A Conversation with Gov. Jon Huntsman

TPP, HONG KONG, AND THE FUTURE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: A CONVERSATION WITH GOV. JON HUNSTMAN

Jon Huntsman Jr. is an American politician, businessman, and diplomat who served as the 16th Governor of Utah from 2005 to 2009, and as United States Ambassador to Singapore from 1992 to 1993, and China from 2009 to 2011. He has served in the administrations of fve U.S. Presidents and was a candidate for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination. In January 2014, Huntsman was named chairman of the Washington-based foreign policy think-tank the Atlantic Council.

[World Outlook] Troughout your career, you’ve overseen a lot of trade deals and recently you’ve been very vocal about your support for the Trans-Pacifc Partnership, or TPP. So our question is, why do you think TPP has been so controversial lately, and what do you see as its biggest economic and political benefts?

[Jon Huntsman] Well, it’s a very good question. I’d say that TPP has been controversial because, in politics, fear sells. You can easily create a fear narrative around things that are not well understood. International trade, I’ve come to fnd, because it’s negotiated out of the hallways of Congress, in a sometimes non-transparent environment, that’s just the way trade negotiations are handled. Trade deals include a lot of content that, for most people, would seem to be a bit abstruse. So you can take a trade deal or a trade negotiation and build it into something that is quite distant from reality. In an election cycle you can equate trade into something that is fear-based. And you don’t have to explain it, as we’ve seen in this election cycle.

So one thing this nation needs is a full-blown conversation about trade, and I don’t think we’ve had that and I think it’d be very benefcial for the American people. Tere’s upside and there’s downside, and we haven’t had that kind of full-blown, comprehensive conversation about trade. And I think we’d altogether arrive at a dif- ferent place if we had one such opportunity. But in politics you really don’t have time to have those conversations, so you get right to the talking points, the sound bytes, that in this case have blamed some of our economic slackness on trade. I think trade is responsible maybe for a portion of dislocation, I think technology is largely responsible for a whole lot more. But we ought to let the data drive us. Let the economic facts, the export numbers, the import numbers, the investment numbers really drive our conversation about trade. When you talk about TPP specifcally, what are the economic benefts? Very simply, the economic benefts would include enhanced export opportunities, because we’re looking at 11 other countries other than the United States, representing 40% of the world’s GDP...fve of whom we already have free trade agreements with, so let’s just take those of the table. And that leaves another... many countries that are behind in terms of economic liberalization. Tat ultimately, you’re Interview with Gov. Huntsman 8 going to have larger consumer societies that we’re going to want to have the kind of relationship that allows us to promote American exports which are good for every town, every county, every state in America. So that is the most immediate beneft, the job creation and the economic lift associated with exports. Te second economic beneft really would be along the lines of additional economic liberalization which will take place in countries like Indonesia, which has a vast population, natural resources, trade links with a lot of key countries across the world, but growing slowly and reforming slowly. So this kind of arrangement would advance economic liberalization in ways that would be good for the local economy and the regional economy. Te political benefts? Let me just say that nations that trade usually cooperate in other areas. Tey usually don’t go to war with one another. So those are the most immediate benefts of trade, the relationship is enhanced, it’s deepened, it’s broadened, and it usually leads to political cooperation in areas that maybe hadn’t been imagined originally. When you’ve got economics at stake on both sides in a large, healthy trading relationship, I think you’re much less likely to engage in a political theater and the drama of war because there’s too much to lose, too much at stake. And I think people generally are on better behavior.

[WO] Great, thank you. Related to the diferent trade-ofs that take place with trade itself, and the political implications of TPP, does Asia’s attempt at establishing RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, complicate the diplomatic situation sur- rounding TPP negotiations? Are the two trade deals mutually exclusive, and what would a world with both partnerships look like?

