The Southern Gas Corridor the Azerbaijani-Turkish Project Becomes Part of the Game Between Russia and the EU

The Southern Gas Corridor The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU

Aleksandra Jarosiewicz NUMBER 53 WARSAW AUGUST 2015

The Southern Gas Corridor The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU

Aleksandra Jarosiewicz © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editors Olaf Osica, Krzysztof Strachota, Adam Eberhardt

Editor Halina Kowalczyk, Anna Łabuszewska

Translation Ilona Duchnowicz

Co-operation Timothy Harrell

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP GroupMedia

MAP Wojciech Mańkowski

Photograph on cover Shutterstock

The author would like to thank International Research Networks for making it possible for her to participate in the Turkey Oil and Gas Submit conference in 2014.

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-75-5 Contents

THESES /5

INTRODUCTION /7

I. The genesis and the evolution of the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor concept /9

II. The corridor today: new infrastructure owners and new rules of operation /13

III. The significance of the Southern Gas Corridor for the energy sector /17

1. Azerbaijan – the life line /17 2. Turkey – TANAP as a stage in the construction of a gas hub /19 3. The EU – a drop in the ocean of needs /20

IV. Ukraine casts a shadow over the Southern Gas Corridor /22

1. Turkish Stream instead of South Stream – the Russian gas gambit /23 2. The EU’s interest in the Southern Gas Corridor – no implementation instruments /27

V. TANAP: the clash of visions of Baku, Brussels and Ankara /30

VI. Conclusions /34 3. 2. 1. THESES baijan, for which the Southern Gas Corridor is a pillar of apillar is Corridor Gas Southern for the which baijan, Azer to new challenges bring circumstances The changing West. the and Russia between conflict geopolitical of sphere the another becoming is spects Corridor, some Gas in re plementation which Southern of the complicate im they the West, time the yet same at the with Russia’s project. pipeline game ofgas agreater moves part are Turkish Turkey the in viting Stream Greece to participate and in region, Sea Black the in projects of map energy the tered al has crisis, Ukrainian aconsequence of as the partly sia, Rus slender. are turn, the In corridor ofon influence means EU’s the activity, its even though stimulated has This Russia. with positiondealing its in supplies for and gas strengthening for agenuine diversification of opportunity an as corridor the sees again EU. for Brussels it the made more important has over Russia Ukraine with relations in Corridor, crisis Gas the implemented Southern currently of the weakness Despite the (e.g.Greece). and countries European Bulgaria Southern for essential but EU nevertheless is the to security energy tee guaran not help will – it significance of is marginal Ankara and by Baku determined presentas its shape in corridor the EU,for the help might it hub. which becomeand agas turn, In security improve which energy its onedor projects of as the Turkeyto EU. Corri Turkey the Gas and Southern the views exports of gas launch the namely Azerbaijan’s interests, vital Turkey.and advancement of the above all allow These projects stage implementation, of a different Azerbaijan controlled by at each projects, pipeline gas complementary of three a system currently is Corridor Gas The Southern 2012. in abandoned Nabucco when the project was past of the athing became states supply agas route as Corridor transit independent from Union’sThe European Gas concept Southern of strategic the ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 6 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 4. of variables in play. in of variables number Corridor, a great Gas with Southern of the game the in up anew stage opening are factors these crisis). All Ukrainian of (see rapid the possibility changes the as EU, well as the and Russia between rivalry of the strength the and republics former Soviet of politics the on the impact astrong ready has al be, will outcome Ukraine) (in final whatever the which, means) military post-Soviet using (also the area reintegrate of Moscow’s Ankara’s ambitions, to strength determination the Azerbaijan’station: limitations, its and emancipation the project’soutcomesthis implemen of affecting dynamics complex and vast have the years shown out. three The past carried being is creation its which context in changing the to be due will the corridor of outline final what the It unclear is result. as a economic benefits tangible demanding are they and Azerbaijan, also sides and Russia and EU rivalling the to regard position with their have strengthening been Stream, Turkish the and Corridor Gas Southern the mentation of both forimple the essential is participation their that fact on the turn, and capitalising Greece,In Turkey them. offendeither of not to as so two the between manoeuvring carefully been has and and Russia, EU the between rivalry the from may suffer Corridor Gas Southern the that fears Therefore, Azerbaijan project. it commercial into a purely to turn unable been has possible. corridor’s of However, the launch construction Baku country’s the made security.It that Baku’s is determination the economic development element for an strengthening and - - - es posed by the changing circumstances of the implementation of the of circumstances changing byes posed the challeng the outline to is text of goal this Another project. of this implementation for the key, essential be might factors which and and today,EU,is the is Azerbaijan for Tur what significance its Corridor Gas Southern what the intended determine to is text This crisis. West the Ukrainian over and the Russia tween be relations in aconsequence of adeep crisis are turn in changes Turkish as a new route Stream). known These project with Stream (Moscow region South the replaced the in projects new energy concerning of adjustment plans the and circumstances political in change due the to mainly is which unclear, still are spectives and implementationper shape,significance final its less of this, Regard 2014. implementation on 20September the phase tered Corridor. project Corridor en Gas Gas The Southern Southern the for mostimportant the currently is share, have asymbolic only EU the itself and Western firms which in project) ofand the trol con andpolitical manner financing ownership, infrastructure Azerbaijani-Turkishclusively an supplies, of gas route (in terms (TANAP), ex pipeline gas almost is which The Trans-Anatolian project. this to back efforts political lomatic and dip active made has which Commission, new European ofing the form the was contributed this to has which ridor. factor Another Cor Gas Southern to the priority a higher grant to and once again policy energy its revise to EU the mobilised has that over Ukraine Russia with relations in crisis continuing Itdoned the 2012. is in theaban Nabuccowas project after significantly waned Corridor Gas Southern the in interest project –Brussels’ this disregarding of essentially years two after happening is This revived. has ject pro Corridor Gas Southern the in interest activity, suggest that Commission’s 2015) European the February and and diplomatic (May 2014 strategy EU’s the energy few outlining months, past the in Commission European by the announced The communications INTRODUCTION ------

