Atousa AMIRABEDINI
The Social and Legal Potential of
Islamic Republic of Iran
for Democracy
Master’s Thesis
to be awarded the degree of Master of Arts in Global Studies at the University of Graz, Austria
supervised by Univ.-Prof. Dr.iur. Josef Marko Institute of Public Law and Political Science
Graz, May 2015 Author’s Declaration
Unless otherwise indicated in the text or referenced, or acknowledged above, this thesis is entirely the product of my own scholarly work except where stated. Any inaccuracies of fact or faults in reasoning are my own and accordingly I take full responsibility. This thesis has not been submitted either in whole or part, for a degree at this or any other university or institution. This is to certify that the printed version is equivalent to the submitted electronic one.
Graz, May 2015
II Acknowledgements
I am thankful to many people for helping and being with me during the time of my studies and the course of this work. I want to give my heartfelt thanks to:
Prof. Josef Marko, my supervisor for his profound knowledge and the opportunity to work and to write my Master Thesis with him at his Institute.
DI Ernst Plesiutschnig (my husband and best friend) for encouraging me to learn German and to finish my studies on time.
Dr. Mathew Galler my friend for supporting me with English orthography.
Dr. Gilbert Ahamer for encouraging me to publish my first scientific paper.
My beloved family (Kasra, Saeid and Hekmat) for the financial and emotional support in all aspects of my life.
Dr. Amir Azimzadeh (my uncle) for encouraging me to come to Austria and to stay strong in any kind of situation.
Prof. Vartan Vahramian my painting teacher for teaching me to walk on the wild side of life.
III Content
1 Introduction ...... 1
2 Constitutional Revolution ...... 3
2.1 Tobacco Movement ...... 3
2.2 Constitutional Revolution ...... 4
2.3 Start of Social Awakening ...... 5
2.3.1 Press ...... 6
2.3.2 Modern Schools ...... 7
2.3.3 Poetry ...... 8
2.4 Protests ...... 8
2.5 Considered Reforms ...... 9
2.6 Ideological Conflicts between Secularists and Religious Groups on the Constitution ...... 13
2.7 Problematic Articles in the Constitution of 1906 and Supplementary Law of 1907 ...... 15
2.8 The Coup of 1908 ...... 16
2.9 Summary ...... 18
2.10 Discussion ...... 19
3 Reza Shah and Pahlavi Dynasty ...... 21
3.1 Reza Shah’s Reforms ...... 21
3.1.1 First Phase of Reforms ...... 24
3.1.2 Second Phase of Reforms ...... 26
3.1.3 Third Phase of Reforms ...... 29
3.2 Weakening of Reza Shah ...... 30
3.3 Discussion ...... 32
4 Democratic Election of Mohammad Mosaddeq ...... 35
4.1 The Reign of Mohammad Reza Shah ...... 35 IV 4.2 Mohammad Mosaddeq’s Reforms ...... 39
4.3 Religious Confrontation ...... 40
4.4 Coalition of the United Kingdom and the United States against Mosaddeq ...... 42
4.5 Discussion ...... 45
5 Iranian Revolution of 1979 ...... 49
5.1 Mohammad Reza Shah after Mosaddeq ...... 49
5.2 White Revolution ...... 50
5.2.1 Women Rights ...... 51
5.2.2 Land Reforms ...... 52
5.3 Begin of Religious Confrontation ...... 54
5.4 Disagreement among Religious Scholars on the Role of Religion in Politics ...... 57
5.5 Other Groups ...... 60
5.6 The Islamic Revolution of 1979 ...... 65
5.7 After the Islamic Revolution ...... 66
6 Political Structure of Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 according to the Country’s Constitution ...... 68
6.1 Conflicting and Contradicting Articles in Relation to Democratic Principles ...... 69
6.1.1 Contradictions in Sovereignty of God, People and Religious Leader ...... 69
6.1.2 The Separation of Powers ...... 71
6.1.3 Human Rights ...... 72
7 Summary and Discussion ...... 74
7.1 The Paradox of Iran within the Legal System ...... 78
7.2 The Paradox of Iran within the Civil Society ...... 79
8 Conclusion ...... 81
V 1 Introduction
The purpose of this master thesis is to answer the question of the possibility of democratic transition in Iran that promoted years of scholarly debate. Knowing the reasons why Iranians after century-long political and social struggles still cannot restrain the exercise of the state power of the current Islamic Republic to balance their democratic demands and modern state building is the subject of today’s academic and political debates.
The potential for democracy of the current Islamic Republic of Iran is studied by citing important political and social events of Iran throughout the last century in order to understand both the influence of politicians and political leaders as well as the Iranian people. This helped the author to understand why Iran oscillated politically and socially between tradition and modernity.
Since the Qajar time (late 19th century), a serious challenge between the traditional aspect and the promotion of democracy remains a struggle in
Iran (Abbas Milani 1999). After the overthrow of the Qajar kingdom in 1925 by Reza Shah, the political secular efforts continued during Reza Shah’s reign despite the importance of religion as a personal, spiritual and traditional marker in the Iranian society (Takhshid 2014). Reza Shah’s
1 endeavor to modernize Iran through his reform programs was followed by his abdication in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Shah. Mohammad Reza
Shah’s further modernization movements resulted in popular protests, which replaced him with Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. This revolution with the aim of democratic reforms resulted in a reasonably free election.
However, the political direction of Iran did not continue in the direction of democracy (Abrahamian 1993). Presently, Iranian people are still trying to restrain the exercise of the state power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Understanding Iranian people and society throughout evaluating and discussing the political changes in Iran within the time of the 20th century, and the influence of these changes on the Iranian people enables the reader to better understand the dualistic and contradictive society of Iran during this time. Thus, the transition of Iran to a modern liberal democracy difficult will be difficult (Abbas Milani 1999, Ray Takeyh 2007, Redaelli
2007).
2 2 Constitutional Revolution
2.1 Tobacco Movement
Ahmad Kasravi remembers the Tobacco Movement of 1891-1892 as one of the first signs of mass awakening in Iran and the first political movement of the population to challenge the arbitrary decisions of the ruler to protect national sovereignty (Kasravi 1964). The cleric-led Tobacco Movement, which was the first socio-political movement in which religious scholars as well as merchants, farmers, and the rest of society resisted against tyranny, succeeded in reversing an arbitrary economic decision of the Qajar regime
(Farman Farmayan 1963). It also resulted in weakening the position of the king due to rising political power of clergy (Abutalebi 2010).
The events started on March 20, 1890, when Naser al-Din Shah granted a right to Major G. F. Tablot for purchase, sale and export of all tobacco products. This right harmed the economic interests of Iranian merchants and Muslim legal scholars because of the involvement of Major Tablot, a non-Muslims, in Muslim’s interests1. Political demonstrations were
1 Muslims should not be controlled by Non-believers (Sura Al-Nesa 4:141).
3 followed by a Fatwa2 attributed to Mirza Hasan Shirazi resulting in the nationwide ban of the use and sale of tobacco (Kasravi 1964). The protests succeeded in reversing an arbitrary decision by Naser al-Din Shah without the complete destruction of the regime itself. This movement was followed by the constitutional revolution of (1905-1911) with bigger aims for freedom, democracy and the rule of law.
The Tobacco Movement was the first time religious leaders directly got involved into Iran’s last century politics. The Ulama3 were able to mobilize masses with an Islamic belief, which forbids the domination of infidels over
Muslims (Poulson 2002).
2.2 Constitutional Revolution
Contrary to the Tobacco Movement, the protests for a house of justice and later, the constitutional revolution were not directed by just conservative religious leaders and therefore were not just religiously motivated. The movement was reflecting diverse intellectual trends, social backgrounds and political demands like liberalism, secularism and nationalism.
2 Legal opinion, which a qualified jurist can give on issues pertaining to the Islamic law.
3 Educated class of Muslim legal scholars.
4 In 1906, Iranians had two possible political choices, Islamic or secular, which would dominate the political structure of Iran in the twentieth century (Abrahamian 1982).
Many financial and social rights were granted to foreigners by Naser al-Din
Shah (1848-1896)4 and later by the successor, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1896-
1907). Mozaffar al-Din Shah received two large loans from Russia, for the purpose of his trips to Europe. In return he granted concessions to
Europeans. These granted rights made people demand a curb on royal authority and current establishment ruling the current law with the aim to decrease foreign and especially Russian influence in the country’s affairs
(Rashidvash 2012).
2.3 Start of Social Awakening
According to Kasravi the social awakening of Persian people and formation of opinions on democracy, liberalism, social contract and other modernist ideas started with the publication of books, newspapers and the arrival of foreigners to Iran due to financial and social concessions, which they had in
Iran in late 19th century (Kasravi 1964). Simultaneously, the controversy to the concept of modernist ideas was growing and getting more complicated
4 Tobacco concession.
5 for Iranians who have Shia faith5 since the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736).
Some of them thought of modernity as having a modern, democratic society on a secular and rational basis. Some religious thinkers were trying to bring peace between religion and modernism, starting from Ayatollah Nayini6 to
Mohammad Khatami7. The other group understood it as the modern way of colonial domination or to a society with a more regular tax system (Abbas
Milani 1999).
2.3.1 Press
From the middle of the 19th century and especially during the era of Mirza
Hosein Khan Sepahsalar8 in the 1870s, the small Persian press, though controlled by government, randomly reported on aspects of western constitutional and revolutionary events. By the closing decade of the century the Persian readership had been briefly exposed to not only
5 Shia Islam is based on the Quran and the message oft he Islamic prophet Muhammad. Shia consider Ali, son in law and cousin of Muhammad was the successor to Muhammad and the first Imam.
6 He was Muslim religious thinker and Mujtahid, who was considered to be the most influential authority by introducing his approaches to combat the gap between religion and modernity.
7 Mohammad Khatami is a reformist politician. He served as the fifth President of Iran from 2 August
1997 to 3 August 2005.
8 Mirza Hosein Khan Moshir od-Dowleh Sepahsalar was the prime minister of Iran between 1871 and
1873. During his ministry Shah granted a concession for railroad construction and other commercial development projects to foreigners.
6 colonial expansion and imperial rivalries but also to the recurring constitutional crisis in France, the British parliamentary system, the course of German unification, presidential elections in the United States and revolutionary struggles for independence (Mohit 1987). The many small new printing presses in Persian cities during the period of Muzaffar-al-Din
Shah (1896-1907) played a decisive role in disseminating the constitutionalist message to an eager public9. Translations and adoptions of western works of Philosophy, published in Iran before and during the constitutional revolution, helped to shape the ideology of the revolution
(Mohit 1987). As relations between Europe and Iran was improving and
Iranians were receiving more news from outside world, they were more understanding of the consequences of financial and social rights granted to foreigners.
