Studia Carpathico-Adriatica I.

2020 The Slovak-Croatian Commission of Humanities at the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Science and Education of the Republic of Croatia Studia Carpathico-Adriatica, Vol. I. The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence: History and Perspectives

Studia Carpathico-Adriatica Vol. I.

The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence: History and Perspectives

Edited by Martin Homza a Željko Holjevac

Bratislava 2020 Studia Carpathico-Adriatica is the yearbook of the Slovak-Croatian Commission of Humanities

Editorial Board: Marta Botíková, Miroslav Dudok, Krešimir Filipec, Ivan Gerát, Jadranka Grbić Ja­ kopović, Željko Holjevac, Martin Homza, Zrinka Kovačevič Stričević, Maja Rupnik Matasović, Mirijana Repanić Braun, Andrej Vrteľ, Svorad Zavarský

© Martin Homza & Željko Holjevac © The Slovak-Croatian Commission of Humanities, Bratislava 2020

Reviewed by Ante Nazor & Pavol Matula

Graphic design by Tereza Fedora Homzová Typography by Matúš Brilla Slovak texts translated by Castor Enrique Sanchez Rodrigues

Published by the Slovak-Croatian Commission of Humanities Printed by Stredná odborná škola polygrafcká, Bratislava

The motif on the cover is motivated by the frst silver denarius of Coloman of Galitia (MON- ETA REGIS P SCLAVONIA, around 1235). The motif from the front script comes from the tombstone of Stephan Zápoľský (after 1499).

ISBN 978-80-89728-23-7 Contents

Željko Holjevac: Editorial 9 Martin Homza: A Few Words on the Establishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commission for Humanities 12

The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence: History and Perspectives Nikica Barić: Croatia’s Road to Independence 22 Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 28 Julija Barunčić Pletikosić: The Role of the Catholic Church in Creating the Modern Republic of Croatia 59 Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 66 Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 79 Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context: An Outline of the Issue 91 Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia in the 20th Century (Parallels with Croatia) 111 Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations and Peaceful Reintegration 129 Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s in Croatia and Slovakia 140 Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 153 Aleksandar Jakir: The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia 171

Željko Holjevac* Editorial

Úvodník / Uvodnik

he frst volume of the journal Studia the disintegration of the common state TCarpathico-Adriatica, which is in of the South Slavs and the internation- hands of the readers, contains articles al recognition of the Republic of Cro- writen on the basis of papers presented atia as a new state forged in the war at the scientifc conference The Slovaks for independence. and the Croats on their Way to Independence: Emília Hrabovec in her paper on Slo- History and Perspectives. The conference vak exile and the path to Slovak inde- was held on 18 June 2019 at Comenius pendence notes that the initial political University in Bratislava. In this volume, situation of the Slovak exile was much six Slovak and fve Croatian authors more complex than the situation of most analyze the Croatian and Slovak road to other nations in Central and Eastern independence, having in mind both the Europe. The Slovak exile – similar to historical roots and future perspectives. the Croatian exile – had to struggle not The collapse of communism in Eastern only against the communist regime, Europe, democratic elections, the break- but also for the return of its own state- up of Yugoslavia in a bloody war and hood. In this light, the establishment the peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia of the World Congress of Slovaks, which were the framework conditions in which advocated the idea of state independence Croatia and Slovakia evolved from feder- of Slovakia, was of particular impor- al units of Yugoslavia and Czechoslova- tance, invoking the universally recog- kia into independent states in the early nized principle of self-determination and 1990s. On their path to independence, the principle of full equality of nations. among other aspects, the Slovak and Analyzing the most signifcant activi- Croatian political exile played an impor- ties and atitudes of the Catholic Church tant role, as well as the Catholic Church in the last years of Yugoslavia, and major and other factors. Today both countries turning points in Croatia in the frst half are members of the European Union fac- of the 1990s, Julija Barunčić Pletikosić ing new challenges and new horizons. emphasizes in her article an important In his introductory article on Croa- role that the Catholic Church played tia’s way to independence, Nikica Barić, in the creation of the Republic of Croatia in the most concise terms, chronolog- as an independent state. ically presents the major events that Describing the Slovak early spring led to the deep economic, social and as a catalyst for the Czecho-Slovak political crisis in Yugoslavia in the late spring of 1968 and the federalization 1980s. The crisis in the early 1990s led to of Czechoslovakia, Miroslav Londák and

* Željko Holjevac, Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences in Zagreb (Republic of Croatia).

Željko Holjevac: Editorial 9 Elena Londáková note in their article – within which autonomy was the high- that, in addition to liberalizing the com- est ambition of Slovak political rep- munist regime and creating socialism resentations. On the eve of World War with a human face, another often omit- II, independent Slovakia was established ted major topic was the Slovak national under German auspices. After the war, emancipation process that culminated communist Czechoslovakia experienced in the federalization of Czechoslovakia development from a centrally governed of that time. state to a federation. As a result of divi- In his article, Peter Jašek portrays sion of Czechoslovakia in 1993, an inde- the contacts of Slovak and Croatian pendent Slovakia emerged as a modern political exile in the 1970s and 1980s. European state. The text deals with the broader context After stopping Serbian and Monte- of relations between the World Congress negrin military aggression by the end of Slovaks and representatives of emi- of 1991, and achieving international le- grants from various Central and Eastern gitimacy by recognition by the European European countries in the Soviet bloc. Community and accession to the United The study also includes the reconstruc- Nations in the following year, the fun- tion of specifc cases of co­operation be- damental goal of Croatian politics led tween Slovaks and Croats in the West. by President Franjo Tuđman was to Beáta Katrebová Blehová presents achieve full sovereignty and territorial the issue of the divorce of Czechoslova- integrity within the internationally rec- kia during 1992 in an international con- ognized Croatian borders. In her article text. Documents stored in the archives on the end of the Croatian Homeland of the former Ministry of International War, Ana Holjevac Tuković focuses on Relations documenting Prime Minister military operations, primarily the Cro- Vladimír Mečiar’s meetings with diplo- atian military-police operation „Storm“ matic representatives from Europe and in August 1995, as well as the peaceful Israel show that the Slovak government reintegration of Eastern Croatia under was not ready enough to divide the com- the jurisdiction of Croatian authorities. mon state of Czechs and Slovaks and in- Tomáš Černák’s study outlines the po- itially preferred a confederation instead litical situation and violence at football of an independent state. The documents stadiums in the early 1990s in Croatia also show that the governments of Slova- and Slovakia. He takes into consideration kia’s neighboring states, as well as those the example of a football match between of some great powers, had in mind Dinamo from Zagreb and Crvena zvezda the possible disintegration of Czechoslo- from Belgrade in 1990 and the match- vakia, but advocated for constitutional es between Slovan from Bratislava and action, which was more than under- Sparta from Prague as well as Ferencváros standable in the context of the violent from Budapest in 1991 and 1992. disintegration of Yugoslavia. Albert Bing’s article deals with In his article on the milestones the long process of Croatia’s accession to of the development of Slovakia’s state-le- the European Union. In addition to re- gal status in the 20th century, Ondrej viewing the most signifcant events and Podolec notes that Slovakia, like Cro- transition processes before the acces- atia, was part of multinational states – sion in 2013, various problems that Cro- Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia atia faced in its „European path“ were

10 Slovo na úvod emphasized, keeping in mind the oscilla- The Studia Carpathico-Adriatica is tions in the mood of Croatian citizens and a comparative Slovak­Croatian journal. the atitudes of the international commu- Bearing in mind the multiple Croa- nity towards the Republic of Croatia. tian-Slovak parallels and connections In an article on the challenges of deal- in the past and present, the journal is ing with the problematic past in Croatia, a step forward in the mutual networking Aleksandar Jakir points to conficting of Croatia and Slovakia in the feld of hu- interpretations of „painful“ or „sensi- manities and their joint presentation to tive“ topics in Croatian history of the 20th the European and world scientifc com- century. Such topics provoke not only munity. Appreciating the fruitful coop- debates in historiography but also de- eration of all the authors and partners, as bates in public life in Croatia. Moreo- well as all those who helped in any way, ver, disputes over diferent interpreta- we are pleased and proud to provide tions of the past are often used as a kind the frst volume of the Studia Carpath- of competition among individuals and ico-Adriatica to the scientists and the wid- groups in the domestic political arena. est interested public.

Željko Holjevac: Editorial 11 Martin Homza* A Few Words on the Establishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commission for Humanities

Niekoľko slov k vzniku Slovensko­chorvátskej komisie humanitných vied / Nekoliko riječi o postanku Slovačko­hrvatskoga odbora za humanističke znanosti

he twentieth century in Europe be- as the river has right and left tributaries, Tgan with the frst war in the Bal- this imaginary body has left and right kans in 1912. It also ended with a series limbs. All of Slovakia’s rivers, but the Po- of wars in the Western Balkans between prad, fow into the Danube to become the nations that had formed the Federal its left afuents. Likewise, a substantial Republic of Yugoslavia in the frst half part of the river network in present-day of the 1990s, and the bombing of the rest Croatia also fows into the Danube as its of Yugoslavia by NATO troops in 1999. right tributaries. Like it or not, this nat- That century saw two world wars begin ural water system conditions the people and end. It also saw social experiments living on its shores to interact with each being introduced with great splendour, other at many diferent levels. This was carried out with less glory to fnally end already known to the Romans, the frst up in the dustbin of history in the form to integrate the Danube world politi- of totalitarian regimes. The 20th century cally, culturally, religiously, as well as undoubtedly witnessed a signifcant im- economically and militarily. Likewise, provement in the standard of life of peo- it has always been clear to the Holy See, ple. On the other hand, it was in this pe- which still dreams of restoring the prov- riod that human reasoning reached its ince of Illyricum. And it was also clear highest pride. However, some big plans to the king of Panonnia and later saint, of Man did not come out. For example, Ladislav I, the most outstanding repre- Man was not able to reverse the course sentative of the Nitra line of the Arpads, of rivers. Fortunately. Therefore, the his- whose political career began in Poland. tory of Slovakia and Croatia can fow In fact, in 1091 Ladislav I managed to an- down its natural course. The Danube un- nex the Kingdom of Croatia to his realm doubtedly personalises the soul of Eu- – the crystallising Slavic­Hungarian­Ro- rope’s biggest people, the Slavs. And just manian “commonwealth”. His successor,

* Martin Homza, Department of Slovak History at the Faculty of Arts at Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovak Republic).

12 Slovo na úvod King Coloman the Learned, gave this (Comintern), after Josip Broz Tito, the com- union a legal framework.1 This is how munist leader of Yugoslavia, broke up Slovaks and Croats became part of one with Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Ti- and the same kingdom, in which they to’s Yugoslavia became de facto an en- lived, created spiritual and economic emy of the regimes the soviets had es- values, and coexisted among other na- tablished in East-Central Europe. One tions until 1918. of them was Post-February Czechoslova- Of course, this over-eight-hundred- kia.3 Although the mutual ties between year-long coexistence left lasting marks. the two countries began to recover after Over this timespan, Slovaks and Croats Stalin’s death, they never really reached developed multilateral and multi-lay- their pre-war level, or even the level from ered bonds. Therefore, it is no coinci- 1945 – 1948. The creation of the Czecho- dence that several Slovaks traveling to slovak-Yugoslav Historical Commission Croatia experience a kind of deja vu there. in times of political recession in the 1960s The same happens with Croats coming was a sign that the relations between to Slovakia. However, feelings need to be the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and expressed. From looking for words to de- the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugosla- scribe and verbalise it, it is necessary to via were improving. move on to understanding why it is so.2 This happened in 1966. However, its And this is the main reason why the Slo- activities were characterised by exces- vak-Croatian Commission for Human- sive formalism resulting from the of- ities (hereinafter SCCH) was actually cial communist worldview. As a mater established. The following lines describe of fact, this ideology covered the national how it happened, how the public should character of the historical ties, rather than understand this commission, and what addressed them.4 No wonder the Com- its goals are about. mission stopped working when both su- It was not easy at all for the initia- pranational entities, namely Yugoslavia tors of the SCCH to revive the mutual and Czechoslovakia, ceased to exist. An- ties of Slovaks and Croats in the feld other weak point of the commission was of the humanities. For several reasons. the fact that it predominantly focused on Probably the most serious was the older history and neglected the rest of the hu- split within the Communist International manities. Nevertheless, it can be said that

1 See Andriana Steta: The Pacta Conventa as the Result of the Arpadian Dynasty’s Policy. In: Slovakia and Croatia: Historical Parallels and Connections. Ed.: Martin Homza – Ján Lukačka – Neven Budak. Bratislava – Zagreb: Department of Slovak History, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava – PostScriptum, 2013, p. 81 – 84. 2 On motivation to the cognitive process, see Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas I, 1 – 13. Ed., trans. and comment,: Peter Volek. Trnava: Saint Adalbert Association, 2017, p. 237: “Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever he sees.” 3 See Černák, Tomáš. Roztržka medzi Titom a Stalinom a jej dopad na udalosti v ČSR počas roka 1948. In: Človek, spoločnosť, doba : Zborník štúdií z 3. vedeckej konferencie mladých historikov, zorganizovanej Katedrou histórie FF UPJŠ v Košiciach, ktorá sa uskutočnila 16. – 17. októbra 2013 v Košiciach. Ed.: Zuzana Tokárová – Martin Pekár. Košice: Faculty of Arts at Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, 2014, p. 256 – 264. 4 See, for instance, Suško, Ladislav: Správa z 9. zasadnutia Československo­juhoslovanskej historickej komisie. In: Historický časopis, a. 24, 1976, p. 476 – 478.

Martin Homza: A Few Words on the Establishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commission 13 the work of this commission was an im- In 2008, the Department of Slovak His- portant precedent for the SCCH to be tory, by means of Martin Homza, estab- established. lished ties with the Department of Histo- Another factor hampering the crea- ry of the Faculty of Arts of the University tion of the SCCH after the establishment of Zagreb. The fact that Homza had pre- of the independent Republic of Croatia viously become acquainted with Neven and the Slovak Republic was the fact that Budak in the old capital of the former the countries of the former communist common kingdom, i.e. in Budapest, more bloc from East and Central Europe were exactly at the Department of Medieval kind of competing with each other to es- Studies at the Central European Univer- tablish themselves frst in the political and sity, certainly played a crucial role. Tati- cultural institutions of the West. In other ana Hutyrová, one of Homza’s students words, the natural north-south or Medi- in Bratislava and one of the frst “swal- terranean vector of our common history lows” from Slovakia to study history was temporarily replaced by a western in Zagreb, served as the intermediary (occidental) one. Consequently, estab- between them. Intensive mutual com- lishing ofcial state institutions, which munication between the two institutions would study and popularise the histori- resulted in a common historical excur- cal North-South cultural ties of Slovaks sion of history students from Bratisla- and Croats was neglected. There is anoth- va and Zagreb around eastern Slavonia er not entirely clear but all the more no- at the turn of April and May 2009 (Fig. ticeable factor, which to some extent com- 1 – 3). One of the most important re- plicated the establishment of ofcial ties sults of this informal common event was in the feld of humanities. When trying to the agreement between Martin Homza renew their bonds with Croatia’s cultural and Neven Budak on the organisation community, Slovakia’s cultural commu- of the conference Slovakia and Croatia: His- nity felt, so to speak, a kind of a priori torical Parallels and Relations (until 1780), Croatian post-war syndrome, which con- which eventually took place on June 20 sisted in the Croats being “self-absorbed” – 24 in Bratislava and Levoča (Fig. 4 – 6). after the end of the civil war in former It counted with rich international partic- Yugoslavia. History did not stop with ipation, namely 45 scientists from Slova- the victory of the Croats in this con- kia, Croatia, Hungary, the Czech Repub- fict, though. Indeed, after a while these lic, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania “isolationism” and self-centeredness of and Serbia. It was organised by the De- the Croats gave way to a search for nat- partment of Slovak History at the Facul- ural allies in the further historical devel- ty of Arts at Comenius University in Bra- opment of the Republic of Croatia and its tislava together with the Department cultural policy. And it did not take long of History at the Faculty of Arts at Uni- for the Croats to fnd their traditional versity of Zagreb. Its fruit was the memo- (un)known friends, the Slovaks. rable and representative almost 450-page The actual chain of events that led to proceedings of the conference, entitled the creation of the SCCH looks as follows. Slovakia and Croatia, vol. I.5 In addition

5 Slovakia and Croatia, vol. 1: Historical Parallels and Connections (until 1780). Ed.: Martin Homza – Ján Lukačka – Neven Budak. Bratislava – Zagreb: Department of Slovak History, 2013.

14 Slovo na úvod to valuable scientifc results, the forum Program between the Ministry of Education, of Slovak and Croatian historians also Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak determined the mechanisms and goals Republic and the Ministry of Science, Edu- of further cooperation, which were sum- cation and Sport of the Republic of Croatia marised in the Agreement on Cooperation for 2014 – 2017, whose Article 11 stipulat- between the Department of Slovak History ed the creation of the SCCH. at the Faculty of Arts at Comenius Universi- ty and the Department of History at the Fac- “The Contracting Parties shall establish ulty of Arts at the University of Zagreb. This and subsequently support the activities agreement constituted the informal of the Slovak-Croatian Commission starting point for mutual cooperation for Humanities, whose meetings will be until the establishment of the SCCH. held regularly in both countries in ac- Among other points, it included cordance with the statute of the Com- a commitment for the University of Za- mission. The composition of the Com- greb to organise a scientifc conference mission and the number of its members entitled Croatia and Slovakia: Historical Par- shall be determined by the Contracting allels and Relations (from 1780 to the Present) Parties by mutual agreement.”6 as well as a commitment for both sides to develop eforts to create the legal frame- Consequently, the initiative of both work necessary to establish a common scientifc centres in Bratislava and Za- Commission for Humanities: “whose aim greb fnally got the necessary legal will be interdisciplinary research and research foundations to launch their activities. into our (Slovak and Croatian) common The creation of the new commission (cultural) heritage” (Fig. 7 – English ver- seemed within reach. However, the road sion of the agreement). In December 2011, to it proved to be much longer and thorn- the three versions of the agreement, name- ier than expected. ly in Slovak, Croatian and English, were It took a new person to make it hap- signed by the Dean of the Faculty of Arts pen. It was Željko Holjevac, who helped at Comenius University, Jaroslav Šúšol, organise the second international Croa- and by the member of the Department tian-Slovak conference and would even- of Slovak History, Ján Lukačka, on behalf tually lead Croatia’s SCCH team. This of the Slovak side, as well as by the Dean time the conference took place in Zagreb of the Faculty of Arts at the University on 7 – 11 May 2014. It was atended by of Zagreb, Damir Boras, and the Head 28 scientists from Croatia, Slovakia and of the Department of History, Damir the Czech Republic and was organ- Agičić, on behalf of the Croatian side. ised by the Department of History and After that, the Foreign Departments the Department of West Slavic Languag- at the Ministries of Education of Slovakia es and Literature at the Faculty of Arts and Croatia started to negotiate the con- at the University of Zagreb in coopera- ditions under which the SCCH would tion with the Department of Slovak His- be established. In 2013, the ministries tory at the Faculty of Arts at Comenius of both parties approved the Cooperation University in Bratislava. The proceedings

6 Author’s archive. See SCCH webpage (under construction).

Martin Homza: A Few Words on the Establishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commission 15 to this conference were also published and the names to be appointed to the dif- in 2017. This second and equally memo- ferent posts in the future commission rable three-hundred-page publication is from among the worlds of humanities entitled Croatia and Slovakia, vol. 2.7 of Croatia and Slovakia. The fnal decision by the relevant au- On 20 June 2018, a working meeting thorities to establish the commission was was held at Comenius University aimed helped to some extent by the ofcial cer- to solve these and other issues. The Croa- emonies of both scientifc outputs, which tian side was represented by Željko Hol- took place in the two capitals, i.e. Bratisla- jevac, from the Department of History va and Zagreb. The one in Bratislava was at the Faculty of Humanities and Social held in the Rector’s Hall at Comenius Uni- Sciences, as well as by Ivica Šute, Hol- versity with the participation of the rector, jevac’s colleague from the same depart- the deans of both faculties, Slovakia’s Ed- ment, Zrinka Kovačevič Stričević from ucation Minister, Dušan Čaplovič, and the Department of Slovak Language and the Ambassador of the Republic of Croa- Literature from the same faculty, and tia in Bratislava, Jakša Muljačić, as well as by the Ministry of Science and Educa- other diplomatic ofcials (Fig. 8 – 13). tion of the Republic of Croatia, Miroslav It was not until 2018 that the SCCH Lovrić. gained momentum. On 19 January 2018, The Slovak side was represented the Ministers of Education of the Repub- by Jaroslav Šúšol, Dean of the Faculty lic of Croatia and the Slovak Republic of Arts at Comenius University, by Mar- met in Zagreb and, among other things, tin Homza, Head of the Department extended the validity of the Cooperation of Slovak History at the same institu- Program between the Ministry of Education, tion, as well as by Martina Stifelová Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Re- and Katarína Baranyaiová on behalf public and the Ministry of Science, Education of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Sport of the Republic of Croatia from Research and Sports of the Slovak Re- 2018 to 2022, whose Article 11 stipulating public. The Minutes from the Reception the creation of the SCCH had remained of this Foreign Working Visit, prepared unfulflled during the previous period. by Katarína Baranyaiova, point out that This fact just made this task even more the identifed problem areas were suc- relevant. It was up to the stakeholders to cessfully resolved. The participants also complete the ratifcation process of this suggested the place (Bratislava) and ap- agreement and fnally bring the com- proximate time (spring 2019), as well as mission to life. However, a few serious the main topic of the SCCH frst session issues still needed to be addressed. First (Slovaks and Croats on the Road to Independ- of all, it was necessary to defne a com- ence: History and Perspectives).8 mon statute, the number of members After a working meeting of both the commission would have, the strate- delegations, the frst ofcial ceremony gy for selecting the diferent humanistic in Slovakia, Croatia and Slovakia, vol. 2. disciplines in order to secure their parity, followed. It took place in the Scientifc

7 Croatia and Slovakia, vol. 2: Historical Parallels and Connections (from 1780 to Present Day). Ed.: Željko Holjevac – Martin Homza – Martin Vašš. Zagreb – Bratislava: FF Press, 2017. 8 Author’s archive. See SCCH webpage (under construction).

16 Slovo na úvod Council Hall at Comenius University to initiate and coordinate scientifc and with the participation of Slovak Educa- research activities in the area of History, tion Minister, Martina Lubyová, the Rec- Linguistics, Neo-Latin Studies, History tor of Comenius University, Karol Mičie- of Art, Ethnology and Archeology. On ta, and the Ambassador of the Republic this day, the Slovak-Croatian Commis- of Croatia in Bratislava, Aleksander Hein sion for Humanities has been launched. (Fig. 14). On this solemn occasion, the Slo- We wish it plenty of success in its future vak Minister said: activities.”10

“This publication is one of the few Therefore, 21 November 2018 at 11:15 works that proves what public ofcials am can be regarded as the day and hour of the Slovak Republic and the Republic from which the SCCH counts its exist- of Croatia are currently declaring, namely ence. (Fig. 16 – 18). that we are interested in the Western Bal- After the ofcial ceremony in Zagreb kans, that we are interested in studying launching the book Croatia and Slova- the history of this geographical space and kia, vol. 2 and declaring the ofcial es- in continuing our common relations.”9 tablishment of the SCCH, the Rectors of the University of Zagreb, Damir Bo- On 21 November 2018, the last of a se- ras, and the Rector of Comenius Uni- ries of ofcial ceremonies, Croatia and Slo- versity in Bratislava, Karol Mičieta, met vakia, vol. 2 took place at Zahreb Univer- in the ofce of the Rector of the Univer- sity. Its agenda included the ceremonial sity of Zagreb. The meeting was also at- launch of the SCCH. (see program Fig. 14 tended by Branislav Slyško, Press Sec- – 15). Therefore, the Declaration on the Es- retary of Comenius University, Željko tablishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commis- Holjevac, from the Department of His- sion for the Humanities can be considered tory at the University of Zagreb, Mar- the baptismal leter of the commission. tin Homza, Head of the Department The Ambassador of the Slovak Republic of Slovak History at Comenius Universi- to the Republic of Croatia, Peter Susko, ty, and Andrej Vrteľ, the future secretary read it in the Rector’s Hall at the Univer- of the Slovak part of the commission. sity of Zagreb on 21 November 2018, ex- Slovakia’s Ministry of Education was actly at 11:15 am. Its fnal words are: represented by Martina Štifelová. Dur- ing the meeting, Comenius University “One hundred years after the disintegra- Rector, Karol Mičieta, said among other tion of Austria-Hungary, in a common things: Central European framework as an inte- gral part of the European Union, a com- “With Croatia we have in common mission of six Slovak and six Croatian over 800 years being part of the same members has been formed with the aim state, the Kingdom of Hungary, as well

9 Public Relations Department of Comenius University Rectorate: Profesor Martin Homza predsatvil novú publikáciu o slovensko-chorvátskych vzťahoch. See htps://uniba.sk/detail­aktuality/ back_to_page/univerzita-komenskeho/article/profesor-martin-homza-predstavil-novu- publikaciu­o­slovensko­chorvatskych­vztahoch/?fclid=IwAR1qfIHT7cxoXtoxEgsjpOaE EE_DEhuvRNf6Fv­kxn7VZ65wXViRl7JrRY. 10 Author’s archive. See SCCH webpage (under construction).

Martin Homza: A Few Words on the Establishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commission 17 as the tradition of a common policy and a non-public one. At the beginning in the revolutions of 1848 and within of the public part, which counted with the Litle Entente following 1918. Now the presence of high state and universi- we are members of a common Europe- ty representatives, the State Secretary an family. Slovakia has continuously of the Ministry of Education, Science, Re- supported the European integration search and Sports of the Slovak Repub- ambitions of Croatia. As a mater of fact, lic, Olga Nachtmanová, ceremoniously it is no coincidence that the Slovak handed over the decrees to the members Republic was the frst member state to of the Slovak SCCH team. (Fig. 19 – 21) ratify the Accession Treaty of Croatia Croatian Ambassador to Slovakia, Alek- with the European Union on 1 February sandar Hein, was present when the rel- 2012.”11 evant membership decrees were handed over to Martin Homza, Head of the Com- After this meeting, things gathered mission for Slovakia, to Andrej Vrteľ, Sec- momentum. On 28 November 2019, retary of the Commission, as well as to Željko Hojevac, new director of the Ivo Ivan Gerát, Miroslav Dudok, Marta Botík- Pilar Institute of Social Sciences in Za- ová, and Svorad Zavarský in the felds greb, was appointed Head of the Com- of History, Archeology, Theory of Art, mission in the area of History, Zrinka Literature and Language, Ethnology and Kovačevič in Literature and Language, Neo-Latin Studies, respectively. Mirijana Repanić Braun in Theory of Art, After this ofcial ceremony, the new Maja Matasović in Neo­Latin Studies, chairman of the Croatian SCCH team, Krešimir Filipec in Archeology, and Željko Holjevac, moderated the frst part Jadranka Grbić Jakopović in Ethnology. of the scientifc conference on Slovakia Zrinka Kovačević was appointed Secre- and Croatia on the Road to Independence: tary of the Croatian team. In December History and Perspectives. The contribu- of 2018, Martina Lubyová, Slovak Minis- tions presented within the public part ter of Education, Science and Research, of the meeting are contained in the frst signed the decrees appointing the com- volume of Studia Carpathico-Adriatica. mission members for Slovakia. For this reason, they are not addressed Almost 10 years passed from the mo- here any further. ment the initiative was frst presented The contents of the second, non-pub- until it became true. However, the new lic, part of SCCH’s frst gathering are legal situation in which the commission included in the minutes of this meeting found itself corresponds to the new qual- and, together with other important doc- ity of the preparations for the frst com- uments and material, will be available mission meeting. This took place on 17 on the Commission’s website, which is – 19 June 2019 in the Scientifc Council currently under construction. The open Hall at Comenius University in Bratisla- and accessible character of the com- va. It consisted of two parts: a public one mission’s work to the public shall be

11 See Slyško, Branislav: Rektor UK prof. Karol Mičieta na Univerzite v Záhrebe. See htps://uniba. sk/detail-aktuality/back_to_page/univerzita-komenskeho/article/rektor-uk-prof-karol- micieta­na­univerzite­v­zahrebe/?fclid=IwAR1IdUh2Cz8YQoHsXXqE6lpYwrxAjOTijRyii 9I_Vt7AE-SAEEFUg-iE8yE.