[JH] You’re deep into the weeds if you’re already learning about RCEP, which is a really interesting arrangement if you look at it. You know, it includes ten countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Plus six of the countries with agreements - Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea - would be the initial six. So when you look at RCEP, in its totality, based upon its GDP, it’s estimated that by 2050 it will likely have a GDP size roughly twice the size of the TPP countries. So it’s a major economic grouping. Te diference is their standards of trade — when you look at intellectual property protection, trade facilitation, labor, the environment — are lower than what a US agreement would seek to achieve. So it isn’t exactly a gold-plated agreement. Te standards are lower, and therefore it really becomes hard to bring TPP and RCEP together in any reconcilable way. Does it mean there’s no way to connect them in the future? I don’t think so. I think as economies mature, and as RCEP gets up and running, you’ll see additional economic globalization. But there are two diferent arrangements. Tere are two diferent arrangements complete- ly. And I’m not sure how far RCEP is actually going to get. You’ve got a lot of dispa- rate economies lumped into one, and I’m not sure how far TPP is going to get in terms of a legitimate political opening to ratify it. And remember, all eleven other countries in TPP are having the same political discussions in their home capitals. Te political lift is signifcant for TPP, and RCEP is just sort of foating out there. But make no Interview with Gov. Hunstman 9 mistake, if TPP were to fail, and never take fight, the Chinese would use RCEP as a tool with which to fll the void, the vacuum which would be created by the disappearance of TPP. And trade is very real in that it occupies the relationship between nations, and when trade is not there, when an agreement like TPP doesn’t materialize or come to fruition, something flls the vacuum. And the Chinese would very much desire to fll whatever is left by the disappearance of TPP which also, just on the political side, if I can get back to the original question which asked about the political benefts...I have to say that TPP is unusual in that it really represents the resolve of the United States towards the Asian-Pacifc region. And for years and years, as long as I’ve been involved — three, fve years in the Asian-Pacifc region — our resolve has been questioned...are we going to be around, are we gonna engage in trade and regional security, and in general help to promote American values that we aspire to? Tat question has been asked for a very long time, and TPP has really been representative of our resolve towards the region more than anything else, and if it were to disappear it would really would have a devastating impact on the way that the region sees the United States, our state power and our commitment towards Asia.

[WO] So speaking of US commitment to Asia, some Asian nations have been concerned about the United States’ commitment to countering Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea. What is your take on China’s motivation for these aggressive actions, do you believe it’s an attempt to challenge the US as a global hegemon, is it merely a belief that their cultural heritage is at stake and needs to be reclaimed, or do you believe that there is a third reason for this aggressive behavior?

[JH] Well, everything you’ve said is right, and in addition the third reason would be because they can. Tey are at a point in time economically and militarily and diplomatically where they can make such a move. Before, it just made no sense, it wasn’t part of their strategy, and the experience in [Deng Xiaoping’s] years as head of China, went way back to the 70s when asked about the South China Sea. He said, “We’ll leave that to future generations to fgure out.” Well, we’re now at the future generations, and they’re trying to fgure it out. But it does represent something fundamentally important about the challenge that we have in the United States in dealing with China. Tey recently back in 2009, 2010 made the South China Sea issue a core issue. Now their core issues include their foreign policy priorities around sovereignty: Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan, the East China Sea. Te South China Sea wasn’t a core issue until recently. Once it becomes a core issue, it’s a non-negotiable issue. So for them, it’s a top-tier and top priority foreign policy issue. And it’s one that we’re going to have to deal with very realistically. It also deals with China’s sovereignty as they interpret it, going way back, and therefore they see it as an issue of national pride. So they’ll continue to expand, and to build out islands. Tey’ve currently built out four, and there may be a ffth, and we’ll have to see how that works. Tey’re paying little attention to the case taken to the Hague by the Philippines that brought to the forefront many very important issues about Chinese behavior. Te Chinese lost on Interview with Gov. Huntsman 10 every count. But it’s had little, as I have predicted, infuence at all. But the region is concerned, because you’ve got fve claimants with legitimate historical claims between the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, and Malaysia. It’s a festering regional sore that has no immediate answer. We talk about it politically, we fex our muscles, we send in the Seventh Fleet, we buzz the region in our airplanes doing reconnaissance missions — and so do other countries by the way — but there really is no immediate solution. So the South China Sea since it is a core issue to the Chinese because it is refective of national pride and their historic claims they’re not going to let of and it’s going to have to be managed very carefully so it doesn’t lead to a war.

[WO] Speaking of no immediate solution, do you think an eventual solution is more likely to be achieved diplomatically or will the military have to be involved?

