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Patterns of Perception Nemira Hathor Gasiunas Submitted in Partial Patterns of Perception Nemira Hathor Gasiunas Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2019 © 2019 Nemira Gasiunas All rights reserved ABSTRACT Patterns of Perception Nemira Gasiunas Our ordinary concept of perception contains a seeming tension: we distinguish perception from thought on the grounds that it is a direct awareness of mind-independent objects through their effects on our senses; yet we also allow that what we see (hear, feel, etc) is determined by how we interpret or classify the data that comes through our senses. Theorists of perception disagree over which of these intuitions should prevail, with some maintaining that concepts are in play all the way down and others that perceptual awareness is wholly immediate and concrete. But we do not have to choose. This dissertation argues that the patterns of perception sustain a distinctive form of nonconceptual classification, in which property spaces organize sensory matter so as to preserve rather than discard its concreteness and detail. What then is classification without concepts? What sort of abstraction, generality, representation, or form does it entail? And what ramifications then for thinking about the roots of language and reason, and of our awareness of the external world? TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures iii Acknowledgments iv Introduction 2 1. Reconceiving the Nonconceptualism Debate 39 1.1 Introduction 39 1.2 The (Conventional) Nonconceptualism Debate: Evans and McDowell 44 1.3 The Reconceived Nonconceptualism Debate: Travis 58 1.4 Two Perspectives on the Nonconceptual 67 1.5 Two Perspectives on ‘Frege’s Line’ 80 1.6 Conclusion 86 2. Classification Without Concepts 91 2.1 Introduction 91 2.2 Monism 98 2.3 The Argument from Mereology 106 2.4 Attribution without Atomism 113 2.5 The Argument from the Nature of Propositions 129 2.6 Attribution without Propositions 132 2.7 Comparing Conceptual and Nonconceptual Classification 141 2.8 Conclusion 149 3. Rethinking the Generality Constraint 156 3.1 Introduction 156 3.2 The Generality Constraint and Nonconceptual Content 160 i 3.3 The Argument from Systematicity 169 3.4 The Problem 175 3.5 Degrees of Stimulus-Independence 187 3.6 The Argument from Inference 192 3.7 Nonconceptual Content Regained 202 3.8 Conclusion 207 4. The Problem of Perceptual Receptivity 213 4.1 Introduction 213 4.2 The Intuition 218 4.3 The Problem 229 4.4 Redefining the Stimulus 243 4.5 Redefining Receptivity: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant 249 4.6 Redefining Receptivity: A Nonconceptualist Reading of Kant 260 4.7 The ‘Predictive Processing’ Theory 268 4.8 Conclusion 274 Conclusion 279 References 292 ii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Two drawings of a boa-constrictor having swallowed an elephant. The first figure illustrates the author’s drawing in its original form, which is subsequently mistaken by the adults for a drawing of a hat. In the second figure, the snake is drawn in cross-section, so that the true meaning of his figure is impossible to misconstrue, even by the stupidity of adults. ………………………….. 3 Figure 2. A diagram illustrating a ‘digital-conversion system.’ The system takes in the registrations of the speedometer in analog form and generates a digital output that classifies the speed within a general range (tones #1-4). ……………………105 Figure 3. The Kanisza triangle demonstrates the phenomenon of illusory contour. The central figure is seen as a triangle even though no edges are marked on the page. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………216 Figure 4. An illustration of the visual phenomenon of amodal completion. The visual system ‘fills in’ information about the shape of the obscured object, choosing the ‘solution’ in figure B rather than any of those in figures C-E. The illustration comes from Palmer (1997: xiv). ……………………………………………………..…………220 Figure 5. The chessboard illusion illustrates the processes that underwrite normal cases of color constancy. In the left figure, squares A and B are seen as different colors due to visual cues indicating that B is in shadow. In reality, the two squares are the same color, as illustrated in the figure on the right. …………………..………….222 Figure 6. A sequence of four images showing how a figure moving through space receives information that reduces indeterminacy in the retinal image. In this example, the changing size of the doorframe as the subject approaches indicates the effect of distance on retinal size. ……………………………………………………..…..……236 Figure 7. A regular rectangle oriented at an angle of 90 degrees is normally seen as a diamond. ……………………………………………………..…………………………………….