Fordham Law Review Volume 88 Issue 4 Article 3 2020 Monopolizing Free Speech Gregory Day University of Georgia Terry College of Business Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons Recommended Citation Gregory Day, Monopolizing Free Speech, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1315 (2020). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. MONOPOLIZING FREE SPEECH Gregory Day* The First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing speech, though individuals can ban, chill, or abridge free expression without offending the Constitution. Hardly an unintended consequence, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously likened free speech to a marketplace where the responsibility of rejecting dangerous, repugnant, or worthless speech lies with the people. This supposedly maximizes social welfare on the theory that the market promotes good ideas and condemns bad ones better than the state can. Nevertheless, there is a concern that large technology corporations exercise unreasonable power in the marketplace of ideas. Because “big tech’s” ability to abridge speech lacks constitutional obstacles, many litigants, politicians, and commentators have recently begun to claim that the act of suppressing speech is anticompetitive and thus should offend the antitrust laws. Their theory, however, seems contrary to antitrust law.