2.3.2 Modern Schools
In the late 19th century in Tabriz and Tehran, new secular schools (Persian: dabestan) were replacing the Muslim elementary schools (Persian: maktab) and their traditional way of educating. In the new schools, languages such
9 Akhtar (The Star, in Constantinople, 1875), Qanoun (The Law, in London, 1900), Habl ol-Matin (n
Calcutta, 1875), Mosavat (Equality, in Istanbul, 1900s) Hekmat (Philosophy, in Cairo, 1892-3) are the most important newspapers in the history of Modern Persia. These newspapers influenced social and political thoughts of Iranians.
7 as French and science were taught with a different system of education. At the time education was belonging to children of the rich and businessmen
(Kasravi 1964).
2.3.3 Poetry
Poetry about the nation and nationality had a huge impact on Iranians political views with people sharing their political nationalistic views in the form of poetry (Kasravi 1964).
2.4 Protests
The rise of sugar prices sparked the first protests for the constitutional revolution (Bayat Mangol 1992). In 1905, the governor of Tehran ordered to bastinado some sugar merchants in public for refusing to lower their prices, which caused Bast10 in a Tehran mosque by merchants, and the
Ulama. The government officials dispersed the group, later the group took refuge in a shrine south of Tehran. By January 1906 the Muzaffar al-Din
Shah Qajar agreed to their demands, which included the formation of an adalatkhaneh11 (Kasravi 1964). Despite his assurance, the Shah did not follow up on his promises, which led to growing unrest. Finally there was a
10 The designation of certain sanctuaries in Iran that are considered inviolable and were often used by people seeking refuge from prosecution.
11 House of Justice.
8 confrontation involving a group of clerics and their students in which one student got killed. This violent encounter led to another Bast. Between
12,000 and 14,000 protesters gathered at the British embassy demanding the formation of a parliament. The Shah finally relented and in August 1906 he issued a decree calling for formation of national assembly in Iran
(Kasravi 1964).
2.5 Considered Reforms
Demands for justice were prominent in reformist writings, the sermons of popular preachers, and petitions by merchants (Kermani 1997). Such demands seemed legitimate, in accordance with the concept of “seeking justice’’ in Persian-Islamic theory of government (Lambton 1987).
Afterwards, the demand was increasing for constitution and parliament, which were European modern requests. Obviously the majority of Iran’s population didn’t have any exact opinion about a possible conflict, which these concepts could have with their religion and traditions. According to
Kasravi even some of the open-minded leaders who were encouraging people to ask for constitution had no idea about the consequences of it
9 (Kasravi 1964). Mirza Malkom Khan12 was the first Persian reformist writer having an adequate knowledge of the French and English scholars of liberal thought. Such key terms as qanun13, eslahat14, majles-e sura15, mellat16, melli17 and hoquq-e mellat18 were first introduced in his Ketabca-ye gaybi ya daftare tanzimat19, written in 1858-1859, the earliest known systematic exposition in Persian about a constitutional system (Nurayi 1973). The definition of a house of justice was obvious for people, but protesters mentioned constitution at the English embassy for the first time. The
English embassy was like a school, in which people were thought and informed about the meanings of Parliament and constitution which were totally European definitions (Kasravi 1964).
12 Malkom khan was a prominent Iranian modernist. The most remarkable aspect of his work was his promotion of law to bring about an orderly society in which royal power was subjected or conditioned to regulations.
13 Codified law
14 Reforms
15 Consultative council
16 Nation
17 National
18 Right oft he people
19 Booklet inspired by unseen, or the book of reforms.
10 Subsequent events for a constitutional revolution revealed that these efforts were not enough to make Iran a democratic country. These events showed the large gap between the majority and minority of Europe educated leaders. Allameh Tabatabi, one of the religious leaders of this movement, mentioned: “Iranian population is still not ready for constitution” (Kasravi 1964).
At the beginning of the constitutional movement the contrasts between constitution and Islam was not mentioned by the reformist leaders. With few expectations like Sheikh Fazlollah Noori20, the early advocates of political reform were preoccupied with the compatibility of the Islamic
Sharia with constitutionalism. They were both defined as a way to rescue the nation from Tyranny. In the book “Yak Kalema” (English: A single word)
Mostasar-al-Dawla cited the Koran and Hadith in order to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with equality and liberty, as well as with important articles of the French constitution (Mostashar-al Dolle 1870). Emphasis was on the common points of these two. Therefore, there was no big contradiction between religious and secularist leaders of the movement.
Secularists were covering their liberalistic theories with Islam to get
20 Sheikh Fazlollah Noori was a prominent Shia Muslim cleric and he opposed the separation of religion and state in the Iranian constitutional revolution. 11 approval from religious leaders, who were influential among people
(Kasravi 1964).
The reason religious leaders were so trusted by people has a long story in the history of Iran. Since the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), Shia Islam was chosen as the official religion of Iran. The reputation of the Shia clergy grew in Iranian society due to their functions within private and public life. Based on their authority as sources of imitation, perception of many functions of an administrative nature, monitoring of Islamic law, being responsible of managing assets and affairs of vulnerable people such as widows and orphans, collecting and managing alms and authenticating of official documents, the trust upon Shia clergy increased in Iran over the years.
These religious leaders were not familiar with European sources to understand the real meaning of a constitution. Freedom and justice, which were first concepts they understood from constitution, were not in contrast with Islam. Therefore they approved the demand of a constitution (Beck
1996). With the approval of the Ulama, people also thought about a constitution as the only solution to their social and financial problems.
However the cooperation between religious and secular groups was not taking too long (Kasravi 1964).
12 2.6 Ideological Conflicts between Secularists and Religious Groups on the
Constitution
Since people were taking refugee in the English embassy in the summer of
1906, the first signs of conflict among religious and secular groups were felt. The conservative religious leaders like Sheikh Fazlollah Noori were against the protests inside the English embassy as well as any foreign interference in Iran’s domestic problems. Contradictions were increasing during the formation of an assembly, writing and the adoption of a constitution (Kasravi 1964). Conflicts between secularists and religious leaders increased the distrust among people upon a constitution (Kasravi
1964).
The debate of constitutionalism vs. religious law (Persian: mashrua vs. mashrute) was rising. The supporters of constitutionalism believed that
Iranian ‘’citizen’’ have the right to make the national law, but religious thinkers like Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri opposed it (Kasravi 1964, Samadzadeh
1989). During the establishment of a legislative assembly, he became the primary clerical opponent of the constitutional revolution because he realized that the assembly was going to pass laws in areas, which were the domain of the clerical elite. They believed only God was sovereign and
13 being a Muslim was primarily based on submission to God’s will21, i.e. the humanity should follow God’s laws, and can not make a new law. Within the religious scholars there were also liberal religious thinkers like Ayatollah
Naini refusing this line of reasoning, and generally argued that humanity, as
God’s vice-regency on earth, had the obligation to create laws governing a nation (Poulson 2002).
During the protests in the embassy of England the demands for a consultative assembly brought the debate, if the assembly should be an
Islamic assembly or national assembly. The primary demand from the
Ulama of Islamic consultative council was a body, which would interpret the laws of Islam. Secular leaders, who were emphasizing on the national assembly, rejected this demand. They even opposed, that Shah must ratify the laws (Kasravi 1964). From their point of view, neither the Shah, nor the
Ulama should have the authority to override law instituted by the new national assembly (Kasravi 1964).
21 Islamic Sharia law is a source of legislation in various Muslim countries like Iran. Sharia has two primary sources. One of the sources is Quran, which Muslims believe to be revelation from God and the other source is Sunnah of Muhammad including his specific words, habits, practices and silent approvals. 14 2.7 Problematic Articles in the Constitution of 1906 and Supplementary Law
of 1907
Mozaffar al-Din Shah accepted the demand of secularists for having a national assembly (Poulson 2002). Later, an elected assembly convened and drew up a constitution that provided for strict limitation on royal power, an elected parliament, with wide powers to represent the people and a government with a cabinet subject to confirmation by assembly. The second debate was on supplementary fundamental laws which were approved in 1907, providing the freedom of press (within limits), speech and association (Glenn E. Curtis 2008).
The first problem was the article 8, noting that all Iranians are equal in the face of law. The Ulama criticized the article and insisted that Muslim and non-believer (Persian: Kafir) cannot be the same in receiving atonement
(Persian: Diye) and certain Islamic penalties (Persian: Hodud). For instance, if a Muslim is killing a Jewish person or Zoroastrian, he cannot get killed as a penalty. He must pay Diye. The next problem was article 19. This article made schooling mandatory, which was against Sharia. An other problematic point was article 20 of supplementary law. The Ulama were insisting on religious experts to control the contents of the books and press (Kasravi
1964).
15 2.8 The Coup of 1908
Despite an optimistic beginning to the constitutional revolution,
Muhammad Ali Shah (successor of Mozaffar al-Din Shah), felt strong enough to lead a military coup to get his royal authority back against the parliament by June 1908. He succeeded for three reasons.
The first reason was the instability of Iran’s political system due to the coming together of England and Russia. During the constitutional revolution, the Russians and British became increasingly wary of the instability occurring throughout Iran (Kasravi 1964). Throughout the conflict, supporters of the Shah and supporters of the constitution made appeals to the British and Russian representatives in Tehran (Kasravi
1964). The Russians were inclined to support the Shah, and the British were inclined to support the constitutionalist. These two powers were setting the 1907 Anglo-Russian partition treaty, which divided Iran into three zones of economic influence with north Iran considered in the
Russian sphere of influence, central Iran designated as a ‘’neutral zone’’ and south Iran considered in the British sphere (Poulson 2002). The convention greatly hindered the efforts of the constitutionalists because Iran’s autonomy was completely negated. This instability allowed the Shah to operate and crush the constitution (Poulson 2002).
16 The second reason that Shah was successful in getting his royal authority back was due to the parliament attempting to reform the tax system. The parliament wanted to take authority away from local accountants and give it to the finance ministry, which sparked hostility from the Shah and his supporters. The Shah’s hostile response stemmed mainly from parliament’s proposal to decrease the funding of the court treasury, which led to the deterioration of palace stables, armories, kitchens, warehouses, kilns, harems and workshops (Poulson 2002).
Thirdly, the clergy was against the secular proposals and reforms of the constitutionalists, causing Sheikh Fazlollah Noori to separate from his colleagues Seyyed Abdullah Behbahani and Seyyed Muhammad Tabatabai.
As a result, Sheikh Fazlollah Noori accused the liberals of undermining religion (Abrahamian 1982, Kasravi 1964), which caused the bombardment and dissolution of parliament by Mohammad Ali Shah.
After the bombardment and dissolving of parliament, the military balance among the constitutionalists and the royalists tilted in favor of the constitutionalists in 1909. At this time the Bakhtiyari tribal and Caucasian fighters joined in the struggle. The entry of these new constitutionalist forces into Tehran in 1909 concluded the civil war (Keddie 2006).
Mohammad Ali Shah took refuge in the Russian embassy and abdicated in
17 favor of his son, Ahmad Shah. New elections were held and the parliament met again in November 1909 (Keddie 2006).
