditions (like the establishment of social movements), changes in public opinion (e.g. awareness of climate change and a need for sustainability), changes in systemic governing coalition (resulting from periodically elections) and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems (like changing tax laws). These external variables affect the policy subsystems and the composition of the advocacy coalitions, but are also at the same time subject to change as the result from the lobbying strategies and the success of the advocacy coalitions. (Idem: 102-103). Within these coalitions, one or more strategies are adopted which have the purpose of influencing the policymakers and eventually realising their preferred policy outcome. Both the strategies as well as the beliefs of advocacy coalitions may change during the process of policy influence. When two or more advocacy coalitions are opposing each other, their conflicting strategies cause the involvement of a third group of actors; the policy brokers. These policy brokers will try to reduce the conflict by producing a reasonable compromise. Policy brokers are often but not necessary governmental agents. They can also be actors from a third advocacy coalition acting in a strategic manner,

18 102 RA. Sabatier exceedingly complex situation involving hundreds of actors from dozens of organizations seeking to influence the overall policy process over periods of a decade or more in situations where relatively technical information concerning problem severity and causes cannot be neglected.

Structural overview of the ACF Figure 1 presents a general overview of the framework. On the left side are two sets of exogenous variables - the one quite stable, the other more dynamic - that affect the constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors. The former include the basic constitutional structure, socio-cultural values, and natural resources of a political system. Being extremely difficult to change, they are seldom the subject of coalition strategies (except in the very long term). Neverthe- when less,a certain they clearlycompromise affect behavior. appears Forto be example, in its own Moe best (1990) interest has recently. (Bratt argued 2013: that2-4). Eventually, the efforts changing the law is typically the focus of coalition strategies in separation-of- of the different advocacy coalitions and the policy brokers are concluded by the decision-makers.

RELATIVELY STABLE PARAMETERS 1 Basic attributes of the Constraints problem area (good) POLICY SUBSYSTEM Coalition A Policy Coalition B 2 Basic distribution of and a) Policy beliefs brokers a) Policy belief~ natural resources b) Resources b) Resources 3 Fundamental socio- resources cultural values and social structure Strategy A1 Strategy B1 of re. guidance re. guidance 4 Basic constitutional instruments instruments structure (rules) / subsystem Decisions by sovereigns actors EXTERNAL (SYSTEM) Institutional rules, resource EVENTS allocations, and appointments 1 Changes in socio- economic conditions Policy outputs 2 Changes in public opinion Policy impacts 3 Changes in systemic governing coalition 4 Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems

Figure I Revised diagram of the ACF Figure 1. The revised diagram of the ACF (Sabatier 1998: 102).

A third flaw of the interest group influence framework is related to the determinant of the institutional context. Although the differences between certain national contexts are addressed by the current IGIF, it still does not sufficiently acknowledge the general position of interest groups within the specific society. Within the political scientific literature, a lot has been written on the different systems of interest representation (e.g. Cohen & Rogers 2001; Greenwood 2011; Sanchez Salgado 2014; Schmitter 1979). Whether a society shows elements of a (neo-)pluralistic, neo-corporatist, elitist or associative system of interest representation affects the amount of influence interest groups can have on policy decisions. These models differ in a number of aspects, but the main division lies in the role authorities have in providing support to interest groups and the equality or inequality in the position or prominence of these interest groups (Sanchez Salgado 2018: 3-8). The traditional division is made between the pluralistic and elitist model. Within a pluralistic system interest groups have equal access to the policymakers and therefore an equal chance to represent their interests. The plurality of different interest groups provides a self- correcting system, which prevents the possibility for a few interest groups to become to dominant at the expense of the others (idem: 3-4). This is in contrast to the elitist model of interest representation, where certain interest groups have more resources, are better organised, have more access and consequently have far more influence on policy decisions than others (idem: 4-5).

19 A neo-corporatist model of interest representation is a model often associated with the Dutch polder model in which the three categories of government, employers and employees are functioning in a deliberative and balanced manner (idem: 5-6). Other types of interest groups, which are not included within these three categories are limited in participating in the policy process. Lastly, an associative democratic system resembles the pluralistic model in some form, but differs in its stronger focus on equality, democracy and citizen participation. Besides the representation that citizens enjoy through their electoral bodies, they also seek representation through the interest groups who represent their interests in the policy processes (idem: 6-7). For the purpose of levelling the playing field and establishing equal representation among these different interest groups, the government provides state-funding to groups who would otherwise not have the capabilities to exist. A prime example of a context in which this takes place is the European Union, where the European Commission benefits from the presence and input of NGOs and other public-oriented interest groups. For a clear overview of all the differences between these models of interest representation, see table 1. According to Sanchez Salgado, the neo-pluralistic model is nowadays the most popular model for describing a country’s system of interest representation (2018: 3). It is presumed here that, depending on the specific national or international context, other models might be better applicable in some cases like the European Union exemplifies. For this reason, when conducting an analysis of a policy process and the institutional context, it is important for the extended-IGIF to take account of the model of interest representation which is best applicable to this context, for it provides awareness of the chances and limits of the interest groups within these contexts. Finally, the fourth flaw of the IGIF lies in the fact that it does not take into account some of the constraints a politician might have to implement the preferences of an interest group. Although the institutional context is one of the determinants within the framework, still too little attention is paid to the limits the politicians might have in their decision-making power due to the type of democracy and the constitutional rules which structure these democracies. This contextual element of the type of democracy affects the agency of the politicians and therefore consequently the amount of influence an interest group might have. Within this research, a distinction is made between majoritarian democracies and consensual democracies (Lijphart 2012). Both types provide extra chances and extra limits for the interest groups. In a majoritarian democracy, there is usually only one political party in office which has the power to implement policies and adopt laws. Examples of these majoritarian democracies are Anglo-Saxon countries like the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States. It only takes one party or in some cases only one person who needs to be influenced or pursued to act in a certain way, to have an interest group’s desired policy-outcome. (Idem: 9-29). Contrary to majoritarian democracies, in consensual democracies no single party is capable of achieving an absolute majority. This results in multiple parties forming a government coalition. A lot of European countries like Germany, Belgium, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands are examples of this type of democracy. When multiple parties are in a governing coalition, the decision-making power is shared. This provides interest groups with multiple access points where they can pursue influencing the policy decisions. At the same time however, because the decision making power is shared and the governing parties

20 have to take each others preferences into account, the influence of interest groups is also limited. In this type of democracy, multiple decision-makers need to be influenced by the interest groups to have their preferred policy outcome. (Idem: 30-45). Within a multi-party democracy, an advocacy coalition also becomes more diverse as multiple political parties can be included in the same advocacy coalition, which provides extra means to have the preferences of the advocacy coalition lobbied for. These four flaws and the provided solutions to these flaws are the extensions to the interest group influence framework, which together form the new extended-IGIF. Besides the four original determinants of the actor characteristics, issue characteristics, the lobbying strategy and the institutional context, four new aspects are added to the framework. These are the decision-maker characteristics, the focus on advocacy coalitions, the model of interest representation and the type of democracy. Together these eight determinants provide an analytical tool, which creates a much better understanding of the entire context in which interest groups operate and influence policy decisions. After disusing the research design and the case specifics of the packaging deposit money systems in the upcoming two chapters, the extended-IGIF will be applied to the case of the PDMS, after which the functionality of this framework will be determined.

Pluralism Elitism Neo-corporatism Associative democracy

Public intervention Ensures basic Ensures Ensures stability Ensures effective rights and representation of and governability and balanced competition powerful groups representation among groups Access Open to all groups Restricted to an Restricted to a Open to all groups respecting basic elite of groups limited number of fulfilling certain rights and with wealth and groups normative criteria constitutional rules power

Representativeness Groups represent Elite’s wealth and Hierarchical and Accountability and a segment of the power give them centralized system completeness of population greater access and of interest group’s influence aggregation membership Autonomy The state should Elites have a The state controls Subsidies in not interfere in the disproportionate the articulation of exchange for internal dynamics influence on policy demands and observing of groups selection of leaders behavioural constraints Limits/risks Unbalanced Undemocratic, Excludes voices Bureaucratic representation aristocratic, and endangers politics oligarchic autonomy of groups Table 1. Four models of interest representation and the EU funding of CSOs (Sanchez Salgado 2018: 9).

21 2. Research design As has been discussed in chapter one, influence measurement is not without its difficulties. Proving causality, detecting all different forms of influence and determining the real preferences of stakeholders are issues which accompany the measuring of influence. Acknowledging these issues is a first step in dealing with them. Addressing influence with Chalmer’s information processing theory is a way to manage the preference determination issue, but this only takes care of one of the issues and it should also be noted that it is oftentimes not possible to access and inquire every bit of information distributed from the interest groups to the policymakers. Similar to the information processing theory approach, every other method has its benefits and drawbacks. Within the academic community, political scientists disagree with each other on the matter which method should be considered the best suitable to measure influence (e.g. Chalmers 2011; Klüver 2009a; Woll 2007). Some of them favour one method over the other, while others encourage the application of a triangulated approach (Dür 2008: 569; Mahoney 2007: 37). This triangulated (or sometimes called a mixed-method) approach, includes the use of multiple methods in the same case. This approach should only be applied on the condition that the researcher is aware of the drawbacks of every separate method and adjusts for these drawbacks through the choice of compatible and supplementary methods. This way, the researcher can produce a comprehensive and well-substantiated understanding of the activity and influence of the different stakeholders in this policy process. For the purpose of uncovering the influential effect of the interest groups in the case of the PDMS, a triangulated approach has also been applied in this research.

2.1. Influence measurement methods Within this research, multiple influence measurement methods have been used. This mixed-method approach includes process-tracing, a stakeholder analysis, preference attainment and a moderate version of attributed influence measurement. These are four methods which are often used within the academic community (Dür 2008; Klüver 2009b; Woll 2007). The suitability of these methods dependents on the case specifics. This is the reason why a fifth method, quantitative content analysis, was not applied. This method is considered very suitable for large-N case comparison studies and therefore not applicable to this case study (Klüver 2009a). The other methods are very suitable for qualitative case studies, while at the same time also being very compatible to each other. The first one of the methods applied in this research is process-tracing. As the French political scientist Pascal Vennesson defined it: “[it is] a research procedure intended to explore the pathways through which initial conditions are turned into outcomes” (2008: 224). Process-tracing as a method has some similarities with investigating and developing a historical narrative, but it is more than that. It is a technique which can be used in different variants for three different scientific purposes. The first one of these purposes is to test an already existing theory. This theory is formulated in the form of a hypothesis of a causal mechanism between variables X and Y, of which the relation is tested by tracing the process of a specific case. A second way in which process-tracing can be applied is for the purpose of theory-building. In this