7 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 8 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 infrastructure. Due to this, Iran is not a subject of this analysis. analysis. not of is asubject this Iran this, to Due infrastructure. production and of transport lack long due the to the term in only mayfeasible be gas supplies of Iranian Iran, negotiations with nuclear the in EU. made Despite the progress and Russia tween Turkish route development northe the be Stream of relations possible does not consider implementation and the countries of European to individual gas supplies ofof Azerbaijani potential Turkey. However, impact of the analysis it not an is intended as and promoters: Azerbaijan main its to Corridor Gas Southern the - 2 1 in 2008 Review theEnergy Second in Strategic announced first Union. It European supplies was of sources routes gas to the and the at diversifying aproject aimed is Corridor Gas The Southern I. announced in May 2009 in announced was which Partnership, Neighbourhood’, Eastern i.e.‘Eastern the its at with co-operation aimed EU’s the new programme with lel paral West.in created to the being It closer was Caucasus the bring EU intended help to the was corridor the terms, political In ple, by BP, Devon Total, Statoiland Energy. time, exam for that investments held were at in field, which gas Deniz Shah Azerbaijani the concerned mainly this phase, initial the investors.the In were where Westernneighbourhood firms close its located deposits in gas with EU the intended connect to (TAP) The elements. its were adoptedwas corridor Pipeline as Turkey-Greece-Italy the line, Trans-Adriatic (ITGI) the route and Nabucco pipe gas planned pipelines: the of gas projects existing on pre-The based EU’s was Corridor Gas concept Southern of the Turkey and Caucasus Europe. to the through Asia East-West Central from an ing running corridor visionto promote of build US efforts its geopolitical longstanding late 2006/early in changed the 2007) country and president of this the since –especially Turkmenistan and Iraq Iran, Azerbaijan, (from region Caspian supplies the from gas Western in companies by shown genuine interest the 2006, in crisis Russian-Ukrainian the issue following security energy the of significance creasing in processes: aconsequence the ofIts emergence several was

do?uri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EN:PDF Actiondarity Plan, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. Soli and Security Energy EU –An Review Energy Strategic Second first presented in 2003. 2003. in presented first was Policy, which Neighbourhood European the replaced programme The EP T EU’ g he s S G outhern a enesis 2 e the nd . It was also intended at creating stronger stronger intended at creating also . It was a s C conceorridor v o l o ution f the p t 1 ------.

9 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 10 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 diversification of supplies, partly through restoring significance significance restoring through diversification supplies,of partly topic point), the of resumed EU the breakthrough the being 2014 (Russia’s March in over ofRussia Ukraine Crimea annexation and EU the between relations in crisis aconsequence of the As route. TANAP the with Nabucco the project areality, Corridor replacing Gas Southern the Turkeymake toand efforts Azerbaijan continuedof their this, Regardless project. work discontinued fact on in this Commission European Corridor, Gas the and Southern the in lost interest EU Since the Nabucco gas pipeline project was cancelled in 2012 in cancelled project was Nabucco pipeline Since the gas corridor. of vision EU) the the seen by (as the optimal out carrying of the opportunity offerto one only Nabucco, promoted the and the was which interests their Baku’sFrom Ankara’s point of and not view, did respect Brussels countries. European Central and of Southern security energy diversification of and supplies the improve would asignificant to corridor’s of the outline it hoping would form, lead the that mined who deter EU. Brussels It the was with agentsactive contacts in than passive rather were considered as countries Thus, two these stagethe corridor’s of first at the operation. necessary plier of gas country, Azerbaijan’s and of atransit supited that to Turkey’s manner. unrestricted supply an lim in role was line this to Turkmenistan) and Iraq (Iran, sources various from gas nect would able be EU intercon to the vision, law. this to According EU to according functioning and owners) (infrastructure firms supply controlled by would corridor agas Western be line the version, optimal the in that, planned Commission The European 2005. in onbarked accession talks em had parties two the Turkey between bonds after EU the and 3

azerbaijan-and-turkey publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-07-18/southern-gas-corridor-managed- Turkey,and Commentary OSW Azerbaijan by managed Corridor Gas Southern Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra , 18 July 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/ 2012, July 18 , 3 , the , the - - - - - mentation of the Southern Gas Corridor, Gas appointed Southern mentation of by Baku the imple the supporting with body tasked advisory i.e. the Board, Advisory Corridor Gas theSouthern of meeting first sion, the in Commis president vice European of the the Šefčovič, of Maroš participation the included has activity activity. This political and Commission’s 2015) new European 25 the February and diplomatic ation on 1 May 2015 co-oper on energy declaration of amultilateral passing the and Ashgabat in Commission president vice European of the the and Turkey, from of ministers Turkmenistan meeting and Azerbaijan of moves of Turkmen EU. the these include The the to results gas Turkey and Azerbaijan supplies enable to Turkmenistan, tween be Commission’s co-operation European facilitate to the efforts 6 5 4 Union Energy on the communication the stance, in for EUdocuments, the provisions of in reflected is significance supplies. gas Its growing dependence on Russian lessen the will that infrastructure pipeline of new gas construction for the nity the opportu offering viewed project as corridor is the and issue, important supply an and routessources diversification energy of makes once complicatedsituation again political increasingly the EU’s Corridor.Gas official to At according present, declarations, Southern supplies the using former idea of the to diversifying Turkmenistan to the EU. The European Commission has also also has EU. Commission The to the European Turkmenistan ofsupplies on agreement a framework preparation gas from the level and ministerial ofpointment vice aworkingat group the

http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/sefcovic/announcements/ash gabat-declaration_en content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&qid=1407855611566 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- strategy, EU’s energy new the presenting 2014, May in announced communication Commission’s European the was project, akey is Corridor Gas Southern the that proving document Another EU. the inside nectors intercon gas build and infrastructure LNG develop to need the to pointed EU the Corridor, Gas Southern the to council/2015/03/19-20/. addition In http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european- 2015 March 20 on 19- Council European the by accepted was communication Commission’s http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/index_en.htm, the European http://en.apa.az/xeber_socar_announces_details_of_joint_declara_223611.html 6 . The parties agreed, for instance, on the ap on the for agreed, instance, . The parties 4 (announced on (announced 5 , and , and ------11 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 12 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 Brussels at the ministerial level ministerial at the Brussels and Ankara between dialogue of for aplatform energy initiation country, one the consequence is of transit which most important Turkey, with co-operation closer establish to attempts made the 7 concerning Ukraine. Ukraine. concerning crisis of aserious time at the happening is this and of interest, zone post-Soviet exclusive Russian violates the the in area tivity ing. Moscow’s From point of Commission’s view, European the ac mean apolitical has project also implementationbut the of this security, about by energy concerns haveCorridor inspired been Commission’s The Gas European Southern moves the concerning

