50 Leading Women in Hedge Funds 2019
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The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE GRANULAR NATURE OF LARGE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS Itzhak Ben-David Francesco Franzoni Rabih Moussawi John Sedunov Working Paper 22247 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22247 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 May 2016, Revised July 2020 Special acknowledgments go to Robin Greenwood and David Thesmar for thoughtful and extensive comments. We also thank Sergey Chernenko, Kent Daniel (NBER discussant), Itamar Drechsler, Thierry Foucault, Xavier Gabaix, Denis Gromb, Andrew Karolyi, Alberto Plazzi, Tarun Ramadorai (AFA discussant), Martin Schmalz, René Stulz, and Fabio Trojani as well as participants at the NBER Summer Institute (Risk of Financial Institutions) and seminars at Cornell University, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, University of Texas at Austin, Georgia State University, Tilburg University, Maastricht University, HEC Paris, USI Lugano, Villanova University, The Ohio State University, the Bank for International Settlements, NBER Risk of Financial Institutions Summer Institute, and American Finance Association for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2016 by Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi, and John Sedunov. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi, and John Sedunov NBER Working Paper No. -
Institutional Investor Study 2019
Institutional Investor Study 2019 Geopolitics and investor expectations Marketing material for professional investors and advisers only Schroders Institutional Investor Study 2019 | Geopolitics and investor expectations 01 Contents 02 Executive summary 10 Investment goals • Generating income comes out on top 03 Portfolio performance Increasing allocations to fixed income • Geopolitical concerns dominate the investment landscape 12 Growing appetite for innovation • The quest for new, customised solutions 05 Return expectations • De-risking through LDI • Optimistic return expectations despite an uncertain landscape 14 Risk management strategies • The dominance of diversification 08 Staying strategic • Strategic asset allocation 16 About the Study driving decision making • Focus on long-term holding periods Schroders Institutional Investor Study 2019 | Geopolitics and investor expectations 02 Executive summary Geopolitical turbulence and the threat of a However, the most important investment Schroders’ third annual global economic slowdown are seen as the objective for investors for the next most important influences on a portfolio’s 12 months is meeting income and yield investment performance for the next 12 requirements (66%). Capital preservation Institutional Investor Study months. Since our inaugural Study in 2017, and generating high risk-adjusted returns we have seen investors become more rank second and third, illustrating how This Study analyses the investment perspectives of 650 institutional concerned about how world events are institutions are looking to more defensive investors, collectively responsible for $25.4 trillion in assets and from affecting growth (32% in 2017 vs. 52% in 2019). assets to de-risk portfolios during heightened 20 locations across the world. The Study provides a snapshot of some This is also evidenced by a steady decline in geopolitical uncertainty. -
Form ADV Part 2A – Disclosure Brochure
Prosperity Advisory Group LLC Form ADV Part 2A – Disclosure Brochure Effective: October 12, 2020 This Form ADV Part 2A (“Disclosure Brochure”) provides information about the qualifications and business practices of Prosperity Advisory Group LLC (“PAG” or the “Advisor”). If you have any questions about the content of this Disclosure Brochure, please contact the Advisor at (585) 381-5900. PAG is a Registered Investment Advisor with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The information in this Disclosure Brochure has not been approved or verified by the SEC or by any state securities authority. Registration of an investment advisor does not imply any specific level of skill or training. This Disclosure Brochure provides information about PAG to assist you in determining whether to retain the Advisor. Additional information about PAG and its Advisory Persons is available on the SEC’s website at www.adviserinfo.sec.gov by searching with the Advisor’s firm name or CRD# 310720. Prosperity Advisory Group LLC 50 Square Drive, Suite 220, Victor, NY 14564 Phone: (585) 381-5900 * Fax: (585) 381-0478 https://prosperityadv.com Item 2 – Material Changes Form ADV 2 is divided into two parts: Part 2A (the "Disclosure Brochure") and Part 2B (the "Brochure Supplement"). The Disclosure Brochure provides information about a variety of topics relating to an Advisor’s business practices and conflicts of interest. The Brochure Supplement provides information about the Advisory Persons of PAG. PAG believes that communication and transparency are the foundation of its relationship with Clients and will continually strive to provide you with complete and accurate information at all times. -
Private Debt in Asia: the Next Frontier?