18 Slovo na úvod ensured by the SCCH Facebook page and Croats lived in one kingdom for over administered in line with the best tra- eight hundred years. Croatia joined ditions of the coexistence of all Danubi- the European Union on 1 July 2013. Since an nations. It will have three language then we have again shared one common versions, namely Slovak, Croatian and state. Therefore, the goal of the SCCH the New Latin, i.e. English. This is with remains to make the cultural heritage the aim to prevent the SCCH from get- of both nations as accessible as possible ting stuck in academic rigidity. Instead, not only to each other, but also to ofer it wants to remain open to all types to the wide European market of histor- of external stimuli so that it can refect ical cultural values the widest possible the current needs of the people of Slova- amount of quality products from our kia and Croatia who, like the initiators rich Slovak­Croatian past. I am confdent of this new humanist platform in Cen- no one doubts that both nations have tral Europe, keep wondering why things a lot to ofer, not only to Europe but also around us are the way they are. Slovaks to the whole world.

Martin Homza: A Few Words on the Establishment of the Slovak-Croatian Commission 19

The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Nikica Barić* Croatia’s Road to Independence

Chorvátska cesta k samostatnosti / Hrvatski put u samostalnost

U prilogu su, u najsažetijim crtama, kronološki prikazani događaji koji su krajem 1980- ih vodili do duboke krize u Jugoslaviji, koja je početkom 1990-ih dovela do raspada države i osamostaljena Republike Hrvatske i njezinog međunarodnog priznanja. Ključne riječi: Jugoslavija, Hrvatska, Srbija, Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tuđman

uring the mid-1970s, extensive con- in the Yugoslav republics and provinc- Dstitutional and legal changes were es. Although considerable rights were made in the Socialist Federative Republic granted to the republics by the 1974 of Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslav consti- constitution, there were also institu- tution was adopted in 1974. By this con- tions of federal government in Belgrade. stitution, the republics were given broad An important federal institution was rights in the conduct of their afairs. the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). An important feature of the system Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito was the slogan on “brotherhood and died in 1980. Tito was the leader of the Yu- unity” of the Yugoslav peoples and na- goslav communist and partisan move- tionalities and the suppression of all na- ment, which seized power at the end tionalisms which were seen as a serious of World War II. Tito’s authority was un- threat to the Yugoslav unity. The regime questionable, and throughout his rule he did not impose the creation of a “Yugo- made the fnal decisions on the further slav nation”, but it also did not condone direction of politics at all key moments. the over-emphasis on nationality, since it After Tito’s death, a collective presidency saw it as a possible nationalistic threat to of Yugoslavia was introduced, with rep- the Yugoslav community. resentatives of all republics and autono- An important feature of the system mous provinces. was the system of socialist self-man- After Tito’s death, the frst major agement, and as part of the reforms problem was a serious economic cri- of the 1970s, the notion of associate labor sis. Already in the 1970s, the Yugoslav on socially-owned means of production economy was lagging behind, but this was introduced, with the adage that all was also a period of increased borrow- the income earned from that work be- ing from foreign loans. Thus, the 1970s longs to the working class who earned it was characterized by large investments through their work. and a solid standard of living of citizens, The League of Communists of Yu- but such a picture of prosperity was only goslavia (LCY), as the ruling party, was an appearance. Eventually, at the turn organized into leagues of communists of the 1970s, the country was hit by trade

* Nikica Barić, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb (the Republic of Croatia).

22 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives and payment defcits and large external assessed that this position was extremely debt. The economic crisis, accompanied unfavorable and that the Serb people were by high infation, continued throughout the only ones in Yugoslavia who “did the 1980s. In 1988, LCY fnally decided to not have their own state”. In addition to abandon socialist self-management and pointing out the plight of Serbs in Koso- turn to a market economy.1 vo, the Memorandum said that the po- Also in 1981, there was a so-called sition of Serbs in Croatia was extremely counter-revolution in the Socialist Au- unfavorable, moreover, that the situation tonomous Province of Kosovo, which for these Serbs was worse only during was majority populated by the Albani- World War II, during the Ustasha regime an population. Kosovo was part of Ser- in the Independent State of Croatia. Fol- bia, and Albanian protesters demand- lowing the appearance of the Memoran- ed that the province be granted status dum, the Communist leadership of Ser- of an republic.2 bia condemned the text, assessing it as At the same time, oppositional intel- a nationalist document directed against lectual and artistic circles were becoming Yugoslavia and called for the resignation more active in Belgrade. They criticized of the leadership of the Serbian Academy the undemocratic nature of the com- of Sciences and Arts.3 munist system, and on the other hand, But during the second half of 1987 the atitude of that system towards Ser- Slobodan Milošević took over the lead- bia and the Serb people in Yugoslavia ership of the League of Communists in general. They considered that the Serb of Serbia. While the leadership of com- people, as the largest in Yugoslavia and munists in Serbia had previously sought as the nation that had the greatest casu- to regain control of autonomous provinc- alties during both world wars, were es, Milošević began to address this issue eventually left disfgured and damaged, outside the institutions. The discontent which was blamed on Tito’s rule. That of Kosovo Serbs, as well as the dissatis- is why the 1974 constitutional order was faction with the unfavorable economic criticized, because it gave autonomous situation, was used for the so-called “an- provinces within Serbia – Kosovo and ti-bureaucratic revolution”. This was a se- Vojvodina – broad independence over au- ries of mass gatherings, that is, demon- thorities in Belgrade. In 1986, a Memoran- strations whose goal was to remove dum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and the hated “bureaucrats” from the gov- Arts appeared in public. The paper ana- ernment, although it actually served lyzed the crisis in Yugoslav society and Milošević’s goals. Under the pressure then focused on the position of Serbia of mass demonstrations, the leadership and the Serb people in Yugoslavia. It was of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina

1 Bilandžić, Dušan: Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: Glavni procesi 1918 – 1985, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1985.; Radelić, Zdenko: Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945. – 1991.: Od zajedništva do razlaza, Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest – Školska knjiga, 2006. 2 Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992: Rađanje države. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2017., pp. 77 – 79. 3 Dragović­Soso, Jasna: „Spasioci nacije”. Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje nacionalizma, Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2004., pp. 123 – 154; Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992, pp. 77 – 83.

Nikica Barić: Croatia’s Road to Independence 23 resigned in 1988, and in early 1989 lead- President Tito crushed this movement. ership in republic of Montenegro also The Croatian leadership was forced to re- resigned. The LCY leadership approved sign, followed by the persecution of nu- changes to the Serbian constitution, and merous people who stood out in the Cro- in 1989 Serbia assumed control of its atian national movement, many of whom provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. But were expelled from the League of Com- in Kosovo, this led to new protests by munists, and many were also sentenced the Albanian population and clash- to prison on charges of Croatian nation- es with security forces. After all these alism. Subsequently, the new leadership events, Serbia had four of the eight votes of Croatia acted decisively to counteract in the Presidency of Yugoslavia.4 any emergence of Croatian nationalism.6 In the meantime, there have been ma- Ethnic Serbs also lived in Croatia jor changes in Slovenia, the northernmost in signifcant numbers. According to and most developed Yugoslav republic, the 1981 census, Serbs made up 11.5% where alternative social and cultural of the population of Croatia. In the part trends appeared. They sought to protect of municipalities in the central part the Slovenian national peculiarity, while of Croatia, the Serb population was ma- criticizing the dogmatism of the commu- jority, while in other parts they were nist system. The communist leadership signifcantly represented in the popula- in that republic proved more open to tion. As early as 1989, it was evident that various forms of democratization. After Milošević’s “anti­bureaucratic revolu- the emergence of Slobodan Milošević tion” was pouring into Croatia, spread- and his aspiration to gain dominance ing among Serbs in that republic, while in Yugoslavia, the greatest confict arose Belgrade media atacked the communist between Slovenia, which did not want to leadership of Croatia as “anti-Serb”, al- surrender its rights to a possibly central- ways recalling the period of the Second ized Yugoslavia and Belgrade.5 World War, when the Ustasha regime In the meantime, the Communist of the Independent State of Croatia per- leadership in Croatia remained true to secuted and killed Serbs.7 the principles of Yugoslavia as enshrined In response to pressure from Belgrade, in the 1974 Constitution. During the late Slovenia has taken steps to protect its sov- 1960s and early 1970s, a national move- ereignty, and the communists in Slovenia ment appeared in Croatia, which sought and Croatia have decided that the next to exercise the greater rights of Croatia elections for the parliaments of their re- within Yugoslavia and leadership of re- publics should be free and multi-party. public and communists of Croatia also This happened in circumstances where advocated these goals. But in late 1971, the communist regimes in the Warsaw

4 Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992, pp. 83 – 91. 5 Fischer, Jasna (ed.): Slovenska novejša zgodovina, vol. 2: Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije, 1948 – 1992, Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga – Institut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005. 6 Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992, pp. 125 – 155. 7 Barić, Nikica: Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990. – 1995. Zagreb: Golden marketing ­Tehnička knjiga, 2005, pp. 39 – 52.

24 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Pact countries were in crisis, that is, when on the support of the YPA. The armed in some of these countries the commu- forces of Yugoslavia consisted of a fed- nists also allowed the creation of alterna- eral army and territorial defence units. tive political parties.8 This was in line with the concept In early 1990, the 14th Extraordinary of “armed people” as a defence strategy Congress of the LCY was held in Bel- developed by the Yugoslav communists. grade. Milošević’s atempt to seize control In the period when multiparty elections of the party ended in failure, as delegates were held in Croatia, the YNA confscat- of the leagues of communists of Slovenia ed the weapons of the territorial defence and Croatia left Congress. In doing so, units, making the new Croatian govern- the party that had ruled Yugoslavia since ment almost completely disarmed.11 1945 ceased to exist. In 1989, the Croatian Thus, the leadership of Serbia had Democratic Union (CDU) was founded double standards. In Kosovo, autonomy in Croatia under the leadership of Franjo was abolished and the province subordi- Tuđman. During World War II, Tuđman nated to Belgrade, although the majority fought in Tito’s partisan army, after Albanian population lived there. By con- the war he was an ofcer in the Yugoslav trast, when it came to the borders of Cro- People’s Army, and then worked as a his- atia, Belgrade did not intend to respect torian at the head of the historical insti- them, since in some parts of Croatia tute in Zagreb. Tuđman gradually be- the Serb population was either majority gan to act as a Croatian nationalist, and or signifcantly represented. clashed with the regime, was expelled From mid-1990 to mid-1991, unsuc- from the League of Communists, and cessful negotiations between the leader- later sentenced to prison for his political ships of the Yugoslav republics on the fu- activities. The CDU emerged as a broad ture organization of the country were nationalist movement that would protect held. Opposing views could not provide Croatia’s rights against growing pressure a solution. Slovenia and Croatia favored from Serbia and won power in the frst a Yugoslavia as a loose association of re- multi-party elections held in April 1990.9 publics or outright independence, while Shortly before the democratic elec- Serbia and Montenegro advocated a frm- tions were held in Croatia, Serbia’s lead- er and more centralized federation.12 ership decided on a new strategy. Instead In the meanwhile, in the summer of keeping Yugoslavia under the domi- of 1990, an armed rebellion of ethnic nation of Serbia, it was decided that Serbs broke out in Croatia, in northern in the case of Croatian independence, it Dalmatia, and after that the Serbs uni- was necessary to keep the “Serbian terri- laterally established their autonomous tories” in Croatia within rump Yugosla- provinces on Croatian territory, with via.10 In doing so, Milosevic could count the aim of remaining in Yugoslavia,

8 Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992, pp. 169 – 171. 9 Ibidem, pp. 155 – 168. 10 Barić, Nikica: Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, pp. 75 – 76. 11 Opširnije o ulozi JNA see: Marijan, Davor: Slom Titove armije, Jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. – 1992. Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2008. 12 Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992, pp. 325 – 342.

Nikica Barić: Croatia’s Road to Independence 25 that is, in a common state with Serbia, it was occupied, almost completely de- in the case of Croatia’s independence.13 stroyed in artillery and air strikes.15 On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Cro- In the meantime, the European Com- atia declared independence. This was munity has launched negotiations on followed by a brief YPA intervention resolving the crisis and war in Yugo- in Slovenia, but soon an agreement was slavia. In doing so, the principle was reached on the withdrawal of the feder- adopted that no changes to the borders al army from the republic. In contrast, achieved through violent means would Milošević and the YPA did not intend to be recognized, that is, that the bor- relent in Croatia. Between June and De- ders of the Yugoslav republics cannot cember 1991, conficts in Croatia leading be modifed by unilateral moves. To- to open war escalated. On one side were wards the end of 1991, Germany showed weakly armed Croatian forces and on an increasing willingness to recognize the other, Serb forces from Croatia, with the independence of Slovenia and Cro- the support of Belgrade and the YPA. atia, requiring these republics to guar- At the beginning of the crisis in Croa- antee minority rights, which in the case tia, the units of the federal army acted as of Croatia concerned rights of ethnic a force to thwart “interethnic conficts”, Serb. Accordingly, Croatia has adopted but in reality the YPA provided support a constitutional law on the rights of eth- to rebel Serbs in Croatia, to fnally be nic and national communities.16 completely on their side.14 The countries of the European Com- However, despite its vast superiority munity recognized Croatia as an inde- in arms, the YPA failed to defeat Cro- pendent state on 15 January 1992. Mean- atian forces in an ofensive operation while, an armistice between Croatia launched in early October 1991. Howev- and the JNA was concluded in early er, Serb forces and the YPA managed to 1992. The United Nations has also be- occupy about one-third of the Croatian come involved in resolving the crisis. territory. These were also areas where The deployment of the UN peacekeep- the Serb population was not majority ers to Croatia, in areas under Serb con- before the confict broke out. A large trol, was thus agreed. The deployment number of Croats were expelled from of “blue helmets” brought temporary the area occupied by Serbs and the YPA, relief to the crisis, but UN mission could and many Croatian civilians were killed. ultimately not be successful. On the one The war brought many devastations and hand, Croatia’s aspiration was to return victims. However, the fate of the town the areas under Serb control to its rule, of Vukovar in the eastern part of Croa- and on the other, the Serbs, who declared tia, in the vicinity of border with Serbia, the Republic of Serb Krajina in the areas stands out. For months, Serb forces and they controlled at the end of 1991, did not the YPA besieged the city, defended by want to deviate from their statehood and Croatian forces, and the city was, before complete separation from Croatia.17

13 Barić, Nikica: Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, pp. 62 – 108. 14 Marijan, Davor: Hrvatska 1989. – 1992, pp. 503 – 520. 15 Ibidem, pp. 503 – 520. 16 Ibidem, pp. 521 – 551. 17 Barić, Nikica: Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, pp. 143 – 166.

26 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives During 1992, with the outbreak of war during 1995, with the mediation of the in- in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aten- ternational community, peace would be tion of the international community fo- established in Bosnia and Herzegovina cused on the crisis in that country, where and it was also agreed that Serb-con- the extent of war and casualties was much trolled areas in eastern Croatia, along greater than in 1991 in Croatia. It was not the border with Serbia, which remained until 1995 that Croatia would bring back under Serbian control, will be gradual- most of the Serb-held territories under ly returned to Croatian rule, which was its control by military operations. Also successfully completed in early 1998.

Nikica Barić: Croatia’s Road to Independence 27 Emília Hrabovec* The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia

Slovenský exil a cesta k nezávislosti Slovenska / Slovačka emigracija i put u neovisnost Slovačke

Na jar 1945, pod dojmom postupu Červenej armády, obnovy Československa a jeho rýchlej boľševizácie, opustila Slovensko prvá masová vlna politickej emigrácie v moderných slovenských dejinách; o tri roky neskôr, po defnitívnom prevzatí moci komunistami, ju nasledovala druhá emigračná vlna. Spoločným menovateľom drvivej väčšiny slovenského exilu bolo odhodlanie bojovať za obnovu Slovenskej republiky na demokratickom a kresťanskom základe a proti komunizmu, rôznili sa iba v názoroch na to, akým spôsobom to dosiahnuť. Východisková politická situácia slovenského exilu bola oveľa zložitejšia, než situácia exilov väčšiny iných národov strednej a východnej Európy, pretože podobne ako exil chorvátsky musel bojovať nielen proti komunistickému režimu, ale aj za znovuzískanie vlastnej štátnosti. V tomto zápase musel čeliť nepriaznivej medzinárodnej politickej konštelácii, postavenej na báze uchovania politického a územného statu quo, neporozumeniu zo strany mnohých západných politických faktorov, ktorí vnímali strednú Európu iba v logike studenej vony, resp. ako geopolitický priestor na uplatnenie vlastných záujmov, a početným politickým odporcom. K nim patrila najmä veľká väčšina českého exilu, stojaca na platforme Československa a nárokujúca si právo hovoriť aj v mene Slovákov, a samotné Československo, ktoré sa nekompromisným antikomunizmom a kresťanským hodnotovým zameraním slovenského exilu a jeho úsilím o zmedzinárodnenie slovenskej otázky a slovenskú štátnosť cítilo oveľa viac ohrozené než exilom českým, preto v zápase proti nemu neváhalo používať všetky prostriedky vrátane násilia. Prvým medzníkom v dejinách povojnového slovenského politického exilu sa stala polovica päťdesiatych rokov 20. storočia. Kým dovtedy vládol istý optimizmus ohľadne možnej zmeny pomerov, porážka maďarského a poľského povstania, tvrdé represálie, ktoré postihli aj Slovensko, pasívny postoj západných štátov, presun časti politických záujmov do Tretieho sveta a postupne sa proflujúca politika mierovej koexistencie medzi veľmocami ukázali, že uskutočnenie politických cieľov exilu bude treba odložiť do časovo vzdialenej budúcnosti. Druhým medzníkom boli roky 1968/69. Federalizácia Československa síce demonštrovala svetu, že volanie exilu po práve na samourčenie zodpovedalo túžbe národa, vojenská intervencia v Československu a ďalšia exilová vlna však zároveň ukázali pretrvávajúcu neslobodu. V tomto svetle bol zásadným počinom vznik Svetového kongresu Slovákov, ktorý po prvýkrát zjednotil prakticky celý slovenský exil a vytvoril silnú platformu pre jeho politickú a kultúrnu činnosť. Kongres sa prihlásil k myšlienke štátnej nezávislosti Slovenska, vzhľadom na medzinárodný vývoj a existenciu Československa, uznaného medzinárodnou komunitou štátov, tak však robil

* Emília Hrabovec, Department of Church History Faculty of Roman Catholic Theology of Cyril and Methodius, Comenius University Bratislava (Slovak Republic).

28 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives predovšetkým s odvolaním na všeobecne uznaný princíp samourčovacieho práva a na zásadu úplnej rovnoprávnosti národov. Kľúčové slová: Politický exil, antikomunizmus, studená vojna, slovenská štátnosť, Slovenský oslobodzovací výbor, Slovenská národná rada v zahraničí, Svetový kongres Slovákov, Štefan B. Roman, medzinárodná politika.

n 1945, due to the decision of the victori- Republic on democratic and Christian Ious Powers, Slovakia was reintegrated grounds and against Communism, they into the restored Czechoslovakia, from difered only in the view and the meth- which the Powers assumed it would suit ods of how to achieve this goal. Within their political and ideological intentions their ranks, two relevant exile groups beter than an independent Slovak state. emerged, both headed by personalities The renewed Czechoslovakia became who shared the common destiny of poli- part of the Soviet zone of infuence and ticians who had got into disfavour of Ber- under the façade of “people’s democracy”, lin due to defending Slovak interests and its political regime was already introduc- resisting the penetration of German in- ing the Soviet ideological, political and fuence in Slovakia and 1939 – 1940 had to economic system, leaving decisive levers leave the active politics. of power to the communists, delegitimat- In the frst postwar years, Ferdinand ing political activity beyond the commu- Ďurčanský was undoubtedly the most nist-led coalition, depriving a substantial dynamic protagonist of the Slovak ex- part of the population of their civil and ile. Ďurčanský was one of the frst Slo- national rights, introducing a harsh po- vak politicians who was able to over- litical retribution and anti-Catholic meas- come the traditional self-centredness ures, and paving the way for a defni- of the Slovak innerpolitical scene and tive Communist takeover accomplished include the dimension of foreign policy in February 1948. into it. As a former Slovak foreign min- In spring 1945, under the impres- ister and university professor for inter- sion of the advancing of the Red Army, national law, Ďurčanský was convinced the forced renewal of Czechoslovakia and of the necessity to internationalize its rapid bolshevisation, the frst wave the Slovak question1 and to present it eo of Slovak exiles left Slovakia. In all sev- instanto to the key political players that eral thousands of persons, among them decided about the destinies of Europe, not only people politically connected to i.e. to the Peace Conference in Paris, to the frst Slovak Republic, but intellectu- the highest representatives of the victo- al élites, university professors, scientists, rious powers, the United Nations and writers and a numerous group of young other internationally relevant institu- university graduates and students fed tional and individual protagonists, from the country. Their common objective the US Secretary of State George C. Mar- was the unconditional determination to shall to Pope Pius XII. Ďurčanský as- struggle for the renewal of the Slovak sumed that according to the principles

1 Cf. Ďurčanský, Ferdinand: The International Aspects of the Slovak Question. New York: Slovak Liberation Commitee, 1954.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 29 of international law the political situa- výbor, SOV) founded in Rome in the be- tion in Slovakia created after 1945 was ginning of 1946, fooded the Western po- unlawful and the Slovak Republic con- litical world with countless memoranda, tinued to exist. He urged the Powers appeals and leters,3 created the bulletin not to disregard the wishes of the over- Slovak Information Service that informed whelming majority of the Slovaks, the in- the world about the situation in Slovakia, ternational law and the commitments to established contacts with representatives the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of other Eastern European exile groups, of the United Nations, not to treat Slo- founded a radio station north of Rome vakia diferently as the other former al- that broadcasted to Slovakia,4 initiat- lies of Germany who were not deprived ed even the forming of Slovak military of their states, but to recognize her as units abroad5 and transferred one part a defeated nation and to conclude a peace of his activities to Slovakia, where he treaty with her or to ascertain the will built up a clandestine movement in order of the Slovak people by a plebiscite un- to demonstrate in front of the world that der international supervision.2 As a very his organisation did not represent an iso- dynamic politician, Ďurčanský and his lated group of exiles, but enjoyed a wide Slovak Action Commitee (Slovenský popular support. Similarly as many oth- akčný výbor, SAV), later Slovak Libera- er relevant Western politicians including tion Commitee (Slovenský oslobodzovací some British military and political elites,

2 République Slovaque. Ministère des affaires étrangères: Aide-Mémoire sur l’existence de la République Slovaque et sur la nécessité de conclure le traité de paix avec elle, Paris 1946; Comité d’Action Slovaque: Aide-Mémoire sur la necessité du plébiscite en Slovaquie, Paris 1946; Slovak Action Committee – Slovak National Council in London – Slovak League of America – Canadian Slovak League: Memorandum presented to the peace conference concerning the rationality of existence of Czecho-Slovakia, Paris 1946. 3 Slovak Action Committee: Address of the Slovak Action Commitee to the Council of Foreign Ministers, [s.l. & s.d.]; Slovak Action Committee: Petition of the Slovak Action Commitee to His Excellency Mr. Trygve Lie Secretary General of the United Nations, [s.l. & s.d.]; Memoriae sacrae excellentissimi viri sacerdotis selosissimi hominis status christiani exemplarissimi Dr. Josephi Tiso qui falso accusatus occisus crematus summam gloriam adeptus est ad omnes qui in universo orbe sunt catholici sincera pietate dicatum, [s.l. & s.d.]; Slovak Action Committee: Appeal concerning the Deportation of the Slovak Population by the Soviet Authorities presented by the Slovak Action Commitee to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, [s.l.] 1947; Slovak Action Committee: Appeal of the Slovak Action Commitee to the civilized World Concerning the Deportation of the Slovak Population in Sudeten by the Czechs, [s.l.] 1947; Slovak Action Committee: Open Leter from the Slovak Action Commitee to the Representatives of the Members of the United Nations, [s.l.] 1947; Slovak Action Committee: Proposal to the Security Council of the United Nations for the creation of a Central-European Conferation, [s.l.] 1947; and others. Cf. Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Afari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale Roma (thereafter ASMAECI), Afari Politici 1946 – 1950, Cecoslovacchia, busta 14, Demande adressée à l’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies concernant la création d’une comission d’enquête sur la persécution religieuse en Slovaquie et l’exclusion de la Tchéco­Slovaquie des Nations Unies, signed by Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Anton Bugan, August 1949. 4 Cf. the memoirs of Okáľ, Ján: Výpredaj ľudskosti. Cambridge [ON]: Dobrá kniha, 1989, pp. 340 – 355. 5 Géci, Jozef: Slovenská európska činnosť a doktrína o celoeurópskom zjednotení. In: Slovenský politicky exil v zápase za samostatné Slovensko: Materiály z vedeckej konferencie konanej v Bratislave 5. – 6. júna 1995. Ed.: Ján Bobák. Bratislava: Dom zahraničných Slovákov, 1996, pp. 244 – 245; Katrebová Blehová, Beata: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku v rokoch 1945 – 1950. Bratislava – Roma: Slovenský historický ústav v Ríme, 2019, p. 67.