22 case, a theory is constructed following the analysis of a case where no mechanism has initially been hypothesised yet, but found while conducting the investigation. The third and most often used version of process-tracing has the purpose of producing a correct explanation of the outcome. This objective is different than the previous two, because it is not trying to discover or construct generalizable mechanisms or theories applicable to other cases. The theory-testing and theory-building variants on the other hands do have this objective. (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 9-22). Regardless of the purpose, process-tracing is considered to be very suitable for decision-making processes (Bennet & Checkel 2015: 5). For this particular research, process-tracing is used to test the theory of the IGIF, while also trying to produce an explanation for the purpose of answering the research question. The second method applied in this research is called a stakeholder analysis. This is a method which is not only used within the academic world, but also as one of the tools for conflict resolution, project management, business administration and even by interest groups when constructing their lobbying strategy (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018). This method is applied to map all the relevant stakeholders involved in a specific case and assess the amount of power and the level of interest each stakeholder has in the issue. It requires a thorough analysis of the stakeholders for the purpose of identifying their preferences, capabilities and activities. A stakeholder analysis overlaps in some way with the other methods like process-tracing and preference attainment. To clarify; no process can be thoroughly traced, without also focussing on the stakeholders who were involved. Furthermore, no preference-outcome comparison can be made without a good analysis of the different actors. This makes this method very compatible to process-tracing. However, the methods still vary in the fact that the angle of approach differs, which makes it important to consider it as a separate approach. Usually a stakeholder analysis is carried out by plotting a chart and placing the different stakeholders within the power-interest axes. However, their placement is arbitrary and it was therefore decided for this research to carry out this analysis in a different way by describing these stakeholders on the basis of their preferences, their activity and the manner in which the preferences of the stakeholders are reflected in the policy outcome (Dür 2008: 562). The last category of the stakeholder analysis matches a different influence measurement method; preference attainment. Preference attainment; a method which includes the comparison between the preferred outcome of the stakeholders and the actual outcome of the policy process as a way to estimate their influence, is a seemingly simple and straightforward method and very well applicable to cases where only one coalition is actively lobbying. Because of the comparison between preferences and outcomes, this method is considered to be rather objective and comprehensive for it takes all lobbying strategies and activity into account (Klüver 2009b: 536). However, as mentioned before, this method also has its flaws, for it might be difficult to deduce the genuine preferences of the stakeholders, especially if the stakeholders are not fully aware of their own preferences or when they are not open and truthful about them (Woll 2007). Furthermore, this method is also not capable to take into account the influence exerted through counter- lobbying activities. Because of the focus on preferences and the policy outcomes, this method is very complementary to process-tracing and the stakeholder analysis. It differs in the fact that this method explicitly focusses on the comparison between the stakeholders’ wishes and the outcome. The multiple

23 drawbacks of this method make preference attainment a prime example of a method which can best be applied as part of a triangulated approach. The fourth and final method applied in this research is the attributed influence method. By applying the attributed influence method, stakeholders are themselves approached and asked to make an estimation and evaluation of the amount of influence they and other stakeholders had on the policy outcome. This is done by conducting interviews with these stakeholders. As mentioned above, within this research a moderate version of the attributed influence method is used. The term ‘moderate’ is mentioned here because the attribute influence method is usually conducted through the use of surveys, which are sent to a significant number of stakeholders in which the amount of influence can be defined in a quantitative manner (e.g. Dür 2015) (Dür 2008: 565). This is not the case in this particular research. Only those stakeholders which have been interviewed have been asked to make an estimation of the amount of influence they and other stakeholders had in the policy process. This estimation has not been expressed in a quantitative manner and because of the small number of interviews, the combined assessment could also not be considered significant. Still, these interviews and the individual perception of the stakeholders provide a subjective insider perspective on the policy case and the lobbying activity, which is a valuable addition to the objective outsider perspective provided by the preference attainment method. In addition, the interviews that have been conducted also present complementary information and a better and more complete understanding of the case, which consequently also provides input for the process-tracing aspect of the research. A negative aspect of the attributed influence method is that it measures the perception of influence instead of the actual influence. Stakeholders might knowingly or unknowingly overstate or underestimate their own or other stakeholders’ perceived influence (Dür 2009: 17-18). For this reason, just like the preference attainment method, the attributed influence method is useful when applied as part of a triangulated approach.

2.2 Research data As mentioned in the paragraph above, this research is based on different types of data; data derived from open sources and information obtained through interviews. The open source information consists of a variety of different sources including media sources like news articles (from Dutch newspapers like Trouw, NRC, Parool, Volkskrant and the public broadcast corporation NOS), TV-broadcasts and documentaries, but also governmental documents like minutes of parliamentary debates and commission meetings, parliamentary letters and motions and position papers of parliamentary hearings. Other types of official documents included national agreements, accords, reports, evaluations, petitions, transition agenda’s and political party documents. The information obtained from these open sources allowed for the construction of the case description as well as the development of the earlier mentioned outsider perspective necessary for the influence measurement methods and the case description. One of the benefits of this particular case study was the relatively large amount of accessible governmental and political documents. Sometimes, certain parliamentary meetings are restricted to the general public. The content of these closed-door meetings is therefore oftentimes not available to researchers. However, fortunately in this research this was not the case, which provided valuable input from the parliamentary hearing ‘Kunststofketen en zwerfafval’

24 (plastic chain and litter) from November 30th, 2017, the complementary position papers provided by the stakeholders for this hearing and the parliamentary commission meetings, which followed in the months thereafter in which members of parliament (MPs) and State Secretary Van Veldhoven discussed the policy issue. These meetings, which proved to be key sources of information, were all video-recorded and most of them were put in writing as well. In addition to these sources, the choice has also been made to conduct interviews with several stakeholders. These interviews were held in a semi-structured way. This was done for the purpose of allowing the interviewees to speak freely and provide input at their own behest, while still maintaining some structure to acquire the same type of information from the different respondents. In order to provide a complete picture based on different perspectives, multiple parties were interviewed which were all involved in the policy process in some manner. The interviewees were selected on their activity in the policy process and their position towards the policy issue. Initially, four categories were formed which included the different types of stakeholders. These were the expert outsiders, the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition, the profit-oriented advocacy coalition and the politicians & decision-makers. Unfortunately, for different reasons, not all stakeholders were willing or able to participate in an interview. The full agendas of the stakeholders, the limited timeframe of the research and presumably the political agenda of some stakeholders, the lack of benefits and the relative low prestige of a master thesis were cause for some interviews to not take place. Regarding the last three reasons, although these can not be proven, it is likely that they have played a role. Stakeholders which have been influential in a policy process, but do not want this to be public knowledge are not inclined to participate in a research. Furthermore, because of a full work schedule, (especially political) stakeholders might also choose not to take part in an interview because they do not gain any benefits from this. This might differ when a research is being conducted by a journalist or a high level researcher who both reach a large audience, but this is less likely in the case of a master thesis. As the name ‘expert outsiders’ suggest, these are stakeholders which have not been active within the policy process through an influential or decision-making capacity. Nonetheless, these stakeholders have an interest in the issue and a large amount of (expert) knowledge regarding this issue, thus making them valuable sources for this research. In this particular research, journalists were approached as the expert outsiders, for they are well-informed and approachable sources suitable for interviewing. One interview has been conducted with a journalist from the newspaper Trouw, Joop Bouma, who had been following the case for a long period and whose name appeared above several news articles on the subject. The decision was made to approach the expert outsiders prior to the other categories, because they could provide conformational input for the information which had already been collected through the open sources. This way, they allowed for a better preparation of the other interviews. Due to a lack of response from other media sources, this interview remained to be the only expert outsider. Thereupon, the non-governmental stakeholders from the advocacy coalitions were approached, starting with the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition. Three members of this coalition were interviewed; Recycling Netwerk Benelux, Natuur & Milieu and Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG). The choice for these organisations was based on their presence during the parliamentary hearing ‘Kunststofketen en

25 zwerfafval’ (plastic chain and litter). This parliamentary hearing was held at the initiative of two MPs who determined which organisations were invited, thereby identifying the most prominent and influential organisations in this policy domain. Other organisations which were present at this hearing, which are part of the profit-oriented advocacy coalition, were also approached for an interview. These organisations included Afvalfond Verpakkingen, Centraal Bestuur Levensmiddelenhandel (CBL) and Kennisinstituut Duurzaam Verpakken (KIDV). Unfortunately, non of these organisations were receptive to the interview requests. Either no response was given or they stated that they had no time available in their schedule. Lastly, the group of the politicians and decision-makers has also not been included within this research. The limited amount of time for conducting this research was one of the reasons for this, but the busy schedule of these stakeholders also played a role. The lack of input from the last two interviewee categories is unfortunate for it allows the non-profit oriented coalition’s perspective to be stronger heard in this research and result in an incomplete insider perspective on the policy process. By being aware of this one-sided perspective and combined with the information derived from the open sources, it was still possible to construct a proper stakeholder analysis, case description and analysis of this policy process.

26 3. Case description As mentioned earlier, the case of extension or disappearance of the packaging deposit money system is multifaceted. It includes the goals and issues of the circular economy, the resource scarcity, recycling goals, the plastic soup and general litter. Proponents favour the extension of the system as they perceive this as the best suitable method to deal with these issues. They are challenged by those who oppose the system and any further extension, for they regard it as an inadequate and expansive tool, which is not as effective as other strategies might be. The issue has been actively debated for almost two decades. Both sides of the issue have been represented by interest groups, who have been actively trying to influence the national policies towards their own preferences and advantages. This has also been the case during the policy process between November 2017 and March 2018 in which the State Secretary of Infrastructure and Water Management Van Veldhoven was consulted and deliberated on the issue and which lead to a decision and a new directive in the policy issue. Before going into these recent developments and the influential activities of the multiple interest groups within this policy process, the events leading up to this policy process which shaped the national discussion will now first be discussed for the purpose of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the historical context of the political debate and the policy issue.

3.1. The PDMS in a broader context The PDMS is a system which is not per definition fixated on one type of drinking package or material. It might include different types of drink packages like plastic or glass bottles, metal containers (cans or barrels) or plastic beer crates. It is a system which exists in the Netherlands, but which is also not uncommon in other countries in and outside Europe. In the Middle East, Israel is the only country which has introduced a PDMS on beverage containers and beer bottles. Anglo-Saxon countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some states in the United States have also implemented different forms of a PDMS. Within the United Kingdom, all four countries are either considering or have already announced plans to implement a deposit money system and on the European continent, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, all the five Nordic countries and a couple of Baltic, Balkan and Eastern European countries have also all introduced deposit money systems in the last couple of decades (Bond Beter Leefmilieu n.d.; Edie 2017). In the Netherlands, this system has been in place for a long time as well. It was introduced in the 1950s out of financial consideration for the producers (especially the milkmen who delivered and retrieved their milk bottles every day favoured this system). These bottles were relatively expansive at that time, but a few decades later during the 1980s, when the production of glass bottles became increasingly cheaper and cardboard packaging made its introduction, the system of deposit money on this type of packaging disappeared, with the exception of glass beer bottles. Around this time, polyethylene terephthalate (PET) plastic bottles were introduced as packaging for carbonated water and soft drinks, which were both cheap and (unlike cardboard) very suitable for containing the carbon dioxide. Deposit money was introduced on a national scale on the large plastic bottles (> 0.5 litre). (Statiegelddebat 2014). Bottles smaller than 0.5 litre, who were introduced at a later stage halfway the 1990s, were excluded from this regulation.

