Private Equity Spotlight June 2008 / Volume 4 - Issue 6
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Startup Valuation THESIS V.35 (REVISADA)
UNIVERSIDADE DE SÃO PAULO FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA, ADMINISTRAÇÃO E CONTABILIDADE PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ADMINISTRAÇÃO Jose Roberto Securato Junior CLASSIFICATION, INVESTMENT SELECTION, AND VALUATION OF NEW VENTURE AND STARTUP COMPANIES CLASSIFICAÇÃO, SELEÇÃO DE INVESTIMENTOS, E VALUATION DE NEW VENTURES E STARTUPS Versão Corrigida (versão original disponível na Biblioteca da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade) São Paulo 2020 1 Prof. Dr. Vahan Agopyan Reitor da Universidade de São Paulo Prof. Dr. Fabio Frezatti Diretor da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade Prof. Dr. Moacir de Miranda Oliveira Junior Chefe do Departamento de Administração Prof. Dr. Eduardo Kazuo Kayo Coordenador do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração 2 Jose Roberto Securato Junior CLASSIFICATION, INVESTMENT SELECTION, AND VALUATION OF NEW VENTURE AND STARTUP COMPANIES Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós- Graduação em Administração do Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Doutor em Ciências. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Jose Roberto Ferreira Savoia Versão Corrigida (versão original disponível na Biblioteca da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade) São Paulo 2020 3 4 Excellence precedes success 5 RESUMO Esta tese examina como a seleção de investimentos e a avaliação econômico-financeira de new ventures e startups variam ao longo do ciclo de vida destas companhias. A abordagem de pesquisa foi estruturada em 3 fases: i) revisão da literatura em new ventures e startups, ii) um questionário para 105 investidores qualificados e entrevistas públicas sobre perspectivas dos investidores, e iii) modelagem do retorno esperado ao longo do ciclo de vida das new ventures e startups com base em regressões robustas. -
Boaml PE Team Spins out Newquest Capital Partners to Focus on Direct Secondaries in Asia Via Its $400 Million Fund
FUNDS [email protected] BoaML PE team spins out NewQuest Capital Partners to focus on direct secondaries in Asia via its $400 million fund AS WESTERN INVESTMENT BANKS COME Asia, we’re talking only about 10% and that’s cycle for some of the assets BoaML had held under increasing pressure to minimize their largely limited to the buy-out markets of Japan, in its portfolio for the past years. Massara risk – and have thus shed their alternative asset Korea and Australia. We think that it is largely notes that the "rm may announce its "rst exits investment units – Bank of America Merrill Lynch due to the fact that there are a limited number of in the coming months, and as well as new (BoaML) has taken a unique stance in the spin buyers focused on that part of the market” investments. o! of its private equity business, seeing its head Massara explains that the size of Asia’s un- “The fund currently has $400 million, of which professionals launch an independent, direct exited deal market is roughly US$150 billion. a signi"cant amount of that is dry powder for secondaries-focused "rm backed by the new investments,” says Jason Sambanju, region’s top LPs. Co-Head of Paul Capital Asia, NewQuest’s NewQuest Capital Partners, backed by cornerstone LP. “One way to tap into more a consortium consisting of Paul Capital, capital is thru NewQuest’s existing LPs. HarbourVest Partners, LGT Capital Partners So when the opportunity to increase the and Axiom Asia, has acquired “substantially fund size arises, we can easily step up to all” of BoaML’s non-real estate private put more money to work.” equity portfolio in Asia, launching the The BoaML-cum-NewQuest team $400 million NewQuest Asia Fund I, L.P., began discussions with Paul Capital, to manage the assets. -
Secondary Market Poised to Lift