30 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Ďurčanský in the immediate postwar in exile, in the frst postwar years Sidor time expected a fast escalation of a polit- remained politically inactive, limiting ical and eventually even a military con- himself to the – without doubt urgently fict between the West and the Soviet Un- needed – charity help in favour of his em- ion,6 in which the Slovaks as a Christian igrated connationals. Sidor, too, persued nation would stand on the Western side, the goal to work for the independence and he wanted them to be prepared.7 of Slovakia, but considered the launch- Diferent was the assessment ing of a political action in the immedi- of the situation by the former Slovak en- ate postwar period inopportune and voy to the Holy See Karol Sidor, who had the insistence on the continuity thesis found an asylum in the Vatican until his not viable from the point of view of re- departure to Canada in 1950, and around alpolitik, and for the time being, he want- whom the second exile political centre ed to lead the political struggle through evolved. Sidor had a beter starting posi- the existing strong Slovak-American or- tion, because he could proft from the mor- ganisations in the USA, above all the re- al prestige of his Vatican residence, from spected Slovak League in America, and the good reputation he had earned him- through the Slovak National Council self also among the Allied diplomats,8 in London founded in winter 1943/44 from the lively contacts he had with by Peter Prídavok. Sidors wait-and-see the Italian political elite around the nas- policy might have been partially due to cent Christian democratic party (Alcide the fear not to compromise his political de Gasperi, Guido Gonella, Mario Scel- asylum in the Vatican. Moreover, he ev- ba), as well as from the fact that the Holy idently underestimated the revolution- See continued to recognized him silent- ary character of the political changes ly as a representative of Slovakia and in Central-Eastern Europe after 1945 and in Rome it was generally expected that for a while he even nourished the hope he would found a government in exile.9 to return to the Slovak inner politics as Nevertheless, to a great disappointment a leader of a new Catholic political par- of many contemporaries at home and ty that would take over the heritage

6 Rzheshevsky, Oleg – Myagkov, Mikhail Yu.: The End of the Grand Alliance. New Documents and Materials. The Second World War in the XXth century history: Bulletin du Comité international d’histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, a. 30/31, 1999/2000, pp. 11 – 26. 7 To the activities of Ferdinand Ďurčanský and his organisation cf. Polakovič, Štefan: Záznam o činnosti SAV­u. In: Zahraničné akcie na záchranu a obnovenie slovenskej samostatnosti (1943 – 1948). Ed.: František Vnuk – Štefan Polakovič. Lakewood-Hamilton: Slovak Research Institute of America, 1988, pp. 111 – 225. 8 In this sense expressed himself also the British ambassador to the Holy See Sir Arcy d’Osborne in a conversation with the postwar Czechoslovak chargé d´afaires to the Holy See František Schwarzenberg, who reported it to the minister of foreign afairs Jan Masaryk. Schwarzenbergsche Familienarchive Murau, Nachlaß Franz Schwarzenberg, Karton Vatikan, 4th political report of chargé d’afaires František Schwarzenberg to the Ministry of Foreign Afairs in Prague, 14.3.1946. Cf. Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko, Svätá stolica a diplomatická misia Karola Sidora (1939 – 1945). In: Sidor, Karol: Šesť rokov pri Vatikáne. Na vydanie pripravili Rydlo, Jozef M. – Vnuk, František. Bratislava: LHS, 2012, p. 255. 9 Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko, Svätá stolica a diplomatická misia Karola Sidora (1939 – 1945), pp. 257, 266 – 270; ASMAECI, Gabineto, busta 47, Karol Sidor to Alcide de Gasperi, 20 October 1944, and de Gasperi to Sidor, 4 November 1944.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 31 of the prewar Slovak People’s Party. Only intellectuals joined it, as well as many when it became evident that the politi- former members of the Slovak Revolu- cal system of the National front did not tionary Resistance (Slovenský revolučný ofer any prospective for a free parlia- odboj), an organisation of young exiles mentary struggle and his tribunals even – university students and fresh grad- sentenced Sidor to a long term impris- uates, who in 1945 – 1948 had created onment, and when after the defnitive a dense communication and intelligence communist takeover in February 1948 network between Slovakia and the ex- a second wave of émigrés arrived that in- ile and initially collaborated more with cluded also non-Communist politicians Ďurčanský’s organisation,11 the major- who had cooperated with the National ity of the Slovak-American organisa- front, Sidor realized that a political action tions and of the newcomers after 1948. in exile was necessary and decided to lay The support of the later demonstrated the institutional fundaments for a polit- in front of the world that also Slovaks ical organisation – the Slovak National who had lived in Slovakia after the war Council Abroad (Slovenská národná rada including politicians active in the Na- v zahraničí, SNRvZ). It appeared in pub- tional Front system supported the idea lic on Christmas 1948 with the declared of the Slovak statehood, once being able objective to “free Slovakia from the Commu- to declare their convictions freely.12 nist dictature and Czech preponderance”, to The starting position of the Slovak ex- create a democratic Slovak state and to ile in the West was much more difcult integrate it as equal member into the in- then the situation of the majority of other ternational organisation.10 The prestige exiles from the Eastern bloc. It resulted of the new organisation was enhanced by from the elementary fact that the Slovaks, the fact that almost all former Slovak dip- in contradiction to the programmatic lomats abroad and several well-known declarations of the victorious Powers

10 Cf. the frst document of the organisation Prvý ohlas SNRvZ na slovenskú emigráciu so zvláštnym zreteľom na slovenskú pospolitosť v Spojených štátoch a Kanade (The First Appeal of the Slovak National Council Abroad to the Slovak Emigration with particular consideration to the Slovak Community in the United States and in Canada), published by Vnuk, František: Slovenská národná rada v Londýne a v zahraničí (1943 – 1948). In: Zahraničné akcie na záchranu a obnovenie slovenskej samostatnosti (1943 – 1948). Ed.: František Vnuk – Štefan Polakovič. Lakewood-Hamilton: Slovak Research Institute of America, 1988, pp. 105 – 108. 11 To the activities of the Slovak Revolutionary Resistance cf. the diary of one of its exponents Komandera, Rudolf: Denník 1945 – 1947. Bratislava: ÚPN, 2012; cf. also the memoirs of one of the founders Jankovič, Ladislav: Spomienky a úvahy. In: Joštiak, Jozef – Jankovič, Ladislav: Dva životy – jeden osud. Bratislava: Dom zahraničných Slovákov, [s.d.], pp. 135 – 164. 12 More to Sidor and his activities in Rome see Katrebová Blehová, Beata: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku, s. 21 – 62, 137 – 153; Vnuk, František: Slovenská národná rada v Londýne a v zahraničí (1943 – 1948), pp. 1 – 108; Hrabovec, Emília: Jozef Tiso a Svätá stolica. In: Jozef Tiso: Kňaz a prezident. Ed.: Eadem. Bratislava: PostScriptum, 2017, pp. 123 – 131; Eadem: Santa Sede e Cecoslovacchia 1945 – 1965. In: Chiesa del silenzio e diplomazia pontifcia, 1945 – 1965: Umlčaná cirkev a pápežská diplomacia 1945 – 1965. Ed.: Eadem – Giuliano Brugnotto – Peter Jurčaga. Cità del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana (= Ati e Documenti, 44), 2018, p. 62 – 64, 74; Kirschbaum, J.[ozef]: Via Tanaro – kus Slovenska v Ríme. In: Karol Sidor. Politik, novinár, spisovateľ. Ed.: Jozef Paučo. Middletown [PA].: Literárny Almanach Slováka v Amerike, 1962, pp. 94 – 101. To the activities of the Slovak National Council Abroad cf. Slovenský národný archív Bratislava (SNA), Slovenská liga v Amerike (SLvA), k. 12, 14, records of the meetings of the political organs of the Slovak National Council Abroad from the Fifties.

32 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives such as the Atlantic Charter or the Charter émigrés were usually directly or indi- of the United Nations and without regard rectly at the service of foreign political to the wishes of the overwhelming ma- centres, Slovak exile politicians were jority of the people, were re­integrated in their exile work politically independ- into the renewed Czechoslovakia, so that ent and “participate in the separatist move- – similarly as the Croatians, but in con- ment out of conviction”.13 trast to almost all other exiles, struggling The frst strong adversary of the Slo- only against the Communist regime – all vak exile was the Czechoslovak state that generations of the postwar Slovak politi- looked upon the Slovak emigration as its cal exile had to follow a double objective: greatest enemy. The uncompromising an- the struggle against Communism and ti-Communism of the Slovak exile and the struggle to regain the own independ- its embedment in Christian moral values ent statehood. In this batle they had to threatened the ideological fundaments face a disfavourable international politi- of the Communist regime far more rad- cal constellation based on the maintain- ically then the predominantly leftist-so- ing of the political and territorial status cialist Czech exile, which sometimes even quo, numerous political adversaries and earned praise of the Prague ideologists a dramatic lack of fnancial resources. for its “progressive” points of view.14 First In contrast to the post-February Czech of all, the Slovak exile, in its eforts to in- exile, that was at least partially subsi- ternationalize the Slovak question and dised from the state budget of the USA, to regain an independent state, menaced supported by ideologically akin non-gov- the very existence of Czechoslovakia. ernmental organisations and that could Therefore, both the People’s Democratic make use of the Czechoslovak fnancial and the Communist regimes in Czecho- resources abroad accumulated in pre- slovakia invested enormous eforts to vious times, the Slovak exile lived from paralyze the activities of the Slovak exile. the hard work of his members and from In the frst postwar years, Prague made their boundless idealism and personal every efort to achieve the extradiction commitment almost unimaginable to- of Slovak émigrés to Czechoslovakia,15 lat- day. Even the Czechoslovak Communist er it invested huge means to spy on them, regime had to acknowledge in the “Brief penetrate their ranks, subvert their organ- Report on the Czechoslovak Emigration” isations from inside and to compromize that while Czech top-level political the exiles in front of their own people and

13 II. správa HS StB, Orientační zpráva o čs. emigraci, 5 September 1966. Prague Cold War, accessible online htp://www.praguecoldwar.cz/Soubory/660901_Cs­emigrace.pdf. (6 October 2019). 14 The Communist Party daily Rudé právo (Prague) published in 1956 an article that praised the Czech (Czechoslovak) broadcasting of Radio Free Europe from 31 October 1956 dedicated to the explanation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and to the criticism of its deviations under Stalin: “It is certainly a great satisfaction to hear such words after so many years of abuse against Marx and Lenin and against the socialist society which we are building…There is only one thing we do not understand. What were these gentlemen running away from in 1948?” Rudé právo, (4 November 1956). 15 Cf. the memoirs of Čulen, Konštantín: V amerických zaisťovacích táboroch. Bratislava: Matica slovenská, 2004; Okáľ, Ján: Leto na Traune. Cambridge [ON]: Dobrá kniha, 1986, pp. 86 – 276; Idem: Výpredaj ľudskosti; Šprinc, Mikuláš: K slobodným pobrežiam. Bratislava: Matica slovenská, 2004. See also Katrebová Blehová, B.: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku, pp. 63 – 78 and 129 – 139; Hrabovec, Emilia: Santa Sede e Cecoslovacchia 1945 – 1965, pp. 62 – 64.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 33 above all in front of their host countries, put it: “We have to hold Czechoslovakia even thus destroying them politically and ex- if (…) only one single Slovak goes with us.”19 istentially. Many anti-Slovak defamation The protagonists of this Czech exile ar- actions originated in Prague which were rogated for themselves the right to speak apparently launched by Western jour- on behalf of the Slovaks whom they con- nalists, lobbying groups or the strong sidered an integral part of the mythical Italian Communist Party.16 In some cas- “Czechoslovak nation” or an underde- es, the Czechoslovak secret services did veloped ethnical group whose destiny not refrain even from open physical vio- was inextricably linked to Czechoslo- lence like kidnappings or assassinations vakia. A stronghold of such opinions – the most sadly known was the lethal at- was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia tack against the president of the German (Rada svobodného Československa) found- branch of the Slovak National Council ed in February 1949 in Washington and Abroad Matúš Černák, murdered in July dominated by Czech National Socialists 1955 by a bomb sent via mail.17 around Peter Zenkl and Czech Social Paradoxically, the strongest adversary Democrats, mostly former close collab- of the Slovak exile was not Czechoslova- orators of president Edvard Beneš and kia itself, but the Czech – or Czechoslo- members of the Communist-led Nation- vak as it used to call itself – post­Feb- al Front government. They denounced ruary exile, that stood on the platform any independent Slovak move in exile as of the frst Czechoslovak Republic and “a menace to democracy”, “an absence of right the postwar system of National front political thinking”, “a general lack of culture” and saw its main political goal, if not and “a form of primitivism”, and warned its raison d’être, in securing the survival the Western democracies not to make of the unitary Czechoslovak model and any compromise with the Slovak exile in struggling against the “Slovak sepa- if they wanted to reestablish democracy ratism”. As the traditionally sovietophile in Central and Eastern Europe.20 Such Czech National Socialist Hubert Ripka18 hard and malicious pronouncements

16 Hrabovec, Emília: Generálne zhromaždenie SKS v Ríme 1975 v kontexte slovenského a medzinárodného vývoja. In: Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase proti komunistickému režimu. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: ÚPN, 2018, pp. 106 – 111; Eadem: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989). 2nd ed. Bratislava: Lúč, 2017, pp. 255 – 281. 17 ASMAECI, Afari Politici 1951 – 1957, Cecoslovacchia, busta 1276; [s.a.]: Wer war Matúš Černák? München: Akademischer Verlag Dr. Peter Belej, 1955; Archív Pápežského slovenského ústavu sv. Cyrila a Metoda v Ríme (thereafter APSÚSCM) APSÚSCM Roma, Korešpondencia 1955, Slovak Catholic Centre to Vojtech Bucko, Slovak priest and delegate of the German Bishops’ Conference for Slovak Catholics living in Munich, 403/55, 12 July 1955. 18 During the First Czechoslovak Republic Hubert Ripka was the co­editor of the journal dedicated to the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship Praha-Moskva and in 1935 he organized a journey of Czech journalists to the USSR. In the exile in London during World War II he belonged to the most open supporters of the pro-Soviet course of president Edvard Beneš and the government-in-exile. Cf. Ripka, Hubert: East and West. London: Lincolns-Prager, 1944, p. 34. 19 Kaplan, Karel: Poúnorový exil. Praha: Dialog, 2007, pp. 192 – 193, cites Ripka’s leter from 26 March 1949. 20 The citations are from an elaborate of the Czech Social Democrat Miroslav Kerner for the American occupation forces in Germany. Cited from Uhrík, Igor: Československý politický exil v Spojených štátoch amerických a Spojenom kráľovstve na začiatku studenej vojny. In: Politický exil z krajín strednej a východnej Európy: Motívy, stratégie, aktivity a perspektívy na Východe a Západe, 1945 – 1989. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2017, pp. 416 – 417.

34 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives resulted from the political and ideologi- of the post­February émigrés, too, both cal convictions of their authors, but also common emigrants and political prom- from their geopolitical thinking, clearly inents (Emanuel Böhm, Štefan Blaško, expressed by their political mentor Ed- Ľudovít Kandra, Michal Zibrín), once vard Beneš in 1947, as he declared that in liberty, avowed themselves supporters the Czechs could never accept an inde- of the Slovak statehood.23 pendent Slovakia, because having on Imrich Kružliak, himself member the one side 70 million Germans, they of the post-February emigration wave, must on the other side have Russia as personally connected with the Demo- their neighbour: “This is a vital problem cratic Party and the National Front gov- for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and ernment, who later, after he had not suc- as a state.”21 ceeded in emigrating to Canada, found A few Slovaks of “Czechoslovak” his daily bread in the Radio Free Europe convictions, former collaborators which he dared to criticise only after of the National Front system, engaged his retirement, branded the atitudes in the Council of Free Czechoslova- of the small group of Slovaks around kia. They representated a thin minor- the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ity among the Slovaks, but they gave as “political conjuncturalism”24 and the Council and its afliated institutions “a fnancial question”.25 “Their Czech- a “Czechoslovak” legitimacy.22 Among oslovakism arises out of fear provoked by them, there were some former diplo- the errors they commited after 1945 and from mats of the Prague Ministery of For- a kind of inferiority feeling, which results I do eign Afairs (Juraj Slávik, Ján Papánek) not know if from the conscience that they are and some exponents of the government very few or from the awareness that they act of the National Front from the Slovak in profound contrast to the will of the nation”, Democratic Party and the minuscule Kružliak wrote to his fried, the publicist Party of Liberty (Jozef Letrich, Rudolf Konštantín Čulen. “But Czechoslovakia fell Fraštacký, Jozef Dieška and others.). apart and it is not possible any more to re- Abroad, however, they got into a painful suscitate her, if not by pressure from outside isolation: because of inner conficts they and only as a federation, but I do not know soon at least temporarily left the Coun- for how long, since we have seen in the his- cil, while from the Slovak exile they tory how all these federations were bound to remained divided by an insurmount- end.”26 “The Czechs and the Czechoslovaks able precipice, since the huge majority may do whatever they want”, Kružliak

21 Zprůmyslnění Slovenska povede k vyrovnání mezi Čechy a Slováky. In: Rudé právo, (14 February 1947), p. 1. 22 Kaplan, Karel: Poúnorový exil, p. 64; Goněc, Vladimír: Česko-slovenský vztah v exilových diskusích počátkem padesátých let. Brno: Vydavatelství MU, 2006, pp. 52 – 58. 23 Emanuel Böhm became even president of the Restraint Presidium of the Slovak National Council Abroad. Cf. SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 36, minutes of the sessions of the Restraint Presidium 1953 – 1955; ibidem, Emanuel Böhm to Whitney Shepardson, President of the National Commitee for a Free Europe, 6 January 1954; SNA, SLvA, k. 14, Michal Zibrín to “My friend” [Konštantín Čulen?], 5 January 1955; Michal Zibrín to Charles J. Kersten, 4 January 1955. 24 SNA, SLvA, k. 14, Imrich Kružliak to Konštantín Čulen, 8 September 1951 25 Ibidem, 12 April 1950. 26 Ibidem, 8 September 1951.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 35 closed his observations, “I am not afraid a strategic space, in which they had no of their endeavours, because I know the mood other national interests than those dic- at home… They can return home only un- tated by the logics of the Cold War and der Czech bayonets and they would not last the geopolitics. for long in Slovakia today.”27 The situation in Washigton was even The representatives of the Slovak po- more complex. The American politics litical exile were well aware of the fact had an eminent interest in defeating that taking into account the weakness Communism and from 1947/1948 on, it of the Slovak factor on the internation- explicitly began to count on the exiles al stage, they could achieve their goals as instruments in the political and psy- only if they succeeded in involving chological warfare in the Cold War.28 the non-Slovak ambience, the exile rep- At the same time, however, Wash- resentatives of other nations, the inter- ington clearly stood on the platform national organisations, but above all of the concept of the united Czecho- the infuential Western governements slovakia, in which it saw not only a fa- and parliaments in the Slovak cause. vourite historical child of the American The victorious Western powers, how- liberal democracy born with American ever, despite the intensifying Cold War, help in 1918, but, apart from its Com- remained on the platform of the Jalta munist government, also an acceptable agreements and the territorial order es- political entity from the standpoint tablished in 1945 and respected the exist- of stability, security and economic vi- ence of Czechoslovakia, with which they ability of Central and Eastern Europe maintained diplomatic relations, the di- and the American geopolitical interests vision of the world into two blocks and and a safeguard against the political the existence of the Soviet zone of infu- and economic fragmentation of the re- ence, as they clearly demonstrated both gion. Therefore, Washington supported after the defeat of the Hungarian and the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, that the Polish uprisings in 1956 and after was for some time fnanced from the US the military intervention in Czechoslo- budget and initially considered a sort vakia in 1968. Moreover, the great West- of unofcial government­in­exile,29 and ern European protagonists on the inter- a “Czechoslovak point of view” in Amer- national chessboard, Great Britain and ican or US-inspired initiatives including France, lacked any particular historical the unique “Czechoslovak desk” of Radio and political ties to the small, geographi- Free Europe in Munich and the govern- cally and mentally distant Slovakia with- mental Voice of America.30 out proper historical state traditions, The Slovak policy in exile was well and considered her territory at the most aware of the relevance of the American

27 Ibidem, 12 April 1950. 28 Uhrík, Igor: Československý politický exil v Spojených štátoch amerických a Spojenom kráľovstve na začiatku studenej vojny, pp. 375 – 390. 29 Ibidem, pp. 397 – 421. 30 To the genesis and the programmatic line of the RFE in general see Johnson, A. Ross: Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and beyond. Stanford 2010; Cone, Stacey: Presuming a Right to Deceive: Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the CIA, and the News Media. Journalism History (Ohio University), a. 24, 1998/1999, nr. 4, htps://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio_University.

36 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives factor in international politics. Beside the Slovak-American organisations the existence of a strong and well-or- in the USA made use of this atmosphere ganized Slovak-American community, to point out to the clean anti-Communist this was the main reason while at the be- shield of their members31 and above all to ginning of the Fifties, several exile ini- make American politics acquainted with tiatives comprising the Slovak National the dramatic situation and the perduring Council Abroad transferred their seats to anti-Communist resistence in Slovakia the USA. However, under the given cir- (above all with the activities of the clan- cumstances, in the atempted rapproche- destine movemente Biela légia – The White ment to Washington, the Slovak policy Legion,32 and mass unrests). could capitalize only its anti-Communist Many American congressmen and stance. It was not a case that it found at- senators, critical of the excessive permis- tentive listening particularly in the frst siveness of the Roosevelt and the Truman half of the Fifties, as the most radical administrations towards the Soviets and phase of the Cold War culminated, hopes Communism and of the undiferentiated for a quick liberation from Communism support of the post-February Czech or were still surviving, but concerns about Czechoslovak exiles, former collaborators possible penetration of Communist in- of the undemocratic system of National fuence into the West and the USA be- front co-responsible for the Communist gan to grow, too. The Slovak exile and takeover in Czechoslovakia, showed

For the situation of the Slovaks within the unique Czechoslovak board cf. SNA, SLvA, k. 12, Report on the activities of the Slovak National Council Abroad in Europe, 13 November 1951; APSÚSCM, Korešpondencia 1953, Imrich Kružliak to Anton Botek, 23 October 1953; Jozef Šramek to Anton Botek, 25 October 1953; Korešpondencia 1954, Anton Botek to the president of the Association of the Slovak Catholics Miloš Mlynarovič, 25 November 1953; ibidem, Anton Botek and Štefan Náhalka to the abbot of the St. Andrew Abbey in Cleveland Teodor Kojiš, 25 November 1953; ibidem, leter of a refugee arrived on 19 October 1953; Korešpondencia 1954, elaborate „Menlivé úhly Dr. Šrámka“; ibidem, Jozef Šramek to Anton Botek, Štefan Náhalka and others, 22 January 1954; Kanadský Slovák, (3 October 1953), p. 4; Grébert, Arvéd: „Dôverne” o personálnej politike v RFE. Slobodné Slovensko, 41, Nr. 2 (1986), p. 3; Grébert, Arvéd: Svedectvo Dr. Jozefa Šrámka o Rádiu Slobodná Európa. In: Slovenský politický exil v zápase za samostatné Slovensko: Materiály z vedeckej konferencie konanej v Bratislave 5. – 6. júna 1995, Bratislava: Dom zahraničných Slovákov, 1996, pp. 289 – 291; Kružliak, Imrich: Rádio Slobodná Európa a Slováci. In: Slovenský povojnový exil: Zborník materiálov zo seminára Dejiny slovenského exilu po roku 1945. Ed.: Juraj Chovan­ Rehák – Genovéva Grácová – Peter Maruniak. Martin: MS, 1998, pp. 338 – 344; Katrebová Blehová, Beáta: Rádio Slobodná Európa a Svetový kongres Slovákov. In: Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase proti komunistickému režimu, pp. 184 – 207; Hrabovec, Emília: Štefan Náhalka – zakladajúci rektor Slovenského ústavu sv. Cyrila a Metoda a neofciálny slovenský diplomat v Ríme. In: Perla slovenského kňazstva: Štefan Náhalka (1916 – 1975). Ed.: Jozef Rydlo. Bratislava: LHS, 2020 (in print). 31 One of the ofcial reports of the Commitee on Un­American Activities that conduct enquiries about the Communist infuence in the USA, signifcantly stated that Slovak­American organisations belong to those who “are on record as opposed to Communist rule and as supporting present American forign policy”. Cf. Report on the American Slav Congress and Associated Organizations, 26 June 1949, cited from Paučo, Jozef: Slováci a komunizmus. Middletown [PA].: Jednota Press, 1957, p. 315. 32 On the White Legion see Vicen, Jozef: Vo víroch rokov 1938 – 1988. Bratislava: Lúč, 1999, pp. 191 – 220; Cintavý, Pavol: Po stopách Bielej légie v protikomunistickom odboji. Bratislava: Spisy Konfederácie politických väzňov Slovenska (Dokumenty a svedectvá II.); Idem: Dokumenty o Bielej légii. Bratislava: Spisy Konfederácie politických väzňov Slovenska (Edícia Dokumenty a svedectvá III).

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 37 a keen interest in news about the perdur- representing the anti-Communist Slovak peo- ing anti-Communist resistance in Slova- ple”. 33 In March 1955 congressman Alvin kia and discovered in the Slovaks a far M. Bentley cited in the House of Repre- stronger pillar of anti-Communism than sentatives the Declaration of the Slovak Czechoslovakia. They blamed the Amer- National Council Abroad approved on ican government for disregarding its 4th July 1954 in Niagara Falls, that defend- own democratic principles and for “trag- ed the right of the Slovaks to self-deter- ic errors” in relation to small nations mination and expressed the conviction including the Slovaks, and did not hide that the best safeguard of the political, the conviction that the USA should give cultural, and economic rights of the Slo- the Slovaks political and a moral sup- vak nation consisted in a democratic Slo- port by recognizing publicly their right vak state and that “there cannot be freedom of self-determination including the right for the Slovak nation as long as democratic to an independent state. governments shall seek a compromise with Extremely agile in this sense was the Soviets or with states having a Com- congressman Ray J. Madden, in 1951 munistic government”. 34 Alvin M. Bent- president of the Select Commitee to ley and senator Everet Dirksen met Conduct an Investigation and Study also with the president of the German of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstanc- branch of the Slovak National Council es of the Katyń Forest Massacre. In May Abroad Matúš Černák during his jour- 1953, Madden submited to the Congress ney to the USA in 1953 that lasted sever- a concurrent resolution in which he ex- al months; on this occasion, Černák was pressed the frm conviction “that the Slo- received also in the State Department.35 vak people have the right of self-determina- In similar sense acted also the congress- tion and the right to be governed by their men Alvin O’Konski, Daniel J. Flood, own consent based on the free expression Clement Zablocky, Edward Derwinski, of popular will in free elections”. T he reso - Philip J. Philbin, Michael A. Feighan lution demanded for Slovakia free elec- and others, who maintained contacts tions under the supervision of the Unit- with the representatives of the Slovak ed Nations, “aid and moral support to active National Council Abroad, with the Slo- fghters now struggling for the liberation vak League in America and other Slovak of the Slovak people”, a n d t h e r e c o g n i - organisations, held speeches in their tion of an “efective Government in Exile public meetings and published their

33 Concurrent Resolution in the House of Representatives, submited by Hon. Ray J. Madden, 7 May 1953, published in Kirschabum, Joseph M.: Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1960, Document Nr. 58, pp. 335 – 336. A similar concurrent resolution was submited by Madden on 2 May 1956. Published ibidem, p. 353. 34 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 37, Extention of Remarks of Hon. Alvin M. Bentley of Michigan in the House of Representatives, 10 March 1955. 35 Matúš Černák v Amerike. In: Slobodné Slovensko, a. 8, 1953, nr. 9, pp. 1 – 2; Z Černákovej aktivity v USA. In: Slobodné Slovensko, a. 8, 1953, nr. 11 – 12, p. 2; Vnuk, František: Životopis Konštantína Čulena. Cleveland [OH]: Slovenský ústav, 1984, p. 176. Cf. remeberance of Štefan Kramár in Maruniak, Peter (ed.): Prof. Matúš Černák 1903 – 1955. Žilina: Kabinet výskumu dejín slovenského exilu Matice slovenskej a Mestský úrad Žilina, 1999, p. 58 and Mikuš, Jozef A.: Pamäti slovenského diplomata. Middletown [PA]: Jednota, 1978, p. 425, published a photograph of the meeting with senator Everet Dirksen.