2.9 Summary
The constitution of Persia eliminated Shah’s role as an executive power. At the same time, it installed a legislative body. In article 2 of the constitution, the parliament attained rights to represent the nation. The people’s right to vote and to participate politically is mentioned in articles 25, 11 and 45 of the constitution. This right was completed with the right to submit complaints to the parliament about governmental violations on the fundamental rights of citizens (article 32). The constitution established a bicameral legislature with the formation of a senate according to article 43,
45, 46 and reserved the authority of enacting the senate’s internal regulations for the parliament in article 44 (Boozari 2011). Regarding the legislation, the king’s original power as sole legislator was limited to signing or ratifying the laws passed by both the parliament and the senate in article
15, 17 and 33. Parliament held sole jurisdiction over tax revenues and financial laws according to articles 18, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 46 (Boozari 2011).
18 2.10 Discussion
In fact, the constitutional revolution was led and dominated by elites who had access to European political ideas. The urban groups participating in the revolution were particularly encouraged by the leading members of the
Shia Ulama. For the Ulama, the constitutional revolution was to consider the new circumstances in which Iranians wanted to enact a constitution to fulfill their social aims. Therefore, many Shia jurists were heavily involved in the process of enacting the fundamental laws and their supplements.
They issued fatwas especially after the attacks against the parliament and the constitution in which the protection of constitutionalism in Iran was repeatedly declared to be mandatory duty. The support of prominent religious jurists for all of the events prior to and after the 1905 constitutional revolution was a key factor in constitution’s initial progress
(Ali M Ansari 2003), but popular grievances were much more immediate and were not a reflection of the liberal democratic values of elites who had lived abroad. Elite groups supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, which was not in agreement to the opinions of the majority of Iranians. According to (Ali M Ansari 2003), during the events of the constitutional revolution, the popular participation remained an urban phenomenon and it was estimated that only 10% of the total
Iranian population lived in cities and towns. There were a few main reasons
19 why Iranians found it difficult to accept the basic elements of the constitutional revolution. One reason was the challenge between traditional ideals, which has a dominant role in Iran, and modern ideals, which were brought on by educated European intellectuals. Another reason was the social values of Iranians living for centuries as Muslims. These social issues caused the failure of successive cabinets to implement reforms as well as decentralize power. In 1914, the central government had lost control outside Teheran. During WWI, the situation of Iran got worse even though the government was declaring its neutrality during the war. British, Russian and Turkish armies conducted military operations on Iranian territory and the government could not prevent occupations. Tribalism was common in the absence of any authority. Therefore, lawlessness and a lack of security caused the centralized government to totally collapse (Baskan 2014, Matin
2013).
20 3 Reza Shah and Pahlavi Dynasty
The constitutional government existed in Tehran, but its effective power was hardly felt outside of Tehran (Matin 2013). Major tribes, collaborating with the constitutional revolution had destroyed a degenerate tribal- absolutist state, but they had been unable to replace it with a modern centralized one (Baskan 2014). The strong man desperately looked for by
Iranian intellectuals to help the country’s situation would appear on
February 21, 1921 (Baskan 2014). The commander of the Cossack Brigade,
Reza Khan, marched toward Tehran with 3000 men and overthrew the existing government in the capital. By 1923, he had largely succeeded in securing Iran from any remaining domestic and foreign threats. Upon his return to Tehran, he appointed a prime minister, which prompted Ahmad
Shah Qajar to leave Iran for Europe, where he would remain until his death.
By October 1925 (1304), Reza Khan succeeded to depose and formally exile
Ahmad Shah and instate himself as the next Shah of Iran (Baskan 2014).
3.1 Reza Shah’s Reforms
In his sixteen years of rule, Reza Shah continued the modernization movement started by Naser-al-Din Shah Qajar. In the beginning of his reign,
21 his popularity was at a high point. However, as his views on religion and politics started to get more secular, he started to lose his popularity, first with the Ulama and then with the people (Safari Jamal 2014, Vaez 2007).
The first period of Reza Shah’s reforms (1921-1928) is known as the period of the cooperation between the Ulama and Reza Shah. The reforms of this period took place with the approval of the Ulama (Safari Jamal 2014).
During this time Sheikh Abdul Karim Haeri, one of the politically important
Ulama of the time of Reza Shah, was moving to Qom, a neglected Shia Islam center in the north of Iran. Due to his residence in Qom, this city has become a center of religious education and gathering after Tehran, and also
Iran’s largest religious political center. Haeri was not interested in politics despite the fact he was known as an open-minded reformist. During the first period, Reza Shah was able to coordinate with Mr. Haeri to implement his reform programs (Safari Jamal 2014). With the approval of Sheikh
Haeri, Reza Shah and his reforms were receiving the consent of the community. In this era, Reza Shah respected the traditions and religious beliefs of the society and still received the approval of the Ulama (Safari
Jamal 2014).
One of the important events of this time was the election of Atatürk for presidency by the Turkish Grand National assembly on October 1923. This represented the end of the Ottoman caliphate through the separation of
22 religion and politics. Reza Khan had the same plan for Iran. He wanted to replace the monarchy with a republican government and he wanted to be the president of the country. On this bases of the vote of fifth parliament, he eliminated the monarchy and became the first president of Iran. Some members in the fifth parliament were voting in favor of the republican plan, which was prepared and given to parliament. On the day of elections for the republican government, people who follow religious leaders were protesting in Tehran. On the same day, Reza Khan went to parliament with some soldiers to confront the protests. The soldiers beat people and one person got killed (Safari Jamal 2014).
The Iranian clerics from Iraq were dissatisfied about the events. Reza Khan, fully aware of the importance of support of the Ulama, went to Qom to meet religious scholars to explain the event. There, he explained his aim was to protect the lives and properties of the nation. He emphasized that he is the servant of Sharia Islam and that the event in front of parliament was a regrettable accident. Due to the fact that republicanism was against the
Shia Jafari school, the overall theme for republicanism was called off (Safari
Jamal 2014).
23 3.1.1 First Phase of Reforms
The first reform was to eliminate and forbid the protests in holy places and houses of religious scholars. These types of protests were popular during the Qajar Dynasty, mostly during the time of the constitutional revolution.
The second reform was on the national calendar. Before this time the national calendar was lunar22, Reza Khan changed it to a solar calendar with the approval of the national assembly.
The third reform was on the military service. Reza Shah made the military service compulsory for boys. In the proposed law, there were no exceptions for religious scholars. This point changed after the request of group of
Ulama in Qom (Safari Jamal 2014).
The other reform was with religious schools and seminaries. The government decided to bring the seminaries under its own control in order to uniform and equalize the value of education in all education centers.
The compulsory registration of documents was another reform (Safari
Jamal 2014). This reform was associated with religion. Before the reform, provision and documentation of transport and transfer of property, and sharing of inheritance was the duty of the Ulama, and this was partly their
22 The Lunar Islamic calendar is a calendar consisting of 12 months in a year of 354 days.
It is used to date events in many Muslim countries to determine the proper days on which to observe annual fasting. 24 income resource. With the formal establishment of notaries and providing rights to religious scholars, this reform was successfully implemented.
One of the difficult alternations of the time was the new legislation to reform the total system of the court of justice and closure of the Sharia courts. Sharia courts were common in Iran since the Safavid period and they were run by Sheikh al-Islams23, who were appointed by the government. Since Qajar time, these courts were ruled by Islamic Ulama without government interference (Vaez 2007).
The other reform was on harmonization of the way of clothing in the country. Iranians needed to wear uniforms in European style with Pahlavi hats. By the time of Reza Shah, everybody was free to wear outfits similar to clergymen covers; the aim of this law was to exclude clergymen from non- clergymen and to avoid unqualified people from wearing these costumes.
Self-mutilation with chains was also highly common during this time in religious mourning ceremonies. However, the new rule was forbidding it with approval of the Ulama on the basis of the religious rule that harming the body is forbidden in Islam.
Another reform program, which was associated with religious practices, was prohibiting the ritual of washing in a pool in public bathrooms. Due to a
23 Sheikh al-Islam is a title of superior authority in the issues of Islam.
25 lack of hygiene and the transmission of skin diseases such as trachoma and ring worm, the Ulama were in approval (Safari Jamal 2014).
3.1.2 Second Phase of Reforms
After military reforms and changing the military to his base of power, Reza
Khan was feeling confident in showing his real intentions of making a secular government without the influence of clergymen and religion
(Takhshid 2014).
One of the strong points of the Shia clergymen was their independence until the end of Qajar dynasty. It was one of the reasons that they could stand against the tyranny and deal with oppression by the ruling powers.
People’s financial help and dedication were the main resource for their independence. Dedications were normally in the form of lands, homes, and schools, which were provided by people to religious institutions and religious scholars (Takhshid 2014). These forms of dedications were common throughout the history of Shiism. The aim of Reza Shah was to change this tradition and diminish the independence and power of clergymen trying to change the rules on religious dedications (Takhshid
2014).
The national assembly approved Endowments Act, in which a governmental agency under the ministry of education and religious affairs was established to manage and control the endowments (Safari Jamal 2014).
26 According to the first article of this law, any endowment without a trustee or an unknown trustee or in the case of misadministration could come under the control of the ministry of education and religious affairs (Safari
Jamal 2014). As a result, some public endowments, which were devoted to religious issues, were getting out of control of religious scholars because some religious acts were becoming forbidden. Therefore, Reza Shah could easily remove the control of endowments from the hands of clergy with the reason of misadministration to independently decide on the future of endowments. After the reform, he could guide the incomes, which were previously concentrated on religious issues to public and secular purposes.
Some of these purposes were to make modern schools, publish useful books, public education, to help charity organizations and to provide school supplies to students in need (Takhshid 2014).
In the second period (1929-1933), the relation between Shah and clergymen was not friendly anymore. Despite this fact, neither clergymen nor people were against reforms and modernization efforts of Reza Shah.
Some protests were taking place but failing due to the lack of support by the influential Ulama like Ayatollah Haeri. One of these protests was because of the rule of the compulsory military service. People from Isfahan with some religious scholars were migrating to Qom to protest the act, but Ayatollah
Haeri was keeping his neutrality until the end of the protests. Unlike during
27 the constitutional movement and migration of scholars to Qom, in which businessmen were paying the costs of protesters with the advice of the
Ulama, protesters at this time needed to cover all the costs themselves. The high cost of living and the cold weather of winter were factors, which made people to give up the protests.
The other event was the detention and deportation of Sheikh Mohammed
Bafghi. He was preaching against the women and daughters of Reza Shah because they were present in public with no Islamic cover. Shah jailed him for 6 month and later exiled him until his death, but Ayatollah Haeri and other Ulama in Qom were keeping their silence.
From 1929 onwards, the relationship between scholars and government deteriorated, because the king and government did not fully respect the opinion of scholars and governments in making reforms (Takhshid 2014).
The reform that increased the tension between the Shah and religious scholars was the new policy on theological studies. Before the reform, theological studies were thought in accordance with the old Islamic traditions. The government wanted to change this tradition to coordinate theological studies.
