DOCSLIB.ORG

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY Legal Theory PUBLICATION of the AMERICAN SOCIETY of INTERNATIONAL LAW INTEREST GROUP on the THEORY of INTERNATIONAL LAW

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY Legal Theory PUBLICATION of the AMERICAN SOCIETY of INTERNATIONAL LAW INTEREST GROUP on the THEORY of INTERNATIONAL LAW International1 • INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY Legal Theory PUBLICATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INTEREST GROUP ON THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME 5 (2) • 1999 ISSN: 1527-8352 Chair: Nicholas Onuf, Florida International University Vice-Chair: Jianming Shen, St. John’s University Editors: Francesco Parisi, George Mason University Mortimer Sellers, University of Baltimore Student Editor: Charles Blomquist, University of Baltimore LETTER FROM THE CHAIR liberal world in the decades following the Congress of Vienna affected the increasingly In this issue, ILT features a paper whose troubled experiment, in the United States, with author, Harry Gould, is a doctoral student in the federal republicanism. Please consider writing a Political Science Department at Johns Hopkins comment for inclusion in the next issue. ILT University. Hopkins is well known for its depends on you--at least some of you--doing so, scholars in political theory and international and I personally will be very, very grateful. relations, but it has not had anyone teaching international law on a regular basis since my Nicholas Onuf own days as a Hopkins student in the 1960s. Florida International University There is, of course, nothing new about this story. Throughout the United States most departments of political science offer no international law TOWARD A KANTIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW beyond the introductory level, if then. The steadily growing interest in international law in Seeing Immanuel Kant invoked by Professor vocationally oriented law schools offers some Nardin and his respondents in an earlier issue of compensation, but not enough. International International Legal Theory stirred a long legal theory too often falls between the cracks. dormant question: what would a Kantian theory of international law look like? (Fernando Tesón, I find it heartening that a student as serious The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 and as capable as Harry Gould has turned to Colum. L. Rev. 1, 53-102). My answer will rest international law and put it at the center of his on two strongly held positions which run theoretical concerns. There must be others, contrary to much contemporary commentary: perhaps quite a few. For any of them who Kant is neither a Natural Law theorist (contra chance to read these words, I want to emphasize Nardin) nor a Cosmopolitan (contra nearly that ILT is the ideal forum for scholars, new and everyone writing on ethics and International established, to try out their work in progress on a Relations). I should also state at the outset, that sympathetic and superbly qualified audience. while I will strongly defend my interpretation of Kant, I do not claim that he would necessarily Every time I write this letter, I make the same agree with any or all of the uses to which I have plea: Submit your work in progress! And some put his work, although I believe we share a of you may have thought that I should put my common set of ends. money where my mouth is. I contributed to the very first issue, but not since. It seems fitting I will begin with two sections in which each then, as my tenure as Chair comes to an end, that of my rather contrarian claims will be elucidated a paper of mine will appear in the next issue. It and defended. Section three will look closely at is a pilot study for a long-term project that I am Kant's remarks on law, justice and public undertaking with two historians, James Lewis and Peter Onuf, to show how the rise of the ASIL • 2223 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20008 • 1999 32 • INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY VOLUME 5 international law. Armed with this and some articulation of natural law theory; it is its discussion of Kant's moral theory, (which for rejection. Kant eschews the teleology of the Kant imbues all of these topics), I shall outline ancient natural law thinkers, the deductive my vision of what a Kantian International Law natural law, which the Thomists shared with might look like, and conclude that the current Grotius (and despite some differences, state of international relations stands somewhere Pufendorf) and the perfectionism of Leibniz and between the state of nature over which Kant Wolff as bases for the derivation of the moral (following Hobbes) so famously