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The Role of Community in Inquiry THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY IN INQUIRY: A PHILOSOPHICAL sTUDY by K. Brad Wray Department of Philosophy Submitted in partial fulfihent of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Graduate Studies The Universi@ of Western Ontario London, Ontario April 1997 O K. Brad Wray 1997 National Library Bibliothéque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliogaphic SeMces services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K1AON4 ûltawaON K1AON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pemettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in rnicrofmm, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom tt Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT 1 examine a number of recent challenges to traditional individualist epistemologies. In chapter 1, 1 examine Margaret Gilbert's clah that certain types of cornmunities, "plural subjects," are capable of having what she calls "collective beliefs." In chapter II7 I examine Lynn Hankinson Nelson's claim that communities, and not individuals, are the primary epistemological agents. In chapter III, I examine Miriam Solomon's claim that scientinc rationality is a property of cornmunities, not individuals. In chapter IV, I examine Richard Rorty's daim that solidarity is the end of inquiry. Finally, in chapter V, I examine Helen Longino's clah that scientific knowledge and inquiry are mediated by processes that are irreducibly social. I argue that many philosophers who argue for a more socid epistemology are mistaken about what role the comrnunity plays in inqujr, and that only individuals are epistemic agents--only they believe, knoiv, and act rationally. In this respect, traditional individualist epistemologies are correct. 1also argue that what is distinctively and irreducibly social about inqujr are the norms and processes that mediate our interaction with each other. These norms and processes require numerous individuals to sustain them. Further, 1 argue that given this understanding of the role of the comrnunity in inquiry we are required to change our understanding of both the nature and role of the individual knower, and the project of epistemology. Individual knowerç are dynamic, changing their conception of themselves as they interact in the world with others. An integral but hitherto neglected part of epistemology is the evaluation of the social processes that mediate our interaction with others. key words: epistemology, knowledge, rationality, belief, individualiçm, philosophy of science, Rom, Longino, cornmunity, epistemic agency, inquiry, ferninism Writing this dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. 1thank my supervisor, John Nicholas, for remaining calm and supportive, and yet at the same time dernanding, throughout the whole process. My readers, Kathleen Okruhlik and Bruce Freed, have both been supportive throughout the doctoral programme. Kathleen deserves a special th& for the encouragement,insight, and support she offered as I worked on chapters II and V. And Bruce raised some important concerns that shaped chapter III. In addition, 1 would like to thank Alison UTylieand Bill Dernopoulos who have each had a significant innuence on my development as a philosopher. 1also need to thank my partner, Lori Nash. Lori critically read and reread numerous drafts of each chapter. She always pushed me to articulate my ideas more clearly. And, she has been supportive and encouraging throughout the programme, helping me keep matters in perspective. The support staff in the Philosophy Department at Western have also been both supportive and encouraging. 1 thank Julia, Andrea, Ella, Melinda, Angie, and Pauline. Some of rny peers also deserve to be mentioned for their support. 1 thank Tracy Glenn, Michele Hiscock, Andrew Reynolds, Jan Sutherland, and Michael Doering. 1also thank the University of Western Ontario and the Ontario v Government for financial support throughout my graduate studies, in the form of Special University Scholarships, a Graduate Research Fellowship, and an Ontario Graduate Scholarship. And, 1thank the University of Chicago Press and Philosophia for allowing me to include slightly revised versions of papers for which they hold the copyright. A version of chapter 111 dlappear in Perspectives on Science, and a version of chapter N will appear in Philosophia under the title 'The Role of Solidarity in a Pragmatic Epistemology." I also thank the editors of these journals, Dr. Joseph Pitt, and Dr. Asa Kasher. Finally, 1thank my parents for giving me the determination and character required to finish somethmg as diflicult as a doctoral programme. TABLES OF CONTENTS Page .. Certificate of examination II .-. Abs tract 111 Acknowledgements v Table of contents vii Introduction 1 Collective Belief 1.1 Gilbert's Account 1.2 Acceptance and Belief 1.3 Singularism and Pluralism 1.4 The Epistemic Significance 2 Knowing Communities 2.1 Nelson's Account 2.2 Why Communities Don't Know 2.3 The Postrnodern Project 2.4 Against Transcendent Social Entities 3 Rational Communities 3.1 Solomon's Account 3.2 Rereading the DriR Literature 3.3 Rereading the Psychological Research 3.4 Against Externalist Accounts of Rationality 4 Solidarity and the End of Inquiry 4.1 RortyandtheTmth 4.2 Solidarity and the Tmth 4.3 Solidarity and the Scientific Community 4.4 Solidarity and Pluralism 5 Knowledge and Social Processes 5.1 Longinors Account 5.2 Alternative Social Accounts 5.3 Addressing Her Critics 5.4 Addressing Her Cntics (Part II) 5.5 Goldman's Framework for Social Epistemics 6 Concluding Remarks 6.1 The Role of the Community in Inquiry 6.2 Traditional Individualkt Epistemologies 6 -3 Reconceptudizing the Knowing Individual 6.4 Socializing Epistemology Appendices Bibliography Vita Introduction Traditional epistemologies can be characterized as individualist in two respects. First, epistemologists have generally assumed that when one is influenced by social factors in inquiry these social factors necessarily have a distorting effect, leading one into error. Given this assumption, many epistemologists have sought to explain how we can eliminate, or at least mitigate, the effects of such factors on inquiry. Ideally, it is assumed, inquirers should be autonomous, and thus, not susceptible to the influences of such factors. Second, generally, epistemologists have been exclusively concerned with explaining what it is for an individual to have knowledge. A thorough answer to this question was assumed to exhaust the concerns of epistemologists. The role that the community play in inquiry, and the relationship between an individual and her community, was assumed to be irrelevant to epistemology. Developments in epistemology and the philosophy of science in the last 30 years have led many to question these individualist assumptions. In the early 1960's Thomas Kuhn presented a compelling account of scientific change that Mplied that nonrational factors oRen infiuence scientists in their decision-making.' For example, Kuhn suggests that disagreements between advocates of corn peting theories are not resolved by 2 appealing to agreed upon criteria of theory choice. Philosophers of science since Kuhn have had to consider the possibility that nonrational factors may influence scientists' decision-making in ways that are not necessarily negative. Such an admission, thoügh, nlakes room for the influence of social factors on inquiry. Historical and sociological studies of science-notably Latour and Woolgar, Shapin and Schaffer, and Barnes and Bloor--have also raised challenges to the above-mentioned individualist assumptions.' First, many social scientists have argued that scientific decision-making is determined principally, if not wholly, by social factors. That is, theories are accepted or rejected on the basis of a consideration of how well they serve social interests. Second, their detailed case studies have led many social scientists to believe that inquiry is essentially a collaborative enterprise. The interaction between scientists, many social scientists have suggested, plays a constitutive role in the construction of scientific knowledge. This suggests that individuals rnay be an inappropriate focus for epistemologists. Further, Quine's proposal, that epistemology be naturalized, has led many philosophers to reconsider the way epistemology should be d~ne.~ Epistemology, Quine suggests, is just one of our many developing theories, and, thus construed, it is neither able to provide a foundation for our knowledge, nor able to be developed prior to our other theories. Further, naturalizing episternology requires that philosophers give serious 3 consideration to research in psychology, for such research will enable us to better understand the processes that make inquiry and knowledge possible. Much of this research suggests that the way people expenence the world is shaped by
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