PRIVATE DEBT IN ASIA: THE NEXT FRONTIER? PRIVATE DEBT IN ASIA: THE NEXT FRONTIER? We take a look at the fund managers and investors turning to opportunities in Asia, analyzing funds closed and currently in market, as well as the investors targeting the region. nstitutional investors in 2018 are have seen increased fundraising success in higher than in 2016. While still dwarfed Iincreasing their exposure to private recent years. by the North America and Europe, Asia- debt strategies at a higher rate than focused fundraising has carved out a ever before, with many looking to both 2017 was a strong year for Asia-focused significant niche in the global private debt diversify their private debt portfolios and private debt fundraising, with 15 funds market. find less competed opportunities. Beyond reaching a final close, raising an aggregate the mature and competitive private debt $6.4bn in capital. This is the second highest Sixty percent of Asia-focused funds closed markets in North America and Europe, amount of capital raised targeting the in 2017 met or exceeded their initial target credit markets in Asia offer a relatively region to date and resulted in an average size including SSG Capital Partners IV, the untapped reserve of opportunity, and with fund size of $427mn. Asia-focused funds second largest Asia-focused fund to close the recent increase in investor interest accounted for 9% of all private debt funds last year, securing an aggregate $1.7bn, in this area, private debt fund managers closed in 2017, three-percentage points 26% more than its initial target. -
The Outlook Newsletter
September 20, 2018 IN THIS ISSUE… Making Sense of the Changing Structure of What has changed in the U.S. Equity Markets U.S. equity markets? Why this is not your parents’ stock and bond market – Part II How is the investment landscape changing? “The underlying principles of sound investment should not alter from decade to What do these changes decade, but the application of these principles must be adapted to significant mean for investors? changes in the financial mechanisms and climate.” - Benjamin Graham, investor and professor widely acknowledged as the “father How is ARS addressing the of value investing” changes in the structure of the market? We have always viewed the markets as a medium of exchange, swapping dollars for shares of businesses understanding that the opportunity to build long-term capital lies in the discrepancy between the real worth of a business and its stock price as determined by the auction market. Our focus is to own a relatively small number of the best-positioned, best-valued companies in the market, and not the market itself. Investments are made in client portfolios with a view to holding them for the medium to longer-term believing The opportunity to build long- that these companies are the beneficiaries of the secular trends driving the term capital lies in the global economy. Before committing capital, our research must produce a discrepancy between the real clear picture of those investments that are deemed to offer the most cash worth of a business and its flow, assets and earnings for the fewest dollars invested. -
Marshall Wace Ucits Funds Plc Annual Report and Audited Financial
MARSHALL WACE UCITS FUNDS PLC ANNUAL REPORT AND AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 2014 MARSHALL WACE UCITS FUNDS PLC AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS For the year ended 30 June 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE COMPANY INFORMATION 2 - 4 DIRECTORS ’ REPORT 5 - 7 STATEMENT OF DIRECTORS ’ RESPONSIBILITIES 8 CUSTODIAN ’S REPORT 9 STATEMENT OF CUSTODIAN ’S RESPONSIBILITIES 10 INVESTMENT MANAGER ’S REPORT 11 - 12 INDEPENDENT AUDITORS ’ REPORT 13 - 14 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 15 STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME 18 STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN NET ASSETS ATTRIBUTABLE TO HOLDERS OF REDEEMABLE PARTICIPATING SHARES 19 CASH FLOW STATEMENT 20 NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 21 - 55 SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS 56 - 80 ADDITIONAL INFORMATI ON 81 MARSHALL WACE UCITS FUNDS PLC COMPANY INFORMATION DIRECTORS Ronan Daly* David Hammond Linburgh Martin* Robert Bovet* All the Directors are non-executive Directors *Independent director REGISTERED OFFICE 33 Sir John Rogerson ’s Quay Dublin 2 Ireland Registration number : 465375 INVESTMENT MANAGER , PROMOTER Marshall Wace LLP AND DISTRIBUTOR 13 th Floor , The Adelphi Building 1-11 John Adam Street London WC2N 6HT England ADMINISTRATOR Citco Fund Services (Ireland) Limited Custom House Plaza , Block 6 International Financial Services Centre Dublin 1 Ireland CUSTODIAN J.P. Morgan Bank (Ireland) plc J.P. Morgan House International Financial Services Centre Dublin 1 Ireland PRINCIPAL COUNTERPARTIES Deutsche Bank AG London Winchester House 1 Great Winchester Street London EC2N 2DB England J.P. Morgan 10 Aldermanbury London EC2V 7RF England UBS AG 1 Finsbury Avenue London EC2M 2PP England 2 MARSHALL WACE UCITS FUNDS PLC COMPANY INFORMATION (Continued) PRINCIPAL COUNTERPARTIES (Continued) Barclays Bank plc 5 The North Colonnade Canary Wharf London E14 4BB England HSBC Bank Plc 8 Canada Square Canary Wharf London E14 5HQ England Citco Bank Nederland N.V. -
