Hastings Law Journal Volume 53 | Issue 1 Article 2 1-2001 Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements Stuart P. Green Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 Hastings L.J. 157 (2001). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol53/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements by STUART P. GREEN* Introduction The term "legal moralism" has traditionally referred to the view that it is permissible to use government sanctions, including criminal sanctions, to enforce prohibitions on conduct that is immoral but not directly harmful (or even offensive) to others or self. Legal moralists of this stripe thus embrace the anti-liberal view that the state may legitimately criminalize acts such as adultery, incest, and prostitution, even when performed in private by consenting adults.' In recent years, however, "legal moralism" has also come to mean something else. The term is now frequently used to refer to the view that, as Dan Kahan has put it, "law is suffused with morality and, ' Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.