[JH] I’d like to think that diplomats can fgure out every issue we have out. Tis is true unless the diplomats fundamentally fail. And sometimes diplomats fail and you have military to back you up. So we have a formidable presence in the Asia region, namely the Seventh feet which has air assets, sea assets, etc., and everyone knows it. We have been a massive insurance policy in the South China Sea for decades ever since the end of World War Two. And many have beneftted from that insurance policy because we’ve kept the seaways free of confict and trade has fourished. Te Chinese have beneftted from our investment and security. So everyone knows that we have a military quite capable and formidable but I would say diplomatically, if we are not able to come up with a new conduct in which to view sovereignty for these little dots in the South China Sea, then we are failing the region. Tere’s a diplomatic solution there somewhere but it isn’t a short-term thing. I can’t imagine a scenario in which this issue will be resolved in a short period of time. I’m looking 10 to 20 years into the future. But you can array maybe new nations, major seafaring nations of the world, not just in the Asia Pacifc region but other regions. Tese nations care about freedom of navigation, care about the fundamental issues of the global commons and how we manage the global commons and are maybe willing to put additional pressure on this issue because the one thing China responds to is pressure and right now it isn’t the resolve for the United States that we’re going to go to war over a bunch of miles in the South China Sea and the Chinese know that. So they can push and they can do whatever they want. Tey know our abilities to respond are fairly limited. I don’t think it will always be that way but for now it is. Tere’s no immediate solution.

[WO] At times the media characterizes the US-Chinese relationship as threatening. What are our strongest points of bilateral cooperation in regards to China? Does the media have it correct or do you think there is unrealized potential for our partnership with the Chinese?

[JH] We have, overall, a very competitive relationship with China and as my friend and former ambassador Winston Lord said it’s a sweet and sour relationship, put- ting an interesting twist on it. Tere are elements of cooperation and confict and Interview with Gov. Hunstman 11 competition and we have to all be smart enough to realize that given the size and the geographic scope and the interests of China, their history vs our history, the role of the individual in society, a Jefersonian society vs a Confucian society, we’re not going to agree on everything and on a lot we will hit heads on some fundamentally important issues. We will always, I think, have to manage that reality. It’s only going to grow more acute during the 21st century as they continue to grow as their economy continues to expand and develop. We can choose to fnd areas of cooperation and development to build a meaningful relationship around knowing we will always have elements of confict and then manage them properly so we can do more. Are we max- imizing the relationship today? No, we’re more worried about managing the threats and the outside risk.

It becomes a political issue when you’re president of the United States. I haven’t been there but I’ve tried. I’ve been around the presidency enough to know that China is never a good news story for the White House because as you mentioned the media likes to portray stories of confict and tensions. Tey like to rise the fear factor etc. Te fear factor is a good motivator and like trade China is used time and time again as a motivator out of fear. When is the last time you heard a politician turn about the upside of the China relationship or areas we should expand cooperation in? You won’t because there are no political benefts. But that’s what we’re going to have to do. Find areas of cooperation and manage aspects of the confict. Today I would see the elements of cooperation that stand out most would be climate, the environment, energy, education, people to people exchange, China now has over 300,000 students studying in our universities, that’s a big deal. We have maybe a fraction of that number in terms of US kids studying in China, so these are all elements of cooperation that say nothing about investment in trade. You have to say that in a fve hundred billion dollar trading relationship, soon to be the largest trading relationship the world’s ever seen, you’re going to have points of confict and contention, as a trade negotiation, I remember some of our biggest issues with Canada. Tings like softwood timber. Tey’re our best friend and neighbor! So with fve hundred you’re going to have confict, but they are about things that are larger than they are appear.

I would cite the economy even though politicians always look at the downside. Our economic interdependence has been an area of cooperation. We’ve invested, we’ve traded tech, we’ve traded and now what are we seeing on the US side are more exports to China as their economy matures, more Chinese investment in the US just as you expect, so that’s an area of cooperation that I has both good sides and bad sides. Te areas where I think tremendous potential exists would include China’s rise to be a player on the world stage where they have never been before, at least in last 200 years.

