ISRAEL'S ENTRY INTO , 1959-1963: DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY IN THE By Zach Levey*

Israel's establishment of relations with Cyprus in 1960 marked the successful culmination of the diplomatic campaign that it had commenced in early 1959. The entry into Cyprus deepened Israel's strategic cooperation with , ameliorated the regional isolation from which the Jewish state had begun to emerge, and enhanced its image as a dynamic state that could assist other countries emerging from .

Cyprus gained its independence on Foreign Ministry created a separate , 1960 and agreed to exchange division to deal with fourteen African ambassadors with Israel. That assent countries that in 1960 and 1961 became notwithstanding, Cyprus deferred until independent and entered into diplomatic the opening of an Israeli relations with the Jewish state. , acquiescing to it only after Israel wanted to establish ties with Turkey and the Cyprus, too, in order to further ameliorate supported a sustained Israeli campaign to the isolation that had marked the first gain diplomatic entry. Moreover, Cyprus decade of its existence, but also did not send an envoy to Israel and only anticipated the establishment of friendly in 1994 did they open an embassy in Tel ties with a new state that "shared its Aviv. Why did Israel nevertheless border."(1) Thus, attendant upon Israel's consider the establishment of ties with desire for representation in were Cyprus, a country with a population of additional foreign policy aims that made less than 600,000, and poor in natural relations with Cyprus a goal more resources, an important foreign policy ambitious than merely the opening of objective? another embassy abroad. This article From 1948 to 1956, Israel devoted analyzes the cluster of objectives that most of its attention in foreign policy to Israel pursued in its diplomacy with relations with the powers that could Cyprus, the role of Israeli-Turkish provide it with arms, economic aid, and relations in achieving them, and the immigrants. At the beginning of 1957, measure of success of those policies. Israel maintained only seven embassies, Israel's foreign policy with regards to four of which were in (Britain, Cyprus has been almost completely , , and the ), two unexplored in the secondary literature.(2) in North America (the and Among primary sources, British ) and one () in Latin documents in the Public Record Office at America. But by 1960, Israel had sent Kew reveal little regarding Israel's role in ambassadors to and , Cyprus, while files at the Ben Gurion established ties with Ethiopia and Archive and the Israel Defense Force , and forged a relationship with Archive contain little more than cursory Turkey and marked by a quiet but references to the subject. Thus, this growing strategic consensus. The Israeli article makes extensive use of recently

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Zach Levey released documents at the Israel State possible, Israel wished at least to ensure Archive and highlights the role of the that not dictate the character of its Israeli Foreign Ministry in the future ties with Cyprus. formulation of policy toward Cyprus. Sixth, Israel aspired to closer relations with Turkey, which, since the OBJECTIVES AND OBSTACLES IN establishment of Israel, had declined to CYPRUS exchange envoys at the ambassadorial Six elements in Israel's foreign policy . 's refusal to do so made the establishment of notwithstanding, the 1958 coup in diplomatic ties with Cyprus. These are and the rise of the UAR created greater recounted here briefly and dealt with at common ground. This was the basis for greater length below. First, Israel was Israel's initiative of an "alliance of the determined to thwart the attempts of the periphery," the purpose of which was to United Arab (UAR; the union forge ties in regions beyond the Arab of and that the former confrontation states. Israel cultivated dominated) to pressure the new republic relations with Turkey and Iran, both to deny Israel a presence there and thus Muslim but non-Arab states, and hinder its efforts to break out of its predominantly Christian Ethiopia, which regional isolation. Second, Israel also controlled the approaches to the Red sought to ameliorate the isolation that .(5) On August 2, 1958, Israeli marked its international diplomatic Foreign Minister Golda Meir met in standing. In 1955, Israel was with Fatim Zorlu, her Turkish excluded from the Bandung Conference counterpart and on August 29, 1958, of non-aligned countries, which adopted David Ben Gurion, Israel's prime an anti-Israeli motion. Exclusion from minister, met secretly in Ankara with Bandung distressed the Israelis, who , prime minister of thereafter placed even greater emphasis Turkey. Israel and Turkey also shared upon every demonstration of friendship intelligence discreetly with a view to shown them and heightened the containing the influence of Egyptian importance of establishing relations with President Gamal Abdul Nasser.(6) emerging states. Third, as an independent Israel included neither Greece nor state, Cyprus could vote in the United Cyprus in the alliance of the periphery Nations, and Israel's desire to avoid but nevertheless viewed favorably the ostracism made diplomatic ties with it emergence of a friendly regime in a important for that reason too. Closer trade Cypriot state that was both ties was a fourth incentive to pursue geographically proximate (220 miles to relations. its west) and non-Arab.(7) At the same A fifth goal was Israel's attempt to time, Israel sought to enhance its status in exploit ties with Cyprus to improve its the eyes of the Western powers by chilly relations with Greece. Since 1954, presenting itself as a regional power able the debates in the United Nations on the to exert a pro-Western influence on its future of Cyprus had Greece seeking the newly independent "neighbor." It was support of the Arab states.(3) Israel had also natural that Israel consider ties with refrained from supporting either the Turks of Cyprus a means to further (the union of Cyprus with Greece) or enhance its relationship with Ankara. of the country between its Greek Moreover, the support that the Arab and Turkish communities, but had states lent the both before lobbied in the United Nations in favor of and after that country's independence Turkey's position regarding a deepened Turkey's sense of regional compromise on Cyprus.(4) Thus, were an isolation and heightened its perception improvement in relations with not that there existed the potential for