27 3.2. Political developments Around the time of the introduction of the small plastic bottle, the Dutch government made a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the packaging industry and chose to not include them within the PDMS, on the condition that they would maintain a market share of less than 2% (Van Duin 2016). In 2001, the Minister of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental Management Jan Pronk ((PvdA: cabinet Kok II: coalition of PvdA (Labour party) and VVD (conservative-liberals)) acknowledged the fact that the market share of small plastic bottles had become larger than 2% and he therefore decided that the extension of the deposit system on every size of plastic bottles was necessary. Introducing this extension was not without its difficulties. Minister Pronk met strong opposition within his own cabinet from the coalition partner VVD, which emphasized the negative financial consequences such a system would have for the packaging industry. Therefore, the minister allowed the packaging industry to come up with their own solution, which would have to result in an 80% decrease of plastic waste in the upcoming two years (Trouw 2001). If this target would not be reached through the industry’s own measurements, the government would implement the extension of the deposit money system nonetheless. A few years later in 2004, the packaging industry had nog succeeded in reaching the 80% target. However, by that time the PvdA-VVD cabinet had been long replaced by the more right-wing cabinet of Balkenende II, which consisted of CDA-VVD-D66 (coalition of CDA (conservative Christian Democrats), the VVD and (the progressive social-liberal) D66). Because of the change of cabinet and the more conservative composition of political parties in the governing coalition, the announced extension was not implemented. In the following years, during the cabinets of Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA) (2002 – 2010), relatively little attention was paid to the packaging deposit money systems and its possible extension or removal. The discussion took off again some years later in 2012, following the publication of the preliminary findings of a research by the Wageningen University in 2011. Based on these findings, the State Secretary of Infrastructure and Milieu, Joop Atsma ((CDA) cabinet Rutte I: right wing coalition with VVD-CDA-PVV (populist right wing party)) concluded that the entire deposit money system was too expensive to maintain (Wageningen University & Research n.d.). Based on these findings, Atsma decided to allow the abolishment of the deposit money system, if the packaging industry would meet seven different conditions of which the main goal was they would reach the goal of a 52% recycling rate of their plastic bottles through their own methods by 2014 (Parool 2012). Two years later, half of these conditions were not met and due to another change of government coalition and the interfering activity on the part of the environmental organisation Recycling Netwerk Benelux, the new State Secretary of Infrastructure & Milieu Wilma Mansveld ((PvdA), cabinet Rutte II: coalition of PvdA & VVD) prevented the possible abolishment of the PDMS (Van Duin 2016). Two years later, in 2016, the story broke that the research published by Wageningen University was done poorly; ordered by the packaging industry itself, carelessly done without proper reviews, with predetermined conclusions and based on selective data that was delivered by the industry as well (Marijnissen 2016a; Marijnissen 2016b). This news resulted in political and societal disapproval and consequently lead to the governmental request for new objective and trustworthy research for the purpose of making a well-substantiated decision in this policy issue.

28 3.3. A new directive This governmental request lead to the publication of two reports from the research and consultancy firm CE Delft and the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in August and September 2017.2 The research done by the CPB and especially CE Delft lead to a new continuation of the political discussion on the subject. This time the discussion focussed on the possibility to incorporate small plastic bottles and tin cans in the system instead of the abolishment of the system all together, for both reports were predominantly positive about the effectiveness of the deposit money system. These reports were published around the same time when the newly formed government of cabinet Rutte III took office in October 2017. This coalition consisted of four parties; the VVD, CDA, D66 and the Christen Union (Christian social- conservative party). This new government also provided the new State Secretary of Infrastructure and Water Management, charged with the policy domain Milieu; Stientje van Veldhoven (D66). Prior to her appointment, Van Veldhoven had been active in the Dutch national politics as MP since 2010 in the policy domains of Climate, Milieu, Energy, Circular Economy and Gas Extraction. She has been largely recognized by fellow MPs and other stakeholders as someone talented and experienced, who was also personally invested in the issues of the plastic soup (Tweede Kamer 2017a). During the debate on the budget of the ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management in November 2017 (the unofficial start of her term as State Secretary), Van Veldhoven disclosed that she intended to make progress and find a breakthrough in this case in the upcoming months. The circular economy, the litter problem and the plastic soup stood high on the agenda of both herself as well as a number of different political parties (ibid). This budgetary debate initiated the period from November 2017 until March 2018, in which the policy process took place and which allowed all the (relevant) interest groups to provide their input to the State Secretary for the purpose of influencing the policy outcome. Already on November 27th, the day before the budgetary debate, a parliamentary hearing was held on the subject ‘plastic chain and litter’ at the request of MPs Suzanne Kröger (GroenLinks)3 and Erik Ziengs (VVD), both members of the parliamentary commission of Infrastructure and Water Management. During this hearing, the results of the reports of the CPB and CE Delft were presented and their work explained by both organisations. In addition, multiple representatives of different interest groups who were all considered important stakeholders in this policy issue were invited by the MPs to inform them with their expert knowledge on the issue and make their case either in favour or against the PDMS and its possible extension. These stakeholders included three environmental protection organisations, three professional associations, two executive organisations and a knowledge institute. Based on the multiple position papers provided by the interest groups prior to the hearing and the input of these stakeholders during the meeting, two advocacy coalitions can be identified. The first one is a profit-oriented advocacy coalition which consists of the representatives and advocates of producers, supermarkets and the hospitality business (horeca). These stakeholders lobby

2 The CPB stands for Centraal Planbureau, which can be literally translated as Central Planning Bureau. However, this institution prefers their English translated name as the ‘CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis’ to prevent any confusion about their purpose. 3 GroenLinks, translated as GreenLeft is a green, social-democratic political party.

2 9 against the extension of the deposit money system and prefer other methods to reach the objectives of the circular economy and the decrease of litter and plastic soup. Reasons for this stance derive from the negative financial costs that the extension of this system will have for the producers and sale points like supermarkets and other types of shops. If the extended PDMS is implemented, these businesses will most likely lose revenue due to a loss in sales resulting from the increased prices. The deposit money is one of the reasons for the increased prices per product, but the products would also become more expensive because they need to make up for the extra costs which result from the extra space necessary for storage and the extra administrative and labour costs accompanied by the extended deposit money system. Because plastic bottles and tin cans include only a relative small part of the total amount of litter, they consider the PDMS to be an ineffective and unnecessary measure of which the costs are too high.4 Within this advocacy coalition, the main actor is the CBL, a branch organisation which represents the collective interests of 25 supermarket and food service companies in the Netherlands. They are supported in their advocacy coalition by Afvalfonds Verpakkingen, an executive organisation set up by the packaging industry for the purpose of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the collection and recycling of waste, specifically their own packaging products. The CBL is also supported by NederlandSchoon5, a NGO which focusses on collecting litter and keeping the environment clean as well as Kennisinstituut Duurzaam Verpakken, a knowledge institute which provides companies and entrepreneurs with expertise and practical tools about sustainable packaging for the purpose of reaching a circular economy. The last member of this advocacy coalition is the branch association for the hospitality business and catering industry; Koninklijke Horeca Nederland (KHN). The KHN represents the interest of 20.000 hospitality entrepreneurs and a quarter million employees working in hotels, cafés, restaurants and other types of hospitality or catering businesses. This interest group was present during the parliamentary hearing in which they provided input and made their preferences known. However, apart from this appearance did the KHN nog take on a strong or active role in the policy process. Therefore, the are left out of the stakeholder analysis. Within this profit-oriented advocacy coalition, an important stakeholder is missing; the Federatie Nederlandse Levensmiddelen Industrie (FNLI). The FNLI is a very influential and prominent umbrella organisation for Dutch corporations in the food industry, which includes certain companies like Unilever, Heineken, Mars and Coca-Cola. Although the FNLI was an active opponent of the PDMS in the recent decades, they remained remarkably silent and neutral during the policy process of November 2017 and March 2018. This change of mind was caused by recent controversy, which emerged in October 2016 after internal classified emails from Coca-Cola were leaked and published by the website DCLeaks. In these emails, top employees of Coca-Cola discussed the coordinated lobbying strategy and activity of the

4 Within the discussion, the different parties disagree on the right method to measure the amount of litter. If expressed in number of objects, plastic bottles make up only 3% and tin cans 6% of the total amount of waste. However, if the share of bottles and cans is expressed in volume, it makes up for approximately 40% (CE Delft 2017). 5 Missing space between ‘Nederland’ and ‘Schoon’ is intended.

30 company, which took place in several states in the US, but also in the UK, France and more in general the European Union. Their activity involved the distribution of strategic coordinated messages to reporters and social media platforms through which they debunked scientific research, built Astroturf (fake grassroots) coalitions and influenced governmental officials (Pfister 2016). The release of these emails was met with public outrage for it was perceived as the soda industry’s “united force against public health” (ibid). An interesting aspect about the emails was the so-called ‘Public policy risk matrix & lobby focus’, which was included and which illustrated the topics of interest of the company plotted on a chart between the two axes of ‘business impact’ and ‘likelihood to materialize’ and of which the topics were divided between the categories ‘monitor’, ‘prepare’ and ‘fight back’ (see figure 2). A couple of months after the publication of the emails, the company changed it stance on the topic ‘EU scheme for deposit systems’, a topic which was previously categorized under the denominator ‘fight back’. In February 2017, Coca-Cola announced that they would support the introduction of a deposit money scheme in Scotland and England because, as they stated: “the time is right” (Plastic Soup Foundation 2017). As the result from the leaked emails and the immense public critique which followed from this, Coca-Cola changed its lobbying effort and position on several issues, which consequently lead to the change of position of Coca-Cola in the Netherlands towards the possible extension of the PDMS. Being one of the most important members of the FNLI, this consequently lead to a change of activity of the association as well. This is the reason why the FNLI was also not present during the parliamentary hearing of November 27 and also had not been publishing any content on the issue since the beginning of 2017. They had taken a neutral position in the matter. (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018).

Figure 2. The public policy risk matrix & lobby focus (Quintero 2016).

The profit-oriented advocacy coalition of the packaging industry is opposed by a non-profit oriented advocacy coalition, which is best represented by a large organisation called the Statiegeldalliantie

31 (deposit money alliance). This Statiegeldalliantie was established by a group of organisations of which the environmental NGO Recycling Netwerk Benelux is the most prominent. It consists of over more than 750 Dutch and Flemish organisations, associations, businesses and local and regional governments (Statiegeldalliantie 2018). In addition, their effort enjoys the support of the vast majority of the Dutch and Flemish population6, which are in favour of the implementation of an extension of the deposit money system (EenVandaag 2018a). Recycling Netwerk Benelux, a NGO which focusses mainly on primary materials and the effort to diminishing their environmental impact of them (e.g. through recycling) was also present during the parliamentary hearing on November 27th. They were accompanied by a second environmental NGO called Natuur & Milieu, an environmental organisation which has been working together with the packaging industry in an environmental clean-up and recycling program called ‘Schoon belonen’ and which is also a supporter of the Statiegeldalliantie. A third interest group which can be considered a member of the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition which was also a participating stakeholder at the parliamentary hearing is the VNG. The VNG is the representative association for Dutch municipalities, which became a natural partner within this coalition after more and more municipalities started supporting the Statiegeldalliantie. During the policy process, approximately two-third of the VNG members supported the alliance, which has now become over more than 90%. Both advocacy coalitions have been actively lobbying on their behalf to influence the policy decision of the national government towards their own advantages. Following the parliamentary hearing of November 27, all of these actors met numerous times with the State Secretary Van Veldhoven as well as with the MPs of both the coalition parties and the opposition parties who were involved in the parliamentary commission Infrastructure and Water Management and engaged in this policy issue. The moments of contact, their frequency and its content will be further discussed within the stakeholder analysis. The result of their input however, was presented on Friday March 10th, when Van Veldhoven announced her decision to extent the PDMS and incorporate small plastic bottles within the system. The date of implementation of the extension of the deposit money system was set at January 1st, 2021. Included in this decision, two preconditions were given. The extension of the PDMS would only be implemented if the businesses sector will not succeed through their own means in reaching the minimum goal of a 90% recycling rate and a 70– 90% reduction of plastic bottles in the amount of litter. The State Secretary argued that, given the fact that the government needed the time until 2021 to prepare the implementation of the new policy, the packaging industry might as well be allowed to have one last chance in achieving the same goal by succeeding on their own terms. As the State Secretary stated herself: “We are going to resolve this, either through deposit money or not, we are going reach the same goal, one way or another” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).7 Although the extension of the PDMS appeared to be in favour of the Statiegeldalliantie, the non- profit oriented advocacy coalition still reacted critical to this decision. They argued that this decision had

6 According to multiple polls, this support fluctuates around the mean of 84% and 75%; approximately 84% of the public is in favour of incorporating small plastic bottles in the PDMS and 75% of the public is in favour of incorporating tin cans in the deposit system as well. 7 Translation: “We gaan dit oplossen. Via statiegeld of niet, we gaan hetzelfde resultaat bereiken, linksom of rechtsom.”