38 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives resolutions and memoranda in the Con- without any outside pressure.38 Kersten gressional Records.36 was convinced, and at the historical con- The probably most visible political gress of the Slovak League in May 1952 steps were taken by congressman Charles he publicly acknowledged, that Slovakia J. Kersten. On the basis of information should not have been deprived of her provided by the Slovak exile, particular- state independence, because it violated ly by the president of the Commission the Christian and the democratic prin- for foreign afairs of the SNRvZ Jozef Mi- ciples and because as an independent kuš, who had a special ofce in Washing- state it would have resisted the Commu- ton, and by the co-founder of the White nist expansion far more efectively than Legion Jozef Mikula,37 Kersten introduct- Czechoslovakia did: ed in July 1951 into the Congress a con- current resolution of far-reaching rele- “The Slovaks have ever opposed Com- vance, in which he stressed the existence munism: and they strongly resist it of a strong anti-Communist movement today. Slovakia should not have been in Slovakia (“there ist no other country wantonly destroyed, because it could in the Soviet orbit which has a beter under- have served us in a good stead today on ground movement than heroic Slovakia”) the side of the democratic world. It is and called upon the USA to formulate in the interest of America that all na- a more severe anti-Communist policy, tions of the earth, including the Slovak to avoid any further agreements with nation, have the right to self-determina- Czechoslovakia and to orient the Amer- tion and, if they so desire, to be free and ican United Nations representatives independent.”39 to demand that free elections be held in Slovakia and in the Czech lands under In July 1953 Kersten helped the supervision of the United Nations so the delegation of the SNRvZ to be re- that the Slovak and the Czech nations ceived in the State Department, where it may freely choose their own form of gov- presented a memorandum on the Slovak ernment and establish their own states question addressed to the State Secretary

36 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 36, 37; Mikuš, Jozef A.: Pamäti slovenského diplomata, p. 392. 37 In Washington a special ofce of the Slovak National Council Abroad (ofcially maintained and fnanced by the Slovak League of America) was opened whose primary task consisted in informing of American politicians and politicians and diplomats arriving to the US capital on the situation of Slovakia and the political programme of the Slovak exile. The ofce was lead by Jozef M. Mikuš, a former Slovak diplomat, jurist and expert for foreign policy in the Presidium of the Slovak National Council Abroad. SNA, SLvA, k. 12, Mikuš’s reports on his visiting diplomacy and lobbying in Washington. See also SNA, OF Jozef M. Mikuš, k. 9, Mikuš’correspondence with congressman Kersten and other American politicians. Cf. Mikuš, Jozef A.: Pamäti slovenského diplomata, pp. 391 – 394. For providing of information to American congressmen and senators on the resistance activities in Slovakia cf. also Katrebová Blehová, Beáta: Kongresman Charles J. Kersten a výbor Kongresu Spojených štátov amerických pre vyšetrovanie komunistickej agresie. In: Historický zborník, a. 29, 2019, nr. 2, pp. 66 – 79; Kirschabum, Joseph M.: Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads, pp. 312 – 360. 38 The Kersten Resolution for the Freedom of the Slovaks (No. 139). Congressional Record, 17 July 1951, 959126 – 39804. 39 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 20, Independent Slovakia should not have been destroyed. Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten at the Conference sponsored by the Slovak League of America, 23 May 1952.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 39 John Foster Dulles and handed over to Communism. According to the report, it the chief of the Division for East Euro- was ‘above all the naive faith, condivided pean Afairs Mr. Barbour.40 In 1954, af- in varying degrees by all Czech politi- ter Stalin’s death, as the Soviet leader- cians, that was responsible for the fact ship gradually began to push forward that the Communist Party took over the policy of peaceful coexistence that the power so easily in 1948’.”42 was strongly criticised by the Slovak exile, Kersten initiated the creation The Slovak exile policy nourished of the Select Commitee on Communist great expectations from the presidency Agression that enquired Communist of Dwight Eisenhower (1953 – 1956)43 crimes in Eastern Europe, heard a huge that, as it appears, considered a correc- number of testimonies comprising sev- tion of the American policy in favour eral Slovaks and in cooperation with ten of the Slovaks, who were regarded congressmen and with the experts from the element of strongest resistance the Georgetown University elaborated against Communism in Central and a fnal report known as the Kersten Re- Eastern Europe. In 1956, as anti-Com- port. It not only condemned the peace- munist uprisings in Hungary and in Po- ful coexistence as a “myth”, but outlined land culminated and reports about un- the history of Slovak struggles for po- rest and clandestine movements arrived litical equality and freedom, criticised also from Slovakia, a Slovak delegation the reintegration of Slovakia into Czecho- was received for the frst time personal- slovakia “without any form of plebiscite” ly by the Secretary of State John Foster as contradictory to democratic principles Dulles, who had been a frequent ad- and emphasised the right of the small dressee of Slovak memoranda and leters European nations comprising the Slo- already since the beginning of the Fif- vaks to self-determination.41 The Slovak ties. The president of the Slovak League political exile considered the Kersten re- in America Filip Hrobák, who partici- port a fundamental document that pated in the delegation, summarised his impressions with the words: “The State “rebuts political legends and propa- Secretary has been well informed about ganda lies” and “reveals clearly who the substance of the Slovak problem already bears the guilt of murders, political and before our visit. From his remarks it was clear religious persecution and fnally the mer- that he knew that the Slovaks do not want to ciless delivery of Slovakia and Czechia to live with the Czechs in one state.”44

40 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 36, Minutes of the meeting of the Restraint Presidium of the SNRvZ in Washington, 2 July 1953. 41 Kersten, Charles J.: Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czechoslovakia. Special Report No. 8 of the Select Commitee on Communist Agression No. 8 of the Select Commitee on Communist Agression, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Washington: United States Government Printing Ofce, 1955. 42 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 20, Nad záverečnou správou Kerstenovho výboru. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum. 43 Černák, Matúš: Das erwarten die Slowaken vom Präsidenten Eisenhower. In: Südor-Stimmen, a. 2, 1958, pp. 6 – 8. 44 SNA, SLvA, k. 14, minutes of the meeting of the Executive Commitee of the Slovak League in America, Pitsburgh, 15 December 1956.

40 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Nevertheless, a principal revision of diplomatic relations with Prague and of the American policy towards Czecho- in principle not excluding a possible re- slovakia did not occur. Although the State setlement of Central Europe according to Department in several ofcial leters the will of the nations in a post-Commu- to American congressmen and Slovak nist future, underestimated the gravity representatives recognized the princi- of national oppression as an integral part ple of self-determination of all nations of the Communist repression and in prac- and the right of the Czech and Slovak tice lent force to those political factors that peoples to determine themselves in fu- saw their raison d’être in the unconditional ture under free conditions whether they defense of the Czechoslovak status quo. will continue to live together in a com- More favourable conditions for mon Czechoslovak state,45 it reiterated the Slovak exile were to be found at the same time its refusal to take any in Western Germany. By its creation initiative in proposing alternative forms in 1949 the Western German state did not of the organisation of Central Europe and gain a complete sovereignty and thanks stressed that the American policy should to the absence of a peace treaty with concentrate on the creation of conditions Germany and to the division of Germa- under which the peoples of Eastern Eu- ny into two states integrated into two rope will be able to freely determine their diferent political blocs, the German governmental and economic institutions, question remained open. Nevertheless, and not become involved in discussions Bonn received the possibility to conduct about the future of the enslaved nations.46 its proper foreign policy and thanks Washington continued to consider to the decision of the Western Allies to the united Czecho slovakia a viable polit- rapidly integrate Western Germany into ical concept, and the policy of “non-pre- euroatlantic political, economic and later determination”, although corresponding also military structures, also some space to the political logics of the existence for maneuvering.

45 As James Cowles Hart Bonbright, acting assistant secretary in the Department of State, put it in a leter of 16 August 1951 addressed to Rev. Florian C. Billy, chief secretary of the Association of Slovak Catholics: “The United States has never opposed the aspirations of any people in Europe to determine by their own free choice the state or form of political organization under which they wished to live. On the contrary, self-determination has been a fundamental principle of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson; and this Government has not departed from it in the case of the Slovaks.” Cf. Kirschbaum, Joseph M.: Slovakia – Nation at the Crossroads, pp. 358 – 359; Ďurčanský, Ferdinand: Die slowakische Frage eine internationale Frage. München: Slowakisches Befreiungskomitee, 1954, pp. 9, 24. The Department of State confrmed this view in the leter of the Assistent Secretary Thruston B. Morton to Alvin M. Bentley of 2 May 1955. Kirschbaum, Joseph M.: Slovakia – Nation at the Crossroads, pp. 359 – 360. Bentley quoted the leter in his remarks at the 34th Congress of the Slovak League of America on 23 May 1955. Cf. Glaser, Kurt: Czecho- Slovakia: a critical history. Caldwell [ID]: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1961, pp. 243 – 244. 46 Cf. the already mentioned leter of the Department of State of 2 May 1955 to Alvin M. Bentley, quoted by Glaser, Kurt: Czecho-Slovakia: a critical history, pp. 243 – 244, and a leter of Philip Hrobak, president of the Slovak League of America, to congressman Daniel J. Flood of 14 July 1955, in which he critically discussed the views of the State Department. The remarks of Daniel J. Flood in the House of Representatives of 20 July 1955, in which he quoted in extenso the leter of Philip Hrobak, were published by Kirschbaum, Joseph M.: Slovakia – Nation at the Crossroads, pp. 349 – 352.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 41 Thanks to the geopolitical posi- Free Europe and Radio Liberty, where tion, the unresolved German question, the representatives of almost all Europe- whose integral part were the millions an political exiles lived, a great number of Volksdeutsche expulsed from the East, of diferent exile publications appeared and the traditional historical and eco- and that soon became the playground nomic ties with Central and Eastern for the highest concentration of agents and Europe, Western Germany, diverse- spies that had ever met at the same place. ly from the Western states in the real Though the Bonn government could sense, in the long run could not be dis- not and did not want to ofcially support interested in Central-Eastern Europe any of the Slovak exile groups, it tolerated and in at least theoretical refections their activities and even maintained some on its possible future reorganisation, contacts with them. Since 1953 the Minis- in spite of the fact that under the giv- try for inner German questions even sub- en circumstances its foreign policy was sidized with a considerable monthly sum oriented towards the West and the inte- the activities of the Slovak National Coun- gration in euro-atlantic structures, and cil Abroad and the publication of the jour- for the moment renounced the reunifca- nal Slobodné Slovensko (The Free Slovakia). tion of the country. This was largely a personal merit of Matúš The entrance of the German policy Černák. Černák, as a former student into the European political concert had, of University of Leipzig from his youth therefore, a not negligible relevance culturally oriented towards Germany, for the Slovak exile and signifcantly spent practically the whole war in Berlin broadened its operative possibilities. as minister plenipotentiary of the Slovak In a conversation with a high ofcer Republic and established a widespread of the German Ministry of Foreign Af- network of relations there. Many of his fairs Dr. Kossmann on 11 October 1952, contacts had connections to the anti-Na- the president of the German branch tional Socialist resistence groups around of the SNRvZ Matúš Černák signifcantly Carl Friedrich Goerdeler or the bishop remarked that France and Great Britain of Berlin Konrad von Preysing or with could be satisfed with the given geopolit- people around the future co-founder ical constellation, whereas Western Ger- of the German Christian Democracy and many, the USA and the countries of Cen- federal chancellor Konrad Adenauer, tral and Eastern Europe had a common and after the birth of the German Fed- interest in the fall of Communism and eral Republic they occupied infuential a new order in Central Eastern Europe.47 posts in the nascent political and higher Hence it was not by chance that administrative apparatus at the feder- at the beginning of the Fifties several al or the regional level. In exile, Černák leading personalities of the Slovak exile maintained personal contacts with chan- moved to Germany. They usually setled cellor and till 1955 also minister of for- in Munich, where the Americans had eign afairs Adenauer, with Adenauers founded the broadcasting stations Radio successor in ofce Kurt Kiesinger or with

47 Hruboň, Anton: Poznámky k politickým aktivitám slovenského exilu v prvej polovici 50. rokov z pohľadu agendy Zahraničného úradu Nemeckej spolkovej republiky. In: Slovensko v rokoch neslobody 1938 – 1989, vol. III.: Menšiny. Ed.: Anton Hruboň – Juraj Jankech – Katarína Ristveyová. Banská Bystrica: Belianum, 2014, pp. 234 – 246.

42 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the federal minister for displaced per- the Carpathian Germans a full civic sons, refugees and war victims Theodor equality and the right to cultural auton- Oberländer. The president of the German omy, as well as an indemnity for the per- federal parliament, the Christian Demo- secution after 1945, while the Association crat Eugen Gerstenmaier, during the war of Carpathian Germans obliged itself to member of the resistance group Kreisau- “fully support the SNRvZ in its struggle er Kreis, and his party colleague in Ade- for the independence of Slovakia”. 49 nauer’s government Waldemar Kraft, Eforts to establish contacts with even spoke at the celebrations of the Slo- the exiles of other nations from Cen- vak statehood in March 1956.48 Although tral and Eastern Europe on the basis these contacts cannot be overestimated, of the common refusal of Communism in their time they probably represented and of Jalta, a common Christian and con- the best contacts to the political establish- servative ideological views and common ment the Slovak exile disposed of in any eforts to achieve freedom and self­deter- Western state. mination for all nations, represented an- The representatives of the Slovak exile other characteristic feature of the Slovak in Germany were well aware of the fact political exile. These contacts were often that expulsed Germans from the East, informal, based on personal contacts, or, above all the Carpathian Germans (Kar- in other cases, on an institutional plat- patendeutsche) from Slovakia, represent- form like the Central European Federal ed an important political factor that Club in London, the Anti-Bolshevic Bloc could not be ignored. While professor of Nations in Munich, or Intermarium. Ďurčanský later maintained mainly cul- Signifcantly, the only exile with which tural and scientifc contacts with them, – with some exceptions50 – it proved Černák in the name of SNRvZ in January impossible to establish a political dia- 1953 even signed a cooperation agree- logue, because of complete irreconcila- ment with the Association of Carpathian bility in all basic questions concerning Germans in Germany (Karpatendeutsche the political future, was the Czech one, Landsmannschaft). The agreement stat- frmly based on the platform of uncon- ed that “the vital interests both of the Slo- ditional maintenance of the Czecho- vak nation and of the citizens of Slovakia slovak state. Consequently, the Slovak of German nationality can be fully guaran- exile remained excluded from all those teed only in an independent and democratic exile associations that were founded as Slovak state”. The Slovak side promised organisations of former ofcial political

48 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 36, chief of the German branch of the SNRvZ Fraňo Tiso to the Presidium of the SNRvZ in Clevelande, report on the activity, 27 July 1956. 49 Ibidem. For Černák’s contacts with the organisation of Carpathian Germans whose centre was in Stutgard see also Černák, Matúš: Pozdrav do Stutgartu – Gruss nach Stutgart. In: Slobodné Slovensko, a. 6, 1051, nr. 6, p. 1. 50 This exception was represented by a small number of Czech exile politicians who were in opposition to the post-February Czech political mainstream and particularly to the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, open criticized the People’s Democratic Czechoslovakia and were willing to recognize the Slovak claim for independence. Cf. Cholínský, Jan: Český a slovenský protikomunistický odboj v zahraničí po únoru 1948: Sonda do vztahů Čechů a Slováků neuznávajících Radu svobodného Československa. In: Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2012, pp. 707 – 742.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 43 representatives of the postwar regimes where institutional structures arose and in Central Eastern Europe, that were large scale activities were launched that at least partially fnanced by the Amer- surpassed even the exiles of many oth- ican National Commitee for a Free Eu- er historically and numerically strong- rope (later Free Europe Commitee, both er nations. The Slovak Catholic Centre fnancially dependent on the US state founded in 1951 was their frst pillar, budget) and had an anti­Communist, in 1963 replaced by the Slovak Institute but at the same time a leftist character, of St. Cyril and Methodius around which as for example the Assembly of Captive a strong group of Slovak priests gathered European Nations that accepted only who tought in the Slovak gymnasium, representatives of the Council of Free worked in the pastoral service for the Slo- Czechoslovakia, who placed a veto on vaks abroad, founded a Slovak publish- the Slovak membership.51 ing house, lectured at the pontifcal uni- A specifc feature of the Slovak exile versities or worked in the Roman Curia. that refected the tightly interwoven na- Although these wide range activites were tional and religious identity of the Slo- primarily of religious or cultural-aca- vaks and the vivid religiosity of their demic character, they did have a consid- past generations, was its close linkage erable political relevance.52 It consisted to the Church (for the great majority already in the very fact that on the “papal the Catholic one) and a relevant pres- soil” the Slovaks acted consequently un- ence of Catholic clergy (and some evan- der the own name and under their own gelical pastors) in its institutional struc- institutions recognized by the Holy See tures and activities. With the frst exile that never created any “Czechoslovak” wave after 1945 several dozens of Catho- institutions. The “missions” (parish- lic priests arrived. They were active not es) for Catholics living abroad, founded only in the religious feld, but in char- according to the apostolic constitution ity and cultural activities of the exile, of Pius XII Exsul familia (1952),53 were or- as well. A strong group of priests and ganized in consonance with the national religious arrived in exile at the turn principle, in the framework of the Vati- between the Forties and the Fifties, as can Radio a Slovak broadcasting existed, the frst wave of agressive anti­Catholic the same applied to the diferent com- persecution in Czechoslovakia culminat- mitees or curial organs dedicated to ed. Rome became their natural centre, specifc questions of the Church behind

51 By a leter of 24 July 1957, the chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations Vilis Masens rejected the application for membership of the Slovak National Council Abroad of 28 August 1956 argueing that “for Mr. Peter Zenkl that application ‘was unacceptable’.”The Slovak National Council Abroad, as the chairman of its Foreign Afairs Commitee put it, considered the position of the Assembly “nothing less than a denial of the right of self-determination to one of the oldest Central-European nations”. SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 21, Jozef Mikuš to the leaders of the delegations of the members of ACEN, 15 September 1957. 52 Hrabovec, Emília et al.: Slovenský ústav svätých Cyrila a Metoda v Ríme (1963 – 2013). Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Univerzity Komenského, 2015, and the references quoted there. 53 Pius PP XII: Exsul Familia. In: Acta Apostolicae Sedis, a. 44, 1952, pp. 649f. On the Slovak Catholic missions in the world see Hrušovský, Dominik: Slovenský ústav sv. Cyrila a Metoda v Ríme a duchovná služba pre Slovákov v zahraničí. In: Hrabovec, Emília et al: Slovenský ústav svätých Cyrila a Metoda, pp. 53 – 97.

44 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the Iron Curtain. Up to a certain point, of the situation. It became evident that the Slovak exile in Rome could even re- for the time being, resistance activities place a non existing Slovak diplomacy behind the Iron Curtain had hardly any and bishops’ conference and contrib- chances to succeed, and the realisation ute to a relevant degree to the solution of the expectations of the political exile of various unresolved political-ecclesias- had to be postponed to a distant future. tical questions, among them the creation The changed international situation, of the Slovak Church province that laid above all the new policy of peaceful coex- the ecclesiastical foundations of the Slo- istence, which was beginning to appear vak individuality.54 since 1954 – 1956, and the gradual shift In the middle of the Fifties, the frst of political interest towards the Third signifcant turning point in the histo- World, signalised, too, that both sides ry of the Slovak exile occured. While were preparing for a long convivence. at the beginning of the Fifties A negative infuence on the activities an optimistic view reigned with regard of the Slovak exile exerted paradoxically to a possible political change in Europe also the Austrian State Treaty (Staatsver- and the tense international atmosphere trag) signed in 1955 which obliged Aus- (Corean war, Berlin crisis, uprising tria to permanent neutrality, thus hin- in Eastern Germany, Poland and Hun- dering exile activities on Austrian soil, gary) further nourished such hopes, where until then the foreign centre the defeat of the Hungarian and Polish of the White Legion and a broadcasting uprisings and hard reprisals in Slovakia, station of the same name had operated that practically ended the phase of open and the basis of the exile information and resistance to the Czechoslovak Commu- communication services resided; the f- nist regime, brought painful disappoint- nal blow to its activities was the kidnap- ments. The probably most painful one ping of its main organizer Jozef Vicen to was caused by the atitude adopted by Czechoslovakia by the Czechoslovak se- the Western countries that demonstrat- cret service two years later.55 ed that the Western powers might have The Slovak National Council Abroad, been anti-Communist and verbally con- too sufered painful human losses, as demn the Soviet intervention, but they in the course of a few years three presi- respected the Soviet zone of infuence dents of the Council died56 and the most and – absorbed by their own problems agile and successful territorial vice-pres- like the Suez crisis or the wars in Indo- ident Matúš Černák was murdered by china and Tunis Algeria – they behaved the Czechoslovak secret service. The Slo- passively. The outcome of the events vak Liberation Commitee on the other of the fery autumn of 1956 for a long time hand was marked by a certain discon- buried all hopes for a quick improvement tinuity caused by the emigration of its

54 Cf. Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 221 – 282. 55 Cf. his memoirs Vicen, Jozef: Vo víroch rokov 1938 – 1988, pp. 224 – 233. 56 The founding president Karol Sidor died in Canada in 1953, his successor in ofce František Hrušovský in Cleveland in the USA in 1956 and Jozef Cíger Hronský in Argentina in 1960. SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 36, Minutes from the extraordinary meeting of the Restraint Presidium of the SNRvZ on 13 September 1956 in Cleveland.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 45 leading personalities to the distant Ar- – the liberation from the Communist and gentina in 1947, although Ďurčanský Czech preponderance and the renewel returned to the Old Continent in 1952, of an independent Slovak state, whereas and by the fact that the political precon- the persisting division into two camps, ditions it had counted on in its frantic ac- as time passed, was nourished more by tivities immediately after the war, failed personal animosities than by diferen- to materialize. cies of programmatic or at least tacti- Under these circumstances, at the lat- cal character, but caused the exile deep est in the second half of the Fifties the Slo- moral and political damages. In May vak exile began to abandon the more 1960 representatives of Slovak Liberation radical ideas about the possibilities of re- Commitee, Slovak National Council sistance against the Prague Communist Abroad and Slovak League in America regime and to focus on long term activ- fnally met in New York and agreed upon ities. It continued its exhausting eforts, the foundation of a unique exile political hindered by the fnancial straits in which organisation called Slovak Liberation most of the exiles lived, to inform rele- Council that in its frst public message vant political instancies and the world confrmed the goal to work for the liber- public opinion about the dramatic sit- ation of Slovakia “from the Communist-So- uation in Slovakia and to claim liberty, viet tyranny and the Czech occupation” and democracy and independence for Slova- for “a free, democratic Slovak Republic based kia; the methods and ways of its activi- on Christian principles”. 58 ties, however, underwent some changes. Spiritus movens of this unifying meet- Cultural, scientifc and publishing activ- ing was the Canadian-Slovak industri- ities, that in front of the academic and al magnate Štefan B. Roman, originally political public opinion historically and member of the Slovak Liberation Commit- juridically justifed the right of the Slo- tee. In the course of the Sixties, Roman vak nation to self-determination and to distinguished himself as one of the most an independent state,57 assumed a dom- prominent protagonists of the Slovak ex- inant role, together with intensive reli- ile. It was Roman who few days before gious activities. Christmas of 1968 invited the represent- In this situation, voices were raised atives of the Slovak Liberation Council with new urgency that called for unifca- and of the Slovak League in America tion of the exile, all the more considering to Toronto to a common meeting with the fact that unlike other national exiles the aim of fnding a way how to unify from behind the Iron Curtain, innerly di- all Slovak forces in the West under one vided along party and ideological lines, common institutional roof.59 the Slovak exile was programmatically The immediate motivation was man- and socially relatively homogeneous, ifold. The most important one were condivided the same basic programme the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968,

57 Ďurčanský, Ferdinand: Právo Slovákov na samostatnosť vo svetle dokumentov. Buenos Aires: Slovenský oslobodzovací výbor, 1954; Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Náš boj o samostatnosť Slovenska. Cleveland [OH]: Slovak Institute, 1958. 58 Posolstvo slovenskému národu. In: Jednota (Middletown), a. 70, 1960, nr. 3594 (8 June), p. 1. 59 Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Založenie Svetového kongresu Slovákov. In: Desať rokov činnosti SKS. Ed.: Idem. Toronto: Svetový kongres Slovákov, 1981, pp. 20 – 28.

46 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the great hopes awoken by the polit- In this context, an urgent necessity ical liberalisation and sufocated by was generally felt to have an exile or- the military intervention of the armies ganisation that would unite all Slovaks of the Warsaw Pact, which was followed in the world, thus giving them force and by a new exodus, that showed the per- legitimity to speak on behalf of the si- sistent lack of freedom in the country lenced nation at home and to claim jus- behind the Iron Curtain. The new émi- tice, freedom, self-determination and grés brought a “blood transfusion”60 into independence for her. Out of these re- the exile and new challenges, as well. fections, the idea was born to found An entire human and political genera- a Slovak World Congress (Svetový kon- tion divided them from their exile pre- gres Slovákov, SKS), that for the frst decessors. They were already grown time appeared in public in June 1970 and up and educated in the Communist whose institutional genesis was complet- Czechoslovakia, many of them showed ed at the General Assembly in Toronto no interest in political activities or after in June 1971.61 a quarter of century of political indoctri- The foundation of the Congress was nation in Czechoslovak schools they had a historical step. For the frst time it difculties to orient themselves in Slo- united practically the whole Slovak ex- vak history and in the exile situation and ile and created a strong and respected were hardly integrable into the existing platform for its political and cultural political organisations. activities. Extraordinary perspectives At the same time, however, the feder- opened to the activities of the Congress alisation of Czechoslovakia and the cre- thanks to the fact that it was headed by ation of the Slovak Socialist Republic Štefan B. Roman, a well-known person- demonstrated to the world that the exile ality with world-wide political, econom- claim of self-determination correspond- ic and social contacts. Roman, a deeply ed with the will of the nation, survived religious Catholic of Eastern Rite, former all persecutions and came to the surface lay auditor of the Second Vatican Coun- in the very frst favourite moment that cil, organizer of huge religious events presented itself, although in the limited in Canada and elsewhere and personal form which the given situation allowed. friend of two popes, who had a cathe- The new federative order, since 1969 pro- dral constructed on his property near gressively undermined, remained, how- Toronto, maintained also lively contacts ever, a question of inner politics, so that within the highest ranks of the ecclesi- Slovakia continued to be deprived of her astical world.62 Roman united the ideal- own voice abroad and to be non-existent ism of a glowing patriot, who considered for the outer world. serving the nation a moral duty to which

60 Vnuk, František: Slovensko v plánoch politickej emigrácie (1945 – 1970). In: Slovenský politický exil v zápase za samostatné Slovensko, p. 139. 61 Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Založenie Svetového kongresu Slovákov, pp. 20 – 45. 62 Hrabovec, Emília, Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 101 – 103, 121, 177, 181 – 182, 329, 361, 389. With regard to Roman’s nomination as auditor of the Second Vatican Council see Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Cità del Vaticano (AAV), Concilio Vaticano II, busta 670, directory of the auditors; ibidem, general secretary of the Council Pericle Felici to Štefan B. Roman, 21 September 1964.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 47 he remained unconditionally devoted did not exist internationally and that for the whole life and to which he was only an independent state could give it ready to dedicate time, energy and con- real freedom, justice and equality with siderable fnancial means, with the prag- other nations which the Congress did matism of a businessman who refused not cease to claim. Hence from the begin- empty political dreaming and demand- ning the Congress claimed the state inde- ed a disciplined and deliberated activity pendence of Slovakia, but with regard to and who enjoyed an unquestionable au- the dynamic international development, thority, able to mediate in conficts and to the existence of Czechoslovakia, rec- to lead the way. ognized by the international community The Slovak World Congress represent- of states, and to other factors, above all ed a broader organisation than its exile the accusation from abroad, particular- predecessors. As an umbrella organisa- ly from the USA, but also from a small- tion of all Slovaks, it united at one insti- er part of the émigrés after 1968, that it tutional platform not only the postwar “prejudges” the decision of the nation political emigration, but all Slovak organ- at home,65 he did it above all with refer- isations and individual persons regard- ence to the generally recognized princi- less of their political or religious views or ple of self-determination, “that includes the time when they had come abroad, i.e. also the right of a nation to an independent both Slovaks from all waves of the postwar state”, 66 and the principle of full equality political emigration and the community within the family of nations. of expatriates of older origin. It wanted to With particular openness become a “Slovak parliament” sui generis, the Congress manifested its commit- “a unity in diversity”, 63 on the platform ment to the independent Slovak state of a common goal, defned by the pro- in 1979, on the occasion of the 40th anni- grammatic declaration of the founding versary of the proclamation of the frst congress in New York as the realisation Slovak Republic. The Congress dedicat- of the natural law of the Slovak people to ed to this topic the entire number of its freedom, political and spiritual self-de- journal Bulletin SKS and a special Dec- termination, equality with other nations, laration, that explained that the birth “an international justice expressed by the full of the frst Slovak Republic could not be democratic statehood” and the right to free- understood as a consequence of outer in- ly and directly participate in the integra- tervention, but as a natural consequence tion process in Europe.64 of Slovak historical development and The Slovaks in the Congress were as a “inalienable right and inalienable obli- well aware that a nation without a state gation of the Slovak nation”. 67 The right to

63 Cf. the programmatic speech of Štefan B. Roman at the General Assembly in Washington in 1978. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 32/33, 1978, pp. 6 – 8. 64 Declaration approved by the preparative General Assembly in New York in 1970, published by Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Založenie Svetového kongresu Slovákov, pp. 41 – 42. 65 Okáľ, Ján: Ideológia SKS v prejavoch Štefana B. Romana. Kirschbaum, Jozef M. (ed.): Desať rokov činnosti SKS, p. 208. 66 From among a high number of diferent pronouncements cf. for example Roman’s speech on the meeting of the Presidium of SKS in Paris 27 – 28 April 1979. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 35, 1979, p. 6. 67 Bulletin SKS, a. 9, nr. 34, 1979, p. 1. The whole number of Bulletin SKS, a. 9, nr. 34, 1979, was dedicated to this anniversary and to the analysis of the third political goal of the Congress –