20SecondaI BUYOUTS I December 13.2010 vnnv.buyoutsnews.com arket Poised To Lift Off ByTom Stein Sellers Proliferate Secondary buyers have been predicting big Indeed, it’s no secret that financial insti tutions have their backs to the wall, They things for their market for some time. Now it are under increasing regulatory pressure to finally seems to be coming to pass. restrict their exposure to private equity. Governments and financial regulators are hammering out new rules, including Basel III and the Volcker Rule in the United States, After a dismal 2009, in which only $8 bil ing to investors a potentially cheaper and which will make private equity investing a lion worth of private equity assets were trad more liquid way to get exposure to private lot less attractive for financial institutions ed on the secondary market, 2010 is shaping equity. For LPs, an active market means an and possibly even prevent them from creat up to be a record year. Total volume for the opportunity to snap up some bargains, ing their own private equity vehicles. year is expected to reach $25 billion, easily either by directly purchasing secondary This year saw the start of some of that surpassing the previous record of $15 billion positions or by investing in secondary funds. unwinding, with AXA PrIvate EquIty pur set in 2008, according to private equity advi What is the bullish case for the second chasing part of Bank ot America’s private sory firm Triago. ary market? For starters, Richard Lichter, equity portfolio for $1.9 billion. The deal For investors like David de Weese. -
FORM 20-F Cootek
Table of Contents UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 20-F (Mark One) REGISTRATION STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(b) OR 12(g) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 OR _ ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018 OR TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to OR SHELL COMPANY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Date of event requiring this shell company report . Commission file number: 001-38665 CooTek (Cayman) Inc. (Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter) N/A (Translation of Registrant’s Name Into English) Cayman Islands (Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Organization) Building 7, No. 2007 Hongmei Road, Xuhui District Shanghai, 201103 People’s Republic of China (Address of Principal Executive Offices) Jean Liqin Zhang, Chief Financial Officer Building 7, No. 2007 Hongmei Road, Xuhui District Shanghai, 201103 People’s Republic of China Phone: +86 21 6485-6352 Email: [email protected] (Name, Telephone, E-mail and/or Facsimile number and Address of Company Contact Person) Securities registered or to be registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act: Title of Each Class Name of Each Exchange On Which Registered American depositary shares, each representing 50 Class A New York Stock Exchange ordinary share Class A ordinary shares, par value US$0.00001 per share* New York Stock Exchange* *Not for trading, but only in connection with the listing on the New York Stock Exchange of American depositary shares. -
Corporate Venturing Report 2019
Corporate Venturing 2019 Report SUMMIT@RSM All Rights Reserved. Copyright © 2019. Created by Joshua Eckblad, Academic Researcher at TiSEM in The Netherlands. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS LEAD AUTHORS 03 Forewords Joshua G. Eckblad 06 All Investors In External Startups [email protected] 21 Corporate VC Investors https://www.corporateventuringresearch.org/ 38 Accelerator Investors CentER PhD Candidate, Department of Management 43 2018 Global Startup Fundraising Survey (Our Results) Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TiSEM) Tilburg University, The Netherlands 56 2019 Global Startup Fundraising Survey (Please Distribute) Dr. Tobias Gutmann [email protected] https://www.corporateventuringresearch.org/ LEGAL DISCLAIMER Post-Doctoral Researcher Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG Chair of Strategic Management and Digital Entrepreneurship The information contained herein is for the prospects of specific companies. While HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Germany general guidance on matters of interest, and every attempt has been made to ensure that intended for the personal use of the reader the information contained in this report has only. The analyses and conclusions are been obtained and arranged with due care, Christian Lindener based on publicly available information, Wayra is not responsible for any Pitchbook, CBInsights and information inaccuracies, errors or omissions contained [email protected] provided in the course of recent surveys in or relating to, this information. No Managing Director with a sample of startups and corporate information herein may be replicated Wayra Germany firms. without prior consent by Wayra. Wayra Germany GmbH (“Wayra”) accepts no Wayra Germany GmbH liability for any actions taken as response Kaufingerstraße 15 hereto. -
