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Minds, Machines and Qualia: a Theory of Consciousness

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Minds, Machines and Qualia: A Theory of Consciousness by Christopher Williams Cowell A.B. (Harvard University) 1992 A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the GRADUATE DIVISION of the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY Committee in charge: Professor John R. Searle, Chair Professor Hans D. Sluga Professor John F. Kihlstrom Spring 2001 The dissertation of Christopher Williams Cowell is approved: Chair Date Date Date University of California, Berkeley Spring 2001 Minds, Machines and Qualia: A Theory of Consciousness Copyright 2001 by Christopher Williams Cowell 1 Abstract Minds, Machines and Qualia: A Theory of Consciousness by Christopher Williams Cowell Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Berkeley Professor John R. Searle, Chair It is clear that there is a problem of consciousness; it is less clear what that problem is. In chapter one I discuss what it might be, bracket o® some especially intractable issues, and present two central questions. First, what is the nature of consciousness? Second, what are the prospects for producing consciousness in machines? I then look at various ways one might approach these questions. Chapter two focuses on the nature of consciousness. My de¯nition of conscious- ness centers on qualia, a concept that I discuss in detail. I show that consciousness can be thought of as having three aspects: intransitive creature consciousness, transitive crea- ture consciousness, and state consciousness. The relations between these three facets are explored. Chapter three expands on two issues raised in chapter two. First, I argue that qualia are present not just in sense perception but also in ordinary propositional thought. 2 Second, I contrast my de¯nition of consciousness with other common de¯nitions. I show that some of these reduce to qualia-based theories similar to mine, while others lead to problems severe enough to suggest that they should be abandoned. Chapter four deals with machine consciousness by looking carefully at the Chinese room argument and at connectionist models of cognition. I support the Chinese room's conclusion that the running of a program is insu±cient for producing consciousness, and I argue that the possibility of machine consciousness hinges on our ability to identify and replicate the causal mechanisms that produce it in humans. My theory has implications for a variety of philosophical questions. These im- plications are explored in a somewhat speculative manner in chapter ¯ve. I discuss how consciousness a®ects our e®orts to solve the mind/body problem; I assess possible strate- gies for recognizing consciousness in other systems; and I examine connections between consciousness and personhood, focusing on the issues of personal identity and personal rights. Instead of developing a single line of thought or argument in this dissertation, I present a collection of ideas and arguments which, although not tightly integrated, do provide mutual support and contribute to a single overarching theory of consciousness. Professor John R. Searle Dissertation Committee Chair i I dedicate this work to my parents and brother, three of the best people I know. ii Contents List of Figures iv Acknowledgments v 1 The problem of consciousness 2 1.1 What is the problem of consciousness? . 2 1.2 Approaching the problem . 9 2 What is consciousness? 15 2.1 A qualia-based de¯nition . 15 2.2 State vs. creature consciousness . 41 2.2.1 Creature consciousness . 44 2.2.2 State consciousness . 50 2.2.3 Relations between the three aspects of consciousness . 54 3 Filling in some gaps 67 3.1 Qualia and propositional thought . 67 3.2 What consciousness isn't . 70 3.2.1 Consciousness is not wakefulness . 74 3.2.2 Consciousness is not awareness . 76 3.2.3 Consciousness is not introspection or higher-order states . 82 4 Machine consciousness 93 4.1 The Chinese room argument . 94 4.1.1 Strong and weak arti¯cial intelligence . 95 4.1.2 The structure of the argument . 97 4.1.3 Criticism one: the Turing test is inadequate . 101 4.1.4 Criticism two: language comprehension is not autonomous . 108 4.1.5 Criticism three: the fallacy of division . 113 4.1.6 Implications of the Chinese room argument . 117 4.2 Brain architecture: connectionism to the rescue? . 122 4.2.1 The nature of connectionist models . 125 iii 4.2.2 Levels of organization . 125 4.2.3 Connectionism with ultralocal representation . 128 4.2.4 Connectionism with distributed representation . 131 4.2.5 Additional objections . 137 4.2.6 Review and summary . 143 4.3 Where do we go from here? . 143 5 Implications of consciousness 149 5.1 Consciousness and the mind/body problem . 149 5.2 Recognizing consciousness . 156 5.3 Consciousness and personhood . 167 5.3.1 What is a person? . 168 5.3.2 Personal identity . 