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Home , Abubakar Rimi, Adamu Atta, Aminu Kano, Aper Aku, Awwal Ibrahim, Bola Ige

THE NIGERIAN CRUCIBLE

Politics and Governance in a Conglomerate Nation, 1977-2017

RICHARD JOSEPH

PART ONE V. The Ethnic Trap: Notes on the Nigerian Campaign and Elections, 1978-79

Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 11, 1/2 (April, 1981), pp. 17-231

The building of a trans-ethnic political space, and a nation that commands the loyalty of the country’s citizens, have been persistent aspirations of Nigerian governments. The 1979 elections demonstrated that, however much political party leaders may seek to build a national following, they are “trapped” by ethnic and other sectional identities. Attempts to build policy-oriented parties, and promote a progressive social agenda, are hostage to the persistence of as a conglomerate society.

In his opening address to the forty-nine members of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) on 18 October, 1975, the head of Nigeria’s new military government, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, declared: “It is important that we avoid a reopening of the deep splits which caused trauma in the country.”2 Those splits, made known to the outside world during the civil war, were ethnic, regional, and to a lesser extent, religious. Of these three modes of overt division, Nigerians have always been most successful in controlling the religious aspect.3 General Muhammad’s statement is also instructive on the problem of regional divisions: “The fear of the predominance of one Region over another has… been removed to a large extent by the simple Constitutional Act of creating more States.”4 Four months later, following the assassination of Mohammed, the successor regime of General Obasanjo declared the creation of seven more states, bringing the number to nineteen from the twelve established by General Gowon in May 1967. While it is evident that the existence of “regions” has not been obliterated by their subdivision into states, this development has reduced the immediate political visibility and at least some of the salience of regional boundaries.

It can be asked whether in the 1978-79 campaign and elections Nigeria made a notable step forward in transcending or diluting the political significance of its ethnic scission. In considering this question, one must be mindful that the Electoral Decree of 1977 and the new

1 Also published as “Le piège ethnique: notes sur les élections au Nigeria (1978-79),” Politique Africaine, Vol.1, No. 3 (1981). 2 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee containing the Draft Constitution (, 1976), vol. 1, p. xli (hereafter referred to as CDC, vol. 1). The 50th nominee, Chief , declined to participate, complaining about the method by which he was informed of his appointment. 3 I have already dealt in a preliminary way with the issue of class divisions in “Political Parties and Ideology in Nigeria,” Review of African Political Economy 13 (1979). See also, in that volume, Segun Osoba, “The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie,” and Gavin Williams, ed., Nigeria: Economy and Society (London, 1976). [An interesting remark considering the extent to which the prolonged Boko Haram Islamist movement has shaped Nigeria’s global image.] 4 CDC, vol. 1, p. xli.

2 Constitution of 1979 took every opportunity to promote national unity and prohibit ethnic discrimination in the political arena. Some of the relevant provisions in the Electoral Decree (E.D.) and the 1979 Constitution can be indicated.5 First, no associations other than political parties were allowed to canvass for votes or provide funds for electoral candidates [E.D., s. 77(1)]. Membership in such parties was open to all Nigerians, irrespective of place of origin, religion, ethnic group, or sex; the name, emblem, or motto of such parties could have no ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that its activities were confined to a geographical part of Nigeria; and the headquarters of all parties had to be situated in the Federal capital [E.D., s. 78(1), b, e, f]. The final important provision regarding political parties is that their executive committees were to include representatives from at least two-thirds of the states of the Federation.

The wording of the Constitution shows a strong formal commitment to these goals. It is often affirmed that a criterion for appointment to governmental positions or bodies is that consideration be given “to the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity.”6 This requirement is accorded its ultimate expression in the provision that, in nominating federal ministers, the President must include at least one indigene from every state of the Federation [s. 135(3)]. Indeed, in its statement of the fundamental objectives and directive principles that should guide all future Nigerian governments [Chapter II discussed in “National Objectives and Public Accountability”], the Constitution lays a duty on the officers of the State that goes well beyond nondiscrimination and includes demands for affirmative action that are seldom regarded as pertinent to political institutions:

s. 15(3) For the purpose of promoting national integration it shall be the duty of the State to… (c) encourage intermarriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic association or ties; and (d) promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional barriers (4) The State shall foster a feeling of belonging and of involvement among the various peoples of the Federation, to the end that loyalty to the nation shall override sectional loyalties

It could be argued that the main reason the drafters of these fundamental documents of the Second Republic placed so much emphasis on positive action to combat ethnic discrimination is because they recognized how prevalent the latter is in all dimensions of

5 Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Electoral Decree 1977,” Official Gazette 64, no. 61 (29 December 1977), and The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (Lagos, 1979). 6 The parallel phrasing at the state level is “shall have regard to the diversity of the people within the State.” See 1979 Constitution, s. 157(5) and 188(4).