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cooperation with Israel over Cyprus as 1959, he won two thirds of the Greek .(8) Cypriot vote, thereby becoming Yet, four main obstacles obstructed President-elect of Cyprus.(10) The Israel's diplomacy in Nicosia: the Israelis considered Makarios a threat to disposition toward Israel of the their endeavors in Cyprus, viewed government of Greece, the circumstances overcoming his resistance to their of the in Egypt, the presence a principal diplomatic identification with Athens of the Greek challenge, and sought the help of both the community of Cyprus, and the attitude of and the Turkish that community's leader, Cypriots in pursuing that goal. Michael Mouskos Makarios. Thus, at These objectives and obstacles first, the Greek government had accorded provide the setting for the three periods Israel only de facto recognition, that this work explores. The first phase applauded Egypt's 1956 "victory" over commenced when Greece and Turkey Britain, and developed close ties with the signed the Zurich and Arab states, while allowing Israel no London agreements that lay down the more than the lowest level of diplomatic terms for the end of British rule and the representation in Athens. Second, both political future of Cyprus.(11) The Greece and the Greek Cypriots evinced Israelis assumed that when Cyprus great concern for the Greek communities achieved statehood, it would grant them of Egypt. In 1960, the Greek diaspora in permission to open an embassy and Egypt, centered mainly in , prepared the groundwork for that numbered approximately 70,000 people, occasion. Yet, when in , of whom some 17,000 were Greek Cyprus became independent, it left in Cypriots. This diaspora community abeyance Israel's diplomatic status. This exerted pressure upon both the setback forced the Israeli Foreign government in Athens and Greek leaders Ministry to concentrate upon forestalling in Cyprus, claiming that both an exclusion from that country, and during enhancement of Greece's relations with this second phase, Israel conducted a Israel and the inauguration of Cypriot- lobbying campaign in which Turkey and Israeli ties would bring upon them the the Turkish Cypriots played a central wrath of the Egyptian authorities. role. That campaign culminated in A third encumbrance lay in the of January 1961, when the government of commercial ties. The Greek community Cyprus allowed Israel to open its of Cyprus constituted 80% of the embassy in Nicosia. The third part of this population of the and controlled, work evaluates the manner in which proportionally, an even greater share of Israel then exploited its opportunity. its commerce. The Greek Cypriots traded with the Arab states, and many of them FEBRUARY 1959 TO JANUARY viewed askance Israel's efforts to create 1961: BALANCING ACT closer economic relations with Cyprus. A Israel welcomed the signing of the fourth obstacle was in the person of February 1959 agreements on Cyprus as Archbishop Michael Mouskos Makarios, an opportunity to normalize its relations leader of the Greek community of with Greece, hoping that "the road to Cyprus, who was generally pro-Arab and Athens will pass through Nicosia."(12) had friendly relations with Nasser.(9) On The Israelis considered the Cyprus March 1, 1959, Makarios had returned accords a turning point that would from exile in the and shortly remove the restraint hitherto preventing thereafter became the most powerful Greece from extending de jure influence on the foreign relations of pre- recognition to the Jewish state.(13) independence Cyprus. On , Greece's campaign over Cyprus and

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 75 Zach Levey coordination with the Arab states at the consul in Nicosia during that period, with United Nations had also served Athens as operational guidelines. Moshe Sasson, a pretext for keeping Israel at a distance. head of the Middle East Division of the In , Evanghelos Averoff, Foreign Ministry, acknowledged that the Greece's foreign minister, told the Israelis Turkish Cypriots were Israel's "natural that resolution of the Cyprus issue would allies" but cautioned against drawing bring but little change to their Cyprus into the Arab-Israeli dispute. Any relationship. He reminded them that the attempt to do so, said Sasson, would precarious position of the Greek damage Israel's standing there. Zvi community in Egypt remained a serious Locker, head of the British obstacle to closer ties(14) and in fact, Commonwealth Division, also warned during the months that followed, Greek- against open identification with either the Israeli relations did not grow warmer.(15) Greek or Turkish Cypriots, because, he Therefore, Israel understood that the feared, Israel would later pay a political pursuit of its goals in Cyprus dictated price for such partisanship. The Foreign forging a relationship with Nicosia Ministry decided to urge both Cypriot independent of the influence of communities to reject outside interference Greece.(16) This policy required Israel to in their affairs, planning to use the exploit both its relations with Turkey and months preceding independence to the communal divide in Cyprus. expand trade ties and to begin providing In March 1959, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, technical assistance.(21) leader of the Turkish Cypriots, told Yet, relations with the Greek Cypriots Peretz Leshem, Israel's consul in Nicosia, in general and those with Makarios in that the Turks of Cyprus sought warm particular became cause for growing relations and close economic ties with Israeli concern. For example, in March Israel.(17) Israel did not reject Kutchuk's 1959, Greek Cypriot leaders requested overture but still wished to maintain a that Israel guide them in their careful balance in its relations between negotiations with Britain. The Greek Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thus, Cypriots wished to draw upon Israel's Leshem also met that month for the first experience with the 1948 termination of time with Archbishop Makarios, Britain's mandate in Palestine and asked describing to the prelate Israel's aid for detailed information regarding the projects in Burma and Ghana. Makarios financial arrangements of that period. The expressed interest and assured Leshem approach appeared to afford Israel with that he intended Cyprus to establish full an opportunity to help Cyprus but in relations with Israel.(18) In , truth, this was an uncomfortable the Foreign Ministry drew detailed proposition. First, assent to the Cypriot plans for hosting Cypriot ministers, request might bring Britain to conclude religious figures, and trainees in Israel, that Israel sought to interfere with the emphasizing the exigency of inviting process of transferring power on the representatives of both communities.(19) island.(22) Second, the Greek Cypriots At the same time, Leshem carefully were negotiating the terms of Britain's cultivated both prominent Greek and continued presence at its bases on Turkish Cypriots expected to play leading Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios was intent roles when their country became upon minimalizing any vestiges of independent.(20) "colonialism" in his country and At the beginning of , senior determined to gain from Britain the officials of the Foreign Ministry met to maximum possible financial advantage. formulate Israel's policy toward Cyprus Third, in the view of the Foreign during the "-up" to statehood and to Ministry, the circumstances of Palestine provide Ze'ev Levin, who was to serve as in 1948 were in any case too dissimilar to