…….237 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writing of this dissertation challenged me in ways I could not have imagined. So, whilst authors often acknowledge those ‘without whom this work would not have been written,’ I want to stress how literally these words are true for me. At a time when I had nothing but a head full of ideas and a bunch of hang-ups to show for five years of near-constant toil, Lydia Goehr took me on as her student. If I am sitting here not 14 months later putting the finishing touches on a 300-page text, she is the reason why. Lydia believed in me and she fought for me when I had almost no fight left in me. She reignited my love for the written word, and taught me by her example to see that my creativity and intuition are an asset to my philosophical abilities and not a weakness in them. If I can give to my future students even a fraction of what was so freely given to me, I will have done well by them. If writing can be a hell, then my friendship with Manu Chander is steel forged in its fires: his cheers propelled me over the finish line, just as loud as they had been when the starting gun sounded seven years ago. The same goes for Jorge Morales, who walked this path beside me and understands those things I do not know how to communicate in words. Matthew Heeney was wise and impossibly generous in coaxing the real me out from underneath an armour of words. I do not know if he, Simon Brown, Grace Helton and Louise Doust realize how important their lively discussions and compassionate feedback were in making philosophy feel fun — and safe — for me again. Lex Braes kept my eyes and mind open through his intellectual honesty and his passion for perceptual experience. David Rosenthal, through his encouragement and endless wisdom, has helped me in ways I could not have imagined when I first took his class as part of my masters requirements iv many years ago. The support I received from Jessica Collins and Achille Varzi in my hour of need meant more than I could say. Stacey Quartaro’s ingenuity and generous spirit came to my rescue on multiple occasions. My friends and loved-ones outside of my philosophical community played a crucial role in keeping me sane. Where my intellectual world could easily have become drab and dreary, Lavinia Lorch and the CUSP stuff filled it with color and life. The students I taught through CUSP and through my summer classes reminded me over and over again what all of this is really about. Jennifer Friede, Julia Burgdorff and Gabrielle Sullivan never stopped showing up for me, even during the black hole of those final few years; their unconditional love and their loyalty leaves me speechless. Tracey Ober, Anne Kadet, James Bott, Lynne Buckley and Erin Evers have guided me through blind alleys more times than I could possibly count. I owe a special debt of gratitude to those who have had to endure the turbulence of writing a dissertation as the price of loving and living with me. My mother and father, Nijole and Aras, gave unstintingly of themselves to nurture my love of knowledge and to provide the practical support necessary for me to pursue it. My sisters, Saule and Geddie, joined with them in indulging me with discussions of concepts around the dinner table, in patiently providing feedback, and in setting me back on my feet every time I got knocked down. Most of all I thank my husband, George, the man who was there to hit the send button after I had fallen asleep on his shoulder. His huge heart made a home for me when I least expected to find one, and humbles me every day. v PATTERNS OF PERCEPTION NEMIRA GASIUNAS Glory be to God for dappled things— For skies of couple-colour as a brindled cow; For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim; Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches’ wings; Landscape plotted and pieced—fold, fallow, and plough; And all trades, their gear and tackle and trim. All things counter, original, spare, strange; Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?) With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim; He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change: Praise Him. —Gerard Manley-Hopkins, ‘Pied Beauty’ 1 PATTERNS OF PERCEPTION NEMIRA GASIUNAS INTRODUCTION Our ordinary concept of perception contains two elements which, if not quite contradictory, stand in a seeming tension with one another. In the first place, we regard perception as yielding a direct awareness of objects in our environment, through their effects on our senses. If you see a bird in the tree, then you are aware of an entity, existing independently of you that is directly registered by your visual apparatus. By contrast, if you conclude that there is a bird in the tree on the basis of seeing its droppings on the ground, or if you are told there is a bird in the tree by someone else who can see it, then you apprehend the existence of the bird indirectly; not by perceiving it but by constructing it out of something else you perceive.
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