The other problem was with the regulation on Sharia courts. The new regulation was making it possible that only a state court can subject a case
28 to Sharia court in limited cases like marriage, divorce and selection of trustees for orphans and widows (Takhshid 2014).
With another regulation, new restrictions were brought to the Ulama, which could previously function as a judge in courts. With the new law the trial judge had to hold a bachelor’s degree of law school in Tehran or other cities and the judges, who did not have this license needed to pass an specific examination from the Department of Justice (Takhshid 2014).
3.1.3 Third Phase of Reforms
During the third period, starting from 1934 the secularization efforts of
Reza Shah had reached its highest point. He started to actually separate religion from politics. In this era, reforms were carried out without the consent of the Ulama. People following clergymen were also dissatisfied with governmental reforms. During this period Reza Shah lost his popularity (Takhshid 2014).
For the first time Reza Shah was traveling to Turkey in 1934. Atatürk, the first president of Turkey, was a secular person and he was introducing a secular government to Turkey. Atatürk was showing Reza Shah the developments and industrial progresses of Turkey. The most interesting point for Reza Shah was the participation of women in all-national public works of Turkey. With this progress, Turkey was doubling its manpower by engaging women in several jobs outside of their homes. In comparison to
29 Turkey, half of the workforce in Iran were still in homes and the minority of women who were working outside of the home needed to wear veils, which prevented them from being effective in society (Safari Jamal 2014).
Reza Shah established a law in year 1936 on changing the form of clothing after his return from Turkey, which was forbidding veils for women.
Additionally, he ordered his wives and daughters to unveil. Reza Shah did these reforms without previously collaborating with the Ulama and religious organizations. People were unhappy with the removal of the veil and the new regulation. The cities were crowded again and people were protesting in religious places (Vaez 2007).
There were two problems with this law. Unlike the first law on uniform clothing, the latest unveiling law was a decision made directly after coming back from Turkey without a correct deduction of nation’s cultural background. The second problem was with the police officers responsible to enact this law. Their execution was sometimes rude and violent against people (Dabiri Mehr, Amir 2014, Safari Jamal 2014).
3.2 Weakening of Reza Shah
Even if the reign of Reza Shah was dedicated to development of the country, institutionalizing the educational system and industrialization, the system of the constitutional monarchy was still facing many challenges. In the end
30 of his years of his power, Reza Shah suppressed the free press, murdered reformists which were taking part in his reform movements, but were critical about his secular quick steps. These acts showed that the formation of a democratic process of Iran with Reza Shah is also unattainable (Matin-
Asgari 2012). Shah’s policies treated the urban middle class, the managers and technocrats as a result his state-owned industries remaining unproductive and inefficient. The corruption of the Qajars was still continuing during his time and the progress toward modernization was getting more isolated day-by-day. Traditional values of Iranian people, with the importance of religion as a personal, spiritual and traditional marker in
Iranian society, were still quite apparent. Losing people’s trust in his reforms, his system became dependent on his military force and the army, which in return received up to 50 percent of the public revenue to guarantee its loyalty (Matin-Asgari 2012). The opposition to his new regime aroused not from gentry, but mainly from clergy, tribes and young generation of the new intelligentsia.
In 1941, despite Reza Shah’s declaration of neutrality in World War II, the allied powers of Great Britain and the Soviet Union attacked Iran by air and sea. Britain forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, who replaced his father as Shah on 16th September 1941
(Matin-Asgari 2012).
31 3.3 Discussion
Reza Shah was able to consolidate domestic order and stability through his reform programs, but he was not able to completely fulfill or destroy all aims of the constitutional revolution. He was unable to destruct the ancient nature of arbitrary rule and to replace it by a lawful government because its realization was partly also the duty of the nation (Atabaki 2004).
The material promises of the constitutional revolution necessitated a strong parliament more than a strong military to work in tandem with the constitutional monarch (Abrahamian 1982), but Shah’s first step was to establish a strong army (L. Esposito 1996). The army was at the forefront of social and cultural change to national unification. It was at the core of implementing tribal policy, centralization, security and stability. As a result of the Shah’s military policy, a privileged class was created which frequently abused individual and property rights of those less fortunate.
The Shah did not recognize his sovereignty sourcing from the people and undermined the parliament legitimacy despite preservation of institutions of representative government. As a result, the parliament failed in representing the Iranian people. The seventh to the thirteenth parliament elections were totally controlled by Reza Shah and its function became ceremonial. Reza Shah also banned the Reformist Party, dissolved the
Socialists Party, banned all trade unions and closed down independent
32 newspapers. His effort was to ensure the existence of a powerful, pro-Shah party, which would form a disciplined majority in parliament. Due to these facts, Shah was not able to legitimize his reforms via a social base.
Therefore, he failed to cement his institutions through different social classes.
Moreover Reza Shah’s westernization was too quick to promote a proper synthesis of the West and Iran (Banani 1961). The Shah’s social reforms were an example of pseudo-modernism, which was forced to Iran’s society.
Reza Shah banned the veil for women at public places. He threatened any discrimination against women with huge fines, however people did not view this as emancipation but as police repression (Atabaki 2004). Men in turn were ordered to wear European bowler-hats, with the hope that by dressing like Europeans they would think like Europeans.
Although the new dress code was about imposing discipline and standardization, the change was not rooted in civil society and it was superficial.
During Reza Shah’s reign, the transition from a system based on Islamic jurisprudence gave way to western secular legal concepts but Shah’s reversion to a state of arbitrary rule in addition to his reactionary tendencies undermined people’s confidence in the legal establishment and lead to loss of confidence in their Shah and his reforms.
33 The Shah identified modernization as the separation between politics and religion, with ousting the clergy from the political system regardless of their influence on society. The new judiciary diminished the power of the clergy by the process of attrition and the reorganization of the ministry of justice in 1936 removed the final vestiges of authority from the clergy. Some penal codes were influenced by western countries (e.g. the exemption of the insane from punishment and the prohibition of animals cruelty) (Banani
1961). Nonetheless, the rule of law failed to meet the promises of the constitutional revolution because the Shah was not able to completely separate culture from religion. In fact, the social and cultural practices were slowly changing, but the law itself was not entirely modern.
Despite all efforts, the Sharia was still at the core of Iranian culture especially with regards to marriage, family and crimes against humanity.
The ideas of a contractual basis of society, a system of mutual duties and the rights of the individual were still foreign to Persian thought.
For the Revolution’s promises to be achieved, a socio- cultural transformation was necessary in order to make these elements understandable to people (Bayat; Mangol 1991). Additionally, the Shah had to manage the transition of Iran from an imperial idea to a national idea and from a multi ethnic empire into a unified state with one nation, one
34 language, one culture, and in agreement on political authority (Abrahamian
1982, Bayat; Mangol 1991)
Despite the provision of rights and security for the state, the law failed to empower the individual. The notion of human rights, which is intrinsic in a modern society, was undermined by Reza Shah’s arbitrary rule. As a result, the internalization of ideals of constitution into Iranian discourse, a process that must be done organically by the people, was also not possible during the governance of Reza Shah (Atabaki 2004).
4 Democratic Election of Mohammad Mosaddeq
4.1 The Reign of Mohammad Reza Shah
After Mohammad Reza Shah replaced his father on the 16th September
1941, he rehabilitated all political personalities who had suffered distrust during Reza Shah’s reign and removed the forced unveiling policy run by his father in 1935 (Matin-Asgari 2012). From the beginning of his reign he fought against social and political disarray and the economic crisis. His efforts were generally welcomed by the masses.
In the 1950’s, a political crisis was brewing in Iran. Iran oil reserves in the
Persian Golf area were developed by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AIOC) to be exported to Britain. 35 Important issues began to make their way into the collective consciousness of the Iranian people such as the low profit share of Iran from AIOC for its oil, the refusal of the AIOC to offer a 50-50% profit sharing deal to Iran as
Amarco oil company had to Saudi Arabia, and the discussion of nationalization of oil. With the assassination of the prime minister General
Ali Razmara, who opposed full nationalization of oil on the grounds that
Iran could not override its international obligations and lacked the capacity to run the oil industry independently, was assassinated and as a consequence, Shah appointed Hossein Ala as prime minister on March 15,
1951 (de Bellaigue 2013). He presented his government program to the parliament, but it was rejected and he resigned. The Shah, facing further unrests, appointed Mosaddeq as prime minister after the parliament nominated him by a vote of 79-12. The reason for Mosaddeq’s rising popularity was his support for oil nationalization. Mosaddeq’s political carrier started with the Iranian constitutional revolution as a parliament member and later as finance minister and foreign minister during the reign of Ahmad Shah. After the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty, which Mosaddeq voted against in parliament, he retired from politics. After abdication of
Reza Shah, Mosaddeq was once again elected to parliament as a leader of the Jebhe Melli party24, which was a board coalition of groups based on the
24 National front party of Iran.
36 urban middle and lower classes. The aim of this party was to establish democracy and end the foreign presence in Iranian politics, especially by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian oil company operations in Iran.
Mosaddeq was not a communist and he did not promote the interests of communists, though he drew on their support because of his aim to nationalize Iranian oil (Society 2014). This brought the accusation of being a supporter of Russian interests in Iran (Ali M Ansari 2003).
Aware of the impact of religious support from clerics, Mosaddeq tried to draw their support from the beginning. One of the clerics, which the national front party of Mosaddeq highly depended on, was Ayatollah Abol-
Ghasem Kashani (Ali M Ansari 2003). Unlike Mossadeq, Kashani could influence many Iranians. Laurence Paul Elwell- Sutton wrote: “Kashani is a follower of Jamal ad-din Afghani. His followers have the distinction of assassinating Naser al-Din Shah, supporting the constitution in 1906, and fighting against the secularizing policy of Reza Shah” (Kurt Kressin 1991).
Kashani’s aim was a worldwide Islamic revival, but in theological terms he was decidedly junior to Shiism’s top ayatollah, Seyyed Hossein Burujerdi, believing that if the clergy involves itself in politics, he would lose public respect (de Bellaigue 2013). Kashani had the ability to bring a religious reason for nationalization of oil and could gather Muslim fanatics and western-educated secularists around Mosaddeq (de Bellaigue 2013).
37 Historians also accept his important role in the future downfall of
Mosaddeq (de Bellaigue 2013).
Kashani opposed Britain policies for a long time. He had been expelled due to nationalist positions and for encouraging Shia scholars to reject British policies. He continued to oppose foreign, especially British control of Iran’s oil industry while in exile. Since October 1949, he had thrown his political and religious weight behind the candidacy of Mosaddeq’s National Front members to the 16th parliament. When he successfully returned to Tehran in June 1950, Mosaddeq and the other members of the National Front greeted him at the airport to show their political support (Rahnema 2014).
During the ministry of Mohammad Mosaddeq he served as speaker of parliament (Kurt Kressin 1991).
In future events, Kashani’s support for Mosaddeq was not strong and he only supported the idea of the expulsion of foreign influence from Iran
(Kurt Kressin 1991). America believed that Kashani was trying to improve his position to impress his notions on Mosaddeq and to guide the national movement (Kurt Kressin 1991).