3 Nigerian life. It should also be noted that they considered it insufficient merely to proscribe such discrimination. Nigerian political aspirants and officers of state were enjoined to take account of sectional identities in their public actions. National unity or integration was to be achieved not by disregarding ethnicity and place of origin, thereby rendering them irrelevant in the eyes of politicians and elected officials, but by ensuring that they figure in decisions at the Federal, state, and local levels of government.

Formation of Political Parties

All five registered political parties satisfied the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) that their organizations were national rather than regional or ethnic in nature. Despite the achievement of the required spread in executive committee membership, as the campaign unfolded it became apparent that each of the parties had a regional, if not ethnic, core.7 The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) attempted to mesh the formal electoral provisions with its own informal structure by devising a “zoning” arrangement. According to this plan, the presidential candidate would come from the North and his running mate from the East (note the resort to regional categories) and the chairman of the Party from the West. Even this strategy itself camouflaged a deeper level of categorizing since it was expected, given the balance of power among aspirants from the competing ethnic groups, that the Northern president should be Hausa- Fulani, the Eastern vice-president an Igbo, and the Western chairman a Yoruba.8

The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)—the first to be announced on 22 September, 1978— nominated Obafemi Awolowo as the presidential candidate, Chief Philip Umeadi (an Igbo lawyer) as the vice-presidential candidate, and Alhaji Alinakura (a little-known former opposition parliamentarian in the Northern House of Assembly from ) as chairman.9 Considerable effort was made to ensure the participation of Northern delegates at the first National Convention of the UPN. Moreover, although it was well known that the party was the brain-child of Chief Awolowo and his closest, largely Yoruba, advisors, all the rituals of having the party propose Awolowo as its torchbearer, then calling him back into the General Assembly to receive his supporters’ acclamation, were duly observed. The UPN had no difficulty in establishing offices and procuring candidates - albeit of greatly varying degrees of credibility - throughout the Federation, but it could never overcome the tension between its national

7 On the process of party registration see “Political Parties and Ideology in Nigeria.” 8 There was a prolonged struggle for the position of vice-presidential candidate. The hopeful non-Ibo from the East, Dr. , was rewarded following the elections with the plum post of president of the Senate. Observers present at the NPN convention in December 1978, including myself, were able to notice the process by which state delegations gave their votes to the candidates endorsed by the party’s national organizers. 9 Alinakura defected from the UPN even before the elections were held, and lost heavily in the race for the Senate. These remarks about the UPN National Convention held in Lagos in September 1978 are based on my observations of the situation.

4 aspirations and the facts of its being mainly Yoruba-led and Yoruba-financed and deriving such a high percentage of its support from the Yoruba peoples.

The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) was originally designed to transcend the ethnic and regional divisions of Nigerian society. In fact, Club 19, which gave rise to the NPP, wanted to promote the cause of Nigeria’s “majority of minorities” and to challenge the inevitable reduction of Nigerian politics to maneuvers among the parties representing the three major ethnic sections of the population.10 The original thinking of the NPP was in keeping with the spirit of the speech with which General Muhammed launched the transition. Before 1966, according to Muhammed, “three major political parties emerged with Regional and ethnic support, and at the centre, only an uneasy coalition of two of these parties was possible at any one time.”11 Yet, the early NPP also inherited the strong belief among young political activists from the Middle-Belt area of the North that they could prize from the Hausa-Fulani elites the leading position they had often held in Nigerian politics.