32 been too much in the advantage of the business sector. According to them, the State Secretary had been influenced too much by the corporate lobbyists of the packaging industry (Greenpeace 2018). A number of critical points were expressed by Recycling Netwerk Benelux. The director of Recycling Netwerk Benelux, Rob Buurman stated that it remained to be uncertain what the preferred methods of the business sector exactly were. He suspected strongly that they were most likely not going to be effective. The effort to change behaviour has been attempted since the 1970s without success and other methods set up by the packaging industry in the last couple of years have also not been successful. Furthermore, a second point of critique included the fact that tin cans were not incorporated in this policy decision. State Secretary Van Veldhoven argued that this was due to the lack of political support in this matter. The only motion which had ever been accepted by parliament on this topic included only small plastic bottles and excluded tin cans. She stated that this policy decision primarily had the purpose of addressing the issue of the plastic soup, which would now be achieved. Buurman predicted in his critique that this would probably result in a shift in the use of plastic bottles to a growing use of tin cans. This would mean that the litter problem would not be solved but merely moved. (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018). A last point of critique and disappointment was expressed by several political opponents and members of the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition which focussed on the existence of the escape clause available to the packaging industry. As they argued; postponement would only result in the possible prevention of the actual implementation. If the situation would develop in which the cabinet Rutte III would prematurely step down and be replaced by a new (more right wing) cabinet, the scheduled policy decision of Van Veldhoven might not occur, thereby referring to the period 2002–2005 when the same development occurred (Greenpeace 2018).

33 4. Stakeholder analysis As stated before, within this case of the extension of the PDMS, two advocacy coalitions can be identified. Actors within these advocacy coalitions differ in the manner of their involvement, which varies in the intensity of their interests and preferences, their access and activity and their status or position of power which determines their level of influence. Still, these coalitions can be identified based on the shared set of beliefs and the goal which unite them. Advocacy coalitions can include many different types of actors, governmental, as well as non-governmental. Within this stakeholder analysis, besides the interest groups which participated in the parliamentary hearing on November 27th, the political parties and their representative MPs active on this policy issue will also be discussed, for they should also be considered members of the two advocacy coalitions due to their political activity, which steered the public debate. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the four coalition parties which had a different and stronger position than the opposition parties, due to the fact that their support was necessary for State Secretary Van Veldhoven to come to a decision.

4.1. The non-profit oriented advocacy coalition: political parties Starting with the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition, as mentioned before, the coalition is best portrayed by the Statiegeldalliantie, the organization initiated by Recycling Netwerk Benelux, which is supported by more than 750 Dutch and Belgian organisations and businesses, including Natuur & Milieu and the majority of the VNG-members. Although no political party is an official member of the Statiegeldalliantie, the non- profit oriented advocacy coalition enjoys the political support of several parties, including GroenLinks, the SP (Socialist Party), the PvdD (Animal Party), the PvdA, and 50PLUS. Throughout the policy process period of November 2017 and March 2018, the parliamentary commission of Infrastructure and Water Management met on several occasions, starting with the parliamentary hearing of November 27, the budgetary debate which took place on November the 28th and the 29th and the commission meetings on March the 15th and 22nd. Besides the MPs, State Secretary Van Veldhoven also participated in the meetings of which the possible extension of the PDMS was one of the most discussed topics. These meetings provide insight in the overt moments of access of the MPs to the State Secretary in which their positions, preferences and the reactions to these preferences are disclosed. Although these political parties can at some points be fierce opponents of each other, in this particular case they shared the (in Sabatier’s terms) policy core belief that the PDMS needed expanding. The five political parties mentioned above have different reasons for being part of the non-profit coalition. GroenLinks and the PvdD are typical green parties which makes their support for the PDMS rather obvious. The representatives of these parties, Suzanne Kröger and Frank Wassenberg were also the most outspoken MPs on this issue during the parliamentary meetings. At the time of the parliamentary commission meetings of March 22, Wassenberg even specifically positioned his own party and his fellow coalition members against the profit-oriented advocacy coalition, when he responded to the timeframe of Van Veldhoven’s policy by stating: “In addition to that postponement, which may lead to abandonment,

34 there are more points where the environment loses from the lobby of the business community” (Tweede Kamer 2018b).8 A week prior to this meeting, he even specifically named and supported the interest groups he considered to be at his side, when he mentioned them in the following statement: “[…] Natuur & Milieu, the Plastic Soup Foundation, the Plastic Soup Surfer and the Recycling Network Benelux. They are not involved in monitoring agreements. Their cooperation and expertise are really essential when dealing with the problems. A response from the State Secretary please and preferably the commitment that these organizations are going to be involved in the monitoring” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).9 A third MP which has been active in this matter is the representative of the SP, Cem Laçin. Just like MPs Kröger and Wassenberg, Laçin had not made it a secret where he and his party stood on the issue and which solution had their preference: “Extension of packaging deposit has been a very important subject for the SP for many years. My predecessors, including Remi Poppe and Eric Smaling, have always argued for expansion” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).10 The reason for this stance lies in the fact that the Socialist Party considers itself as a party, which represents the interest of the people, especially those less well-endowed. ‘The polluter pays principle’ is therefore appealing for the SP, because the clean-up costs of waste and litter would no longer be paid by the state through the citizens’ taxation, but by those who do not return their packaging. More importantly, due to their ideological standpoint, the SP is traditionally distrustful of large corporations and their lobbyists and perceive the political standstill in this policy issue of the last two decades as the result of their doing. As Laçin stated himself during the commission meeting of March 15: “For almost twenty years, parliament has been talking about the deposit system. The decision of the State Secretary shows little decisiveness. That is the conclusion of the SP because this State Secretary lends her ears to the industry. We are sick and tired of the intentions and promises of the industry. She had her chance” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).11 The last two political parties which are part of the non-profit advocacy coalition are the PvdA and 50PLUS. These two parties differ with GroenLinks, the PvdD and the SP in the secondary aspects of the policy subsystem, for they still support the extension of the PDMS, but are less outspoken on the issue and perceive it as less significant. The PvdA MP on this topic, Gijs van Dijk, was less involved in the discussion during the meetings, but he did explain the position of his party and their preference when he stated: “Too little has been done in recent years. Yes, that was also the fault of the Labour Party, but the Labour Party also let itself be persuaded, not by parliament, not by other parties but by people in society who stood up

8 Translation: “Naast dat uitstel, dat mogelijk tot afstel leidt, zijn er meer punten waarop het milieu het verliest van de lobby van het bedrijfsleven.” 9 Translation: “[…] Natuur & Milieu, de Plastic Soup Foundation, de Plastic Soup Surfer en het Recycling Netwerk Benelux […]. Ze zijn niet betrokken bij afspraken over monitoring. Hun medewerking en expertise zijn echt essentieel bij het aanpakken van de problemen. Graag een reactie van de Staatssecretaris en liefst de toezegging dat deze organisaties bij de monitoring worden betrokken.” 10 Translation: “Uitbreiding van het statiegeld is voor de SP al jaren een heel belangrijk onderwerp. Mijn voorgangers, onder wie Remi Poppe en Eric Smaling, hebben altijd gepleit voor uitbreiding.” 11 Translation: “Al bijna twintig jaar spreekt deze Kamer over het statiegeldysteem. Het besluit van de Staatssecretaris getuigt van weinig daadkracht. Dat concludeert de SP omdat ook deze Staatssecretaris haar oren laat hangen naar de industrie. Wij hebben onze buik vol van intenties en beloften van de industrie. Die heeft haar kans gehad.”

35 and said: “it is done, it is going to be a disaster and we need to do something about it”” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).12 The argument presented by Van Dijk is well-fitting given the fact that the PvdA is a labour party which praises itself on being a party for the people, which was also no longer held back by governmental coalition compromises. 50PLUS is, contrary to the four previous mentioned parties, not a left wing, but centre party with populist elements, which specifically represents the interests of elderly citizens (Van der Aa & Jongejan 2016). At the commission meeting of March 15, the MP of 50PLUS, Corrie van Brenk, specifically mentioned that the extension of the PDMS should include tin cans as well, because it receives the support of the vast majority of the population, thereby indicating that this was the primary reason for her party to support this extension. A week later, she repeated her party’s position when she stated that: “Deposit on plastic and tin according to 50PLUS really is a must if we want to avoid litter” (Tweede Kamer 2018b).13 Because the State Secretary does not need the support of the opposition parties, their influence is limited. Still, their activity should not be considered worthless. Besides their agenda-setting ability and capacity to influence the public debate, opposition parties can also put coalition parties in an embarrassing position when the critique on their proposals can not easily be rejected. Furthermore, if possible, governmental parties prefer their proposals to enjoy large support among the population, as well as among the opposition parties. Therefore, the activity of the opposition parties need to be taken into account. Besides the critical questions they addressed at the State Secretary, the parties also made suggestions, adjustments, filed motions and at one point even focused their critique on the policy proposal towards one of the coalition party MPs in a collaborative manner. When Jessica van Eijs, MP for the coalition party D66, expressed her support for the policy proposal of the State Secretary during the commission meeting of March 22, both Kröger, Laçin and Wassenberg addressed her in a consecutive manner, in which they berated her and kept repeating the same question whether or not in her opinion tin cans should also be incorporated into the deposit money system. This joined effort provides a clear example of the existence of the collaboration between these political parties, which together take part in the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition. The response to the effort of these opposition parties was less than they would have wanted. Although they were in some way mildly content with the possibility of the PDMS extension, they were also in agreement with each other that the policy decision was not taking it far enough. Kröger called the decision ‘disappointing’ and announced to come up with her own bill, which would also incorporate small tin cans (De Kort 2018; Bouma 2018). Van Dijk called it an unappealing political compromise of which he suspected the VVD to be the party which defended the interest of the industry (Tweede Kamer 2018a). Laçin was also

12 Translation: “De afgelopen jaren is er te weinig gedaan. Ja, daar zat de Partij van de Arbeid ook bij, maar de Partij van de Arbeid heeft zich ook mede laten overtuigen, niet door de Kamer, niet door andere partijen maar door mensen in de samenleving die opstonden en zeiden: het is klaar, het gaat hier hartstikke fout en daar moeten we wat aan doen.” 13 Translation: “Statiegeld op plastic en blik is wat 50PLUS betreft echt een must als we zwerfafval tegen willen gaan. Wij begrijpen het getreuzel niet. Sommige wetstrajecten worden door dit kabinet met stoom en kokend water doorlopen, maar hierbij is 2021 pas de horizon. Dat kan echt sneller.”

36 not satisfied and emphasized the fact that the interest groups of the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition also did not approve of the State Secretary decision when he said: “Yesterday we received a letter in which the Plastic Soup Surfer, the Plastic Soup Foundation and Natuur & Milieu state that they can not find themselves in the proposal of the State Secretary” (Tweede Kamer 2018b).14 In response to this policy decision, the MPs together filed eight different motions for the purpose of adjusting the decision. These motions included (among others) the demand to incorporate tin cans in the system, the decrease of the three-year timeframe of implementation, the request to let the environmental interest groups take a large part in the monitoring process and the demand for insight in the strategy, which the packaging industry was considering to use as their own method to reach the objective. However, none of these motions were accepted by a majority of the parliament, because none of the coalition parties were willing to support them.

