Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life

1. In 1843, Søren Kierkegaard developedo a view of the aesthetic life in his frst major work, Either/Or,1 and, a few years later, through a chap- ter on “The Banquet” (modeled upon Plato’s Symposium) in Stages on Life’s Way.2 The peculiarity of these works is that, though presupposing a philosophical substructure, they are literary in character: collections of aphorisms, a dialogue, essays, diaries, a sermon, letters. This is central to Kierkegaard’s intention to call attention to “existence,” that is, to the character of human subjectivity as individually instantiated rather than as objectively refected upon in terms of concepts.3

1Either/Or D. Swenson and L. Swenson trans., two volumes. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1944) (henceforth E/O). 2Stages on Life’s Way. W. Lowrie trans. (New York: Shocken Books, 1967) (henceforth SLW). There is a difference between aesthetic theory regarding the arts and the exposition of the life of the aesthete that I am providing here. For a sketch of the former, see George Pattiso, “Art in an age of refection,” Alasdair Hannay ed. Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 76–100 (henceforth H and M). Peder Jothan helpfully distinguishes four aspects of the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s work: as a stage of existence, as a view of art and beauty, as a literary style, and as a mode of religious existence. Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood: The Art of Subjectivity. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 10ff (henceforth KAS). 3Concluding Unscientifc Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. W. Lowrie trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 292–5 (henceforth CUP).

The aesthetic stage or sphere is, following Hegelian terminology, the stage of “immediacy.” It has a variable range. It plays in tandem with “refection.” These terms refer initially to what is roughly equivalent to Hegel’s Nature and Spirit where Nature is everything from the animal level down, even in us, while Spirit is the distinctively human, modi- fed by and modifying “Nature” in us. Spirit is the sphere of refection that allows for the deliberate transformation of “immediacy.” For Kierkegaard, the frst meaning of “immediacy” is what is given through our natural endowment: what we would today call our “genetic endowment,” our organism with its sensory presentations and appetites. But there is a second, a distinctively human mediated immediacy that is the sphere of the cultivated aesthete. Unlike the other works mentioned, Sickness Unto Death is focused upon the conceptual structure of “Spirit.” Again close to Hegel, human nature is a synthesis of mind and body, of the eternal and the temporal, of the infnite and the fnite, and, following from all this, of freedom and necessity. But so conceived, the self is not the synthesis, but is the fact that the synthesis “relates itself to its own self.”4 It is individual self- presence in the midst of these humanly universal polarities that is crucial. Hegel provides the basis for these polarities and for the peculiar view of the self. For Hegel our mind is related to the eternal and infnite via the notion of Being with which the mind is identifed, while everything related to our body involves us in the temporally immediate and fnite. The notion of Being includes everything in its scope and everything about everything, but it includes all that emptily and thus in the form of the question about the Whole and our place in it. When confronted with any putative limit, we are always able to ask what might exist beyond it, et sic ad infnitum.5 That is because the notion of Being is all-encompassing— whatever we may come to think the All consists in. Even John Locke, sensate empiricist though he was, claimed that, if anything exists, eternity exists.6 The only problem is where it is located: in the ongo- ing processes of Nature as a whole or in another level beyond Nature.

4Sickness Unto Death. W. Lowrie trans. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), 146 (henceforth SUD). 5HPM, §386, 23–41. 6Essay Concerning Human Understanding. P. Nidditch ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 622. He seems not to be aware how this blows a hole in his empiricism. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 249

But such a claim involves a ground in the notion of the All given with the notion of Being which arises within the mind when it frst thinks. And for Hegel, it is the openness to the Whole that prises us loose from any fnitude, even our own, and hands us over to ourselves, privileged— or condemned—to form ourselves by choosing between the options available to us. The I stands over against everything, including its own determinations. We are determinate/indeterminate: determined by our genes, our upbringing, and our past choices, so that we have only a limited set of options for determination. But, as I, each of us is free to determine oneself within the necessary limits of one’s situation at any given time.7 This is the context Kierkegaard assumes, for he merely lists, without developing, the polarities: mind and body, the eternal and the temporal, the infnite and the fnite, freedom and necessity. For him, the synthesis involved in each of these polarities is a relation; but freedom lies in the fact that the synthesis in us is “a relation that relates itself to its own self.” I would say that the self-turning relation again follows from the notion of Being which, along with the whole of what is, includes the whole of what we each individually are. Such a relation related to itself is the index of human freedom: detached, via the notion of Being, from all determinacy, we are each compelled to choose. The three levels of necessity in us—genetic, cultural, and personal-historical—establish a “mediated immediacy.” Everything turns upon the principle of choice we employ in taking up this immediacy. Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage, initial or mediated, is a constant in human experience; but we can relate to it from different perspectives. He considers it in terms of two other stages, the ethical and the religious. If the aesthetic is taken as the primary sphere of existence, its principle, its “categorical imperative,” is “Enjoy yourself.” And that means, “Whatever makes you feel good, crude or refned, do it.” The principle

7Though Kierkegaard is clearly in many respects anti-Hegel, whom he views as “forgetting, in world-historical absent-mindedness, what it means to be an existing individual, with passion and inwardness, (CUP, 109), he draws heavily upon Hegelian categories. See Stephen Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1995), 4–8. Exposition of the three levels can be found in any of the many overall presentations of Kierkegaard’s thought, but especially helpful is Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) (henceforth KDI). 250 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life of the ethical sphere might be expressed in the imperative, “Do your duty” and the religious in the command, “Stand before God.”8 CUP, 256. Either/Or presents us with the fundamental choice between a life ruled by the aesthetic imperative and one ruled by the ethics of commitment— concretely, by Judge William’s commitment to his wife, his profession, and his community. The work concludes with the relaying of a sermon the judge had heard that moves us toward the larger context of the Whole to which we relate in the religious sphere.9 Here we fnd the conclusion to the self-relation in the oppositions listed above: “In relating itself to itself, it relates itself to that which founds it,” namely, God.10 The problem for Kierkegaard is that the only way to achieve this relation is to leap over the Paradox, the contradiction that is the God-Man, and thus to transcend reason. 11

2. All this heavy philosophical lifting is the sub-text behind its concrete exhibition in particular characters in Kierkegaard’s work. His basic tack is to embody philosophic principles in human characters, setting the direction for twentieth-century Existentialists like Sartre and Marcel who wrote novels and plays in tandem with their more abstract philosophical works. But Kierkegaard has a peculiar way of presenting his thought. He produced two lines of work: the better known are his so-called “pseudonymous” works, some of which are collected by one pseudonym and written by others.12 But Kierkegaard simultaneously published in his own name works that are lesser known and that showed his own commitment to the religious.13 In the former, following the example of

8CUP, 256. 9E/O, II, 339–56. 10SUD, 126. 11John Caputo notes Hegel’s infuence on the whole project of the three stages: “Like Hegel, Kierkegaard thinks of a kind of education of the spirit by way of a gradual ascent to higher and richer forms of life as lower forms collapse from internal contradictions.” Kierkegaard, London: Granta Books, 2007), 30. 12The Point of View of My Work as an Author. W. Lowrie trans. New York: Harper and Row, 1962) (henceforth POV). 13For example, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, H. Hong and E. Hong ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, D. Speere trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1956) (henceforth PH); and POV, etc. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 251

Plato’s dialogues, he has characters, as editors and authors, present the works within which each character exhibits another facet of the “aesthetic life.”14 This induces “double refection”: refection upon the position occupied by the character and upon the status of the presenter. As actual author, Kierkegaard himself stands at a distance two or three steps removed. This complex pseudonymous procedure is meant to suggest refection on the part of us readers upon our own selves to see how we resemble, or not, the form of life that is described in each character or exhibited by the point of view of each author or editor. For the educated readers of texts, it involves refection for each of us upon how our own interest in the topic fts within our overall “life style.” The aim of the pseudonymous works, according to Peder Jothen, is “to provoke, reveal, seduce, upbuild and call out to each self the true ontological possibility— not through dogmatic arguments—but through aesthetic means.”15 As an epigram to In Vino Veritas within Stages, Kierkegaard cites Lichtenberg: “Such works are like mirrors: when an ape gawks in, no apostle gazes out.”16 The reader provides the perspective for reading, taking it up in terms of their way of life that is either corroborated, extended, or challenged by the work. The ape/apostle image is also an image for the three stages: the self-same action in the aesthetic sphere considered from the principle of self-enjoyment may be taken up within the context of marriage and profession as fundamental duties that set limits to the aesthetic, and both within the context of standing reli- giously before God. The latter two spheres place limits on what is legiti- mate within the aesthetic sphere. The epigram also points to the fundamental distinction that works throughout the pseudonymous authorship: the distinction between the inner and the outer. Hegel held, with regard to human existence, that the inner eventually shows itself in the outer. If “interiorly” I think I am intelligent, I myself only fnd out whether or not I am right by taking an intelligence test or attempting to pass in a class (on Kierkegaard, for example) or solve a complex problem. Or I may think I am a “beautiful

14See my “Recollection and Two Banquets: Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s.” International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or I. R. Perkins ed. Atlanta: Mercer University Press, 49–68 [henceforth IKC, E/0). 15KAS 161. 16SLW, 26 252 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life soul,” untainted by the world and dedicated to God, but am unwill- ing to act out in the world with others for fear of tainting my precious interiority.17 Granted the truth of these observations, Kierkegaard yet strenuously directs himself against the Hegelian principle that the inner is the outer. Johannes Climacus, his pseudonym in Concluding Unscientifc Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, repeats the mantra: our age has forgotten, “in world-historical absent-mindedness, what it means to be an existing individual; to exist with passion and inwardness.”18 Here he distinguishes the subjective thinker from the objective thinker. The emphasis upon the latter is upon What an object is, whereas the former is concerned with the How of one’s relation to it. And for human life, the highest truth is subjectivity, ultimately in the religious sphere: an objective uncertainty held in the most passionate inwardness.19 In the works of Hegel, objectively contemplating World History, one fnds magnifcent thought-castles, while, according to Climacus, the contemplator lives in a miserable shack nearby.20 “Living” as “an exist- ent individual” involves a deepening in inwardness that is ambiguously related to the outer display to others. Either/Or and Stages show, in various ways, the incongruity between the outer and the inner. In his own life, Kierkegaard made a point of appearing regularly in public—but only for just enough time to be noticed—in order to conceal the fact that he was busy turning out several works in a period of a few years. At the level of deepest intent, Kierkegaard was dedicated to showing the incongruity between the Christendom of establishment Lutheranism in Denmark and the real requirements of Christian inwardness. It was, on his reading, all show and little substance: the outer hid the inner. Actually, inspired as he was by the works of Plato, Kierkegaard is following out the basic premise of the overall argument of the Republic in the comparison of the just man and the tyrannical man, that appearance and reality should be reversed: the just man appearing unjust and thus not gaining any exterior advantage for really being just, and the unjust