When they finally, and reluctantly, acknowledged the need to obtain some participation from the far North, the NPP organizers negotiated an alliance with the splinter movement of Waziri Ibrahim, a Kanuri from and former NPC Federal Minister. A struggle then ensued between the very wealthy Waziri, who thought he could win control of the party he was called upon to bankroll, and the supporters of Dr. , who would not abandon their desire to swing the new party behind their former leader. Since Waziri was unwilling to take second place to Zik, the issue could only be resolved through a scission of the party.12 Waziri therefore formed the Great Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP) which failed to threaten the hegemonic politico-social groups in the far North. The NPP, which had seemed destined to confront the old Nigeria of sectionally-based parties, became the organization most overtly aligned with the communal aspirations of two politically-alienated peoples, the Igbos of Imo and Anambra states and the non-Muslim peoples of .13

The fifth of the registered parties, the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) led by Aminu , can only be considered in terms of a sectional referent if the analyst is prepared to explore

10 Based on interviews conducted with leading members of this group in the Constituent Assembly of 1977-78, notably Chief Olu Akinfosile, Dr. Obi Wali, and Dr. Omo Omoruyi. 11 CDC, vol. 1, p. xli. 12 I was present at both the first NPP Convention in November 1978, when the party leaders clashed on the floor of their assembly, and the second one in December, when Zik’s devoted supporters—Chiefs Ogunsanya and Akinfosile, M.T. Mbu, , and Paul Unongo—literally danced around their restored leader, having dislodged the usurper, Waziri. 13 The alienation of the Igbos stemmed, of course, from their defeat in the civil war and their feeling of having fallen behind in the competition over access to state resources; while the Plateau peoples not only still feel politically and culturally dominated by the Hausa-Fulani but also that they have suffered discrimination since the overthrow of their kinsman, , and the failure of the counter-coup of February 1976 in which Gowon was allegedly implicated.

5 the tacit dimensions of party activity. Both the UPN and the PRP emphasized the importance of their political programs, and they presented themselves to the electorate as Nigeria’s progressive or even socialist parties. However, the UPN came to be perceived in ethnic terms more than the PRP. The first reason for this was that whereas aspired to play the role of “Leader of the North” in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Federation in 1966-67, he never came to be regarded in this way nationally as was Awolowo, the avowed “Leader of the Yoruba” after 1967.”14 Second, the major ethnic division in Nigeria has for the past three decades been between the Yoruba and Igbo despite the significant objective differences between these two collectivities and the Hausa-Fulani. To explain this phenomenon, one would need to trace the early years of the independence movement in Nigeria, the rivalries between Awo and Zik (and hence the Action Group and the NCNC), and the keen competition for appointments to public bodies during the late fifties and early sixties.15

Most crucially, Awolowo came to be portrayed as the man who had misled Lt-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu and the Igbos in 1967 by (so it is contended) making them believe he would take the West out of the Federation if the East seceded.16 This belief grew unabatedly during the civil war. Awolowo came to be held personally accountable, by outspoken Igbos, for decisions taken by cabinets of the Federal military government of which he was a senior civilian member. Three Northerners who played important roles in ensuring the defeat of Biafra - as an aggressive commander of the Second Division, Aminu Kano as a mobilizer against the secession at home and abroad, and Waziri Ibrahim as an arms purchaser in Europe— are all well regarded in , while Awolowo is distrusted, although no more “guilty” than they of defending the Republic.17

This enduring ethnic split that the UPN tried to bridge had no equivalent for the PRP, and so the latter could bolster its national image through recruitment of prominent Igbos like S. G. Ikoku, Chief A. A. O. Ezenwa, and Arthur Nwankwo. Similar affiliations within the UPN would

14 Many of the interpretive judgements made in this section are based on my close coverage of political developments between 1976 and 1979 and numerous interviews I conducted with knowledgeable persons during the final year of the transition. For the relevant information on Awolowo, see “The Crossroads of Politics” in B. J. Dudley’s Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (, 1973). 15 These points are fully treated in Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1964), and K. W. J. Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-66 (London, 1973). 16 For Awolowo’s exact words, whose careful ambiguity was largely disregarded during the 1978-79 political campaign, see John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the , 1967-70 (Princeton, 1977), pp. 52-53. 17 Other charges levied by Igbos against Awolowo during the campaign are that he was responsible for the financial changes that “robbed” them of their accumulated savings, that he advocated starvation as a legitimate instrument of war, that he banned the importation of stock fish and used clothing (items valued by Igbos), and that he masterminded the indigenization program at a time when most Igbos could not participate in purchasing shares in foreign companies.