strategic-energy-cooperation_en arias-canete/announcements/eu-turkey-high-level-energy-dialogue-and- Dialogue, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/ Energy Level High 7 . - - 8 by Turkey. alesser to extent and Azerbaijan controlled by route, are Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum the to parallel in runs ment. Two which pipeline gas the and i.e. TANAP of them, stages atof develop different projects pipeline gas plementary Azerbaijani-Turkish com an of three route consisting primarily fact in is Corridor Gas Southern the to as What today referred is II. http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Economics&Finance/012300025666en. structure for gas exports from A for exports gas structure implemented and of presentinfra shape planned The – htm#.VBRYsYVa-Iw – rallel section with a transport capacity of m 17 capacity billion atransport with section rallel o T control of this route control of this have total also will Baku solely by Azerbaijan. incurred be will and US$ 3 billion cost is construction Its estimated gas. was positively received by the European Union. positively receivedwas European by the ceremony, were present at Commission the European this Corridor. Gas Evenern no representatives of though the of work launch South the on as, the nounced by Azerbaijan an was which 2014, on 20September launched was BTE to parallel in running pipeline of agas The construction 8 billion m 8 billion present level the of from capacity route’s transport annual Turkey’s is pipeline gas tion of this the BOTAS.To increase Iran’sand NICO (10%). The Turkish sole of the owner sec TPAO (19%), (16.7%), SOCAR (15.5%), Petronas (10%) LUKoil field by: formed gas BP (28.8%), Deniz Shah on the rating ope pipeline), gas aconsortium is Caucasus shareholder its -Tbilisi-Erzurum Baku existing the to parallel runs which pipeline a gas he w a ners corridor 3 to 25 billion m 25to billion ne nd route (BTE, also referred to as the South South the as to referred also route (BTE, 8 tod . w ru ay: 3 of gas, it is planned to build apa build to it of planned gas, is l ne o es zerbaijan to the EU EU to the zerbaijan w f o in p f er r a a structure tion 3 pf pf ------

13 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 14 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 by the project’s shareholders (i.e. the company referred to as the the project’s as to (i.e.by the company referred the shareholders controlled be will TANAP via transit Gas changed. have also port route), TANAP trans of gas planned rules the the replaced with (Nabucco been changed has has infrastructure planned Since the – – – – between 10 billion m 10 billion between reach will capacity The project. route’s transport this annual from (5%). withdrew E.On Total Switzerland’s and Axpo and (20%), (20%), SOCAR Statoil (20%), (19%), Fluxys (16%) Enagas ction work began in Kars in Turkey 2015. in Kars March work in in ction began The project. constru of this shareholders cided join to the Total have Azerbaijan’sto Statoiland not de expectations, Contrary SOFAZof incomes Fund. its deposited the in Oil part purpose for this allocated has held –Azerbaijan shares respective their to project’s proportion in the shareholders solely by incurred be will cost assurancesthe to According Turkish-Greek billion. the to der US$ border, 11 around is bor Turkish-Georgian the from running pipeline, of the T zegovina, Montenegro,zegovina, Croatia. Slovenia and Her and Bosnia to it gas possible supply to make Azerbaijani would This construction. under currently Pipeline Adriatic Ionian the route with planned the orderconnect to in states and firms gas West with Balkan of agreements a number into entered also It EIB. has the and EBRD the with example, of for intent, letters signed project –it has mentation of this hopes receive imple to forThe loans the TAP consortium 2016. in begin to expected pipeline’s is The gas construction US$ 2 billion. around cost is construction The estimated of 32 billion m of billion 32 ty will be 16 billion m 16 be billion will ty 2019), capaci in end will route’sction the transport annual Britain’sstagethe BPconstru (12%). first (2021; the During (58%), Turkey’s SOCAR reholders are: (30%) BOTAS and the the AP T (Trans- A N AP (Trans- A driatic P driatic 3 in 2026. The estimated construction cost cost construction The 2026. in estimated 3 of gas and 23 billion m 23 billion and of gas A 3 of gas, to ultimately reach the level the reach ultimately to of gas, gas pipeline, whose pipeline, sha gas natolian) ipeline ) – its shareholders are: BP are: shareholders ) –its 3 as a maximum. amaximum. as ------be possible to transport it to other markets it other to possiblebe transport to it TANAP. will when gas Turkey Only buy to Azerbaijani refuses volume sent ofvia of gas excess this in quantities all consumers forced is offer to to Azerbaijan that EU. means Turkish This the to capacity and tariff rates tariff and capacity route’s decide on it the project, can the in transport stake a 58% suppliers’ – holding access block other to TANAP can Azerbaijan ditional Azerbaijani gas (above the limit of m 10 (above billion limit gas the Azerbaijani ditional other. It Turkey is ad decide on what with may happen who will able block to one are an parties the that mean Such provisions 12 11 10 9 Turkey, 30% respectively and –58% shares greatest holding the and at present by thus Azerbaijan Entity) –and Project TANAP eration of the gas pipeline, such as the tax rates, for example. tax the as such pipeline, gas oferation the theframework project’s of the implementationlegal and op fines have by signed Turkey be to Turkeywill de Azerbaijan. and also ment provides for transit of m ment 10 only billion provides for transit agree the TANAP. hand, via of other non-Azerbaijanigas the On maytransit impedeor even producers, block the i.e.other Baku supplies from gas it regards lets decide as holds stake a58% Baku that fact the one other. hand, the On block to each opportunity the them offer and shareholders of TANAP relations mutual the ulate Turkish-AzerbaijaniThe of provisions of the agreement reg 2012 32 billion m billion 32 above increased be to is capacity transport TANAP’sIf annual

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make it available to third parties and set the transport tariffs. At the same same the At tariffs. transport the set and parties third to it available make discretion, sole its in capacity pipeline’s gas the use to right the has Entity Project TANAP agreement, aforementioned of 7.4 the article to According TANAPIGA.pdf http://www.tanap.com/content/file/ here: available is which 2012, of June agreement of 7.4 the article Cf. shares. of the 51% hold at least will baijan to thePursuant intergovernmental Azerbaijani-Turkish agreement, Azer Article 7.6Article of the aforementioned agreement. 3 of gas, an additional intergovernmental agreement agreement intergovernmental additional an of gas, 12 . 10 . 3 of Azerbaijani gas gas of Azerbaijani 3 ), while 11

9 . ------15 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 16 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 this way has been reduced to that of a gas consumer. of reducedagas been that to way has this designed infrastructure Union the The in role European of the it as seesfit. policy ply it transit itits to may shape –therefore do not ap Community, directives EU and Energy of the a member Turkey. with Turkey issues negotiate transit not is Furthermore, and forced new be TANAP,infrastructure in build to will or they shareholder majority the receive consent Azerbaijan, from will they –either or Turkmenistan Iraq for Iran, from jan, example Azerbai than other route sources from this via of gas transport possible shareholders). the concerns The (the main same Ankara and Baku route with this via of transit rules the need agree to the Turkey, and TANAP, by Azerbaijan dominated is mean which will Thus, for the firms engaged Azerbaijan in Thus, firms for the 13