The common ideological ground of Mosaddeq and Kashani was little (de
Bellaigue 2013). They had a common shared hatred for dictatorship of the
Anglo-Iranian oil company on one side, but Kashani opposed certain laws that Mosaddeq did not. Kashani wanted that the parliament repeal all un-
38 Islamic laws like the sale of alcohol and also wanted to forbid women from going out without the veil (de Bellaigue 2013). His aim was to carry out the will of Muslims and serve the nation according to Islamic principles. He confronted the attempts to separate religion and politics in Iran though he had promised Mosaddeq through declaration to parliament that he would not interfere in political affairs: ”Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq is completely at liberty in choosing his aides, from the very beginning I am refraining from giving any advice to him and shall obtain from doing so hereafter so that he will not feel constraints in carrying out his responsibilities”. Mosaddeq was not against Kashani’s demands, but he was postponing them to after nationalization of oil (Kurt Kressin 1991).
4.2 Mohammad Mosaddeq’s Reforms
The administration of Mosaddeq introduced a wide range of social reforms like social security and rent controls to help the working class. The unemployment compensation was introduced, factory owners were ordered to pay benefits to sick and injured workers, peasants were not anymore obligated to work in landlord’s estates (de Bellaigue 2013).
Twenty percent of the money landlords received in rent was placed in a fund to pay for development projects such as public bath, rural housing and pest control (de Bellaigue 2013).
39 Additionally, he retired corrupt and hostile senior army officers and strengthened the separation of powers by removing government responsibility for judicial appointments (Mohammadi 2008). Laws were prepared for the holding of the country’s first provincial elections in which women would be able to vote.
By giving some modestly enhanced rights to women and bringing the military under civilian control, Mosaddeq was unveiling his aim to bring
Iran to a constitutional regime. This was the start of confrontations from religious groups (de Bellaigue 2013).
The economic policy of Mosaddeq was based on self-reliance and independence. After the oil nationalization in 1951, the oil embargo against
Iran decreased the oil income of the country and the government emphasized more on non-oil economy and non-oil exports and penalized non-essential imports.
These economic reforms were not able to slow down the momentum of the resistance (de Bellaigue 2013).
4.3 Religious Confrontation
During the first government of the Mosaddeq (1951-1952), Kashani was having influence on Mosaddeq’s reforms. He was able to request special
40 consideration for a client or advising on appointments in different governmental departments. He even interfered in the manufacture of salt.
It was not consistent with Mosaddeq’s future plans for democratic ad modern government to let religious leader impose their opinions in the country’s politics. Therefore, he tried to remove clergymen from politics during his second government. He ordered government departments to ignore the Ayatollah Kashani’s missives, and although mutual respect of them continued, the Ayatollah Kashani’s opposition hardened (de Bellaigue
2013).
From this point, accusations against Mossadeq’s government increased.
Some compared him with Hitler and Reza Shah’s dictatorships, but as
Ahmad Rasavi described: ”No prime minister in the constitutional era has enjoyed such a high degree of popular trust and faith by the nation”.
America and Britain, being aware of the non-challengeable government of
Mosaddeq, in which religious and secular nationalism was combined, encouraged Kashani and other head supporters to oppose Mosaddeq (Kurt
Kressin 1991).
After the oil nationalization agreement by Iranian parliament, the British interests in oil industry of Iran were endangered and Britain’s repeated attempts were failing to reach a settlement with Mosaddeq’s government.
First, Britain removed its technicians and closed down the oil installations
41 in Iran (Abrahamian 1982). Secondly, it started to boycott Iran’s oil industry internationally and threatened purchasers of oil produced in the former British-controlled refineries with legal action. The United Kingdom took its anti-nationalization case against Iran to the International Court of
Justice representing the British Anglo-Iranian oil company, but it lost the case (Abrahamian 1982).
After all, Britain insisted to replace Mosaddeq with a different prime minister to protect British interests in Iran.
4.4 Coalition of the United Kingdom and the United States against
Mosaddeq
After the nationalization of AIOC, the first step of the U.K was to attract the support of the U.S to defend it’s own interests in Iran. Despite this fact, the
U.S, with president Truman, developed a plan to ease the effect of the
British oil blockade on allies (Gasiorowski 1987). U.S oil companies were asked to provide oil voluntarily to those allies that had been affected by the blockade. With this plan, the British blockade strengthened and undermined the Iranian economy and Mosaddeq’s government. At the same time, the U.S was against interference in Iran’s internal affairs. With the beginning of the presidency of Eisenhower, British prime minister Clement
Attlee suggested to the new U.S administration that Mosaddeq would
42 become dependent on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, which could result in
Iran’s turn to communism. As a result, the U.S and the U.K agreed to work together against Mosaddeq (Abrahamian 1982).
The second effort of Britain was to decrease the popularity of Mosaddeq among his main supporters by creating rumors of his support of communism and anti-religious and anti-monarchy movements. Mosaddeq’s opinions regarding land redistribution and some social reforms were similar to communistic views. He also defended leftist activism when the nation needed unity to fight imperialism and poverty, though he was opposing any coalition with the communist party of Tudeh (Kurt Kressin
1991). Mosaddeq was well aware of the religious background of the Iranian nation and he knew that any possible coalition with communist party will reduce his popularity and will put him against religious leaders
(Gasiorowski 1987).
The efforts of Mosaddeq could not prevent the propaganda sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was a political plan apparently funded at $1 million per year to spread anti-communist articles and cartoons in Iranian newspapers, books and leaflets critical of the Soviet
Union and the Tudeh party. The propaganda involved hiring street gangs to break up Tudeh rallies and founding anti-communist organizations like
Pan-Iranist parties to battle Tudeh members in the streets. Religious figures
43 were also paid to denounce the Tudeh as anti Islamic and they hired people to attack mosques and public figures in the name of Tudeh. They could successfully detach Kashani and his followers from the national front by portraying Mosaddeq as a corrupt and immoral person (Kurt Kressin
1991). From the beginning, there were fundamental personal and political divisions between the activist religious leader and the secularist prime minister, but Mosaddeq’s demands to increase his own political powers, his insistence in separating religion and politics, and the rumors, which showed him as a communist and anti-Monarch, increased the differences until Kashani started to protest against Mossadeq in favor of Zahedi’s future government (Kurt Kressin 1991).
The other aim was to get direct support from Shah to remove Mosaddeq.
Shah appointed Mossadeq because of his possible assassination attempt and his growing popularity. He didn’t want to put himself against the nationalization movement, which was at the time very popular among people and clergymen. Although Shah had doubts about the support of army, he joined the coalition of CIA to overthrow Mosaddeq’s government to guarantee his future absolute monarchy, which was until now limited to the constitution by Mosaddeq and his government.
44 The coup, executed by the CIA, dismissed Mosaddeq and appointed General
Fazlollah Zahedi as a prime minister and, once more, attempts to make Iran a democratic country was failing (Abrahamian 1993).
The writer of Patriot of Persia calls Mosaddeq the first liberal leader of the modern Middle East (de Bellaigue 2013). He was a rationalist and an anti-
British nationalist (Kurt Kressin 1991) who hated obscurantism and believed in the primacy of the law (de Bellaigue 2013). He declared its necessary for a country to have jurisdiction over all its residents. He was a reformist and aimed to change and modernize the law to suit the needs of the time. De Bellaigue mentions in his book that Mosaddeq, in presenting himself as an advocate of Islam with democracy and twinning the old faith with modern cult of the nation, became the most popular prime minister of
Iran (de Bellaigue 2013).
4.5 Discussion
The social and cultural issues hindering Reza Shah’s reform programs were also limiting Mohammad Mosaddeq efforts to make Iran a democratic country (Safari Jamal 2014).
Influenced by the issues of the time of Reza Shah, the implementation of western ideas like liberty and modernity lacked a social basis. This basis was still not existing during the time of Mohammad Reza Shah even if the
45 election of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1950 reflected popular dissenting views against perceived imperialism (Bayat; Mangol 1991).
Mosaddeq dealt with the problems of democratization of the Iranian society beside oil nationalization issues, which were centered on preserving national sovereignty by removing the influence of the U.K (de Bellaigue
2013).
After the nationalization of oil, Mosaddeq’s effort was to build a democratic country with respect to the religion of Islam. He was introducing himself as a Muslim, but he did not use religion for the sake of political gain. He believed making religion a political issue would not serve the interests of the country and its people, yet he still recognized its significance in Iranian society.
During his time, the religious groups were confident enough to demand
Mosaddeq to apply Sharia law, starting with the imposition of a women’s dress code, firing of all women working in the government and banning the production, sale and consumption of alcohol, but Mosaddeq was strongly against the establishment of a religious state and refused to obey any of their demands (de Bellaigue 2013). This was easily perceived to be threatening to the position of religious groups in Iran’s society, who Reza
Shah tried to eliminate from political power (Rahnema 2014). Therefore, clergy made people to believe that Mosaddeq’s government was anti-
46 Islamic, threatening the legitimacy of the monarchy and risking the Tudeh communist party to takeover the country.
In addition to the Ulama’s ability to bring a large contingent of supporters to the streets, the distribution of CIA-provided mobs helped to weaken
Mosaddeq and his government (Kurt Kressin 1991).
The organized opposition showed Mosaddeq in the press as anti-religious, anti-constitutional, anti-monarchic, anti-patriotic and pro-communist.
Adib-Moghaddam explained how the U.S intelligence services also planted a fake study in an American newspaper which, when reprinted in Iran, fed the ‘war of nerves’ against Mosaddeq. The U.S played on the idea that
Mosaddeq was a ‘communist danger’ (Ali M Ansari 2003).
After large efforts, a coup organized by the CIA of the U.S and the MI6 intelligence bureau of the U.K was successfully orchestrated against
Mosaddeq in 1953, which was a clear example of direct foreign interference that violated Iran’s sovereignty. After the coup, 40% of Iran’s oil revenue went from the U.K. to the U.S, a country that Mosaddeq expected to be sympathetic to provide loans in order to sustain the oil company and to compensate for the oil revenue deficit during the nationalization of Iranian oil (Gasiorowski 1987). These events completely undermined the desire to sustain an Iranian identity that resisted imperialism (Rahnema 2014).
Iran’s perceived ally, the U.S, was instrumental in removing a popular
47 minister who had been fighting for Iranian freedom. This coup created a deep distrust between Iran and the U.S and arguably marked the beginning of Iranian identity being constructed around opposition to the U.S, at least in the minds of ordinary Iranian people (Wise 2011).
The coup and further interventions by the U.K and the U.S during the governance of Mohammad Reza Shah ensured that the future political events of Iran would have a distinctly anti-western nature. After the coup of
1953, both secular and religious Iranians turned to political Islam to achieve their goal of regime change, removing western influence and turning to the leadership of the exiled religious leader and politician
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 (Wise 2011).