fretted, and his law. Kant is quite adamant that morality is not goal of a world existing in a condition of right. rooted in nature. (4:409-411). J.B. Schneewind We have moved some of the way toward a state nicely delineates another of Kant's differences of right. The world is still composed of states, with the natural law tradition. Unlike Kant, but their rights and freedoms are delineated, natural law theorists did not believe that people limited and ensured by a supranational authority could comprehend the requirements of morality with (some) coercive capability. Self-help still without being told by an outside source exists but its allowable usage has been greatly (authority). Although God had given humanity circumscribed. The theory I propose is based the ability to understand most basic principles, upon viewing states as both legal and moral the majority of people were unable to discern the persons, and articulating categorical yet wide moral requirements implicit in those principles. duties backed by coercive sanction. My theory is Likewise, the natural law theorists felt that most humanistic, duty-based, and at times moralistic persons could not grasp what was required in as Kant's views require. particular cases. (J.B. Schneewind, Autonomy, Obligation and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Kant and Natural Law Moral Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 311-12, (Paul Guyer ed., Professor Nardin makes a very strong claim 1996)). about Kant's commitment to natural law. Natural Law did influence Kant (especially his moral Even setting aside the limited ability to philosophy), but only slightly, as with Hobbes. know what the natural law commands, they Professor Nardin seems to believe that any non- viewed most of humanity as unwilling to obey consequentialist theory will be ipso facto the natural law, and hence in need of coercion naturalist. "It is this priority of principles with the threat of punishment. This coercive forbidding wrong over injunctions to produce principle was consistent with their conception of good ends that distinguishes natural law as a obligation. Kant rejected this as pure moral system." (Nardin, International Legal heteronomy, because for him, to act out of fear Theory 8-9 (1999)). Kant's Categorical of punishment, even if this entailed acting in Imperative holds without regard to accord with the moral law, was not acting consequences, so Nardin places Kant's legal morally. (and moral) philosophy within the naturalist tradition. Kant and Cosmopolitanism The problem with Nardin's view is that It has become commonplace to consider Kant's system of maxims and imperatives is Kant a Cosmopolitan; it is my contention that based on the internal legislation of moral law this is incorrect for several reasons. Kant is (autonomy). To derive one's morality from any indebted in his moral philosophy to the Stoa, external source, even the Natural Law (or divine and he does appropriate selectively the language law or any other source) is to fall into of Cosmopolitanism, but there is little beyond heteronomy. "I am not under any obligation this, and much to the contrary. A useful foil for even to divine laws except in so far as I have these purposes is the work on Cosmopolitanism been able to give my consent to them" (All by Martha Nussbaum. (Martha Nussbaum, Kant citations to Kant will utilize the standardized and Cosmopolitanism, in Perpetual Peace: Academy pagination; 8:350). This is not a re- Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal (Bohman, ASIL • 2223 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20008 • 1999 VOLUME 5 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY • 33 et al. eds. 1997); Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism articulates the content of cosmopolitan law, and Cosmopolitanism, in For Love of Country: obviates this criticism, because his vision of Debating the Limits of Patriotism (Nussbaum cosmopolitan law is largely without ed., 1996)). content.(8:360-362; 6:352-372). Nussbaum begins her articulation of Kant's In Kant's claim regarding the "organic purported cosmopolitanism with the textual interconnectedness" of humanity, Nussbaum argument that Kant frequently uses the term again sees debts to the ancients; however, it is "Cosmopolitanism," and does so often in close mistaken to construe the assertion that "[t]he proximity to quotations from classical, Stoic peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying figures. The Cosmopolitanism that Kant is degrees into a universal community, and it has claimed to espouse is Stoic in origin, but developed to the point where a violation of laws mediated by modern natural law theory. in one part of the world is felt (Nussbaum leaves the