The Dominance and Monopolies Review, Fifth Edition
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Report on the Results of the Icn Survey on Dominance/Substantial Market Power in Digital Markets
Unilateral Conduct Working Group, July 2020. REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE ICN SURVEY ON DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER IN DIGITAL MARKETS 1. Introduction Digital technologies have entered all sectors of the economy and more and more companies are transitioning to the use of digital systems and technologies. Competition authorities are increasingly confronted with the need to assess unilateral conduct in digital markets.1 A number of competition authorities have commissioned studies aiming at understanding how digital markets operate and many authorities have already gathered experience in dealing with unilateral conduct in such markets. The literature on this subject has been growing exponentially too. In response to these developments, in 2019 the Unilateral Conduct Working Group (UCWG) decided to start a new multi-year project which focuses on issues relating to unilateral conduct in digital markets, and in particularly, on the assessment of dominance/substantial market power2 in these markets. The discussions held in May 2019 at the annual ICN conference in Cartagena, and in November 2019 at the UCWG workshop in Mexico, showed that these issues are of interest to many ICN members. Indeed, establishing dominance/substantial market power is an important step, and often the starting point, in the assessment of unilateral conduct. Therefore, as part of the UCWG multi-year project, the co-chairs of the UCWG prepared a survey, which sought to collect information on the ICN members’ experience in assessing dominance/substantial market power in digital markets. Its aim was to clarify whether this experience suggests that the assessment of dominance/substantial market power in digital markets requires considerations or techniques of assessment different from those applied in non-digital markets. -
CMA's Response to the Smith Commission
The Competition and Market Authority’s response to the Smith Commission 31 October 2014 CMA36 © Crown copyright 2014 You may reuse this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government- licence/ or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3 Summary .................................................................................................................... 4 Background ................................................................................................................ 5 Markets ...................................................................................................................... 7 Cross-border effects: businesses ............................................................................. 10 Cross-border effects: consumers ............................................................................. 11 Competition regime .................................................................................................. 13 Consumer regime ..................................................................................................... 18 Transition ................................................................................................................ -
Defensive and Offensive Strategies for Market Success
International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 13 [Special Issue - July 2011] Defensive and Offensive Strategies for Market Success Dr. Peter Yannopoulos Associate Professor Brock University, St. Catharines Ontario, Canada, L2S 3A1 E-mail: [email protected] Tel: (905) 688-5550 ext. 3909 Abstract In industries in which there is strategic interaction among competing firms, companies are continuously involved in defensive and offensive strategies. In this paper we discuss several defensive and offensive strategies that managers can you for market success. Defensive strategies are divided into pre-entry and post-entry stretegies. Marketing managers should attempt to discourage would be entrants before entry has occurred. They can achieve this goal by engaging in pre-entry startegies. After entry is occurred it is more difficult to persuade new entrants to exit the industry. For this reason, marketing managers should use different defensive strategies for defending their positions in pre-entry and post-entry situations. Key words: Defensive strategies, offensive strategies, pre-entry strategies, post-entry strategies 1. Introduction Competition forces companies to constantly engage in offensive and defensive marketing strategies. Rivalry occurs because one or more competitors either feels the pressure or sees an opportunity to enter an industry or to improve its position within an industry. In most cases, competitive moves by one firm have noticeable effects on its competitors and, thus, may invite retaliation or efforts to counter the move (Porter 1980). Companies respond to competitor challenges by counterattacking with increasing advertising expenditures, cutting prices, increasing innovation, and introducing new products, or even accommodating the entrant by doing nothing or decreasing the level of marketing effort (Karakaya and Yannopoulos, 2011; Scherer, 1980). -
Guidance on the Functions of the CMA After the End of the Transition Period
Guidance on the functions of the CMA after the end of the Transition Period 1 December 2020 CMA125 © Crown copyright 2020 You may reuse this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU, or email [email protected]. This publication is also available at www.gov.uk/cma. Contents 1. Preface ................................................................................................................. 2 2. The legal framework ............................................................................................. 6 3. Merger control ..................................................................................................... 13 4. Enforcement of the competition law prohibitions (‘antitrust’, including cartels) ... 24 5. Consumer protection law enforcement ............................................................... 37 ANNEXES ................................................................................................................ 42 A. CMA guidance .................................................................................................... 43 B. EU block exemptions in force under EU Law, becoming Retained Block Exemption Regulations ...................................................................................... 46 1 1. Preface 1.1 The United -