6 be dismissed as mere camouflaging of the party’s Yoruba core.18 What really matters in this regard, therefore, is not how a political organization is structured, or even projected, but rather how its structure or activities—whatever their nature—come to be perceived by the electorate. One of the ironies of the 1978-79 campaign is that, in the absence of opinion polls, parties like the UPN persisted in seeing only the image they sought to project through advertisements and public meetings, which rendered the negative response of whole sections of the population all the more crushing when the votes were finally counted.

The subtle sectional referents of the PRP will be only listed here, since they acted to win the party support in its core area without undermining its image in peripheral areas. First, Aminu Kanu sought to be leader of the Northern-led National Movement and withdrew to form the PRP only when it became clear that he would not achieve this goal.19 Second, the PRP has successfully underplayed its strong Hausa identification through its projection of this sentiment in class terms, i.e., the lower-class Hausa Talakawa against the aristocratic groups significantly composed of descendants of the Fulani conquerors (and the allied business class, more ethnically Hausa in nature).20 Third, outside the North, enthusiasm for the PRP was largely restricted to left-wing intellectuals and communities of Hausa traders and transporters. Finally, the dual political stratagem used by Aminu Kano in pre-1966 politics—of fighting firmly in the north against the Northern conservative party while participating, through alliance with the NCNC, in the NPC-led government in the Federal center - was again in evidence in 1979. Aminu Kanu boldly fought the NPN in the electoral campaign but refused to play any part in the last-ditch effort to have Shagari’s election voided.21

The Campaign and Election Results

A brief discussion of the election results will show how ethnicity can serve as a springboard to political success in Nigeria’s liberal democratic system if it is accepted and utilized or a trap to ensnare politicians and political groups if it is discounted or rejected. There is, of course, a third alternative available to political actors (especially of the Left), i.e., refusing to play the game of ethnic politics at all. Robin Luckham chanced upon a relevant statement by the counsel of the Tribunal of Enquiry into the Lagos City Council of 1966: “Almost all the

18 There is obviously some useful research to be undertaken by political scientists interested in psychosocial dimensions of political behavior, regarding the contrasting reactions of many Igbos today toward the Hausa-Fulani on one hand and the Yoruba on the other. The greater willingness of many Igbos to cooperate with the former than with the latter seems not to have been significantly altered by the brutal pogroms unleashed against their people in 1966. 19 See “Political Parties and Ideology in Nigeria.” 20 For the relevant background see C. S. Whitaker’s thorough study, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966 (Princeton, 1970). 21 Many of the relevant details of the post-election problems have been summarized in my “Democratization under Military Tutelage: Crisis and Consensus in the 1979 Nigerian Elections,” Comparative Politics (forthcoming).

7 people in the Council practice tribalism. And to them all tribalism is the greatest misery.”22 This statement fits many of the active participants in the Nigerian 1978-79 campaign and elections. While few of them overtly or publicly espoused ethnic chauvinism, fewer behaved as if this phenomenon was anything but a self-evident fact of Nigerian political and social life.

We have already seen, in discussing the Constitution and Electoral Decree, that exhortations to transcend sectional identities are juxtaposed with provisions that definite account be taken of them. This duality was reflected in the public and private statements of many eminent Nigerians interviewed. Quite often, after a discussion of the parties’ programs and general appeal, the researcher would be cautioned not to overlook the role of ethnicity in deciding the outcome, whatever the objective value of these programs and presentations. The opposite argument was put in its strongest form by Chief Awolowo, who criticized journalists and university lecturers for always harping on the issue of tribalism or ethnicity. The common people, he claimed, were more concerned with procuring the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and education for their children.23 Much of the drama of the campaign concerned which of these two attitudes would be rewarded by the electorate at the polls.

The National Party of Nigeria won the greatest spread of votes throughout the Federation. With the sole exception of , the NPN was either the first-placed or second-placed party in all the states and in all five elections.24 It won between 36 and 38 percent of the contests in each of the first four elections. won at least 25 percent of the vote in twelve states in the presidential election, well ahead of the next-placed Chief Awolowo who achieved that required minimum in six states.25 After Awolowo came Dr. Azikiwe with three states and Aminu Kano and Waziri Ibrahim with two each.

Another way to approach this question is to look at the extent to which the candidates obtained overwhelming support in just one part of the country or set of states. If we take 60 percent of the votes in any state as indicating a “landslide victory,” this was by Shagari in four states of the former North (, Benue, Niger, and Sokoto) and two states of the former East (Rivers and Cross River). Equally significant is that two of the northern states, Benue and Niger, are composed of non-Hausa-Fulani peoples, Benue being predominantly Christian and Niger predominantly Muslim. As for the two former Eastern states, they are composed of a multiplicity of ethnic groups once regarded as minorities of that region.