Issues like North Korea, I think the Chinese there are at the limit of their patience in viewing the country that’s blown of half dozen nuclear bombs without warning to the Chinese. Tey want a solution on the Korean peninsula and are increasingly Interview with Gov. Huntsman 12 more likely to cooperate with us and some of the former G6 party members to achieve that. Issues like stability in the Middle East. China does a lot of transactional work, gas and oil, trading in Middle East, but they never get involved in third party con- ficts they’re doing a little more on anti-piracy in the gulf which is very good thing. Tey’re involved more and more in peacekeeping operations today than before. Tese are all areas of great potential but I’d like to say that the issue I always bring up that never seems to get any traction but I don’t know why are health sciences and medical cooperation. If we can try to fnd issues on energy and climate, why aren’t we curing cancer? We’ve got the best and smartest scientists the world has on both sides, we’ve got the best laboratories, we’ve got a motivation in that 1 / 3 citizens in both countries will have cancer, these are the kinds of things that I think if done right could really build trust in both countries as we are working towards building humanity on both sides, we ever engage on the issues that build the humanity it always seems like we’re tearing it down. It would be a quick thing if we can ever get our act together. Tere is tremendous untapped potential in science in medicine in biotechnology.

[WO] Next, I’d like to talk about the stability of the Chinese political regime and potential for democratization. We’ve also seen demonstration rising near China such as Hong Kong. Do you see potential for that unrest to move to China or do you think that techniques for keeping democratization movements under control are stable?

[JH] On Hong Kong, I think Hong Kong is fairly isolated in that they are an ad- vanced economy and that they’ve lived under democratic principles. Tey’re moving towards democratic elections. So they see the world and they’ve lived in a political environment that is much diferent from China. Increasingly they’ll merge at some point – it’s therefore no surprise that people in Hong Kong are a little surprised about the increasingly assertiveness of the Chinese government and I think we may see more demonstrations in this period. Tey care deeply about their future as they should.

As for the rest of China when not having been exposed to those democratic principles or having lived in free economy, it becomes difcult to appreciate what you’re missing. I’ll tell you what is a problem and that is the growing distrust between the people and the Communist Party of China. Much like we have a trust defcit in our country between people and institutions of governance, there’s a real trust defcit in China between the people and the party. It lacks transparency and responsiveness. It’s corrupt. People can’t petition their government. Tey can’t get involved. Tis is particularly true to people who want to participate and make communities better and this is the challenge for Xi Jinping as he approaches the congress a year from now and anticipates a second term of fve years until 2022. How do you build trust with the Chinese people? And the Chinese people are increasingly sophisticated. Tey have access to the rest of the world, they travel, they don’t always fnd an open and free internet, but often times they do. My daughters lived in China and they were able to jump over the great wall easily with VPN technology so the challenges are signifcant. Interview with Gov. Hunstman 13 Tat’ll stand for the Chinese party in terms of legitimacy, fundamental issues of legitimacy, and that will only continue. But don’t expect that China becomes a Jefersonian democracy. Sometimes when we throw democracy and words like that out we’re not fully appreciative of Chinese culture and how deeply embedded in 5000 years is the way they see themselves, their country, and their place in the world. But I do think that there’ll be a signifcant push for transparency and for greater participation in their political system. I do see a time when civil society which has long been absent but is robust in Hong Kong as it is in Taiwan will play a role in politics in China.

[WO] Tere tends to be a trend in the international arena that as economies grow and change, they stabilize and their growth rates decrease – in terms of exponential growth. What do you think are the political or international efects of the slowing growth in the Chinese economy?

[JH] Well I think the more immediate efects are a tendency to want to look inward to come up with national solutions, to engage in issues like indigenous innovation of the commercial and trade side, to engage in hyper-nationalism – as they have toward Japan with the East China Sea and toward ASEAN with the South China Sea – and in the short run in the complete opposite direction of what we just described in the last question. I think the economic performance of China has a very real corollary efect on their political behavior. It also tends to minimize their involvement on the global stage. So when they are not performing well at home, they will have a tendency to withdraw from any international engagement and they become a less responsible stakeholder on the world stage.

[WO] Great. So our last question about the U.S.-China relationship is on the U.S. presidential election. Some people call a new president the opportunity for the U.S. to restart or shift its foreign policy, set new priorities and goals. Do you think its necessary for the next president to make changes to the pivot to Asia policy more generally? Do you think this was a wise choice to refocus U.S. policy to the region?