48 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives an independent state was particularly The representatives of the Slovak stressed in a special chapter of a funda- World Congress were well aware that mental document elaborated by a closed the realisation of their desires would meeting in Galt in Canada in 1979 on not only depend on the fact if they suc- the occasion of the 40th anniversary ceed in unifying and mobilizing all rel- of the proclamation of the frst Slovak evant Slovak forces abroad and from Republic and approved by the General the development in Slovakia, but, as al- Assembly in Toronto in 1981, that de- ways in the case of small and politically fned the basic ideological starting points weak nations, also on the will and the in- and political aims of the Congress.68 terests of the great powers.70 Therefore, On the occasion of the 50th anniversary the activity of Slovak World Congress of the frst Slovak Republic the Congress had from its very start an explicit for- issued a special declaration entitled His- eign-policy and international dimen- tory is the Witness of Our Rights. The Dec- sion. Already the frst General Assembly laration ended with an invitation to all of the Congress in New York in June 1970 Slovaks in the world: declared the Slovak question an inter- national one,71 the Congress notifed its “We invite all Slovaks in the world, all foundation to all Western foreign min- democratic political currents, all cul- istries72 and in its activities it systemati- tural feasors and spiritual workers, into cally tried to “get Slovakia back on the map the work for a democratic statehood. of Europe”, i.e. to present the Slovak issue A modern and culturally highly-devel- on international political, academic and oped nation needs all of them, in order cultural fora and to fnd a way how to to work, in spite of all diferent opin- inform key representatives of the West- ions, for a common goal: the democratic ern powers and of international organ- freedom in an own independent state. isations about the Slovak question and For us, this idea is imprescriptible. to convince them to take it into consid- We shall promote it till the victorious eration as a relevant factor of the future end, as the national consciousness and European order. the human honour requires it from us. The basic strategy of the Con- In front of the world we want to be a free gress parted from the conviction that and independent nation.”69 the Slovak cause would be served best

the independence of Slovakia. Cf. also Kirschbaum, Stanislav J.: Význam ťažiskových aktivít SKS. In: Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase proti komunistickému režimu, p. 91. 68 Bulletin SKS, nr. 47, 1981, pp. 13 – 15. Cf. Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Poznámky k Ideovým základom a politickým cieľom SKS. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 48, 1981, p. 13. 69 Bulletin SKS, nr. 83, 1989, pp. 1 – 2. The Declaration was signed by the acting president of the Slovak World Congress Jozef Krištofík and by the general secretary Dušan Tóth. 70 The president of the Congress Štefan B. Roman, in a very realistic way, always stressed this fact. Cf. for example Roman, Štefan B.: Svetový kongres Slovákov po piatich rokoch. Bulletin SKS, nr. 18/19, 1975, pp. 1 – 2 and Idem: Slovenské práva sú nedeliteľnou časťou ľudských práv. Bulletin SKS, nr. 47, 1981, pp. 1 – 7. 71 The Declaration approved by the preparative Slovak World Congress in New York was published also in Desať rokov činnosti SKS, pp. 41 – 42. 72 Report of Štefan B. Roman on the meeting of the Presidium of SKS in Detroit 8 – 9 June 1972. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 8, 1972, pp. 5 – 6.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 49 if the Congress was able to “lead it out for international justice, stability and of the exile isolation”, to “put it on a broader peace.75 Self-determination as an integral foundation” and “integrate it into the concept part of human rights was stressed par- of the Western policy”. 73 In other words, ticularly in front of the Carter adminis- if it can formulate and justify the Slo- tration that elevated human rights to its vak goals in harmony with the political main agenda, whereas towards the Rea- goals and interests of the Western states. gan administration self-determination In their way, all exile groups also before was accentuated as a strategic instru- the Slovak World Congress had tried to ment for the supression of the Soviet in- do this, but only the Congress, thanks fuence and the desintegration of the So- to its power and to the favourable inter- viet Union; national conditions, could consequently Third, the support of the European in- follow this path. The cornerstones of this tegration, although from the beginning strategy were: linked to the condition that the Slovak First, a consequent anti-Communism nation as an integral part of the Europe- and resistance against the Soviet power an historical and cultural space would and ideological expansion that natural- participate in it directly as an independ- ly resulted from the views of the Slo- ent subject with equal rights. vak exile and at the same time integrat- A particular feature of the political ed the Congress into the principal line and ideological programm of the Slo- of the Western Cold War policy; vak World Congress was the fact that it Second, the efort to justify the Slo- did not limit itself to the “outer goals” vak claims not with regard to the fact in the sense of the achievement of free- that they are just, what mostly does not dom and state independence of Slovakia, represent an assertive argument in pol- but from the very start claimed that this itics, but with reference to the funda- state must enshrine political and spiritual mental political principles and values contents embedded in the Slovak his- recognized by the West like the Atlantic torical tradition and its Christian roots. Charter, the Charter of the United Nations In some publications of main Congress or the Final Act of Helsinki. In concre- representatives, not only Communism as to, particular stress was put on human ideology and political system was decid- rights understood in the broadest sense edly rejected, but also boundless Capital- as “the most sacred idea of man which com- ism with its absolutized pursuit of proft prises national and political, cultural and and its litle consideration of moral prin- religious rights”, 74 the right of self-deter- ciples and solidarity was criticized. Part- mination, which included the right to ing from the principles of the Catholic so- an independent state, and democratic cial doctrine, Roman himself often spoke principles, whose implementation was of the necessity to put Capitalism on new considered the necessary precondition ethical grounds. To the Slovak political,

73 Cf. for example Roman, Štefan B: Svetový kongres Slovákov po piatich rokoch. Bulletin SKS, Nr. 18/19 (1975), pp. 1 – 2. 74 Roman at the meeting of the Presidium of SKS in Paris 27 – 28 April 1979. Bulletin SKS, Nr. 35, 1979, p. 6. 75 Roman, Štefan B.: Slovenské práva sú nedeliteľnou časťou ľudských práv. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 47, 1981, pp. 1 – 7.

50 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives economic and theological thinking, Ro- the necessity, which the Congress felt man ascribed a particular mediation from the very start, to fnd support role in this feld. In 1977, in collaboration of the American political representatives with the professor of economic scienc- for the activity and the goals of the SKS. es of Jewish origin and vice-president Beginning with New York in 1970 in all of the Slovak World Congress Eugen general assemblies infuential American Loebl, he published a programmat- senators and congressmen and members ic book entitled The Responsible Society of the Canadian federal and provincial that formulated the theoretical concepts governments participated, and writen of a new social order built up on the “ethi- addresses were sent to the assemblies cal principles of the Holy Scripture”. 76 These by relevant political actors including principles – formulated, however, rath- the future US presidents Gerald Ford er generally –, were later incorporated or Ronald Reagan.78 With the support also into the programmatic document. of these politicians several meetings and “The ideological grounds and political goals political seminaries with Slovak partici- of the Slovak World Congress” which was pation were organized in the Senate and elaborated in 1979, without ever being in the Congress of the United States,79 theoretically deepened or economically and Congressional Records published substantiated.77 news and reports on the events organ- The Slovak World Congress’ head- ized by the Slovak World Congress as quarters was located in Toronto and with well as texts of its memoranda. one exception of the General Assembly Given the frm ties of the American in Rome in 1975 all general assemblies policy with the idea of Czechoslova- took place on the American continent. kia, the representatives of the Congress It arose naturally from the fact that tried to present their long-term strate- the main founder and the spiritus rector gic vision carefully, often not empha- of the Congress Štefan B. Roman, the ma- sizing in the frst lane the Slovak ques- jority of the conveners of the Congress tion as such, but the generally accepted and the strong Slovak-American frater- idea of the right to self-determination nalist organisations resided overseas. It for the peoples of Central Eastern Eu- refected also the weight of the Amer- rope, interpreted as the implementation ican factor in the world politics and of democratic freedoms and human

76 Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Poznámky k Ideovým základom a politickým cieľom SKS. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 48, 1981, p. 13. 77 Ideové základy a politické ciele SKS. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 48, 1981, pp. 14 – 21. 78 Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Založenie Svetového kongresu Slovákov, pp. 27, 30; Trubinský, John C.: Pozdravy členov Kongresu Spojených štátov amerických a predstaviteľov národnostných organizácií v USA prvému Svetovému kongresu Slovákov. Slovák a svet, Knižnica dokumentov 1. Bulletin SKS informed regularly on the participation of American and Canadian politicians in the events of the Congress. 79 An important meeting took place on 21 August 1974 on the occasion of the 6th anniversary of the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in the Capitol Building in Washington. Eugen Loebl held a conference there on the United States Foreign Policy from an Eastern View. Cf. Predsedníctvo Svetového kongresu Slovákov zasadalo v Toronte. Bulletin SKS, Nr. 16/17 (1974), p. 3; Loebl, Eugen: United States Foreign Policy from an Eastern View. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 16/17, 1974, pp. 15 – 18, or Idem: Zahranično­politická koncepcia SKS. In: Desať rokov činnosti SKS, s. 139 – 152.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 51 rights and at the same time as a strate- of Central Eastern Europe, found ardent gic instrument to desintegrate the Soviet support of the Congress that perceived it bloc, being thus in line with the priorities as a confrmation of its own policy. In this of the American foreign policy.80 sense, on the occasion of his reelection In spite of many diferent intersections in November 1984, Štefan B. Roman sent between the Congress and the Amer- Reagan a long and warm gratulation tel- ican policy and of long-term personal egramm, in which he praised the stand- contacts with its representatives includ- points of the president: ing some presidents, in the relations between the Slovak World Congress “You are the frst President to inter- and Washington a friction remained. pret the Yalta Conference in the spirit In the Seventies it was caused above all of the commitment of the Atlantic and by the policy of détente that culminated the United Nations Charter, who has during the SALT negotiations with Mos- rejected the concept of spheres of interest cow and the Helsinki conference on se- and demands free elections in all the Na- curity and cooperation in Europe and tions of Central and Eastern Europe. We was accompanied by a vivid visiting di- regard your interpretation of YALTA as plomacy between Moscow and Washing- the most important and most realistic ton. The Congress perceived these steps contribution for lasting peace. There is as weakening of the anti-Communism no peace without freedom. There is no of the West and pushing aside of refec- freedom without peace.”81 tions on a possible reconstruction of East- ern Central Europe. Therefore, the new Under the Reagan administration, foreign policy course of the Reagan ad- however, also new obstacles appeared ministration, that brought a radicaliza- for the Slovak exile politics. Since the end tion of the Cold War and of the relations of the Seventies, and then with new in- to the Eastern bloc, stressed the inter- tensity since the mid-Eighties, the Slovak pretation of the Atlantic Charter and World Congress was confronted with the Charter of the United Nations pressures from the White House and in the light of the principle of self-determi- the State Department that urged it to rec- nation, of free elections for all nations and ognize the territorial integrity of Czecho- of the refusal of the division into spheres slovakia. They resulted not only from of infuence, and in the last consequence the already mentioned historical bonds tended to overcome the Jalta agreements of the American policy with Czechoslo- as symbol of the division of Europe and vakia, but also from the diminishing rel- to gradually oust the Soviet infuence out evance of anti-Communism as a political

80 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 37, Štefan B. Roman to president Jimmy Carter, 8 August 1978; ibidem, k. 36, Hearing of John Hvasta before the Commitee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate Ninety-Eight Congress, Second Session, June 12, 1984. Cf. excerpts from the conference of Eugen Loebl in Washington in August 1974: United States Foreign Policy from an Eastern View. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 16/17, 1974, pp. 15 – 18, or Loebl’s analysis of the foreign policy concepts of the Congress Loebl, Eugen: Zahranično­politická koncepcia SKS, pp. 139 – 152. 81 Bulletin SKS, nr. 65, 1984, p. 5. For the positive reaction of the Slovak World Congress to the frst election of Ronald Reagan cf. the editorial of the Congress periodical writen by the editor in chief Okáľ, Ján: Čo očakávať od prezidenta Reagana? In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 43, 1980, pp. 1 – 2.

52 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives factor with which the Slovak policy had ‛free, democratic Slovak Republic’ as operated until then, and in the second being the optimal solution are also seen half of the Eighties probably also with in this light. Similarly, greetings sent the shaping of frst specifc American by a spokesman of the SWC to a Sude- plans for a possible new territorial and tan German meeting, in which he used political order after the already foresee- the words ‛Long Live a Free Sudeten- able fall of the decomposing Communist land,’ also raise questions about your regimes, in which the USA preferred organization’s dedication to the pres- the maintaining of Czechoslovakia. Af- ervation of the territorial integrity ter the General Assembly of the Slovak of Czechoslovakia. World Congress in New York in 1984, a high representative of the State Depart- We have searched carefully, but in vain, ment Mark Palmer sent a long leter to for any positive references in your publi- Štefan B. Roman, in which he confronted cations of the speeches of your leaders to the president of the Slovak World Con- the Czechoslovak Republic or to the idea gress with a political choice aut aut: of cooperation between Czechs and Slo- vaks in one state. Instead, we have seen “The basic problem we have with a glorifcation of the state of 1939 – 45. Al- the SWC is what we believe can reason- though it is not our role to dictate a view ably be considered its espousal of Slovak of history to the SWC, we fnd the linkage separatism. United States Government of the Slovak ‛state’ to your long-pro- policy has consistently supported the in- claimed goals of Slovak self-determination tegrity of the Czechoslovak Republic (such as Ms. Anička Roman’s remarks since its founding in 1918, and has re- to your recent Congress) to be further jected atempts – from whatever quarter evidence suggesting that the SWC in fact – to break up the Czechoslovak state. does not accept the Czechoslovak Republic as it now stands. Some recent statements made by spokes- men of the SWC create, in our opinion, If the SWC wishes to normalize reasonable doubt as to the organiza- its relations with the Department tion’s dedication to the continuation of State, we would fnd most helpful of a united Czechoslovakia. Examples an unambiguous ofcial statement that include your own recent remarks about the SWC accepts the territorial integrity the need for the Slovaks to ‛freely de- of the Czechoslovak Republic.”82 termine their relationship with their neighbors,’ and to live ‛free and inde- The Congress and Roman person- pendently in the family of nations,’ ally decisively rejected the blackmail. or Mr. Kirschbaum’s more direct call In a long leter, Roman tried to explain for ‛freedom and independence’ and the point of view of the Congress and his evocation of a ‛Slovak Question.’ at the same time to demonstrate its sub- Remarks made by Mr. Braxator about a stantial identity with the basic principles

82 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 37, United States Department of State (signed by Mark Palmer, Department of State, Bureau of European Afairs) to Štefan Roman, 20 July 1984.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 53 both of the international law and the US the positions of European political actors political tradition: who as a rule took her more into consid- eration than the distant American great “After all, the Pitsburgh and Cleveland power. As already mentioned, the claim Agreements of Czechs and Slovaks of self-determination resounded far during the World War I also applied more markedly in the divided Germany to the principles of the right to self-de- than in the Anglo-American ambience, termination, which were infuenced in spite of the fact that after the arrival by President Wilson’s political con- of the Social Democratic coalition gov- cept. The Atlantic Charter as well as ernment, the launching of the Eastern the Charter of the United Nations and policy of the Bonn government, the con- politics of the United States fully respect solidation of the relations with Czecho- this sovereign right of every nation to slovakia in 1973 and the gradual gen- determine its own future existence. erational change of German elites both the inner-political atmosphere and Our concept, that the principle the programmatic foreign policy visions of the right of self-determination underwent a profound transformation. in Central and Eastern Europe could Also the European unifcation process, be the international peace politics, was in the Seventies already in considera- incorporated by the German CDU/ ble progress, required the integration CSU into its election program. Further- of the Slovak question into the Europe- more, the National Security Advisor, an contexts. The Conference on Security Mr. Robert F. McFarlane, in his leter and Cooperation in Europe drew aten- of March 26, 1984, addressed to Mr. tion to the Old Continent, too. Already Loebl, wrote: ‛Indeed if self­determi- in 1972, at the opening of the negotia- nation were granted to the nations tions, the Congress sent to the participat- of Eastern Europe, there would be ing governments of the member states much less cause for the security of the North Atlantic Pact a Memoran- concerns shared by almost everyone dum on European Security, that pointed of the continent’."83 out the importance of the Slovak ques- tion for the development in Europe.84 It was also in this context that the Pre- Afterwards, the Congress developed sidium of the Slovak World Congress be- vivid activities with regard to the con- came aware of the necessity to put more trol conferences of Helsinki in Belgrade, emphasis on activities in Europe. It re- Madrid and Vienna, to which the Con- sulted from many factors. First of all from gress sent its delegations, that presented the incontestable geopolitical fact that well formulated memoranda that called Slovakia laid in the middle of Europe and for atention of the European public to her future depended to a great extent on the national and religious persecution

83 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 37, Štefan B. Roman to Mark Palmer, 20 July 1984, concept of the answer. In a similar spirit also the leter of John Hvasta to Zbigniew Brzezinski of 30 January 1979 was formulated. Ibidem. 84 Mikuš, Jozef: Zahranično­politická činnosť SKS. In: Desať rokov činnosti SKS, p. 134; Kirschbaum, Stanislav J.: Politické ciele povojnovej slovenskej emigrácie. In: Slovenský povojnový exil, p. 98.

54 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives in Slovakia.85 Finally, there was a “hu- In the second half of the Eighties, while man factor”, too. It was in Europe, where in the Soviet Union the perestrojka was the majority of the new émigrés that in progress and a series of Soviet-Amer- arrived into the exile after 1968, mostly ican summits took place, the West began highly educated persons with a notable to feel the vicinity of profound political potential of public activity, had setled. transformations in Central and Eastern The Slovak World Congress main- Europe. The political and psychologi- tained contacts also with the repre- cal Cold war initiated in the immediate sentatives of the Council of Europe and postwar years culminated, too, and it of the European Parliament in Strassburg, began to be evident that the decisive po- whom a delegation of the Congress led by litical factors in the West were program- Štefan B. Roman visited in October 1976.86 matically, organisationally and personal- Another working meeting with some ly preparing themselves for a new order deputies of the European Parliament took after the already forseeable fall of Com- place in Munich in 1980. In April 1975 munism. Similarly evident was the fact the Slovak World Congress was admited that in this process, the Czech leftist-lib- into membership in the European Con- eral-socialist dissent from around Char- ference for Human Rights and Self-De- ta 77 and its ideological counterpart termination of Nations in Luzern.87 at the other side of the Iron Curtain were In June 1975 it organised the historic the preferred partners of the Western General Assembly in Rome, in February media. While every public appearance 1976 followed a successful international of the speaker of Charta 77 found imme- press conference in Bern,88 in May 1977 diately echo in the world media, nobody a delegation of the Congress participat- informed about the various mass expres- ed in the “European days” in Germany. sions of the Slovak resistance to Com- The relations with other Central Euro- munism that manifested themselves pean exiles, whose head ofces resided above all in the religious feld, for exam- mostly in Europe, received new impuls- ple when only in the Marian year 1988 es, too.89 One of the fashpoints of this col- more than 600.000 mostly young people laboration represented the international participated in pilgrimages, or Slovak conference “Peace and Freedom in Europe” catholics were arrested.91 organized by the European functionaries In this context, the Slovak World Con- of the Congress in Munich.90 gress began to “think the unthinkable, speak

85 SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 37, Memorandum of the SKS for the control conference in Belgrade and an elaborate intitled Les violations des droits de l’homme en Republique Socialiste Slovaque. Cf. also Braxátor, František: Slovenský exil 68. Bratislava: Lúč, 1992, pp. 68 – 73. 86 Zasadnutie Predsedníctva Svetového kongresu Slovákov v Európe. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 24/25, 1977, pp. 4 – 8. Braxátor, František: Slovenský exil 68, pp. 70 – 72. 87 Bulletin SKS, nr. 18/19, 1975, p. 20. 88 Švajčiarska tlač o tlačovej konferencii SKS v Berne. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 22, 1976, pp. 6 – 7. 89 –js­: Maďarsko­slovenský dialóg.In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 13, 1972, pp. 14 – 15; Spolupráca so stredoeurópskymi exilmi. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 16/17, 1974, p. 18; Slovensko­maďarský dialóg. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 22, 1976, p. 7. Cf. Braxátor, F.: Slovenský exil 68, pp. 100 – 139. 90 Kružliak, Imrich (ed.): Frieden in Freiheit für Europa. München: Kokodynsky, für Slovak World Congress Toronto, 1984. 91 Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989). pp. 294 – 295.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 55 the unspeakable”92 and to prepare for pro- in Canada with the president of the fed- found changes. The General Assembly eral government Lubomír Štrougal, one in Toronto in 1987 formulated more ex- of Husák’s close collaborators.96 In 1987, plicitly than ever – with reservation the idea was born to organize the Fourth of the fnal decision of the Slovak citi- World Festival of Slovak Youth in Slo- zens, once they would be free to express vakia, but it failed because of the refus- their will – the programme of an inde- al on the Czechoslovak side. The presi- pendent Slovak state as the principal goal dent of the Matica slovenská, a traditional of the Congress and declared that all its Slovak cultural organisation, Vladimír political actions will move from the con- Mináč, whom the government of the Slo- viction that only an own independent, vak Socialist Republic entrusted to write free and democratic Slovak state can the response to the ofcial request fully guarantee the development and of the Slovak World Congress adressed the prosperity of the Slovak nation.93 to the chairman of the government Peter The Congress and Roman himself Colotka, answered according to the po- intensifed also the eforts to approach litical instruction in a negative or even the political representatives and the dis- hostile way.97 In spite of this political set- sidents in Slovakia. In 1987, the Nation- back, the festival did not refuge to over- al Award of the Congress was granted seas as its two predecessors, but took to Pavol Čarnogurský, former deputy place in the immediate neighbourhood of the parliament of the Slovak Republic of Slovakia, in Austrian Semmering. and father of a famous Slovak dissident The Congress and Roman registered Ján Čarnogurský.94 Roman relaunched painfully that while Poland and Hunga- his eforts to establish direct contacts ry, despite the Communist regime, were with the president of the Czechoslo- establishing more and more intensive vak Socialist Republic and the gener- contacts with their connationals abroad al secretary of the Communist Party, on the basis of a common patriotic in- the Slovak Gustáv Husák, which he terest, and even the socialist Czechoslo- had sought in vain since the late Six- vakia tollerated contacts of the Czech ties,95 and in the summer of 1986 he met dissent with foreign countries, contacts

92 Cf. the title of Roman’s opening address at the conference on Central Europe organized by the Slovak World Congress in Toronto in 1981: Roman, Stephan B.: Think the unthinkable – speak the unspeakable. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 47, 1981, pp. 16 – 17. 93 Cf. the resolution of the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress from June 1987. Bulletin SKS, nr. 77, 1987, p. 6; Braxátor, František: Slovenský exil ’68, p. 59; Kirschbaum, Stanislav J.: Význam ťažiskových aktivít SKS, p. 93. 94 Bulletin SKS, nr. 77, 1987, pp. 2 – 4; I. K. [Kružliak, Imrich]: Svetové snemovanie Slovákov v Toronte. In: Horizont, a. XVI, 1987, nr. IV, p. 3. 95 Ústav soudobých dějin Akademie věd České republiky (ÚSD AV ČR), KV ČSFR, F4, telegramme of the Czechoslovak ambassador in Otawa to the minister of foreign afairs in Prague, 27 September 1969; SNA, OF Jozef M. Kirschbaum, k. 7, Štefan B. Roman to Gustáv Husák, concept, 7 October 1969. Cf. Hrabovec, Emília, Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 177 – 181 and Eadem: Generálne zhromaždenie SKS v Ríme 1975 v kontexte slovenského a medzinárodného vývoja, p. 116. 96 Eadem: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 417 – 418. 97 Na margo smutnej korešpondencie. In: Bulletin SKS, nr. 78, 1988, pp. 2 – 7. Cf. Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 418 – 419.

56 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives with the Slovak exile remained harshly political personality able to shield persecuted. Signifcantly, while Hunga- the Slovak struggle for national emanci- ry, after the elevation of the archibishop pation on the international stage. of Esztergom László Lékai to cardinal, or- On the other hand, the Slovak cause ganized an ofcial diplomatic celebration received a visible support in the papal in Rome,98 the cardinal’s hat for the Slo- Rome. If during the pontifcate of Paul VI vak curial archbishop Jozef Tomko could there were some concerns in the Roman not be mentioned in the Czechoslovak Curia that ofcial contacts with the Slovak media and the regime prohibited even emigration and the accentuation of the na- to Tomko’s close relatives to travel to tional character of the Slovak activities the ceremony. Instead of a gradual “rap- in Rome could burden the positions prochement” visible in the relations of the Vatican Eastern policy towards between the homelands and the exiles Czechoslovakia, Karol Wojtyła – Pope of other countries, in Czechoslovakia John Paul II put aside such considera- of the second half of the Eighties, a new tions and openly expressed his vicinity intensive propaganda campaign against to the Slovak exile. A clear sign in this the Slovak exile was launched. Prague, direction was the Pope’s nomination pol- that felt that it could not rescue the Com- icy: as soon as in summer 1979, the Pope munist regime any more, tried to pre- elevated Jozef Tomko to archbishop and serve at least the Czechoslovak state.99 bestowed the important ofce of the gen- In this situation it was a painful blow eral secretary of the Bishops’ Synod on for the Slovak exile and the Slovak poli- him; in 1985 Tomko received the cardi- tics in general that the relatively young nal’s hat, thus becoming the frst Slovak and healthy Štefan B. Roman died unex- curial cardinal, and was entrusted with pectedly in March 1988.100 His death not the direction of the crucial Congrega- only fundamentally weakened the high- tion for the Evangelization of Peoples.101 est Slovak exile organisation, but had In November 1981, John Paul II visit- the consequence that on the eve of a new ed the Slovak Institute of the SS. Cyr- era, when the power and the political re- il and Methodius in Rom – it was his lations in Central Eastern Europe were very frst visit after the atentate in May undergoing profound changes, the Slo- 1981;102 in 1983, he personally conse- vaks lost their internationally respected crated Dominik Hrušovský, the rector

98 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik (ÖStA, AdR), BMfAA, IIPol. 1976, Karton 138, Rom Vatikan, political report of the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See Gordian Gudenus to the Ministry of Foreign Afairs in Vienna, 16 June 1976. 99 Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 366 – 368, 394. 100 The entire nr. 79, 1988 of Bulletin SKS was dedicated to this sad event. Cf. particularly Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Slovenský národ stratil veľkého syna a symbol slobody. In: Ibidem, pp. 2 – 4; Kružliak, Imrich: Živorný odkaz Štefana B. Romana, pp. 4 – 6; Polakovič, Štefan: Čím bol Štefan Roman v národe?, pp. 8 – 10. 101 Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), p. 394; Tomko, Jozef kardinál: Na životných cestách. Rozhovory s Mariánom Gavendom. Trnava: Spolok svätého Vojtecha, 2008, pp. 247 – 285. 102 Slovenské hlasy z Ríma, a. 30, 1981, nr. 12. The whole number was dedicated to the historical visit of the Pontifex.

Emília Hrabovec: The Slovak Exile and the Way to the Independence of Slovakia 57 of the Institute, to bishop entrusted with vivendi with the Communist regime aimed the pastoral care of the Slovaks abroad.103 at a fundamental change, at the overcom- In 1980, the Pope erected the diocese ing of the Yalta divisions and the reunit- for the Slovaks of Eastern rite in Canada, ing of Europe on Christian basis, and four years later he personally consecrated that beside the diplomatic negotiations its cathedral in Toronto.104 Personalities mobilized the consciences of the Catho- of the Slovak exile, particularly cardinal lic masses.105 Tomko, but also the bishops Pavol Hnil- The kiss of the Slovak soil, a gesture ica and Dominik Hrušovský, belonged otherwise reserved to souvereign states, to the circle of close friends of the Pon- with which John Paul II opened his frst tifex who condivided and supported his spontaneous pastoral visit to Slovakia “new Eastern politics”. A politics that in April 1990,106 just four months after after years of difcult and mainly re- the collaps of the Communist system, sultless negotiations under the pontif- was a more than symbolic expression icate of Paul VI regained the charac- of his solidarity with the neighbouring ter of a radical opposition that instead Slovak nation and his respect for her de- of searching for an acceptable modus sire for an independent state.