TANAP and has been granted preferential rules of access to this pipeline. pipeline. this to of access rules preferential granted been has and TANAP for base material raw the is 2, which Deniz Shah than fields gas At other Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Turkey of these moves. moves. of Turkey of Republic these of the Resources Natural and Energy of Ministry the inform to obligation the has only Entity Project TANAP time 13 the emergence of emergence the - - to the need for genuine diversification and modernisation of the of need forand modernisation to the genuine diversification problems output oil related and sector. gas Giventhe falling the development the in of investments lead withholding to also could pipeline gas the build to plans of the A possiblekey at failure best. or Tur to recipients: or previous its to Iran, Russia gas export to have choice no but other will Azerbaijan unsuccessful, is TANAP of construction the If stability. economic political and maintain to country for the essential production is output, oil gas ously falling continu given the turn, In Azerbaijan. in sector ment gas of the the developfor significance afundamental sector, has TANAP route). oil for pipeline oil the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan the Thus, like BTE supplied be the to will 25% (around Azerbaijan’s exports gas route 70% for provide the of around i.e. gas, it will of Azerbaijani transport role the leading play in the will pipeline The new gas 2007. until gas ed Russian import Turkeyto Azerbaijan which via (BTE), Russia, to and Iran running pipelines routes: gas the existing already addition the to an be will TANAP markets. Turkish European the to Russia and from independently exports point of gas project enables view, this for A significance greatest the tion has construc The under Azerbaijani-Turkish currently pipeline gas 1. infrastructure. planned and built the thesize of by affected also is entities project by individual the country. The of perception consumer, project: transit supplier and this in perform they functions on the depends it in and interested entities of of the each case the in varies element, most important the Turkey is pipeline via gas jan TANAP where Europe, to the Azerbai from supply i.e. the route running construction, under currently is Corridor which Gas theSouthern of The significance III. Azerbaijan – the life line life line Azerbaijan –the

C T f orridor si he g ni f ic ener or the a nce o S f the gy sector zerbaijan G outhern . From Baku’s. From a s ------17 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 18 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 of the energy sector energy of the development the from income generate and (co-dependencies) Turkey with co-operation try’s strengthen dependence on Russia, It coun away 2006. is lessen to the in built was which pipeline oil Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan the as for Azerbaijan importance strategic holds TANAP a similar that mean aforementioned factors the All regime. governed authoritarian by an acountry to athreat posing economy, problems, economic political in and would result this 14 (in billions of m (in billions routes individual via Azerbaijan from exports Forecast of gas based. been has curity country’s the on economic which developmentAzerbaijan, se and independent of policy an of the pillar Westthe been the has with co-operation in and Russia routesfrom independently export gas

Russia Azerbaijan- Route To Turkey To Georgia to BTE: Nakhchivan) to (swap Azerbaijan-Iran the country’s largest oil field (Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli) by Western firms. firms. by Western (Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli) field oil largest country’s the of development the concerning century’ of the ‘contract the baijan’s signing of Azer anniversary twentieth the i.e. 2014, September –20 BTE) to parallel in running pipeline gas of the construction the (i.e. commenced project this of stage first work on the on which date of the choice the through manifested was Corridor Gas Southern the of significance strategic this terms, symbolic In 3 ) Transport Transport volume in in volume 2014 2014 14 0.4 0.2 6.6 1.4 . Traditionally, the development. Traditionally, the of and oil Transport Transport volume in in volume 2020 6.6 0.5 1.4 1 Transport Transport volume in in volume 2030 2030 6.6 0.5 1.4 1 (in billion billion (in transport transport m erational; erational; technical capacity capacity A 3 5 (op 5 nnual nnual of gas) of – 13) – 10 8 - - - - itself supplies m ofitself 6billion guaranteed has security.Ankara improveto energy its expected supplies, is of sources gas its routes and and the a way diversify to count for is of TANAP over 60% of imports), its construction the For 2. its transit using the infrastructure currently under construction. construction. under currently infrastructure the using transit its co-decide on extent to a limited also can and Azerbaijan, from gas volumes buy of additional can infrastructure, transport owns and sources access raw to material agreater Nabucco). has Ankara (unlike of TANAP case the Turkey in state not a transit is just pipeline). gas Trans-Anatolian the (Turkey’s territory its in in a30% stake has BOTAS infrastructure 9% from 19%)to development Deniz the and of Shah gas in share (Turkey’s fields access gas to i.e. gaining TPAO its increased has strategy, of energy its keyguidelines of the anumber into practice Turkey allow also put to Azerbaijan with co-operation and TANAP country. supplies this from gas concerning negotiations way opened up to further the has TANAP) and via Total jan from Azerbai exports total in share TANAP’s TANAP Route Turkey – TANAP as a stage in the construction of a gas hub of hub –TANAPTurkey agas astage construction as the in Turkey , which heavily relies on Russian gas supplies (they gas ac on Russian relies heavily , which - Transport Transport volume in in volume 2014 2014 8.6 0 - 3 of gas from Azerbaijan (transported (transported Azerbaijan from of gas Transport Transport volume in in volume 2020 25.5 41% 16 Transport Transport volume in in volume 2030 2030 73% 35.5 26 (in billion billion (in transport transport 49 in 2026 2026 in 49 m 32 in 2026 2026 in 32 39 in 2021 2021 in 39 16 in 2021 2021 in 16 capacity capacity A 3 nnual nnual of gas) of - 19 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 20 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Italy, alesser to extent and supplies Azerbaijan from Bulgaria, and i.e. countries, Greece of individual case the in hand, other the On level. sent demand 2% pre cover of the around only will quantity a whole, this since as EU of the security energy the major onany improving impact route. route. this using transit supplies, decide on gas it even though cannot gas regarding Turkmenistan with engagedbeen talks active in Turkey entities. other to regard has with implementing policy its of course the in by Ankara used instrument an also is TANAP policy. Turkish of goal the energy ultimate the being latter – the hub or atrading atransport be will this whether question open an lion m lion (10 bil by Azerbaijan declared Europe to volumes export of gas sector of theenergy for significance al version of TANAP is margin the in Corridor Gas The Southern 3. (an autonomous EU for disposer) the gas becometo gas hub a offers this opportunity greater a Turkey All 15 lion m lion