17HPM, §§632–671, 383–409. 18CUP, 118ff. 19CUP, 181–2. 20The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard. Alexander Dru ed. and trans. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 156. But who knows how such a one “lives”? Isn’t it presumption to think you know that? Couldn’t the outer here mask the inner? Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 253 man appearing just and thus gaining all the exterior advantages of being, underneath the just appearance, actually unjust. Thus the latter is able to acquire riches and fame, with all that they entail, while the just man is scorned and impoverished—even crucifed.21 In the basic conclusion to the overall argument, Socrates presents a description of the tyrannical man. He appears smiling because he is strong, handsome, rich, surrounded by all the good things that riches provide, and basking in the sunlight of public adulation, while inwardly he is flled with the ravenous beasts of his appetites located in his loins and clamoring for attention and while “the man,” that is, his mind, is a little “wimp” seated inside his head and doing the bidding of the beasts.22 I am always reminded of Hollywood stars to whose hands I am especially attentive and which frequently show fngernails bitten to the nub. (This is the case with male actors. In the case of female, “the exterior conceals the interior.”) What is the tortured inwardness concealed behind that fne exterior? So Kierkegaard presents various situations in which the outer conceals the inner. And he poses for us questions such as: what goes on behind the doors of private dwellings that is not revealed in the public persona of each of the inhabitants? What goes on inside all those who appear to us, both strangers, acquaintances, and friends, and even the members of our own family? And what lies in our own deep interior of which we may have intimations but which we are afraid to face? Or what may lie hidden beyond those intimations? Socrates asked himself if he was a gentle being or a monster like Typhon.23 In presenting instances of the aesthetic stage, Kierkegaard focuses upon the interiority involved in a life governed by aesthetics in the broad sense of the term, not by a life in which aesthetics has a rightful place. As Merold Westphal puts it, for the aesthete, boring/interesting rules over right/wrong, good/evil: “Excitement is in; duty and virtue are out.”24 One could say that many people live by the aesthetic imperative. In fact, it is a basic principle driving our economy. Adverts present

21Republic. P. Shorey trans., 2 volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), II, 362A. 22Republic, IX, 588c. 23Phaedrus. H. Fowler trans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 230a. 24“Kierkegaard and Hegel.” H and M, 105. 254 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life

“the good life”: it is food, drink, sex, sights, and sounds in maximum abundance. People work in order to “have fun”: “running around,” “bar hopping,” “playing the feld,” having “one-night stands,” “living together,” buying the latest to the extent they can afford it or, even though they cannot not afford it, possessing a credit card and having been taken in by the latest ad campaigns. All these are living according to the aesthetic principle. And if one has enough discipline to get an “education” (that is, job training with a few irrelevant “humanities” requirements thrown in), one can found a business, make a fortune, live in the best neighborhoods, and buy everything on the high end, including Rolls Royces, Rolex watches, power boats, top-shelf liquor, the fnest wines, gourmet food, and Cuban cigars—meanwhile, serving the public good by creating jobs for those who are involved in the pro- duction and distribution of such goods. Kierkegaard’s aesthetes are for the most part “high-end” aesthetes, well-to-do, cultivated (at least most of them).

4. In Either/Or the chief character exhibiting the aesthetic principle is simply called A and his ethical interlocutor B, who is later identifed as Judge William. The abstract alphabetical designators put them on the same plane, but B is named in terms of his function and his individuality. A is not identifed further, presumably because, since his principle is private enjoyment, he has no public function and has not “made a name” for himself. Maybe he is Johannes the Seducer whose diary A claimed to have found. In “The Banquet” there are several fgures: the Young Man, Constantin Constantius (author of Repetition), Victor Eremita (editor of Either/Or), Johannes the Seducer (author of “Diary of a Seducer” in Either/Or, whose substitute surname indicates his major function), the Woman’s Tailor (again, only his function is indicated and not even his frst name which would focus his individuality), and William Afham (perhaps Judge William, author of the second part of Either/Or). Along with A, none of them simply follow the aesthetic imperative in the common ways described above, although their enjoyment might include what is available through “education.” They are what we typically call “aesthetes” who mediate their immediacy by refection: they have cultivated tastes. But everything turns upon the immediate, which they consider Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 255

“the most divine of the categories.”25 The banquet is set up in such a way as to appeal to each of the senses: a sumptuous table in a properly appointed room, orchestral background music, perfume, gourmet food, and fne wine. They enjoy their after-dinner cigars. They arrive and depart in elegant horse-drawn carriages. Either/Or is edited by Victor Eremita, the “Victorious Hermit,” who gives a speech later in “The Banquet.” The speech reveals him as one who enjoys things in eremitical silence.26 In his introduction he tells how he secured the papers of A. Victor took a fancy to a desk which he subse- quently purchased. He found a secret compartment that he forced open; it contained various papers. There are two symbols here: the role of chance and the distinction between the outside and the inside, the secret and the public, both with regard to the desk and with regard to the papers, especially “The Diary of the Seducer” which reveals Johannes the Seducer as com- pletely hiding his real intentions. And as we said, in addition to the secrets one hides from others, there is the secret of the self, hidden from itself.27 Among the things that Victor found in the secret compartment were scattered pieces of paper which contained various aphorisms written by A and which Victor arranged randomly under the heading “Diapsalmata” or “Refrains.” This randomness is an image of the aesthete’s life which turns now this way and now that, always searching for “the interesting” from which he might extract his enjoyment. In this pursuit, chance is both his ally and his enemy. The aphorisms pertained to the aesthetic life. A, we see, had a good command of literature and music. He wrote essays on music, tragedy, and comedy which indicate as much. He knows Danish, German, and French literature and can discuss it in depth. Several of the essays that he penned were read before a society whose members call themselves Symparanekromenoi, a group of aesthetes who are together (sym) but only alongside (para) one another; they are fas- cinated with the thought of death (nekromenoi) which gives a certain aesthetic depth to life.28 As Buber once wrote: “The script of life is so unspeakably beautiful to read because death looks over our shoulder.”29

25SLW, 39. 26SLW, 67–76. 27E/O, I, 26. 28E/O I, 135–62. 29Martin Buber, Daniel: Dialogues on Realization, M. Friedman trans. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 91. 256 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life

They gather on occasion to listen to essays and carry on conversation. The banqueteers in Stages might just be that group. They are only “alongside” one another because they know no intimacy or care for others. They are surprised that after a year they are still together and—like too many newlyweds today, locked into their sensorily aesthetic lives, do not know how long that togetherness will last.30 The nadir of the focus of the banqueteers is upon “The Unhappiest Man.”31 They know how to squeeze aesthetic appreciation even out of misfortune. One of the key problems of a life governed by aestheticism is boredom. Harries identifes it as the Grundstimmung of the Diapsalmata, a sense of homelessness in the world, a basic nihilism, focused on freedom without any desire to construct something in the common world but only a world of private enjoyment.32 A remarks: “Boredom rests upon the nothing that interlaces existence; its dizziness is infnite, like that which comes from looking into a bottomless abyss.”33 A delivers an address on that topic to the Symparanekromenoi entitled “The Rotation Method.”34 One way to overcome boredom is to be busy; but people who follow this way are the most boring of all. Rather than thinking, according to conventional wisdom, that “idleness is the devil’s work- shop,” it is precisely idleness which allows one to pursue the aesthetic life. In fact, the aesthetic way pursued by the characters in Kierkegaard’s repertoire presupposes independent wealth and unlimited leisure. According to one of the aphorisms, the trick is “to play shuttlecock with the whole of existence” by rotating between remembering and forgetting.35 Remembering and forgetting are here not considered in their spontaneous forms but are developed into an art form shaping the self which, in the identity between both aspects, becomes “the Archimedean point from which one lifts the whole world.”36

30Karsten Harries views them as being buried alive in their narcissism. Between Nihilism and Faith: A Commentary on Either/Or. (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 53 (henceforth BNF).The plausibility of this interpretation does not cancel out the view provided by the etymology I have presented. Harries’ work is a fne example of reading a text carefully in relation to his own thoughts about human existence. 31E/O I, 215–28. 32BNF, 18 and 21. 33E/O I, 287. 34E/O I, 279–964. 35E/O I, 290. 36E/O I, 291. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 257

Experience itself has to be prepared for such an art, so that one does not give oneself overly much to any one experience, so as not to upset one’s balance. Furthermore, such an art precludes any attach- ments such as friendship, marriage, or an offcial position. “When you are one of several, then you have lost your freedom; you cannot send for your traveling boots whenever you wish, you cannot move aimlessly about the world.”37 “The whole secret lies in arbitrariness,” varying the perspective from which you view things.38 One lives in Romantic irony, standing at a distance from each involvement and whimsically withdrawing from it.39 A’s aphorisms as well as the presentation of “The Unhappiest Man” indicate that, as we already noted, at the core of aestheticism, there is a sense of nihilism and despair. Anti-Climacus in Sickness Unto Death indicates that this follows from a failure to establish the proper relation between the two poles of human existence. The eternal and infnite pole is neglected in favor of the fnite and temporal. One fees from oneself and becomes oblivious of the 70,000 fathoms upon which we foat, opened up in principle by the eternal and infnite grounding relation.40 But when one becomes aware of it, it appears as a yawning chasm that generates vertigo and upsets the carefully crafted balance.41 A’s exposition sets up a polarity between two extreme aesthetic types: one is Don Giovanni, the other is Johannes the Seducer. The absence of a surname in both cases is signifcant, since neither has any intention of producing progeny. They act for themselves and not for the species. Like so many today, their freedom abstracts from their role in carrying on the species; having received life, they refuse to give it. But, as Plato claimed, sexual desire is the love of the mortal for the immortal, a link between

37E/O I, 293. The late Bradley Dewey presents a most interesting analysis of seven different ways of understanding Johannes. 1995. “Seven Seducers: A Typology of Interpretations of the Aesthetic Stage in Kierkegaard’s ‘The Seducer’s Diary.’” [henceforth SS] IKC, E/O, 159–99. 38E/O I, 295–6. 39Kierkegaard’s thesis was on The Concept of Irony. L. Capel trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965). Louis Mackey sees irony as “the originating concept of the modern age.” KDI, 2. 40CUP, 126 The awareness that we foat on waters “70,000 fathoms deep” appears frequently in Kierkegaard’s work. 41CUP, 256. 258 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life

Thanatos and Eros.42 Eros is the next generation saying to us: “You have to die; let us live in your place.” Don Giovanni is presented in Mozart’s opera which is the object of A’s sensitive commentary.43 Harries points out that “this is perhaps the only example of an experience of genuine love in his [A’s] life…”44 The Don displays the universal scope of any appetite: it is oriented towards all individuals that fall under the kind of object correlative to the appetite, though actualized each time by an individual of the type involved. As an appetite, male sexuality is normally oriented toward the female. But rather than resting content with one object, the Don, as sexuality incarnate, restlessly moves from object to object. Young/old, tall/short, fat/ thin, beautiful/ugly—none of this makes any difference to the Don: each is an exhibition of womanhood as generic object of sexual appetite. If he cannot have them all, he conquers them serially in the largest num- ber possible. Leporello, his sidekick, records them: 1,003 in Spain alone, followed by 640 in Italy, 520 in France, 200 in the Rhineland, even 90 in Turkey, and so forth… . He lives in and is governed by his appetite which—fortunately for the appetite and thus his enjoyment—makes him spontaneously irresistible to women. He doesn’t have to seduce: women are immediately attracted to him. As a Don, he has unlimited resources to carry out his conquests. He is the ideal of adolescent males. A presents him in a brilliant commentary on the opera. His basic con- tention is that music is the medium whose form carries the content of appetite as a continual fow of ever-recurring cycles of attraction, pursuit, satisfaction and repose, Plato’s “leaky vessel” that has to be continually reflled as it empties.45 It expresses life itself which culminates in sexuality which arises with the achievement of organic adulthood and is, indeed, the sign of organic maturity. But, of course, the Don is without concern for the natural consequence. If it happens to occur, that is left to his victims to cope with. The same is the case with his opposite: Johannes the Seducer.46 If the Don is the immediacy of appetite incarnate, the Seducer is refection

