An Incredible Mole. Who Would Be Tsar
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
TheWashington Star EDWARD L EPSTEIN' Comment THE WASHINGTON STAR Sunday, May 17, 1981 An Incredible Mole. Who Would Be Tsar Several weeks ago the world was stunned to learn that a former head This incredible 'mole" case began of British intelligence was officially nearly a quarter of a century ago. Ro- suspected of being a Soviet agent. by the name The suspect, now deceased, was Sir as the vice Roger Hollis, who as head of MI-S ch intelligence in from 1958 to 1966 was roughly the Poland. Since he had a special re- British equivalent of J. Edgar Hoo- sponsibility for counter-infelligence ver. - or catching enemy spies - he During'this period, other officers worked closely with representatives in the British intelligence service of Soviet and East German intelli- had been identified as "moles," but gence. if the actual head of the British set-- Occasionally, his KGB liaison of- ' vice turned outIto be a mole, the en- ficer, a clever but boastful Russian tire secret world of intelligence dur- named Col. Ivan Andreievich Raina, ing this period woud have to be would allude to very sensitive agonizingly reappraised. After this sources that the KGB had estab- charge was made, Prime Minister lished inside the CIA and other West- Thatcher told Parliament that two ern intelligence services. He pro- secret investigations of Sir Roger vided only hints - but no names. had failed to produce any credible Edward J. Epstein is the author of evidence that he had worked for So- a number of books, including "Leg- viet Intelligence; yet, the swirl of end: The Secret World of Lee Harvey suspicions and allegations contin- ued. Oswald" (Readers Digest Press). Copyright c 1981 Independent News During this entire controversy, one of the few men who could cast ALEKSEIROAtANOFF some light on Sir Roger's bona fides sat quietly in his small apartment in Kew Gardens, in Queens, N.Y., He could only deduce shunned by all the intelligence ser- vices in the Western world. that the KGB had a A pale man in his early 70s, with a distinctive walrus mustache, this mole of its own in the man is perhaps the only important CIA, with access to what CIA mole to have successfully pen- etrated the secret world of Soviet in- he was supplying. telligence and survived to tell his tale in the West. (The CIA's other top moles - Oleg Penkovsky and Peter Popov - were both captured by the KGB and executed). He now is an American citizen living under the name Aleksei Romanoff, who ekes out a living editing a small newslet- ter. Twenty-three years ago, however, he turned the entire universe of in- telligence inside out when he re- vealed the existence of KGB agents who had risen to the top echelons of British. German, French and American intelligence. These KGB penetration agents, or "moles." had been actively undermining and be- traying the secret activities of West- ern intelligence. Such a list should have been kept Continued from G-1 On one occasion, for example, Cot in the most potected vault of British Raina warned that the CIA would at- intelligence, and known only to a as possible candidates for compro- tempt to recruit a Polish diplomat in few top British intelligence officials- mise and recruitment. It now be- Switzerland. He gave the ap- The CIA therefore wondered how came absolutely clear to all con- proximate time and place that the their mystery agent had obtained a \ cerned that the list had not been CIA approach would be made. copy. i lifted from a Warsaw phone dlrecto- How did Raina know the CIA ' In his next report, "Heckenschul- ! ry, as the British had suggested, but plans? Romanoff deduced from such tze" explained that he had gotten. it came from the secret files of either British intelligence or the CIA. tidbits of information that the KGB I this British secret list from the KGB. had indeed succeeded in placing one The implication was clear: The KGB It has never been determined or more "moles" in the CIA. 