4.2. The non-profit oriented advocacy coalition: interest groups As the director of Recycling Netwerk Benelux, Rob Buurman, mentioned, one of the appealing factors of the Statiegeldalliantie was the fact that they were unambiguous about their goal; they only had one demand for the Dutch government: introduce a deposit money system which includes all types of plastic bottles and tin cans. Apart from asking for these requirement and sending the occasional tweet, the alliance did not undertake any activity, held no meetings, approached no policymaker and did not set up any type of campaign. This made the alliance an attractive organisation for any other interest group, organisation, corporation or governmental group to become part of. Because of this low threshold, the membership base grew rapidly since its establishment in October 2017. Even the interest groups LTO Nederland and VisNed, two organisations representing the interests of farmers and fishermen, whose interest usually do not concur with those of environmental protection organisations, became supporters of the Statiegeldalliantie.15 Consequently, this growing attention for the alliance produced a snow-ball effect due to the growing media attention, which oftentimes produced a news article when a well-known organisation or municipality became a supporter of the Statiegeldalliantie. Through this inactive but successful strategy, the political agenda and the public debate was strongly influenced by the work of the alliance. After the announcement of the government to extent the PDMS by 2021 with plastic bottles, their only response was repeating their objective. Because their requirements were not met, the alliance was therefore not satisfied. (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018). Contrary to the Statiegeldalliantie which did not undertake any activity, the initiator of the alliance, Recycling Netwerk Benelux did act on its own account. It goes without saying that Recycling Netwerk Benelux had a strong preference for the extension of the PDMS, similar to the Statiegeldalliantie. Besides the establishment of this alliance, they also met three times with the State Secretary (including the

14 Translation: “Gisteren kregen we die brief waarin de Plastic Soup Surfer, de Plastic Soup Foundation en Natuur & Milieu aangeven dat zij zich niet kunnen vinden in het voorstel van de Staatssecretaris.” 15 The LTO became a member of the Statiegeldalliantie after a report came out about the damage being done by tin cans to the cattle of Dutch farmers. VisNed became part of the Statiegeldalliantie due to the damage the plastic soup had on the marine life; the livelihood of fishermen.

37 parliamentary hearing) to provide input on the policy decision. In addition to the meeting with Van Veldhoven, Recycling Netwerk Benelux also met on several occasions with MPs and corporations of the packaging industry to exchange views, confirm each other positions and assess each others steadiness. Furthermore, at their request research was conducted by a master student of the University of Wageningen. The research focussed on the damages Dutch farmers suffered due to the tin cans and other types of litter which end up in the food of their cattle. On an annual base, approximately four thousand cows die after they consume parts of this garbage, which is mixed within the hay and weeds the farmers mow and save up for the winter season (EenVandaag 2018b). The request for this research and the results was part of the strategy of Recycling Netwerk Benelux to have more organisations and municipalities join their alliance (e.g. LTO). It was also part of a strategy to find new arguments to address certain political parties. The coalition parties CDA and the Christian Union have a large part of their constituency within the rural areas and the agrarian sector and would therefore be sensitive to these newly discovered facts. Finally, another element of the influence strategy of Recycling Netwerk Benelux included the request to a survey company to measure the public’s opinion on the matter, thereby having a special interest in the political preference of the respondents and their stance towards the extension of the PDMS. Recycling Netwerk Benelux requested this survey for the purpose of affecting the position of the coalition parties on the matter. The survey concluded that approximately more than 80% of the constituencies of the coalition parties supported the extension of the packaging deposit money system (Zoete 2018). In addition to the Recycling Netwerk Benelux, Natuur & Milieu also met with several MPs outside of the parliamentary hearing for the purpose of influencing their perspective on the issue. Being a member of the Statiegeldalliantie, Natuur & Milieu was a strong proponent of extending the PDMS, calling it: “the quickest, most effective and honest method to address litter and plastic soup” (Natuur & Milieu 2017). As the representative of Natuur & Milieu on the topic ‘Circular economy’, Jelmer Vierstra, explained, their strategy included the effort to address the issue for the MPs in an attractive manner by supplying new arguments and new perspectives which agree with the political and ideological position of the MP: “Arguments that have been there for twenty years and have not worked in twenty years; they are no longer valid. So that is our challenge: can we also explain this from another angle in the hope that most parties say: “Oh yes, I have not looked at it this way and this also gives me the chance to make a credible change of position, because there are new insights.”” (Vierstra, interview, May 29, 2018).16 One of these angles of approach was based on the research on the cattle damages conducted on account of Recycling Netwerk Benelux. A different approach was aimed at addressing the liberal ideological position of the VVD and included the polluter-pays-principle and the emphasis on the possible financial relief the tax payer could have if the extended PDMS would be introduced. Within the lobbying strategy, Natuur & Milieu primarily

16 Translation: “Argumenten die er al twintig jaar en zijn en het al twintig jaar niet gedaan hebben, die gaan niet meer mee. Dus dat is onze uitdaging: kunnen we dit ook vanuit een andere kant belichten in de hoop dat de meeste partijen zeggen: “Oh ja, zo heb ik er nog niet naar gekeken en dat geeft mij ook de kans om op een geloofwaardige manier van standpunt te draaien, want er zijn nieuwe inzichten.””

38 focussed on influencing the coalition parties, especially given the fact that most of the opposition parties were already on the same page. Lastly, the third interest group member of the non-profit advocacy coalition is the VNG. Although the VNG is far less outspoken on the issue of the extension of the PDMS (especially compared to the previously mentioned environmental NGOs), it is still a stakeholder which should be included within the analysis because it is an important and large actor within the political arena. The VNG itself is not a member of this alliance and even in the position paper they submitted prior to the parliamentary hearing of November 27, they were not strongly in favour of the extension, stating that: “The control of litter requires social awareness and a broad approach with a variety of instruments” (VNG 2017). It was only two months after the hearing that the VNG officially chose their position after internal deliberation had taken place within their Environment, Energy and Mobility Committee (NVRD 2018). Mark van Waas, one of the VNG’s policy officers involved in this case, admitted that this action was the result of the increasing amount of municipalities which supported the Statiegeldalliantie, which forced the VNG to take a position on this issue. Although this move was not problematic, it was also not something they did enthusiastically, because they were committed to the certain recycling and waste management agreements (Raamovereenkomst), which existed between the VNG, the government and the packaging industry and which was signed to last until 2023. The VNG did not want to step on any toes of the packaging industry by becoming a strong supporter of the PDMS extension, which might affect cooperative activity in a negative way. For this reason and because almost 80% of their municipality members supported the Statiegeldalliantie did the VNG meet with State Secretary Van Veldhoven and several MPs on different occasions, during which they announced and explained their new position, without making any strong demands. (Van Waas, interview, June 20, 2018). In other words, the VNG should be considered a member of the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition, but strongly differs from Recycling Network Benelux and Natuur & Milieu in the secondary aspects of their policy subsystem. As the parliamentary MP of the SP, Cem Laçin, mentioned to Van Veldhoven, the interest groups could not find themselves in the proposal of the State Secretary. This was true in the case of Recycling Netwerk Benelux and Natuur & Milieu. Buurman called it: “the smallest possible victory imaginable” (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018). He mentioned he had envisioned five different scenarios about which he said: “"These could be the outcomes", so that I could be prepared for it, but this [scenario] was not among them. This was at the bottom; under the bottom of which I thought: "This could happen." My worst-case scenario was a definitive decision about deposit money on plastic bottles a few years without an escape clause. That didn’t happen. I mean, there is an escape.”17 (Ibid). Natuur & Milieu was also not satisfied with the policy outcome, although they were more modest in their public expression of it. In a press statement, the NGO called the decision: “a step in the right direction”, after which they emphasized

17 Translation: “"Dit zijn de uitkomsten", zodat ik daarop voorbereid kon zijn, maar deze stond daar niet tussen. Deze stond aan de onderkant; onder de bodem waarvan ik dacht: "Dit zou er kunnen gebeuren." Mijn ‘worstcasescenario’ was een definitieve beslissing over een paar jaar statiegeld op plastic flesjes zonder escape clausule. Dus die is er niet gekomen. Althans, er is een escape.”

39 that the issue continues to exist as long as the tin cans would not be included within the PDMS (Natuur & Milieu 2018). Vierstra confirmed that they were in fact “disappointed” (Vierstra, interview, May 29, 2018).18 Contrary to these environmental NGOs, the VNG’s reaction to the policy decision was “positive”, as they informed their members (VNG 2018). Van Waas stated that in a general way, the municipalities could live with the outcome, although he indicated that they would have preferred a more comprehensive measure.19

4.3. The profit-oriented advocacy coalition Just like in the case of the first coalition, the profit-oriented advocacy coalition was also united by a common goal: opposing the extension of the PDMS. Again, similar to the members of the Statiegeldalliantie which had different reasons for supporting their alliance, the members of this advocacy coalition also had their own distinct motives for being part of their advocacy coalition. As mentioned before, the most important actor of this coalition (especially given the fact that the FNLI took a neutral position) was the CBL, the interest group which represents the collective interests of 25 supermarket and food service corporations. The CBL defines her own purpose as: “the establishment of favourable preconditions for the entire branch and the provision of information” (CBL 2017). In this case, because of the financial cost an extended PDMS would have for its members, these favourable preconditions included the prevention of the implementation of deposit money on every type of plastic bottle and tin can. As the head of the CBL, René Roorda, said during the parliamentary hearing of November 27th: “We are not in favour of a deposit on small packaging, so as far as we are concerned, only a broad approach is worth considering and on that point we would like to get assistance from the government” (Tweede Kamer 2017b).20 The reason that the CBL is considered to be the most important actor of this coalition, is because of the fact that the CBL has a strong influential effect on the position and activity of the other stakeholders within this advocacy coalition. Afvalfonds Verpakkingen, the organisation set up by the packaging industry for the purpose of meeting their legally determined collection and recycling goals, is managed by different representatives of the packaging industry of which a CLB-commissioner functions as the board’s president (Afvalfonds Verpakkingen n.d.). Although the CBL is the larger organisation, Afvalfonds Verpakkingen is the more active stakeholder in this case. They are the executive organisation, which coordinates the activity and campaigns designed for the purpose of reducing the amount of litter, increasing the recycling goals and achieving a circular economy. Afvalfonds Verpakkingen is financed by the so-called ‘waste management contribution’ (afvalbeheersbijdrage), which is paid by the packaging industry. The organisation was no supporter of the extension of the deposit money system, stating that it would only effect a small percentage of the entire amount of litter. Instead, he argued at the parliamentary hearing for: “awareness and

18 Quote: “We waren nog wel een beetje teleurgesteld.” Translation: “We were still a bit disappointed”. 19 Quote: “Dus ik denk dat gemeenten in algemene zin wel kunnen leven met de uitkomst. Ik denk wel dat het straatbeeld er anders had uitgezien als de maatregel wel was ingevoerd […] Of ook was ingevoerd op blik.” Translation: “So I think that municipalities in general can live with the outcome. I do think that the street scene would have looked different if the measure had been introduced. Or also included tin.” 20 Translation: “Wij zijn geen voorstander van statiegeld op klein-verpakkingen, dus wat ons betreft is alleen die brede aanpak aan de orde en daar zouden we graag assistentie voor willen van de overheid.”

