ARISTOTLE AND AUGUSTINE ON FREEDOM This page intentionally left blank and Augustine on Freedo11t

Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia

T. D. J. Chappell Lecturer in Philosophy University of East Anglia ©T. D.J.Chappell1995

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995 978-0-333-62537-8

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chappell, T. D. J. (Timothy D. J.) Aristotle and Augustine on freedom : two theories of freedom, voluntary action, and akrasia I T.D.J. Chappell. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-12467-0 1. Free wiil and determinism. 2. Aristotle-Views on . 3. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo-Views on free will. B105.lA5C45 1995 123'5'0922-

Gillian Patriciae Chappell

30.4.1937- 13.12.1989 Quia fecisti nos ad Te et inquietum est cor nostrum donee requiescat in Te This page intentionally left blank By , then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every• one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute. : An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1775), VIII.l

It does not seem to be self contradictory to suppose that [the acceptance of determinism could lead to the decay or repudiation of participant reactive attitudes] ... But I am strongly inclined to think that it is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable. The human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships is too thoroughgoing and too deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any such things as interpersonal relationships as we normally under• stand them. Peter Strawson: 'Freedom and Resenhnent', Proceedings of the British Academy, 1962 This page intentionally left blank Contents

Preface xi

Part I Aristotle

1 The Limits of the Voluntary 3 1.1. 'Positive' and 'Negative' Theories of Freedom 3 1.2. Compulsion, Duress, Persuasion and Free Action 6 1.3. The Varieties of Ignorance 18 1.4. Irrationality 25

2 Freedom, Ability and Knowledge 32 2.1. Function, Process and Ability to Do Otherwise 32 2.2. Aristotle's Epistemology 47

3 Practical Reasoning 55 3.1. Proairesis 56 3.2. The Difference between Action on Proairesis and Voluntary Action 61 3.3. Deliberation 66 3.4. Practical Reasoning and the 'Practical ' 71 3.5. Conclusion 86

4 The Varieties of Akrasia 88 4.1. How to Solve the Problem of Akrasia 88 4.2. Aristotle's Account 98 4.3. The Varieties of Akrasia 112

Part II Augustine

5 Voluntariness and Responsibility in Augustine 121 5.1. Introduction 121 5.2. The Linking of Voluntariness and Responsibility 122 5.3. Two of Augustine's Conditions of Voluntary Action 125 5.4. Ignorantia and Difficultas 130 5.5. From the Earlier to the Later Theory 134 5.6. Conclusion 139

ix X Contents 6 Voluntas and the Voluntary 140 6.1. Introduction 140 6.2. The of Voluntas: Two Requirements 141 6.3. Ability to Do Otherwise 144 6.4. The Cause(s) of Voluntas Again 149 6.5. A Reflexive Will? 150

7 The Will and the Good Life 154 7.1. Introduction 154 7.2. and Practical Wisdom in Augustine 155 7.3. Aristotle and Augustine on the Directedness of Action 160 7.4. Felicitas 162 7 5. Good Will and the Order of the World 172

8 Bad Will and the Mystery of 176 8.1. Introduction 176 8.2. Bad Will 178 8.3. An Incomplete Account? 184 8.4. A Necessarily Incomplete Account? 187 8.5. Manichaean Dualism and Privatio Boni 193 8.6. Incompleteness Again 197 8.7. Augustine and Voluntarism 198 8.8. From Augustine's Rationalism to Augustinian Voluntarism 202 8.9. Conclusion 206

List of Works Cited 208

Index of Names 213 Preface

Aristotle and Augustine probably seems like an incongruous pairing to many readers. As I hope this book will show, it is not as odd a conjunction as it may look at first sight. To instance one straw in the wind (though it is no more than that): for all his professions of , we know that St Augustine read Aristotle's actual words, but we do not know that he ever read 's actual words. He tells us in the Confessions that he read the Categories at school; but the nearest we get to evidence that he had read Plato is the famously unspecific phrase in platonicis libellis, also in the Confessions. (However, of course, Augustine did not find the Categories an inspiring read; and it is perhaps also worth pointing out that Augustine, in the City of God, remarks casually that Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies were virtually identical in content!) More seriously, what I hope to show is that Aristotle and Augustine develop theories of freedom and the voluntary which are in many ways strikingly analogous. Both are more concerned to describe freedom than to prove its existence. Both describe freedom of action by describing voluntary action. Both conclude that aban• doning belief in freedom means abandoning belief in voluntary action too - which very few are willing to do. Again, it is striking that both their of voluntary action show that voluntary actions must be (i) uncompelled; (ii) not ignorant; and (iii) done in pursuit of perceived attainable . But don't agents sometimes act voluntarily in pursuit of perceived attainable ? Aristotle says not: any such actions would be inexplicable as voluntary actions. Augustine, agreeing that such actions are inexplicable, still insists that they can occur. This- as I argue -is the true place, in Augustine's theory of free• dom, of his famous 'theory of will'. It is also the real point of con• trast between Aristotle and Augustine.

This book had its origins in an Edinburgh University doctoral thesis supervised by James Mackey and David Wright, to both of whom I am grateful for the benefit of their wisdom, scholarship and advice.

xi xii Preface I have also learnt much from a number of others who have listened patiently to my heterodoxies, and done their best to straighten them out: David Bostock, David Charles, Willie Charlton, Roger Crisp, Brian Davies, John Divers, Steven Everson, Philippa Foot, , Justin Gosling, Dave Horner, Mike Inwood, Fergus Kerr, Christopher Kirwan, John Lucas, Christopher Martin, Stephen Priest, David Pugmire, Hayden Ramsay, Dory Scaltsas, Richard Sorabji, , Charles Taliaferro, Lubor Velecky. If I have sometimes resisted their good sense, that is hardly their fault. In another way, I am indebted to the Whitefield Institute, , for their generous support, both financial and moral, during my postgraduate research; to Wolfson and Merton Colleges, Oxford, for electing me to a Junior Research Fellowship and a Lectureship in philosophy respectively, the tenure of which posts has facilitated the metamorphosis of thesis into book; and to the University of East Anglia, for repeatedly believing my claim that the book really was about to come out. I am also grateful to my daughter Miriam, for being herself, and to my parents for their love, support and encouragement during my studies; I am sad that my mother did not live to see them bear fruit. But my biggest debt of all is to my wife Claudia, without whom this project could never have been begun, let alone finished.

T. D. J. CHAPPELL Wolfson College, Oxford Merton College, Oxford