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those of Cyprus in 1959 to make such Cypriot interest in the prospect of cooperation at all useful.(23) technical assistance programs and Therefore, the Israelis were reluctant seeking out those Greek Cypriot to accommodate the request.(24) They businessmen who recognized the did not wish to become identified with potential in trade with Israel.(31) But either a militant Greek Cypriot stance or Makarios displayed little enthusiasm, and negotiations the purpose of which was before the independence of Cyprus simply to extract the highest possible Israel's ability to prove its value as a price from the British. Moreover, the source of training and purveyor of aid contingency of an overtly political projects was highly circumscribed. Thus, service to the of Cyprus (but not for example, in , the Foreign the Turks) dictated caution. As a result of Ministry prepared to host Turkish Cypriot that logic, the Israelis did not regard youth groups, but at the same time, evasion of the Greek Cypriot approach as Makarios withheld the authorization to cause for disquiet regarding their position visit Israel that two of the seven Greek in Cyprus. However, in July 1959, for the members of Cyprus' Transitional first time Makarios openly evinced an Government had requested (the ministers attitude inimical to Israel, telling the of Labor and Agriculture).(32) Three Washington that Cyprus would seek days before election to the office of UAR approval before establishing president, Makarios told the newspaper diplomatic ties with Israel.(25) Ethnos that he was determined to make On , 1959, Levin (who had Cyprus a "true paradise" in the Middle four days earlier replaced Leshem in East and in a rare friendly reference to Nicosia) met with Makarios, who denied Israel, expressed admiration of the that there was any substance to the article kibbutz, the agricultural success of which in the Star and rejected the idea that he said he considered a model for his Nasser would be dictating Cypriot country.(33) But this hardly mitigated foreign policy.(26) Nevertheless, during Israel's growing wariness of Makarios the second half of 1959, increasingly and its apprehension concerning the heavy pressure from the UAR, principally diplomatic consequences of relations with on the economic level, made the Greek a government that he would dominate. Cypriots increasingly wary of ties with On January 18, 1960, the leaders of Israel.(27) The Egyptians threatened that both Cypriot communities met in London were Cyprus to allow Israel to open an with the foreign ministers of Britain, embassy, all markets in the Arab states Greece, and Turkey, and decided to would be closed to Cypriot trade.(28) On postpone independence for one month. In the other hand, Israel was important as a fact, Anglo-Cypriot talks broke the source of , and in 1959, some impasse in negotiations only in July, 3,000 Israelis visited Cyprus.(29) Levin when final arrangements were made to remarked acerbically that Cairo's claim to declare Cyprus independent on August have sent thousands of tourists to Cyprus 16, 1960.(34) For the Israelis this meant was absurd; the real number was about more time for diplomacy, the purpose of 100.(30) which was to thwart a bid by Makarios to In mid-1959, the expectation that deny them a presence in Nicosia.(35) By Cyprus would in become early 1960, the Foreign Ministry independent brought Egypt to intensify considered that to be an increasingly its pressure upon the Greek Cypriots to possible contingency and pursued three refrain from establishing relations with avenues toward avoiding exclusion. Israel. The Israelis fought the Egyptian First, Israel attempted to convince the campaign against their presence in United States and Britain that its Cyprus by attempting to stimulate greater diplomatic presence in Cyprus was both a

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 77 Zach Levey matter of principle and of strategic found in both Ankara and the Turkish benefit to the West. The Israelis pointed community of Cyprus. to what they claimed was their part in Thus, the third avenue that Israel combating communist influence in Africa pursued in order to avoid exclusion from and suggested that an embassy in Nicosia Cyprus was increased contact with the would be of similar utility to the Western Turkish leadership on the island and powers.(36) The Department of State and closer coordination with the government the Foreign Office accepted the Israeli of Turkey with a view to exploiting plea for diplomatic "fair play" and agreed mutual mistrust of UAR intentions.(44) to exert pressure upon Makarios not to Ankara's role in determining Cypriot favor the UAR and discriminate against policy was Israel's "first line of Israel.(37) Moreover, the and defense,"(45) but the relationship with British acknowledged Israel's concern the Turkish Cypriots was of rapidly that Nasser would attempt to induce increasing importance. By the beginning Cyprus to adopt a "neutralist" stance in of 1960, the Israelis had concluded that foreign policy.(38) However, both relations with Athens would help them in London and Washington responded Cyprus not at all, while at the same time, coolly to the idea of cooperating with a completely neutral approach to the Israel in containing communism in communal divide in Cyprus was Cyprus.(39) unrealistic. Fortunately for Israel, the Second, Israel cultivated leading Cypriot constitution gave both the figures in the Greek community in the President (a Greek) and the Vice- United States who had influence in either President (a Turk) the power of veto in Athens or Nicosia. According to the the areas of defense, internal security, and Foreign Ministry, a warm relationship foreign affairs.(46) For the most part, with could balance the Makarios ignored Kutchuk instead of influence that the consulting him regarding important wielded in both Greece and Cyprus.(40) diplomatic appointments or the general Among the Foreign Ministry's contacts conduct of foreign policy.(47) were the Greek archbishop of , Nevertheless, Makarios could not decide the Greek-American millionaire Spiros that Cyprus would have diplomatic Skoras, who had warm relations with relations with the UAR and other Arab Makarios and business ties in Cyprus, states while denying Israel the same and Dean Alfange, the chairman of the status unless the Turks of Cyprus so American Hellenic Congress.(41) While consented. little resulted from contact with the In mid-, Moshe archbishop, Alfange (who also promoted Sasson secured Turkish Foreign Minister closer Greek-Jewish relations in the Fatin Zorlu's promise that Ankara would United States) lobbied leaders in Athens work to help prevent Israel's exclusion on behalf of Israel but to no avail.(42) from Cyprus.(48) This was a turning Israel also conveyed through these point for Israel's diplomacy in pre- Greek-American "back channels" to independence Cyprus, and in early Makarios notice that the Jewish January 1960, Levin met with Turkey's community in the United States would consul in Nicosia to coordinate protest loudly in Washington were the policies.(49) Zorlu also urged both government of Cyprus to discriminate Kutchuk and the Turkish Cypriot leader's against Israel.(43) Yet, the overall benefit protégé, Rauf Denktash, to work closely to Israel of these various contacts with with the Israelis. In mid-January 1960, Greek Americans was of a highly limited Kutchuk informed Levin that he had told nature compared to the support that Israel the archbishop that Cyprus must maintain a strictly even-handed approach to all