40 behavioural change among citizens. Preventing, cleaning up and expanding the infrastructure required for this (number and locations of public bins, collection frequencies etcetera) is all part of this. [This should be] focused on all material flows ending up in litter” (Tweede Kamer 2017b).21 A second organisation set up and financed by the packaging industry is the foundation NederlandSchoon. As they state themselves: their organisation was established 25 years ago: “Based on the idea of a common responsibility for litter” (NederlandSchoon n.d.).22 The organisation is best known as an environmental organisation responsible for multiple large-scale campaigns and clean-up projects like ‘Supporter van Schoon’ and the national clean-up day (Landelijke Opschoondag). Until this day, the supervisory board of NederlandSchoon still includes multiple members who are active in the packaging industry, including the vice president who acts on account of the CBL. Although the organisation claims to be acting independent, critics argue that this is in fact not the case due to their financial dependence and the involvement of these actors within their board (Kassa 2014). Recycling Netwerk Benelux even stated that the only reason why the packaging industry established NederlandSchoon in the first place, was to prevent the possible extension of PDMS and possibly achieve its entire removal (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018). During the parliamentary hearing of November 27th, the representative of NederlandSchoon, Peter Swinkels, declared that a broad approach was necessary, because otherwise: “my budget could be reduced to zero”, thereby referring to willingness of the packaging industry to participate in a shared effort to address the issue, which could be reduced as a consequence of an extended PDMS (Tweede Kamer 2017b).23 The third stakeholder which is financially supported by the packaging industry through the waste management contribution, is the Kennisinstituut Duurzaam Verpakken. Just like NederlandSchoon, this institute claims to be an independent actor; acting only for the purpose of developing, gathering and sharing of knowledge on plastics and packages. However, their independence is questioned based on their financial dependence and due to the fact that the head of Afvalfonds Verpakkingen, the director of the CBL and the director of the FNLI are members of their supervisory board. When the KIDV was established in 2012 as part of the Raamovereenkomst, it was considered a cooperative project of the packaging industry, the municipalities and the national government. This collaboration however ended when the municipalities and the government decided to suspend their involvement in the organisation, due to their partisanship (Bouma, interview, May 22, 2018). According to critics, this resulted in the development of a bias of the institute’s work method. As Buurman stated on this matter: “The KIDV can perform a few perfectly objective analyses, but the choice of topics, the questions and etcetera hugely determines to way one can steer the debate” (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018).24 During the parliamentary hearing of November 27th, the representative of the KIDV, Hester Klein Lankhorst, was unwillingly to express any support for a PDMS

21 Translation: “[…] bewustwording en gedragsverandering bij de burger. Voorkomen, opruimen en het uitbouwen van de daarvoor vereiste infrastructuur (aantal en locaties van openbare bakken, leegfrequenties en dergelijke) hoort daar zeer nadrukkelijk ook bij. [Dit moet] gericht [zijn] op alle in het zwerfafval voorkomende materiaalstromen.” 22 Translation: “Vanuit het idee van een gezamenlijke verantwoordelijkheid voor zwerfafval.” 23 Translation: “Want dan zou mijn budget weleens tot nul gereduceerd kunnen worden”. 24 Translation: “Dan kan het Kennisinstituut Duurzaam Verpakken een paar analyses prima objectief uitvoeren, maar de keuze van de onderwerpen en de vraagstelling en dergelijke bepaalt enorm hoe je het debat kan sturen.”

41 extension, instead stating: “So no, I'm not saying that this is the solution. I am only saying that you as the parliament have to decide whether you want this system or if you want a broad approach” (Tweede Kamer 2017b).25 With regard to the preferences and activity of these stakeholders, the KIDV is far less outspoken on the matter when compared to the CBL and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen. This is largely due to the fact that they have a smaller interest invested within the case. For this reason, just like in the case of the VNG, they were less active during the parliamentary hearing. Afvalfonds Verpakkingen and the CBL on the other hand did adopt this active role, both inside the parliamentary hearing, as well as outside of it. It was after the research organisation CE Delft provided their input in the parliamentary hearing, that the CBL and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen started criticizing its work. According to CE Delft, the costs of the extension of the PDMS could vary between the 10 or 110 million euros per year, depending on the type of system the government would introduce. Both interest groups stated that this estimation was to wide, not narrow enough and possibly even false. NederlandSchoon criticized the research by stating that: “No objective information is available anywhere about whether or not a deposit money system really works” (Tweede Kamer 2017b).26 For this reason, the different interest groups proposed that new research would be have to be conducted, an act which the environmental organisations would consider to be part of a stalling (meestribbelen) tactic. In addition, besides questioning the reliability of the research done by CE Delft, Afvalfonds Verpakkingen also explicitly tried to pressure the MPs during the meeting by stating that the packaging industry would become an unwilling partner in their joint effort against waste and litter, by threatening to withdraw their financial support to the multiple clean-up projects, if the PDMS extension would be introduced (Tweede Kamer 2017b).27 Apart from their presence at the parliamentary hearing, these interest groups also met on two occasions with the State Secretary and several moments with MPs in a private setting to discuss their preferences and provide input. Unfortunately, the content of these conversations remain to be unknown. However, one of the methods the Afvalfonds Verpakking used to influence the public opinion is known,

25 Translation: “Dus nee, ik zeg niet dat dat de oplossing is. Ik zeg alleen dat u als Kamer moet besluiten of u inderdaad uiteindelijk op dit systeem wil zitten of een brede aanpak wil.” 26 Translation: “Nergens is objectieve informatie te verkrijgen of statiegeld echt werkt.” 27 Quote: “Imagine that a deposit system would be legally imposed on us, what does that have consequences for the [Raamovereenkomst]? I think it would be good to state here that we would perceive this as breaking with the [Raamovereenkomst], which would mean that we would have to take a look how we would deal with this. [...] and all kinds of additional agreements that are now included in the [Raamovereenkomst] (20 million to the municipalities for litter, the NederlandSchoon 5.5 million, KIDV 2 million), that is the question whether we can and will continue to finance it in the future, because we are no longer bound by it, because in fact that covenant is broken by the legislator.” Translation: “Stel nou dat er een statiegeldsysteem ons wettelijk zou worden opgelegd, wat heeft dat voor consequenties voor de Raamovereenkomst? Ik denk dat het goed is om hier te stellen, dat zouden wij percipiëren als het openbreken van de Raamovereenkomst en dat zou voor ons betekenen dat wij zouden moeten kijken hoe we daar mee om gaan. […] en allerlei aanvullende afspraken die nu in de Raamovereenkomst staan (20 miljoen aan de gemeentes voor zwerfafval, Nederland Schoon 5,5 miljoen, Kennisinstituut 2 miljoen) dat is dan de vraag of wij dat kunnen en willen blijven financieren naar de toekomst toe, omdat we er dan ook niet meer aan gebonden zijn, omdat dan in feite dat convenant door de wetgever is gebroken.”

42 due to the fact that it involves a public campaign. Following the success of the Statiegeldalliantie, Afvalfonds Verpakkingen founded an alliance as well. This alliance, known as the ‘Pact voor een Zwerfafvalvrij Nederland’ (Pact for a litter free Netherlands), was established in January 2017 and included an appeal to multiple parties like municipalities, companies, schools and other types of organisations to join together and declare their support for a litter free country (Afvalfonds Verpakkingen 2018). The pact was designed for the purpose of surpassing the Statiegeldalliantie and framing litter and the plastic soup as an issue which should be solved through large scale clean-up programs and a change in mind-set, instead of the proposed method of deposit money from the Statiegeldalliantie. The project however failed to achieve this, as their brand did not reach the desired publicity, despite a number of different advertisements. With regard to the policy decision, although the packaging industry explicitly stated that they opposed the extension of the PDMS, they nonetheless claimed to be satisfied with the choice to allow them additional time to reach the objective on their own terms. Afvalfonds Verpakkingen responded by stating: “We are going to reach these objectives, one way or the other, with or without deposit money”28 (Bouma 2018). Most likely, this is not the case, but their satisfaction is based on the fact that they acknowledged that this was the most that they could get out of it and the possibility still exists that the extension will not be introduced (Buurman, interview, June 7, 2018).

4.4. The coalition parties As mentioned before, in October 2017, Cabinet Rutte III took office after a coalition accord was made between four different political parties: VVD, CDA, D66 and the Christian Union. Due to their diverse ideological positions and political backgrounds, these parties had different perspectives on the matter of the possible PDMS-extension. In order to function as a coalition, the ministers and undersecretaries need to provide policy proposals where all four parties and their representative MPs can agree on. On this particular issue, no agreement was made between the coalition parties within the coalition accord, which meant that the MPs and the cabinet needed find a consensus. A consensus includes compromises on all parts, but the extent in which a coalition party is prepared to make these compromises differs per case and depends on multiple conditions like the specific policy issue, the amount of value a specific party attaches to this issue and the more general ‘give a little, take a little’ principle, which is a common practice within a coalition. Although the cabinet takes the initiative in the policy process with their proposals, they are still limited in their possibilities resulting from the extent to which the coalition parties are willing to support it. In other words, State Secretary Van Veldhoven did not have the ability to unconditionally implement her or her party D66’s preference in her policy decision. With regard to the preferences of Van Veldhoven and her party; prior to the national parliamentary elections of March 2017, D66 expressed its position towards the PDMS in its election program, in which they declared: “D66 wants to tackle litter effectively. For this reason, expansion of the deposit system is an

28 Translation: “We gaan deze gezamenlijke afspraken linksom of rechtsom halen, met of zonder statiegeld.”

43 option” (D66 2016: 40).29 This position fits the social-liberal party, for it is known to be both environmentally oriented but flexible (or pragmatic) in their positions as well. A year later, a week prior to the announcement of the cabinet to extent the PDMS, the D66 national congress voted and accepted a motion in which they explicitly proclaimed their support for the extension of a deposit money system, which would include both small plastic bottles and tin cans as well (D66 2018). Van Veldhoven, who was present at this congress, responded to the motion by asking the party for its trust and ‘negotiation space’ (onderhandelingsruimte). Due to “the resistance of the CDA, VVD, the food industry and the supermarkets” on this matter, she would focus primarily on combating the plastic soup, because, as she figured, this would be the most likely to succeed. (Ibid). This statement illustrates the limits of the power position a single party has within a coalition. This tendency to be compliant to the consensual position of the coalition could also be observed in the statements made by D66’s MP, Jessica van Eijs, who had become the new representative of the party in this matter after Van Veldhoven. Despite the motion of the D66 party congress, Van Eijs was unwilling to support a parliamentary motion to call upon the government to include tin cans within the PDMS, an ambiguous position which (as mentioned above) caused her to be a focus point of critique from the opposition parties. During the parliamentary commission meeting of March 15, she stated: “I agree with Mr Laçin that tin cans should be dealt with as well, just like other litter. At the moment the priority lies with the plastic soup. It is true that there are more cans than bottles, but they produce a different kind of problem” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).30 The behaviour of D66 shows similarities with the position of the Christian Union, the small social- conservative Christian coalition party. Due to their Christian values, this party is conservative on certain issues like same-sex marriage, abortion and euthanasia, but at the same time can also be considered progressive on social or environmental issues, based on the values of charity and stewardship. Just like D66, the Christian Union was also in favour of the extension of the PDMS, as can be read in their parliamentary election program of 2017 (ChristenUnie 2016: 79). Their representative on this issue, Carla Dik-Faber, who was elected the ‘greenest politician’ in 2017, had oftentimes expressed her support for the implementation of the extended PDMS (Natuurmonumenten 2018). However, after the coalition was formed, similarly to her colleague Van Eijs, she became hesitant in taking a strong position on the issue. During the budgetary debate of November 29 she stated: “The Christen Union has indeed always been in favour of extending the deposit money system. We will continue to do so, but I think that we have to look at the logical sequence of things and which agreements we have made with each other. [...] We are going through that process and we will see what the smartest solution is to prevent litter on the streets” (Tweede Kamer 2017a).31

29 Translation: “D66 wil zwerfafval effectief aanpakken. Daarvoor is uitbreiding van het statiegeldsysteem een optie.” 30 Translation: “Ik ben het eens met de heer Laçin dat blikjes ook moeten worden aangepakt, net als ander zwerfafval. Op dit moment ligt de prioriteit ligt bij de plasticsoep. Het klopt dat er meer blikjes liggen dan flesjes, maar dat geeft wel een andere problematiek.” 31 Translation: “De ChristenUnie is inderdaad altijd voorstander geweest van uitbreiding van statiegeld. Dat blijven we ook, maar ik denk dat we wel even moeten kijken wat de logische volgorde der dingen is en welke afspraken we met elkaar gemaakt hebben. […] Dat proces gaan we dus allemaal doorlopen en dan gaan we kijken wat de slimste oplossing is om het zwerfafval op straat tegen te gaan.”

