INTERSTATE PEACEKEEPING: CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND EMPIRICAL EFFECTS Virginia Page Fortna* Department of Political Science & Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies Columbia University permanent address 420 W. 118th Street New York NY 10027 w. 212 854-0021 h. 212 662-5395 f. 212 864-1686 AY 2004-2005 address Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford CA 94305 w. 650 723-0746 c. 503 548-7429 f. 650 723-1687 email:
[email protected] Version: September 14, 2004 * The author owes debts of gratitude to more people than can be listed here for help and feedback with the project of which this paper is a part. She thanks in particular, Nisha Fazal, Hein Goemans, Lise Howard, Bob Jervis, Bob Keohane, Lisa Martin, Jack Snyder, Alan Stam, Barb Walter, and Suzanne Werner. This research was made possible by grants from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. INTERSTATE PEACEKEEPING: CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND EMPIRICAL EFFECTS ABSTRACT Peacekeeping is perhaps the international community’s most important tool for maintaining peace in the aftermath of war. Its practice has evolved significantly in the past ten or fifteen years as it has been used increasingly in civil wars. However, traditional peacekeeping between states is not well understood. Its operation is under-theorized and its effects under-tested. This article explores the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace, and examines its empirical effects after interstate wars. To take the endogeneity of peacekeeping into account, it also examines where peacekeepers tend to be deployed.