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2006, Issue 1 The Catalyst The Official Newsletter of JOIFF March 2006 www.joiff.com FROM THE EDITORS his is the first edition of The our Members Section we are activity and in this edition, we Catalyst for 2006, the sixth particularly pleased to report on publish reports from AFOA, the Tyear of its publication. the huge contribution made by Airport Fire Officers Organisation, During the past five years, the JOIFF Members in ensuring a on their recent Conference in range of subjects covered in The speedy and safe resolution to the Dublin and from the General Catalyst has been wide and varied Incident. Secretary of the Institute of Fire and to assist our Readers in their Safety Managers. search for subject mater, we have JOIFF recently welcomed FPEC now included an Index of the Corporation, its first new Member We would like to thank our main articles published in past from Japan, and we are very advertisers and ours sponsors for editions, on The Catalyst web pleased to publish an article by their support - without them, we page on the JOIFF website. FPEC's President Yoshiyuki Kato would be unable to function. We on the most interesting encourage our Readers to For this edition, as always, we technology they have developed circulate The Catalyst amongst extend a special thank to those to simulate extinguishment of their colleagues and interested JOIFF Sponsors who have tank fires. Parties and we welcome any contributed articles for this comments. edition. DuPont provides us with With the growing threat of "Bird an article on some very Flu" we publish an article by Our policy is to bring you high interesting research into James Ricci which addresses quality articles on new performance of Firefighters some of the issues with regard to developments and other clothing. The biggest Fire in the this and other potentially fatal happenings in the area of United Kingdom in recent history diseases and the "Blue Light" Emergency Services was the Buncefield incident and Driver Training specialists Minding Management. In addition to The we are pleased to include three Driving have sent us a Press Catalyst, current information stories on this event in this Release which we also publish. relevant to Emergency Services edition. The first is from Angus Management is posted on the who provide details of their We are pleased to provide a JOIFF website. response and support to the platform to other Organisations extinguishment of the Fires and in engaged in similar fields of ABOUT JOIFF OIFF, the Organisation for Management Team / Occupational accreditation of job competencies, Emergency Services Firefighters/Emergency information and technical advice. JManagement, is a grouping of Responders and Corporate JOIFF welcomes interest from Organisations represented by their Members are Organisations which Organisations and persons who Hazard Manager - or equivalent do not comply with the wish to become Members - contact position - and one nominated requirements of Full Membership the JOIFF Secretariat, details on Deputy. Full Members of JOIFF are but which nonetheless wish to the back page of The Catalyst. Industrial/Commercial associate with and support JOIFF. Organisations that have nominated JOIFF provides a forum for JOIFF Ltd. Registration number 362542. personnel as a Hazard discussion amongst peers, Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in The Catalyst are not necessarily the views of JOIFF or of its Secretariat, Fulcrum Consultants neither of which are in any way responsible or legally liable for any statements, reports or technical anomalies made by authors in The Catalyst. The Catalyst The Official Newsletter of Joiff NEW MEMBERS During December 2005 and Supervisor and Maxwell Davidson, Senior Fire January and February 2006 the Instructor. Qatar International Safety Centre is Executive of JOIFF were delighted currently undergoing approval for OPITO accreditation to welcome the following new Members. This brings the for Firefighting, is the leading training Centre in Qatar current number of JOIFF Members to 70 Full Members and will also provide manpower for consultancy for Fire and 23 Corporate Members spread through 24 and Marine. Countries. Corporate Members Full Members Corporation FPEC, Japan, represented by Ken Andoh, Gazobezopasnost Astrakhan Well Control Unit , Marketing Manager and Yoshiyuki Kato, President. Russia, represented by Tchoudnovsky Dmitry FPEC specialises in plant fire protection system Markovich, Training Centre Manager and Vitaly engineering and provides its customers with well- Baranov, also in the Training Centre. Gazobezopasnost balanced fire protection system construction. FPEC is is Russia's largest well control and blowout elimination also involved in software development for fire service provider with Branches operating in all Russia's protection. An article by Yoshiyuki Kato is published in major oil and gas regions. All these Branches together this edition of The Catalyst. employ 300 emergency response personnel whose primary job is to prevent and/or eliminate gas Kidde Fire Trainers, England, represented by Peter emissions, kicks