1. Gina Rinehart 2. Anthony Pratt & Family • 3. Harry Triguboff
1. Gina Rinehart $14.02billion from Resources Chairman – Hancock Prospecting Residence: Perth Wealth last year: $20.01b Rank last year: 1 A plunging iron ore price has made a big dent in Gina Rinehart’s wealth. But so vast are her mining assets that Rinehart, chairman of Hancock Prospecting, maintains her position as Australia’s richest person in 2015. Work is continuing on her $10billion Roy Hill project in Western Australia, although it has been hit by doubts over its short-term viability given falling commodity prices and safety issues. Rinehart is pressing ahead and expects the first shipment late in 2015. Most of her wealth comes from huge royalty cheques from Rio Tinto, which mines vast swaths of tenements pegged by Rinehart’s late father, Lang Hancock, in the 1950s and 1960s. Rinehart's wealth has been subject to a long running family dispute with a court ruling in May that eldest daughter Bianca should become head of the $5b family trust. 2. Anthony Pratt & Family $10.76billion from manufacturing and investment Executive Chairman – Visy Residence: Melbourne Wealth last year: $7.6billion Rank last year: 2 Anthony Pratt’s bet on a recovering United States economy is paying off. The value of his US-based Pratt Industries has surged this year thanks to an improving manufacturing sector and a lower Australian dollar. Pratt is also executive chairman of box maker and recycling business Visy, based in Melbourne. Visy is Australia’s largest private company by revenue and the biggest Australian-owned employer in the US. Pratt inherited the Visy leadership from his late father Richard in 2009, though the firm’s ownership is shared with sisters Heloise Waislitz and Fiona Geminder. -
Arbitrage Pricing Theory∗
ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY∗ Gur Huberman Zhenyu Wang† August 15, 2005 Abstract Focusing on asset returns governed by a factor structure, the APT is a one-period model, in which preclusion of arbitrage over static portfolios of these assets leads to a linear relation between the expected return and its covariance with the factors. The APT, however, does not preclude arbitrage over dynamic portfolios. Consequently, applying the model to evaluate managed portfolios contradicts the no-arbitrage spirit of the model. An empirical test of the APT entails a procedure to identify features of the underlying factor structure rather than merely a collection of mean-variance efficient factor portfolios that satisfies the linear relation. Keywords: arbitrage; asset pricing model; factor model. ∗S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, forthcoming, Palgrave Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This article is taken from the authors’ original manuscript and has not been reviewed or edited. The definitive published version of this extract may be found in the complete The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics in print and online, forthcoming. †Huberman is at Columbia University. Wang is at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the McCombs School of Business in the University of Texas at Austin. The views stated here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Introduction The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was developed primarily by Ross (1976a, 1976b). It is a one-period model in which every investor believes that the stochastic properties of returns of capital assets are consistent with a factor structure. -
Vulture Hedge Funds Attack California
JUNE 2019 HEDGE PAPERS No. 67 VULTURE HEDGE FUNDS ATTACK CALIFORNIA "Quick profits for Wall Street" versus safe, sustainable, affordable energy PG&E was plunged into bankruptcy after decades of irresponsible corporate practices led to massive wildfires and billions in new liabilities. Some of the most notorious hedge fund vultures are using their role as investors to make sure PG&E’s bankruptcy leads to big profits for their firms—at the expense of ratepayers, public safety and the environment. CONTENTS 4 | Vulture Hedge Funds Attack 10 | Meet the Billionaires and Vultures Preying on PG&E – Andrew Feldstein – Joshua S Friedman – Paul Singer – Dan Loeb – Jay Wintrob – Seth Klarman – Richard Barrera 17 | How Californias Will Get Hurt – Impact on Public Safety – Impact on Ratepayers – box: Lessons from Puerto Rico 20 | Sustainability / Climate 22 | Protect Californias —And All Americans—From Predatory Hedge Funds 24 | Hedge Funds Should Be Illegal – table: Hedge Funds That Own One Million or More Shares of PG&E 28 | About Hedge Clippers 29 | Press + General Inquiry Contacts MEET HEDGE FUNDS PUTTING THEIR 1 BILLIONS TO WORK IN HARMFUL WAYS Over three dozen hedge funds are attacking California’s biggest utility. SEVEN BILLIONAIRES AND VULTURES are leading the charge. They're treating control of PG&E as up for grabs while climate crisis wildfires rage and customers pay through the nose. The Answer: Outlaw hedge funds. Andrew Feldstein CEO, BlueMountain Capital 2 3 4 Paul Singer Dan Loeb Jay Wintrob Elliott Management Third PointCapital Oaktree -