22 The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67 (Cambridge, England: 1972), p. 222. 23 Personal interview, Yola, , 17 June 1979. 24 See the tables in the Appendix (Whitaker Table 4). 25 In addition to securing the largest number of votes, the winner in the first round had to obtain 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of the states. The great controversy following the declaration of Shagari’s victory came over the interpretation of what should be considered two-thirds of nineteen states, a full thirteen or twelve states plus 0.67 of the vote in the thirteenth state.

8

While there is no basis for arguing that the votes of the winning candidate in the presidential election were sectionally derived, it will be argued here that the NPN did implement a general strategy involving mobilizing disparate ethnic solidarities behind local elites. The greatest number of votes received by Waziri Ibrahim was 54 percent in his home state of Borno. Even here, over a third of the votes were won by Shagari. It cannot be said that Waziri won the consolidated support of the Kanuri people (nor that he particularly sought such support).26 The ethnic appeal of Aminu Kano and the PRP was well integrated with that of class. He won 76 percent of the votes in his home state of Kano but lost to Shagari in , where the PRP had two weeks earlier won the governorship. The potential impact of the PRP cannot be judged, however, solely on the basis of the 1979 elections, since the campaigning was so hampered by financial constraints.

It is the votes for Chief Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe that reflect the sectional pattern of voting most clearly. Awolowo did not win 60 or 70 percent of the votes in the four Yoruba states. His victories were more crushing than that, ranging from a low of 82.5 percent in Oyo to a high of 93.5 percent in . The highest number of votes he received outside Yorubaland was 53 percent in the adjacent Bendel state (formerly part of Awolowo’s Western Region), which contains a variety of ethnic groups. His main opponent, Shehu Shagari, wrested a respectable 36 percent of the vote in Bendel. Meanwhile, Dr. Azikiwe won over 80 percent of the votes in the two Igbo states of Imo and Anambra, and just short of 50 percent in Plateau, where once again Shagari garnered over a third of the vote. The limit of Zik’s national appeal can be seen in his failure to register even 5 percent of the vote in eleven of Nigeria’s nineteen states. Conversely, the measure of Shagari’s and the NPN’s support is in their strong performance in the secondary areas of support of the UPN (Bendel and Gongola), the NPP (Plateau), the PRP (Kaduna), and the heartland of the GNPP (Borno).

Although all the parties were constrained by the Electoral Decree to present a national posture, the voting results demonstrate that only one of the five succeeded in being national in more than name. To conclude—as journalists are prone to do regarding African politics—that the Nigerian parties, campaign, and elections were determined merely by ethnic affiliation would be an unwarranted simplification of the complex process in Nigeria, 1978-79. The leaders of the political parties were motivated, like political aspirants everywhere, by a variety of concerns and objectives. Nevertheless, the sentiments of ethnic solidarity and ethnic conflict are factors which they could positively use, indirectly accept, or idealistically deny. It will now be shown how the registered parties operated against this attitudinal background.

26 The many ambiguities of Waziri Ibrahim’s political behavior deserve closer attention. In this case, although he rebelled against the primacy of the Hausa-Fulani in Northern politics, he left himself open to being accused of distributing his largess everywhere in the Federation except within his home state among his fellow Kanuri.

9

Both the PRP and the GNPP succeeded in preventing renewal of single-party dominance in the former Northern Region. However, as indicated above, their appeals were only in a minimal or indirect way based on ethnic identities. The National Party of Nigeria reflected in its purest form the dualism of the 1979 Constitution by promoting the cause of “One Nigeria” while recruiting sectional elites who could then appeal for their people’s support as “sons of the soil.” In this way, the NPN combined features of all three major parties of the First Republic. From the NPC, the notion of Northern primacy and a conservative but weakly articulated ideology could be traced. There is a parallel with the former NCNC in the semi-autonomous NPN structure that allowed the party to assume a communal coloration wherever it was implanted. And, from the Action Group, it was the NPN which paradoxically inherited the role of a refuge for minority peoples in the Federation who no longer wished to be subordinated to a larger ethnic group in their region. The NPN was therefore successful in retaining many of the former strongholds of the NPC (Sokoto, Bauchi, Niger, Kwara) while making significant inroads in the peripheral areas of support of both the Action Group (Plateau, Benue, Cross River) and the NCNC (Oyo, Bendel, Rivers).27