and open blowouts at oil and gas Gould, Sales Manager and Jonathan Smith, Proposals / installations. Gazobezopasnost's Well Control Training Project Engineer. Kidde Fire Trainers, whose Head Centre is located near the Caspian Sea in the city of Office is in Germany are a UTC Company that supplies Astrakhan and it provides a "hands on" type of training and install Real Fire Training Systems including school with a pressurised well reservoir for simulation Industrial, Aviation and Domestic systems. of kicks and blowouts, electronic simulator and a number of trainers for well control, H2S safety, Kuiken Hytrans, The Netherlands, represented by industrial safety, drilling operations and floormen Richard Verhoef, Sales Manager and Robert Hut, courses. Gazobezopasnost is the leading training Managing Director. Kuiken Hytrans are suppliers of organisation for on-shore and off-shore personnel and large capacity water supply systems, high volume Astrakhan Drilling Training is an IWCF accredited pumps and special vehicles for Firefighting. location for Rotary Drilling certification since 2001. We look forward to the involvement of our new and Qatar International Safety Centre , Qatar, existing Members in the continuing development of represented by Graham Rennie, Fire Training JOIFF. BIRD FLU by James Ricci he current media fixation on bird flu - which is how a pandemic from loss of feathers to multiple bird flu has created a would spread most quickly - the organ failure to death within 48 Tpotentially deadly World Health Organization (WHO), hours - for more information, visit combination of facts, myths and among other global health the WHO website at www.who.int. confusion. During a three year institutions, have definitively As mentioned previously, bird to period through February 2006, stated that a pandemic on the human transmission is currently bird flu has infected about 200 scale of 1918 is not a question of rare, but is extremely deadly people globally, killing almost 90. "if," but "when." Bird flu is when it does occur. The current In comparison, the 2002-3 Severe believed to be the precursor to mortality rate for infected humans Acute Respiratory Syndrome pandemic flu. In the confusion is 50%. The real concern with this (SARS) outbreak killed 774, out of between what bird flu is and what strain of bird flu - medically 8096 infections, while the 1918 pandemic flu could do is where known as H151 - is that if given Spanish flu pandemic infected the danger awaits. enough opportunities it will over 1 billion people and killed mutate such as to transmit between 25 - 40 million. Bird flu is Bird flu, also known as avian directly between humans. not pandemic flu, yet. While there influenza, is a viral infection that Seasonal flu - which kills have been no reported cases of usually infects birds, and approximately 12,000 people per human to human transmission of sometimes pigs. Symptoms range year in England and Wales - is page 2 The Official Newsletter of Joiff The Catalyst different from pandemic flu, as that have collectively experienced who has the the former usually adversely hits outbreaks of bird flu, Ebola, disease. They infants and the elderly because of Malaria, and Marburg in the past also spread their weaker immune systems. 10 years. While an oil worker from quickly over Pandemic flu - which has many of Western Europe may have access long distance. the same symptoms as seasonal to first-rate medical treatment in The first reported case of bird flu flu, just more intense - affects all his home city of London or Paris, in Africa came from Nigeria - over age groups, and as the 1918 this will not prevent him suffering 10,000km from the next closest outbreak demonstrated, even an agonizing death from case. Finally, the incubation people in their 20s and 30s are at haemorrhagic fever - a disease period can range up to 3 weeks. risk. Confusion about the varieties whose symptoms are similar to flu This means that a worker could be of flu also plays a critical roll in and can also cause uncontrollable in close proximity to a disease how individuals and corporations bleeding - in Western Africa. From carrier, but the infected person prepare against these threats. Iran to Venezuela, Iraq to the would show no visible signs of Sudan naturally incurring infection. These diseases can This confusion, though, extends infectious diseases, of all spread quickly and quietly over beyond bird flu. Bird flu and varieties, wreak deadly havoc. long distances and in some cases, influenza are the tip of the iceberg Adding to these specific there are limited medical options in regards to deadly naturally geographical dangers, are issues if exposed. occurring infectious diseases. of frequent travel, stressful work While diseases like Ebola, Malaria environments, and interaction The misconceptions about bird flu and Marburg most likely will not with a wide range of people. All of have also damaged awareness of turn into a pandemic, they these factors expose fire, oil and these other naturally occurring present serious health and safety emergency response workers to a diseases.
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