Regulatory Guide 3.16, General Fire Protection Guide for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants
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January 1974 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 'REGULATORY GUIDE DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS REGULATORY GUIDE 3.16 GENERAL FIRE PROTECTION GUIDE FOR PLUTONIUM PROCESSING AND FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS A. INTRODUCTION Each applicant for a license to possess and use particularly in locations vital to the functioning of of special nuclear material in a plutonium processing and confinement barriers and systems, to methods fuel fabrication plant as defined in §70.4(r) of 10 CFR controlling radioactive materials within the facility, and Part 70, "Special Nuclear Material," must satisfy the to the maintenance of safety control functions. The provisions of §70.23, "Requirements for the Approval adverse effects of fires and explosions on structures, of Applications." Paragraphs (aX3) and (4) of §70.23 systems, and components important to safety can be require that the applicant's proposed equipment and minimized by providing systems with sufficient capacity facilities and proposed procedures be adequate to and capability for detecting and suppressing explosions protect health and minimize danger to life or property. and fires and. transmitting alarms to one or more central control areas. It is important in the design of the plant At plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plants, and fire-suppression systems to Include provisions to a principal risk to health and safety is the release and protect against adverse effects in the event of dispersal of radioactive materials from a fire or fire-suppression system operation or failure. explosion. Fire protection programs for these plants should prevent, detect, extinguish, limit, or control fires Implementation of the above entails an evaluation and explosions and their concomitant hazards and of such factors as the expected maximum amount of damaging effects. This guide presents methods combustible material in each area of the plant; severity, acceptable to the Regulatory staff for complying with intensity, and duration of credible fires; assurance of §§70.23(aX3) and (aX4) with respect to fire protection confinement of radioactive and other potentially for plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plants. dangerous contaminants; arrangements and structural design features of buildings for control of smoke, heat, L. DISCUSSION flame, and combustible and explosive gases; and systems for fire detection, confinement, control, and The principal purposes of a fire protection program suppression. for a plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plant are the protection of the general public from radioactive and Water should be the principal fire suppressor, and material, protection of plant personnel, and toxic special consideration should be given to selection of against loss of confinement. protection water sources, water distribution systems, fire pumps, systems to systems, and components important to and automatic and manual fire extinguidsing Structures, fire in any area. should be designed and located so they can control and extinguish a credible safety should be continue to perform their safety functions effectively Automatic sprinkler or equivalent coverage provisions for Under credible fire and explosion exposure conditions. provided throughout the facility with Heat-resistant and noncombustible materials should be special hazard fire control measures where particular used wherever practical throughout the facility, hazards exist. USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES copses at ps*mshed guids amy be obtulnad by -au-t bhidtflm0*~ dlhom terdto the US. Awn*i 9 00 caiin~lon. mzWishntonVC- 20"58. Attestien: Dikctor of Regulatwoy Sun*ds. Commna mid ugg9iorm for RegulatomrGuides ae Issued to decibe and msks "laitis to tht pubic parts of i"WroW~fiwtt. lIn thems ftdmwe -io~**d tbo,4W Wmithe SaaatarV amtods acoeptable to the AEC Regulato suff of Imhpemnstn speaic of thu Cammwmalon, U.S. Atomic Emhnon W q . oDio . 2045. on. Commtisscn reaukatIiw. to delimete ftcUr.Iqu Wed bv the auW in Attention: C¢i•. PwdficvRmeiap ant". ewauliagkgedhlic Probbemt of poatstatad accidents. or tlpovde- guidance to apkslwis. Reulatory Gwidm nat Kmiautsia, ftorrtepulatiom a e wnpierel The VAl*' we WooMi Me fo umbiOn bind iXvidom: mith them I not 8u8lird. Mathods Ond sohlusom different trom t at out in ,Idmw~lbesemlala Nthey proide a baue for the "Idnge oMgulai 01) t. Poi•w Reactors L Podu =emi t" fapulanoprm or ",am by theCommission. 2. Rmmerch mid Tast Reactors 7. 