The general strategy of the Unity Party of Nigeria was diametrically opposed to that of the NPN. Chief Obafemi Awolowo insisted that potential adherents must accept the party’s clearly defined political program. He stoutly rejected what he called “horse-trading,” i.e., individuals negotiating their entry into the party, and thus the adherence of their local supporters on the basis of promised governmental jobs or positions.28 Chief Awolowo felt that where such local elites refused to accept his approach, he could go over their heads and make a direct appeal to their people. With regard to the Yoruba, Chief Awolowo correctly assessed that he had now become their unchallenged leader. He therefore felt he did not need to make specific appeals to Yoruba solidarity, although this attitude did not prevent his followers from doing so on their own initiative.

The voting results proved most conclusively that the non-Yoruba electorate was not prepared to accept Chief Awolowo or his party in the way that he intended. Despite his strenuous campaigning among the Igbos, he received less than one percent of their vote and came last in their states among the five candidates. In nine of the ten states of the former North, he obtained derisory figures of less than 7 percent of the votes in each, with the exception of Gongola state, where he gained the respectable figure of 21.7 percent.29 The attempt by Awolowo to transcend

27 A separate area of important inquiry suggested by these observations concerns the undermining of the political salience of regional identities as a consequence of the creation of new states. 28 These comments are based on several conversations with influential members of Awolowo’s campaign team at different times during the campaign, as well as conversations with Awolowo himself. 29 Unless the UPN and the GNPP continue their loose post-election alliance, it is hard to see how the UPN will retain its foothold in Gongola, with the GNPP in control of the governorship and the NPN hard at the latter’s heels with a third of the votes in the presidential contest.

10 the old politics, in which party leaders negotiated with sectionally-based elites in order to win pledges of their people’s support, clearly did not succeed. Despite the popular enthusiasm and extensive media coverage generated by his call for free education, rural development, full employment, and free health care, the greatest number of Awolowo’s supporters as well as of his opponents voted on the basis of who he was (in ethnic terms) rather than the ideology and programs of himself and his party.30

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe came into the campaign with the intention of regaining the mantle, not so much as the leading former Nigerian nationalist (or “Zik of ” as it is affectionately put), but as the prime champion of the interests and hopes of the Igbo people. It should be remembered that Dr. Azikiwe was Nigeria’s premier national leader and that he only turned to developing a sectional political base when his attempts to head the government in the West in 1952 were blocked by Awolowo. In 1978-79, however, it was clear that Zik was not joining a party that had much chance of emerging in the short term as the foremost political formation in the nation. His assumption of the leadership of the NPP was calculated to give him an independent political instrument after he failed to negotiate an acceptable role for himself in the NPN.31 Moreover, those members of the NPP who promoted his adherence to their party had already envisaged an Igbo-Middle-Belt axis as a new basis for the party—instead of a diffused concentration on all ethnic minorities—and they regarded Zik as the torchbearer who would enable them to implement this strategy.32

Zik achieved his fundamental aim of drawing the Igbo people en bloc behind the only party willing to accept his leadership. In one of the two key states of the , Plateau, both the NPP campaign and the votes it received went according to plan: the party won four of the five senatorial seats, the governorship, and half of the state’s presidential votes. In the second of these two states, Benue, a combination of internal NPP rivalries and NPN success in attracting such powerful local patrons as Joseph Tarka, , and former Federal commissioner Colonel Ali resulted in a decisive setback for the NPP. Apart from sentiments of Igbo redemption at home and resistance to Hausa-Fulani hegemony in the Middle Belt, Zik and the NPP had no grounds for challenging the other parties, especially the much better-organized and better-financed NPN. They therefore had a negligible impact elsewhere in the Federation, except

30 Such a statement is made in the full knowledge that his most fervent supporters would contend that they voted for him because of all he promised to do for the people. The question such claims provoke is: Why did these promises not generate more support among non-Yoruba peoples, even in the South, who were often in greater need of these reforms (e.g., in the provision of educational services) than were the Yoruba? 31 The way in which Azikiwe encouraged the advances of both the NPN and NPP during the last quarter of 1978 provided fertile material for Nigeria’s political cartoonists. 32 For the details of these maneuvers see “Political Parties and Ideologies in Nigeria.”