The EU – a drop in the ocean of ocean needs the in –adrop The EU NG-82.pdf http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ 2014, Oxford challenges, and policies Market: Energy Domestic Turkish the in Gas Natural Rzayeva, Gulmira cf. implementation, of their conditions and plans low). on more For still are Turkey’s fields gas Iranian underinvested the from Turkey to supplies of increasing chances but the improving, is situation cal politi the where Iran, is (one exception possible become will supplies these long before take it will region, the in situation political deteriorating the en However, giv Iran). and Israel Kurdistan, (Iraqi gas of natural sources tional for addi search active an in engaged been has Ankara a reality, strategy this To make exchange. Turkish the from bought aproduct as but rather transit of part as much so not EU the to Turkey supplied be from would Gas location. strategic country’s the by offered benefits the maximise to Ankara allow and consumers for Turkish prices of gas areduction in result would tory, which terri its in exchange gas natural a regional build to is goal Turkey’s strategic 3 3 will be divided between Greece and Bulgaria) will not have will Bulgaria) Greece and between divided be will , of which 8 billion m 8billion , of which 3 will be supplied to Italy and 2bil supplied be and Italy to will the EU as a whole as EU the 15 . Even though it is still . Even it still though is . The ------would tangibly improve their energy security. energy improvewould their tangibly Therefore,supplies Azerbaijan from gas imports. gas Bulgarian for 100%accounts 70% of and gas between and Greek es. Russian supply diversification gas of androutessourc areal cause will - 21 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 22 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 clude the replacement of South Stream with Turkish by with Stream replacement of Stream clude South the EU’s the Russia’s in and to changes policies. Thesethen in energy countries), European on other to and further and Bulgaria to Sea Black the via Russia from intended run to was route which Stream (which, forsels completely work example, South the on the halted Moscow Brus and between dialogue of the led abreakdown to initially conflict sector, Ukrainian the energy context of the the In of Moscow’s policy. new aggressivereintegration intentions about the concerns aggravated has crisis Ukrainian the post-Soviet West. the the In area, and Russia between a new strife triggered terms, geopolitical in and, Ukraine via transit gas to ant even more Russia resist made Russia, and EU the ation between of foundations co-oper existing the and trust the It undermined moreserious. became conflict Ukrainian West over Russia the and the between crisis the as changed EU the to Azerbaijan from ning run pipeline implementation of gas the of the The circumstances markets. gas European Central the avoid to der in Gazprom with competing or in market) gave TAP route up (Italian the Nabucco chose and a gentlemen’sBaku out, i.e. that ruled be cannot 2012 in agreement into entered Russia and Azerbaijan of that it.cism The possibility criti from refrained and plans competition forserious export its not did it recently view as Nabucco –until with case the unlike – which acceptable Russia, to was TANAP that appeared It also of implementation. its costs the incur it ready proven to is that has which Baku, to satisfactory fully is pipeline gas of this scale The sources. small supplies other from it Principally, offers room gas. no forgas Azerbaijani transporting i.e. of Baku, interests at implementing the above all project aimed version asmall-scale TANAP is the in Corridor Gas The Southern I V.

S Uk G outhern r a c ine a sts ash a s C orridor a do w o v the er ------16 Turkeywith accept to Moscow’s refusal co-operation conditions)their with (in fact Ukraine and EU the with of interaction lack replace the to attempts make it can that shown EU. Moscow Meanwhile, has the in user end access the to gaining in interested is and Stream South build to determined is Russia that belief These the included region’s based. the been on which had policy sumptions energy idea hub Turkey) of in cise agas completely as has the disproved impre still the Turkish and (using border Greek the Stream the Turkey and Sea Black the to through running pipeline agas ing idea of the build to replace forit and with years, through pushing Russia’s aproject it been had Stream, South decision reject to 1. weight. added political its to also has and Corridor, Gas imvolved actors of Southern the the in calculations energy and thepolitical influenced indirectly also has Ukraine China). needsia’s compete to the with and resistance Rus genuine possibilities, (disregarding Turkmenistan from also it aroute viewed for is as but supplies not Azerbaijan from only level, since diplomatic political at Corridor and the Gas Southern Commission’s European Moscow the and for renewed support the

not been set precisely as yet. According to initial information, information, initial to yet. According as not setprecisely been The pipeline’s route has Ankara. to Putin president Vladimir Russian by the avisit during 2014 on 1December made was Turkish as Stream known pipeline agas build to The proposal Stream Turkish gas gambit gas Russian of –the South instead Stream Stream Turkish russian-gas-export-policy/ org/2015/01/cancellation-south-stream-signal-fundamental-reorientation- https://www.oxfordenergy. see: project, Stream South the from drawal with for its reasons rational the and Russia’s in policy For on changes more 16 . - - - - - 23 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 24 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 wants to be treated more on equal terms in contacts with the EU and and EU the with contacts in terms more on equal treated be to wants itself which sia’s have positively been received proposals Ankara, in EU. of Rus the Greece) (above countries expense at all, the ropean Turkey Eu with Southern relations in and initiative strategic the Russia’s regain to moves desire its (Turkish demonstrate Stream) form the general information that around 47-49 billion m 47-49 billion around that information general form the of (apart what it wouldout like be details however any giving hub Turkey of in agas with Turkish create to part Stream, as Turkey. to pipeline offered also has Russia Ukrainian-Balkan the via 2016). gas in sending cease to Russia would allow This into it to operation bring stage promised has first (Gazprom the tion with a transport capacity of m 16 billion capacity atransport tion with m 63 billion reach to expected is capacity pipeline’sThe declared gas final (cf. waters map). Bulgaria’sentering territorial of Turkey direction the in before southwards turn route and Stream South planned the to parallel run Turkish will Stream not been signed, havenot signed, employed been been purpose. for this Turkey with agreement the even though had route begun had of this work construction May that on in the announcement year, the and this February not agreed) in been still (which has pipeline route gas of the planned along the minister energy common flight helicopter of Gazprom’sthe and head Turkish the as such grandstanding, Blatant pipeline. the concerning work in made been has progress impression that the create to efforts made has Russia announced, Since Turkish was Stream by Saipem. built be will pipeline gas of the section maritime the that is fact Russkaya).known Gazprom Another promotedhas (Russia subcontractors as chosen be will firms yet which unclear also is pipeline. It gas the finance who will Nabucco (using the route).Baumgarten not agreed It been has to extended Turkishbe could that year Stream this February would suppliedof be gas it). to suggested in PresidentPutin 3 (the same as in the case of Stream). South Asec case the in as (the same 3 will be built in in built be will - - 3