103 Hrušovský, Dominik: Roztratených zhromažďovať: Rozprávanie o mojom živote. Bratislava: PostScriptum, 2018, pp. 210 – 222. 104 Roman­Barber, Helen (ed.): Our heritage of faith: Consecration of the Slovak Cathedral of the Transfguration by His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, September 15, 1984. Unionville [ON]: Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in Canada, 1985. 105 On the “new Eastern politics” of John Paul II see Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 – 1989), pp. 319 – 462; Eadem: L’Ostpolitik di Giovanni Paolo II e la Slovacchia (1978 – 1989). In: Incorrupta monumenta ecclesiam defendunt: Studi oferti a mons. Sergio Pagano, prefeto dell’Archivio Segreto Vaticano. Vol. III. Inquisizione romana, Indice, Diplomazia pontifcia. Ed.: Andreas Gottsmann – Pierantonio Piatti – Andreas E. Rehberg. Cità del Vaticano: Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Collectanea Archivi Vaticani, 108), 2018, pp. 267 – 290. 106 See Labo, Šebastián – Košiar, Ján (ed.): Ján Pavol II. Posol lásky a pokoja: Návšteva Svätého Otca v Česko-Slovensku. Trnava: Dobrá kniha, 1991.

58 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Julija Barunčić Pletikosić* The Role of the Catholic Church in Creating the Modern Republic of Croatia

Úloha Katolíckej cirkvi pri vzniku súčasnej Chorvátskej republiky / Uloga Katoličke crkve u stvaranju suvremene Republike Hrvatske

U radu se analiziraju uloga i značenje Katoličke crkve u zbivanjima u Hrvatskoj u prvoj polovici 1990-ih. Kroz pregled najznačajnijih aktivnosti i stavova Katoličke crkve u posljednjim godinama postojanja SFRJ, te prijelomnim godinama stvaranja moderne i samostalne hrvatske države, pokušat će se dati odgovori na pitanja kakva je bila uloga i značenje Katoličke crkve u zbivanjima u Hrvatskoj u prvoj polovici 1990-ih godina. Ključne riječi: Republika Hrvatska, Katolička crkva, Jugoslavija, demokratske promjene, Franjo Kuharić.

ollowing the frst multiparty elections Before analysing the actual and pos- Fin the spring of 1990 and the abolish- sible role of the Church in a communist ment of the then single-party commu- state and that in a democratic society, it nist government system, the Republic should be highlighted that general pos- of Croatia joined the general democrati- tulates of the Catholic Church regarding zation process pervading at the time most the relationship between the Church and of the then communist countries in Eu- the political community (i.e. the state) rope. With the new Croatian Constitution have clearly been regulated by the social (December 1990), based on the principles teachings and documents of the Church of democracy, Christianity also gained adopted at the Second Vatican Council its full freedom upon proclamation (1962 – 1965).1 However, it should also of the constitutional principle of religious be emphasised that this relationship freedom. The Catholic Church thus ac- between the Church and the state has, quired freedom to perform public work throughout history, including both be- in Croatia. This way it contributed signif- fore and after the Second Vatican Coun- cantly to the creation of the independent, cil, mostly been conditioned by the re- sovereign and internationally recognized gime system of individual states in which modern Croatian state. the Church “lived”. In reality, “life”

* Julija Barunčić Pletikosić, Croatian Memorial Documentation Centre of the Homeland War, Zagreb (the Republic of Croatia). 1 Turčinović, Josip (ed.): II. vatikanski koncil, Dokumenti, latinski i hrvatski, 1970. Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1970, p. 649­662.

Julija Barunčić Pletikosić: The Role of the Catholic Church in Creating the Modern 59 of the Church was diferent in a confes- all communist governments (i.e. states) sional state, where both the Church and had the exact same atitude towards re- the state acknowledged and encouraged ligion. Politics varied when it came to their mutual relations since the same peo- the Church, from the most radical, e.g. ple were members of both the state and in Albania, to the Eastern Bloc countries the Church, than the “life” of the Church where the Church, despite the fact that in communist states, where it was most- it was not ofcially prohibited, was also ly denied or strictly controlled.2 Com- fully prevented from operating publicly, munism, as a term and an ideology, but to the example of the former SFRY where, also as the political system that emerged especially since the 1960s, the relation- from its postulates, in its essence de- ship between the Catholic Church and nounces private ownership, free market, the state was, tentatively speaking, much civil liberties, multi-party system and, more liberal than in other communist especially, emphasising of religious and states, but still in line with the postulates national values, and it promotes atheism. of communism as an ideology.4 Therefore, religion was marginalised Unlike communist states, the Church in all communist states, often prevented operates freely in modern democratic from operating publicly and expressing countries free from ideological features, its views, especially on the ruling class just like all other social subjects, and it and political structures, but also on fun- binds its members i.e. believers (howev- damental human rights, civil liberties er, not all citizens of a country) by social and the majority of social and politi- and moral norms, which it was unable to cal issues. do in communism, and often prohibited Religion was not prohibited open- from doing. The Role of the Church is ly and directly in most of the commu- basically equal to that of other subjects nist states. However, in reality it was in a democratic state when it comes to ad- suppressed from the public life and vocating and respecting social and moral marginalised. In other words, work values, which it is allowed to establish by of the Christians and religious organisa- itself and support. However, it may not tions and institution was often disabled impose its norms and goals to other sec- or controlled, and the Communist Par- ular areas and other social values, thus ty sought to be the only ideological and also the state and all of its citizens.5 political authority because, according to The year 1980 or, to be exact, the teachings of communism, religious the death of Josip Broz Tito, the Presi- and national disparities create and accen- dent of the SFRY, marked the beginning tuate diferences, which might lead to na- of a slow breakup of the League of Com- tional and civil conficts, especially when munists of Yugoslavia and of the SFRY. it comes to Yugoslavia.3 Furthermore, not Economic crisis and long-suppressed

2 Devčić, Ivan: Društveno djelovanje Crkve i država. In: Riječki teološki časopis, a. 1, 1993, nr. 2, pp. 193-208. 3 Radelić, Zdenko – Marijan, Davor – Barić, Nikica – Bing, Albert and Živić, Dražen: Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, Školska knjiga, 2006, pp. 17 – 20. 4 Marasović, Špiro: Crkva i država u komunističkim društvima. In: Crkva i država u društvima u tranziciji. Ed. Ivan Grubešić. Split: Knjiznica Dijalog, 1997, pp. 25 – 30. 5 Devčić, Ivan: Društveno djelovanje Crkve, p. 207.

60 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives national diferences, and especially as- War of Independence in the frst half pirations of supporters of the Greater of the 1990s, used certain festive occa- Serbian ideology for the Serbian suprem- sions, such as regular New Year’s Day re- acy within the SFRY, all contributed to ceptions hosted by the President of Par- the fnal breakup of the League of Com- liament (Sabor) of the Socialist Republic munists of Yugoslavia, which took place of Croatia, to draw atention to the unfa- in Belgrade in January 1990, at the 14th vourable position of both the Church and (Extraordinary) Congress of the League the Croatian people in the former Yugo- of Communists of Yugoslavia. All those slavia. For example, cardinal Kuharić factors contributed greatly to the breakup gave the following speech to the Presi- of the SFRY, which fnally occurred on dent of Parliament at a New Year’s Day 25 June 1991 as Slovenia and Croatia de- reception, in 1981, which the President clared their independence. of Parliament of the Socialist Repub- During the 1980s, the Church was of- lic of Croatia hosted for representatives ten prevented from expressing its views of religious communities: publicly and from operating publicly in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. How- e.g. “You represent responsibility ever, its work was not prohibited since for the public life in Croatia; therefore, the Catholic press reported regularly on we express our wishes to you in the light public appearances of Croatian Catholic of the common good of all Croatian peo- bishops and other church dignitaries. ple and each individual, no mater where It is evident from various documents, they might fnd themselves, what service speeches, statements, leters and com- they might perform and what anxieties munications of the Bishops’ Conference they might be exposed to. (…) of Yugoslavia, being the representative body of the Catholic bishops in the SFRY, The goal is clear to all of us: common that in those years the work of the Catho- good is established when personal, lic Church became all the more open national and religious identity of each and louder when it came to advocating person is recognised, when their invio- the respect and protection of funda- lable personal dignity is protected, when mental human rights and civil liber- their consciousness is granted freedom ties, both individual and collective, but to live peacefully by their beliefs in both also advocating national equalities and private and public life (…)”.7 democratisation of society.6 Represent- atives of the Catholic Church in the So- In his statements and refections, Car- cialist Republic of Croatia, most often dinal Franjo Kuharić often referred to cardinal Franjo Kuharić as the President the words of the Pope John Paul II, who of the Bishops’ Conference of Yugosla- stated that e.g. “man is not for order but or- via, who played an extremely impor- der for man”, referring to the political, so- tant role in Croatia during the SFRY and cial, economic and cultural systems that even greater one during the Croatian must be sensitive to the human needs

6 Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata u službi mira i stvaranja samostalne Hrvatske. Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2009, pp. 5 – 6. 7 Ibidem, pp. 23 – 25.

Julija Barunčić Pletikosić: The Role of the Catholic Church in Creating the Modern 61 of men and their good, and free to trans- by siding with the Holy See, which has form themselves.8 become an innate part of the Croatian In the second half of the 1980s, the national being”.10 Croatian bishops addressed more often in their public appearances the crisis that Owing to the fact that, after almost was felt in all spheres of life in the former half a century of the communist rule, Yugoslavia, since long-suppressed na- the Eastern European countries started tional tensions, especially by supporters to discover e.g. “the value of deep Christian of the the Great Serbian ideology, actual- roots, signifcance of the respect for rights ly arose to the surface during that crisis. of individuals for the civilisation and of its Such climate only increased pressure on creative activity, and the necessity of restor- the Croats in Yugoslavia, primarily by ing democratic institutions”, the Croatian accusing them of genocide and impos- bishops saw e.g. “signs of hope and encour- ing collective guilt on the entire Croatian agement” in all those events, suggesting population for crimes commited against that the Yugoslav nations may achieve the Serbs during the Second World e.g. “true equality, mutual respect and need- War, which accusations were brought ed cooperation” in the near future, thus on against the Catholic Church and the overcoming circumstances in which e.g. Holy See.9 “tyranny of the strong threatens to impose it- The Croatian bishops emphasised self aggressively and trample over sovereign- more frequently their belief that the ty and self-determination of the people”.11 Croatian people foster the aspiration In the climate of the aforementioned and strength for the initiative and join- changes which have already been intro- ing together at the political, cultural, duced in the majority of the communist economic and social front, consider- states, the Croatian bishops made it clear ing their long tradition of exercising that they support the new inclination their rights in a parliamentary manner. of the Croatian people towards politi- The institution of the Croatian Parlia- cal pluralism, that is, political dialogue ment (Sabor) as the e.g. “continuous form based on the multi-party system, i.e. in- of existence of the Croatian national law and spired by events in Yugoslavia caused by the rule of law” testifes of that. Therefore, the crisis in political, economic and other the Croatian people also need to pave areas of public life, as well as the increas- the way for e.g. ing inter-ethnic disagreements, that led to the breakup of the SFRY more rapidly. “positive courses uniting the Western The Catholic Church, generally, Europe, towards which the Croats def- throughout the entire period of Yugo- nitely directed their history as early as slavia’s existence, regardless of the char- in the frst century of the Christian era acteristics of relations with the state,

8 Ibidem, pp. 27 – 29. 9 Barunčić Pletikosić, Julija: Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj, Julija: Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i Domovinski rat 1991. – 1995.: stavovi, djelovanje, stradanja. Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno­dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, Glas Koncila, 2017, pp. 14 – 24. 10 Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata, pp. 71 – 74. 11 Priopćenje za tisak o jesenskom saboru BKJ u Đakovu 2. – 4. Octobre 1989. In: Službene vijesti Biskupske konferencije Jugoslavije, 1990, nr. 1, pp. 6 – 7; Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata, pp. 71 – 74.

62 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives permanently and systematically pro- Cardinal Franjo Kuharić spoke tect and promote the cultural, econom- of the same aspirations in the New ic and political interests of the Croatian Year’s reception at the then President people, primarily Croatian cultural and of the Croatian Parliament in January national identity. Such views and eforts 1990. He pointed out that the Catholic of the Catholic Church are atested by all Church in Croatia e.g. “with sympathies the ofcial documents and press releases and hopes” follows the process of democ- of the Bishops’ Conference of Yugosla- ratization that is slowly beginning to be via, as well as numerous statements of its realized in Croatia, because, basically, representatives. democracy includes the possibility of dif- For example, in his New Year’s speech ferent thinking and seeking solutions on 31 December 1989, Cardinal Franjo Ku- to the general good, which at the level harić addressed the infuence of changes of the people or the state community taking place in the Eastern European requires the existence of a multi-party socialist countries on the Croatian peo- system and the equality of political pro- ple, which demonstrates that even then grams and parties.13 That leads to free the Catholic Church monitored carefully and multi-party elections, where peo- the events occurring outside the SFRY ple freely choose their representatives, borders and that, for many years preced- and the statehood of the Croat people, as ing those major changes, it recognised the Church believes, represents the Par- and was atentive to the needs of the Cro- liament. The Church also believes that atian people living in Yugoslavia. e.g. the constitution of a state is a fundamen- tal norm of public life in general, and “There is talk of democratisation in our the creation of the new Croatian Constitu- homeland, as well. Croatia has also tion in 1990, as an expression of the will announced its departure from the sin- of the Croatian people and the founda- gle-party system and transition to- tion of future relations among peoples, wards the multi-party system, in which therefore it should be left to the Croa- the entire population would be ofered tian Parliament, where legally and free- programmes through equal proposing, ly elected representatives of the people which always presumes the principle will bring forth new laws as the basis of free political association. The people for the future life of all Croatian citizens. will be given the opportunity to decide Before the multi-party elections in Cro- in free elections by secret ballot, to state atia announced for the Spring of 1990, their wishes and what they consider to in March that same year the Catholic be in the interest of the common good bishops addressed a pre­election leter to in politics, economy, dealing with social the Christians and all citizens, emphasis- issues, social fairness, education, health- ing that the Catholic Church welcomes care, culture etc. (…)”12 this e.g. “turning point in history” taking place at the free multi-party elections and

12 Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata, pp. 81 – 83 and Kuharić, Franjo: Mir je djelo pravde. Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 1995, pp. 37 – 39. 13 Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata, pp. 87 – 90.

Julija Barunčić Pletikosić: The Role of the Catholic Church in Creating the Modern 63 enabling the people to decide for them- of their innards and opened their sup- selves on the future of their nation. It was pressed thoughts and hidden aspirations stated that e.g. “the Church as a community for freedom. That is how freedom has was not sent to organise the political and eco- happened; the transition from a one-par- nomic life of people”; however, all Church ty system to a multi-party, parliamenta- members are also members of a nation ry democracy has occurred. That wave and community, which is responsible did not even pass over Croatia.”16 for its political, social and economic life and, therefore, members of the Catholic On June 25 in 1991, the Declaration on Church are, as free citizens, invited to the Establishment of a sovereign and inde- participate in their nation’s public life.14 pendent Republic of Croatia was adopted. The bishops also pointed out: e.g. On the basis of the referendum of the Cro- atian citizens, on June 25 the Croatian “It is understood that as believers, it Parliament also enacted the Constitution- is especially important if a particular al Decision on the Sovereignty and the Inde- political program guarantees the true in- pendence of the Republic of Croatia, the Con- dependence of the Church from the state stitutional Act on the Amendments to the power. It’s important to know whether Constitutional Act on the Implementation the church will fnally get a public-law of the Constitution of the Republic of Cro- status or will more or less skillfully lay atia, the Declaration on the Establishment down the laws on the legal position of re- of the Sovereign and Independent Republic ligious communities and keep the same of Croatia and the Charter on the Rights community under their palms controlling of Serbs and Other Nationalities in the repub- their development and acting as if they lic of Croatia. On the same day Slovenia are a potential social danger. (…)”15 also proclaimed independence. Howev- er, at the request and through the good When, shortly after the elections, ofces of the European Community and a constitutional session of the new, dem- US, on July 7 1991 Croatia and Slovenia ocratically elected Parliament of SRH accepted, on the Brioni island (Brioni was held on May 30 1990, it was also at- Agreement) a three­month moratorium tended by Archbishop of Zagreb, Cardi- on independence so that negotiations on nal Franjo Kuharić who said, in the Za- a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav cri- greb Cathedral on the same day, that e.g. sis could continue.17 Confrming the will of the Croatian “from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea people expressed in the referendum it raised suddenly and unexpectedly, and proclaiming Croatia’s independ- in the peoples and countries of Eastern ence, The Catholic Church reiterates Europe, a wave of such deep changes the historical meaning of such a decision in the system as the multitudes spoke out for the Croatian people and all citizens

14 Ibidem, pp. 95 – 98. 15 Ibidem, pp. 95 – 98. 16 Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata, pp. 99 – 101 and Kuharić, Franjo: Mir je djelo pravde, pp. 61 – 63. 17 Nazor, Ante: Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-ih. Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno­ dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2011, pp. 68 – 69.

64 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives of Croatia. After the Declaration on the Es- the Republic of Croatia as a community tablishment of a sovereign and independent of the Croatian and all other people liv- Republic of Croatia was passed, Cardi- ing in it, regardless of their religious or nal Franjo Kuharić declared that the act national afliation. In emphasising and confrmed the referendum by the will supporting its beliefs, the Church has re- of Croatian, and the Declaration itself lied on the basic postulates of faith and should be a great e.g. “charter of peace, mu- on the underlying documents adopted tual respect in justice and freedom”.18 at the Second Vatican Council relating to One can conclude that the Catho- rights of the people and nation. Moreo- lic Church in Croatia has not only wel- ver, one of the most important reasons be- comed persistently all democratic eforts hind the Catholic Church’s frm support resulting in political changes, which of the aforementioned democratic chang- have enabled Croatia to declare its sov- es and the new political power system is ereignty and independence after sev- surely its position and freedom of public eral decades of being part of the SFRY, operation in the newly formed Croatia, but it has also advocated that all those which was guaranteed to it as the consti- changes be made peacefully, respect- tutional right, and which it did not have ing the free will of the Croatian people in the former Yugoslavia. The possibility in all spheres of social and political life. of public operation, which the Church That was the only future the Church did not enjoy for several decades, was saw for the Croatian people and viabili- granted to it by the independent Croatian ty of the Croatian statehood, envisioning state after the 1990 democratic changes.

18 Blažević, Velimir: Katolička crkva u Hrvata, pp. 152 – 153.

Julija Barunčić Pletikosić: The Role of the Catholic Church in Creating the Modern 65 Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková* Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967)

Slovensko v predjarí (1963 – 1967) / Slovačko rano proljeće (1963.­1967.)

V 40-ročnej histórii československého komunistického režimu zaujíma výnimočné postavenie rok 1968, kedy prišlo k významnému pokusu o jeho reformu. Táto dostala názov socializmus s ľudskou tvárou. No pri popisovaní toho vývoja, ktorým Československu v r. 1968 prešlo, dochádza často k zjednodušeniam. Autori sa zaoberajú alebo okupáciou krajiny, alebo ponímajú celý vývin len ako o snahu o istú demokratizáciu režimu, ktorá sa začala v januári 1968 nástupom A. Dubčeka k moci. Avšak na dôsledné pochopenie toho vývoja, ktorým Československo prechádzalo roku 1968 je potrebné poznať i obdobie predchádzajúce, obdobie tv. slovenského predjaria (1963 – 1967). V tom čase sa pripravovali podmienky nasledujúceho spoločenského vývinu. Obdobie predjaria sa mohlo začať z toho dôvodu, ža na začiatku 60. rokov 20. storočia prišlo k značnému oslabeniu komunistického režimu v krajine. A to tak z hľadiska politického, morálneho i ekonomického. Ukázalo sa totiž, že tie nezákonné politického procesy, ku ktorým prišlo na zač. 50. rokov sú späté so špičkami komunistického režimu a že celá kauza tv. slovenského buržoázneho nacionalizmu bola vykonštruovaná. Zároveň sa začala hospodárska kríza, ktorej príčiny si predstavitelia režimu nevedeli predstaviť. Navyše na jar 1963 sa stal A. Dubček šéfom slovenských komunistov. Práve na základe spomínaného sa mohlo začať slovenské predjarie a následne rok 1968. V ňom však nešlo len o liberalizáciu režimu a formovanie socializmu s ľudskou tvárou, ale zároveň prebiehal i proces emancipácie slovenského národa, vrcholiaci v procese federalizácie Československa. Kľúčové slová: slovenské národné dejiny, československý komunistický režim, slovenské predjarie, Alexander Dubček, rok 1968.

hree Slovak historians have named was possible not only because Alexan- Tthe period from 1963 to 1967 Slova- der Dubček had become First Secretary kia’s Early Spring.1 It was the time preced- of the Slovak branch of the Communist ing the year 1968, known as the Prague Party of Czechoslovakia in April 1963, Spring, which is, in fact, Czecho-Slova- but also thanks to the fact that from 1962- kia’s Spring. During this period, the chain 1963 the communist regime in Czech- of events we associate with the year 1968 oslovakia had become considerably were gestated. In Slovakia’s Early Spring weakened. As a mater of fact, it faced many restrictions were loosened. This a severe economic crisis, whose causes

* Miroslav Londák, Institute of History at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava (Slovak Republic) and Elena Londáková, Institute of History at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava (Slovak Republic). 1 For more details, see Londák, Miroslav – Sikora, Stanislav – Londáková, Elena: Predjarie: Politický, ekonomický a kultúrny vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967. Bratislava: Veda, 2002, 392 p.

66 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the regime was unable to establish. It was silent either. In fact, they openly spoke also debilitated politically and morally against the administrative and direc- after the public found out that the rul- tive way Slovakia’s economy was being ing communist elite was behind the un- managed and considered new methods lawful political processes that had been for running it. This all, of course, within staged in the 1950s. These processes pro- the framework of the so-called socialist foundly afected not only the so­called economy. Slovak bourgeois nationalists but Slova- In the more relaxed atmosphere kia’s entire political and cultural soci- of the Early Spring, Slovak intellectuals ety. In the spring of 1962, the so-called also had the opportunity to have their Kolder’s Commission issued a report, works published. An outstanding po- which stated that the evidence examined sition in this respect was occupied by clearly showed that the afair known as the weekly Kultúrny život, which was so “bourgeois nationalism within the Commu- popular that it was difcult to get. Even nist Party of Slovakia” had been artifcial- in Prague. In fact, Czech authors also ly fabricated and all those accused of it contributed to it, as the “breeze of free- were actually innocent.2 dom” had not yet reached the centre During the Early Spring, restrictions of the country. The atmosphere in Slo- and censorship aimed at preventing vakia was diferent to that in the Czech any kind of criticism were relaxed, and lands.3 Among other things, this was due Slovakia’s intelligentsia could open- to the fact that Alexander Dubček had ly express their dissatisfaction with become leader of Slovakia’s communists the conditions in the country. This in the spring of 1963. Instead of silencing clearly showed in the spring of 1963 criticism, Dubček gave it priestor (space)4 at the Congress of Writers of Slovakia and gradually identifed with many and, later on, at the Congress of Jour- of the critics. It was mainly thanks to nalists of Slovakia. As can be expected, Dubček that several events in the history the most addressed issues were the so- of Slovakia were dusted of. For instance, called Slovak bourgeois nationalism, but the history of the Slovak National Upris- also the freedom of creation and the need ing, a major milestone in Slovak history, to speak out on public life issues. The bu- was no longer defamed or distorted but reaucratic system also became the target looked at without any bias. Neverthe- of criticism, as well as the (not most ap- less, due to Antonín Novotný, the frst propriate) industrialisation of the coun- man of the Communist Party of Czecho- try. Slovakia’s economists did not remain slovakia, the question of a fairer position

2 The Central Commitee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CC VPC) at its April 1963 session adopted the report Správu o porušovaní straníckych zásad a socialistickej zákonnosti v rokoch 1949 – 1954. 3 Well-know Czech historian, Karel Kaplan, put is as follows: “In the 1960s, the political movement in Slovakia formed one of the basic currents that merged into the national reform movement. It occupied an important position in it, was full of initiative, had robust program points, especially the adjustment of the Czech-Slovak relationship, which directly afected the organisation of the existing power and political system.” Quoted after Kaplan, Karel: Antonín Novotný: Vzestup a pád „lidového“ aparátčíka. Brno: Barrister & Principal, o. p., 2011, p. 209. 4 This is why party members gave Dubček the nickname Alexander Priestorovič (author’s note).

Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 67 of Slovakia in the constitutional struc- became just a territorial organisation ture of the country remained taboo. of the countrywide Communist Party After the 1948 coup d’état, there was of Czechoslovakia. From that moment nothing to stop the Communists from on, the representatives of the CPS in Slo- disfguring Czechoslovakia’s civil so- vakia only pursued the policy dictat- ciety and imposing Soviet-style social- ed by Prague. Ambitions of equality, ism. This suited Moscow well and, so, which was being considered at the end the country became an integral part of the war, and of a federal country of the Eastern bloc for four full dec- were replaced by a policy oriented to ades. The initial period of Czechoslova- make the economy and social conditions kia’s communist regime (1948 – early 50s) in Slovakia level with those in the Czech saw the most signifcant political chang- lands. Its main tool was to be the social- es taking place, the market economy be- ist industrialisation of Slovakia, funded ing replaced by a planned-economy, as from countrywide means.7 well as the beginning of the transforma- To understand the position in which tion of the country’s social structure. As Slovakia found itself, it is necessary to get for the position of Slovakia, an asymmet- familiar with the afair known as Slovak ric model of state order began to be fully bourgeois nationalism. The Communist implemented.5 Although Slovaks had al- Party of Czechoslovakia took advantage ready been recognised as an independent of the specifc situation the internation- nation,6 the competencies of the Slovak al communist movement was going national authorities were gradually re- through to get rid of insurgent CPS lead- duced, making their impact on the coun- ers by fabricating political trials, in which try’s political life and on the develop- e.g. Gustáv Husák was sentenced to life, ment of its economy really negligible. Laco Novomeský to ten years in pris- In the autumn of 1948, the Communist on, Ladislav Holdoš to thirteen years, Party of Slovakia (CPS) ceased to exist etc.8 The biggest wrongdoing the Slovak as an independent political party and “bourgeois nationalists” commited was

5 The essence of the asymmetric model of unitary Czechoslovakia lay in the fact that, although there were Slovak national authorities, they were largely subordinated to the countrywide authorities, which actually represented the Czech national state authorities. For example, there was no Czech National Council or its executive bodies of power. 6 The spring of 1945 became a historic milestone in the development of the theory of Czechoslovakism. Until then, it was considered the ofcial state ideology and the central authorities aimed to create a political Czechoslovak nation. After that date, the Slovak nation was recognised as equivalent to the Czech nation. In practice, however, Czechoslovakism could still be seen in so­called “substitute” forms. Quoted after Kováč, Dušan: Slováci, Česi, dejiny. Bratislava: AEP, 1997, p. 126 – 127. 7 In this context, it is important to emphasise that in the autumn of 1945, a monetary reform took place in Czechoslovakia. The main problem was to determine the optimal exchange rate between the Slovak currency and that of the Protectorate, which at the end of 1945 was 4:1 in favour of the Slovak currency, although it weakened slightly by the end of the war. The exchange rate was fnally determined in a 1:1 ratio. The concessions of the Slovak party were to be compensated in the future in the process of making Slovakia’s economy and society (and its industrialisation) level with the Czech lands using countrywide sources. 8 Representatives of Slovakia’s cultural life also got severe sentences. Partisan commanders from WWII, Viliam Žingor and Jozef Trojan were sentenced to death, etc.