Competition Law
Powers of investigation Understanding competition law Competition law 2004 Since 1 May 2004 not only the European Commission, but also the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has the power to apply and enforce Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty in the United Kingdom. The OFT also has the power to apply and enforce the Competition Act 1998. In relation to the regulated sectors the same provisions are applied and enforced, concurrently with the OFT, by the regulators for communications matters, gas, electricity, water and sewerage, railway and air traffic services (under section 54 and schedule 10 of the Competition Act 1998) (the Regulators). Throughout the guidelines, references to the OFT should be taken to include the Regulators in relation to their respective industries, unless otherwise specified. The following are the Regulators: • the Office of Communications (OFCOM) • the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (OFGEM) • the Northern Ireland Authority for Energy Regulation (OFREG NI) • the Director General of Water Services (OFWAT) • the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), and • the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). Section 52 of the Competition Act 1998 obliges the OFT to prepare and publish general advice and information about the application and enforcement by the OFT of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions contained in the Competition Act 1998. This guideline is intended to explain these provisions to those who are likely to be affected by them and to indicate how the OFT expects them to operate. Further information on how the OFT has applied and enforced competition law in particular cases may be found in the OFT's decisions, as available on its website from time to time. -
The Development of British Competition Law: a Complete Overhaul and Harmonization
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Lever, Jeremy Working Paper The development of British competition law: a complete overhaul and harmonization WZB Discussion Paper, No. FS IV 99-4 Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Lever, Jeremy (1999) : The development of British competition law: a complete overhaul and harmonization, WZB Discussion Paper, No. FS IV 99-4, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51159 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu discussion papers FS IV 99 - 4 The Development of British Competition Law: A Complete Overhaul and Harmonization Jeremy Lever March 1999 ISSN Nr. -
Evaluation of an OFT Intervention
Evaluation of an OFT intervention Independent fee-paying schools May 2012 OFT1416 © Crown copyright 2012 You may reuse this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: Marketing, Office of Fair Trading, Fleetbank House, 2-6 Salisbury Square, London EC4Y 8JX, or email: [email protected]. This publication is also available from our website at: www.oft.gov.uk. CONTENTS Chapter/Annexe Page 1 Executive summary 1 2 Introduction 6 3 Theory, methodology and data 9 4 Descriptive analysis 18 5 Econometric analysis 22 6 Conclusion and estimate of consumer benefits 31 7 References 33 A List of SS Schools and Non-SS Schools 34 B Market for independent schools 37 C FT score and rank 38 D Econometric analysis 40 E Dispersion analysis 52 F Consumer detriment averted 58 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1.1 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has a public commitment to evaluate each year at least one of its previous interventions. These evaluations help us to understand whether and how our projects have achieved the desired impact, and whether the outcomes could be further improved. The OFT relies on findings from such evaluations to learn lessons that can be applied to future comparable interventions. 1.2 In this context, the OFT’s evaluation team has evaluated the impact of the intervention addressing the anti-competitive practice of 50 independent fee-paying schools in the setting of fees during academic years 2001/02 to 2003/04. -
Competition Act 1998
Competition Legislation Competition Act 1998 Application in the Energy Sector Contents Page Contents .............................................................................................................................. 1 1. Introduction.................................................................................................................2 2. Legal Context.............................................................................................................. 4 3. Economic Analysis ................................................................................................... 12 4. Process for Investigation........................................................................................... 27 1 1. Introduction 1.1 The Competition Act 1998 as amended by SI 2004, No. 12611 (‘CA98’) gives the Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) and the sector regulators, including the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (‘the Authority’) powers to apply and enforce Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (‘Articles 81 and Article 82’ respectively) as well as the Chapter I and II prohibitions of CA98 using their concurrent powers. 1.2 Article 81 and the Chapter I prohibition contained in section 2 (1) of CA98 prohibit agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices (‘agreements’) which have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. Article 81 applies to agreements which may affect trade between Member States in the EU. The Chapter 1 prohibition applies -
Financial Results Results for the Half Year to 30 September 2019 BT Group Plc 31 October 2019