48
5 Iranian Revolution of 1979
5.1 Mohammad Reza Shah after Mosaddeq
After the coup, the Shah returned to Iran. People greeted him on the streets and celebrated his return. The Shah thought the people elected him, and he was more confident than ever to make decisions on his own for the future of his people. He was also aware of the role in which the U.S and the U.K. were playing to bring down the popular prime minister Mosaddeq and his party, so he always felt responsible for allowing direct interference of the
U.S and the U.K in country’s policies. The fact that the U.S and the U.K feared
Iran would fall to communism was helping the return of the Shah. On the other hand, but it was one of the main reasons forcing him to leave the country before the revolution of 1979 (Wise 2011). The extensive control of the U.S and the U.K over Iran in the following years created the impression with the people of the Shah as an American puppet, which increased the hatred toward the U.K and the U.S until the Islamic revolution of 1979
(Wise 2011).
49 5.2 White Revolution
Learning lessons from the coup, Shah’s government became more centralized than ever, turning him to a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch (Wise 2011). He established SAVAK, an organization for intelligence and national security, which operated until the revolution of
1979 to prevent further political and security crises. According to Time
Magazine, SAVAK was the most hated and feared institution of Iran because it was responsible for the torture and murder of thousands of the Shah’s opponents (Time 1979). On the other side, Shah started his modernization plans on Iran to eliminate the power of the traditional ruling groups like landlords and clergymen over the people. He named this modernization movement “White Revolution (WR)”, which started from the 1960ies. The reason for the name WR was to promote a bloodless and step-by-step social and economic revolution. According to (Gürbüz 2014), the transition led by the Shah from authoritarian to a modern country was not successful, because the economic and social reforms were not democratic.
The WR started with a national referendum in 1963 in which 5,598,711 people voted for the reforms and 4,115 voted against it (Mohsen M Milani
1994).
50 5.2.1 Women Rights
Socially, Shah gave more rights to women. A new election law included women’s suffrage (Wise 2011). Initially, when the right to elect and being elected was granted to women in provincial councils, the religious opposition made the government to withdraw it. Therefore, women were required to put their votes into separate ballot boxes in the referendum of
26 January 1963, and these votes were not counted (Sara Ansari 2002).
Later, on the occasion of the elections of the national consultative assembly in September 1963, Iranian women received the right to vote, but the problem was that the literacy rate among Iranian women in the early
1960ies was very low, so they were not correctly aware of their social rights (Sara Ansari 2002). The primary reasons were lack of facilities and the existence of other priorities like marriage at a very young age. The interested women on women’s rights were from the upper class but for the rest of them women’s suffrage was not a real concern. Despite this fact, later participation of active women in elections and winning seats in the parliament resulted in the enactment of the Family Protection Law (Sara
Ansari 2002). This law changed the divorce procedures, marriage and child custody regulations in favor of women. The execution of this law was difficult because women were not aware of their own rights to expect governmental consideration of their views or demands. The traditional and
51 religious structure of the society and the influence of the clerics on decisions regarding women rights was an additional factor which decelerating the process (Sara Ansari 2002).
The series of law reforms deviating from strict Sharia in the cases such as limiting a husband’s power over his wife in divorce cases, prohibiting polygamy without the consent of earlier wives, giving women the right to sue for divorce in specific instances, giving women opportunity to study and work without parental or espousal permission, and raising the legal age for marriage were enough influence the position of the clerics against the social reforms movement (Amuzgar 1991).
5.2.2 Land Reforms
Lands reforms were another part of the reform program. The government bought the land from the feudal land lords at a fair price and sold it to peasants at 30 percent below the market value, with the loan being payable over 25 years at very low interest rates (Moghadam 1996). With land reform, 1.5 million peasant families, who had once been little more than slaves in the lands, could now own the lands (Moghadam 1996). One of the aims of this program for the Shah was to gain support among the peasants and working class. The reform, like most capitalist land reforms, was unequal even on the level of the villagers in the same village. Some villagers received more, some received less, and some nothing (Haghighat 2000).
52 The landlord was allowed to keep one village and this was often by the landowner’s choice. This option gave the landlord to keep the better land
(Haghighat 2000). Since the government’s reform attempt had been mooted for some years before 1962, landlords had a chance to make partly fictitious sales or gifts to relative or friends in order to lessen their legal holdings in return for real control or compensation (Haghighat 2000). Other important reforms include:
• nationalization of forests and pasture lands to protect, develop and
cultivate them
• privatization of the government-owned enterprises to create a new
class of factory owners who could help to industrialize the country
was another reform
• profit sharing with factory workers and employees to give 20% share
of the net profits of the places where they worked
• formation of health corps to extend public health care throughout the
villages and rural regions of Iran
• formation of literacy corps with the people who had a high school
diploma and were required to serve their military service to fight
illiteracy in villages was another social reform
53 • formation of the Houses of Equity where 5 village elders would be
elected by the villagers for a period of 3 years to act as arbitrators in
order to help settle minor offences and disputes
• formation of reconstruction and development corps to teach the
villagers the modern methods and techniques of farming and keeping
livestock, nationalization of water resources
• urban and rural modernization and reconstruction
• price stabilization
• free and compulsory education
• free food for needy mothers
• introduction of social security and national insurance for all Iranians
were another reforms (Ali M Ansari 2001)
5.3 Begin of Religious Confrontation
The land reforms and social rights for women were the main reasons for the start of the confrontation between two main groups: landlords and clergy. The landlords were dissatisfied with the land reforms because their land was bought by the government and then sold in smaller plots to citizens at lower prices, creating additional competitors. They also did not appreciate the government undercutting their authority in relation to peasants (Moghadam 1996). In the first place, the clergy was unsatisfied
54 due to the new rights given to women and reforms within the family law.
From the clergy’s point of view these laws were against Sharia law. The second point was the educational system, which was aimed to reduce their traditional power among people. The third reason was the land reforms.
Upper echelon of the clergy usually came from landowning families deeply affected by reform. The rents from an estimated 10,000 villages that helped finance the clerical establishment was in danger because of the redistribution program (Moghadam 1996).
The first man who was openly critical of the reforms was Ruhollah
Khomeini. He didn’t just criticize the reforms such as granting suffrage to women and land reforms, he also criticized the base of the regime
(Haghighat 2000). Until this time, Khomeini was relatively unknown teacher in the Shia center of learning in Qom, but after his critical speech about the regime he transformed from a professor of religious law to a main figure in opposing the Shah’s regime (Van Dijk 2014). From his point of view, the WR was against religious constitutions and Iranian traditional culture. Khomeini insisted just on the implementation of the constitution by
Shah’s regime before the WR, but after the reform program he started to criticize the Shah himself. 2 days after his public speech on the 5.June 1963
Shah arrested him and subsequently sent him into exile. It was during this exile when Khomeini enjoyed free speech (Phillips 2009). In his speeches in
55 Iraq and later in France he insisted on the relationship between politics and religion in Islam. He was giving ideas on Islamic government based on religious activism with the elimination of the dual (i.e. political and religious) authority in society. He was bringing the idea of political guardianship of the Ulama, which should control all political affairs of the
Muslims in Iran. Previous to Khomeini’s speeches and writings the responsibility of the Ulama was commonly accepted over those unable to protect themselves, especially in areas influencing the religious life of the community and on the Muslim community’s general welfare, by propagating Islamic values (Khomeini 1970).
In the book of Vilayat-I Faqih, Khomeini related all the issues of the Iranian nation where the Islamic law was not enacted (Khomeini 1970). He mentioned in the book that the first Islamic government was prophet
Mohammad’s. Mohammad was a political leader of his nation. He was a judge, he was choosing judges and he was enacting Islamic law. He had chosen a political ruler to succeed him. Khomeini writes: “The Islamic law enforcement was not just limited to Muhammad time because Islamic rules are not limited to the specific time or place” (Khomeini 1970). He adds
Islamic government is neither despotic nor absolute. Islamic government is constitutional (Persian: mashrute), but not in the conventional sense of the present constitutional legislation, which is subject to the vote of the
56 majority of people (Khomeini 1970). He argues that the West might be able to go to the Moon, or even to Mars, but the people of the western nations will still be spiritually deprived and unable to solve their social problems as
Islam is the only source of these answers with its provisions for faith and morality (Kenrick 1990). It is constitutional (Persian: mashrute) in the direction that government’s implementation and administration are committed to Islamic rules. Later, he mentions that knowledge of the
Islamic law and justice as two essential requirements for Islamic governance.
5.4 Disagreement among Religious Scholars on the Role of Religion in
Politics
During his exile years, Khomeini was not the only member of the Ulama who was against the politics and the reforms, but critics were not in agreement regarding the future role of religion in the country. One of the important religious thinkers of the time was Ayatollah Shariatmadari.
Shariatmadari was a traditionalist (Kenrick 1990). The religious traditionalists tended to avoid involvement in politics whenever possible because for them Islamic principles are more to the individual, rather than to a society as a whole (Kenrick 1990). For traditionalists, true religion is more an internal and private matter. Traditional Shia Islam lacks a clear
57 ideology dealing with power and wealth in society. This group insists on the maintenance of Islamic law for marriage and divorce. They are against their loss of control over education and not having a voice in the legislative process. They normally don’t condemn the government as a whole. Rather, they criticize the government on specific issues. Shariatmadari entered into political action in 1978 following the violation of his house by government security forces and he formed an alliance with Khomeini. However he was never interested in obtaining immediate political power for himself or his class. He wanted an Islamic order for the country, but it was not necessary to reject past developments and enforce Sharia as the exclusive source for the solution of Iran’s problems (Kenrick 1990). In his view of Islam, the
Ulama were not entirely cut off from politics in which they held ultimate political authority, but were to exercise it only in defense of Islam.
Otherwise, politics was to be left to the professional politicians.
Shariatmadari’s aim was not the removal of the monarchy (Kenrick 1990).
Instead he demanded the implementation of the 1906 constitution. His concept of government was the closest to the western concept of government. Shariatmadari differed from western model regarding the place of God. In his concept of democracy the people rule, but God is the supreme lawmaker (Kenrick 1990).
58 Later, Shariatmadari was agreeing with the concept of Vilayate Fagih, but only in the case where the sovereignty of people and the independence of the country is protected (Kenrick 1990).
Another leading political ideologist among the Iranian religious community was Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani. His aim was to revitalize the understanding of Shia Islam. He was a traditionalist who proposed alternative ideas to both conservative and western viewpoints (Kenrick
1990). He entered into politics with the Mosaddeq’s National Resistance movement, which was based on a coalition of secular and religious groups who were opposed to the domination of foreign powers on Iran. In the
1960ies he stood against protests in favor of a traditional land holding system in which clergymen did participate, but he condemned the royal dictatorship. He was supporting the claim for an absolute ownership of the dead (uncultivated) land by anyone who could actually use it and he found it matching to Islamic law, which encourages man to develop land for his own benefit. Although he always asserted dictatorship as a form of idolatry and as an offence to monotheism (Kenrick 1990). Taleghani always insisted on the real application of the constitution. He blamed clergy of failing to guide the believers on social and political principles, which caused the youth to turn to western theories for solutions. He insisted that religious scholar should enter into politics as the righteous guides of the people on
59 religious and social matters. In his book ‘’Jihad va Shahadat’’ Taleghani insisted more in being active in politics. He invited people to defend themselves when their rights, honor and dignity are endangered (Kenrick
1990). He wanted to bring back the social justice as the main goal of the religion to the society.