44 Besides these to environmentally-oriented parties, the cabinet of Rutte III is also supported by two political parties who are known for being less receptive on these issues. The first one of these is the CDA, the party which opposed the introduction of the extended deposit money system in 2005 and whose State Secretary Atsma proposed to replace the system in 2012 under certain strict conditions. Although the CDA shares the Christian values of the Christian Union and the idea of stewardship, it also favours the economic interests of farmers, entrepreneurs and generally the middle class and maintains close ties with business and industry, which can sometimes go at the expense of environmental protection (Bouma, interview, May 22, 2018). In a statement made in 2015, the parliamentary representative of the CDA on this issue, Agnes Mulder, reacted to the decision of State Secretary Mansveld to preserve the PDMS on which she said: “Deposit money is a good method to prevent litter and to make people aware of the need for reuse. We know that manufacturers prefer other methods, because it requires time and space. But [in order to replace it] there must be something in return. It is a missed opportunity that not enough work has been done on making the packaging more sustainable, but the CDA is pleased that the deposit money is retained as a means” (CDA 2015).32 Their coalition partner, the VVD, shows similar characteristics to the CDA. The party is known for its conservative-liberal position; liberal with regard to financial or economic issues and conservative on cultural issues or certain topics like defence, justice, and security (law and order). The VVD is considered to be the political party, which best represents the interest of entrepreneurs, businesses and corporations (Van den Berg 2012). This party also maintains close ties with the corporate world and oftentimes protects the financial interest of these groups. It is very likely that both the CDA and the VVD had many moments of contact with the representatives of the CBL and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen (Bouma, interview, May 22, 2018). For this reason, they were very receptive to the input of Afvalfonds Verpakkingen en the CBL during the parliamentary hearing, agreeing with their argumentation as well as their critique on the research of CE Delft (Bouma, interview, May 22, 2018). Their parliamentary representative, Erik Ziengs, expressed his party’s perspective on the matter during the parliamentary hearing of March 15, when he stated: “I am trying to indicate that we will not solve the problem with deposit money. The problem is there and it is called "litter". We have […] an agreement, a Raamovereenkomst, with the branch through which they want to tackle the litter problem in its totality. In this case [of plastic bottles and tin cans] it is about a small percentage; that is like shooting a mosquito with a canon” (Tweede Kamer 2018a).33 In the policy decision of the Secretary of State, none of the coalitions parties got exactly what they desired. If the decision was up to D66 and the Christian Union, the PDMS would have been extended on

32 Translation: “Statiegeld is een goede methode om zwerfvuil te voorkomen, en mensen bewust te maken van de noodzaak tot hergebruik. We weten dat fabrikanten het liever niet hebben, aangezien het tijd en ruimte kost. Maar daar moet dan wel iets tegenover staan. Het is een gemiste kans dat er niet genoeg werk gemaakt is van het verduurzamen van verpakkingen, maar het CDA is wel blij dat daardoor het statiegeld als middel behouden blijft.” 33 Translation: “ik probeer dus aan te geven dat we met statiegeld het probleem niet oplossen. Dat probleem is er en dat heet «zwerfafval». We hebben – dat was mijn tweede stelling – een overeenkomst, een raamovereenkomst met de branche waarmee die het zwerfafvalprobleem in zijn totaliteit wil aanpakken. Het gaat in dit geval om zo’n klein percentage, dat het met een kanon op een mug schieten is.”

45 both type of packages, most likely without the escape clause for the packaging industry. In contrast, the VVD and the CDA would have prevented the possible extension of the system all together. Nonetheless, during the parliamentary commission meetings of March 15th and 22nd, the representatives of the coalition parties reacted satisfied to the policy proposal of Van Veldhoven, complimenting her for her reached breakthrough. These reactions indicate that these parties reached a consensus in which they all made concessions which they ultimately could agree on. According to Van Waas, it was most likely that the VVD provided the strongest opposition for Van Veldhoven to the extension of the PDMS, which allowed the CDA to fulfil a key-position in this decision, because they would agree on this conditional introduction of the PDMS (Van Waas, interview, June 20, 2018). In addition, As Vierstra put it: “the fact that the environmental movement is disappointed and the industry is unhappy, proves that the State Secretary has managed to get the most out of it” (Vierstra, interview, May 20, 2018).

46 5. Analysis The IGIF is a tool which can be used to analyse a specific policy case and provide an explanation of the outcome and the amount of influence different stakeholders had in this process. When applied correctly, this theoretical framework offers the possibility of comparing different policy processes in which lobbyists and interest groups were active in influencing the outcome. In this final chapter, the IGIF and the additions are applied to the case of the PDMS and the extent of its suitability is analysed and assessed. This will be done by analysing the case step by step based on the first four determinants after which the four improvements are discussed as well. Together, both parts of this analysis provide an answer to the third sub-question of this research: How successful were the different interest groups in influencing the policy decision of the Dutch government to conditionally extent the national packaging deposit money system? The first factor which determines the amount of influence an interest group can have on a policy decision, is the actor characteristics. The most active and influential actors which stood out in the case of the PDMS are Recycling Netwerk Benelux and its Statiegeldalliance and the CBL and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen in their advocacy coalition. As stated before, the identity of the actors and the type of interest group greatly affects the possibilities they have to influence policy. For an environmental organisation like Recycling Netwerk Benelux or Natuur & Milieu, certain green parties like GroenLinks and the PvdD are very receptive towards their input (Vierstra, interview, May 29, 2018). Parties like D66 and the Christian Union, which also value environmental protection would therefore be expected to be receptive to their activity as well. In the case of the CBL and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen, the CDA and especially the VVD were the coalition parties which were most open towards their agenda and input, due to their good relationships and the shared political ideals. Interest groups who act on account of the publics interest generally experience more accessibility and a larger response rate with policymakers than interest groups working for private interest (Mahoney 2007: 41). The good relations between the CDA, VVD and the packing industry however made this practice non-existent. With regard to the amount and type of resources at their disposal, it could be stated that both advocacy coalitions were well-foreseen. Afvalfonds Verpakkingen and the CBL had a large amount of financial means available as well as information and expertise, which they derive from their daily practice and the work of the KIDV. This allowed them to invest more time and energy and be better prepared, which consequently strengthened their position. Being a small environmental organisation, Recycling Netwerk Benelux could not match these financial resources. However, this policy issue was one of the NGO’s top priorities, which made them to focus a large part of their time and energy on this issue. Furthermore, because of the Statiegeldalliantie, they had a large amount of support which strengthened their legitimacy and their right for a seat at the table. With regard to its effectiveness, due to the fact that this alliance contained a simple and specific goal, it did not experience problems of collective action. Had it taken up a diffuse agenda with multiple objectives, it might not have been as successful as it was (Dür & De Bièvre 2007: 6). Even though Afvalfonds Verpakkingen did not succeed in establishing its Pact voor een Zwerfafvalvrij Nederland, the CBL still experienced a similar advantage as Recycling Netwerk Benelux

47 because of the 25 supermarket and food service corporations they represent. Especially since the FNLI was absent in this process, this legitimacy made them the most prominent interest groups in this policy issue, which consequently strengthened their message towards the policymakers. The capability of both coalitions was noticeable in the fact that they were able to construct alliances, set up campaigns, influence public opinion and have a proper understanding of the political landscape, its parties and its developments. Therefore, it might be stated that these coalitions were worthy opponents. Nonetheless, the non-profit oriented coalition had the advantage due to the momentum they had, which resulted from the large support present in their Statiegeldalliantie and the general population. The second determinant of the IGIF, the issue characteristics, also affected the policy process and the influence of the interest groups. The decision to extent the packaging deposit money system involved an issue for which a regulatory policy was used; a type of policy which often produce benefits for one group at the expense of another, thus causing conflict between multiple interest groups in the policy process. This conflict has been present within the case of the PDMS. It goes without saying that an interest group which encounters no opposing parties, is more likely to influence a policy decision in favour of their own advantage. Regarding the complexity of the issue, it can be easily stated that this case did not contain a highly complex issue (“the degree to which a given policy problem is difficult to analyse, understand or solve”) (Klüver 2011: 487). Although it contained a multifaceted issue (litter, plastic soup & recycling), the issue still included the basic question what the best method was to prevent a large amount of waste ending up in the environment. Two simple solutions were presented by the two advocacy coalitions; either introduce deposit money or create more awareness and establish behavioural change among the citizens. Because of the lack of complexity, no particular interest group with a large amount of resources (e.g. expertise) was at the advantage in this case. A different aspect of the issue, the salience had a larger effect on the influential capacities of the interest group. Because of the establishment of the Statiegeldalliantie, public awareness of the issue increased and public opinion was influenced, while the policy process took place. The reason for this was due to the multiple (local) media sources, which published about the existence of the alliance every time a well-known organisation or municipality declared its support, thereby increasing the ‘brand awareness’ of the alliance and the salience of the issue. The increase of this salience was in favour of the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition. However, the issue could still not be considered one of the highest importance, especially when compared to the situation in Belgium, where it had been a topic of debate for several times within the national parliament in which two of the three coalition parties publically strongly disagreed with each other (De Morgen 2018). Although a large part of the population supported the extension of the PDMS, it was not considered a critical issue. For this reason, it was possible for the coalition parties VVD & CDA to enforce a moderate version of the policy decision, regardless of the fact that their own constituencies favour

48 the full extension. As Mark van Waas stated: “Municipalities did not revolt after hearing this outcome; [they did not] revolt or whatever by ceasing to clean up the litter as a sort of strike.”34 The third determinant of the interest group influence framework is the lobbying strategy. Both coalitions applied inside as well as outside lobbying strategies. The Statiegeldalliantie and the Pact voor een Zwerfafvalvrij Nederland are prime examples of the outside lobbying strategies of Recycling Netwerk Benelux and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen. Other outside lobbying initiatives however also occurred. One of the most successful efforts was the 1200-kilometer-long journey of Merijn Tinga, otherwise known as the Plastic Soup Surfer, an activist who surfed from the Netherlands to England in September 2016 for the purpose of increasing public awareness on the issue of the plastic soup. As the result from this effort, he collected a petition with 57.000 signatures, which he delivered to the parliament in February 2017. This lead to the direct acceptance of the so-called ‘plastic soup surfer motion’, in which parliament called upon the government to decrease the amount of plastic ending up in the environment in three years by 90%. This motion provided the mandate to State Secretary Van Veldhoven on which she based her policy decision. During the parliamentary committee meetings, she often referred to this motion as being the only assignment which she received from parliament, which allowed her to exclude tin cans from the PDSM (Tweede Kamer 2018b). The lobbying strategies were aimed at increasing the salience of the issue and thereby influencing both the political agenda and the public opinion for the purpose of indirectly influencing the policymakers. Regarding the Pact voor Zwerfafvalvrij Nederland, as has been mentioned before by Dür: “it seems plausible that groups sometimes fail to pick the most effective lobbying strategy” (2009: 9). This seems fitting for this particular effort of Afvalfonds Verpakkingen, but this attempt was only one of many different methods of the profit-oriented advocacy coalition. The campaigns and initiatives of NederlandSchoon can arguably also be considered part of a lobbying strategy of the coalition to prevent the extension of the deposit money system by focussing on different methods. However, during the months in which the policy process took place, most of the lobbying activity of both coalitions was part of an inside lobbying strategy. The parliamentary hearing was the only public- accessible moment in which the interest groups made contact with the MPs, but according to Van Veldhoven, she also met with the interest groups on two separate occasions (Tweede Kamer 2018b). In addition, both the stakeholders of both advocacy coalitions also met with the MPs on several occasions, which consequently had an indirect effect on the decision made by the cabinet. When considered, the inside lobbying strategy is the logical choice for Afvalfonds Verpakkingen and especially for the CBL to proceed, because they are a core insider group within The Hague with strong connections to the VVD and the CDA. The reason for this lies in the fact that the food industry is one of the biggest economic sectors within the Netherlands. Therefore, this sector demands a well-functioning interest group in The Hague, which represents their interests in the political area in an effective way. Vice versa, the MPs need to have good contacts with this interest group for the purpose of being aware of all the developments and information

34 Translation: Gemeenten zijn niet in opstand gekomen na het horen van deze uitkomst; massaal in opstand komen of wat dan ook door het zwerfafval niet meer op te ruimen als een soort van staking.