42Symposium. W. Lamb trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 206c. 43E/O I, 83–184. 44BNF, 32. 45Gorgias. W. Lamb trans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 293e. 46E/O I, 297–440. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 259 incarnate.47 Harries sees this as the culmination of the aesthetic stage in the richest character analysis.48 A presents the Seducer’s diary in which Johannes records the steps he takes, over a six-month period, to secure the total commitment of Cordelia Wahl to him as a person. Unlike the Don, Johannes does not want any old woman, but one who has the possibility of a deepened personality whom he carefully cultivates, giving her reading relevant to his quest and engaging in conversations, but without any suggestion of erotic involvement. When she has reached the requi- site depth, he uses various techniques to get her erotically involved. He also pretends friendship with her aunt and a suitor, both of whom he manipulates for his own purposes. There is no sexuality until her fnal surrender, after which he promptly drops her; in fact, it is not even clear that sexual relations were even realized. Bradley Dewey asks, “Could he be…a eunuch, ‘fundamentally unerotic’ or ‘sexually impotent,’ more interested in art than act?”49 And Johannes does say that in service to the Idea he pursues, he has “self-discipline, abstemiousness from every forbidden enjoyment.”50 He typically gives himself a maximum of six months for each conquest. Meanwhile, he keeps his eye open for future possibilities. And in his diary he records his progress for future refective enjoyment. Jothen notes that what grounds his existence is existing in the imagination, “reliving past events and fantastical possibilities.”51 What Johannes enjoys in his conquest of women is his mastery of each situation, before, during, and after each episode—not in massive numbers like the Don, but fewer and more select, like a connoisseur rather than a wolf, to be savored afterwards in imagination. His central observation regarding himself is contained in an image: he lives riding the currents of a sea of challenges and enjoyment while simultaneously occupying a crow’s nest of refective observation, high above the storms, from which he directs his action.52 There

47The late Bradley Dewey presents a most interesting report on seven different ways of understanding Johannes. SS, 159–99. 48BNF, 41. 49SS, 162. 50E/O I, 432. 51KAS, 14. 52E/O I, 320. 260 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life are three characters involved in all his relations: his object, himself in his immediacy, and himself in his refective distance. All his words and actions in relation to his prey and those he uses with others as means to the prey are calculated. He allows no spontaneity and refectively enjoys his own enjoyment. Dewey refers to Johannes’ “schizophrenia.” But that is necessary: “If the hovering self gets too closely involved with the activ- ity itself…it loses the aesthetic distance it needs to direct the action and enjoy the stimuli.”53 In fact, he always restrains himself in those sorts of enjoyment that might catch one up in wild abandon, such as those by which the Don was governed. That’s why it isn’t clear whether his relation to Cordelia is consummated sexually or not. In a sense, it doesn’t matter—a real disappointment for those adolescent males (and older males who never got beyond adolescence) who secretly admire the Don. In between the extremes of the Don and the Seducer, immediate appetite and cultivated enjoyment, there are many grades of aestheticism, some of which we have noted above. There is another set of aesthetes in Kierkegaard’s sense, a set that stands in a vertical relation to the horizontal polarity between the Don and the Seducer: it is the polarity between the detached observer and the poetic contemplator. In his preface to “The Banquet,” William Apham distinguishes between memory and recollection.54 The former is a matter of quasi- mechanical recall; but the latter is related to the former as wine to grapes. Recollection takes place when the inessential drops away and the essential appears. This typically occurs in older people whose memory for particulars dims, while the ability to distill the essential from the past yields “poetic far-sight”—provided senility has not set in.55 Such sight allows things to “draw near”: distance opens up closeness. One gains an appreciative depth. One of the conditions for such sight is dwelling in silence. Silence in this sense is not privative, not the absence of sound; it is positive. It involves the stilling of appetitive craving. It creates the condition for poetic appreciation. But in the young, who are gifted with better memory, recollection is poor and their living in appetitive immediacy puts them at a distance from things. They are to a certain extent like Don

53SS, 185. 54SLW, 27–37. 55SLW, 23–37. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 261

Giovanni who, living in his sexual appetite, is close to no woman, though he ravishes them all. Such people know no silence. In Kierkegaard’s view, the modern world is diseased: the modern city is a mechanism for the generation of ever-present noise. He remarks that, if he were a physician contacted for a remedy, he would prescribe the practice of silence.56 As positive as poetic far-sight might be, as great a cultivation and thus self-discipline it might require, it is still a mode of aestheticism without ethical and religious commitment. And there are other Kierkegaardian aesthetes of the cultivated sort: intellectual aesthetics, those who engage in philosophic speculation which culminates in the contemplation of Nature and History or in various forms of detached observation. In addition to the author of Either/Or vol. I, there is Constantin Constantius, a psychological experimenter and author of Repetition; Johannes Climacus, author of Philosophical Fragments57 and its Postscript, a contemplator of ideas; Anti-Climacus, author of Sickness unto Death; Johannes de Silentio, author of Fear and Trembling who attempts various interpretations of the Abraham–Isaac story; Hilarius Bookbinder, editor of Stages that contains “Guilty/Not Guilty” discovered and edited by Frater Taciturnus;58 and William Afham who introduces and narrates “The Banquet.” All these are more “speculative.” They play intellectu- ally or—in the case of Afham, poetically—with certain possibilities. Frater Taciturnus, for example, is interested in “the religious” as a phenome- non, though he admits that he is not himself religious.59 They might, like Walter Kaufmann, mourn the disappearance of the religious because of the loss of the source of all the beautiful art religious people have produced.60 Climacus takes on Hegel’s speculative system directly and lays out certain options for the religious stage, though, again, he is not himself religious—indeed, he is himself dispositionally like Hegel in that he is employing categories to single out Existence. Such types enjoy theory,

56Cited by Max Picard as the conclusion of his work, The World of Silence, without iden- tifying the locus. 57Philosophical Fragments. D. Swenson and H. Hong trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 58SLW, 363–444. 59SLW, 1967, 437. 60Religion in Four Dimensions: Existential, Aesthetic, Historical, and Comparative. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977). 262 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life observation, speculation or poetizing. So in Kierkegaard’s terms, even Aristotle’s life of theoria is a life of self-enjoyment. These are disciplined modes of constructing thought-castles, though Kierkegaard seems more disposed to poetic far-sight than he is to abstract speculative appreciation. The basic question is, again, the perspective from which one relates to both poles of one’s existence. What is the overall principle of life within which these practices are embedded? How does it stand with respect to one’s dedication to others, to one’s role in carrying on the human enterprise in the familial and professional aspects, and how do both the aesthetic and the ethical spheres together stand before God? How deep is the inwardness, especially in relation to the latter? Minimally, that would involve the awareness that “we foat on waters 70,000 fathoms deep” as a more profound aesthetic. The aesthetic and ethical spheres would be positioned within an awareness of the cosmic context that would be more than conceptual.61 Kierkegaard himself transferred the notion of sensory beauty in art to life itself as an art. Such an art requires a focal point. In his earlier years it is this which he lacked. “Vainly I have sought an anchorage, not just in the depths of knowledge, but in the bottomless sea of pleasure.”62 He thought he had found such an anchorage in his fancée, Regina Olsen, but he soon broke off the engagement and hinted at his reasons in several of his works. At last he found it in being a poet and thinker who viewed his work as a God-given vocation. In the second part of Either/Or, Judge William both carries on a polemic against aestheticism and argues for its higher existence within the context of a marital commitment. It is the latter which gives one’s life solidity, binding together what might only be “aphorisms,” that is, atomic fragments, found in life itself. Marriage is the real poetic life. The judge says, “There are two things that I must regard as my particular task: to show the aesthetic meaning of marriage and to show how the aesthetic in it may be retained despite life’s numerous hindrances.”63

61Sylvia Walsh provides a detailed study of Kierkegaard himself as the poet who concocts the characters and views, but also, like and unlike the cultivated aesthete, becomes the artist of his own life viewed as a divine call. Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics. (University Park Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994) (henceforth LP). 62Cited in Harries, BNF, 6. 63E/O II, 8. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 263

Further, he says, “I sacrifce myself to my work, my wife, my children or, to be more accurate, I do not sacrifce myself to them, but fnd my joy and satisfaction in them.”64 As Harries points out, basically he proposes seeing life as a vocation rather than as an experiment.65 On the other hand, Bradley Dewey asks, “If you had to decide who had the most vital, engaged, and interesting self—Johannes or the Judge—who would it be?” He leaves no doubt, for Johannes had “pow- erful refective capacity, focused self-consciousness, penetrating analyti- cal skills.” He is more highly developed than many at higher stages. So Dewey notes that “Kierkegaard’s development of the self and his doc- trine of the stages are, in fact, decoupled.”66 For all that, A was a narcissist. He himself said, “I have found in myself the most interesting person among my acquaintances.”67 And, of course, “interesting” is a basic characteristic of the aesthetic life. But for Kierkegaard, the ultimate framework within which the aesthetic stage and even the ethical stage are embedded is the religious, situating the larger community within which one might secure an ethical commitment, within the cosmos and before God. Climacus in the Postscript distinguishes two modes of religiousness, unceremoniously called A and B.68 The frst involves a general relation to God that may be rafted upon a sense of cosmic depth, while the second involves a distinctively Christian commitment. A is a-historical; B is grounded in the entry of God into history. For Climacus, the latter involves passing through the affront to reason presented by the Paradox, the Absurd that is Christ as the infnite become fnite, as the God-Man.69 Climacus says, “Christianity is spirit; spirit is inwardnesss; inwardness is subjectivity; subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infnite, personally interested passion for one’s eternal happiness.”70 Confronted with the Paradox, the individual is driven to the ultimate mode of passionate inwardness.71 One’s ultimate destiny is at stake, and