'had one or more moles deep within' whether the British denials repre- Then, through a series of acci- British intelligence who had stolen sented honest oversight or deliber- dents, he was upon by the Rus- the list 'for the KGB. ate lying to the CIA. And if the Brit- sians to open the safe of a Soviet in- Allen Dulles, then director of the ish were lying, was it for protective- telligence officer in Poland who had CIA, personally brought the matter security reasons or for more nefar- committed suicide. The contents of to the attention of British Intelli- ious purposes? the safe provided more pieces in the gence. Among the top British offi- Confronted with this new evi- jigsaw, and led Romanoff to con- cials queried about this list was Sir dence. the British accepted the pos- sibility that there might be a clude that the KGB had "moles" op- Roger Hollis, who then, in 1960, erating in West German, British and headed MI-S. The CIA wanted to high-level leak. An investigation French intelligence. Then, in 1958, know if the list was genuine; and if was immediately begun as to who had access to the list, and then nar- he decided to defect to the United so, who was in a position to leak it States - and provide this valuable in- to the KGB. rowed down to a Dutch-born career formation to Western intelligence. Several weeks later, British Intel- officer in MI-6 named George Blake. In April 1958, Romanoff crossed ligence reported back to the CIA the border into West Berlin, and that, after a thorough investigation Catching George Blake Blake. it turned out, had rapidly posted a letter addressed to Henl'y J. of the matter, it was determined that Taylor, the U.S. ambassador to Swit- the list was nothing more than a advanced his career through a re- zerland. In this letter, he gave nei- clumsy fabrication, It suggested that markable string of successful rec- ther his name nor his nationality. He the names could have been taken out ruitments of communist diplomats of the Warsaw phone book. and military officers serving in Ger- explained to Ambdssador Taylor that many. It now appeared that a num- the KGB had The British denials were so con- penetrated Western in- ber of these "successes" had been telligence, and if he identified him- vincing that even James Jesus An- purposely provided Blake by the self, his identity would soon be gleton. the legendary head of CIA KGB so that he would rise in the known to the KGB. counterintelligence, was prepared ranks of British intelligence. Instead, he proposed to help the to believe that the mystery mole was, Placed under surveillance, Blake United States ferret out these moles' a fake. Indeed, it was suggested that was caught in the act of stealing a by supplying information that could lieckenschultze" might itself be a' document, and then he confessed to be traced to them. He suggested that KGB disinformation operation de- : having turned over to the KGB ev- the FBI should set up a "mail drop" signed to sow discord between the5 ery important docment in the files for him, and inform him of the ad- CIA and the British Secret Service. of the British Secret Service that he dress through a classified ad in a Then, to the CIA's astonishment, West German newspaper. He pre- a researcher in the CIA's East Euro- had access to. ferred the FBI - since he believed "Heckenschultte" next turned his . pean division discoverved an exact the CIA was penetrated by KGB copy of the list of Polish nationals attention to piecing together the moles. He signed the letter 'Hee- in the archives. It had been sent KGB spy network in West German kenschultze." more than one year earlier to Wash- intelligence. He had been told by his Despite this advice, Ambassador ington by the British Secret Service KGB liaison, Cot Raina, that two of a group of six West German intelli- Taylor turned the case over to the _See CIA, which by law was the proper INCREDIBLE, G-4 gence officers who visited CIA head- channeL In a matter of weeks, the quarters in Washington in 1956 were CIA advertised an address for the KGB moles. Raina even bragged that anonymous mole in a Frankfurt these agents personally met with newspaper. It then began to receive CIA Director Dulles. incredibly detailed reports from' The CIA checked through its re- Hu. kgpschutp_" cords and it found that a delegation " These repats quickly identified' of six West German Intelligence of- no fewer than seven spies. These in ficers had indeed met with Dulles in eluded a British admiralty aide' 1956, and promptly began investigat- named Harry Houghton, who had ing the group to see who among furnished the Soviets with secret in- them might be double agents. In formation about U.S. nuclear subma- short order, the lead focused suspi- rines; Col. Israel Beer, an Israeli mili- cion on Heinz Felfe, who was then tary historian who had gained the deputy chief of West German Intel- confidence of Prime Minister David ligence; and then, through surveil- Ben-Gurion; and Col. Stig Wennes- lance of Felfe, to the head of his own trout, the Swedish air attache in surveillance unit in Bonn. Both men Washington, D.C. eventually were convicted of espi- While the CIA was still hotly de- onage on behalf of the Soviet Union. bating the bona rides of this mystery Meanwhile, in Warsaw, the KGB agent, a document arrived at the became increasingly concerned mail drop that caused considerable about the source of the teak that had consternation.