meaning and everywhere"(8:360) as equivalent to the Stoic consequences of this claim unexplored. topos that the contingent political community is without moral value. As formulated by Kant, Nussbaum focuses upon Kant's notion of the the cosmopolitan moral community is volitional Kingdom of Ends to illustrate his indebtedness and contingent, rather than the matter of physis to the Stoics; however, she mistakenly attributes the Stoa considered it. a teleological function to this concept, rather than the regulatory function which Kant assigns For Kant, the state is far from irrelevant; his to it. (8:433-434). modified contract theory (6:312-316; 8:289-297) may indicate that states are contingent creations, Without any textual support, Nussbaum but there can be no doubt that they are makes the very bold assertion: absolutely necessary. Prior to entering into a lawful state, there exists, as for Hobbes, only a As do Marcus and Cicero, Kant stresses that the situation of self-help; for Kant this is the community of all human beings in reason entails situation of ultimate moral degradation for a common participation in law (jus), and, by our mankind.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Natural Law Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller in Contrast to Roe V. Wade and Its Progeny
    The Natural Law Philosophy of Lon L. Fuller in contrast to Roe v. Wade and Its Progeny Thomas W. Strahan This article analyzes the legal theories of Lon L. Fuller (1902- 1978) as contrasted with the legal framework adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and its progeny. Fuller was a professor of general jurisprudence at Harvard Law School for many years until his retirement in 1972. The scope of his writings on law included legal philosophy, contracts, mediation, comparative law, and legal procedure. As far as can be determined, Fuller never commented on abortion in his writings. He believed that law should stand the scrutiny of reason and stressed the importance of good orderi (emphasis added). He criticized the views of philosophers such as Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Marshall Cohen. Fuller opposed legal positivism, the idea that law is no higher than a particular authority, that is, a sovereign state or a rule of recognition, is morally neutral, and is merely an instrument of external ends such as utility.ii His leading work on legal theory, The Morality of Law (1964,1969), has been translated into several languages and has been used as the text for teaching legal principles in developing nations. The book advocated a kind of secular natural law,iii and it was initially severely attacked by many lawyers and philosophers. The Morality of Law offers an extended discussion of the difference between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration and took the position that the purpose of law was both practical and moral.
    [Show full text]
  • Lexisnexis™ Academic
    LexisNexis™ Academic Copyright (c) 1996 The University of Notre Dame The American Journal of Jurisprudence 1996 41 Am. J. Juris. 133 LENGTH: 13043 words ARTICLE: KELSEN'S UNSTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO NATURAL LAW: RECENT CRITIQUES NAME: Jeffrey Brand-Ballard * BIO: * The author wishes to thank Wilfred E. Rumble and James Q. Whitman for valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. They retain responsibility for none of the remaining defeats. TEXT: [*133] I. INTRODUCTION Legal theorists in this century have often perceived a need for a theory capable of occupying a stable middle ground between natural law theory and nineteenth-century legal positivism. The prolific German-American legal philosopher, Hans Kelsen, was perhaps not the first to feel the need for such a theory, but he was certainly among the first to attempt to construct one. n1 Although Kelsen's own efforts failed, in many ways they defined the ambitions of twentieth-century legal theory and inspired others to take up the challenge. In order to understand the nature of the challenge, which confronts us still today, it is helpful to examine central difficulties with Kelsen's own Pure Theory of Law. Despite Kelsen's indubitable influence on legal theorists in the Anglo-American world and elsewhere, n2 the seminal nature of his work remains underappreciated in the United States. The international community, by contrast, has treated the Pure Theory to extensive criticism at every stage of its long development. Kelsen's earlier work, especially, has received some studious and illuminating criticism in recent years from critics on both sides of the Atlantic.
    [Show full text]
  • Redalyc.H. L. A. HART's MODERATE INDETERMINACY THESIS RECONSIDERED: in BETWEEN SCYLLA and CHARYBDIS?
    Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho ISSN: 2007-4387 [email protected] Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México México FLORES, Imer B. H. L. A. HART’S MODERATE INDETERMINACY THESIS RECONSIDERED: IN BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS? Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, núm. 5, 2011, pp. 147-173 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Distrito Federal, México Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421940003008 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative PROBLEMA Anuario de Filosofía 5 y Teoría del Derecho H. L. A. HART’S MODERATE INDETERMINACY THESIS RECONSIDERED: IN BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS?* Imer B. FLORES** Resumen: En este artículo el autor, en el contexto del cincuenta aniversario de El concepto del derecho de H. L. A. Hart, reconsidera la tesis de la indeter- minación moderada del derecho, la cual deriva de la textura abierta del lenguaje. Para tal propósito, pretende: primero, analizar la tesis de la in- determinación moderada del derecho, i.e. determinación en los “casos fá- ciles” e indeterminación en los “casos difíciles”, la cual recuerda la “doc- trina del término medio” de Aristóteles; segundo, criticar la tesis de la indeterminación moderada del derecho por fracasar en dar lugar al tér- mino medio virtuoso entre extremos viciosos, al insistir que el ejercicio de la discreción requerida constituye una legislación “intersticial”; y, ter- * Revised version of the papers presented in the Special Workshop “H.L.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Hans Kelsen's Contributions to the Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 5-2019 Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen's Contributions to the Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility Jason Kropsky The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3249 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] BETWEEN POLITICS AND MORALITY: HANS KELSEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CHANGING NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY by JASON REUVEN KROPSKY A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2019 © 2019 JASON REUVEN KROPSKY All Rights Reserved ii Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen’s Contributions to the Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility by Jason Reuven Kropsky This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date John Wallach Chair of Examining Committee Date Alyson Cole Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: John Wallach Bruce Cronin Peter Romaniuk THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Between Politics and Morality: Hans Kelsen’s Contributions to the Changing Notion of International Criminal Responsibility by Jason Reuven Kropsky Advisor: John Wallach The pure theory of law analyzes the legal normative basis of jurisprudence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Reception of Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory in the United States: a Sociological Model D
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ValpoScholar Valparaiso University ValpoScholar Law Faculty Publications Law Faculty Presentations and Publications January 2008 The Reception of Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory in the United States: A Sociological Model D. A. Jeremy Telman Valparaiso University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Telman, D. A. Jeremy, "The Reception of Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory in the United States: A Sociological Model" (2008). Law Faculty Publications. Paper 7. http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. THE RECEPTION OF HANS KELSEN ’S LEGAL THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES : A SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL D. A. Jeremy Telman ∗∗∗ Abstract The Essay explores the reasons underlying opposition to Hans Kelsen's approach to the law within the U.S. legal academy. The vehemence with which legal scholars within the United States rejected Kelsen's philosophy of law is best understood as a product of numerous factors, some philosophical, some political and some having to do with professional developments within the legal academy itself. Because philosophical and political opposition to Kelsen's legal philosophy has been well-explored in earlier articles, this Essay discusses those topics briefly in Part I and then sets out in Part II a sociological model that grounds the academy's rejection of Kelsen's pure theory of law in professionalization processes already well underway when Kelsen arrived in the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial Process As an Empirical Study: a Comment on Justice Brennan’S Essay
    Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Articles Faculty 1988 Judicial Process as an Empirical Study: A Comment on Justice Brennan’s Essay Charles M. Yablon Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Process as an Empirical Study: A Comment on Justice Brennan’s Essay, 10 Cardozo Law Review 149 (1988). Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/208 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. JUDICIAL PROCESS AS AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: A COMMENT ON JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ESSAY Charles M. Yablon* I. LOOKING AT WHAT JUDGES ACTUALLY DO One of the enduring accomplishments of the Legal Realist move­ ment was to shift at least some of the attention of academic lawyers away from their favorite occupation—telling judges what to do—and to get them to consider what it is that judges actually do. The genera­ tion of legal scholars who immediately preceded the Realists had at­ tacked the formalism of judicial decisionmaking, criticizing judges for mechanically applying formal rules without considering social needs or public policy.' The Realists, while sympathetic to this prescriptive claim about the proper role of judges, added to it a descriptive claim, that judges did not in fact decide cases through mechanical applica­ tion of general rules, that such formal rules were indeterminate at the level of practice, and did not yield certainty or predictable results.^ Certainty and predictability, to the extent they existed in the legal system, were the product of the "personality of the judge," not the • Professor of Law, Benjamin N.
