Riding the Rails Interview with Mark Gertler Why Didn't Canada Have A
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Balance-Sheet Shocks and Recapitalizations∗
Balance-Sheet Shocks and Recapitalizations∗ Damiano Sandri Fabian Valencia International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund October 29, 2012 Abstract We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions on both financial intermediaries and goods-producing firms. In this context, due to high leverage of financial intermediaries, balance sheet disruptions in the financial sector are particularly detri- mental for aggregate output. We show that the welfare gains from recapitalizing the financial sector in response to large but rare net worth losses are as large as those from eliminating business cycle fluctuations. We also find that these gains are increasing in the size of the net worth loss, are larger when recapitalization funds are raised from the household rather than the real sector, and may increase after a reduction in financial intermediaries idiosyncratic risk that raises leverage. JEL No. C61, E21, G13 Keywords: Financial accelerator, bank bailouts, leverage, balance-sheet shocks ∗The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. The authors thank Christopher Carroll, Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Gregory de Walque, Robert Kollmann, Luc Laeven, Jose Luis Peydro, Jose Victor Rios-Rull, Thierry Tressel, Kenneth West, two anonymous refer- ees, and seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute, the IMF, the CEPR-EBC-HEC-NYSE/Euronext-RoF Conference on \Financial Intermediation and the Real Economy", the National Bank of Poland's conference \DSGE and Beyond", and CEPR-National Bank of Belgium-JMCB-ECARES-Ghent University conference on \Macroeco- nomics and Financial Intermediation" for comments and discussions. -
Chapter 24 Financial Accelerator
Chapter 24 Financial Accelerator Starting in 2007, and becoming much more pronounced in 2008, macro-financial events took center stage in the macroeconomic landscape. The “financial collapse,” as many have termed it, had its proximate cause in the U.S., as several financial-sector institutions experienced severe or catastrophic downturns in the values of their financial assets. Various and large-scale policy efforts were implemented very quickly in the U.S. to try to contain possible consequences. The motivation behind these policy efforts was not to save the financial sector for its own sake. Instead, the rationale for policy responses was that severe financial downturns often lead to contraction in real macroeconomic markets (for example, think in terms of goods markets). Despite a raft of policy measures to try to prevent such effects, the severe financial disruption did cause a sharp contraction of economic activity in real markets: GDP declined by nearly four percent in the third quarter of 2008, the time period during which financial disruptions were at their most severe. This quarterly decline was the largest in the U.S. since the early 1980s, and GDP continued declining for the next three quarters. But the reason this pullback in GDP was especially worrisome was something history shows is common. When it is triggered by financial turbulence, a contraction in real economic activity can further exacerbate the financial downturn. This downstream effect was the real fear of policy makers. If this downstream effect occurred, the now- steeper financial downturn then could even further worsen the macro downturn, which in turn could even further worsen the financial downturn, which in turn could even further worsen the macro downturn, and …. -
Inflation Targeting
A SYMPOSIUM OF VIEWS Inflation Targeting Should the Federal Reserve in its conduct of monetary policy follow ome argue that while Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, in office since 1987, has been an extraordinarily sub- Stle and skillful manager, his successor may not en- the European Central joy these unique skills. Thus, the system needs eventually to agree on a series of guiding benchmarks if not a target for use Bank and adopt some in the conduct of monetary policy. Globally, such an addi- tional tool might help in the convergence process and po- form of inflation target tentially create more stability for exchange rates. Others counter that it is not wise to lock the system range? TIE asked thirteen into a simplistic rule, or set of rules, particularly at a time of continued geopolitical uncertainty. Still others distinguished experts. counter that the European Central Bank established provisions that have successfully anticipated such ex- ternal shocks to the system. Is the time approaching for the U.S. central bank to adopt an inflation target or inflation target range? Or does the U.S. monetary system require a more prag- THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY matic and intuitive approach? To what extent should an 2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 950 Washington, D.C. 20006 inflation target be discretionary? Phone: 202-861-0791, Fax: 202-861-0790 www.international-economy.com 24 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2004 I will therefore simply sketch out what has worked well for us at the ECB. We announced our monetary poli- Inflation targets are cy strategy in October 1998. -
Capital Flows and Financial Stability: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Responses∗