49 available within this sector. In contrast, Recycling Netwerk Benelux is considered to be a specialist insider group, less frequent in their moments of contact with the policymakers, but known for their expertise on specific issues. This difference makes the choice for a larger outside lobbying effort more logical for the Recycling Netwerk than for the profit-oriented advocacy coalitions. Regarding the effectiveness of the strategies of the coalitions; both were effective. Recycling Netwerk Benelux were very successful in the way they influenced public opinion and the political agenda and the CBL and Afvalfonds Verpakkingen were correct in recognizing the strength of their personal network and relationship with the MPs (Bouma, interview, May 22 2018). The fourth and last determinant of the IGIF is the institutional context. The policy process took place within the national context in which no international institutions played a part. Even though the issue of the plastic soup and litter is also a topic of discussion within the European parliament (e.g. the introduction of the ban on free plastic bags), a European policy in the case of the PDMS has not been on their agenda and therefore no European institution was involved in the political discussion. The Dutch context is one that has been subject to change in the last two decades. This is a context in which both coalitions are very familiar with the structure of the political institutions and its regulations, mores and constitutional rules. The old polder model has been slowly disappearing. Parties no longer have solid constituencies and their number of parliamentary seats can fluctuate tremendously per election (e.g. the PvdA which dropped from 38 to 9 parliamentary seats in one term). While the size of the parties decreases, the number of parties in parliament increases. Currently 13 parties are present in parliament of which the largest (VVD) has 33 of the 150 seats. This process of ‘splintering’ or fragmentation leads to the increased importance of minority parties and the increased complexity in the work of interest groups, which ultimately benefits the professional lobbyists (Keulen 2017: 255-262). In addition, due to this fragmentation taking place, it becomes increasingly difficult for political parties to form coalitions because more parties are needed to reach a majority. This makes it nearly impossible for one party to acquire their unconditional preference in the policy decision. The increased amount of political parties complicates the work of interest groups. Although it offers them multiple access points, the extent of their influence is decreased because the power position of the political parties has been declining as well. This has been the case for both of the advocacy coalitions, although it might be argued that the CBL has the advantage in this situation because they are better rooted in The Hague and had stronger ties with the political parties. Regarding the flaws of the interest group influence framework, it would be a mistake if the beliefs and the political background of the decision-maker Van Veldhoven would not be taken into account in the analysis of this policy process. The State Secretary, which has been voted greenest politician three times during her time as MP, explicitly stated that she did no longer function as the representative of D66 on this issue: “The representative of D66 is sitting in a few seats to the left of you. I am sitting here on behalf of the cabinet […] I’ll implement what parliament asks me to do” (Verlaan 2017; Tweede Kamer 2018a).35

35 Translation: “De vertegenwoordiger van D66 zit enige stoelen links van u. Ik zit hier namens het kabinet. […] Ik voer in dit dossier uit wat de Kamer mij vraagt.”

50 Regardless of this remark, her personal position continued to play a part in the matter, as has been demonstrated by her statement on the national congress of D66 on March the 3rd. As has been mentioned before, her role as State Secretary did determine the limits of her actions, but she can not be considered as an impartial actor within this case. Chances are that if a representative of the VVD would have fulfilled that position, he would have been less receptive towards the input of the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition and he would also probably have made less of an effort to push for a PDMS-extension. Therefore, in this policy process, the position of Van Veldhoven as State Secretary was beneficial for the effort of the non- profit oriented advocacy coalition. A second flaw of the IGIF, which can not be left out of the analysis, is the possible presence of advocacy coalitions. Although stakeholders might differ in the extent or intensity to which they desire certain solutions to a given problem, they still support a shared objective. Moreover, even though there might sometimes not be a strong or any type of collaboration between these different actors, the still provide input to the policymakers on an individual base, which makes their preference on the issue be heard more often, which consequently strengthens their position and improves their chance of achieving their favoured result. The presence of an advocacy coalition was very obvious on the part of the non-profit oriented coalition due to the existence of the Statiegeldalliantie. Based on the statements made by the parties present at the parliamentary hearing, it was also clear that multiple parties agreed with each other on the need for alternative methods to oppose litter and plastic soup. This was especially understandable given the fact that multiple employees of the CBL have a supervising or managing role in the other organizations like Afvalfonds Verpakkingen, NederlandSchoon and the KIDV, which confirms the existence of their advocacy coalition as well. Sabatier’s ACF is a helpful tool which can simplify an otherwise complex situation in which hundreds of actors are actively trying to influence a policy process. By categorizing them into a few advocacy coalitions, the case becomes much more comprehensible. Although the existence of the Statiegeldalliantie made this less of an issue, special attention for advocacy coalition could provide a helpful perspective in other cases. The ACF also demands special attention for the different types of actors, which can take part within an advocacy coalition. Not only interest groups take part in it; politicians are influential actors within it as well. By applying the ACF, cooperation between the VVD and the CBL becomes more apparent, as is also the case between GroenLinks and Natuur & Milieu. Furthermore, consideration of dynamic external system events is a necessity if one wants to provide a good explanation for changes in the composition of advocacy coalitions. The establishment of the Statiegeldalliantie is a prime example of a dynamic external system event, but the increasing demand for sustainability and the presentation of the National Agreement on the Circular Economy also fulfils this function. Finally, it might be argued that the CDA behaved as a policy broker in this case. Policy brokers are the actors who function within a policy issue by trying to produce a reasonable compromise, which reduces the conflict. As Van Waas stated: “I think that they have played the key role, because they were positioned a bit in the middle in this case. […] in the end, the parties probably had a good talk with the State Secretary and said: "Well, looking at a number of other issues, we

51 can live with this solution and if you want to use it more firmly, then we can not agree"” (Van Waas, interview, June 20, 2018).36 If this is indeed the case, than the CDA did fulfil the function of a policy broker. The third flaw of the interest group framework is related to the institutional context. Within this category, the position of interest groups within the specific societal context and their relation towards the policymakers should be assessed. Therefore, the theory on the different models of interest representation provide as a useful addition. Acknowledging the risks accompanied within every type of interest representation model is an important element, when the activities of interest groups are being analysed. As stated before, during the 1990s, the Netherlands was known for their neo-corporatist model, otherwise known as the polder model, in which the three branches of government, employers and employees worked together in the policy process. This polder model became increasingly criticized because it was exclusive to outsiders and it produced no real ‘winners’. This model has since then started to disappear and was slowly replaced by the neo-pluralistic model of interest representation. Within this model, all interest groups have the ability to represent their interest at the political level. This representation is accompanied by a certain element of competitiveness. In theory, all of these groups have access to the policy process, although in practise this representation is oftentimes uneven (Sanchez Salgado 2018: 9). This neo-pluralistic model of interest representation can be identified within the case of the PDMS, where multiple interest groups of different backgrounds are active and have access to the policymakers. The same holds true for the uneven amount of access the CBL had, when compared to stakeholders from the non-profit oriented advocacy coalition. This difference can be explained by the fact that the CBL is a core-insider group, while the environmental NGOs are considered to be specialist insider groups, who have a less frequent amount of contact with the policymakers. Lastly, the fourth and most important improvement which has to be made to the IGIF is the addition of the democracy type. If the case of the PDMS was analysed based on the four initial determinants, no fitting explanation could have been provided regarding the policy outcome. Given the history of Van Veldhoven and the ideological position and values of her party D66, full implementation of the extended- PDMS could have been expected. Given the different determinants of the interest groups in this case, the same outcome would also have been expected. The issue of the garbage litter, plastic soup and the circular economy are issues, which are all connected in the case of the PDMS and these are all issues with a moderately high salience. As different poles have shown, the implementation of an extended PDMS receives large support among the population. A coalition of over 750 organisations, associations, businesses and municipalities also supported this goal. D66 as environmentally-oriented party would have been more receptive to the arguments made by this non-profit oriented advocacy coalition than to those arguments made by the CBL. All these criteria determine that the Statiegeldalliantie would have had the most amount of influence in this policy decision, which would have resulted in an unconditional full extension of the

36 Translation: “Die heeft volgens mij wel redelijk de sleutelrol vervuld, omdat die een beetje in het midden zat op dit vlak. […] uiteindelijk hebben de partijen waarschijnlijk een goed gesprek gehad met de staatssecretaris en gezegd: "Nou, kijkend naar nog een aantal andere dossiers kunnen we leven met deze oplossing en wilt u steviger gaan inzetten, dan kunnen wij niet akkoord gaan."”

52 PDMS. However, the Netherlands has no majoritarian model of democracy and D66 has no absolute power within the government or within parliament. The fact that the Netherlands has a consensual democracy, in which multiple political parties need to form a coalition, is an essential element in understanding the outcome of this policy process. The advocacy coalition of the CBL had a strong partner in the VVD. This relationship allowed them to be very influential in this policy process, despite the fact that the actual decision-maker Van Veldhoven was not part of the VVD and not sensitive to the CBL’s preferences. The VVD as the biggest party within the coalition, the party which also provided the prime-minister, has showed itself to be an influential stakeholder and a reliable advocacy coalition partner for the CBL. Conclusively, both advocacy coalitions were very influential, but because of the presence of this coalition, the policy decision contained a consensus, which favoured neither of them explicitly.

53 Conclusion Measuring influence is a practise some political scientists choose to avoid. Similar to other policy processes, the case of the extension of the packaging deposit money system has proven itself to be difficult to fully comprehend. Certain aspects of the activity of lobbyists and interest groups will remain inaccessible for scientific research. No single method is adequate enough to compensate for this deficiency. Nonetheless, the multiple perspectives provided by the mixed-method approach of process-tracing, a stakeholder analysis and preference attainment has proven itself to be a valuable combination. Together, it allowed for the construction of detailed case description and a proper understanding of the case specifics. Consequently, this allowed for the application of the interest group influence framework to this policy case. As stated before, this theoretical framework is a tool which has proven itself to a valuable asset in the analysis of a policy process. This research has been the first step in developing this tool and it allows for the further improvement of this tool through the analysis of other case studies, making it more fitting and useful. Regarding the case of the PDMS, the discussion on the possible extension or removal of has been one which lasted many years. It has become clear through this research that a large part of the reason for this long period of time is the result of two advocacy coalitions trying to influence public policy according to their own preferences. Although lobbyists and interest groups fulfil an important role within a democratic society, this shows that they can also have a negative effect on it. Due to the consensual aspect of the Dutch society, the extent of their influence is limited, but this is also the case for the politicians. The new directive State Secretary Van Veldhoven has introduced could be a breakthrough that the cabinet desires, but could also be a repeating event. If that is the case, than this struggle between both advocacy coalitions could continue for many more years.

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