1 Digest of Jurisprudence of the Un and Regional Organizations

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1 Digest of Jurisprudence of the Un and Regional Organizations DIGEST OF JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM 1 Contents INTRODUCTION I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS A. State duty to protect B. Compatibility of counter-terrorism measures with human rights obligations C. Relation of human rights and international humanitarian law in their application to counter-terrorism measures II. STATES OF EMERGENCY A. Rules concerning derogation measures B. Procedural aspects III. SPECIFIC RIGHTS A. Right to life B. Prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment C. Conditions of detention D. Pre-trial and administrative detention D.1 Judicial control and prohibition of arbitrary detention D.2 Charges and right to be informed of the reasons for arrest D.3 Prolonged pre-trial or administrative detention D.4 Incommunicado detention E. Right to fair trial E.1 Presumption of innocence and other rights E.2 Military and other special courts E.3 Right to appeal F. Principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) G. Access to counsel H. Freedom of thought, conscience and belief I. Right to political participation, freedom of opinion, expression and assembly J. Freedom of movement K. Freedom from discrimination L. Treatment of non-nationals (including asylum, expulsion and non-refoulement) Annex I: Relevant provisions of international instruments Annex II: General Comment No. 29 of the UN Human Rights Committee 2 Introduction This digest is a compilation of findings of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies of the United Nations and regional organizations on the issue of the protection of human rights in the struggle against terrorism. It has been prepared by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Its aim is to assist policy makers and other concerned parties in developing a vision of counter-terrorism strategies that are fully respectful of human rights. No one doubts that States have legitimate and urgent reasons to take all due measures to eliminate terrorism. Acts and strategies of terrorism aim at the destruction of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. They destabilise governments and undermine civil society. Governments therefore have not only the right, but also the duty, to protect their nationals and others against terrorist attacks and to bring the perpetrators of such acts to justice. The manner in which counter-terrorism efforts are conducted, however, can have a far-reaching effect on overall respect for human rights. Human rights law establishes a framework in which terrorism can be effectively countered without infringing on fundamental freedoms. The need to protect human rights in the struggle against terrorism has been highlighted by the UN Secretary- General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other leaders in the international community. The objective of this digest is to enhance the understanding of this framework. Definition of terrorism Twelve international conventions related to terrorism have been adopted within the UN context. One gap in these conventions is the lack of a clear and commonly- agreed definition of terrorism. A draft comprehensive convention on terrorism is currently being debated at the General Assembly which is grappling with this issue. Although terrorism has yet to be authoritatively defined, States have already agreed on some of its core elements. On 9 December 1994, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, in the annex to resolution 49/60. The Declaration stated that terrorism includes “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes”, and further held that such acts “are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other nature that may be invoked to justify them”. States’ obligations under human rights law Human rights law has sought to strike a fair balance between legitimate national security concerns and the protection of fundamental freedoms. It acknowledges that States must address serious and genuine security concerns, such as terrorism. The balance is reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified or acceded to by 151 States, as well as in regional human rights treaties such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the American Convention on Human 3 Rights (ACHR), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The “Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism”, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 11 July 2002, usefully articulate the balances in the context of the European system. Terrorism may, under very specific conditions that will be considered below, lead to a state of emergency. Human rights law, notably article 4 of the ICCPR, article 15 of the ECHR and article 27 of the ACHR, recognizes that some rights can be derogated from in time of public emergency. (In contrast, the African Charter does not contain a derogation clause). The three conventions, however, mandate that certain rights are not subject to suspension under any circumstances. The three treaties catalogue these non-derogable rights. The list of non-derogable rights contained in the ICCPR includes the right to life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the principles of precision and of non-retroactivity of criminal law (except where a later law imposes a lighter penalty). Derogation from other rights is only permitted in the special circumstances defined in each of the three treaties. According to the ICCPR and ACHR, any such measures must be of exceptional character, strictly limited in time and to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, subject to regular review, consistent with other obligations under international law and must not involve discrimination. ECHR requires that such measures be limited to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with other obligations under international law. The three treaties further require informing the Secretary- General of the UN or the relevant regional organization of the provisions from which a State has derogated and the reasons for such derogation. Building on States’ other obligations under international law, the UN Human Rights Committee has developed a list of elements that, in addition to the rights specified in article 4, cannot be subject to lawful derogation (see General Comment No. 29 in Annex II, below). These elements include the following: all persons deprived of liberty must be treated with respect for their dignity; hostage-taking, abduction, and unacknowledged detention are prohibited; persons belonging to minorities are to be protected; unlawful deportations or transfers of population are prohibited; and “no declaration of a state of emergency … may be invoked as justification for a State party to engage itself … in propaganda for war, or in advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. The Human Rights Committee is the body established to monitor the implementation by States Party of the ICCPR and its Protocols. The right to a fair trial during armed conflict is explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law. Under the ACHR (article 27), the right to judicial guarantees essential for the protection of non-derogable rights cannot be suspended, even in time of war, public danger, or emergency. According to the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 29, the same principle applies in the context of the ICCPR. As the Committee explained, the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial be respected during a state of emergency. The Committee stressed that it is inherent in the protection of rights 4 explicitly recognized as non-derogable that they be secured by procedural guarantees including, often, judicial guarantees. The provisions of the ICCPR relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. In particular, any trial possibly leading to the imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must conform to the provisions of the ICCPR, including those on fair trial. These include the right to equality before the courts and tribunals; the right to a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal; the presumption of innocence; the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her promptly and in detail in a language which he or she understands; the right to communicate with counsel of choice; the right to examine witnesses and secure the attendance and examination of witnesses on behalf of the accused; and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. In addition, the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR, as well as the African Charter require that, in the exceptional circumstances where it is permitted to limit some rights for legitimate and defined purposes other than emergencies, the principles of necessity and proportionality must be applied. The measures taken must be appropriate and the least
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