In contrast to other clergymen accepting the political ruling power of a
Mujtahid (clergymen allowed to deduce Islamic rights), Taleghani accepted the sovereignty of Muslims under the guidance of the Mujtahids (Kenrick
1990). In determination of the later route of revolution in 1979, he kept silent and this allowed religious supporters to pilot the revolution wherever they wanted. After the revolution, he ceased all public statements that were in opposition to those of Khomeini to secure the unity of the revolution. After the revolution, he witnessed the Ulama’s failure to bring social justice to society. He wanted to leave politics to professional statesmen. He started to warn against despotism and meant that true Islam must allow a nation to freely protest and criticize the government (Kenrick
1990).
5.5 Other Groups
Clergymen and Islamist groups were not alone in opposing the regime of the Shah. Another group, which was successful in mobilizing Iranian people,
60 was the Tudeh party. The party was formed in 1941 and it played an important role during Mohammad Mosaddeq’s campaign to nationalize the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The coup against the government of Mosaddeq was weakening the party, but it was still active during the years before the
Islamic revolution (de Bellaigue 2013).
The communistic Tudeh party was able to mobilize the working class, who had high expectations of increasing wages and wealth. These classes supported the government’s policies on land reform, women’s rights to vote and progressive policies that served the interests of the working class. The promise of improving workers conditions did not materialize after the WR.
Instead, the state pursued policies, which enhanced capital accumulation and imposed a heavy cost on the vast majority of the working class. The government tried to limit the workers unions’ activities and it reduced the workers class capacity for collective action against the government. New laws granted employers arbitrary powers to dismiss the workers. Most workers labored ten to twelve hours a day and only 22 percent of wage earners had social insurance in 1974. Rising inflation especially after 1973 due to scope and pace of development deteriorated the situation of the workers. The economic development had a positive impact on the earnings of highly skilled workers, but a majority of workers could not maintain a livelihood in the 1970ies and the gap between highly skilled and unskilled
61 segments of the working class widened as a result of the regime’s development strategy (Misagh 1989).
In comparison to other active groups of the time, the Tudeh party was relatively well organized, but they did not plan on the formation of the state that represents their social and political ideals (Misagh 1989). The party lacked the necessary instrument in the form of revolutionary and leadership. They resisted against forming an imperial society (Javadzadeh
2010, Zayar 2013). In contrast to other communist parties, they hoped for a national democratic state before moving towards the socialist revolution in
Iran (Zayar 2013). In contrast to Islamic activists, the Tudeh party denied the idea of death and martyrdom, which meant giving one’s life in the path of God, which arose in the seventh century with the death of two prominent
Imams25 (Javadzadeh 2010). The leaders of Shia Islamic groups like
Ayatollah Taleghani always mentioned a martyr as a model and hero for
Shia Muslims, who should refuse to play according to the rules of the existing political system and fight for their aims until their death
(Javadzadeh 2010). At the beginning the Tudeh party was constantly criticizing the method to be an adventurist, which contributed to their lack of acceptance among people. People traditionally believed that martyrdom is the only way to fight against a dictator who had stifled all methods of
25 First Shia Imam, Ali ibn Abu Talib and third Shia Imam, Husayn ibn Ali.
62 dissent for the opposition (Javadzadeh 2010). Understanding their difficulty in explaining their ideals to a traditional society of Iran, the Tudeh party emphasized their alliance with Islamic groups and accepted their notion of martyrdom. Martyrdom became a unit to measure authenticity among
Tudeh party, declaring themselves as Marxists and Muslims, with the difference that the Marxists believed in the idea of martyrdom but did not believe in the afterlife story. For communists like Khosro Golsorkhi and
Karamat Daneshian, martyrdom was often referred to as a necessary condition for achieving an ideal society (Javadzadeh 2010).
In February 1979, the leadership of the Tudeh party argued: “As the character of Iran revolution is anti-imperialist we must accept the fact that the regime, which came to power after the revolution is progressive in nature… That is why the most important left forces Tudeh of Iran… is behind Khomeini” (Javadzadeh 2010). Despite this approval, the situation of the Tudeh party after the revolution was changing and they were getting ignored, captured and tortured by new Islamic government, because the
Islamic groups didn’t want to share their power with Marxists and non- believers (Javadzadeh 2010).
The National Front, People’s Fadayeen and People’s Mojahedin of Iran were other groups confronting the Shah. The National Front was revived in early
1977 as a secular group. The communist organization of the Iranian
63 people’s Fadayeen formed in 1964 and People’s Mojahedin of Iran was founded on September of 1965 by a group of left-leaning Muslim Iranian university students (Misagh 1989). These organizations had faced repression and had been declared illegal during the 1960s and 1970s. The
National Front and other liberal groups were demanding political freedom and formal democracy, but failed to mention economic injustice (Misagh
1989). The party hesitated an overthrow of the monarchy too. This stance did not attract segments of the bazaar, the working class or students who favored a more radical political course (Misagh 1989). The Fadayeen party founders were mainly young Marxist students who had broken away from the Tudeh party and the National Front. In contrast to the National front they began their armed struggle in 1970ies to fight the Shah’s regime, but they still had no plan for the time after the revolution, hence following the movement of the Islamic group. “Despite most of the modern revolutions, in which secular intellectuals have played leading roles in struggles for establishment of rational societies, the Iranian secular contenders failed to achieve a dominant position in Iran’s revolution and the revolution was succeed by Ayatollah Khomeini’s group, which was the most political and most radical of all groups” (Misagh 1989). Khomeini’s followers were not only thinking about resistance (Javadzadeh 2010). They had a plan for how to build a state, which would answer the necessities of an oil-rich
64 developing capitalist economy and would keep Islamic faith present.
Another reason for the success of the Islamic group was that many of the secular group’s leaders and members were born into an Islamic culture, which helped to shape their thoughts and ideas (Javadzadeh 2010). Even if they were Marxists, their agents of socialization were imbued with an
Islamic belief and philosophy. Marxist organizations in Iran spoke about the acceptance of Islam as a liberating ideology. They believed that the Islamic
Republic of Iran was a government closer to their ideals than a monarchy ruled by the person of Shah (Javadzadeh 2010).
5.6 The Islamic Revolution of 1979
In 1979, the mass movement steadily increased and the working class became increasingly radicalized. Finally, the overthrow of Mohammad Reza
Shah happened with the support of many seculars, leftists and religious groups. The Shah left Iran for exile on January 16, 1979 and left his duties to a regency council. Ayatollah Khomeini came back to Iran as the leader of the
Islamic revolution. The royal reign collapsed shortly after on February 11 when rebel troops overcome Shah’s loyal troops.
(Gürbüz 2014) mentions the outcome shows that the modernization and democratization, which Shah did could be just succeeded when the country democratized. The main part of Shah’s concentration was on developing
65 Iran’s economy and to form intellectual groups, but with undemocratic type of ruling which resulted in Islamic revolution of 1979 (Gürbüz 2014).
5.7 After the Islamic Revolution
In the months after the Shah’s fall there was no censorship in the country
(Stoner Kathryn 2013). Hundreds of papers and magazines, each presenting a different perspective, were published. Political parties were free to operate. These freedoms made the religious groups to be frightened.
Suppression started in March 1979, when women tried to organize a demonstration to protest against the rule forcing Islamic veil (Stoner
Kathryn 2013). Soon the opponents to the new regulations were called hypocrites and Islamic groups attacked the leftist peaceful gatherings
(Stoner Kathryn 2013)
With referendum of 1979, Iranians voted to become an Islamic Republic and to approve a new theocratic-republican constitution. In January 1980
Abolhassan Banisadr was elected president of Iran. Banisadr’s government defended democratic values, but real power was in the hands of Ayatollah
Khomeini’s religious representatives. Rapidly, executions of members of the past regime started. Before the revolution, the group promising to obey the constitution, now was accused of speedy executions of opponents (Stoner
Kathryn 2013).
66 The Iranian revolution did not end up formulating a modern political system, which could fulfill the Iranian political and social aims. The first reason was that the majority had imprecise information about the consequence of voting for an Islamic government. A second reason was their deep traditional trust upon the religious clerics, which started from
1501 as Safavids introduced the Shia Islam as the official religion of Iran. As
Shia clergymen were active in many social aspects of Iranians lives, it increased their social power in society and later they gained their political power through confrontation against evil in Tobacco Movement, establishment of constitution, support of democratically elected
Mosaddeq’s government and allying with all groups of people against
Mohammad Reza Shah (Beck 1996).
Ayatollah Khomeini promised the rule of law, but what he meant by law was Islamic law (Khomeini 1970). The existing constitution from 1906 needed to be reviewed by clergymen to match the Islamic law.
67 6 Political Structure of Iran after the Islamic
Revolution in 1979 according to the Country’s
Constitution
After the Islamic revolution of 1979, the constitution of Persia was revised.
The provisional government of prime minister Mehdi Bazargan in June
1979 published the draft constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran. The constitution was adopted by a referendum on October 24, 1979 and went into force on the third of December the same year (Shirazi 1998). The constitution was modeled on the constitution of the French Fifth Republic
(Hosen 2007). The draft introduced an Assembly of Experts dominated by clerics, except for the president and the prime minister, whose positions were retained for the executive branch of government as from the French model (Hosen 2007, Shirazi 1998).
Due to the tensions between the powers of the president and the prime minister and effort to clarify the future of the clerically selected leader of the Islamic republic of Iran, the constitution was amended in 1989. The amendment abolished the position of the prime minister (Pirseyedi 2013).
68 The amendment recognized the Expediency Council26 as an advisory board to the leader to determine the general policies of the country and to solve the disagreements between the parliament and the Council of Guardians27, whose clerical jurist maintaining veto power over all legislation (Assembly
1979).
The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran contains theocratic, democratic and authoritarian qualifications, which are showing the contradicting opinions on how to define the political system of Iran after the revolution.
6.1 Conflicting and Contradicting Articles in Relation to Democratic
Principles
6.1.1 Contradictions in Sovereignty of God, People and Religious Leader
Article 1 and 2 of the constitution insists on the sovereignty of God by stating that the Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in a single God.
Article 6 states that the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of a president, the representatives of the Islamic consultative
26 Expediency Discernment Council is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader.
27 The Guardian Council is composed of six Islamic faqihs, chosen by Supreme Leader and six jurists elected by the parliament.
69 assembly and the members of councils28, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other articles of this constitution29.
Article 56 states that man is the master of his own social destiny and God as an absolute sovereignty made man master of his own social destiny (so if the people are the representatives of God’s sovereignty, then a religious leader should be not necessary).
