Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2003 Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors Daniel C. Richman Columbia Law School,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons Recommended Citation Daniel C. Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2490 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW VOL. 103 MAY 2003 NO. 4 ARTICLES PROSECUTORS AND THEIR AGENTS, AGENTS AND THEIR PROSECUTORS Daniel Richman * This Article seeks to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal enforcement agents, and to suggest how these dynam- ics affect the exercise of enforcement discretion. After considering the virtues and pitfalls of both hierarchicaland coordinate organizational modes, the Article offers a normative model that views prosecutors and agents as mem- bers of a "working group," with each side monitoring the other. It concludes by exploring how this model can be furthered orfrustrated with various proce- dural and structural changes. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .. .................................................. 750 I. CONSTITUENT ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION ................... 755 A. Prosecutorial Gatekeeping Monopoly ................. 758 B. Agency Control over Investigative Resources, Tactics, and Agenda ........................................ 767 C. Prosecutorial Controls over Investigatory Tactics .....