philology An Irreader Edited by Sean Gurd & Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei ’pataphilology: an irreader. Copyright © 2018 by editors and authors. This work carries a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 International license, which means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format, and you may also remix, transform and build upon the material, as long as you clearly attribute the work to the authors (but not in a way that suggests the authors or punctum books endorses you and your work), you do not use this work for commercial gain in any form whatsoever, and that for any remixing and transformation, you distribute your rebuild under the same license. http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ First published in 2018 by punctum books, Earth, Milky Way. https://punctumbooks.com ISBN-13: 978-1-947447-81-3 (print) ISBN-13: 978-1-947447-82-0 (ePDF) lccn: 2018954815 Library of Congress Cataloging Data is available from the Library of Congress Book design: Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei Cover image: After Albrecht Dürer, “Saint Jerome Extracting a Thorn from the Lion’s Foot, Lyons, 1508 (copy),” n.d., woodcut. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, acc. no. 31.54.43. One The Walker and the Wake: Analysis of Non-Intrinsic Philological Isolates Michael D. Gordin and Joshua T. Katz for David Bellos his paper has two points of departure. The first is the use of marginal phenomena to elucidate complex core con- T ceptual questions, an approach that has been used to good effect in a wide variety of disciplines.1 One such question is “What is language?,” where one not uncontroversial research program looks at animal behavior that arguably resembles hu- man communication (e.g., bee dances, whale songs).2 Another question — which we insist on distinguishing sharply from the 1 E.g., Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spauld- ing and George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1951 [1897]); Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Bloomington: In- diana University Press, 1984 [1965]); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 2 Tania Munz, The Dancing Bees: Karl von Frisch and the Discovery of the Honeybee Language (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); D. Gra- ham Burnett, The Sounding of the Whale: Science & Cetaceans in the Twen- tieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). For the nine- teenth-century precursors to these debates, see Gregory Radick, The Simian 61 ’pataphilology former — is “What is a language?” By this we refer both to the determination of the place at which one language stops and an- other begins (e.g., Danish/Norwegian, Kazakh/Kyrgyz) and to the potential distinction between a language and a dialect (e.g., Hochdeutsch/Bairisch, Modern Standard Arabic/Maghrebi).3 We confine ourselves to this latter question. The second point of departure, more common in anthropol- ogy and history of science, is the categorization of intellectual concepts or disciplines into collections of practices. To take an example from the history of physics, certain theories (e.g., clas- sical electromagnetism, quantum field theory) are only clearly definable in retrospect; in the process of research, what physi- cists actually do is solve problems using specific, often hetero- geneous, sets of calculating practices (e.g., partial differential equations, Feynman diagrams) that frequently transcend highly policed intradisciplinary borders. Different physicists retro- spectively group together particular calculating practices and call the resulting conglomeration “thermodynamics” or “string t h e or y.” 4 Our proposal is that “philology” — and therefore also pataphilology — is amenable to the same sort of analysis: it can be treated as a set of practices (e.g., collation of manuscripts, hermeneutics) that individual scholars, and communities of scholars, aggregate in various combinations and deploy with different emphases.5 Tongue: The Long Debate about Animal Language (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 3 For a good general discussion of what is involved in discriminating among languages, see Stephen R. Anderson, Languages: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 4 Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory: Cambridge and the Rise of Mathe- matical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); David Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 5 For a large-scale history of philology, see James Turner, Philology: The For- gotten Origins of the Modern Humanities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). See also the essays in Sheldon Pollock, Benjamin Elman, and Ku-ming Kevin Chang, eds., World Philology (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 2014). 62 the Walker and the Wake These combinations and emphases may at times seem pecu- liar. The question is, to whom? Our point is quite general. In any domain of knowledge (science, medicine, the humanities), the boundary between the legitimate and the anathema is conten- tious, in terms of both where it should be drawn and whether the drawing of such a line is even permissible. The allegation that something is pseudoscientific is notoriously problematic, for a variety of reasons.6 First, people never attribute quackery to themselves; the term thus cannot be separated from polemic. Second, since the definition of controversy is that specialists in a discipline do not yet know what the right answer is, disciplines cannot definitively label a position valid or erroneous (e.g., string theory or the innateness hypothesis, today).7 And third, theories that were once mainstream (e.g., astrology) become demonized, while ones that were demonized (e.g., atomism) become conventional wisdom. The point has been most exten- sively explored in the natural sciences but is equally applicable to other areas of Wissenschaft, such as philology.8 There are more and less helpful ways of making the exten- sion. One strand of scholarship, drawing extensively on the sociology of deviance, explores the less respectable neighbor- hoods of language use (thieves’ cant, Rotwelsch, Pig Latin) as 6 Michael D. Gordin, The Pseudoscience Wars: Immanuel Velikovsky and the Birth of the Modern Fringe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). See also Michael Hagner, “Bye-Bye Science, Welcome Pseudoscience? Reflex- ionen über einen beschädigten Status,” in Pseudowissenschaft: Konzeptionen von Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, eds. Dirk Rup- now, Veronika Lipphardt, Jens Thiel, and Christina Wessely, 21–50 (Frank- furt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008). 7 On string theory, contrast Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: Nor- ton, 1999) with Lee Smolin, The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String The- ory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006). On linguistic innateness, contrast Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York: Morrow, 1994) with Michael Tomasello, Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 8 Lorraine Daston and Glenn W. Most, “History of Science and History of Philologies,” Isis 106 (2015): 378–90. 63 ’pataphilology modes of protest against established norms, defined negatively by the absence of some specific properties of the unmarked lin- guistic variant: in short, as “anti-language.”9 Our difficulty with this framework, which has had the salutary effect of increasing empirical awareness of such widespread phenomena as well as some of their general characteristics, is that it starts from an assumed definition of “language” and then searches for its by-blows. More promising, in our view, is the aforementioned emphasis on practices of language use. A forger, just like a phi- lologist, collates texts and studies, say, the forms of majuscules. Much can be gained by bracketing the intellectual or monetary value of the forgers’ fruits and focusing instead on which prac- tices they learn from the philologists — and, conversely, what the philologists learn from the forgers.10 At the level of practices, there is no need to introduce a notion of deviance. Pataphilol- ogy is philology, full stop.11 The canonical domain of philology — that is, where philo- logical practices are deployed — is literature. Our entry point is fiction written in what one might call non-intrinsic philological isolates, by which we mean unique forms of language (hence, isolates) that could be used outside the confines (hence, non-in- trinsic) of the literary works (hence, philological) in which they made their debut — though generally they aren’t. A marginal perspective, no doubt, but sometimes the fringe reveals the core. 9 M.A.K. Halliday, “Anti-Languages,” American Anthropologist 78 (1976): 570–84. See also Daniel Heller-Roazen, Dark Tongues: The Art of Rogues and Riddlers (New York: Zone, 2013). 10 Anthony Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Carlo Ginzburg, “Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm,” in Clues, Myths, and the Histori- cal Method, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi, 96–125 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989 [1986]). 11 Compare James E.G. Zetzel, “The Bride of Mercury: Confessions of a ’Pataphilologist,” in World Philology, eds. Sheldon Pollock et al., 45–62 (Cambridge: Harvard University