    [Show full text]
  • Signatures of the Possible: Writing and Political Rupture in the Archives of Industrial Unionism
    SIGNATURES OF THE POSSIBLE: WRITING AND POLITICAL RUPTURE IN THE ARCHIVES OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM By MICHAEL VASTOLA A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2010 1 © 2010 Michael Vastola 2 To my parents, Janis and Anthony Vastola, and to my wife, Jessica Livingston This would not be possible without their love and almost pathological generosity 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation has benefited from the advice and guidance I have received throughout my time at the University of Florida. My dissertation director Sidney Dobrin consistently encouraged experimentation and even audacity in my writing. My committee members supplemented that license to experiment with some brutal lessons during my exams. John Leavey coached me into a deeper understanding of what was at stake in the differences between the theories I was then ham-handedly trying to compare. Raul Sanchez compelled me to clarify my ideas and to more rigorously articulate their relationship to existing scholarship in my field. Those difficult lessons, as well as the valuable encouragement of my outside reader, Robert Hatch, were instrumental in shaping the document I would ultimately defend. The drafts of several of my chapters benefited significantly from the advice of my fellow traveler, Jeffry Ginger Rice, who was even more valuable in his capacity as a sounding board for my incessant complaining about academic conventions. But my wife, Jessica Livingston, was just as important an outlet for my frustrations. Without her encouragement and vocal insistence that I finish in a timely manner, this project would have surely stalled numerous times, and might have even been abandoned.
    [Show full text]
  • Hans Kelsen Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy Synthese Library
    HANS KELSEN ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY SYNTHESE LIBRARY MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE, AND ON THE MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES Editors: DONALD DAVIDSON, The Rockefeller University and Princeton University J AAKKO H INTI K KA, Academy of Finland and Stanford University GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden WESLEY C. SALMON, Indiana University HANS KELSEN (1881-1973) HANS KELSEN ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY Selected and Introduced by OT A WEINBERGER Translated by PETER HEATH D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY DORDRECHT-HOLLAND I BOSTON-U.S.A. First printing: December 1973 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 73-86090 ISBN -l3: 978-94-010- 2655-0 e-ISBN -l3: 978-94-010- 2653-6 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2653-6 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc. 306 Dartmouth Street, Boston, Mass. 02116, U.S.A. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1973 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher CONTENTS PREFACE VII TRANSLA TOR'S NOTE VIII INTRODUCTION: HANS KELSEN AS PHILOSOPHER (BY OTA WEINBERGER) IX 1. Kelsen's Conception of Legal Science: the Struggle against Syncretism of Methods X 2. The Contrasting of 'Is' and 'Ought' XIV 3. The Validity of the Norm XVII 4.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Morality of Legality David Dyzenhaus DRAFT the Nature And
    The Morality of Legality David Dyzenhaus DRAFT The Nature and Limits of State Authority A central question in both legal and political philosophy concerns the nature and limits of the authority of the state. According to Hans Kelsen, this question is answered by legal philosophy. If one wants to find out what the state is, and at the same time the limits of its authority, one will look to the norms of the legal order in which the state is located. In finding out what the public or state officials of that order are authorized by those norms to do, one will at the same time answer the question of what the state is and the limits of its authority. Put differently, the state is constituted by law and the limits of the authority of public officials are set by the norms that authorize them to act in the name of the state.1 Kelsen thought that these answers are delivered by a value neutral or scientific inquiry into the nature of law. Law’s authority is explained by describing what he takes to be the normative structure of a legal system, in which the authority of all norms is ultimately traceable to the foundational norm of the system. A valid norm is one that has been enacted in accordance with the procedures authorized by a more basic norm, with the exception of the foundational or Grund norm, the validity of which has to be presupposed in order to ground the unity of a legal system. Moreover, when Kelsen says that the norm has authority because it is has been properly enacted, I take him to mean that it has authority in the full- blooded sense that it makes a justified claim to the obedience of those subject to the norm.