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countries of the . Makarios had appreciation of Ankara's ties with Israel. agreed, Kutchuk reported but then Sarper alerted to a scheme that continued, "You know how he changes Makarios had devised to undermine his mind from day to day."(50) Israeli efforts in Cyprus. The archbishop Turkey did not change its policy had attempted to convince the mufti of toward Israel after the coup in Cyprus to prevail upon Kutchuk to Ankara that ousted Menderes and withdraw his support for Israel. Makarios' Zorlu.(51) Both the government of purpose was to demonstrate to the mufti Turkey and the Turkish leadership in that while the Christians of Cyprus Cyprus continued to cooperate with wished to support Muslim interests, Israel, and during the first few months of Kutchuk preferred Israel to the . 1960, the Israeli Foreign Ministry and The Turkish government considered this Defense Ministry examined the to be dangerous incitement that could possibility of offering the Turkish have inflamed radical Islamic sentiment Cypriots paramilitary training as a way of in Turkey, and Sarper worked quietly to strengthening relations with them. The ensure that the Muslim religious Foreign Ministry assumed that the leadership of Cyprus refrain from being Turkish Cypriots would be receptive to partner to such an initiative.(54) Israeli overtures on this issue, but the Ministry of Defense concluded that the INDEPENDENCE AND IMPASSE limited size of the armed forces that By mid-1960, the prospect of Cyprus would maintain offered little diplomatic ties with Israel forced the opportunity for either arms sales or Greek Cypriot community in Egypt to military training. Israel based its decision launch a campaign in the newspapers of to refrain from such a connection on the Cyprus, claiming that such a move would great care that it took to make no such bring the government in Cairo to expel move without the approval of their entire community. The Cypriot Ankara,(52) but both awareness of the Federation of Trade and Industry called fragile nature of the Cypriot polity and upon Makarios to refrain from any act of expedience also played a part. Both foreign policy that would jeopardize communities in Cyprus were storing arms relations with the Arab states, which were in preparation for a future confrontation, Cyprus' "natural" trade partners. In fact, and in late 1959, a former member of the Makarios reacted to these pressures in a Greek Cypriot underground approached contradictory manner. He told the Cairo Israel with a request for light arms. The newspaper al-Gomhuria that he was not Israelis replied evasively, knowing full free to accommodate Egyptian demands well that supplying arms to one side because he had to take into consideration would incur the hostility of the other, the position of his vice-president, thus thus placing in jeopardy Israel's future failing to uphold the principle of Cypriot relations with Cyprus.(53) neutrality. Makarios should instead have The decision not to cultivate a defense made clear to the Egyptians that he too, connection did not mitigate Israel's desire and not only his Turkish colleague, to foster a discreet, but special intended to pursue full diplomatic relationship with the Turkish Cypriots relations with Israel as well as with the and to pursue the help of Ankara, both of Arab states. Yet, several days later, he which Israel considered vital sources of stated forcefully that the Arab states support in Cyprus. Turkey's new foreign could, if they so desired, open six minister, Selim Sarper, was determined embassies in Cyprus but not prevent the that the Israelis gain diplomatic entry into opening of an Israeli embassy as Cyprus, and in early August 1960, he well.(55) provided a clear demonstration of his