Financial results Results for the half year to 30 September 2019 BT Group plc 31 October 2019 BT Group plc (BT.L) today announced its results for the half year to 30 September 2019. Key strategic developments: • Launched a host of new products for consumer and business segments, including the new Halo converged product plans and BT Mobile 5G • Introduced a range of new service initiatives including bringing the BT brand to the high street in over 600 EE/BT dual- branded stores, and to answer 100% of customer calls in the UK & Ireland from January 2020 • Continued to make progress on the BT modernisation agenda, including delivering over £1.1bn transformation benefits, announcing the first locations in our Better Workplace Programme, and disposal of BT Fleet Solutions • Outlined our Skills for Tomorrow programme to provide digital skills training for 10m UK children, families and businesses Operational: • 5G network live in over 20 cities and large towns; 5G smartphone plans now available on both EE and BT brands • Openreach announced the launch of new FTTP 1Gbps and 550Mbps products. FTTP rollout at c.23k premises passed per week; 4.2m ultrafast (FTTP and Gfast) premises passed to date; currently announced plans to build FTTP in 103 locations • Consumer fixed ARPC £38.5, broadly flat year on year; postpaid mobile ARPC £20.8, down 5.5% year on year due to impact of regulation and continued trend towards SIM-only; RGUs per address up to 2.38 • Postpaid mobile churn remains low at 1.2% in Q2 despite impact of auto switching; fixed churn at -
Reports of Cases
Report s of C ases JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber) 11 December 2013 * (Competition — Concentrations — European markets for internet communications services — Decision declaring the concentration compatible with the internal market — Manifest errors of assessment — Obligation to state reasons) In Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc., established in San Jose, California (United States), and Messagenet SpA, established in Milan (Italy), represented by L. Ortiz Blanco, J. Buendía Sierra, A. Lamadrid de Pablo and K. Jörgens, lawyers, applicants, v European Commission, represented by N. Khan, S. Noë and C. Hödlmayr, acting as Agents, defendant, supported by Microsoft Corp., established in Seattle, Washington (United States), represented by G. Berrisch, lawyer, intervener, APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision C(2011) 7279 of 7 October 2011, declaring the concentration between undertakings involving the acquisition of Skype Global Sàrl by Microsoft Corporation (Case COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/Skype) to be compatible with the internal market and the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber), composed of S. Papasavvas, acting as President, M. van der Woude (Rapporteur) and C. Wetter, Judges, Registrar: S. Spyropoulos, Administrator, * Language of the case: English. EN ECLI:EU:T:2013:635 1 JUDGMENTOF 11. 12. 2013 – CASE T-79/12 CISCO SYSTEMSAND MESSAGENET v COMMISSION having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 29 May 2013, gives the following Judgment Facts Parties to the proceedings 1 The applicants, Cisco Systems Inc. (‘Cisco’) and Messagenet SpA (‘the applicants’), are undertakings that provide, inter alia, internet-based communications services and software for, respectively, undertakings and the general public. -
Are You Using the Term “Agile” Correctly?
Are you using the term “Agile” correctly? There are a host of technical terms that get thrown around when discussing software implementations and outsourcing solutions. Understandably, these concepts are often misused or confused, which can improperly influence our decision-making and ultimately our allocation of resources. In this article, we will explore some key terms and how we can properly apply them to business planning and vendor management as we move into the modern digital age. Modern Application Architecture (“MAA”). Prior to recent advancements in technology (e.g., cloud platforms such as Amazon Web Services) and a growing demand for nimble contracting strategies, single-platform or single-solution providers were the go-to choice for the pharmaceutical industry when tackling commercial and government contracting. As the world evolves, however, so must our thinking around the solutions that support our business functions. Recognizing the value of recent advancements, when Riparian embarked on the journey of developing our software solutions, we centered on some key concepts that were critical to our success. One of them is MAA which is a foundational concept used for flexible and Agile software development, giving organizations the ability to reduce risk and pivot. MAA stresses certain process characteristics such as organizing around business capabilities, componentization, the ability to interface with other platforms, and Agile development. Having explored these concepts from a foundational business perspective in developing our software solutions, we also believe the concepts should be applied more broadly--- beyond software to the process of outsourcing commercialization services for the life sciences industry. Componentization. Again, historically, organizations looked to single software-platforms or single-solution providers to implement or outsource their revenue management/ contract management requirements. -
Product Compatibility in Markets with Network Effects
Avoiding Market Dominance: Product Compatibility in Markets with Network E®ects¤ Jiawei Chen Department of Economics University of California-Irvine Irvine, CA 92697 (949) 824-3189, -2182 (Fax) [email protected] www.socsci.uci.edu/~jiaweic Ulrich Doraszelski Department of Economics Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 617-495-2896, -8570 (Fax) [email protected] www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/doraszelski Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Department of Economics Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD 21218 410-516-7615, -7600 (Fax) [email protected] www.econ.jhu/people/harrington September 13, 2008 ¤The comments of two anonymous referees, the editor, Mike Baye, Brian Viard, and seminar participants at Indiana (Kelley School of Business), Ohio State, Illinois, Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, 2007 IIOC, and 2007 EARIE are very much appreciated. The second author gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of the Hoover Institution during 2006/07 and the third author expresses his gratitude to the Department of Economics of Harvard University where, during 2005/06, much of this work was done. 1 Abstract As is well-recognized, market dominance is a typical outcome in markets with network e®ects. A ¯rm with a larger installed base o®ers a more attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which produces a yet bigger installed base advantage. Such a setting is investigated here but with the main di®erence that ¯rms have the option of making their products compatible. When ¯rms have similar installed bases, they make their products compatible in order to expand the market. Nevertheless, random forces could result in one ¯rm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger ¯rm may make its product incompatible.