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Animal Emotion Descriptive and Prescriptive Definitions and Their Paul, E. S. , & Mendl, M. T. (2018). Animal emotion: Descriptive and prescriptive definitions and their implications for a comparative perspective. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 205, 202-209. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2018.01.008 Version created as part of publication process; publisher's layout; not normally made publicly available License (if available): CC BY Link to published version (if available): 10.1016/j.applanim.2018.01.008 Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research PDF-document This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Elsevier at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168159118300285 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research General rights This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/ Applied Animal Behaviour Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Applied Animal Behaviour Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/applanim Animal emotion: Descriptive and prescriptive definitions and their implications for a comparative perspective ⁎ Elizabeth S. Paul , Michael T. Mendl School of Veterinary Sciences, University of Bristol, Langford House, Langford, Bristol, BS40 5DU, UK ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: In recent years there has been a growing research interest in the field of animal emotion. But there is still little Emotion agreement about whether and how the word “emotion” should be defined for use in the context of non-human Animal emotion species. Here, we make a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive definitions. Descriptive definitions ff A ect delineate the ways in which the word emotion is used in everyday life. Prescriptive definitions are used to pick Definition out the set of events that scientific theories of emotion purport to explain. Picking out three prescriptive defi- Animal behaviour nitions, we show that the different ways in which emotions are defined correspond to processes that are dis- Consciousness tributed differentially across the animal kingdom. We propose that these definitions provide a useful starting point for investigating the varying emotional capacities of a wide range of animals, providing a basis for a new, comparative science of emotion. 1. Introduction term memory, abstract learning and concept formation (e.g. see Olmstead and Kuhlmeier, 2015; Pearce, 2008), but very little on emo- Whether and to what extent different animals experience emotions tional ones. However, interest in the emotions of animals has increased of one kind or another is an important scientific question; it is also one considerably in recent years, and the time is right to start to redress this that to date has proven extremely difficult to answer. This is a key imbalance (Panksepp, 2011). To do this, we need to be clear about what problem for the study and practice of animal welfare, as an animal’s we mean when we talk about animal “emotions”. Our starting point is capacity to experience suffering is a prerequisite for any welfare con- the search for a definition of emotion that can be applied to both human cern. But the extent to which different species share facets of the and non-human animals alike (e.g. de Waal, 2011; Lang, 2010; LeDoux, emotional processes identified in humans is also a question for com- 2012). In this paper, we address the often controversial issue of defining parative psychology and neuroscience. What are the fundamental fea- emotions in animals by focusing on the distinction between two types of tures of emotions, and how far into our evolutionary past do they definition; prescriptive definitions and descriptive definitions. First, we stretch? When emotional disorders occur in people (as in major de- offer a descriptive definition which sets out a broad area of interest for pression, generalised anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, etc.) can they comparative emotion research across humans and other species. We be understood in terms of the responses of emotional processing sys- then go on to consider in detail three prescriptive definitions of emo- tems that were originally adapted for a more ancient, even pre-mam- tion. Each of these contemporary definitions has been designed to de- malian, way of life? And to what extent are the behavioural and neu- lineate the types of processing that should be considered “emotional”, ropharmacological facets of emotions shared between people and the and each has the potential for drawing a different line between species species used as models to study these disorders? When we can answer that can and cannot be considered to have the capacity for emotions. No questions about the similarities and differences between humans and one of these definitions is superior to the others; we argue that they are other species in their emotional processing, it may be possible to find all valuable in illustrating the layers of processing that comprise human out, not just about the emotional lives of different animals and the emotional processing, components of which are likely to be present to implications this has for their welfare, but also about the building differing degrees in different species across the animal kingdom. blocks, limitations and potential sources of disorder of human emo- tional processes too. 2. Defining emotion in animals To date, comparative studies of psychological processes have fo- cused most extensively on cognitive capacities such as short and long- What is an emotion? And how can we make use of our human ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (E.S. Paul). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2018.01.008 Received 31 May 2017; Received in revised form 16 November 2017; Accepted 21 January 2018 0168-1591/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. Please cite this article as: Paul, E.S., Applied Animal Behaviour Science (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2018.01.008 E.S. Paul, M.T. Mendl Applied Animal Behaviour Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx understanding of the word to talk about and investigate such processes to, but perhaps not perfectly encapsulate, the meaning of the word, e.g. in animals? For many early ethologists and experimental psychologists, see Izard, 2010). For example, “Emotions are affectively charged, emotion was too human and too quintessentially subjective to be in- subjectively experienced states of awareness (LeDoux, p291, in Ekman corporated into the scientific investigation of animals. When Tinbergen and Davidson, 1994); ‘Emotion is a complex set of interactions among was constructing his four questions of ethology (Tinbergen, 1963), the subjective and objective factors …. which can (a) give rise to affective discussion and use of emotion terms in the context of animals was al- experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) gen- ready largely taboo, and worries about the legitimacy of discussing erate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual ef- emotion within the animal sciences continued for many years there- fects, appraisals, labelling processes; (c) activate widespread physiolo- after. So, definitions can be problematic and need to be applied to gical adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behaviour constructs like emotion with caution. Even attempting to define emo- that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed and adaptive’ tion in the human context has caused problems (e.g. see Gendron, 2010; (Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981, p355); “Emotions are typically eli- Izard, 2010), and the difficulty is magnified in non-human animals who cited by external events……typical emotion episodes contain a number cannot tell us whether or what they feel. In these cases, notions of the of components. There are thoughts, bodily changes, action tendencies, internal or consciously experienced states are essentially inaccessible. modulations of mental processes such as attention, and conscious Nevertheless, the past decade or so has seen a dramatic increase in feelings” (Prinz, 2004, p3). interest, particularly within the neurosciences, but also in ethology, in By de fining emotion in the way we have done, we can point to sorts the topic of emotion and how it can be studied translationally in both of comparative problems of emotion that interest or concern us. For humans and animals (e.g. Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; de Waal, 2011; example, we might want to say “I am interested in whether certain Lang, 2010; LeDoux, 2012; Rolls, 2014). animals experience emotions in a similar way to humans” or “I want to A major and pertinent distinction when attempting to define emo- find out whether birds and mammals differ in the range of emotions tion is the possibility of constructing both descriptive and prescriptive that they show”. This is a useful shorthand; a way of indicating that we definitions (Widen and Russell, 2010). A descriptive definition is a are interested in this domain of research because of our own human dictionary-style definition – one that aims to set out, as comprehen- experience of it. It is also a convenient way of outlining the structure sively and accurately as possible, the ways in which a word is used by and scope of the domain that we want to investigate; the term “emo- people, in a given language, and in everyday life (e.g. see LeDoux et al., tion” circumscribes a domain that is separate from other English lan- 2016). A prescriptive definition is somewhat different; it is a definition guage terms such as “motivation”, “sensation”, “perception” and of the concept or construct that is used to pick out the set of events that “cognition”. A descriptive definition such as this can help researchers of a scientific theory (in this case of emotion) purports to explain. Here, emotion delineate the issues they propose to explore.
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