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Several days before independence, not sympathetic to Israel, but that he had Makarios gave a clearer indication of the influence with Makarios, and so she manner in which he proposed to deal with approached him during the diplomatic Cyprus' Arab-Israeli conundrum. stalemate that followed Cypriot Makarios urged Kutchuk to agree to the independence.(60) Her overture was to no immediate opening of a UAR embassy in avail, and Israel's attempts to sway Nicosia but a six-month postponement of Makarios through , the Israel's entry into Cyprus. Kutchuk Greek Cypriot foreign minister, were adamantly refused, insisting upon both equally unsuccessful. Kyprianou was a Cypriot impartiality regarding the Arab- protégé of Makarios but had far less Israeli dispute and equal treatment of influence over policy than Rossides, who Israel and the Arab states.(56) Sarper (according to Levin) held the young instructed both the Turkish consul in foreign minister (he was 28 years old) in Nicosia and Ankara's ambassador- contempt.(61) Kyprianou tried to explain designate to ensure that Kutchuk be co- to the Israelis that only technical signatory to any document regarding the complications at the compound accreditation of foreign diplomats in designated for the Egyptian embassy had Cyprus. When Cyprus attained delayed the arrival of the UAR independence, Egypt refused to send an ambassador, promising that when the ambassador until Nicosia provided UAR finally did open its embassy, his assurances that it would not grant Israel government would permit Israel to do representation, and other Arab states so.(62) Levin replied that clearly Egypt threatened to follow Cairo's lead.(57) was still dictating the foreign policy of Makarios took no at all, arousing Cyprus.(63) concern among the Israelis that he was In 1960, Nasser visited Athens. colluding with the Arab states to The Greek government, eager to please perpetuate a diplomatic stalemate that Egypt, added its to those urging was most clearly to the detriment of Makarios to restrict Israel's presence in Israel.(58) Cyprus to the lowest possible level.(64) In truth, Makarios would have Israel again turned to Turkey to balance preferred a solution that permitted the Greek influence and Arab pressure. At Israelis representation, but at a level no the end of , the foreign higher than the minimum required to ministers of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey liaise with those Cypriots who insisted met in . Sarper told Kyprianou that upon doing business with them. Israel Turkey could not accept further tarrying continued to appeal to the Cypriot leaders regarding the accreditation of an Israeli for a status equal to that assured its Arab ambassador to Cyprus nor the rivals, pointing to Cyprus' own stated archbishop's attempts to postpone the desire for neutrality but also emphasizing opening of the Israeli embassy to a date at the contribution Israel could make with least several months later than the its technical prowess.(59) The archbishop Egyptian's arrival.(65) In this instance, was not averse to hosting Israeli aid Israel found its most effective support in programs and technical assistance, but he the pressure that the Turkish Cypriot assumed that that was a price Israel leadership exerted upon Makarios. On would in any case be willing to pay for a January 13, 1961, Kutchuk, Denktash, presence in his country. and Osman Orek, the Turkish Cypriot In late 1960, Israeli Foreign Minister minister of defense, demanded that the Golda Meir met with Zenon Rossides, President receive the Israeli ambassador- Cyprus' ambassador to Washington and designate without further delay. Makarios permanent representative to the United was able to procrastinate no longer, and Nations. Meir knew that Rossides was the "best" he could do for the Egyptians

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was to keep the Israeli envoy out of his of ambivalence. However, within a few office for several more days, allowing the months of the opening of the embassy in representative of the UAR the symbolic Nicosia, three elements of Makarios' privilege of arriving first. Kyprianou policies made apparent that as long as he informed Levin that on January 14, 1960, led Cyprus, his country's orientation with the Egyptian ambassador would present regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute would his credentials, requesting that the Israeli be incongruent with Israel's interests. The diplomat do so on January 20. first of these was the disposition of Israel had made its diplomatic entry Cyprus at the United Nations. In 1961, into Cyprus. On February 2, 1961, Moshe Rossides voted against Israel on the issue Sasson met with Sarper in order to of the Palestinian refugees, making clear convey Israel's gratitude to Turkey for its that Cyprus would be no friend in that part in bringing that entry about, noting setting. Israel protested to Kyprianou that that this was "an interesting example of the vote violated Cypriot neutrality fruitful and quiet cooperation in an regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. To no endeavor that began two years ago."(66) avail, however, as Rossides completely The Foreign Ministry also viewed with a disregarded the foreign minister and mixture of satisfaction and surprise the exploited his own direct line to initiative that the Turkish Cypriots had Makarios.(70) The best the Israelis could demonstrated.(67) do was to maintain close contact with Ahmed Akyamach, Rossides' Turkish 1961-1963: DIPLOMATIC Cypriot deputy, in the hope that he would CONSTRAINTS, CONSOLIDATION share with them information regarding OF TIES his delegation in time to be of some In truth, Israel did not intend to use.(71) advertise its tilt toward the Turkish Second, Presidents Makarios and community nor build a relationship with Nasser began to establish a growing Cyprus based on a pronounced proximity rapport. On June 3, 1961, Makarios to one but not the other of its ethnic began a week's visit to Egypt. The groups.(68) The fact that Israel did not archbishop used the trip to acknowledge limit its efforts in Cyprus to the Turkish Egypt's support during the Cypriot sector accounts for much of its success struggle for independence, obtain Cairo's there. Nevertheless, the quiet cooperation promise of backing if the issue of Cyprus inherent in the "" with once more arose at the United Nations (as the Turkish Cypriots remained a basic he surely knew it would), and appeal to element in Israel's Cyprus policy, and Nasser to remove restrictions (principally Levin wrote, "of principal importance is in business and education) upon the the connection with Ankara, from which Greek Cypriot community in Egypt. How the Turkish leadership here receives far, wondered the Israelis, would direct instructions, mainly with regard to Makarios go toward satisfying Nasser's foreign relations."(69) Israel carefully reciprocal demands upon him? In fact, nurtured its strategic accord with Ankara, the archbishop rejected Nasser's call to and its ties with the Turkish Cypriots challenge the presence of British bases on broadened that common ground. Cyprus. He exercised caution with regard Israel continued to cultivate ties with to Israel, agreeing only to a joint the Greek community in the United communiqué making general mention of States, hoping that its influence would the Palestinian refugee problem, and balance the pro-Arab bent of President responding not at all to the Egyptian Makarios. The Cypriot President was not demand that Cyprus sever its ties with implacably anti-Israel, and his conduct Israel.(72) Nevertheless, Makarios and toward the Jewish state reveals a measure Nasser drew closer in inexorable fashion,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 81 Zach Levey as the archbishop and his Greek Cypriot Cypriot representation in Israel. In late colleagues, virtually ignoring Kutchuk 1962, the Israelis once more attempted to and the Turks, decided to orient the new convince Makarios to assign an envoy republic toward the non-aligned bloc.(73) but by then understood that Afterwards, the Israelis took comfort "postponement" of Cypriot diplomatic from the fact that the "damage" to them reciprocity would remain the regular state from Makarios' Egypt visit was of affairs.(78) Cyprus' ambassador to limited.(74) Turkey had charge of his country's Israeli Third, Israel was conducting its affairs, but no Cypriot ambassador visited relations with Cyprus in the context of a Israel until the opening of an embassy in diplomatic anomaly: Cyprus had no 1994.(79) envoy in Israel. Meanwhile, Makarios Yet, limitations in the realm of himself perpetuated that irregularity. diplomacy did not prevent Israel from Thus, while the archbishop had establishing "facts on the ground." The acquiesced to the presence of an Israeli Israelis quickly exploited the opening of ambassador, he did not intend to their embassy in order to consolidate their reciprocate by dispatching a diplomat to presence in Cyprus by rendering Tel Aviv (much less Jerusalem). The technical assistance, expanding economic Israelis initially did not assume that this ties, and providing training in areas incongruity would become a permanent essential to the host country's feature of the relationship. Moreover, in development. The scope of Israeli activity early , Moshe Sasson (then during the two years that followed the assigned to Ankara) urged the Foreign advent of diplomatic relations warrants Ministry to press Makarios to visit Israel note. In 1962, some 70 Cypriots in order to "balance" his trip to Egypt. participated in various training programs Nasser was supposed to have visited in Israel. That figure was greater than the Cyprus in (though in number of trainees from more than half fact he did not), and Sasson called for a of the African states with which Israel at Foreign Ministry initiative to convince that time had relations, the populations all Makarios to receive Israel's president in of which were considerably larger than Cyprus.(75) However, Makarios would that of Cyprus. Tahal, (Israel's water consider neither a trip to Israel nor a visit planning authority), conducted a hydro of the Israeli president to his country.(76) geologic study of Cyprus and submitted Two months later, Makarios told to the Cypriot government detailed plans Israel's English-language newspaper, The for the development of the country's Jerusalem Post, that Cyprus would soon water resources, in which the Israelis open a consulate in Israel. This raised later played a central role.(80) In the hopes at the Foreign Ministry, and Israeli same year, Mashav (the Israeli Foreign officials considered insisting that the Ministry's Division for International Cypriots open an embassy.(77) In fact, Cooperation) set up two experimental these musings were gratuitous. By 1962, farms for irrigation methods in Cyprus Nicosia hosted the embassies of four and instituted separate programs for Arab states: Egypt, , Saudi agricultural training in both the Turkish Arabia, and with the breakup of the UAR and Greek sectors. According to the in late 1961, Syria. While Arab Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Egyptian displeasure had not succeeded in embassy tried to match Israel's success by preventing the opening of an Israeli offering Cyprus 70 six-month embassy in Nicosia, Arab pressure and scholarships for the study of agriculture the implications for the Greek Cypriots in in Egypt. Only 31 Cypriots took Egypt constituted the principal reasons advantage of the opportunity, and all for Makarios' indefinite deferral of returned home within one month.(81)