Pension Fund Investment in Hedge Funds", OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions, No
Please cite this paper as: Stewart, F. (2007), "Pension Fund Investment in Hedge Funds", OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 12, OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/086456868358 OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 12 Pension Fund Investment in Hedge Funds Fiona Stewart* JEL Classification: G11, G18, G23, J31 *OECD, France PENSION FUND INVESTMENT IN HEDGE FUNDS Fiona Stewart September 2007 OECD WORKING PAPER ON INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS No. 12 ——————————————————————————————————————— Financial Affairs Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2 Rue André Pascal, Paris 75116, France www.oecd.org/daf/fin www.oecd.org/daf/fin/wp 1 ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ Pension fund investment in hedge funds Having outlined the potential concerns relating to pension fund investment in hedge funds, the OECD carried out a survey to investigate what information pension fund regulators have on these investments and how they are being controlled. The survey confirms that pension fund regulators have little information regarding how pension funds in their jurisdiction are investing in hedge fund products (in terms of size of investments, the types of hedge funds pension funds are exposed and to what type of product). Only the Slovak Republic and Mexico (for the mandatory system) prevent pension funds from investing in hedge funds. Although the level of such investment is still very low in other countries, it is almost universally expected to increase. Few countries impose specific quantitative investment restrictions on pension fund investment in hedge funds, with most regulators exercising control via general investment restrictions and requirements (for diversification, transparency, through the prudent person rule etc.). -
AG Capital Management Partners, L.P. Commodity Trading Advisor
AG Capital Management Partners, L.P. Commodity Trading Advisor CTA Spotlight: AG Capital Management Partners, L.P. August 2020 Trading futures and options involves substantial risk of loss and is not suitable for all investors. There is no guarantee of profit no matter who is managing your money. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. An investor must read and understand the CTA's current disclosure document before investing. Impressive Performance AG Capital’s managed account program is the Discretionary Global Macro Program (“Program”). Ending March 2020, the Program’s cumulative return has outperformed the S&P by over 400% since its inception in October 2014 (247% vs. 47%). Even before the first quarter of 2020’s plunge in stocks, the Program had performed very well. During one of stocks’ best runs in history, ending in December 2019, AG Capital's cumulative return of 161% strongly outperformed the S&P’s cumulative return of 82%. Be advised that past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Discretionary Global Macro Program (October 2014 - August 2020) Compound ROR 25% Cumulative Return 276% Worst Drawdown 25% (February 2016 – January 2017) Best 36 Month Period 131% (May 1, 2017 – April 30, 2017) Worst 36 Month Period 12% (December 1, 2015 – November 30, 2018) Average 36 Month Period 68% (October 2014 – August 2020) AG Capital VS. S&P 500 TR* (October 2104 through August 2020) AG Capital S&P 500 TR Annualized Compounded ROR 25% 12% Cumulative Return 276% 100% Worst Cumulative Drawdown 25% 20% Program’s Performance During S&P Losing Months The risk of loss in futures and options trading is substantial no matter who is managing money. -
Securitization & Hedge Funds
SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: COLLATERALIZED FUND OBLIGATIONS SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: CREATING A MORE EFFICIENT MARKET BY CLARK CHENG, CFA Intangis Funds AUGUST 6, 2002 INTANGIS PAGE 1 SECURITIZATION & HEDGE FUNDS: COLLATERALIZED FUND OBLIGATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 3 PROBLEM.................................................................................................................................................... 4 SOLUTION................................................................................................................................................... 5 SECURITIZATION..................................................................................................................................... 5 CASH-FLOW TRANSACTIONS............................................................................................................... 6 MARKET VALUE TRANSACTIONS.......................................................................................................8 ARBITRAGE................................................................................................................................................ 8 FINANCIAL ENGINEERING.................................................................................................................... 8 TRANSPARENCY......................................................................................................................................