- - TANAP’s increases capacity intensify, if Competition will markets. supplied be these to gas not let Azerbaijani will and markets, Bulgarian and Greek on the position dominant its Turkishmaintain to use Stream will Russia that fears have Azerbaijan EU signed, been the in consumers with 18 17 have deflated market European on the gas Thus, avoid Baku’s Russian it with competing will hopes that EU. the to point of entry the be will border Turkish-Bulgarian Turkish-Greek the Turkey or the that through assume and run Turkey via projects EU. Azerbaijan Both from the to running line pipe gas gence the of Turkish and competition between Stream consequence ofFirstly, Russia’s one tangible emer the decision is Sea region. Black the located in countries of the calculations energy the and of situation TANAP Turkey to Russia the changed emerged, has from running pipeline agas idea of the building that alone fact the project, out this carry to less of Russia’s ability and determination regard and take, Turkish will shape Stream actual Whatever the purpose). Turkeyin this intended serve to is hub supplies agas competitors its idea from (the of vague creating over control of or take to Europe supplies Southern sition to gas in po dominant its maintain to EU. wants Russia the with of relations toset a new order efforts the become during stronger thus tion will Moscow’s countries. two these between posi negotiating relations closer for foundations building strong EU. forms This the to ning run routes of Western energy of itco-creation influence, offering Russia’s hopes remove to which Turkey orbit expectations, the from Thus, coincide goals. with Ankara’s desires these achieve Ankara helps Russia with Co-operation region. role its the in strengthen to

of undermining Russia’s position on the EU market. EU on the Russia’s position of undermining chance no has TANAP that narrative official Azerbaijan’s in It emphasised is cipients. However, in practice, Azerbaijan’s concerns are enormous and have have and enormous are concerns Azerbaijan’s However, practice, in cipients. re gas with contracts signed has Azerbaijan that emphasising Stream, ish and Turk TANAP between possible is competition that denies Baku Oficially, 18 . 17 – even though contracts – contracts even though ------25 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 26 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 ridor. This concerns above all Greece, which has been invited by invited been Greece, has which ridor. above all concerns This cor of the section European third i.e. TAP project, of the the pants partici and Corridor Gas Southern the from gas of Azerbaijani recipients potential who states are member EU of those culations cal the affected Turkish has Thirdly, idea of the Stream building weight. added Ankara’s to political has hub and trade a gas Turkey’s increased strongly itimprecise, has of becoming chance sector, it even because, if is energy the in Ankara’s calculations doubtlessly affected seriously has EU. proposal Thethe Russian or Azerbaijan with dealings in tough stance equally present an in gas prices gas in a reduction negotiating while a tough stance taken has Stream, Moscow’s seeing Turkish build to determination yetas –Ankara, have feltof strongest been all by Russia assertiveness stronger The consequences of supplies Turkmenistan. Turkey’s from gas for negotiating region, while example, the in issues gas regards player as main the as behaving is Ankara calculations. energy and on political its impact an has which alike, EU the and Russia from partner Turkey important become it an has that believes Brussels. and Baku position its against strengthened has which Ankara, to addressed been has Secondly, proposal Russian the 19

http://1prime.ru/energy/20150506/809600142.html importers: to private offered been already has discount price A gas of negotiations. round another launched parties the and applied, be to was discount the which to regard with component price the questioned Gazprom Then 2014). of 10.5% (February a discount obtain to managed which Ankara, by rejected was offer However, this prices. on gas discount a 6-percent key Tur promised Putin Vladimir president Russian the 2014, on 1December announced was pipeline gas Stream Turkish the of building idea the When oil_and_gas/82686.html http://www.azernews.az/ of TANAP: of implementation charge in company of the manager main the by others amongst raised been has increased, is capacity route’s the transport that case the in of competition, The issue sections/energy/socar-it-impossible-stop-Southern-Gas-Corridor-314810 http://www.euractiv.com/ of SOCAR: head deputy the with interview an cf. stopped, be cannot TANAP that assurances SOCAR’s and Stream Turkish to linked difficulties any outlining reports press through partly expressed been 19 . However, it is conceivable that Ankara will soon . However, will it conceivable is Ankara that - - - - affect the co-operation between Baku and Athens Baku between the co-operation affect adverselysia’s Turkish Greece to will extend to Stream proposal Moscow Rus and and Athens between rapprochement a further that assumed be nevertheless, It can, by Azerbaijan. rejected been Greece’s pipeline. TAP gas of have the demands construction the concerning arrangements the previous revise to efforts made has Greece, in Athens election the in party political Syriza Russian of amore pro- victory the economic and situation the in change the 21 20 Asia, Central from gas natural import to plans more ambitious far of fulfilment the towards step first the as TANAP The views EU of Russia. independent be would that EU post-Sovietvent supplies the to the from gas area to pre efforts made traditionally has which Kremlin’s perception, the to according at least true is This Russia. with ment of rivalry it once instru more into ageopolitical turned has EU ment, the ele essential its as TANAP recognising and onceCorridor again Gas theSouthern to significance strategic doxically, by granting Corridor. Gas Para theSouthern to granted significance higher the diversification gas and supplies the of in interest intensified Commission’s complicated European by the additionally key is Tur to Azerbaijan from running pipeline gas of the construction the around situation the by Russia, taken actions the from Apart 2. Turkish project the in Stream part take to Russia

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_07/05/2015_549808 – no implementation instruments The EU’s Southern Corridor Gas interest the in the revision of Greece’s privatisation strategy: strategy: of Greece’s privatisation revision the and package) energy third of the requirements (the Commission European the from DESFA resistance due to operator system gas Greek the in stake a 66% of purchase of transaction the finalising difficulties also has SOCAR international/greece-us-russia-energy-pipeline.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/business/ Corridor: Gas Southern the of construction the in engaged fully become and Stream Turkish from draw with to Athens to appeals US the are concerns for these proof indirect An 21 20 . . So far,. So due to ------27 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 28 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 Gas Corridor’s infrastructure to 60 billion m billion 60 to Corridor’sGas infrastructure Southern of the capacity transport the able be increase to it will The hopes suppliesthat EU dependenceits Russia. on from gas 2015),reduce on 27 February lished away significantly to as and Commission’s Unionropean pub Energy on the communication and more precisely,and Turkmenistan 22 situation on the gas market (i.e. hardly any demand and low gas low and gas demand any (i.e. market hardly gas on the situation Corridor, Gas present since, given the Southern mentation of the becometo involved implethe unlikely in also are Western firms form promoted EU. by the maximal the in corridor level the to financial and thepolitical ficient support on to adequate provide insuf are and few years past over the change gone aqualitative have not under at disposal its has EU the ridor. The instruments and, more Corbroadly, Gas on influence theSouthern TANAP on areal EU give could the which instruments the lacks active, it still never so before been has Commission European Even the though nature. of adeclarative primarily documents signing Union, and Energy of the charge in Commission president European of the (2), Turkmenistan to its (2) Turkey Azerbaijan and (1) vice by the vis Board, Advisory Corridor Gas Southern the in participation the project: to support political offering to far so have limited been Commission’s European ridor (in present its the variant), moves Cor Gas Southern of the infrastructure planned and constructed the theshape of for possibilities influencing ofGiven real lack the term. medium the put be in to at least into practice, unlikely extremely is and construction, under and planned both is which infrastructure presentof shape the the with at variance 2008). in formulated assumptions The EU’sthe strongly is vision to areturn means (this Iran and it, to i.e. Turkmenistan countries

TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0080 27, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/ 2015, on February lished pub Union on Energy Commission EU of the communication the to See 22 (cf. the provisions of the Eu of provisions the (cf. the 3 and connect other other connect and ------spheres, which is extremely difficult. difficult. extremely is spheres, which andpolitical security, financial the to extend and cross-sectoral toolswould have post-Soviet these be to the in area, credibility its West lost the has that fact the conditions and present geopolitical developed EU. by Given the the instruments fectiveness of the ef on depend the ultimately success its will and begun, just has Corridor Gas Southern the forming infrastructure forport the process of sup EU the it noted be should that of this, Regardless least. investment at the would arisky be oping, this devel is situation geopolitical way the the prices) considering and - - - 29 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 30 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 EU hopes that such supplies 2019 possible early be could as such as hopes that EU TANAP will only be possible in the indefinite ‘future’ indefinite possible be only the in will TANAP to Azerbaijani than other narrative, suppliesgasBaku’s of official route only over a long-term ridor intoIn a transit perspective. Cor Gas Southern the would ready be transform to Azerbaijan it suppliers. avoid to would allow other time with competing same at the which gas Azerbaijani for pipeline exporting a gas supply (fora large gas) EU but route the to Turkmen or Iranian jan’s more complicated. situation Baku’s intention not is build to have Azerbai made alike Russia and EU by the taken Actions V. 25 24 23 ing opened up to additional suppliers up opened ing additional to of be its possibilities the and Corridor Gas Southern of the pacity ca transport the limited fact in Nabucco rejected), has was Baku after project (in 2012, concept TANAP the the to restricted Having Corridor. Gas theSouthern of significance geopolitical reduce the to efforts but other, made promoted on it the projects has by Baku, gas the back to more EU inclined the make will this hoping that year), May this in Ashgabat in tives (formeeting the in example, Commission’s European the in initia it participates one hand the – on EU’s on the adopted a cautiousactivity stance has Azerbaijan

http://report.az/en/energy/rovnag-abdullayev-tanap-will-be-one-of-the- http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/02/uk-turkmenistan-gas-europe-

exclusive-idUKKBN0NN0FI20150502 “irrelevant”. “irrelevant”. be would this that replied TANAP, in Aliyev participate could Turkmenistan whether for). asked lobbying is When EU the (which Turkmenistan from plies of sup option the skipped he time same at the and uncertain, at least was and resolved be to problems infrastructural and of political anumber require would but this possible, were TANAP to Cyprus and Izrael Iran, from supplies gas 2015 that June in Aliyev, who said Natig energy, ministerfor Azerbaijan’s by made statement the was of this Symptomatic for this. lobbying been not it has sources, other from supplies accept to ready is Azerbaijan though Even main-arteries-of-the-region/ quisition_sha_226999.html, http://abc.az/eng/news/88807.htmlquisition_sha_226999.html, T B A russe N AP c : the Cf. http://en.apa.az/xeber_minister__turkmenistan___s_ac l s and la An sh o r ka f v a 25 isions o . In turn, as regards TANAP TANAP regards as turn, . In f Bak 23 , while the the , while u , 24 ------. Baku has been trying to avoid so far by causing the break-off avoid to the by causing of so far trying been has Baku something is this and market, European the suppliers in gas other need to compete the with would mean scenario this Azerbaijan, between interest of EU.conflict the Turkey,and For Azerbaijan to adjust its policy more and more to the Kremlin’s expectations more the to more adjustto policy and its begun post-Soviet has the in area, initiatives gressive reintegration Russia’s fearing Baku, ag developmentscontext of Ukraine. the in thepolicy of avoidingthe with provocationinin fits of This Russia operator (DESFA). system gas Greek of the privatisation process of Commission’s the in European oncounts the assistance and pipeline, implementation TAP gas the of the regards as Athens on it place to pressure Greece, expecting with relations in support EU’s on the insisted has role. Thus Baku auxiliary play an just will EU Corridor, Gas the and Southern of shape the the determine will interests and vision own its adopted by Azerbaijan, stance to the According gas. arecipient The viewed is as est. EU of Azerbaijani EU’s not the and own inter its with accordance in above all gas ural EU’s EU, for to the the but nat responds demand ittion with rather becometo engaged efforts in co-opera does not make Azerbaijan 27 26 market EU the in gas it Russian could compete that denied with has Azerbaijan itself, Southern Gas Corridor to 60 billion m billion 60 to Corridor Gas Southern the supplies of via gas scale planned of the A possible increase Turkey to EU. the and running pipeline gas of the struction sector, con i.e. energy the the in it goals implement to strategic its of allowing Russia’starget time same at the and aggressivepolicy another becoming from Azerbaijan intended at is protecting This

http://report.az/en/energy/socar-competing-with-russia-for-gas-exports- is-impossible/ likacje/osw-commentary/2014-09-15/azerbaijan-a-growing-problem-west Commentary OSW West, for the problem –agrowing Azerbaijan Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra Cf. , 15 September 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub 2014, , 15 September 26 . 3 would also aggravate the the aggravate would also 27 ------. 31 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 32 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 interested in competing with Azerbaijani gas. Since the Nabucco Since the gas. Azerbaijani with competing in interested not is and market, EU supplier the to agas position as dominant its maintain to Moscow’s to trying been Moscow has trary interests. con ofis EU supplies the to terms in variants of these each turn, In Russia. than other sources possible as from gas much natural as receiving in interested also talks with Turkmenistan concerning the Trans-Caspian route Trans-Caspian the concerning Turkmenistan with talks 30 29 28 ture storage in infrastruc investments and BOTAS in transformation ownership changes, hub, additionlegal to in which, trading a gas Turkey turn to is goal into Ankara’s strategic extent. maximum Turkish the to to the or possibly market market also European the supplies to gas TurkeyThe increasing and in EU interested are countries. route for third a transit into TANAP transforming in more interested Azerbaijan make region’s the in might change order that geopolitical aradical only TANAP, through aproject it pushing able is and control. to It is them control over take to of even attempts Turkmen and TANAP to gas supplies ensure to few months the past seen over Ankara’s efforts of activation –hence Corridor the Gas Southern join to the baijan, key. Turkey not aresult, Azer more just and As entities, wants