64E/O II, 174. 65Harries, BNF, 120. 66Dewey, SS, 178–9. 67E/O I, 396. 68CUP, 506–7. 69CUP, 512–5, 540. 70CUP, 33. 71CUP, 510. 264 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life yet one cannot syllogize one’s way into belief. Only a leap provided by grace, if such occurs, can take one over the abyss of contradiction. Yet, having made the leap, one can never rest content with thinking “I am a Christian.” One can only set to work to open oneself to the grace of constantly progressing in becoming a Christian.72 Christendom is the place where the external trappings appear, complete with doctrinal fdelity, rule-keeping, and regular communal wor- ship. It is here precisely where the outer conceals the inner, the place where the “whitened sepulchers who are flled with dead men’s bones” are found. Here one thinks one is a Christian. In Kierkegaard’s time, if a child asked a mother, “What is my religion?”, she might reply with a question, “In which country do we live?” With the answer, “In Denmark,” the conclusion would be, “Then you are Lutheran.” One has to be driven into inwardness by a living awareness of the Absurd to transcend the complacency of such merely external observance. Imagine someone who really was a God-seeker came to a Lutheran believer and asked where to fnd God. Let’s say the believer took out a loaf of bread and a cup of wine and said, “Eat and drink. If you receive the witness of the spirit, his body and blood will come to you and you will be united with Him.” What is a rational person to think? For Kierkegaard it is the affront to reason that evokes the deepest passion for the leap in which one is carried over into belief. Then is opened up what it means to be an existing individual, to live at the deepest level of passion and inwardness. Here is the most profound aesthetic, but one only available through commitment and continual openness. We have presented Kierkegaard’s view of the aesthetic life against the background of Hegel’s analysis of human structure: Spirit as a relation between mind and body, time and eternity, fnite and infnite, freedom and necessity which relates itself to its own self. Peder Jothen claims that those who have written on Kierkegaard’s aesthetics have not explored the ontological moorings that gather the fragments together, so that his work would attempt to remedy that.73 In what follows, I will make that attempt by going to “the things themselves” that constitute the feld of human experience as such. (Here we are only reviewing the overall structure within which this work has been generated.) The basis of this view,

72CUP, 533. 73KAS, 5. Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life 265 in Hegel and in fact, is the bipolar character of human existence. One pole is the biological-sensory pole, the most obvious in our experience of ourselves and what surrounds us sensorily. What we sense are actual individuals, whereas, as objects of sensing, they must have a universal character: they must be individuals of the type correlative to the sense power, as, e.g., color is correlative to seeing. But both the act of seeing and the underlying powers, in seeing and in the objects seen, are not objects of sensing. Of course, to know that is to have the ability to apprehend not only the individual and actual given in sensation, but the types and the powers involved. We have come to call that ability “intellect.” But what founds intellect is what occupies the counter-pole to the sensory world, the ontological pole established by the notion of Being. It is what frst arises when we become aware of intellectual power, and what orients us toward the whole of what is by way of the question: what is the Whole and how are we related to it? The proffered answers are generated by religion, philosophy, and natural science. With the openness of the Whole as object of questioning comes the openness of space and time as encompassing wholes within which we have our sensory experience. This allows us to apprehend meanings applicable whenever or wherever we might fnd their instances. It allows us to apprehend the universal. At the same time, projected toward the Whole, we are set at a distance from any part, including any part of ourselves and thus are forced, condemned to choose how we will relate ourselves to the given situations. So the notion of Being, at the ontological pole of our being, founds both intellect and free will. These are then the poles of experience: the biologically mediated awareness of the sensory environment and ontological pole of reference to the Whole as object of questioning. This structure, as human nature, creates the felds of meaning. Interpretations and choices, passed on to others, forms a world of meaning, a set of ways of thinking, acting, and feeling peculiar to a given tradition which necessarily stamps those inducted into it. So each of us is genetically grounded and culturally formed. When the capacity to make a free choice emerges, each of us has begun to create another set of determinants for which we each have to take responsibil- ity. What we are in any given moment is the result of three determinants which we cannot not have: a genetic, a cultural, and a personal-historical determinant. This sets up a tension between I as center of awareness and 266 Epilogue: Kierkegaard on the Aesthetic Life choice and Me as the currently determinate self. The question always implicit is: what am I going to do with Me? Now fnally, to come to the area of Kierkegaard’s central concern: these three determinants percolate downward into the center of the self to form what a long tradition has called ‘the heart.’74 It establishes a magnetic feld of attractants and repellants unique to each individual and is the default mode for the typical patterns of our choices. The heart is what brings things close to the self, no matter how far or close spatially. My family is closer to me than my brain. The heart is the domain of radi- cal subjectivity, of deepest personal inwardness, generator of our strong- est emotional reactions. It limns the space for what it means to be “an existing individual…with passion and inwardness.”75 As we said, there are different general patterns of choice that form the three spheres of human existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Within the overall bipolar feld, the aesthetic occupies another set of poles: at the level of sensory gratifcation, between appetitive immediacy and refective gratifcation, and at the level of our wider relation to the Whole, between poetic immediacy and philosophic refection. Insofar as any of the character types found in these regions abstract from ethical and religious commitment, for Kierkegaard they still occupy the aesthetic as the lowest level of human experience, no matter how developed they are. Though he gives a direction to contemporary deconstructionists in his pluralist interpretation of the Abraham story, he also holds up the mirror to whatever resemblance its practitioners might have to the aesthetic life.76 What Kierkegaard presents is the aesthetes’ own view of the aesthetic life with no reference to any higher sphere, with the emptiness it eventually displays because it is without any binding commitments to family, friends, the broader community, and the divine—and ultimately for Kierkegaard himself, to Christ. Like everyone else, the aesthete has to die; but the depths of existence would have passed him by. Kierkegaard invites us to place the aesthetic-philosophical exercises exhibited in his work within the deeper contexts of existence.77

74See Kierkegaard’s PH. 75CUP, 118ff. 76See Walsh LP, 245. 77For a treatment of aesthetics through a phenomenological dialogue with the Western tradition from Plato to Heidegger, see my Placing Aesthetics: Refections on the Philosophic Tradition (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1999). Bibliography

Caputo, John. 2007. Kierkegaard, London: Granta Books. Dewey, Bradley. 1995. “Seven Seducers: A Typology of Interpretations of the o Aesthetic Stage in Kierkegaard’s ‘The Seducer’s Diary.’” Hannay and Morino, 159–99. Dunning, Stephen. 1995. Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hannay, Alasdair and Gordon Morino, editors. 1998. The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard. New York: Cambridge University Press. Harries, Karsten. 2010. Between Nihilism and Faith: A Commentary on Either/ Or. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Hegel, G.F.W. 1977. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind. W. Wallace, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jothan, Peder. 2014. Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood: The Art of Subjectivity. Burlington: Ashgate. Kaufmann, Walter. 1977. Religion in Four Dimensions: Existential, Aesthetic, Historical, and Comparative. New York: McGraw-Hill. Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientifc Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. W. Lowrie trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1944. Either/Or D. Swenson and L. Swenson trans. Two volumes. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. ———. 1954. Sickness Unto Death. W. Lowrie trans. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. ———. 1956. Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. D. Speere trans. New York: Harper and Row. ———. 1959. The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard. Alexander Dru ed. and trans. London: Oxford University Press.

———. 1962. Philosophical Fragments. D. Swenson and H. Hong trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1962. The Point of View of My Work as an Author. W. Lowrie trans. New York: Harper. ———. 1965. Kierkegaard’s thesis was on The Concept of Irony. L. Capel trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ———. 1967. Stages on Life’s Way. W. Lowrie trans. New York: Shocken Books. ———. 1993. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. H. Hong and E. Hong ed. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Locke, John. 1975. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. P. Nidditch ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mackey, Louis. 1971, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Martin Buber. 1965. Daniel: Dialogues on Realization. M. Friedman trans. New York: McGraw-Hill. Pattison, George. 1998. “Art in an age of refection.” Hannay and Marino. Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 76–100. Picard, Max. 1958. The World of Silence. Chicago: Regnery. Plato. Gorgias. 1977. D. Zayl trans. Plato: The Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett. ———. Phaedrus. 1977. A. Nehemas and P. Woodruff trans. Plato: The Complete Works. ———. Republic. 1977. G. Grube and C. Reeve. Plato: The Complete Works. ———. Symposium. 1977. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff trans. Plato: The Complete Works. Walsh, Sylvia. 1994. Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics. University Park Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Westphal, Merold. 1998. “Kierkegaard and Hegel.” Hannay and Marino. Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard. 101–12. Wood, Robert. 1999. Placing Aesthetics: Refections on the Philosophic Tradition. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. ———. 2000. “Recollection and Two Banquets: Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s.” International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or. Two volumes. R. Perkins ed. Atlanta: Mercer University Press, 49–68. Author Index

A Böcklin, Arnold, 160 Abram, Murray, 67 Boethius, 157 Adams, Ansel, 207 o Bogart, Humphrey, 219 Albers, Josef, 99, 209 Bourget, Paul, 222 Alberti, Leon Batista, 65 Bowie, Malcolm, 188 Alexander the Great, 102 Brancusi, Constantin, 81, 82, 111 Aligieri, Dante, 87, 89, 166, 186, 190 Breugel, Pieter the Elder, 104, 110 Allen, Woody, 213 Brunelleschi, Filippo, 107 Apollinaire, Guilliame, 109 Buber, Martin, 24, 114, 156 Aquinas, 204 Buddha, 49, 113, 232 Aristotle, 4, 15, 75, 131, 132, 145, Burneat, Myles 152, 173, 177, 180, 184, 196 Arnold, Matthew, 190 Augustine, 6, 86 C Calder, Alexander, 208 Callicot, Baird, 28 B Caputo, John, 250 Bahktin, Mikael Carlson, Allen, ix, 12, 15, 21 Baker, Tammy Fay, 237 Carrol, Noel, 205 Baudelaire, Charles, 86 Cassirer, Ernst, 185 Bazin, André, 212 Cavell, Stanley, 203, 218 Berensen, Bernard, 237 Cervantes, Miguel de, 181 Bergmann, Ingmar, 203, 218 Cézanne, Paul, 116 Blake, William, 99, 192, 194 Chaplin, Charlie, 206 Blixen, Karen, 225 Christ, Jesus, 16 Bloom, Harold, 191 Christo, 6, 50, 91 Boccione, Umberto, 78, 81 Clark, Kenneth, 103 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 269 R.E. Wood, Nature, Artforms, and the World Around Us, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57090-7 270 Author Index

Clerk Maxwell, James, 23 F Cocteau, Jean, 105 Faulkner, William, 222 Collins, Peter, 59 Freud, Sigmund, 187, 196 Corbusier, Le, 56, 60, 65, 66 Fromm, Eric, 27 Correggio, Antonio da, 100 Courbet, Gustave, 103 G Gabo, Naum, 79, 80 D Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 187, 239 Daguerre, Louise, 109 Gehry, Frank, 68 Damish, Hubert, 107 Giedion, Siegfried, 56, 79 Danto, Arthur, 104 Goebbels, Joseph, 211 David, Jacques-Louise Goethe, Wolfgang, 111, 138, 167 Da Vinci, Leonardo, 99, 100 Goldsworthy, Andy, 6, 29, 30, 78, 90, De Chardin, Teilhard, 23 91 Derrida, Jacques, 68, 145, 188 Gratian, Balthasar Dewey, Bradley, 257, 259, 263 Graves, Michael, 67, 70 Dewey, John, 8, 9, 15, 71, 81, 87, Griffth, D.W., 206 102, 103, 108, 113, 114, 132, Groom, Winston, 213 138, 158, 173, 175, 179, 182, Gropius, Walter, 56, 66 184, 185, 205, 223, 229, 240, 242 Dietrich, Marlene, 219 H Dinesen, Isak, 222 Haapula, Arto, 239 Disney, Walt, 221 Harries, Karsten, 65, 67 Dixon, Thomas, 206 Hegel, G.W.F., 7, 9, 15–17, 27, 48, Domingo, Placido, 218 71, 92, 100, 101, 108, 110, 111, Dostoevski, Fyodor, 192 114, 126, 130, 151, 152, 154, Duchamp, Marcel 155, 160, 186, 188, 196 Dunning, Stephen, 249 Heidegger, Martin, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16, 23, 31, 35–41, 49, 68–71, 73, 84, 86, 98, 172, 182, 187, 205, E 208, 232 Eagleton, Terry, 166, 171, 172, 183, Hepburn, Ronald, 12, 14 186, 187, 189–191 Hepworth, Barbara, 78 Eisenman, Peter, 67, 68 Herbert, George, 172 Eisenstein, Sergei, 207, 210–212, 217, Hildebrand, Adolph von, 78, 83, 84, 221 87, 102, 109, 111, 116, 124 Eliot, Thomas Sterns, 190 Hölderlin, Friedrich, 36 Elkins, James, 101 Hopkins, Gerard Manley Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 11, 24 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 166 Empedocles, 177 Husserl, Edmund, 130, 145, 213 Author Index 271