Summary of Alternative Investment Vehicle (AIV) Fees
Summary of Alternative Investment Vehicle (AIV) Fees, Expenses and Carried Interest Reported Pursuant to California Government Code Section 7514.7 (AB 2833) For the period July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017 (Fiscal Year 2017) Fees and Expenses SDCERA's Pro-rata SDCERA's Pro-rata Share of Paid by SDCERA SDCERA's Pro-rata Share Share of Carried Aggregate Fees and Expenses Gross Internal Directly to the AIV, of Fees and Expenses Paid Interest Distributed Paid by the AIV's Portfolio Rate of Return Net Internal Rate Fund Manager or from the AIV to the Fund to the Fund Manager Companies to the Fund (IRR) Since of Return (IRR) Related Parties Manager or Related Parties or Related Parties Manager or Related Parties Inception3 Since Inception Section 7514.7 (d)(1)1 Expenses $173,226 $0 $0 $0 - - 2 Section 7514.7 (d)(2) Expenses $35,650,064 $3,524,917 $28,455,935 $1,250,127 -8.1% Total $35,823,290 $3,524,917 $28,455,935 $1,250,127 Section 7514.7 Expenses by Investment Category Private Equity $11,217,997 $1,194,294 $13,625,045 $1,001,618 - 9.9% Private Real Assets $9,393,188 $975,817 $5,588,021 $202,200 - 6.9% Private Credit $1,752,057 $745,955 $477,455 $45,740 - 3.0% Real Estate $7,450,301 $428,754 $8,681,193 $569 - 7.6% Alternative Fund Structures $6,009,748 $180,095 $84,221 $0 -- Total $35,823,290 $3,524,917 $28,455,935 $1,250,127 1 From January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2017, SDCERA entered into one contract in an alternative investment vehicle (Public Pension Capital, LLC) and made no new capital commitments into existing alternative investment vehicles. -
The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: a Public Interest Perspective
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Publications and Research Queens College 2009 The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: A Public Interest Perspective Matthew Crain CUNY Queens College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/qc_pubs/171 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] International Journal of Communication 2 (2009), 208-239 1932-8036/20090208 The Rise of Private Equity Media Ownership in the United States: ▫ A Public Interest Perspective MATTHEW CRAIN University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign This article examines the logic, scope, and implications of the influx of private equity takeovers in the United States media sector in the last decade. The strategies and aims of private equity firms are explained in the context of the financial landscape that has allowed them to flourish; their aggressive expansion into media ownership is outlined in detail. Particular attention is paid to the public interest concerns raised by private equity media ownership relating to the frenzied nature of the buyout market, profit maximization strategies, and the heavy debt burdens imposed on acquired firms. The article concludes with discussion of the challenges posed by private equity to effective media regulation and comparison of private equity and corporate media ownership models. The media sector in the United States is deeply and historically rooted in the capitalist system of private ownership. The structures and demands of private ownership foundationally influence the management and operation of media firms, which must necessarily serve the ultimate end of profitability within such a system. -
UBS Private Equity Secondary Market Review.Pdf