Capital Flows and Financial Stability: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Responses∗ D. Filiz Unsal International Monetary Fund The resumption of capital flows to emerging-market economies since mid-2009 has posed two sets of interrelated challenges for policymakers: (i) to prevent capital flows from exacerbating overheating pressures and consequent inflation, and (ii) to minimize the risk that prolonged periods of easy financing conditions will undermine financial stability. While conventional monetary policy maintains its role in counteract- ing the former, there are doubts that it is sufficient to guard against the risks of financial instability. In this context, there have been increased calls for the development of macropru- dential measures globally. Against this background, this paper analyzes the interplay between monetary and macropruden- tial policies in an open-economy DSGE model. The key result is that macroprudential measures can usefully complement monetary policy under a financial shock that triggers capital inflows. Even under the “optimal simple rules,” introducing macroprudential measures improves welfare. Broad macropru- dential measures are shown to be more effective than those that ∗I am grateful to the editor Douglas Gale and an anonymous referee for valu- able comments and suggestions. I also thank the participants at the IJCB 4th Financial Stability Conference on “Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options,” particularly Gianluca Benigno, Gianni De Nicolo, and Rafael Portillo. Roberto Cardarelli, Sonali Jain-Chandra, Nicol´as Eyzaguirre, Jinill Kim, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Jaewoo Lee, and Steve Phillips; seminar participants in the IMF, in Korea University, and in the Central Bank of Turkey; and participants at the KIEP-IMF Joint Conference also provided insightful comments and sug- gestions. -
A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Gertler, Mark, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, and Andrea Prestipino
K.7 A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Gertler, Mark, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, and Andrea Prestipino Please cite paper as: Gertler, Mark, Nobuhior Kiyotaki, and Andrea Prestipino (2017). A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics. International Finance Discussion Papers 1219. https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2017.1219 International Finance Discussion Papers Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Number 1219 December 2017 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers Number 1219 December 2017 A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Andrea Prestipino NOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References to International Finance Discussion Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be cleared with the author or authors. Recent IFDPs are available on the Web at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/. This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at www.ssrn.com. A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Andrea Prestipino NYU, Princeton and Federal Reserve Board December, 2017 Abstract This paper incorporates banks and banking panics within a conven- tional macroeconomic framework to analyze the dynamics of a financial crisis of the kind recently experienced. We are particularly interested in characterizing the sudden and discrete nature of the banking panics as well as the circumstances that makes an economy vulnerable to such panics in some instances but not in others. Having a conventional macroeconomic model allows us to study the channels by which the crisis a¤ects real activity and the e¤ects of policies in containing crises. -
January 2021 Fri, Jan 1
January 2021 Fri, Jan 1 All Day Bank Holiday 1 January 2021 Mon, Jan 4 All Day 2021 AEA/ASSA Annual Meeting Virtual Event 8:30 AM – 8:55 AM Morning Checkpoint Call John to dial in 8:55 AM – 9:00 AM Blocked 9:00 AM – 9:30 AM Markets Group 9:05/9:20 Conference Call John to dial in 9:30 AM – 2:00 PM Blocked 2:00 PM ‐2:30 PM Meeting with Daleep Singh Skype 2:30 PM – 6:00 PM Blocked Tue, Jan 5 All Day 2021 AEA/ASSA Annual Meeting Virtual Event 9:00 AM – 9:30 AM Markets Group 9:05/9:20 Conference Call John to dial in 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM Blocked 12:00 PM – 12:30 PM Meeting with the Board John to dial in 12:30 PM – 1:00 PM Blocked 1:00 PM – 1:45 PM Weekly Email Discussion Skype 1:45 PM – 2:00 PM Blocked 2:00 PM – 2:30 PM Weekly Meeting with Chair Jay Powell Skype 2:30 PM – 3:30 PM Blocked 3:30 PM – 3:45 PM Tech Set‐Up for ASSA Panel: The Monetary‐Fiscal Nexus with Ultra Low Interest Rates Zoom 3:45 PM – 5:45 PM John to chair ASSA Panel: The Monetary‐Fiscal Nexus with Ultra Low Interest Rates Zoom 5:45 PM – 6:00 PM Blocked 1 January 2021 Wed, Jan 6 8:30 AM – 8:55 AM Morning Checkpoint Call John to dial in 8:55 AM – 9:00 AM Blocked 9:00 AM – 9:30 AM Markets Group 9:05/9:20 Conference Call John to dial in 9:30 AM – 10:00 AM Phone Call with Barbara Van Allen, ECNY John to initiate the call 10:00 AM – 10:15 AM Phone Call with Luiz Pereira da Silva, BIS Deputy General Manager John to initiate the call 10:15 AM – 10:30 AM Blocked 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM Government Relations Committee Meeting Skype 11:30 AM – 1:00 PM Blocked 1:00 PM – 2:00 PM FVP Interview -
The New Digital Economy and Development
