Rethinlung Progress- a Kantian Perspective -- - by Marc Schattenmann
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Rethinlung Progress- A Kantian Perspective -- - By Marc Schattenmann Y THINK ABOUT PROGRESS? IN THIS PAPER, I TRY TO show that we have good reasons to think about progress-if we do it the right way. I will defend this claim by examining Immanuel Kant's theory of progress. Kant dealt with the issue of progress in numerous wwritings, especially in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), What is Enlightenment? (1784), On the Common Saying: 'That may be cor- rect in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice' (1793), Perpetual Peace (1795), and the Second Part of The Contest of the Faculties, entitled "A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?" (1798). The paper explores Kant's theory of political progress in order to show its systematic connection with his theoretical and practical philosophy and its impor- tance for his normative philosophy of politics. In particular, I stress four points that have ofien been neglected and/or misrepresented: Kant's thebry of progress is an integral part of his philosophical system. (This claim is part of an argument among Kant scholars.) Kant's view of progress is realistically utopian. (This claim is directed against the so-called "Realists" in political theory and international relations theory.) Kant's notion of progress is essentially anti-deterministic. (This claim is directed against the followers of Hegel.) The progress of humanity does not depend on the moral progress of indi- viduals. (This claim is directed against the followers of Marx.) 1. The role of progress: saving morality ANT'S THEORY OF PROGRESS HAS USUALLY BEEN criticized along two lines. One line of criticism considers Kant a prime example of the naive belief in progress supposedly typical of the nlightenment. The other line maintains that, whatever its merits, Kant's I!!!!theory of progress is not part of the critical enterprise undertaken by the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and by the Critique of Judgment. A representative of the first line of criticism is Paul Natorp, one of the editors of Kant's works for the Prussian Academy. In his 1924 book Kant iiber Krieg und Frieden. Ein ~eschichtsphilosophischerEssay, Natorp states that "the belief in the progress of humanity, which even the critically minded Kant had not yet given up entirely, has vanished almost to its last remains." Natorp concludes on a pessimistic note: "In the end, it was Kant's fundamental mistake that he ...did not decide to dis- card the question: What may we hope of the future of mankind?"' The second line of criticism is embraced by Thtodore Ruyssen in his 1962 article, "La philosophie de 1'Histoire selon Kant." Ruyssen considers it "artificial" to regard Kant's smaller writings on history and politics as a corollary of his critical philosophy. He adds: "Commentators of Kant have asked them- Kant realistic enough to know selves nevertheless in is what measure his phi- that progress is far from bein8 losophy of history is connected to the critical inevitable. But in order to save his taken ,, a moral philosophy from being irnugi- whole; a hitimate research, for sure, but TJUrY, he has tO Show that PrOgPeSS is one that, in regard of at leust possible. Kant, seems to us in vain."2 I will argue that both criticisms are mistaken. Kant's theory of progress is not the expression of a na~veoptimism. Furthermore, it is an essential and indispensable part of his moral philosophy. Kant is realistic enough to know that progress is far from being inevitable. But in order to save his moral philosophy from being imaginary, he has to show that progress is at least pos- sible. Although the word "progress" is not used in the Critique of Pure Reason, this work lays the ground for the theory of progress that Kant develops in his later writings. In a section entitled "On the ideal of the highest good, as determining ground of the ultimate end of pure reason," Kant writes: All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope? (C1 A 804 f./ B 832 f.) He then goes on to explain briefly the meaning of those questions. About the third he says: The third question, namely 'if I do what I should, what may I then hope?' is simultaneously practical and theoretical, so that the practical leads like a clue to a reply to the theoretical question ....For all hope concerns happi- ness, and with respect to the practical and the moral law it is the very same as what knowledge and the natural law is with regard to the theoretical cognition of things. The former finally comes down to the inference that something is (which determines the ultimate final end) because something ought to happen; the latter, that something is (which acts as the supreme cause) because something does happen. (C1 A 805 f. / B 833 f.; emphasis deleted) This passage indicates the link between Kant's practical philosophy and his theory of progress that provides the key for an understanding of the latter. The link becomes clear through the way in which Kant rephrases the third question of rea- son. At first, it read simply: "What may I hope?" Rephrased, it reads: "If I do what I should, what may I then hope?" This new formulation makes clear that the third question is connected to the second question and somehow follows from it. But how exactly does "What may I hope?" (a question about the future) follow from "What should I do?" (the question of morality)? What is the nature of this connec- tion? At first glance, the connection might seem to be only psychological. As Kant says in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: "it is one of the inescapable limitations of human beings and their practical faculty of reason ...to be concerned in every action with its result, seeking something in it that might serve them as an end" (Religion VI:7). It is characteristic of humans that we are not con- tent with knowing what we should do. We also want to know what will come of our actions if we do what: we should, what gains and benefits we can expect. We want to know why we should try to live up to the standards of the moral law, and we want an answer more inspiring than, "because it's the law." The problem with this psychological link between the demands of the moral law and our aspirations and hopes is that it may be too weak. Are we really justified to ask all those questions about the outcome of our moral actions? Are we not just acting like donkeys who won't start to run until they have a carrot dangling before their eyes? We certainly have a tendency to ask all those questions-but maybe we are just looking for a pleasant answer that hides an unpleasant truth about our lives. Fortunately, we don't have to rely on this psychological connection. According to Kant, it is not only a psychological necessity but also an analytical truth, "indeed undeniable," that "every volition must have an object" (C2 V:34). As volition ( Wollen) must have an object, so must the will ( Wille). Even the perfect- ly good will, that is, the will that is entirely determined by the moral law and not by some object, has an object: the idea of the highest good (C2 V:122). To use the donkey metaphor again: Even if we don't run because of the carrot, there is nonetheless a relation between action and reward here, such that the carrot still is, in some sense, the "goal" of running. In abstract terms: If a specific formal proce- dure leads to a specific material end, this end is the object of the procedure, even if the procedure is carried out only for formal reasons. Thus, even if the moral law has to be followed only for its own sake alone, it still has an object. This object is called the highest good. This conceptual connection between morality and its object gives us the answer to the third question of reason. If the answer to "What should I do?" is "You should follow the moral law!," then the answer to "If I do what I should, what may I hope for?" must be: "You may hope for the highest good!" But how can Kant say that? How can he say: "You may hope for the highest good?" Kant's answer is based on the following chain of reasoning: 1. Morality can only require the possible: Ought implies Can. 2. The object of morality is the highest good. 3. Therefore: If morality is possible, achievement of the highest good must be possible too. 4. A fact of reason tells us that morality is possible. 5. Therefore: Achievement of the highest good must be possible. 6. Achievement of the highest good is possible if the conditions hold under which it is possible. 7. As achievement of the highest good must be possible (V. 5); the conditions must hold under which achievement of the highest good is possible. Anyone familiar with Kant's moral philosophy will have recognized this type of rea- soning: it is an argument for postulates of practical reason. By a postulate of pure practical reason, Kant understands "a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it follows as an inseparable corollary from an a pri- ori unconditionally valid practical law" (C2 V: 122).