[JH] Well the frst thing that came to mind for me as somebody who’s lived four times in Asia and been engaged for thirty-fve years is since when did we pivot? We have been engaged in Asia at least since the Spanish-American War in the late 1800s – certainly with our relationship with the Philippines frst and foremost. But even before that, if you look at the Treaty of Wangxia that our frst U.S. ambassador to China under President John Tyler negotiated in the 1840s to basically catch up to where the British were under the Treaty of Nanjing right after the Opium War. So we have been engaged in the region, we have fought in the region, we trade in the region, have been there for a long time. So the “pivot” was a nice use of vocabulary, but I am not sure that there was a whole lot of substance to it. I would like to see more substance to it. For example, I think we need to plus up our military assets in ways that go beyond what has been done. Tere are 2000 Marines in Darwin, we have new air assets by way of P-8 Poseidons, and every now and then we get a new carrier battle group to sail Interview with Gov. Huntsman 14 through. But I think we need a more robust military commitment and beyond that more training particularly with the cut recently in Southeast Asia, where I think because of China’s behavior they are more eager than ever before to plus up their security relationships with the United States.

Second, I think on the economic side, if TPP is successful that will constitute the centerpiece of our economic engagement within the region. If it doesn’t work out, we are going to have to think in real time about how you would ensure that a void isn’t created that would be flled by somebody else – which is just the opposite of what we have been talking about. It’s the anti-pivot. It’s a pivot away from Asia in a very signifcant way.

Te third part would be, what more can we do with friends and allies? Tose by our side through two wars in the region. Certainly Korea and Vietnam we train with, we sell things to, we engage in diplomatic cooperation with – there’s got to be a new level of cooperation that can be achieved with our allies and indeed with friends and I would speak specifcally of India. I think India needs to be seen more as a player not just in South Asia, but indeed as a major player in the broader Asia sense. Tey’re desirous to have a better relationship with Australia, to have a better relationship with Japan, and they certainly want to have a better relationship with the United States. I think there is a huge opportunity by engaging India in new and novel ways to really begin to create a new sort of strategy for the region.

[WO] You’ve done some really cool things. One really interesting thing about your career is that you’ve switched between working in the domestic political sphere and then more with other nations in the international arena. How has your experience with domestic policy pursuits shaped your views on the way the United States can interact with the world.

[JH] I really believe in the idea that our foreign policy is good, strong and creative. But when we don’t practice what we preach in terms of our ability to solve big problems as a country, to come together around big issues, to end wars, to manage peaceful economic and societal development at the state and city levels, when we don’t practice that well we lose our soapbox along with our credibility. And as somebody who has managed a state and been involved with the highest levels of local government, I’d have to say that for me as a practicing diplomat I refect on that issue all the time. I used to talk about it on the campaign trail, not sure that anybody cared much about what I was saying, but you can’t have a foreign policy that is at all efective or meaningful without our ability to practice those same principles at home. And we’re not doing that now.

[WO] And fnally, this is our fun question. What advice do you for undergraduates inter- ested in careers for foreign afairs? Are there certain skills – I know you have experience with the Mandarin language. Have language skills served you? Have writing skills, listening skills – what do you think makes someone successful in a career like yours? Interview with Gov. Hunstman 15 [JH] I’m still evolving, but I’d have to say frst and foremost – choosing a career in international afairs is the most exciting career option somebody could choose. I’ve lived it, I’ve breathed it, I’ve seen it as a domestic elected ofcial, I’ve seen it on the frontlines of diplomacy, and if you’ve got it in you – and I’ve always believed that you are born with certain instincts that take you to a career – if you’re born with a love for that kind of work and an interest in those issues, then you’ve got to go there. Nothing else will satisfy you. Once that choice has been made, it then becomes important to become a subject matter expert – not become a generalist – become a real expert in some part of international relations, a region, a topical area, a language – something that then sets you apart from everyone else and will allow you as you build your career to make a unique contribution. Find a mentor. Find somebody who has gone before you and has done it exactly right or in ways where you look at it and say “I’d like to be that person” or “I’d like to have the same career.” Well, just take a look at the steps that were made along the way. You’re likely to be in a position to make similar steps. You’re going to at least build your own career and travel along some of the same ter- ritory and I’ve always found that to be a defnite plus in life – to have mentors who are better and smarter than you to look up to and say, “I want to do half of what that person has done” and there’s the roadmap that allows me to understand the choices I need to make to get there.

[WO] By agreeing to do an interview like this you are defnitely providing a mentorship for our readership.

[JH] I don’t know about that, but I commend you all for having an interest in this area. And I’ll tell you, you know, the twenty-frst century is going to have some major challenges on the international front. And it’s going to take some committed people who don’t just bring politics to the table, who bring a very deep and nuanced under- standing of the world and how well the parts ft together: Culture, history, politics, economics, language, having lived on the ground in places where they can speak as an expert.