haber-detay/eski-tpao-mudurunden-son-bomba/10881/ http://www.borsamatik.com.tr/ Niyzaov’s rule: under Turkmen government the in aminister as served Calik, Ahmed head, whose holding, Calik to linked CEO, is its at least and Atagas, formed. be would triangle Turkmen energy aTurkish-Azerbaijani- that announced president Turkish the year, this March in turn, In Ashgabat. to Erdoğan Tayyip Recep president Turkish the by visit the during 2014 November in signed was sale Turkmen gas cerning con Atagas firm private the and Turkmengaz between contract A framework azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan-in-the-caspian.html http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3650/rising-tension-between- Cf. Turkmenistan. with dispute territorial of its subject the are which waters Sea Caspian the on Azerbaijan by provoked incident an off following broken were pipeline gas Trans-Caspian the concerning Turkmenistan with Talks op. cit. op. Rzayeva, Gulmira Cf. 29 30 , requires above all an increased level supplies of Tur to gas increased an above all , requires . Ankara’s moves go in line with the EU’s interests, which is is EU’s which the . Ankara’s moves interests, with go line in 28 - - - - -

31 route Trans-Adriatic of the capacity transport the use to wanted Russia that said and project, TANAP of the bility feasi andtechnical profitability doubts aboutwho the expressed year, this March in EU the to ambassador Russian by the made comment one the proof was of changed, which project has this Corridor. Gas However, Southern of the to criticism attitude its its mitigated has supplies and Europe to gas ofissue Azerbaijani not mentioned the practically given up,project was has Russia http://www.interfax.ru/interview/429339 31 . - 33 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 34 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 tion of the Southern Gas Corridor. The set of Russian measures (in Corridor. Gas measures The Southern setoftion of Russian the complicate implementa the some will moves that make might sia Rus that Russia’s fears and weaken market, gas EU position on the to plans its EU’s in the viewedrience, be does to not as keyally want into account Ukraine’s expe taking provoketo Azerbaijan, Russia. cautious adoptto and policy, a moreforced flexible Baku as not so have circumstances The end. changing will initiative how this certain be control of it, cannot take to and interests own its serves into aproject which 2012 in Corridor Gas concept Southern of the EU’s the able it even transform to though was Azerbaijan, turn, In government ofadministration. operation the the paralysed has er but oth on the TAP consortium, to the ever new to bring demands Athens stimulated has one Greece, hand on in the which situation economic complicated been harsh due also the to project has the The implementation implementation more of difficult. their make can atool that Corridor, Gas gaining is Russia Southern of the part as projects in participating are which countries project the to Turkey to Turkish regard the Greece. Stream By and addressing with initiative political the take to trying thus is and Stream, ish Turk replaced it it with project, has pipeline gas Stream South the from forced been withdraw to has Russia evenMeanwhile, though grown. has EU the for significance political its proves that Corridor Gas Southern the to engagementactive linked issues in Commission’s The European engaged actors construction. its in the towards and Corridor Gas Southern the policies towards respective their affected has which Russia, and EU the between relations in sis cri the and conflict role a more serious Ukrainian duecupying to the oc currently Theis project grown. has paradoxically, significance its the project, theshape of of influencing means modest only has EU EU, the and the to security energy solve problem the of guaranteeing not implemented will project, TANAP currently the to restricted is presentits version, in Corridor Gas which Southern Even the though V I. C onc l usions ------32 gas Russian ing transport use TANAP for offer to possible a reject to Russian ficult dif may find it Given Baku fears, these gion of Nagorno-Karabakh. re the in conflict for by example, fuelling Azerbaijan, in situation the destabilise to ability addition Turkish to the includes Stream) the actors involved in the Southern Gas Corridor. Gas involved actors Southern the the in Moscow’s and of Russia, each and EU towards the policy between relations include above all The context will components of this context of implementation. its tors changing generated by the fac not on depend the on only but Baku’s also will determination future its aresult, As element of rivalry. geopolitical into an ing not players turn is by of and any the involvedbaijan crisis, the in Corridor, Gas The iteven Southern controlledthough by is Azer Azerbaijan. with position relations in Turkey’s emergence of certainly the Turkish is Stream stronger consequence One of Azerbaijan. also EU, and Russia the to regard with revision thepolicy of its of areflection be will Stream, ish Turk and Corridor Gas Southern the regards as sector, especially energy the in Thus, Ankara’s activity parties. of the each with from derive canco-operation benefits it financial and political the maximise to entities two these between disagreements the on to capitalise attempts made has EU. Ankara the and Russia Turkey,is for both partner desirable a highly becoming is which changes these from benefits which party Beyond doubt, any the in Nagorno-Karabakh. ly resolve conflict the to part project by offering TANAP the in acceptto participation its convince to Azerbaijan try might Russia out that ruled be It cannot

az/xeber_alexei_miller__gazprom_is_ready_to_expor_228649.html). http://en.apa. 2015) June cf. of Gazprom’s in head statement (the context this in interesting quite is Azerbaijan to exports gas Russian resume to The proposal 32 or to refuse Russia’s or to refuse project. to join the proposal Work on this text was completed in completed JuneWork 2015 was text on this Al e k s andr a Jarosie wic z ------35 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 36 POINT OF VIEW 08/2015 Map. Moscow Gas pipelines North Vilnius Southern Gas Corridor Stream existing Świnoujście Minsk planned Berlin Jamal LNG terminals Warsaw Opal existing Kiev planned Prague

Vienna Bratislava Budapest Nabucco Chisinau

Zagreb Ionian Belgrade Bucharest AGRI Sarajevo Constanta – Adriatic Podgorica Pristina Kurt- Soﬁa Blue -Korpedze Rzym IGB TURKISH STREAM Stream Kulevi Tbilisi Tirana Skopje TAP Baku ITG Trans- Vlore Yerevan BTE -Caspian SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR Ankara TANAP Izmir Erzurum

Athens

Nicosia Tehran