    [Show full text]
  • Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems Michael S
    College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2003 Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems Michael S. Green William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Repository Citation Green, Michael S., "Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems" (2003). Faculty Publications. 173. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/173 Copyright c 2003 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs ALABAMA LAW REVIEW Volume 54 Winter 2003 Number2 HANS KELSEN AND THE LOGIC OF LEGAL SYSTEMS Michael Steven Green• Hans Kelsen is generally considered to be the most important legal theorist of the twentieth century, 1 and his pure theory of law has long been the focus of intense scrutiny among foreign-language legal scholars? But it is only recently, after decades of neglect, that English-language studies of Kelsen have begun to appear.3 * Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law; Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale Univer- sity 1990; J.D., Yale Law School 1996. I would like to thank Kiersten Boyce, Robert Hanna, Stanley Paulson, Richard Posner, Dhananjai Shivakumar, and James Q. Whitman for helpful comments. This Article was written with support from George Mason University School of Law and its Center for Law and Economics. Thanks also go to King's College's School of Law at the University of London for providing me with a home during my sabbatical leave from George Mason. 1. See HORST DREIER, RECHTSLEHRE, STAATSSOZIOLOGIE UND DEMOKRATIETHEORIE BEl HANS KELSEN 16 (1986) (stating that the title "jurist of the century" is "commonly used" in connection with Kelsen); William Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, 59 CAL.
    [Show full text]
  • Few Americans in the 1790S Would Have Predicted That the Subject Of
    AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY IN AN AGE OF ATLANTIC WARFARE: A CONSENSUS BROKEN AND REFORGED, 1783-1816 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jeffrey J. Seiken, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2007 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor John Guilmartin, Jr., Advisor Professor Margaret Newell _______________________ Professor Mark Grimsley Advisor History Graduate Program ABSTRACT In the 1780s, there was broad agreement among American revolutionaries like Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton about the need for a strong national navy. This consensus, however, collapsed as a result of the partisan strife of the 1790s. The Federalist Party embraced the strategic rationale laid out by naval boosters in the previous decade, namely that only a powerful, seagoing battle fleet offered a viable means of defending the nation's vulnerable ports and harbors. Federalists also believed a navy was necessary to protect America's burgeoning trade with overseas markets. Republicans did not dispute the desirability of the Federalist goals, but they disagreed sharply with their political opponents about the wisdom of depending on a navy to achieve these ends. In place of a navy, the Republicans with Jefferson and Madison at the lead championed an altogether different prescription for national security and commercial growth: economic coercion. The Federalists won most of the legislative confrontations of the 1790s. But their very success contributed to the party's decisive defeat in the election of 1800 and the abandonment of their plans to create a strong blue water navy.
    [Show full text]
  • Karl Marx and the Iwma Revisited 299 Jürgen Herres
    “Arise Ye Wretched of the Earth” <UN> Studies in Global Social History Editor Marcel van der Linden (International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) Editorial Board Sven Beckert (Harvard University, Cambridge, ma, usa) Dirk Hoerder (University of Arizona, Phoenix, ar, usa) Chitra Joshi (Indraprastha College, Delhi University, India) Amarjit Kaur (University of New England, Armidale, Australia) Barbara Weinstein (New York University, New York, ny, usa) volume 29 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/sgsh <UN> “Arise Ye Wretched of the Earth” The First International in a Global Perspective Edited by Fabrice Bensimon Quentin Deluermoz Jeanne Moisand leiden | boston <UN> This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the prevailing cc-by-nc License at the time of publication, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. Cover illustration: Bannière de la Solidarité de Fayt (cover and back). Sources: Cornet Fidèle and Massart Théophile entries in Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier en Belgique en ligne : maitron-en -ligne.univ-paris1.fr. Copyright : Bibliothèque et Archives de l’IEV – Brussels. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Bensimon, Fabrice, editor. | Deluermoz, Quentin, editor. | Moisand, Jeanne, 1978- editor. Title: “Arise ye wretched of the earth” : the First International in a global perspective / edited by Fabrice Bensimon, Quentin Deluermoz, Jeanne Moisand. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2018] | Series: Studies in global social history, issn 1874-6705 ; volume 29 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018002194 (print) | LCCN 2018004158 (ebook) | isbn 9789004335462 (E-book) | isbn 9789004335455 (hardback : alk.
    [Show full text]