UNCTAD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT THE «NEW» DIGITAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT UNCTAD Technical Notes on ICT for Development N˚8 UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD, DIVISION ON TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS SCIENCE , TECHNOLOGY AND ICT BRANCH ICT POLICY SECTION TECHNICAL NOTE NO8 UNEDITED TN/UNCTAD/ICT4D/08 OCTOBER 2017 The ‘New’ Digital Economy and Development 1 Abstract : This technical note frames the ‘New’ Digital Economy (NDE) as including, most prominently: 1) advanced manufacturing, robotics and factory automation, 2) new sources of data from mobile and ubiquitous Internet connectivity, 3) cloud computing, 4) big data analytics, and 5) artificial intelligence. The main driver of the NDE is the continued exponential improvement in the cost-performance of information and communications technology (ICT), mainly microelectronics, following Moore’s Law. This is not new. The digitization of design, advanced manufacturing, robotics, communications, and distributed computer networking (e.g. the Internet) have been altering innovation processes, the content of tasks, and the possibilities for the relocation of work for decades. However, three features of the NDE are relatively novel. First, new sources of data, from smart phones to factory sensors, are sending vast quantities of data into the “cloud,” where they can be analysed to generate new insights, products, and services. Second, new business models based on technology and product platforms — platform innovation, platform ownership, and platform complimenting — are significantly altering the organization of industries and the terms of competition in a range of leading-edge industries and product categories. Third, the performance of ICT hardware and software has advanced to the point where artificial intelligence and machine learning applications are proliferating. -
The Fourth Industrial Revolution: How the EU Can Lead It
EUV0010.1177/1781685818762890European ViewSchäfer 762890research-article2018 Article European View 2018, Vol. 17(1) 5 –12 The fourth industrial © The Author(s) 2018 https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685818762890DOI: 10.1177/1781685818762890 revolution: How the EU journals.sagepub.com/home/euv can lead it Matthias Schäfer Abstract The fourth industrial revolution is different from the previous three. This is because machines and artificial intelligence play a significant role in enhancing productivity and wealth creation, which directly changes and challenges the role of human beings. The fourth industrial revolution will also intensify globalisation. Therefore, technology will become much more significant, because regions and societies that cope positively with the technological impact of the fourth industrial revolution will have a better economic and social future. This article argues that the EU can play an important role in developing an environment appropriate for the fourth industrial revolution, an environment that is vibrant and open to new technologies. Member states would profit from an EU-wide coordinated framework for this area. The EU has to establish new common policies for the market-oriented diffusion and widespread use of new technologies. Keywords Fourth industrial revolution, Technology policy, Industrial policy, Leadership Introduction Historically there have been four industrial revolutions (see Schwab 2016). The first began in the early nineteenth century, when the power of steam and water dramatically increased the productivity of human (physical) labour. The second revolution started almost a hundred years later with electricity as its key driver. Mass industrial production Corresponding author: M. Schäfer, Department Politics and Consulting, Head of the Team for Economic Policy, Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung, Berlin, Germany. -
Annual Report 2014–15 © 2015 National Council of Applied Economic Research
National Council of Applied Economic Research Annual Report Annual Report 2014–15 2014–15 National Council of Applied Economic Research Annual Report 2014–15 © 2015 National Council of Applied Economic Research August 2015 Published by Dr Anil K. Sharma Secretary & Head Operations and Senior Fellow National Council of Applied Economic Research Parisila Bhawan, 11 Indraprastha Estate New Delhi 110 002 Telephone: +91-11-2337-9861 to 3 Fax: +91-11-2337-0164 Email: [email protected] www.ncaer.org Compiled by Jagbir Singh Punia Coordinator, Publications Unit ii | NCAER Annual Report 2014-15 NCAER | Quality . Relevance . Impact The National Council of Applied Economic Research, or NCAER as it is more commonly known, is India’s oldest and largest independent, non-profit, economic policy research institute. It is also one of a handful of think tanks globally that combine rigorous analysis and policy outreach with deep data collection capabilities, especially for household surveys. NCAER’s work falls into four thematic NCAER’s roots lie in Prime Minister areas: Nehru’s early vision of a newly- independent India needing independent • Growth, macroeconomics, trade, institutions as sounding boards for international finance, and economic the government and the private sector. policy; Remarkably for its time, NCAER was • The investment climate, industry, started in 1956 as a public-private domestic finance, infrastructure, labour, partnership, both catering to and funded and urban; by government and industry. NCAER’s • Agriculture, natural resource first Governing Body included the entire management, and the environment; and Cabinet of economics ministers and • Poverty, human development, equity, the leading lights of the private sector, gender, and consumer behaviour. -
Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory*