68 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives to have struggled for a more independent The unlawful proceedings against Slovak policy at the end of the war. De- the so-called Slovak bourgeois nation- spite the fact that in the spring of 1945 they alists (April 21­24, 1954), which were accepted Klement Gotwald as the head full of criminal constructions, afect- of the Communist Party of Czechoslo- ed the relations between Slovaks and vakia (CPC), this was not enough to buy Czechs on the long term. For a long time, them absolution.9 The CPC considered it blocked Slovakia from enforcing any the eforts Slovakia’s communist intel- kind of political or economic demands. ligentsia carried out to achieve a more The innocent prisoners were gradual- equal position of Slovakia in the struc- ly rehabilitated only at the beginning ture of the country to be high treason. of the Early Spring, especially after 1963. The notion known as Slovak bourgeois As Mieroslav Hysko – who had been ed- nationalism was basically a purposefully itor-in-chief of the communist Pravda fabricated construction, a conscious po- newspaper during the Slovak Nation- litical line, rather than the result of acci- al Uprising – said at the frst Congress dentally coinciding half-truths, deforma- of Journalists of Slovakia in May 1963, tions and mistakes. It did not only aim this injustice had “displeased the Slovak na- to remove some unwanted politicians tion as a whole”.11 personifying a specifc political line, but After February 1948, the new way also a blockade to prevent Slovakia from of managing the Slovak economy quick- making any future political or other na- ly took shape. Communist Czechoslova- tional demands that did not suit the cen- kia was being clearly built as a central- tral authorities in Prague.10 ist state. This had logical consequences Of course, there was no equivalent in the diferent aspects this study fo- notion of Czech bourgeois nationalists. cuses on. The CPS was not in charge After all, the Czech lands supported cen- of managing the economy in Slovakia. As tral, whole Czechoslovak interests, which a mater of fact, several Slovak governing were nothing but a mask for Czech inter- bodies were abolished at the beginning ests. As a mater of fact, the Czech elites of the 1950s. The way Slovakia’s econo- of the time, as well as the broad masses my was managed crystallised gradually of the population in the Czech lands, ful- in the initial period of the communist re- ly identifed with the idea of a Czecho- gime and practically lasted throughout slovak state and nation and did not see the whole duration of socialist Czecho- the necessity to have Czech national slovakia. In fact, it remained immune to authorities. diferent atempts to reform the economy

9 According to some authors, the so-called Slovak bourgeois nationalism “became a scarecrow for a whole decade” and was “one of the forms of solving the Slovak national issue in post-war Czechoslovakia.” Quoted after Černák, Tomáš – Syrný, Marek: Husák, vrcholy a pády 1945 – 1951. Bratislava: Marenčin PT, 2018, p. 218. 10 In 1968, well­known Slovak historian Michal Barnovský wrote that the psychosis caused by the campaign around the so-called Slovak bourgeois nationalism and the consequences resulting from it “paralysed, and even eliminated any initiatives coming from Slovakia, because you risked being labelled a nationalist and traitor. Subsequent events showed that fears of being accused of bourgeois nationalism were well-founded.” Quoted after Barnovský, Michal: Problematika industrializácie Slovenska v rokoch 1945 – 1950. In: Historický časopis, vol. 16, 1968, nr. 2, p. 186. 11 Minutes from the 1st Congress of Journalists of Slovakia.

Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 69 and reorganise the relevant ministries, of the investments made to develop as well as to eforts by Slovak bodies to the industry, i.e. the most progressive expand their competencies. This result- sector of the economy, went to the Czech ed from the fact that Slovakia’s economy lands,12 despite the fact that they were was not managed and determined (as it far more industrialised than Slovakia. had often been the case in the past) by For example, in the 1950s it was almost the local authorities, but was largely 75 – 77%, despite the ongoing industrial- managed from Prague, whose interests isation of Slovakia and the resulting con- were said to be national, but were in fact struction of new plants within its territo- often purely Czech. ry. This investment policy forced many The basic economic development residents of Slovakia to look for work form in Slovakia was a socialist type in the Czech lands because it was no of industrialisation. Its goal was to build longer possible to leave the country to up new industries in Slovakia, as well as work abroad. In fact, workers leaving to make its economy and social stand- the Slovak agricultural sector did not fnd ards even with the Czech lands. Dur- enough work opportunities in the newly ing the decades that Slovakia was part built industries in Slovakia.13 of communist Czechoslovakia, it under- As there was no real long-term went undeniable development. In fact, strategy for the development of Slova- despite the negative aspects of the total- kia’s economy throughout the post-war itarian regime, Slovakia’s economy saw period (despite socialist Czechoslova- its thorough modernisation. kia’s new planned economy), the newly However, not even after forty years, built industries in Slovakia were mostly let alone twenty, did the communist re- ofshoots of Czech enterprises intended gime manage to make Slovakia’s econ- to be subcontractors producing semi­fn- omy level with that of the Czech lands. ished goods with minimal added value. Curiously, in the late 1940s, it was es- This was not only the case in the 1950s, timated that this process would take but also throughout the following dec- three to four quinquennia. The reason ade. This unfortunate situation was for this appalling failure was not only mostly the result of the fact that Prague that the planned economy the Commu- considered the whole economy of Czech- nists so highly praised was not as omnip- oslovakia to be a homogeneous system otent as they would have it. It was main- and failed to see the specifc conditions, ly due to the fact that a high percentage interests and needs of Slovakia.14

12 In connection with the so-called steel concept of the development of Czechoslovakia’s economy, in the Czech lands: “a specifc form of industrialisation was applied, represented by the de facto restructuring of an advanced industrial base built in the past. It was an unparalleled process in Europe, because in another territory of the Soviet bloc that had been industrialised in the past, i.e. East Germany, the starting situation included severely disrupted and largely destroyed capacities, which cannot be said of the industrial potential of the Czech lands after the end of WWII.” Quoted after Jirásek, Zdeněk: „Ocelová koncepce“ hospodářství českých zemí. Opava: Institute of Historical Sciences at the Silesian University in Opava, 2014, p. 6 (translated from Czech by the author). 13 For more details, see Londák, Miroslav: Ekonomické reformy v Československu v 50. a 60. rokoch 20. storočia a slovenská ekonomika. Bratislava: Veda, 2012., p. 110 et seq. 14 This also showed in the preparation and implementation of the frst (Rozsypal’s) and the second (Šik’s) economic reform. For more details, see Londák, Miroslav: Ekonomické reformy v Československu v 50. a 60. rokoch 20. storočia a slovenská ekonomika, p. 71 et seq., as well as 127 et seq.

70 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Mainly basic industry plants were into account the diferent demographic built in Slovakia, which did not need so development in Slovakia and the Czech much labour, so they were not able to lands. This refected in the share of na- absorb a substantial part of the people tional investments fowing into Slova- leaving the agricultural sector. In fact, kia. Consequently, tens of thousands Prague more often than not failed to take of Slovaks had to move or commute to the Czech lands for work.15 Table 1 Workers leaving the agricultural sector and new jobs in industry in the Slovak Republic and in the Czech Republic in 1948 – 196016 Workers leaving agriculture New jobs in industry ČR 414 615 446 811 SR 356 056 173 376 After overcoming the crisis and new industrial enterprises were cre- of the mid-1950s, Czechoslovakia’s econ- ated. In fact, Slovakia’s share of newly omy began to prepare for the second developed basic industrial funds, which investment wave. It had the advantage is the sector of the economy that had that it could still grow, mainly based on the greatest impact on the generation extensive growth factors, and could still of national income, reached 23.95% with- employ more and more workers. Howev- in the monitored period.18 On the oth- er, a gradual transition to new technol- er hand, the development of labor re- ogies, which eventually became known sources in Slovakia became a growing as the scientifc and technical revolu- problem. The situation in this respect tion, failed to happen in Czechoslovakia. was so critical that it has no parallel The second fve­year plan, which corre- in the whole history of socialism in Slo- sponds to the second half of the 1950s, vakia, including the 1980s. From 1956 afected the Slovak economy badly. to the end of the 1950s, i.e. for fve long In the second investment wave, the larg- years the number of people employed est share fowed to bigger and rather in the national economy declined contin- developed Czech industrial centres, uously. The reason for this decrease was such as the Ostrava region.17 Of course, mainly the fact that those leaving the ag- investments were also made in Slovakia ricultural sector could not fnd enough

15 According to ofcial data, 50,000 people of Slovak nationality lived in the Czech lands in 1945, and in 1967 almost 364,000 people. Quoted after the publication Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR, p. 429. In the mid­1960s, the diference of work commuters between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic was around 82,000, others commuted to work in the Czech lands on a weekly and other basis. 16 Calculated on the basis of the publication Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR, p. 460, 661. By the abbreviations SR and ČR we mean the territory of Slovakia and the Czech lands, respectively. 17 The guidelines for the second fve­year plan, adopted by the Countrywisde Conference of the CPC in June 1956, concerning the investment construction, read: “Pay special atention to the preparation and comprehensive provision of capital construction in the Ostrava, Ústí na Labem and Karlovy Vary regions.” (translated from Czech by the author) Quoted after Od X. do XI. sjezdu KSČ: Usnesení a dokumenty ÚV KSČ. Praha: SNPL, 1958, p. 385. 18 During the second fve­year period, such fnancially demanding constructions as water works on the Váh (Nosice, Skalka, Krpeľany, Sučany, Madunice) were also carried out in Slovakia.

Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 71 work opportunities in industry and oth- to grow any further on its own foun- er sectors of the economy. This develop- dations and the theoretical premises ment has no parallel in the Czech lands, of Marxism­Leninism. But then, the frst in which the number of people work- signs of an economic crisis appeared ing grew constantly, the only exception in the course of 1961 causing the ex- being 1971 and 1972, when the fgures tremely ambitious 3rd Five-Year Plan to against the previous year were lower. collapse. The leadership of the Commu- However, no long-term continuous de- nist Party could not understand why this cline was ever registered. Moreover, was happening. So they started to pre- workforce was growing far more slowly pare Šik’s economic reform. in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, even In the early 1960s, Slovak society was in spite of the fact that thousands of Slo- confronted with the testimonies of peo- vaks were moving over to their Czech ple returning from prison after a partial neighbours. In 1945, the number of Slo- amnesty. Information about the behind- vak citizens in the Czech lands was 50 the-scenes political processes of the early thousand; in 1948 it was 220 thousand, 1950s, which had until then been manip- in 1953 – 325 thousand, in 1956 – 367 ulated by the propaganda and concealed thousand, and in 1960 – 422 thousand.19 by the media, became public knowledge. At the very beginning of the 1960s, Not only ordinary people, but also par- there were no signs whatsoever to indi- ty members were shocked. Alexander cate the approaching signifcant changes Dubček himself, who was a member Slovakia’s Early Spring was going to wit- of the team created to investigate these ness. In July 1960, a new constitution was processes, known as Kolder’s commis- adopted proclaiming the victory of the so- sion, declared how the documents he got cialist production relationship “in all areas hold of literally shocked him. As he puts of the economy,” the country’s name was it, after working in the commission he changed to Czechoslovak Socialist Re- “was never the same person again”. public, and the leading role of the Com- The rehabilitation of these intelligent- munist Party in the state and society was sia and resistance fgures of Slovakia anchored in the constitution. On the out- became one of the leitmotifs of the com- side, the Czechoslovak economy in gener- mon eforts of the country’s cultural and, al seemed to be in good condition. eventually also, new political elites. From After all, high year-on-year increases the very beginning, one of Dubček’s clear in national income had been achieved priorities was the thorough rehabilitation at the end of the 1950s (around 7% per and exculpation of all the victims of those year), and the 1953­1955 crisis as well as horrible fabricated trials who were un- the problems connected with the end justly convicted, persecuted and impris- of the 1st investment wave were over. oned, and who had lost not just their In fact, there was no indication that honour and freedom, but also their civil Czechoslovakia’s economy was not able rights, property and, in many cases also

19 Data according to Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR, p. 661, p. 460, p. 429. At the same time, statistics show a curious development – between 1960 and 1961, the number of persons of Slovak nationality in the Czech lands decreased by about 140,000, but at the same time the number of persons of Czech nationality in the given area increased by 107,000.

72 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives their health and families, which broke – Slovakia’s economic underdevelopment up as a result of the separation. was eliminated, and some relative difer- His next political priority was to re- ences between the economic development habilitate important Slovak historical in Slovakia and the Czech lands were also milestones, events and personalities erased, but this process was not as inten- that had been belitled and misinter- sive as to reduce the absolute diferences preted. This program was positively re- in some important indicators. On the op- ceived in Slovakia, just as the apparition posite, these continued to grow bigger. of a new generation, high­ranking fgure Some critical voices also pointed out in the Slovak political scene. that the socialist industrialisation of Slo- The socialist industrialisation of Slo- vakia consisted in the implementation vakia brought about a number of prob- of a number of investment projects, but lems which, from the beginning of Slova- failed to create the subsequent economic kia’s Early Spring20 in 1963 were criticised connection between the diferent newly by Slovak economists such as Hvezdoň built enterprises. For example, process- Kočtúch, Viktor Pavlenda and others. ing plants were not sufciently coupled Likewise, Ján Ferianc and Pavel Turčan with companies in the basic industry, and criticised the methods used to achieve semi­fnished products were shipped Slovakia’s development in the common over to ever-expanding processing com- state. In their opinion, it followed histor- panies in the Czech lands.22 The fact that ically obsolete paths and built only on the technical level of these new industries the traditional development of Czech in- was low and many plants were already dustry, copying its sectoral and territori- obsolete at the time they were being de- al fragmentation, excessive development signed and built, was also a shortcoming of basic industries and which tied up in Slovakia’s industrialisation. large amounts of labor force in inefcient Of course, contemporary propagan- productions. da constantly and zealously highlighted The continuation of these tendencies the successful socialist industrialisation could not lead to Slovakia’s society and in Slovakia. They would list all new- economy reaching the level of the Czech ly built industrial plants at which large lands in the short run. In their opinion, numbers of people were employed. That maintaining these development trends is true, the country was industrialised, could not lead to reaching a balanced thousands and thousands of new work- economy in both regions even within ers joined the new plants and in the ear- a timespan for which extrapolation can ly 1960s, namely in 1963 – 1964, Slovakia make any sense.21 became an industrial-agricultural coun- According to Kočtúch and Pavlen- try, meaning that more people worked da, the course of the levelling-up pro- in the industrial sector than in agricul- cess from the end of the 1940s could be ture. On the other hand, several nega- described by several relevant theses tive aspects that could be seen for a long

20 For more details, see Londák, Miroslav – Sikora, Stanislav – Londáková, Elena: Predjarie, passim. 21 Ferianc, Ján – Turčan, Pavol: Prístupy k analýze priestorového usporiadania československej ekonomiky. In: Ekonomický časopis vol. 14, 1966, p. 184. 22 Ibidem.

Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 73 time were not discussed in public in spite gradually identifed with the criticism of the fact that party leaders and sever- that could be heard in the country al state institutions were aware of them. in Slovakia’s Early Spring. Dubček also A major problem that also afected had several analyses23 at his disposal, the country’s overall economic develop- which pointed out the negative efects ment in the post-February period, was of Šik’s ongoing economic reform in Slo- that new work opportunities in industry vakia. But what irritated him the most and economic development in general were the results of the long-term invest- did not follow demographic develop- ments ordered by Prague, which prac- ment, which was completely diferent tically took no account of the diferent in the Czech lands and in Slovakia. demographic development going on Alexander Dubček became the First in Slovakia and the Czech lands. Their Secretary of the Central Commitee results are documented in the following of the CPS in the spring of 1963 and table:

Table 2 Increase in the number of inhabitants, working age population and work oppor- tunities in Czechoslovakia as a whole, and their share in Slovakia and the Czech lands in 1948 – 196724 Indicator Absolute fgure ČR SR in Czechoslovakia v % v % Total population increase 1 993 987 48,79 51,21 Total workforce increase 774 737 38,87 61,13 Increase of population in productive age 605 011 29,86 70,14 Increase in the number of work opportunities 1 080 170 74,94 25,06 in the national economy Increase in the number of work opportunities 920 236 65,35 34,65 in industry

Of course, Dubček did not have exact- of the growth of population in work- ly a table like this at his disposal, but he ing age in the whole Czechoslovakia. knew the approximate fgures. Dubček At the same time, Slovakia accounted called the situation shown in the last two for less than 35% of the countrywide in- lines an inverse ratio. The fgures speak crease in work opportunities in indus- for themselves. Despite the fact that try, despite the fact that after the end Czechoslovakia had a planned economy of WWII the Czech lands already had and that the socialist industrialisation a much higher degree of industrialisa- of Slovakia was funded using country- tion. For all these circumstances there wide sources, twenty years after Febru- is reason to say that Slovakia’s econom- ary 1948, Slovakia still accounted for just ic development after February 1948 was 25 percent of the new work opportuni- one of the many reasons that led to ties although it accounted for over 70% the Czecho-Slovak spring of 1968.

23 For more details on the analysis of Slovakia’s Planning Commission, see Londák, Miroslav – Sikora, Stanislav – Londáková, Elena: Predjarie, p. 240 et seq. 24 Calculated on the basis of the publication Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR, p. 434, 635, 460 and 661.

74 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives More relaxed political conditions were him the frst “western” co­production most visible in the cultural sphere. While of The Man Who Lies (L’Homme qui ment, being a kind of seismograph of the time, 1968),25 as well as several music groups. culture actively participated in the whole On the other side of the Iron Curtain, transformation society was undergoing. the 1960s were characterised by a livid In the second half of the 1950s, literature Beatle-mania. Numerous music groups and fne arts stepped out of the bound- of 15-year-olds appeared, captivated by aries of communist cultural policy and Big Beat, which best refected the feel- after 1957 several independent groups ings and desires of the young generation. of artists (the August 29 Group, Slovakia’s young flm creation also the Galanda Group, Group 4) emerged found itself on the threshold of its great- and, turning their back to socialist real- est era. The frst groundbreaker was di- ism, resumed the legacy of interwar Slo- rector Stanislav Barabáš with his flm vak modernism and avant-garde. A Song about the Gray Pigeon. But it was On the threshold of the 1960s, they Štefan Uher’s The Sun in a Net, dedicat- were followed by a new generation ed to an unadorned “socialist” everyday of artists who irresistibly “rehabilitated” life, that Miloš Forman called the John abstract art. This new stream bravely set the Baptist of the “new wave” in Czech out on their own path, trying new meth- flm. These artists forgot about great ods of formally simple but ideologically heroes and socialist optimism and be- even deeper artistic creation, looking gan an extraordinarily creative period for new meanings in seemingly ordinary rich in formal experiments and original objects and performances that were frst works of art. While the frst wave of art- presented at private “confrontations” ists re-addressed topics that had been ta- of conceptualists. boo until then, the new generation that Open to free interdisciplinary com- emerged in the late 1960s embarked on munication, they engaged in common their own convention-free path depict- projects with photographers, flmmak- ing metaphorical improvised works on ers, musicians etc. Likewise, sculptures the one hand (Juraj Jakubisko, Elo Havet- became part of modern architecture ta), but also providing a new view of “so- (Jozef Jankovič † 2017). cialist” everyday life. (Dušan Hanák). More relaxed international politi- Like flm production, Slovak per- cal conditions and closer contacts with forming arts and theatre truly bloomed. the world “on the other side of the Iron For years they churned out prominent Curtain” also contributed to the extraor- actors, set designers and directors, whose dinary boom Slovak culture experienced exceptional productions were also pre- in the 1960s. Previously forbidden works sented on television, e.g. in the program were translated and many internation- called Bratislava Mondays. Opera and al celebrities visited Bratislava in 1963 ballet thrived as well, and many of their – 1965 (Jean Paule Sartre and Simone major stars managed to catch atention de Beauvoir, Allen Ginsberg, Roger Ga- in stages and competitions abroad (Lucia rauda, Alain Robbe-Grillet, and with Popp, later Peter Dvorský, and others).

25 In 1968 Jean-Louis Trintignant was awarded the Silver Bear at the Berlin Film Festival for the main role in this flm. Its premiere in Slovakia, scheduled for August 21, 1968, could not take place due to the military occupation.

Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 75 Writers also came to terms with of party elites and his apparition in the Ear- the trauma of being the abused genera- ly Spring became one of the key factors tion of builders of socialism. Young au- that made possible the political move- thors abandoned ideological schemes, ment in the 1960s not only in Slovakia “socialist optimism,” and defended their but also in the whole of Czechoslovakia.26 “right to disillusionment,” just like re- Shortly after taking ofce as First Secre- nown poet Milan Rúfus defended his tary of the CPS on 8 April 1963, Dubček right “to grief.” The older generation spoke out for the rehabilitation of the un- of writers and poets (Dominik Tatarka, justly prosecuted Slovak “bourgeois na- Alfonz Bednár) was followed by a com- tionalists” (although at that time it could pletely new generation (Miroslav Válek, not be really thorough). He also drew Ľubomír Feldek, Ján Stacho, Rudo Slobo- atention to major milestones in the his- da, Vincent Šikula and others). tory of Slovakia that had been pushed Architecture began to write its dis- aside, and went on “bringing back” some tinctive chapter, too. After the neoclassi- important and equally forgoten histori- cism and monumentalism of the 1950s, it cal fgures to the awareness of Slovak so- developed into an innovative and elegant ciety (Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Ľudovít functionalist modernism (the Slovak Na- Štúr, etc.). This is one of the reasons why tional Uprising monument and museum he came into confict with Antonín No- in Banská Bystrica by Dušan Kuzma and votný, the orthodox leader of the Com- sculptor Jozef Jankovič, Bratislava’s cre- munist Party of Czechoslovakia.27 In 1967, matorium by Ferdinand Milucký with when he criticised the Slovak elites, No- a sculpture by Vladimír Kompánek, votný went back to the rhetoric used and the inverted pyramid of the Slovak at the beginning of the 1950s. Dubček, radio in Bratislava by Štefan Svetko). Its who at the beginning had paid atention dark side was large-scale urbanisation to party rules and pressure from Prague in the form of giant prefab housing es- to silence Slovak critics of the political tates, which was the result of industriali- regime, preferred consensus rather than sation and people moving from the coun- the use of means of power and gradual- tryside to the new industrial centres, as ly adopted some of the critical ideas that well as of baby boom years. were being heard in Slovakia, to eventu- While art and culture experienced ally become an active and direct partici- rapid growth and their outcome was pant of these democratisation processes. appreciated at many shows and festi- One of the most important charac- vals abroad, the political elites, thanks teristics of Dubček was that he was not to close communication with the Slovak an ossifed member of a communist ap- intelligentsia and under the infuence paratus but, instead, was capable of per- of Alexander Dubček, gradually became sonal growth. He could listen to experts an integral part of the democratisation from diferent spheres of social life and process as well. formulate non-dogmatic politics based Alexander Dubček was the prototype on that. Dubček got his communist­party representative of the new generation education in the second half of the 1950s

26 For more details on A. Dubček, see Alexander Dubček: The Symbol of Spring. Ed.: Miroslav Londák – Slavomír Michálek. Berlin – Bratislava: Peter Lang & Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2019. 27 The well­known Czech historian Karel Kaplna called Antonín Novotný an anti­Slovak chauvinist.

76 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives at the University of Politics in Moscow. of Slovakia, i.e. from being Secretary After returning from the USSR he was at central level to being Secretary at pro- seen as a promising cadre and one of No- vincial level. Although Dubček spoke votný’s men. Even when the new consti- out in favour of Slovakia’s national in- tution of Czechoslovakia was adopted terests during the Early Spring, it is nec- in 1960, which further reduced the status essary to emphasise that he was by no of the Slovak national authorities, Dubček means a nationalist. In fact, until the end did not show any signs of disagreement. of his life he was rather a Czechoslovak The turning point in his personal de- whose main interest was to bring Slova- velopment was his work as Secretary kia to the same economic and social level of the Central Commitee of the Com- of the Czech lands. munist Party for Industry (he joined on 7 The frst stage of the communist re- July 1960). Dubček not only became part gime in Czechoslovakia ended in 1967. of the centre of power, but also gained Dubček’s speeches from September and access to a lot of secret information relat- October 1967 also contributed to this de- ed to the economic development taking velopment. Subsequently, in January 1968, place in the whole Czechoslovakia, as a discontinuous phase in the develop- well as in Slovakia. This caused Dubček ment of Czechoslovakia began. The year to look with diferent eyes at Czechoslo- 1968 is a signifcant milestone not only vakia’s centrally controlled socialist econ- in the history of this regime and Czech- omy, at the place Slovakia occupied in it, oslovakia’s society, but also an impor- as well as at the economic development tant turning point in the development Slovakia had undergone after February of the entire Eastern bloc and the com- 1948. Dubček was soon daring enough munist movement, especially in the West. to express diferent opinions on invest- The intervention of Moscow and the oc- ment priorities in Slovakia and eventual- cupation of Czechoslovakia by the War- ly also on the competencies of the Slovak saw Pact troops showed that Soviet-type national authorities, from the opinions socialism could not be reformed in Cen- defended by Novotný’s political group. tral-Eastern Europe. The idea at the core That is why in the autumn of 1962, No- of the movement was discredited and its votný decided to sent Dubček away from intellectual atractiveness disappeared.28 Prague and degrade him from the posi- West European communist parties broke tion of Secretary of the Central Commit- up with their Eastern counterparts and tee of the Communist Party of Czech- began to gradually go back to the original oslovakia to Secretary of the Central workers’ movement that had prevailed Commitee of the Communist Party historically: social democracy.

28 British historian Tony Judt thus assessed the world­historical efects of the violent suppression of the reform atempt personifed by Alexander Dubček: “The illusion that communism was reformable, that Stalinism had been a wrong turning, a mistake that could still be corrected, that the core ideals of democratic pluralism might somehow still be compatible with the structures of Marxist collectivism: that illusion was crushed under the tanks on August 21st 1968 and it never recovered. Alexander Dubček and his Action Program were not a beginning but an end. Never again would radicals or reformers look to the ruling party to carry their aspirations or adopt their projects. Communism in Eastern Europe staggered on, sustained by an unlikely alliance of foreign loans and Russian bayonets: the roting carcass was fnally carried away only in 1989. But the soul of Communism had died 20 years before: in Prague, in August 1968.” See Judt, Tony: Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. London: Penguin Press, 2005, p. 447.

Miroslav Londák – Elena Londáková: Slovakia’s Early Spring (1963 – 1967) 77 The events we associate with the year of the regime in the Early Spring, the pop- 1968 occurred for several reasons – do- ulation felt a gust of freedom as new pos- mestic, economic and social ones. The frst sibilities for traveling beyond the Iron twenty years of the regime revealed Curtain opened. a number of problems. Some of them be- In the turbulent year of 1968, the ac- came evident during the Early Spring: cumulated problems of Czecho-Slova- Slovakia’s inadequate and clearly une- kia’s society, conditioned by the whole qual position within the country, the in- post-war development, became part volvement of the regime and of the Com- of the agenda. Questions having to do munist leadership with serious and with the democratisation of the com- unlawful afairs of the 1950s, the far from munist regime resulting from the ideas ideal course of Slovakia’s industrialisa- of the so-called “Socialism with a Hu- tion, as well as the overall economic and man Face” were in the spotlight. Like- social development of the country, es- wise was the question of the coexistence pecially against the developed capitalist of Czechs and Slovaks in a common state, countries, which refected in the stand- which culminated in January 1968 with ard of living of the population. In con- the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak nection with the weakening position federation.

78 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Peter Jašek* Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s

Kontakty slovenského a chorvátskeho politického exilu v 70. a 80. rokoch / Kontakti slovačke i hrvatske političke emigracije 1970-ih i 1980-ih godina

Štúdia sa zaoberá témou vzájomných kontaktov medzi Svetovým kongresom Slovákov ako kľúčovým orgánom slovenského politického exilu na jednej strane a predstaviteľmi Chorvátov v zahraničí na strane druhej. Jeden i druhý exil spájal spoločný záujem formulovaný cieľom bojovať proti komunizmu, ako aj za nezávislý štát. Súčasný výskum je obmedzený z dôvodu komplikovanej dostupnosti archívnych zdrojov. Text sa venuje širšiemu kontextu vzťahov Svetového kongresu Slovákov so zástupcami exilu z rôznych krajín strednej a východnej Európy v sovietskom bloku. Štúdia obsahuje aj rekonštrukciu konkrétnych prípadov vzájomnej spolupráce medzi Slovákmi a Chorvátmi na Západe.