I Leavis, Queenie Roth, 190 Ince, Thomas, 207 Leddy, Tom, 232, 233 Ingarden, Roman, 138, 146, 175, Leopold, Aldo, 11 214, 220 Levi-Strauss, Claude, 166 Iser, Wolfgang, 187 Locke, John, 196 Loos, Adolf, 65 Lossky, Vladimir, 108 J Lotman, Yuri, 186 Jakobsen, Roman, 212 Luther, Martin, 167, 223 Jarzombek, Mark, 67 Jolson, Al, 206 Jothen, Peder, 251, 264 M Joyce, James, 222 Machiavelli, Niccoló, 235 Mackey, Louis, 249, 257 Malevich, Kasimir K Malraux, André, 110 Kahn, Louis, 56, 71 Marcel, Gabriel, 23, 38, 151, 157, Kandinsky, Wassily, 28, 97, 100, 102, 158 103, 111, 114, 125 Matisse, Henri, 101, 109, 114, 118 Kant, Emmanuel, 84, 86, 97, 106, Ma Yuan, 96 150, 151 Meisel, Edmund, 221 Kass, Leon, 12, 222, 223, 225, 234, Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 8, 87, 97, 238 98, 109, 116, 209 Kaufmann, Walter, 6, 16, 24, 36, 156, Meyer, C.F., 69 242 Michelangelo, 77, 86, 88 Keats, John, 180 Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig, 70 Kierkegaard, Søren, 10, 126, 155, Miller, J. Hillis, 178 186, 191, 215 Milton, John, 186 Klee, Paul, 98, 100, Mitry, Jean, 103, 202, 206, 207, 212, 114, 118, 119 214, 219, 221, 222 Klein, Jacob, 179 Mondrian, Piet, 28, 88, 100, 103, Kline, Franz, 97 111, 113, 114, 121, 122, Kubrick, Stanley, 207 124–126, 159 Kuleshov, Lev, 209 Monroe, Marilyn, 219 Kundera, Milan, 181, 182, 189, 193, Montgomery, Robert, 213 215, 241 Moore, Henry, 76–82, 152 Mussorgski, Modest Muzhukhin, Ivan, 209 L Langer, Suzanne, 101, 130, 155, 209 Lean, David, 207 N Leavis, Frank Raymond, 190 Napoleon Bonaparte 272 Author Index

Newton, Isaac, 17, 23 R Nicholson, Ben, 78 Rabelais, François, 190 Nicholson, Marjorie Hope, 19 Rachmaninov, Sergei, 159, 160 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 6, 16, 184, 192, Read, Herbert, 80, 82 196, 215 Renoir, Pierre-Auguste, 100 Norberg-Schulz, Christian, 60, 61, 70 Reynolds, Joshua, 95, 101, 102, 111, Norris, Frank, 207 112, 114 Nussbaum, Martha, 177, 180 Ricoeur, Paul, 5, 134, 168, 171, 176, 187–189, 196 Rilke, Rainer Marie, 6, 75, 82, 87, 88, O 114, 126, 191, 241 O’Keefe, Georgia, 78 Roche, Mark, 241 Olivier, Lawrence Rodin, Auguste, 75, 81, 83, 86–89 Olmstead, Frederick Law, 29 Rolston III, Holmes, 26 Ortega y Gasett, José, 26 Rosi, Francesco, 218 Ouspensky, Leonid, 108 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 87 Ruskin, John, 54, 56, 82, 83

P Panovsky, Erwin, 203 S Parkes, Graham, 243, 244 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 163, 165, 176, 185, Parmenides, 170, 177, 178, 215 188, 190 Parrhasios, 110 Schiller, Friedrich, 193 Pater, Walter, 100, 155, 175 Schlegel, Friedrich, 71 Pattison, George Schopenhauer, Arthur, 71, 83, 95, Perl, Eric, 242 111, 151, 156–158 Pevsner, Antoine, 56 Searle, John, 166 Phidias, 81, 86 Shakespeare, William, 166, 185, 214 Picard, Max, 157, 158, 191 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 221 Picasso, Pablo, 109 Sloterdijk, Peter, 91–93 Plato, 28, 60, 68, 72, 73, 76, 82, 87, Smithson, Robert, 90 100, 101, 106, 132, 142, 152, Socrates, 178, 229, 231 169, 170, 174, 179, 184, 186, Spielberg, Steven, 220 189, 196, 216, 218, 229–233, Spinoza, Benedict, 24 237, 241, 242 Spurling, Hillary, 109 Plotinus, 28, 82, 242 Stein, Gertrude, 109 Plutarch, 157 Stendhal, 190 Poe, Edgar Allen, 153, 184 Stephens, Diane, 193 Pollock, Jackson, 105 Stroheim, Erich von, 207 Pope, Alexander, 185, 234 Strunck, Jürgen, 109 Sullivan, Louis, 63, 65, 66, 70, 72 Author Index 273

T White, Hayden, 171 Tarentino, Quentin Whitehead, Alfred North, 23, 24, 189 Tarkovsky, Andrey, 183, 217 Wilenski, R.H., 60, 77, 79, 82 Tate, Alan, 190 Williams, John, 220 Telemann, Georg Philipp, 240 Williams, Robin, 219 Thoreau, Henry David, 11, 20, 25, 26 Winckelmann, Johann Joachim, 81 Titian, 103 Winters, Jonathan, 219 Tolkien, J.R.R., 177 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Tschumi, Bernard, 67 Wölffin, Heinrich, 99 Wood, David, 12 Wood, Mark, 44, 46 V Wood, Robert E., 5, 151 van Dyck, Anthony, 100 Wood, Robert L., 85 van Gogh, Vincent, 69, 95, 100–102, Wordsworth, William, 23, 172, 239 110, 114, 115 Wright, Frank Lloyd, 56, 66, 70, 82, Venturi, Robert, 67 240 Virgil, 186 Vitruvius, 57, 58, 65 Vittori, Francesco, 235 Y Voltaire, 185 Yeats, William Butler, 163

W Z Walsh, Sylvia, 262 Zemeckis, Robert, 213 Wayne, John, 219 Zeno, 205 Weiss, Paul, 24, 203, 208, 223, 241 Zeuxis, 84, 110 Welk, Lawrence, 149, 221 Welles, Orson, 205, 212 Welsch, Wolfgang, 241 Westphal, Merold, 253 Subject Index

A Animal, 1, 4, 6, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, Abstraction (Abstract), 103, 107, 121, 25, 43, 53, 101, 131, 156, 164, o 123, 168 173, 176, 221, 230, 233, 238 Absurd, 263, 264 Aphorism, 95 Academic, 125, 214 Apodeixis, 179 Action, 5, 13, 16, 44, 48, 86, 104, Apollonian (Apollo), 6, 82, 88, 93, 113, 134, 139, 147, 172, 175, 100, 107, 114, 126, 148, 222, 176, 180, 195, 202–204, 207, 231, 241 210, 211, 214–216, 218, 220, Appearance. See Manifestness 221, 235 Appetite, 1, 6 Actor, 183, 203, 209, 210, 214, 218, Architecture (Architect), 9, 15, 29, 219 31, 40, 47, 48, 53, 54, 56, 57, Adjective, 38, 165 59–62, 65–68, 70–72, 77, 79, 82, Adverb, 165 83, 91, 138, 141, 154, 202, 203, Aesthetics (Aesthetic, Aesthete, 208, 221, 230, 232, 234, 240 Aestheticism), 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, Art (Artform, Artist), 2, 6–10, 12, 49, 110, 152, 244 14–16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28–30, Aletheia.See Truth and Unconcealment 35, 36, 38, 39, 49, 50, 54, 56, Allegory, 178, 179 57, 60, 62, 66, 68, 70, 72, 73, Alphabet (Alphabetical), 168 76–79, 81–84, 86–88, 90–93, Ambiance, 45, 72, 214, 215, 225 95, 97, 98, 100–108, 110, 111, American, 141 113–115, 118, 124–126, 131, Angel, 37 132, 137, 141, 150, 152–156, 158, 160, 172, 175, 182,

184, 185, 201–210, 216, 217, Book, 24, 29, 91, 98, 103, 110, 136, 220–222, 227, 229, 231, 232, 157, 166, 171, 183, 186, 187, 237, 241–243 193, 203, 215, 222–224, 231 Article, 84, 165 Boredom, 256 Artifcial, 42, 45, 60, 71, 84, 208 British, 235 Asymmetry, 244 Byzantine, 107 Atheism (Atheist), 158, 194, 242 Attribute, 3, 71, 113, 165 Audience, 132, 136, 142, 145, C 148, 153, 157, 160, 164, 165, Calligraphy, 243 170, 171, 175, 205, 212, 214, Camera (Cameraman), 26–28, 216–219, 221 87, 102, 106, 107, 109, 203, Aura, 158, 173, 183, 184 208–210, 212, 213, 216, 218, Author, 11, 147, 176, 182, 185, 225 225, 239 Authority, 92, 186 Canon (Canonical), 84, 185, 186, 190 Awareness, 1–3, 13, 17, 18, 22, 28, Catharsis, 177, 180 40, 44, 49, 68, 71, 114, 117, Cathedral, 62, 63, 65, 70, 72, 75, 82, 130, 158, 166, 167, 187, 196, 157, 203, 221 201, 213, 215 Catholic, 2, 142, 187, 234 Cause (Causal), 17, 87, 97, 137, 157, 166, 195, 201 B Cave (Plato), 72 Ballet, 153, 216, 221, 241 Character, 1, 4, 6, 13, 19, 59–62, 66, Baroque, 142, 144, 234 71, 75, 77, 83, 87, 103–106, Bauhaus, 70, 99, 232 110, 113, 121, 126, 141–143, Beauty (Beautiful), 12, 19, 20, 22, 26, 145–148, 152, 164, 167, 172, 28, 39, 47, 49, 54, 59, 60, 62, 174–176, 178–185, 189, 194, 72, 81, 82, 95, 102, 106, 112, 204, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218, 150, 154, 155, 174, 191, 192, 221, 235, 238, 243 195, 233, 240–242, 244 Chartres, 62 Being (notion of), 2, 3, 6, 28, 36, 37, Chinese, 95, 105 53, 167, 196, 230 Choice (Choose), 3–6, 42, 53, 130, Bestand.See Standing reserve 134, 166, 187, 188, 201 Biology (Biological), 3, 6, 13, 14, 17, Chora, 68 23, 53, 187, 230 Choral, 68, 141, 143 Bipolar, 1, 2, 4, 5, 28, 53, 106, 158, Christianity (Christendom), 16, 223 167, 192, 201 Church, 65, 133, 140, 141, 193, 226, Body (Bodily), 9, 30, 50, 65, 87, 88, 234 93, 104, 169, 176, 204, 214, Cinema, 202, 206, 207, 210, 215, 236, 237, 248, 249, 264 222 Citizen, 223, 230 Subject Index 277