UBS Private Equity Secondary Market Review UBS Private Funds Group June—2011 UBS Private Funds Group Secondary Market Review The UBS Private Funds Group’s Secondary Advisory Practice was launched in 2004 with the mandate to provide the highest quality sell- side advice to owners of private equity portfolios. In the current installment of this series, UBS provides a comprehensive review of secondary market activity in 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 and highlights key issues and trends that will impact the secondary market in 2011. Our perspective is unique within the secondary market, based not only on our experience as a leading placement agent and secondary advisor, but also as a seller in the structuring and execution of UBS’s own $1.3 billion secondary transaction in 2003.1 To date, UBS has advised on and executed over $24 billion of secondary transactions and has established itself as a market leading advisor.2 Review of the Secondary Market—2010 Market Environment Secondary volume rebounded to record levels in 2010, totaling approximately $22 billion which represented a 132% increase as compared to 2009 levels ($9.5 billion).3 The combination of improved capital market conditions and strong levels of available capital resulted in a dramatic improvement in the pricing environment during the first quarter of 2010, while increased regulatory pressure crystallized financial institutions’ intention to sell risk assets. Following a somewhat slow start to the beginning of 2010, the year began to pick up momentum following the announcement of Bank of America’s $1.9 billion transaction and RBS’ €400 million transaction. -
GESCHÄFTSBERICHT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 2007 GB P3 07.Qxp:GB P3 18.3.2008 16:15 Uhr Seite 2
GB_P3_07.qxp:GB_P3 18.3.2008 16:15 Uhr Seite 1 GESCHÄFTSBERICHT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 2007 GB_P3_07.qxp:GB_P3 18.3.2008 16:15 Uhr Seite 2 GESCHÄFTSBERICHT 2007 ÜBERBLICK 2007 OVERVIEW 2007 ENTWICKLUNG DES BÖRSENKURSES UND DES INNEREN WERTES 01.01.2007 BIS 31.12.2007 PRICE AND NAV DEVELOPMENT 01.01.2007 UNTIL 31.12.2007 1’600 1’500 1’400 1’300 EUR in 1’200 1’100 1’000 900 12.06 01.07 02.07 03.07 04.07 05.07 06.07 07.07 08.07 09.07 10.07 11.07 12.07 Innerer Wert pro Zertifikat / Net Asset Value (NAV) per certificate Preis / Price 2 GB_P3_07.qxp:GB_P3 18.3.2008 16:15 Uhr Seite 3 ANNUAL REPORT 2007 Firmenprofil Company Profile Die Partners Group Private Equity Performance Holding Partners Group Private Equity Performance Holding Limited Limited («P3 Holding», «P3») ist eine nach dem Recht von (“P3 Holding”, “P3”) is a limited liability company, which was Guernsey gegründete Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung incorporated under the laws of Guernsey and is domiciled in mit Sitz in St. Peter Port, Guernsey. Der Zweck der Gesell- St. Peter Port, Guernsey. The objective of the company is to schaft ist die Verwaltung und Betreuung eines Portfolios aus professionally manage a portfolio of investments in private Beteiligungen an Private Equity-Zielfonds, börsennotierten equity partnerships, listed private equity vehicles and direct Private Equity-Gesellschaften und Direktinvestitionen. P3 investments. P3 is supported in its activities by the Invest- wird in dieser Tätigkeit durch ihren Anlageberater Partners ment Advisor, Partners Group, which is a global alternative Group beraten. -
Private Equity's Broken Pension Promises
ANNUAL CONGRESS SUNDAY 3RD JUNE–THURSDAY 7TH JUNE 2007 PRIVATE EQUITY’S BROKEN PENSION PROMISES PRIVATE EQUITY COMPANIES’ LINKS TO INSOLVENT PENSION FUNDS A CEC SPECIAL REPORT 2007 contents was only when the same private equity companies made an £8billion bid for Insolvent pension schemes Sainsbury’s that the growing role of private equity in the economy became a Chapter 1 2 public issue. Insolvent pension The private equity companies and the multi-millionaire elite that run them schemes and the link and the link to private equity are desperate to portray themselves as growers of jobs,of innovation and of to private equity being vital to the well being of the economy.They are most anxious to shed their companies companies asset stripping image,to shed the impression that they enjoy favourable tax advantages and to shed the notion that the whole industry is simply a Chapter 2 5 mechanism for the multi-millionaire elite to enrich themselves at the expense Some of the In the spring of 2007 the GMB Central Executive Council (CEC)asked that a of GMB members and the general public. multimillionaire detailed study be undertaken to establish the links between insolvent pension elite who have The Treasury Select Committee has set up an enquiry into the role of private funds and private equity companies.At that time there was much controversy amassed a fortune equity and GMB has submitted evidence to it.This report forms part of the GMB in the media about the role of private equity companies in the UK economy. from the private supplementary evidence -