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Israel viewed with satisfaction, too, foreign that Israelis spent in the development of its trade ties with Cyprus compensated it for the imbalance Cyprus. In , Cyprus granted in commerce between the two countries. Israel "most favored nation" status, (86) allowing Israeli exporters unrestricted The Arab states, principally Egypt, access to Cypriot markets. In 1960, Israel never ceased exhorting the government of exported to Cyprus goods worth Cyprus to terminate its relationship with $1,709,000, while Israel's imports were Israel, and the limits to the Turkish $421,000. In 1961, Israeli exports minority's influence upon Cypriot foreign reached $2,620,000 and imports policy encouraged Cairo to persist in $336,000.(82) These figures bear brief those attempts. Yet, Israel had gained comparison to those of Israel's trade with entry into Cyprus, and its various sub-Saharan Africa. In the late and enterprises there both served as the early 1960s, encouraging relations with bulwark that allowed further ties to be Africa constituted a major Israeli foreign cemented with the Turkish Cypriots and policy initiative. In 1963, exports to greatly mitigated the suspicion with Ghana, with which Israel had particularly which so many Greek Cypriots regarded close ties, reached $1,615,000 and those Israel.(87) to Ethiopia, which Israel had engaged in its "alliance of the periphery," stood at CONCLUSION $1,223,000. Only the level of Israeli The establishment of relations with exports to , which in 1963 reached Cyprus in August 1960 and the $1,947,000, rivaled that of Cyprus.(83) inauguration of an embassy in Nicosia in Yet, the population of Nigeria in 1963 January 1961 marked the successful was 45,000,000, more than 75 times that culmination of a diplomatic campaign of Cyprus. that Israel had commenced in early 1959. However, Israel's advantage in trade Israel's entry into Cyprus and a status exposed it to Arab charges that its there equal to that of the Arab states economic relationship with Cyprus was prevented its rivals from exploiting the exploitative. The trade gap between Israel exclusion that would have deepened the and Cyprus was 4 to 1 in Israel's favor, diplomatic and geostrategic isolation while the overall imbalance in Cyprus' from which the Jewish state had by 1960 foreign trade at that time was 2.4 to begun to emerge. 1.(84) In 1962, Israeli exports to Cyprus What had Israel gained and what were fell to $1,719,000 and Cypriot exports to the rewards of its statecraft? Neuberger Israel to $200,000. But the Israelis writes (perhaps in exaggerated fashion) pointed to the tourist trade as a great that during the period of , a benefit to the and state ostracized by the countries considered it (as did the Cypriots) a achieving independence after colonial principal element in the balancing of the rule was devoid of .(88) trade ledger with that country. In 1960, Diplomatic relations with Cyprus 4,500 Israeli tourists visited Cyprus. In augmented the growing acceptance that 1961, this number rose to 8,400 and in began to accrue to Israel and enhanced its 1962 reached 9,320.(85) Israel sought image as a dynamic young state with ways to strengthen ties by exempting which countries emerging from tourists who visited Cyprus from the tax colonialism, principally those of Africa, on foreign travel that Israeli citizens at sought association. In that sense, the that time normally paid. The Israeli establishment of diplomatic ties with government at that time permitted its Cyprus also obviated a failure that would citizens to purchase $500 for purposes of have adversely affected Israel's endeavors foreign travel and estimated that the elsewhere.