City, 19, 21, 28, 50, 64, 82, 131, 141, Contemplation (Contemplative, 178, 229, 230, 238, 241 Contemplator), 133, 180, 190, Civil (Civility), 238 191, 205 Civilization, 41, 111, 191, 217 Convenientia, 58, 59, 67, 68, 236 Classic (Classical), 9, 57, 81, 101, Cosmetic, 236, 237 110, 125, 129, 141–144, 147, Cosmos (Cosmic), 14, 16, 30, 36, 157, 158, 180, 185, 186, 190, 41, 42, 49, 56, 62, 72, 103, 106, 191, 193, 205, 222, 235, 240 113, 133, 156, 157, 178, 230 Clothing, 14, 72, 107, 113, 229–231, Costume, 203, 234 233–236, 239 Counter-Reformation. See Collage, 210, 221 Reformation Color, 3, 4, 6, 19, 20, 28, 29, 42, 45, Courage, 138, 173, 178, 206 49, 69–71, 83, 95, 97–100, 103, Courtesy, 238 105–107, 110, 120, 123–125, Creativity (Creative), 28, 77, 78, 82, 154, 159, 195, 204, 205, 207, 148, 154, 181, 192, 206, 227 209, 226, 231–233, 236, 239, Criterion (Criteria), 185 240 Criticism (New Criticism), 190 Comic, 180 Culture (Cultural), 1, 5, 7, 9, 13, 37, Commentary, 145, 223 38, 47, 50, 84, 85, 126, 138, Communist, 211 156, 167, 170, 175, 191, 201, Community, 7, 20, 36, 50, 91, 158, 214, 217, 238, 243 165, 166, 193, 226 Cutting room, 210, 214, 219 Comportment, 217, 243 Composer, 131, 139, 141, 145–147, 151, 153–155, 157, 203, 221 D Composition, 82, 102, 103, 106, 122, Dance (Dancing), 9, 110, 132, 140, 123, 125, 142, 153, 210, 211 143, 144, 154, 206, 221, 224, Concept (Conception, 226, 233, 238, 240 Conceptualization), 3, 13, 24, Danish, 222, 223 53, 66, 72, 77, 81, 82, 133, 150, Death, 15, 16, 30, 40, 41, 67, 120, 178, 184, 185, 230, 243 123, 153, 160, 196, 223, 231, Concerto, 136, 144 235, 244 Conjunction, 17, 36, 69, 164, 165 Declarative, 165, 174, 178 Connoisseur, 224, 237, 238 Deconstruction (Deconstructive), 59, Consciousness, 13, 17, 23, 82, 187, 67, 68, 181, 186, 189, 191 217 Decoration (Decorative), 14, 48, 62, Consonant, 132, 134, 137, 146, 168, 65, 83, 102, 151, 229, 232 242 Defnition, 186, 242 Construct (Construction), 35–37, 53, Department, 189, 191, 204 56, 59, 63, 64, 66, 70, 79, 84, Depth, 13, 22, 25, 49, 50, 55, 84, 102, 129, 131, 143, 168, 176, 86, 88, 97, 103, 108, 110, 116, 183, 184, 186, 189, 214 278 Subject Index

118, 125, 126, 151, 156, 178, Distinction, 39, 68, 81, 98, 99, 103, 185–187, 191, 241 134, 139, 146, 153, 166, 171, Description, 36, 53, 92, 163, 180, 173, 182, 212, 238, 241 189, 205, 214, 241 Divine. See God(s) Design, 14, 39, 44, 68, 70, 72, 103, DNA, 189 230–233, 240 Doric, 57 De Styl, 66 Drama (Dramatic), 9, 26, 45, 135, Determinacy, 69, 110 140, 143, 149, 155, 175, 180, Development, 16, 25, 26, 28, 30, 36, 204, 215 59, 61, 62, 64, 70, 105, 114, Dutch, 101 125, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, Duty (Duties), 15, 114, 195 157, 164, 170, 174, 176, 181, Dwelling. See Inhabitance 188, 205–207, 210, 222, 236, Dynamics, 132, 136, 145–147, 154, 238 164, 168, 170, 183, 214 Dialogue (Dialogical), 23, 54, 169, 178, 179, 181, 194, 206, 215, 216 E Diapsalmata, 255 Earth (Heidegger), 9, 35, 36, 40, 41, Diaries, 247 49, 69–71 Diction, 147, 175, 180, 185, 205, Editor, 221 214, 215 Ego. See I Difference, 56, 61, 102–104, 132, Egyptian, 81 147, 153, 168, 172–174, 177, Eidos. SeeForm; Eidetic 182, 196, 210, 214, 217, 219, Elements, 17, 21, 39–41, 43–45, 47, 220, 235–238 49, 56, 59, 65–67, 77, 104, 111, Digital, 210 121, 122, 139, 152, 160, 175, Dimension, 42, 48, 50, 56, 67, 70, 176, 184, 192, 215, 216, 226, 71, 76, 78, 109, 118, 119, 130, 229–232, 243 156, 164, 171, 179, 180, 205, Emotion (Emotional), 22, 66, 80, 214, 216, 217 82, 109, 136, 139, 142–144, Dionysian (Dionysus), 93, 100, 148, 151–154, 156, 160, 173, 177, 222, 231, 242 220, 221, 231, 240 Director, 153, 183, 203, 207, Empiricism (Empirical), 2, 134, 168 210–212, 214, 217, 219–222, Emplotment, 175, 176, 180, 204 225, 226 Enactment, 214, 215, 217 Discourse, 95, 102, 111, 165, 168, Encompassing, 3, 14, 24, 28, 40, 50, 181, 188 53, 68, 72, 84, 85, 112–114, Disposition. See Ethos 125, 126, 156–158, 177, 184, Distance, 3–5, 22, 97, 107, 108, 153, 196, 226, 243 157, 170, 177, 181, 191, 197, Engineering, 56, 57, 59, 63, 66 201, 202, 211, 230, 239 English, 29, 170, 174, 189–191, 225 Enjoyment, 18, 238 Subject Index 279

Entertainment, 25, 217, 232, 241 188, 191, 194, 196, 217, 220, Environment, 1, 2, 8, 10, 12–15, 236, 240–242 17, 20, 21, 25, 29–31, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 49, 50, 61, 66, 68, 70, 72, 81, 82, 90, 97, 100, F 101, 104, 105, 107, 125, 164, Fantasy, 118, 176, 177, 183, 184, 207 167–169, 172, 175, 201, 223, Fashion, 36, 195, 221, 236, 239 229, 231–233, 239, 243 Fiction, 171, 176 Epic, 180, 181 Film (Filmmaker), 205, 206 Epigram, 126, 215 Finite, 248, 249, 257, 263, 264 Eros, 178, 179, 196 Flower, 20, 25, 27, 28, 43, 48, 61, 66, Essay, 5, 11–14, 36, 39, 95, 143, 171, 101, 231–233, 240, 243 192, 196, 207 Form. See Eidos Essence (Essential), 13, 28, 36, 37, Fourfold (Heidegger), 36, 37, 39, 40, 40, 48, 68, 69, 78, 81, 98, 102, 49 105, 108, 111, 114, 116, 118, Frame (Framing), 8, 18, 27, 28, 41, 133, 154, 156, 167, 171, 175, 77, 84, 88, 105–107, 109, 123, 177, 211, 214 160, 208–210, 212, 225, 226, Eternity (Eternal), 24, 88, 89, 93, 231, 239 112, 114, 156, 185, 192, Freedom, 114, 130, 152, 186, 188, 194–197, 242 189, 219, 222, 226 Ethical (Ethics), 2, 10, 26, 38, 184, French, 144, 241 191 Friendship, 178, 191 Ethos.See Disposition Function, 2, 7, 16, 18, 27, 36, 43, 53, Etruscan, 81 56–59, 62–69, 72, 84, 102–104, Existence (Existential, Existentialism), 112, 114, 116, 125, 134, 136, 1, 20, 23, 28, 30, 37, 38, 67, 73, 148, 167–169, 171, 172, 175, 126, 158, 160, 168, 178, 196, 176, 179, 195, 208, 218, 229, 217 232, 233, 235–241 Experience, 1, 3–6, 8, 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 35–37, 48, 53, 54, 68, 78, 84, 86, 87, 93, 106, G 108, 113, 114, 124, 126, 130, Game, 21, 25, 176, 241 132, 151–153, 156, 158, 173, Garden, 15, 19, 20, 25, 27, 42, 45, 177, 181, 187, 189, 201, 203, 48, 61 205, 210, 215, 221, 240, 242, Genetic, 5, 130 243 Genius, 29, 168, 173, 185, 224 Expression (Expressivity), 16, 37, 48, Genius loci, 53, 61 54, 57, 60, 63, 69, 77, 82, 84, Genre, 180–182, 185, 192 88, 102, 108, 111, 114, 116, German, 19, 75, 126 118, 125, 130, 136, 144, 151, Gesamtkunst, 203, 232 152, 157, 163, 169, 173, 185, Gestalt, 57, 125 280 Subject Index