169 5.3.3 Animal rights . 182 5.3.4 Machine rights . 185 5.3.5 Death . 186 Bibliography 188 iv List of Figures 2.1 MÄuller-Lyer illusion . 23 4.1 Necker cube . 136 v Acknowledgments First, the technical stu®. This dissertation was produced entirely with free software. Writing and editing were done mostly with the NEdit text editor on a home-built Celeron box running Mandrake Linux and the Enlightenment window manager. Some editing was also done with BBEdit Lite and Tom Bender's Tex-Edit Plus on a Macintosh Powerbook Duo. Typesetting was done with Donald Knuth's TEX, using Leslie Lamport's LATEX 2" macros, a lightly modi¯ed version of Karl Berry and Oren Patashnik's BibTEX bibliography template, and a tweaked version of the University of California Thesis Class by Ethan V. Munson and Blaise B. Frederick. The ¯gures were created within TEX's picture environment, and I used Markku Hihnala's kdvi for proo¯ng the typeset copy. The typeface used throughout is Knuth's Computer Modern. I've included this information because I think it is important to recognize and support those who write useful freeware or shareware, especially when it is open source (as many of these packages are). Second, and of course far more importantly, the people. My parents, Richard and Priscilla, and my brother Nicholas have supported me in countless ways not just during graduate school, but throughout my entire life. I consider myself extremely lucky to have grown up with people that I would have liked and respected enormously even if I hadn't vi been related to them. They have shaped my values, my ways of thinking, and my world-view more than they probably realize; I love all three very much. I also owe a huge debt of gratitude to Kinnari Shah for her unending support. She encouraged me when progress was slow, and she was quick to recognize and celebrate even the most minor of milestones along the way. She is due an extra dollop of thanks for taking on (requesting, even!) the mammoth job of copyediting this entire work|a duller task I cannot imagine. Many thanks and lots of love to Kinnari. Of course I am extremely grateful to the members of my dissertation committee. Hans Sluga and John Kihlstrom influenced the shape and direction of this work with their very helpful comments. John Searle not only served as my committee chairman and main advisor, but has been in many ways my primary philosophical role model. I have learned from him an enormous number of philosophical ideas, approaches, and arguments, but even more important are the lessons I have picked up from him about how to present philosophical content in a straightforward, non-obfuscatory fashion. Throughout graduate school, my writing has been strongly influenced by his sterling maxim, \if you can't say it clearly, you don't understand it yourself." The philosophical community|come to think of it, the whole academy|would be better, more productive, and certainly more accessible if more scholars took his words to heart. I hope my writing in this project reflects my appreciation of this principle; I have deliberately chosen a simple, unsophisticated style in an e®ort to allow the reader to concentrate on evaluating my arguments without being burdened by having to untangle and decipher convoluted prose. I have tried very hard to imitate his clarity of expression, his frequent use of vivid examples, and his refreshingly vii common-sensical approach to philosophy in general. Other philosophers who have had an especially strong influence on my thoughts and my way of communicating these thoughts include Berkeley faculty members Janet Broughton, Daniel Warren, and Richard Wollheim. I also include in this group Eric Lor- mand and Steve Yablo from the Michigan philosophy department while I was there in 1993{95, and Robert Nozick, Sarah Patterson, and Susan Sauv¶efrom Harvard's depart- ment in the early 1990s. I have had the enormous privilege of studying in all three of these departments, as well spending a year doing dissertation work in the Princeton phi- losophy department. I have always believed that exposure to a variety of approaches to a given problem can only help to sharpen one's own approach and ideas, and I think this is especially true when the problems are as nebulous as those typically found in philosophy. I should also recognize and thank Scott Baker for being a willing resource for all matters biological, and Kirsten Holmboe for instructing me on some of the rudiments of human neurophysiology. Eddie Cushman and Peter Hanks provided invaluable assis- tance as I worked through some thorny issues in chapters one and two. Arpy Khatchirian, Jennifer Johnson, and Jessica Gelber were always willing to discuss philosophical and non- philosophical matters, and were helpful in reminding me that occasional non-philosophical interruptions enrich rather than dilute one's intellectual life.
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