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements the St. Paul Companies
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements The St. Paul Companies 1. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES accounts to U.S. GAAP on a quarterly basis. Quarterly financial state- Accounting Principles — We prepare our consolidated financial ments are prepared for Lloyd’s syndicates, using the Lloyd’s three- statements in accordance with United States generally accepted year accounting basis, which are subsequently converted to U.S. accounting principles (“GAAP”). We follow the accounting standards GAAP.Since Lloyd’s accounting does not currently recognize the con- established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) cept of earned premium, we calculate earned premium as part of the and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”). conversion to GAAP. We recognize written premium for U.S. GAAP Consolidation — We combine our financial statements with those purposes quarterly, and assume that it is written at the middle of each of our subsidiaries and present them on a consolidated basis. The quarter (i.e., evenly throughout each period), effectively breaking the consolidated financial statements do not include the results of mate- calendar year into earning periods of eighths. rial transactions between our subsidiaries and us or among our sub- Revenues in our Health Care segment include premiums gener- sidiaries. Certain of our foreign underwriting operations’ results, and ated from extended reporting endorsements. Our medical liability the results of certain of our investments in partnerships, are recorded claims-made policies give our insureds the right to purchase a report- on a one-month to one-quarter lag due to time constraints in obtain- ing endorsement, which is also referred to as “tail coverage,” at the ing and analyzing such results for inclusion in our consolidated finan- time their policies expire. -
Q2 2018 Venture Capital Deals and Exits 3 July 2018
DOWNLOAD THE DATA PACK Q2 2018 VENTURE CAPITAL DEALS AND EXITS 3 JULY 2018 Fig. 1: Global Quarterly Venture Capital Deals*, Fig. 3: Number of Venture Capital Deals in Q2 2018 by Q1 2013 - Q2 2018 Fig. 2: Venture Capital Deals* in Q2 2018 by Region Investment Stage 4,500 80 100% Angel/Seed 7% 5% 1% 3% 4,000 2% 70 Aggregate Deal Value ($bn) 90% 1% 6% 3% Series A/Round 1 Other 1% 3% 3,500 60 80% 4% Series B/Round 2 3,000 50 70% 31% Israel 6% 2,500 54% 36% Series C/Round 3 60% 40 India 2,000 Series D/Round 4 and 50% No. of Deals 30 1,500 17% Later Greater China Growth 40% 16% 1,000 20 8% Capital/Expansion Proportion of Total Europe PIPE 500 10 30% 0 0 20% 37% North America Grant 31% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 10% Venture Debt 30% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 0% Add-on & Other No. of Deals Aggregate Deal Value ($bn) No. of Deals Aggregate Deal Value Source: Preqin Source: Preqin Source: Preqin Fig. 5: Average Value of Venture Capital Deals by Investment Fig. 4: Venture Capital Deals* in Q2 2018 by Industry Stage, 2016 - H1 2018 Fig. 6: Number of US Venture Capital Deals* in Q2 2018 by State 40% 37% 140 35% 120 115 117 104 30% 2016 100 California 25% 24% 23% 80 80 2017 20% 34% New York 36% 14% 15% 60 49 15% 13% 13% 41 Q1-Q2 12% Massachusetts 40 32 29 32 29 2018 Proportion Proportion of Total 9% 26 2828 28 10% 8% 16 22 5% 5% Average Deal Size ($mn) 20 1211 5% 4% 4% 4% Washington 2% 1% 3%2% 2% 2 2 2 0% 0 Illinois 4% Other Round 3 Round 1 Round 2 Series C/ Series Series A/ Series B/ Series 4% Internet Other IT Other Other Services Business Food & Related Telecoms 13% Angel/Seed Industrials Healthcare Agriculture Software & 9% Consumer Expansion Venture Debt Venture 4 and Later Discretionary Series D/Round Series Growth Capital/ No.