11 where Igbos, or Igbo-related peoples, constituted important fractions of the local population (i.e. Rivers and Lagos states).33

Conclusion

To win the support of the nation, a contender for the presidency in Nigeria as much as in the (from whose system that of the former is greatly derived) must risk losing some of the support of the people of his regional, ethno-linguistic, and/or religious group. The clear lesson of the 1979 elections is that individuals who have become identified as the foremost champions of their people’s interests—whether or not such an image has been intentionally sought—cannot expect to win power when the whole nation is considered as a single constituency. In such cases they can be said to be ultimately trapped by the ethnic perceptions of their supporters and opponents, regardless of other countervailing factors in the campaign.

It does not follow from this argument, however, that the victorious candidate and his party in 1979 took a non-ethnic approach in the campaign or that their support was ethnically neutral. The fact that Shehu Shagari did poorly (i.e., obtained less than ten percent of the vote) in only five states, all predominantly Yoruba or Igbo, does not mean that the voting in these states was more ethnically determined than elsewhere. More relevant in explaining this pattern is the fact that the majority of Nigerian states are still ethnically plural. NPN organizers therefore sought to convince the elites of the component ethnic groups of these states that the NPN, as a congress-type party, offered to their people the best opportunity of sharing in national power. The NPN, successful in this appeal, came to be widely perceived as providing the best chance of preventing the Federal state from becoming the preserve, avowed or not, of any major ethnic collectivity popularly identified with a competing party.

The new opposition parties and leaders, if they are to have a reasonable chance of wresting primacy in the political order at any future election, must first recognize to what degree the NPN has been constructed to reflect the dual perspectives on unity incorporated in the Constitution, political institutions, and electoral rules of the Second Republic. They then must choose between trying to beat the NPN at its own game, in which they are unlikely to succeed, or shifting their focus to the arduous task of mobilizing Nigerians along trans-ethnic class lines. The paradox of the latter approach is that it must initially involve forging alliances with groups and individuals who enjoy implicit communal support within their localities. Nigerian ideology, understood in programmatic terms, must first be respectful of ethnicity. Before a true progressive movement can emerge that will pose a serious challenge to the conservative forces that so

33 An important exception to this observation is Bendel state, where the NPN was successful in blocking the NPP from regaining the level of support of the old NCNC, despite the significant population of Igbo- speaking Bendelites. The NPP obtained only 4 of 60 State Assembly seats and 8.6 percent of the presidential vote in Bendel.

12 naturally achieve governance in Nigeria, the workings of the ethnic trap must be carefully studied and deliberately neutralized.

13 Appendix: Election Results, 1979 Table 1 Senate Election State GNPP UPN NPN PRP NPP Anambra 12,832 10,932 210,101 19,574 699,157 Bauchi 188,819 28,959 323,392 127,279 39,868 Bendel 38,332 316,511 250,194 2,055 60,639 Benue 46,452 14,769 332,967 - 75,523 Borno 278,352 22,145 184,633 31,508 - Cross River 161,353 77,479 310,071 - 68,203 Gongola 223,121 124,707 203,226 30,708 17,830 Imo 101,184 7,553 145,507 8,609 750,518 Kaduna 223,824 85,094 410,888 278,305 61,807 Kano 35,430 13,831 233,985 683,367 - Kwara 32,383 126,065 54,282 328 1,020 Lagos 14,480 428,573 35,730 2,556 52,738 Niger 71,498 13,860 175,597 8,139 207 Ogun 1,018 230,411 31,953 - 119 Ondo 4,905 501,522 49,612 - 6,417 Oyo 9,472 758,696 200,372 2,497 4,397 Plateau 41,287 20,024 154,792 19,017 220,278 Rivers 41,287 20,106 153,454 30 86,138 Sokoto 305,292 34,145 571,562 38,305 - Seats won out 8 28 36 7 16 of 95 Percent 8.4 29.5 37.9 7.3 16.9 Sources: These tables of the 1979 election results have been adapted from West Africa, no. 3241 (27 August 1979): 1572-73, and no. 3258 (24 December 1979): 2365.