Gesture, 135, 215–217, 223, 243 House, 20, 39–41, 47, 48, 61, 70, God-Man, 16 105, 116, 225, 229, 232, 233 God(s). See Divine Humility, 190, 191, 244 Good, 4, 28, 29, 68, 77, 83, 95, 102, Hymn, 193, 226, 229 107, 111, 146, 167, 173, 178, Hypomneme, 28, 169 179, 192, 208, 209, 232, 233, 236, 241 Gothic, 64, 81, 82, 86 I Greek, 16, 19, 41, 62, 66, 69, 81, I. SeeEgo 83, 95, 110, 137, 143, 152, 183, Id, 187 216, 225, 236, 238 Idea, 75, 78, 138, 143, 156, 175, Gymnastic, 16, 230, 237 179, 182, 184, 233 Identity, 16, 138, 182, 242 Ideology (Ideological), 187, 188, 190 H Image, 27, 42, 48, 72, 78, 87, 93, Happiness, 263 106, 118, 138, 149, 179, 184, Harmonic Series, 14, 131, 136 190, 195, 205, 208, 211, 215, Harmony (Harmonious), 9, 14, 28, 217, 219, 220 50, 66, 77, 79, 107, 130, 131, Imagination, 9, 14, 27, 78, 82, 83, 136–139, 143, 229–231, 243 95, 109, 152, 181, 211, 214 Heart, 5, 6, 15, 23, 38, 86, 99, 133, Imitation. See Mimesis 139, 156, 172, 175, 181, 188, Immediacy, 22, 125, 167, 173, 201, 215, 217, 224, 241 208, 215, 238 Hermeneutics. See Interpretation Immortals, 36, 37, 49, 50, 69, 79, Heroic. See Spoudaios 196 Heteroglossia, 181, 193 Imperative, 6, 114, 126, 165 Hexameter, 177, 179 Individual (Individuality), 3–5, 13, 24, Hierarchy (Hierarchical), 4, 66, 150, 40, 48, 101, 116, 130, 131, 135, 165, 174, 181, 236 145, 146, 156, 166, 168, 176, History (Historical), 1, 5, 15, 18, 19, 177, 179, 181, 183, 184, 187, 21–23, 36, 42, 58, 59, 66, 67, 188, 190, 194, 201, 213, 214, 81, 82, 95, 98, 99, 101, 105, 219, 225, 238, 239, 242 107, 108, 110, 114, 125, 129, Infnite (Infnity), 3, 88, 114, 151, 139, 140, 142, 163, 164, 167, 173 171, 176, 186, 187, 189–191, Infnitive, 165 204, 205, 207 Inhabitance. See Dwelling Hollywood, 236 Insight, 117, 178, 179, 191 Home, 19, 39, 40, 70, 138, 140, 222, Inspiration, 37, 67, 87, 118, 184, 233 226, 233, 235 Instrument, 117, 135, 137, 139, 140, Horizon (Fusion of; Horizontal), 184, 142–145, 147–149, 229 187 Integration, 18, 44, 175, 204, 233 Subject Index 281

Intellect (Intellectual), 4, 5, 35, 38, 130, 143, 147, 151–156, 159, 78, 81, 110, 126, 155, 156, 173, 160, 165, 178, 179, 184, 179, 191, 192 189–193, 195, 196, 203, 210, Interiority, 151, 214 212–214, 216–219, 221, 222, International Style, 57, 63, 65–67, 79, 226, 231, 233, 237–239, 241, 232 242, 244 Interpretation, 53, 72, 80, 93, 134, Light (Lighting), 3, 25, 30, 37, 40, 146–148, 180, 182, 183, 185, 44, 45, 49, 56, 60–62, 65, 69, 210, 214 71, 72, 83, 84, 86, 88, 97, 106, Interrogative, 165 107, 119, 144, 157, 160, 174, Inwardness, 78, 89, 154 178, 196, 201, 204, 205, 209, 226, 231, 240, 242 Literature (Literary), 9, 67, 87, 147, J 149, 163, 167, 171–173, 175, Japanese, 20, 25, 232, 242–244 177, 178, 180–182, 184–191, Jewelry, 237 193, 202, 208, 241 Johannine, 188 Logic, 66 Joy, 151, 153, 154, 156, 194–197, Logos (Logocentrism), 132, 188, 189 214, 222 Lutheran, 133, 223 Justice, 16, 41, 75, 81, 178 Luxury, 230 Lyric, 27, 141, 180, 194

K Kitch, 241 M Knowledge, 3, 7, 14, 17, 21–23, 56, Manifestness. See Appearance 57, 126, 153, 155, 178, 214, 243 Manners, 238, 239 Marriage, 234, 235 Marxism (Marxist), 188 L Mass, 66, 69, 78, 79, 217 Landscape (Landscaping), 9, 14, Matter, 4, 18, 22, 24, 35, 37, 40, 68, 19, 20, 28, 29, 35, 39–41, 43, 72, 88, 105, 111, 116, 121, 125, 47–50, 69, 101, 117, 207, 233 131, 134, 148, 158, 174–176, Language, 5, 7, 9, 31, 36–38, 86, 183, 184, 186, 189, 204, 205, 114, 125, 131, 132, 134–136, 208, 212, 213, 219, 221, 233, 146, 151, 156, 163, 165–167, 235, 238, 239, 241 170, 172, 179–182, 189, 193, Meaning (Meaningful), 4–6, 9, 36–38, 194, 203, 229, 230 40, 48, 50, 53, 54, 60, 66–69, Life (Living, Life-world), 6, 10, 11, 80, 84, 89, 103, 108, 114, 125, 15, 18–22, 24–26, 28, 37, 40, 134, 135, 140, 142, 149, 150, 41, 47–50, 53, 54, 59, 68–70, 154, 155, 164, 166–175, 183, 72, 82, 86, 88, 93, 101, 103, 185, 187, 194, 195, 201, 207, 114, 115, 120, 121, 124–126, 214, 217, 219, 222 282 Subject Index

Mediation (Mediated), 7, 8, 22, 40, Music (Musical, Musicality), 9, 14, 85, 110, 131, 148, 167, 188, 15, 54, 71, 100, 106, 129–133, 208, 221 135–158, 160, 164, 172, 175, Meditation (Meditative), 22, 25, 26, 179, 182, 190, 202, 206–209, 38, 39, 42–44, 47, 49, 50, 88, 216, 219–221, 230, 231, 240, 159, 160, 243 241 Medium, 8, 78, 79, 83, 95, 118, 125, Muslim, 236 130, 133, 154, 170, 203, 204, Mystery, 25, 29, 30, 35, 47–49, 79, 207, 213, 219–221 85, 86, 90, 113, 119, 120, 126, Melody, 14, 66, 100, 130, 131, 135, 157, 158, 217 137–140, 143, 148, 155, 157, Mythos.See Plot and Emplotment 160, 180 Memory. See Mneme Metaphor, 14, 71, 72, 135, 158, 164, N 168, 172, 173, 178, 179 Narcissist (Narrative), 149, 164, 171, Metaphysical (Metaphysics), 14, 23, 172, 178–180, 193, 204, 205 28, 36, 54, 72, 151, 156, 172, Nature (and human nature), 1, 3–7, 184, 185, 192, 204, 241 9–13, 15–18, 20, 21, 23–30, 35, Meter, 164, 174, 177, 180, 194, 220 42, 45, 49, 50, 54, 56, 59, 61, Metonymy, 211 65, 72, 78, 82, 84, 86–88, 90, Mexican, 81 102, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, Middle Ages (medieval), 28, 142, 242 124, 131, 156, 158, 180, 189, Mimesis. See Imitation 203, 229, 231, 233, 243 Mind, 9, 17, 22, 30, 35, 86, 87, 99, Necessity, 97, 152 111, 131, 148, 149, 156, 166, Neo-classical, 185 175, 191, 225, 233 Norwegian, 226 Mis-en-scéne, 208 Noun, 38, 165 Mneme. See Memory Novel, 145, 146, 181, 182, 189, Modernism (Modern), 41, 57, 59–61, 192–194, 204, 206, 207, 211, 63, 64, 66, 67, 71, 75, 77, 79, 213–217, 222, 226, 241 81, 91, 99, 101, 106, 137, 140, 142–145, 189, 203, 217, 231, 234, 238, 241 O Mood, 25, 44, 79, 83, 97, 99, 100, One. See Unity 103, 114, 138, 153, 160, 163, Ontology (Ontological, and Regional 214 ontology), 203, 205, 220 Mortals, 36, 37, 39, 49, 69, 196 Optative, 165 Motif, 30, 62, 65, 75, 83, 135 Oral (Oral tradition), 100, 134, 145, Motion, 102, 104, 125, 154, 204, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170, 175, 205, 209, 215, 217 178 Muses, 37 Organism (Organic, Organicity), 1, 2, 7, 15, 16, 41, 48, 66, 70, 75, 77, Subject Index 283

80, 81, 97, 124, 132, 145, 158, Philosophy (Philosophic), 2, 36, 171, 164, 167, 169, 175, 176, 180, 176–179, 182, 184, 186, 187, 185, 189, 201, 204, 229 237 Ornament, 65–67, 70 Phonemic, 131, 166–169 Orthodox, 234 Phonological, 168 Orthotes.See Truth Photo (Photography), 27, 28, 75, Ousia.See Substance 109, 118, 208, 209, 212, 239 Physics, 17, 18, 23 Physiology, 53, 201 P Picture, 18, 89, 99, 102, 103, 105, Page, 3, 9, 183, 214, 223, 242 110, 111, 149, 156, 204, 209, Painting (Painter), 9, 54, 69, 72, 75, 213, 216, 217, 220, 242 76, 82–84, 88, 95, 97, 99–102, Pietas, 38 104–107, 109–114, 119, 125, Plainchant, 142 126, 208, 209, 217, 220, 226, Plant, 17, 20, 26–28, 40, 42, 44, 45, 230, 231 80, 164, 229, 232, 233 Pans, 232 Plastic, 54, 78, 150, 155, 156, 182, Paradigma, 151, 185 210 Paradox, 205 Play, 14, 25, 37, 39, 47, 56, 71, 79, Participation, 24, 104, 115, 132, 157, 83, 140, 144–147, 152, 158, 175, 241 160, 173, 175, 178, 209, 214, Passion, 149, 216 216, 218, 219, 226 Past, 5, 50, 66, 78, 87, 91, 108, 130, Pleasure, 4, 27, 151, 156, 195 141, 145, 165, 167, 181, 185, Plot. See Mythos 187, 206, 211, 222, 225, 233, Pluralist, 266 235 Poetry (Poetic), 15, 20, 125, 132, Patina, 80, 83, 244 151, 179–182, 184, 190, 237 Pattern, 25, 28, 30, 57, 80, 97, 108, Polarity, 257, 260 131, 136, 143, 152, 164, 167, Politeness, 238 174, 179, 195 Politics (Political), 53, 58, 66, 188, Performance (Performer), 129, 139, 190, 231 143, 146–149, 152, 153, 177, Polyphony, 66, 142 183, 214, 218 Postmodern, 68 Periodic table, 189 Pots, 232 Person, 5, 28, 104, 110, 116, 149, Power, 13, 16, 20, 27, 49, 82, 86, 88, 155, 156, 164, 166, 179, 180, 89, 92, 98–100, 102, 109, 113, 196, 206, 213, 221, 239 118, 154, 169, 173, 186–188, Perspective (Perspectivity), 47, 77, 192, 203, 213, 215, 216, 223 107, 108, 208, 209, 216, 218, Preposition, 165 231 Presence (Presencing), 3, 6, 19, 22, Phenomenology (Phenomenological), 35, 38, 40, 44, 49, 104, 120, 8, 98, 116, 166 284 Subject Index