Article 5 states that during the occultation of the Wali al-Asr30 the leadership of the Nation (Arabic: Ummah) devolve upon the just and pious jurisconsult (Arabic: Faqih), who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age (Assembly 1979).
Article 107 refers to the task of appointing and dismissing the leader (fagih of article 5) shall be vested with the experts elected by majority of Iranian people.
Article 108 states that the law of setting out the number and qualifications of the experts (who are appointing and dismissing the leader) and the mode
28 According to article 107 of constitution, members of the council of expert are directly elected by people.
29 Article 59 of Iranian Constitution states, in extremely important economic, political, social and cultural matter, the function oft he legislature may be exercised through direct recourse to popular vote through a referendum.
30 According to twelver Shia belief, the 12th imam, who is expected to emerge from occultation to establish a reign of peace and righteousness.
70 of their election must be drawn up by the Fuqaha during the first Guardian council passed by a majority of votes and finally approved by the leader of revolution (Assembly 1979). Hence, the experts who are appointing and dismissing the religious leader, need his approval.
6.1.2 The Separation of Powers
Article 57 of the constitution states that the powers of government in the
Islamic republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary and the executive powers and they are independent from each other but they function under the supervision of the absolute Wilayat al-amr and the leadership of the
Umma.
6.1.2.1 The Executive Power
Article 60 states that the functions of the executive, except in matters that are directly placed under the jurisdiction of the leadership by constitution, are to be exercised by the president and ministers.
Article 118 states that the responsibility for the supervision of the presidential election relies on the Council of Guardian.
Article 91 states that 6 out of 12 members of the Council of Guardian are selected directly by the leader.
71 6.1.2.2 The Legislative Power
Article 93 states that the Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no Council of Guardian.
Article 94 states that all legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative
Assembly must be sent to the Council of Guardian to ensure its compatibility with the Criteria of Islam and the constitution. If the Council of Guardian finds the legislation incompatible it will return the legislation to the Assembly for review.
6.1.2.3 The Judiciary Power
Article 110 describes the duties of the religious leader towards judiciary.
This includes delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of
Iran after consultation with the Nation’s Exigency Council, assuming supreme command of the armed forces and appointment, dismissal and acceptance of resignation of the supreme judicial authority of the country and reducing the sentence of a convict, on a recommendation from the head of judicial power (Assembly 1979).
These contradicting provisions show the paradoxical consequences of connecting democracy and Islamic rules in Iran’s constitution.
6.1.3 Human Rights
Article 19 and article 20, which are in the third chapter of the Iranian
72 constitution, contains a list of individual rights such as equality of all citizens of country in conformity with Islamic law (In Islamic law women are not enjoying the same right as men).
Article 13 states that Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian are the only recognized religious minorities in Iran (In Islamic law non-Muslims are not enjoying the same right as Muslims).
Article 21 emphasizes women’s rights in all respects and in conformity with
Islamic criteria (Assembly 1979).
Freedom of expression in article 23, protection of minorities and founding political parties and societies in article 26, public gatherings and marches in article 27, are other mentioned rights in this chapter except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principle of Islam or the rights of the republic.
73 7 Summary and Discussion
The Constitutional Revolution
In 1906, the first Constitution of Persia was established. The constitution was notably a liberal and democratic document that provided lasting standards for debates on the state and democracy in Iran (Kasravi 1964).
The conflicts started from religious leaders rejecting the idea that Iranians have the right to create the national law. The conflict continued with the supplementary law providing the freedom of press, speech and association for Iranians. The constitution provided equality of Iranian people regardless of gender and religion, which became a further source of confrontation (Kasravi 1964).
Pahlavi Dynasty and Reza Shah
The failure of democracy in Iran came from an absence of social, economic and political factors, which made Iranians, soon realize that their constitutional aims required a strong state. Reza Shah succeeded in building a strong state, securing Iran from any remaining domestic and foreign threats and started to modernize Iran (Banani 1961). He also started secularist reforms such as:
74 • reducing the social and political power of religious leaders within the
education system and the courts
• limiting the dedications by people to religious institutions
• harmonization of the way of clothing
• enacting the unveiling law for women
However, in doing so, he lost support among the Ulama and people
(Takhshid 2014).
Pahlavi Dynasty, Mohammed Reza Shah and Democratic Election of
Mohammad Mosaddeq
Mohammad Reza Shah removed the forced unveiling policy run by his father and tried to gain support from religious and non-religious social groups. He appointed the popular Mohammad Mosaddeq as a prime minister. Mosaddeq became successful with the nationalization of oil, but his secular and democratic decisions and his effort to remove religious leaders from political power made him unpopular among religious scholars and people (Kurt Kressin 1991). With his decreasing popularity, the Shah, the U.S and the U.K eliminated him from power (Gasiorowski 1987).
After the removal of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Shah himself continued to modernize Iran. He gave more rights to women, introduced land reforms, started to fight illiteracy and formed the houses of equality. The land reforms and social rights for women were enough to start confrontations
75 and protests of religious leaders and people. The secular reforms were one of the main reasons why his religious opponent Ayatollah Khomeini later replaced Mohammad Reza Shah (Ali M Ansari 2001).
The Islamic Revolution of 1979
Within the first months after Mohammed Reza Shah, some freedom was given to different political groups. Suppression against women and opposition groups started when women were forced to wear veil. Members of different political groups were executed and religious groups started to rule the society according to Sharia law (Vakil 2011).
Although many political groups, including religious and secular, were in support of the revolution of 1979, Iranian people today are still trying to restrain the exercise of the state power of the Islamic Republic to balance their democratic demands and state building to achieve a durable state that can pursue development and provide security, protect individual rights and the rule of law (Azimi 2008).
Problems with the state power arise when Iranians try to reach their liberal democratic aims such as supported civil liberties, individual rights, and rule of law, and incorporate them to their traditional and Islamic values in a modern state by placing the Ulama in charge of development. From the author’s perspective, this is not possible (Redaelli 2007).
76 Iran’s society is still class-based, traditional and patriarchal (Vakil 2011).
These characteristics are contracting the elements of liberal democracy like unlimited freedom of religion, speech, press, thoughts and belief, majority rule, and equality of all citizens regardless of their class, region, religion, ethnicity, gender or beliefs. Efforts to bring these two different ideologies together was not a solution of too many political and social problems of
Iran during the last century and resulted in the rise of a paradoxical situation in the legal and social structure of Iran (Ray Takeyh 2007).
In fact, after experiencing more than 3 decades of political Islam, Iranians, unlike the rest of the Muslim world, have little confidence in the idea that
Islam is the solution. The Iranians are showing less interest in accommodating the utopian ideals and values of the Islamic Republic in many cases and more support has been displayed for the realization of more liberal democratic values, but just as long as these values are not contracting their religious and traditional values (Mirsepassi 2010).
From the author’s point of view, for a country to become democratic, it is required that all principles of democracy are accepted in its society. For a democracy to be established in a society all citizens must recognize benefits within the new established system and have equal opportunities, rights and obligations to participate within democratic processes including women, men, children and minorities.
77 7.1 The Paradox of Iran within the Legal System
The coexistence of two competing visions of liberal institutionalization and religious traditional concerns in the legal and social system are the main causes of what is also today happening in Iran.
These contrasting points of views were combined together in the first constitution of Persia remaining in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The constitution of 1979 borrows democratic elements from French and Belgian law but yet it also requires that all laws be compatible with
Islamic Sharia (Shirazi 1998).
From legal point of view today, the Islamic Republic of Iran has struggles with its primary political identity regarding if the state should be based on religious principles mandated by God or on human made laws within the will of the people (Assembly 1979).
From one side, reformists tried to use Islam for democratic ends but, on the other side, hardliner clerics insisted that twelve Shia Imams vest ultimate power to the supreme leader in the clerical establishment (Shirazi 1998).
Iran’s current government has the fundamental institutions of a modern democratic republic like independent executive, legislative and judicial branches, the President, 290 parliament members, civil and criminal courts and regular military, but it also has a set of parallel institutions dominated by clergy like the supreme leader, 12-members of Guardian Council, Islamic
78 courts and revolutionary guards forming the Islamic institutions of the
Iranian government (Assembly 1979).
The constitution of 1979 attempted to bring these two paradoxical notions of republican governance and religious authority together with the aim to open the way for the establishment of a religious and democratic society, causing a conflicting set of rules.
7.2 The Paradox of Iran within the Civil Society
Today in Iran, the civil society activism and elections to voice social and political demands show that the Iranian society has moved further along the path to democracy. However, Iranian people still want to combine their modern liberal social needs with their traditions.
Over the course of the past three decades, Iranian people have embraced democratic practices, participated in elections at local and national levels and believed that their vote affects political outcomes (Redaelli 2007).
Despite the fact that the Iranian constitution vests sovereignty in God,
Iranian politicians look to the people for their mandate (Ray Takeyh 2007).
Although the majority of Iranians are not against democracy, the importance of religion as a personal, spiritual and traditional marker in
Iranian society is still quite apparent (Ballen 2009).
79 The political events of the last century show that the major part of Iranian population still trusts and accepts religious leaders as their political leaders due to their (over centuries) traditional functions in the private and public lives of Iranian people. During the 20th century, several times Iranian people confronted democratic and secular reforms like the law of equality of all Iranians in the constitution of Persia, unveiling law of Reza Shah with the aim of making women more active in society, women’s rights and suffrage in the time of Mohammad Reza Shah. These confrontations were generally happening in the name of Iranian’s traditional values (Kurt
Kressin 1991, Takhshid 2014).
Today, Iranian women have right to vote. They have increasing educational and employment opportunities, but they are still underrepresented in management and leadership role. Iran is still a very patriarchal society in which women are revered for their feminine qualities and men are positioned as primary income earners (Beverley Metcalfe 2011).
That enforcement of compulsory veil, repeal of reforms in family law, stoppage of the family planning and population control policy, starting the age of criminal responsibility for girls with the age of 9, and the decision that testimony of women is not the equivalent to the testimony of men are some of the reasons that today on the globe study, Iran scored eight lowest among 61 countries on the dimension of gender egalitarianism (Heidtmann
80 2011). Similar discriminations are referring to linguistic, religious and ethnic minorities that Iran’s society shows little interest in changing it.
8 Conclusion
For a liberal democracy to be representative and inclusive to all citizens, it must have equal opportunities for the people to participate within democratic processes. If these conditions are not present, the benefits of a democracy for social and economic development are severely limited.
Democracy cannot allow inequality or discrimination based on a traditional and patriarchal set of rules.
Despite the effort of Iranians to alter the balance of power between the state and society by subjecting the state’s power to the rule of law while empowering civil society, Iran is far from becoming a liberal democratic government. However, there still remains hope for gradual democratic reforms for matching the nation’s traditions and cultural values (Stoner
Kathryn 2013).
Liberal democracies must be constructed from the ground up. It will take time for the Iranian people, who lived for centuries as Muslims, to incorporate democratic values into their social values (Beck 1996, Beverley
Metcalfe 2011).
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