Membership of the Eight Regional Fishery Management Councils in the United States: Are Special Interests Over-Represented? Thomas A
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Marine Policy 27 (2003) 193–206 Membership of the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils in the United States: are special interests over-represented? Thomas A. Okey* Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2204 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4 Received 27 October 2002; accepted 1 December 2002 Abstract The failure of modern fisheries management is blamed on myriad socio-economic and technical problems, but the most fundamental reason for failure might be the overwhelming dominance of extractive interests in participatory decision-making venues. In the United States, commercial fishing interests made up 49% of appointed voting members of the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils between 1990 and 2001; recreational fishing interests made up 33%, and all other interests combined made up 17%. Dominance of commercial fishing representation over the ‘other’ group was statistically significant, and this unequal apportionment of interests remained statistically stable throughout the 12 years of reporting. Contemporary economic sensibilities within this ‘industry-captured’ regulatory process generate perverse incentives for management decisions that conflict with, and can undermine, national sustainability goals and standards, even when those standards are logically sound and agreed to by consensus. Positive feedbacks in the system reinforce the unequal representation of interests. The relative dominance of these interests can be adjusted through an experiment that legally mandates an apportionment formula designed to optimize the welfare and interests of the general public, thus testing the notion that increasing the relative representation of general public interests would improve the lacklustre performance of US federal fisheries management. r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Alternate states; Democracy; Conflict of interest; Fishery management councils The cause of ineffective management often lies with fisheries and marine ecosystems are stimulating notable institutional deficiencies expressed both in terms of and ongoing reforms to fisheries management systems functions and assemblage. and practices. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organiza- These reforms include re-examination of technical tion [1] approaches to assessment and management by re- ywhenever any Form of Government becomes thinking the erroneous assumptions that underpin destructive y, it is the Right of the People to alter or contemporary fisheries biology. Dubious assumptions abolish it, and to institute a new governmenty include independence of stocks, populations, and life Jefferson et al. [2] stages from each other and from habitat characteristics; regularity (spatial and temporal homogeneity) of environmental forces; universality of ‘recruitment com- 1. Introduction pensation’ at lowered stock sizes (i.e., disproportio- nately high recruitment); and the ecologically narrow There is widespread agreement that fisheries and notion of ‘surplus production’ (unutilized biological marine ecosystems are in a state of crisis throughout the production). Fisheries management problems also stem world [3–14]. Strong warnings from scientists and the from failures to account for inherent uncertainties emergence of common knowledge about the plight of throughout the fisheries assessment and management process [15]. Reform initiatives also reflect the recogni- *Tel.: +1-604-822-1639; fax: +1-604-822-8934. tion that a variety of socio-economic factors, E-mail address: t.okey@fisheries.ubc.ca (T.A. Okey). i.e., overcapacity and ‘over-dependence on fisheries’ 0308-597X/03/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0308-597X(03)00002-2 194 T.A. Okey / Marine Policy 27 (2003) 193–206 resulting from taxpayer subsidies is the most challenging study was to examine the central components of the US and fundamental cause of fisheries degradation and fishery management system to determine whether it has associated ecosystem degradation [11,15–17]. been fair and effective relative to American ideals and Direct participation of fishing people and organiza- fisheries policy objectives, and whether institutional tions in management decisions (‘co-management’) is reforms would improve US fishery management perfor- recognized as crucial because of the knowledge and mance. preferences that fishing people bring to the process, and US fisheries management decisions are currently the tendency for them to cooperate in resulting manage- deliberated by eight Regional Fishery Management ment regimes [18,19]. However, scrutiny of the composi- Councils, each comprised of a federal representative, tions and organizational structures of decision-making state representatives, and appointed members that bodies is increasing because of the recognition that have ‘knowledge’ of fisheries management and conser- inherent conflicts of interest and the institutional vation. The councils are constituted based on the exclusion of broader public interests might be a more premise that participation of fishing industries in fish- fundamental cause of management and government eries management decisions is crucial for successful system failures, particularly in fisheries [20,21]. The issue allocation and conservation of living marine resources, of representation of (general) public interests in fisheries and for increasing the likelihood of compliance with management has remained largely taboo within the fishery regulations. Fishing industries have a collective subculture of United States (US) fisheries management, interest in sustaining fisheries, and they sometimes in spite of perceptive early warnings by Pontecorvo [22] support conservative and responsible fishing strategies and other emerging criticisms e.g., [20]. This issue [23]. However, a natural tendency of capital-minded can no longer be ignored since conflicts of interest, fisheries sectors is to maximize short-term profit at the big money lobbying, disproportionate representation, expense of sustainability (and social and ecological and vote trading have come to the forefront of public considerations) thereby degrading the public value of debate in the US and around the world due to several the exploited resources [15,19,22]. This has been highly visible manifestations. These include domestic identified as ‘‘the fundamental cause of over-exploita- and global protests of the World Trade Organization, tion’’ in fisheries [11]. voting irregularities in the 2000 US presidential election, Almost two decades ago, the Director of the Office of the far-reaching Enron scandal, campaign finance Fisheries Management of the National Marine Fisheries reform debates in the US, and even the recent judging Service (NMFS) conceded that US fisheries are mana- scandal at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, ged through industry lobbying, but he made it sound Utah. The pervasive corruption illuminated by these like this is a functional aspect of fishery management issues, or at least the perception of institutional [27]. It is now recognized that too much influence by the contempt for the public interest, has compelled citizens regulated industry in policy and management decisions to begin scrutinizing a variety of governmental and can lead to unsustainable fishing, degraded marine civic decision-making systems. Similarly, the tragedy ecosystems, and impoverished fishing communities of September 11th, and the rise of global terrorism simply because management systems tend to favor big have arguably increased public awareness and scrutiny money interests when they are structured (designed) to of domestic and global policymaking systems in be influenced by those interests [3,11,20,28]. This occurs egards to issues of fairness, equity, and justice—even because public agencies depend on the support of while mainstream public discourse has focused on legislators who, in turn, depend on the support of retribution. constituents, whose interests are often strongly distorted Nations and states around the world are attempting because industry lobbyists are usually the most influen- to institute equitable, effective, and sometimes adaptive tial of all constituents [29]. The direct and indirect forms of fisheries management or co-management influence industry has on agencies charged with regulat- [23–25]. Democratic and participatory management ing them leads to adverse impacts not only on marine structures that represent the interests of ‘‘all legitimate ecosystems and industry sectors, but also on the interest groups’’ and ‘‘the majority of stakeholders or opportunities and well being of a nation’s general the country’’ [11] are thought to be the best models for public, which is effectively not represented in fisheries successfully achieving stated fisheries objectives. The decision making [22,30]. The general pattern in the US is federal fisheries management model in the US is touted that councils dominated by industry (user group) as an attempt to implement a fair and effective system representatives make the decisions about exploitation [26]. Democratic ideals have always been a source of of public (marine fishery) resources. This has been pride in the US, including the notion that individual referred to as ‘capture’ of the regulatory or management rights and interests are protected, and that the interests process by industry [19,29]. Representatives of broader of the general public are represented in decisions public interests continue to have only token representa- regarding public resources. The purpose of the present tion,