160, 177, 178, 195, 208, 225, Recollection, 213 232, 242, 243 Reference, 2–5, 35, 53, 105, 106, Present, 3, 28, 35, 42, 43, 49, 54, 59, 113, 134, 140, 151, 158, 165, 65, 84, 97, 102, 107, 109, 111, 166, 169, 201, 208 113, 116, 125, 130, 144, 165, Refection, 12, 22, 25, 38, 45, 49, 181, 193, 203, 206, 208, 213, 104, 124 214, 239, 243 Reformation. See Counter- Principle, 10, 56, 57, 80, 81, 117, Reformation 133, 135, 164, 178, 179, 184, Refrain, 66 212, 218, 236 Relation, 1–3, 6–8, 10, 13, 16, 17, Proem, 178 21–23, 27, 29, 36, 37, 39, 40, Profundity, 244 166, 169, 172, 175, 183, 195, Projection (Projector), 145, 158, 205, 196, 208, 210, 219, 231, 238, 214, 221 241 Proportion, 64–66, 70, 98, 107, 108, Religion (Religious), 2, 5, 10, 62, 66, 140, 148, 231 79, 92, 101, 113, 149, 151, 158, Prose, 9, 132, 136, 155, 174, 180, 190, 232, 235, 237 194 Renaissance, 70, 81, 107, 110, 142, Pseudonym, 250, 252 234, 237 Psychophysical, 180 Representative-Calculative, 38 Restraint, 238, 244 Reverence, 13, 190, 191 Q Rhapsode, 169 Quatch, 241 Rhythm, 9, 15, 48, 65, 71, 79, 80, 83, Question, 2, 3, 16, 18, 37, 40, 65, 98, 102, 113, 124, 131, 132, 139, 121, 149, 155, 158, 160, 174, 143, 145, 154, 160, 175, 194, 192, 194, 196, 201, 217, 238 207, 220 Role, 38, 40, 47, 59, 62, 91, 181, 189, 215, 218, 220, 232 R Roman, 19, 58, 145, 148, 181, 214, Rank, 66, 224, 234, 236, 238 220, 234 Rationalism (Rational), 151, 169, 217 Romanesque, 81 Reader (Reading), 40, 68, 125, 137, Romanticism, 19, 79, 101 146, 166, 170, 171, 182–186, Russian, 172 191, 194, 211, 214, 215 Reality, 16, 84, 101, 105, 124, 143, 157, 158, 176, 190, 212, 213, S 221, 237 Sameness, 47, 147, 174, 196 Reason, 4, 15, 16, 26, 54, 56, 64, 99, Scene (Scenery), 13, 18, 118, 149, 108, 111, 119, 134, 137, 156, 156, 184, 205, 209, 210, 212, 165, 166, 172, 173, 186, 195, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220 238 Scholastic, 219 Subject Index 285

Science (Scientifc), 2, 11, 17, 23, 41, Shape, 4, 20, 24, 45, 60, 62, 78–80, 69, 87, 104, 116, 156, 157, 166, 82, 93, 99, 100, 106, 110, 119, 171, 173, 181, 189 120, 172, 195, 231, 239 Score, 138, 142, 145–149, 182, 221 Shot, 206, 209–211, 216 Screen, 205, 208, 211, 212, 214 Silence (Silent), 38, 43, 44, 97, 120, Script, 206–210, 213, 214, 219, 244 125, 138, 146, 157, 158, 191, Scroll, 243 204–206, 214, 215, 243 Sculpture, 7, 9, 15, 55, 59, 75–78, Simile, 173 81–83, 86–88, 90, 95, 101, 111, Simplicity, 81, 92, 189, 244 151, 152, 157, 202, 208, 232, Skill, 17, 59, 63, 98, 230, 232 233, 237, 239 Sky, 30, 37, 41, 44, 50, 60, 65, 70, Seeing, 3, 4, 9, 20, 27, 78, 107, 151, 71, 73, 104, 113, 115, 159, 226 173, 218, 221 Skyscraper, 63, 64, 70 Self, 151, 157, 194 Socratic, 181 Sense (Sensing, Sensory), 1–8, 14, 17, Sonata, 143–145, 149 21–24, 28, 35–38, 42, 48, 49, Soul, 100, 114, 151, 169, 176, 180, 53, 54, 59, 68, 69, 72, 76–81, 217, 230, 237 84, 86, 90, 92, 97, 104, 106, Sound, 14, 20, 125, 130–132, 134, 109, 112, 113, 116, 126, 131, 135, 137, 138, 140, 145, 155, 135, 137, 139, 142, 146, 147, 160, 165, 167, 169, 171, 179, 149, 157–159, 170, 179, 184, 183, 231, 243 201, 202, 204, 216, 242, 244 Soviet, 211, 231 Sensibility, 13, 16, 23, 36, 49, 106, Space, 4, 5, 7, 18, 20, 23, 28, 29, 214, 216, 239 35–37, 40, 43, 47, 50, 56, 60, Sentence, 16, 92, 125, 130, 134, 135, 61, 64, 71, 78, 79, 91, 101, 105, 164–168, 172 146, 167, 168, 170, 182, 191, Serenity, 42, 86, 113, 244 201–204, 212, 218, 240, 244 Sermon, 206, 235 Spatio-temporal, 8, 9 Set, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 18, 27, 30, 42, Speaker, 135, 145, 165, 169, 174 47, 54, 59, 60, 62, 64, 68, 69, Special effects, 203–205, 207, 212 71, 75, 77, 78, 83, 90, 97, 100, Spectacle, 81, 180, 204, 207, 216, 105–108, 121, 123, 136, 137, 221, 235 140, 149, 155, 157, 164, 170, Speculative, 2, 36, 158, 243 176, 177, 182, 183, 190, 202, Speech, 131, 132, 135, 136, 139, 203, 205, 209, 212, 214–217, 143, 145, 150, 158, 163–167, 221, 231, 234, 240 169, 170, 181, 188, 193, 217, Setting, 6, 17, 19, 38, 42–44, 47, 49, 224 70, 89, 99, 119, 120, 147, 176, Spirit (Spiritual, Spirituality, 194, 217–219, 221, 232, 233 Spiritualization), 17, 27, 28, 38, Sex, 216 48, 56, 87, 101, 108, 118, 121, Shakespearean, 183 131, 136, 154, 157, 191, 206, 217, 225, 239 286 Subject Index

Spoudaios. See Heroic Taste, 21, 83, 95, 203, 214, 238, 239, Stabilitas, 59, 68 243, 244 Stage, 91, 123, 142, 171, 183, 203, Technician, 221 204, 206, 211, 215, 216, 219 Technique (Technical), 7, 56, 81, 99, Standing Reserve (Heidegger). See 105, 111, 114, 125, 129, 140, Bestand 153, 154, 184, 205, 207, 216, Story-telling, 9, 165, 167, 171, 176 225, 230 St. Peter’s in Rome, 64 Technology (Technological), 17, 39, Structure (Structuralism), 2, 4, 6, 24, 50, 61–64, 77, 109, 188, 203, 39, 59, 63, 66, 85, 130, 158, 207, 210 170, 178, 187, 188, 201, 240 Temple, 14, 15, 62, 66, 69, 105 Style (Stylistic), 53, 59, 62, 66, 67, Text, 9, 114, 125, 133, 135, 142, 81, 104, 114, 125, 135, 141, 146, 147, 149, 170, 182–184, 142, 148, 171, 172, 175, 181, 186, 187, 189, 191, 214 185, 218, 220, 232, 239 Thanatos, 196 Subjectivity, 108, 114, 125, 126, 130, Theater, 9, 140, 202, 204, 205, 209, 213 216–218 Substance. See Ousia Theology (Theological), 187 Sumerian, 81 Theophany, 24, 49, 242 Super-Ego, 187 Theory (Theoria), 57, 67, 187, 191 Swedish, 223 Thing, 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12–14, 16, 21, Symbebekota, 165 25, 26, 35–37, 39, 41, 56, 60, Symbol (symbolic), 25, 54, 59, 62, 66, 71, 76, 84, 87, 99, 108, 113, 79, 80, 120, 145, 150, 155, 163, 114, 118, 125, 147, 155, 157, 211, 226, 235, 236, 243 165, 168, 173, 182, 189, 195, Symmetry, 77 201, 219, 229, 239, 242 Symphony, 68, 71, 135, 138, 143, Thinging of Things (Heidegger), 37 144, 146, 149, 151, 222 Thinker, 36, 88, 89, 184 Synthesis, 1, 2, 61, 212 Thinking. See Representative- System, 1, 14, 22, 64, 69, 108, 130, Calculative and Meditative 132, 136, 138, 166, 167, 169, Thou, 24, 93 174, 188, 189 Thought, 5, 9, 11, 18, 24, 105, 106, 111, 151, 167, 179, 185, 206, 213 T Time, 11, 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, Take, 2, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 19, 30, 40, 45, 47, 50, 54, 56, 62, 64, 38, 41, 60, 61, 64, 65, 79, 89, 75, 83, 95, 108, 130, 137, 143, 102, 123, 134, 153, 177, 191, 154, 160, 166, 167, 169, 174, 206, 214, 219, 229, 243 181, 183, 187, 201, 205, 206, Talent, 129, 130, 149, 164, 226, 229 210–212, 215, 219, 220, 225, Talkies, 204–206, 216 234, 244 Subject Index 287

Tone, 62, 100, 119, 130–132, 135, Verlässlichkeit, 69 137, 143, 154, 155, 160, 174, Verticality (Vertical), 57, 92, 105, 124, 240 143 Tool, 229, 240 Vessel, 243, 244 Totality. See Whole Viewing, 18, 105, 108–110, 117, 205, Tradition, 2, 4, 5, 36, 38, 59, 70, 81, 208–210, 212–214, 218, 219, 82, 85, 99, 102, 148, 171, 181, 221 186, 190, 196, 234 Violence, 86, 216 Tragedy, 172, 175, 177, 180, 215 Vitruvian triangle, 58, 59 Tranquility, 22, 243 Vowel, 132, 134, 168 Transcendental, 192 Voyeur, 203, 218, 221 Transformation, 6, 16, 30, 50, 68, 112, 126, 166, 177, 187, 208, 220, 225, 229, 230 W Translation (Translator), 38, 78, 167 Wabi-sabi, 244 Truth. See Aletheia, Orthotes Water, 21, 25, 40, 41, 44, 104, 160, Type, 4, 18, 20, 30, 40, 44, 45, 47, 226, 243 53, 59, 61, 62, 137, 140, 178, Whole. See Totality 180, 181, 193, 231, 238, 242 Wisdom, 189, 191, 195 Word, 9, 37, 68, 89, 91, 109, 130, 133, 134, 139, 142, 143, 145, U 152, 164, 169, 172, 174, 183, Ugly, 19, 180, 233 188, 216 Unconcealment. See Aletheia, Truth Work, 1, 9, 23, 27, 30, 35, 47, 54, Understanding, 3–6, 21, 22, 53, 57, 68, 76–78, 82, 84, 86, 88, 89, 62, 67, 69, 72, 73, 80, 126, 146, 91, 98, 114, 118, 124, 126, 135, 155, 156, 164, 176, 177, 184, 149, 159, 167, 171, 175, 177, 201 178, 183, 185, 186, 191, 192, Unity. See One 205, 206, 218, 235, 242 Universal (Universality), 4, 5, 9, 79, World (Worlding of the World— 84, 98, 112, 146, 166, 168, 176, Heidegger), 37 182–184, 213 Writing, 11, 28, 99, 110, 145, 163, Useful, 72, 231, 232 167, 169–171 Utility, 58, 72, 232, 240

Z V Zen, 42 Value, 26, 29, 42, 99–101, 111, 171, Zoion politikon, 4 172, 222, 235 Zoom-in, 218 Vatican, 19, 234 Venustas, 58, 59, 67, 68, 236 Verb, 165