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The commercial ties that Israel patent unwillingness to uphold his developed with Cyprus were clearly a country's neutrality with regard to the reward for its diplomacy, and the Foreign Arab-Israeli dispute. Israeli-Turkish Ministry considered the growing number accord over Cyprus also set in bold relief of Israeli tourists who spent their foreign the lack of success that marked Israel's currency there an important element in attempts to use Nicosia as a bridge to fostering closer ties between the two warmer ties with Athens. Greek-Israeli countries. Greek Cypriots did business relations remained cool, and Greece with Israelis and called upon Israel to accorded Israel de jure recognition only share its technical expertise with their in 1991. government. At the same time, Makarios Warm relations with the Turkish was not averse to receiving assistance Cypriots notwithstanding, Israel wisely from Israel, and the advent of aid projects remained aloof of the communal divide in and training programs that attracted both Cyprus, refraining from establishing a Greek and Turkish Cypriots constituted defense connection with the government the most visible mark of Israeli success in of Cyprus and did not engage in the Cyprus. supply of military hardware to either of Israel's entry into Cyprus also became the rival communities. Israel's care to an opportunity to draw closer to Turkey. avoid involvement in Cyprus' ethnic Ankara's interest in the opening of an dispute served its interests well. Thus, on Israeli embassy in Nicosia both solidified the one hand, the modest profile of the Israeli-Turkish ties and added an Israeli presence in Cyprus contrasted with important dimension to cooperation that its prominence in Africa (by the end of increased in the context of the alliance of 1962, Israel had twenty-two embassies in the periphery. While Cyprus was not a Africa and military ties with several state that the Israelis sought to include in states on that continent). Yet, on the other that framework, the desire to contain hand, the Israelis did not experience in Nasser's influence in the region Nicosia anything on the order of the convinced Turkey and the Turkish severing of relations that most of those Cypriots to coordinate closely with the African states effected in 1973, Israelis in order to ensure that Israel continuing to maintain an embassy in provided a counterweight to Egypt's Nicosia even in the absence of a Cypriot presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. envoy in Israel, a situation which was Moreover, Israeli-Turkish consultations rectified in 1994 when an envoy was regarding Cyprus and Israel's ties with finally assigned. the Turkish Cypriot leaders continued after the May 1960 coup in Turkey. This *Zach Levey is assistant professor of coordination demonstrated the resilience International Relations at the University of both the Ankara-Jerusalem relationship of . He completed his Ph.D. at the in general and the mutual interest of both Hebrew University in Jerusalem and has parties with regard to Cyprus in also been visiting assistant professor at particular. the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The Israeli rapport with the Turkish Dr. Levey is the author of Israel and the community in Cyprus contrasted with the Western Powers, 1952-1960 (University skepticism of the Greek Cypriot of North Carolina Press, 1997). leadership. Makarios evinced an attitude toward the Jewish state that was detached NOTES at best and at times deliberately 1. Western Europe Division to Legation obstructive. The behavior of Zenon in Athens, April 15, 1959, Israel State Rossides, Cyprus' representative to the Archive (ISA) 3122/38. United Nations, demonstrated Makarios'

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2. The subject is treated briefly in Baruch 10. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and 355. Cyprus," in , Aryeh Oded, 11. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. and Moshe Yeager (eds.), The Foreign 355-63; John Reddaway, "Cyprus - The Ministry: The First Fifty Years (Tel Aviv, British Connection," International 2002, in Hebrew), 371-6; Amikam Relations, Vol. 8 (November 1986), pp. Nachmani, Israel, Turkey, and Greece: 529-56. Uneasy Relations in the East 12. Eytan to Legation in Athens, Mediterranean (London: 1987). An , 1959, ISA 3122/38. authoritative account of Cyprus during 13. Prato to Western Europe Division, this period is Nancy Crawshaw's, The , 1959, ISA 3122/38. Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the 14. Prato to Fischer, March 24, 1959, ISA Struggle for Union with Greece (London: 3104/16. Allen and Unwin, 1978); see also Tozun 15. Levin to British Commonwealth Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since Division, November 26, 1959, ISA 1955 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 3122/41. 19-50. 16. Prato to Eytan, June 26, 1959, ISA 3. Egypt backed the Greek position 3104/16. mainly because it wanted to see Britain 17. Leshem to British Commonwealth forced out of its bases on the island. In Division, March 25, 1959, ISA 3122/41. 1956, Britain had used those bases to 18. Leshem to Comay, March 15, 1959, stage attacks on Egypt and in 1958 to ISA 3122/41. airlift help to 's King Hussein. 19. Locker to Comay, May 29, 1959, ISA Nachmani, Israel, Turkey, and Greece, p. 3122/41. 105; Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and 20. See the three cables from Leshem to Cyprus," p. 375. British Commonwealth Division, May 4. Leshem to Comay, , 1959, ISA 25, 1959, ISA 3122/41. 3122/41. 21. Meeting at the Foreign Ministry, July 5. For an account of the alliance of the 2, 1959, ISA 3122/41. periphery see Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: 22. Comay to Leshem, March 20, 1959, Israel and the Arab (London: ISA 3122/41. Norton, 2000), pp. 186-217. 23. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. 6. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and 356-61. Cyprus," p. 372. 24. Comay to Eytan, May 7, 1959, ISA 7. See Sasson's note to the Foreign 3122/41. Ministry's British Commonwealth 25. Leshem to British Commonwealth Division explaining that both Greece's Division, July 6, 1959, ISA 3122/41. diplomatic entente with Egypt but also 26. Levin to British Commonwealth geographic distance from the Arab states Division, July 12, 1959, ISA 3122/41. were the main reasons for excluding it 27. Levin to British Commonwealth from the "alliance of the periphery." Division, August 5, 1959, ISA 3122/41. Sasson to British Commonwealth 28. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and Division, April 18, 1961, ISA 3348/27. Cyprus," p. 375. 8. Suha Bolukbasi, "Behind the Turkish- 29. Levin to British Commonwealth Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View," Division, September 17, 1959, ISA Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 29, No. 3122/41. 1 (Autumn 1999), p. 24. 30. Levin to Eytan, December 6, 1959, 9. "Position of the Arab States on the ISA 3123/1. Cyprus Problem," report of the Foreign 31. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and Ministry, August 10, 1958, ISA 3057/2. Cyprus," p. 375.