Table 2 House of Representatives State # of Seats GNPP UPN NPN PRP NPP Anambra 29 - - 3 - 26 Bauchi 20 1 - 18 - 1 Bendel 20 - 12 6 - 2 Benue 19 - - 18 - 1 Borno 24 22 - 2 - - Cross River 28 4 2 22 - - Gongola 21 8 7 6 - 1 Imo 30 - - 2 - 28 Kaduna 33 1 1 19 10 2 Kano 46 - - 7 39 - Kwara 14 1 5 8 - - Lagos 12 - 12 - - -

14 Niger 10 - - 10 - - Ogun 12 - 12 - - - Ondo 22 - 22 - - - Oyo 42 - 38 4 - - Plateau 16 - - 3 - 13 Rivers 14 - - 10 - 4 Sokoto 37 6 - 31 - - Total 449 43 111 168 49 78 Percent 100 9.6 24.7 37.4 10.9 17.4

Table 3 State Assembly State # of Seats GNPP UPN NPN PRP NPP Anambra 87 1 - 13 - 73 Bauchi 20 9 - 45 2 4 Bendel 60 6 34 22 - 4 Benue 57 6 - 48 - 3 Borno 72 59 - 11 2 - Cross River 84 16 7 58 - 3 Gongola 63 25 18 15 1 4 Imo 90 2 - 9 - 79 Kaduna 99 10 3 64 16 6 Kano 138 3 1 11 123 - Kwara 42 2 15 25 - - Lagos 36 - 36 - - - Niger 30 2 - 28 - - Ogun 36 - 36 - - - Ondo 66 - 65 1 - - Oyo 126 - 117 9 - - Plateau 48 3 - 10 - 35 Rivers 42 - 1 26 - 15 Sokoto 111 19 - 92 - - Total 1,347 157 333 487 144 226 Percent 100 11.7 24.7 36.1 10.7 16.8

Table 4 State Governors State Party Governor Anambra NPP Mr. Bauchi NPN Alhaji Bendel UPN Prof. Ambrose Alli Benue NPN Mr. Aper Aku Borno GNPP Alhaji Cross River NPN Dr.

15 Gongola GNPP Alhaji A. Barde Imo NPP Mr. Samuel Mbakwe Kaduna PRP Alhaji Balarabe Musa Kano PRP Alhaji Kwara NPN Alhaji Lagos UPN Alhaji Niger NPN Alhaji Ogun UPN Chief Bisi Onabanjo Ondo UPN Mr. Michael Ajasin Oyo UPN Mr. Plateau NPP Mr. Solomon Lar Rivers NPN Chief Sokoto NPN Alhaji Muhammadu Kangiwa

Table 5 Presidential Elections Waziri Obafemi Shehu Aminu Nnamdi Ibrahim Awolowo Shagari Kano Azikiwe (GNPP) (UPN) (NPN) (PRP) (NPP) State Total % Votes % Votes % Votes % Votes % Votes Votes Cast Rec’d Rec’d Rec’d Rec’d Rec’d Anambra 1,209,038 1.67 0.75 13.50 1.20 82.58 Bauchi 998,638 15.44 3.00 62.48 14.34 4.72 Bendel 669,511 1.23 53.23 36.19 0.73 8.60 Benue 538,879 7.89 2.57 76.39 1.35 11.71 Borno 710,968 54.04 3.35 34.71 6.52 1.35 Cross River 661,103 15.14 11.76 64.40 1.01 7.66 Gongola 639,138 34.09 21.67 35.52 4.34 4.35 Imo 1,153,355 3.00 0.64 8.80 0.89 86.67 Kaduna 1,382,712 13.80 6.68 43.12 31.66 4.72 Kano 1,220,763 1.54 1.23 19.94 76.41 0.91 Kwara 354,605 5.71 39.48 53.62 0.67 0.52 Lagos 828,414 0.48 82.30 7.18 0.47 9.57 Niger 383,347 16.50 3.69 74.88 3.99 1.11 Ogun 744,668 0.53 92.11 6.23 0.31 0.32 Ondo 1,369,849 0.26 94.51 4.19 0.18 0.86 Oyo 1,396,547 0.57 85.78 12.75 0.32 0.55 Plateau 548,405 6.82 5.29 34.73 3.98 49.17 Rivers 687,951 2.18 10.33 72.65 0.46 14.35 Sokoto 1,348,697 26.61 2.52 66.58 3.33 0.92 Percent 10.0 29.2 33.8 10.3 16.7 Total Votes 16,846,633 1,686,489 4,916,651 5,688,857 1,732,113 2,822,523

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