MONETARY POLICY RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY: EVIDENCE AND SOME THEORY* RICHARD CLARIDA JORDI GALI´ MARK GERTLER We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for the postwar United States economy, before and after Volcker’s appointment as Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differences in the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much more sensitive to changes in expected ination than in the pre-Volcker period. We then compare some of the implications of the estimated rules for the equilibrium properties of ination and output, using a simple macroeconomic model, and show that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing. I. INTRODUCTION From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, the United States economy experienced high and volatile ination along with several severe recessions. Since the early 1980s, however, ina- tion has remained steadily low, while output growth has been relatively stable. Many economists cite supply shocks—and oil price shocks, in particular—as the main force underlying the instability of the earlier period. It is unlikely, however, that supply shocks alone could account for the observed differences between the two eras. For example, while jumps in the price of oil might help explain transitory periods of sharp increases in the general price level, it is not clear how they alone could explain persistent high ination in the absence of an accommodating monetary policy.1 Furthermore, as De Long {1997} argues, the onset of sustained high ination occurred prior to the oil crisis episodes. * We thank seminar participants at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, New York University, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, University of Maryland, NBER Summer Institute, Universite´ de Toulouse, Bank of Spain, Harvard University, Bank of Mexico, Universitat de Girona, and the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, New York, Richmond, Dallas, and Philadelphia, as well as two anonymous referees and two editors for useful comments. -
Digital Era for ASEAN Conglomerates Hype Or Reality?
Digital era for ASEAN conglomerates Hype or reality? Conglomerates have always played a key role in ASEAN economies, with a contribution by top 40 conglomerates, estimated to be more than 20% of the combined ASEAN GDP in 2015. With the digital revolution reshaping the business world across sectors, conglomerates need to devise effective digital strategies to strengthen their leadership position, or find themselves being challenged by more agile newcomers. The USD 100+ billion opportunity for ASEAN conglomerates “Digital” is a hot topic that has forced businesses to question whether it is a passing trend or a strategic topic of substance. Often, we have observed clients consider “digital” as a silver bullet for devising innovative ways of upgrading the business in search of extra opportunities of growth and value. But there are still questions that are not clearly understood. Is digital all about start-ups or is it relevant to established companies? Is it limited to delivering better customer experiences and efficiencies or for enabling focused targeting of sub-segments? Within the ASEAN context, business leaders are also faced with the challenge of managing the diversity and complexity of multiple markets ranging from a fully developed economy (e.g. Singapore) to a market that is only recently opening up to global practices (e.g. Myanmar). How will the digital economy emerge in different markets of ASEAN given such diversity? These are added complications requiring views on how to localize digital innovations to fit the varying market environments. We believe that business leaders need to start by asking the fundamental question “Does digital matter in ASEAN?” Without conviction in this issue, there will be doubts on whether it is even worth putting the topic on the table. -
Strategies Monetary Policy
STRATEGIES for MONETARY POLICY EDITED BY JOHN H. COCHRANE JOHN B. TAYLOR CHAPTER ONE Models, Markets, and Monetary Policy Richard H. Clarida The topic of this volume and the Monetary Policy Conference it originates from, Strategies for Monetary Policy, is especially timely. The Federal Reserve System is conducting a review of the strategy, tools, and communication practices we deploy to pursue our dual- mandate goals of maximum employment and price stability. In this review, we expect to benefit from the insights and perspectives that are presented here, as well as those offered at other conferences devoted to this topic, as we assess possible practical ways in which we might refine our existing monetary policy framework to better achieve our dual-mandate goals on a sustained basis. This essay is not, however, devoted to a broad review of the Fed’s monetary policy framework—that process is ongoing, and I would not want to prejudge the outcome—but it will instead focus on some of the important ways in which economic models and financial market signals help me think about conducting monetary policy in practice after a career of thinking about it in theory. THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY Let me set the scene with a very brief—and certainly selective— review of the evolution over the past several decades of professional The views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of other Federal Reserve Board members or Federal Open Market Committee participants. I would like to thank Ed Nelson and Bob Tetlow for their assistance in preparing this speech.