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32. British Commonwealth Division to 47 Robert Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Foreign Ministry, August 10, 1959, ISA Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict 3122/41. in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: 33. Levin to British Commonwealth Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 173. Division, December 10, 1959, ISA 48. Meeting at the Foreign Ministry, 3122/41. December 20, 1959, ISA 3122/41. 34. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, pp. 49. Levin to Sasson, January 7, 1960, 357-63. ISA 1431/1. 35. British Commonwealth Division to 50. Levin to British Commonwealth Embassy in Paris, January 6, 1960, ISA Division, January 14, 1960, ISA 3344/58- 3344/58-I. I. 36. British Commonwealth Division to 51. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and Embassy in Washington, January 4, Cyprus," p. 373. 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. 52. Levin to British Commonwealth 37. Embassy in London to British Division, , 1960, ISA 1431/1. Commonwealth Division, January 8, 53. Consulate in Nicosia to Ministry of 1960, ISA 3344/58-I; Sufot to Levin, Defense, May 6, 1960, ISA 1008/1; January 12, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I; Levin to Western Europe Division, April Embassy in London to British 21, 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. Commonwealth Division, January 29, 54. Foreign Ministry to Consulate in 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. Nicosia, August 22, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. 38. Levin to British Commonwealth 55. Levin to Foreign Ministry, August 31, Division, , 1960, ISA 759/5. 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. 39. Embassy in Washington to British 56. British Commonwealth Division to Commonwealth Division, January 16, Foreign Ministry, September 2, 1960, 1960, ISA 1008/1; Embassy in ISA 3344/58-II-III. Washington to United States Division, 57. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and February 3, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I; Levin Cyprus," p. 373. to British Commonwealth Division, May 58. Levin to Yachil, December 29, 1960, 11, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. ISA 3344/58-II-III. 40. Avner to Arad, January 16, 1961, ISA 59. Levin to British Commonwealth 3317/3. Division, February 4, 1960, ISA 3344/58- 41. British Commonwealth Division to I. Arad, January 11, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I; 60. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and Harman to Meir, , 1960, ISA Cyprus," p. 375. 3344/58-I. 61. Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Arms, 42. See copy of Alfange's letter to p. 172; Levin to Yachil, January 19, Senator Jacob Javits, May 24, 1960, ISA 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. 3317/3; Consulate in New York to 62. Levin to Yachil, November 17, 1960, Foreign Ministry, October 12 and ISA 3344/58-II-III. , 1960, ISA 3317/3. 63. Levin to Foreign Ministry, November 43. Foreign Ministry to Embassy in 27, 1960, ISA 3344/58-II-III. Washington, 20 December 1959, ISA 64. Levin to British Commonwealth 3122/41. Division, June 15, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. 44. Levin to Eytan, December 6, 1959, 65. Levin to Yachil, December 29, 1960, ISA 3123/1. ISA 3344/58-II-III. 45. Levin to British Commonwealth 66. Western Europe Division to Embassy Division, June 27, 1960, ISA 3344/58-I. in Nicosia, February 8, 1961, ISA 46. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 3348/27; see also Moshe Sasson's report 341. titled "Assessment of the New Regime in Turkey," May 17, 1961, ISA 3348/20.

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67. Levin to Yachil, January 19, 1961, 87. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and ISA 3344/58-II-III. Cyprus," p. 376. 68. "The Turkish Minority in Cyprus," 88. Benyamin R. Neuberger, 'From report of the Foreign Ministry, , Idealism to Pragmatism: Israel and the 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. Third World, 1948-1992,' in Anita 69. Levin to Bendor, April 19, 1961, ISA Shapira (ed.), Independence: The First 3344/58-II-III. Fifty Years (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar 70. Levin to Yachil, January 19, 1961, Center, 1998, in Hebrew), p. 352. ISA 3344/58-II-III. 71. Levin to Western Europe Division, May 4, 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. 72. Levin to Western Europe Division, June 15, 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. 73. P.N. Vanezis, Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism (London, publisher? 1974), pp. 114-5. 74. Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Arms, p. 174; Levin to Yachil, June 22, 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. 75. Sasson to Western Europe Division, August 2, 1961, ISA 1007/4. 76. Levin to Bendor, August 10, 1961, ISA 3344/58-II-III. 77. Bendor to Levin, October 3, 1961, ISA 3344/57. 78. Embassy in Nicosia to Western Europe Division, October 30, 1962; November 8, 1962, ISA 3443/30. 79. Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and Cyprus," p. 376. 80. Gazit to Remez, January 18, 1962, ISA 3443/30; Economic Division to Embassy in Nicosia, March 16, 1962, ISA 3025/31; Economic Division to Legation in Ankara, , 1963, ISA 1430/14. 81. Levin to Bendor, August 31, 1962, ISA 1910/12. 82. Economic Division to Sasson, July 17, 1963, ISA 1430/14. 83. See several reports of the Foreign Ministry entitled "Our Exports to African Countries," , ISA 3501/18. 84. Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Arms, p. 171. 85. Economic Division to Sasson, July 17, 1963, ISA 1430/14. 86. Report of the Legation in Cyprus for 1960, January 1961, ISA 3344/62; also Gilad, "Our Neighbors: Turkey and Cyprus," p. 375.

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