1importaon . Pueb and Materieal Pamltift 18. OMationl• asl 4. Enrwronnental a•d "ot 3. Anttnat• Review Pubtishd =uldatwill be revild parkodsllly. a appropriate. so accommodate L Maerisard Plant Pi ioan 10. General eofwnwmiend to ma'fa w eorntrution or experience. Incipient fires may be controlled by portable fire c. Southern Standard Building Code of the extinguishers. This phase of fire control is particularly Southern Building Code Congress important, even though automatic sprinklers have been d. Basic Building Code of the Building provided. Consideration should be given io the selection Officials Conference of America of portable fire extinguishers suitable for use on specific hazards that may be encountered. C. REGULATORY POSITION The need for fire detection devices and the type Plutonium processing and fuel fabrication plants most desirable should be related to combinations of should be designed to assure the confinement of hazards involved, extinguishing controls available, and hazardous materials during normal or abnormal public and private fire departments. Various detection conditions including fires and explosions. The release of devices operating on different principles for detecting radioactive material to the environment or to an area in fire are available. These include the principles of fixed which levels of radioactivity are normally sufficiently temperature, rate of temperature rise, presence of low to permit personnel access should be reduced to a combustion and pyrolysis products, or various level as low as practicable in accordance with the combinations of these principles. provisions of 10 CFR Part 20. Fire protection systems may be subject to effects of 1. General Features natural phenomena such as seismic motion and floods, missiles, fire and explosion, and other accidents. These a. Fire protection systems for plutonium systems should continue to perform their safety processig and fuel fabrication plants should be designed functions effectively under credible accident conditions. to assure that any credible fire or explosion will not Where possible, continuity of fire protection systems prevent the operation or use of structures, systems, should be assured by such means as standby equipment equipment, and components whose continued integrity and fail-safe control systems. and/or operability are esential to assure confinement of radioactive materials, hereafter designated as "essential The ability of the systems to perform their safety items." functions effectively can be assured by periodic testing b. Where possible, each fire protection system of safety-related components during normal operation of should be designed so that the filure of any one the systems to demonstrate their ability to perform at component (equipment or control device) will not design efficiency and to verify their availability for disable the entire fire protection system. Fire protection K emergencies. systems and components should have fall-safe features with provision for operation and trouble alarm An important aspect of a fire protection program is indication. training of a fiue-fighting organization and maintenance c. Onsite emergency power supply systems should of its competence with periodic drills. be provided -to operate applicable fire protection systems and components as well as other systems and The fire protection program should provide for the components important to safety. Fire protection ise of appliances, equipment, and materials listed by systems should be capable of operating during normal such testing organizations as the Underwriters' power outage. The onsite emergency power sources and Laboratories, Inc. (UL) and the Factory Mutual the electrical distribution circuits should have Research Corp. (FM) as meeting their standards. independence and testability to assre performance of their safety functions assuming any single failure. Fire protection programs should conformnto the d. The design of fire-suppression systems should provisions of the following codes and standards as include provisions ,to protect agains adverse effects it applicable: the event of system operation or failure. For example, collection systems should be provided for runoff water I. National Fire Codes of the National Fire in the event of normal or abnormal flow from an Protection Association (NFPA). automatic sprinkler system. 2. Fire Prevention Code of the American e. The fire protection systems should be designed Insurance Association (AIA). to withstand tornado conditions without loss of 3. Fire Protection Standards and Bulletins of the operating capability due to mechanical damage to the Factory Insurance Association (FIA). systems or components to the extent that they will 4. Standards of the American Petroleum Institute prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials. (API). f. Components of fire protection systems should 5. One of the four model building codes: be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes and a. National Building Code of the AIA remain functional to the extent that they will prevent b. Uniform Building Code of the the uncontrolled