Kľúčové slová: Politický exil, Svetový kongres Slovákov, zahraničná politika, ľudské práva – vzájomné kontakty

he issue of Slovak political expatri- in the establishment of the Czecho-Slo- Tates and their activities, especially vak Republic in 1918, the struggle for au- after 1945, remains unexplored and has tonomy throughout the interwar period, so far received litle atention by Slovak the active part Slovak representatives historiography. This lack of interest is re- such as Štefan Osuský, Milan Hodža and ally lamentable considering the crucial Peter Prídavok took in WWII anti-fas- role the activities developed by Slovaks cism resistance in the West, and the sig- abroad had for Slovak history. After all, nifcant and still underestimated share representatives of the Slovak diaspora Slovak émigrés had in fghting the com- played a signifcant role in almost all munist regime between 1945 and 1948, major turning points in Slovak history, which continued until 1989, alongside especially in the 20th century. Some few the struggle for independence following examples to illustrate this are the cru- 1989. Nevertheless, some literature can be cial part Milan Rastislav Štefánik and found on the topic, which makes it pos- the Slovak League of America played sible to at least outline a basic overview

* Peter Jašek, National Memory Institute, Bratislava (Slovak Republic).

Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 79 of the targeted issues and represents complexly processed goes hand in hand a starting point for future research.1 with other issues, one of which is with There are several reasons why this no doubt the cooperation activities with topic remains a taboo in Slovak histori- representatives of movements of expatri- ography. First of all, it is the over 40-year ates from other Central and Eastern Eu- communist rule and the resulting ide- ropean countries.2 This paper focuses on ologisation of Slovak historical science the issue of the Slovak community of ex- in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist dogmas iles in the 70s and 80s in connection with that in the activities of Slovak expatriates the Slovak World Congress. At his point saw nothing but “ideological diversion”. it is necessary to emphasise that the his- It is, therefore, regretable to see that even tory of Slovak émigrés remains vastly thirty years after the fall of the commu- unprocessed, the result of very limited nist regime, such misleading approach is records and relatively out-of-reach sourc- still tangible in Slovak historiography… es. The information used to look into this Other objective factors that make it dif- topic comes mostly from the organisa- cult to pay atention to Slovak expatriates tion’s ofcial Bulletin of the Slovak World is the fact that the relevant sources are Congress, which regularly brought out not easily available as they are scatered key documents and was used by all its over the archives of numerous foreign leading representatives for their publish- afairs ofces, Slovak expatriate institu- ing activities. tions and private records literally all over The Slovak World Congress contin- the world. It is also necessary to mention ued the activities organisations of expa- many other major subjective factors: ide- triates and individual personalities had ological bias, insufcient language skills been carrying out between 1945 and its and lack of the funds necessary to carry foundation in 1971. As a mater of fact, out costly research abroad. from as early as the end of WWII, Slovak The fact that the topic of the Slovak expatriates had been actively struggling diaspora has not been sufciently and against the communist regime. In the vast

1 For all publications, let us mention at least Hrabovec, Emília: Slovensko a Svätá stolica v kontexte Vatikánskej východnej politiky (1962 − 1989). Bratislava 2016; Eadem: Slovenský ústav svätých Cyrila a Metoda v Ríme (1963 – 2013). Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského, 2015; Jašek, Peter: Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase proti komunistickému režimu. Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2018; Ličko, Miroslav John: Ako chutí cudzina? Slovenská demokracia v exile 1948 − 1989. Bratislava: Kalligram, 1999; Sočufka, František (SJ): Na vlnách Rádia Vatikán. Bratislava: Dobrá kniha, 1998; Pešek, Jan − Vondrášek, Václav: Slovenský poválečný exil a jeho aktivity. Mýty a realita. Bratislava: Veda 2011; Špetko, Jozef: Slovenská politická emigrácia v 20. storočí: Jej vzťahy k českej emigrácii a Čechom. Praha 1994; Idem: Líšky kontra ježe: Slovenská politická emigrácia 1948 – 1989: Analýzy a dokumenty. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2002; Slovenský politický exil v zápase za samostatné Slovensko. Ed.: Ján Bobák. Bratislava: Matica slovenská, 1996; Michálek, Slavomír: Ján Papánek: Politik, diplomat, humanista. Bratislava: Veda, 1996; Politický exil z krajín strednej a východnej Európy: Motívy, stratégie, aktivity a perspektívy na Východe a Západe, 1945 – 1989. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2017; Idem: Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe. Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2012; Katrebová Blehová, Beáta: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku v rokoch 1945 – 1950. Bratislava – Rím: Slovenský historický ústav v Ríme, 2019. 2 In this respect, the article by Czech historian Jan Cholínský on the contacts between the Slovak World Congress and representatives of the Czech exile movement is rather an exception. See Cholínský, Jan: Political Unifcation Atempts by Czech Émigrés and Contacts with the Slovak World Congress. In: Slovak World Congress in the Struggle Against the Communist Regime, pp. 223 – 259.

80 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives majority of cases, groups of Slovak émi- stations, which included Slovak desks grés had been fghting not only against within the Vatican Radio, the BBC, Radio the communist regime, but also trying to Nacional de España, Deutsche Welle, as change the state order of post-war Czech- well as the Czechoslovak sections at Ra- oslovakia. In fact, 1945 meant not only dio Free Europe, the Voice of America, the end of the independent Slovak Repub- and Radio Luxembourg. All these ex- lic State, but also the rapid dismantling patriate organisations, in which Slovaks of the rights Slovaks enjoyed in the com- were also active, formed integral part mon country of Czechs and Slovaks. of the Cold War and the bipolar division In the post-war period, Slovak expatri- of the world, so their activities were car- ates became active members of diferent ried out in this vein. organisations that emerged in the West An important moment for emigration and became part of the anti-commu- were the events of 1968, when eforts to nist resistance. While being united by democratise the communist regime were an anti-communist stance, they were truncated by the invasion of Czecho- also divided by their diferent ideas con- slovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries cerning the constitutional arrangement on August 21, 1968. These events and of post-war Czechoslovakia. Among the gradual imposition of the so-called the best known organisations of expatri- “normalisation regime” resulted in a mass ates were the Slovak Liberation Commitee emigration wave from Czechoslovakia. and the Slovak National Council Abroad, Statistics show that over 70,000 people which promoted the right of Slovaks to did not return to the country, the high- their own statehood. These ideas were est number since the end of World War II. also supported by diferent Slovak expa- In fact, this fgure represents more than triate organisations, such as the Slovak 50% of all emigrants after 1945.3 This wave League of America. In 1949, the Coun- arrived in western countries at a time cil of Free Czechoslovakia was founded of intense unifcation processes within in the United States of America, which the structures of Slovak exiles. Their rep- subscribed to interwar Czechoslovakia. resentatives were fully aware that frag- However, due to its strong pro-Czech- mentation and internal contradictions oslovak orientation, in the 1960s some (many of which were being systematical- of the original members of the Council ly instigated by the Czechoslovak State of Free Czechoslovakia founded the Per- Security) constituted a major obstacle manent Conference of Slovak Democrat- to achieving a common goal. The new ic Émigrés. Among the major achieve- wave of refugees accelerated these unif- ments by Slovak Catholic expatriates cation processes. This is one of the rea- was the establishment of the Slovak sons why, after more than two decades, Institute of Saints Cyril and Methodius it was at least possible to overcome in Rome in 1963, which published reli- the diferences within the Slovak diaspo- gious literature that was often smuggled ra. Unity was fnally reached in June 1970 into Slovakia. Of particular importance when at the initiative of an outstanding was the broadcasting of Western radio Slovak businessman living in Canada,

3 Podolec, Ondrej: Trestnoprávna represia za tv. nedovolené opustenie republiky a jej prehodnocovanie v 80. rokoch 20. storočia. In: Pamäť národa, a. 14, 2018, nr. 1, p. 35.

Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 81 Štefan B. Roman, the Slovak World Con- together 93 major organisations of expa- gress (hereinafter SWC) was established triate Slovak communities and hundreds at a General Assembly of Slovak Expa- of individuals.5 triates that took place in New York from Štefan Boleslav Roman became the frst the 19th to 21st of June 1970 as the umbrel- SWC chairman.6 Other functionaries la organisation of the Slovak political ex- were appointed and horizontal and verti- iles. On that occasion, Roman explained cal structures were created. The congress the need to establish the Congress with was divided into geographical units. the words: Each unit was headed by a vice-presi- dent who represented Slovaks in Aus- “Creating the Slovak World Congress tralia, Europe, South America, the USA is an imperative necessity for Slovaks and Canada.7 It was also structured into in order to speak in a unifed and strong commissions. At the beginning there voice. Among other responsibilities, were 13 commissions covering a wide the Congress shall coordinate the activi- range of areas, namely statistics and reg- ties of pro-Slovak oriented organisations ister, fnances, Slovak minorities afairs, on the other side of the Iron Curtain as politics, afairs of Non­Slovaks in Slova- well as in the free world.”4 kia, cultural activities, religious issues, scientifc and publishing activities, or- The congress was atended by 282 ganisation and planning, social issues, delegates from 12 countries and brought media, contacts with Slovakia, and youth

4 Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Založenie Svetového kongresu Slovákov. In: Desať rokov činnosti SKS. Ed.: Idem. Toronto: Svetový kongres Slovákov, 1981, p. 21. 5 Ibidem, pp. 23 – 24. 6 Štefan B. Roman (1921 – 1988), Slovak businessman and industrialist. After fnishing elementary school in Slovakia at the end of the 1930s, at 16 he and his older brother emigrated to Canada. He frst worked on a farm and, after completing his military service, at a factory. Later on Roman started doing business and founded the Denison Mines company eventually expanding his business activities to other areas such as agriculture, trading industrial raw materials, and fnance. From the 1950s, his business fourished and he became one of the most successful entrepreneurs in Canada. He also made contacts in infuential circles, both economic and political. The name “Roman’s Empire” is eloquent to describe his business and position in Canada’s business world. In fact, he was one of the richest businessmen in the country. Despite his success in business, he never forgot the difcult situation Slovaks had to endure in communist Czechoslovakia. At the end of the 1940s, he became a member of the Canadian Slovak League and a signatory to its resolution demanding the right of Slovaks to self-determination. He also took part in other activities carried out by the community of Slovak émigrés and tried several times to unite it in the 50s and 60s. A successful entrepreneur, he supported the publication of Slovak literature as well as diferent cultural institutions in exile. Being a highly regarded personality, he was a forefront defender of the right of Slovaks to self- determination throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In his opinion, Slovakia’s future was to be built on religious and political ecumenism with the cooperation of all those who accept the idea of a free and democratic Slovakia in a free Europe. See also Jašek, Peter: “Roman’s Empire” Never Forgot its Roots. In: National Calendar 2018. Martin: Matica slovenská 2017, pp. 214 – 215. 7 Bulletin SWC, nr. 1, 1971, p. 6. 8 Ibidem, pp. 11 – 13. After the frst General Assembly in 1971, the commissions were transformed into departments. There were 9 in total: Organisation and Planning, Finances, Culture and Science, Politics, Religious Issues, Social Issues, Information, Youth, Education and Sport, and also the Department for Contact with Slovaks outside the Congress. Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, nr. 6, 1971, p. 24. In fact, the organisational structure was revised continuously in order to make it more efcient and to make it meet the current needs of the Congress.

82 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives issues.8 Besides functionaries, the Con- of America and the Canadian Slovak gress also had a Presidency and a Secre- League, it had a clearly formulated an- tariat, headed by the Secretary General. ti-communist program and sought to From the very beginning, the SWC car- achieve the right of Slovaks to self-deter- ried out several activities, the most visi- mination. In addition, the congress itself ble of which were its general assemblies, was built on foundations of national and at which decisions were made about religious ecumenism, included Slovaks the congress program line, the most of diferent ideological factions, outlined important documents were approved, Slovakia’s democratic orientation after and ofcials were elected. The impor- the fall of the communist regime in all its tance and prestige of the General As- program documents, and openly com- semblies were endorsed by the presence mited to political pluralism, the ideas of infuential politicians of the countries of Western democracy and the observa- in which they took place, especially rep- tion of human and civil rights.11 resentatives of the Canadian government Foreign policy was of particular im- and US congressmen.9 portance within the activities of the SWC, Despite the fact that the Congress had as the destinies of smaller nations always to face unjust defamation and was brand- depended on the policy of the determin- ed as a “fascist” organisation and a pre- ing powers. The Congress atributed server of “populist“ emigrants,10 this su- the Slovak question an international char- preme institution of Slovak exiles, which acter and tried to persuade the represent- was represented by such prominent atives of the Western powers to consider personalities as Štefan B. Roman, Dušan it an international problem rather than Tóth, Jozef M. Kirschbaum, Marián Šťast- an internal issue of Czechoslovakia.12 ný, Štefan Osuský, Andrew Grutka, Jozef For this demand it sought support not Mikuš, Ján Okáľ, Ferdinand Ďurčanský, only on the American continent but also Eugen Löbl, Jozef Staško and Emanuel in Europe, where it actively monitored Böhm, and which associated all ma- the integration process of the West Euro- jor organisations and unions of Slovak pean countries. The “European policy” émigrés including the Slovak League of the SWC incited important meetings

9 Unfortunately, Slovak historiography has not yet addressed the activities of the SWC. Although there are a few articles of a memoir character, the frst comprehensive publication is the quoted collection of contributions from the scientifc conference “The Slovak World Congress in the Struggle Against the Communist Regime”. Ed.: Peter Jašek. 10 The response of contemporary communist propaganda to the activities of the SWC, see Jablonický, Viliam: Slovak World Congress in the Struggle for a Free, Democratic and Pluralistic Slovak Republic. In: Anti­Communist Resistance in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 864 – 866. 11 See several declarations issued by Congress, e.g. Rome Declaration of the General Assembly of the World Congress of Slovaks on June 21, 1975 in Rome. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, a. 5, 1975, nr. 21, pp. 14 – 15; Manifest of the World Congress of Slovaks, adopted at the General Assembly in Washington DC in May 1978. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, a. 8, 1978, pp. 32 – 36; Resolution of the World Congress of Slovaks, adopted at the General Assembly in Toronto ON, 3. July 1987. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, a. 17, 1987, nr. 77, pp. 6 – 7; Resolution of the World Congress of Slovaks on the Persecution of Jews in the Slovak Republic during World War II, adopted at the General Assembly in Toronto ON, 3. July 1987. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, a. 17, 1987, nr. 77, pp. 6 – 7. 12 See Hrabovec, Emília: Generálne zhromaždenie SKS v Ríme 1975 v kontexte slovenského a medzinárodného vývoja. In: Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase proti komunistickému režimu, p. 97.

Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 83 of its representatives with leading West- distributed to leading world libraries ern politicians, such as the visit of a Slovak and, last but not least, the quarterly Bul- delegation headed by Štefan B. Roman to letin of the Slovak World Congress, which the European Parliament in Strasbourg or became one of the leading periodicals its regular presence at the Follow-up Con- of émigrés in general.13 Something that ferences to the Helsinki Accords in Bel- speaks for all the activities carried out grade, Madrid and Vienna. The Congress by the SWC is the fact that the biggest thus represented Slovakia at internation- protest against the communist regime al events before the Western world and during the normalisation period in Slo- acquainted important world politicians vakia, known as the Candle Demonstra- with the Slovak question. tion, was initiated within the Congress.14 At the same time, SWC represent- Worth mentioning are also several docu- atives issued memoranda and resolu- ments and memoranda that pointed out tions that systematically pointed out violations of human rights and religious the problems Slovakia faced in commu- freedoms in Slovakia.15 nist Czechoslovakia. Worth mentioning Creating the SWC was an extraor- are, for instance, the demand to create dinary achievement in the history a Slovak ecclesiastical province (which of the Slovak diaspora that in this way was successfully fulflled in 1977) or became united as it had never been be- a protest against the occupation of Slo- fore and would never be later on. From vakia by Warsaw Pact troops. In sever- its very beginning, the Congress had al memoranda, they drew atention to its own foreign policy, gave the Slovak the violation of human and civil rights question an international character, and as well as of religious freedoms in Slo- demanded “international justice in the form vakia. Perhaps the most signifcant act of full democratic statehood” for the Slovak of this kind was the Memorandum on Hu- nation, as stated in the declaration adopt- man Rights Violations in Slovakia, sub- ed at the preparatory General assembly mited to US President Jimmy Carter. of the Slovak World Congress in New Other important events include the four York on June 21, 1970.16 The SWC foreign World Festivals of Slovak Youth organ- policy focused on the western democra- ised in the 1980s with the participation cies. Equally important was its policy to- of hundreds of young Slovaks from dif- wards the nations that found themselves ferent parts of the world, international under the power of the Soviet Union. conferences on Slovak history and cul- At the same assembly, an SWC resolu- ture, dozens of publications on Slovakia tion unequivocally declared its intention

13 See Jašek, Peter: Bulletin Svetového kongresu Slovákov ako vrcholové periodikum slovenského exilu v 70. a 80. rokoch 20. storočia. In: Periodiká v minulosti a súčasnosti. Ed.: Angela Škovierová. Bratislava: Univerzitná knižnica v Bratislave, 2018, pp. 231 – 239. 14 See Idem: Zahraniční Slováci a Sviečková manifestácia. In: Sviečková manifestácia I. Štúdie: Spomienky a svedectvá. Ed.: Idem – František Neupaer – Ondrej Podolec a Pavol Jakubčin. Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2015, pp. 84 − 100. 15 See, in particular, the Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in Slovakia. Washington: Slovak World Congress, 1978, 26 p; also Memorandum on violation of human rights in Slovakia. Presented to the Government of the Signatory States … on the occasion of the Review Conference in Madrid. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, a. 11, 1981, nr. 45, pp. 21 − 31. 16 Declaration. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1971, nr. 1, p. 7.

84 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives to cooperate with the expatriate organi- General Assembly in June 1973, building sations and associations of all countries up contacts with representatives of oth- and nations on the other side of the Iron er national diasporas was taken over by Curtain. This policy remained of fore- the Department of International Rela- most importance to the SWC throughout tions headed, again, by Jozef Mikuš. its existence until the fall of the commu- The key issues addressed by the po- nist regime. In the long run, this type litical commission were the geopolitical of cooperation aimed to help the Slovak situation around the world and the re- people to achieve freedom and equal- spective standpoints of the western coun- ity with the other European nations, so tries, the United Nations Organisation that Slovaks would be able to determine and the smaller nations that are not rep- for themselves their own fate as well as resented in it, communism and its super- the form and political regime of their power ambitions – which Slovaks con- own country.17 The SWC Commission sidered to be covered by the Brezhnev for Politics, whose frst head was a for- Doctrine – after 1968, and European inte- mer diplomat during the frst Slovak Re- gration.20 As for the UN policy, the Con- public, Dr. Jozef Mikuš, was responsible gress presented the issue of Slovakia for this agenda as well as for building up within the frame of the position of small contacts.18 A major explicitly stated task nations, and in ofcial documents often was “to cooperate with international and referred to three communist federations: other national organisations developing par- Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and allel activities aimed at achieving a new order Yugoslavia.21 in Central Europe [parallel to the activi- Particularly important for the SWC ties of the SWC, note. P. J.].”19 The SWC and to which it paid special atention in its First General Assembly made some or- foreign policy was cooperation among all ganisational adjustments after which nations in Central and Eastern Europe. this agenda became the responsibility This cooperation was pre-determined of the Department for Politics. After fur- by the fact that all these countries were ther reorganisation made at the Chicago within the Soviet sphere of infuence and

17 Relations of the WCS with exiled representations of nations neighbouring Slovakia. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1974, nr. 15, p. 1. 18 Dr. Jozef Mikuš (1909 – 2005) was a Slovak diplomat, university teacher and exile worker. After graduating from the Faculty of Law at Comenius University, he worked in the diplomatic service from the mid­1930s, frst within the Czechoslovak Republic, later on within the Slovak Republic, which he represented at embassies in Italy and Spain. After the end of World War II, being persecuted by the communist regime, he emigrated and setled in the USA, where he worked at several universities. Since the 1950s, he was actively involved in the activities of the Slovak political émigrés: frst as a member of the Slovak National Council Abroad. Later on he participated in the creation and activities of the Slovak World Congress and became one of its most outstanding representatives. 19 Course of the General Meeting. In: In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1971, nr. 6, p. 10. 20 Mikuš, Jozef: Zahranično­politická činnosť SKS. In: Kirschbaum, Jozef M.: Desať rokov činnosti SKS, pp. 131 – 132. 21 Resolution of the World Congress of Slovaks. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1973, nr. 11, p. 34. In a specifc resolution that called on the UN to “study the question of non-free nations on all continents, and hence Slovakia”, the wording was mentioned: “(…) in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia itself, a ruling nation of power it holds the smaller peoples in a pseudo-federal structure which allows them to be gradually nationalized…”.

Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 85 formed an integral part of the Soviet bloc. In his speech, Roman explicitly stated The SWC new organisation structure that “only cooperation among the subjugated adopted at the frst Toronto General As- nations” can create the conditions neces- sembly in 1971 transformed the commis- sary for Central and Eastern Europe to sions into departments. One of the main break free. However, he paid special at- tasks of the Department for Politics was tention to the relations between Slovaks to “establish contacts with free organisations and Czechs, but also made explicit men- of Czechs, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Poles, tion of Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians Croats, Serbs, Slovenes and Romanians”. 22 and Austrians24 – that is, the rest of na- As can be seen, the Congress explicitly tions Slovakia neighbours with. listed Croatian expatriate associations This policy mirrored on the pages as potential partners for mutual cooper- of the SWC Bulletin, especially in the early ation. In the same spirit, other SWC doc- 1970s, which made frequent references to uments speak of the necessity to acquaint the Croatian community of exiles. SWC the world with Slovakia and its people, representatives noticed that the Croatian and to cooperate with partners seeking expatriate press reported on the estab- the fall of the communist regime in Cen- lishment of the congress in a positive way. tral and Eastern Europe. The fact is, how- Indeed, the magazine of Croats in Can- ever, that the SWC specifcally listed those ada Naš put Glas Hrvatskich Republikan- nations that directly neighbour with Slo- aca informed about the establishment vakia (namely Poles, Czechs, Hungarians of the congress with the words: “We wish and Ukrainians), for these nations and the Slovak World Congress and the Slovak na- Slovaks “share not only a common destiny, tion to achieve their national goals, and want but also a common interest in a new, fairer and to express our full solidarity with them.”25 more permanent order in Central Europe.”23 In turn, the Slovak expatriate press in- In a speech at the Eighth General Assem- formed about anniversaries or deaths bly in Toronto in 1987, SWC chairman, of important Croatian personalities and Štefan Roman, once again confrmed this exiles. In 1973, for example, the Relations stance. The signifcance of this speech re- Section of the SWC Bulletin informed sides not only in the fact that it was Ro- about the death of one of the leaders man’s last at the congress, but also that of the Croatian community of exiles in 1987 the defeat of the Soviet Union in Argentina, Dr. Stjepan Hefer, in Bue- in the Cold War was already imminent, nos Aires in July 1973, who had headed so all expatriate organisations, including the Croatian Liberation Movement after the Slovak diaspora, were increasingly the death of Ante Pavelič. In this con- addressing issues concerning the new or- text, the author briefy wonders whether ganisation of Central and Eastern Europe the Croatian émigrés would ever be able after the fall of the communist regime. to “overcome their diferences”. 26

22 From Congress documentation. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1972, nr. 7, p. 11. 23 Relations of the WCS with exile representations of nations neighbouring Slovakia. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1974, nr. 15, p. 1. 24 Roman, Štefan Bohuš: Hrdí na vykonanú prácu, novej sa nebojíme. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, nr. 76, pp. 3 – 4. 25 Ethnic Press in Canada. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1971, nr. 6, p. 19. 26 Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1973, nr. 12, p. 18.

86 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives The détente policy and the result- On this mater, Eugen Löbl, head ing relaxation of the tensions between of the SWC Commission for Politics, said: East and West within the Cold War in the second half of the 1970s also re- “It is imperative for us to get the West to fected in the pages of the SWC Bulletin. focus its foreign policy on the principle Eforts to promote the right to self­de- of self-determination of all nations that termination of nations and to build up have been deprived of this fundamental contacts with expatriate organisations right by Soviet imperialism and expan- of the subjugated nations became a ma- sionism. In this respect we need to em- jor issue again when the Cold War in- phasise that we share the same interests tensifed after 1979. The congress mag- not only with our neighbours, but with azine payed increased atention to this all oppressed nations as well…”28 issue and published several statements by leading SWC representatives. A 1980 The right to self-determination for “all standpoint by František Braxátor, mem- nations under the Soviet rule” is also em- ber of the SWC Commission for Politics, phasised in a key General Assembly doc- mentions in this respect: ument entitled Ideological Foundations and Political Objectives of the SWC.29 “Striving to free Slovakia from the Sovi- The fact that this policy is outlined et sphere of interest remains one of our in this form might give the impression main tasks. This consequently implies that the Slovak community of exiles was searching for allies. These include all carrying out eforts to develop intensive those in the Western and Third World and close relations with representatives who fear Soviet imperialism and ex- of expatriate communities of all other na- pansionism, as well as those who have tions operating in the West. This is just experienced it frsthand, i.e. especially partially true, though. As a mater of fact, all Central European nations that are the intensity of these mutual relations in the same situation and, among them, decreased in direct proportion to the dis- our neighbours in the frst place (…). tance between these nations and Slova- Our interest is the same as the interest kia. They were closest with Slovakia’s di- of the divided Germans, the subjugat- rect neighbours and not so intense with ed Romanians, the constricted Cro- more distant nations, like the Croats, ats, Slovenes, Serbs, Montenegrins, for instance. Besides some common and Macedonians and other nationalities uniting features, however, there were of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarians, the sub- other aspects that hindered mutual coop- jugated peoples of the Baltic republics eration between diferent groups of émi- of the USSR…”27 grés. The chairman of the SWC political

27 Braxátor, František: The Poslanie zahraničných Slovákov v súčasnej medzinárodnej situácii. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, nr. 39, p. 18. 28 Löbl, Eugen: Hovoriť za seba – nie však iba pre seba. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1980, nr. 42, p. 3. 29 Ideological foundations and political objectives of the WCS. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1981, nr. 48, p. 19. The issue of the Slovak point of view is also addressed in other texts published in the Bulletin, eg. Kirschbaum, J. Stanislav: Seba určovacie právo národov a Slovensko. In: Bulletin Svetového kongresu Slovákov, 1986, nr. 71, pp. 7 – 8.

Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 87 commission, J. Mikuš, named them ex- in Argentina33 and Uruguay.34 No further plicitly. In connection with the Hungari- references can be found in the SWC Bulle- ans he wrote “successful cooperation is ham- tin, in spite of the fact that one would ex- pered by Hungarian revisionist ideas towards pect a kind of tacit and logical alliance be- the Hungarian minority [in Slovakia].” tween Slovaks and Croats resulting from In this respect, the position of the SWC their common Catholic religion as well as was clear: to preserve the territorial in- by the fact that after World War II the res- tegrity of Slovakia within its borders.30 toration of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia Mutual cooperation with Ukrainians, cost both nations to lose their own inde- in turn, was hindered by “growing Ukrain- pendent countries. Especially difcult was ian nationalism and cultural expansion establishing direct contacts at a political in eastern Slovakia.” The relations with level. Like the Slovak diaspora, the Croats the Poles seemed best, although they were also very active; to some extent even were also burdened by the loss of part more radical than the Slovak exiles.35 of the northern territories of the Orava However, there was a bigger obstacle and Spiš regions. However, cooperation hindering mutual cooperation between was considered necessary mainly with both communities. The strong position the aim to eliminate Soviet infuence Yugoslavia enjoyed in the West signif- over both countries. It was the expatriate cantly limited the possibilities for open organisations of these three CEE coun- cooperation between the Slovak and tries that the SWC primarily wanted to Croatian diasporas. After the rift be- nurture contacts with. This preference tween Yugoslavia and Stalin in 1948, Yu- for the neighbouring countries and na- goslavia had a special status in the pol- tions, which were supposed to play a di- icy of the West towards the Soviet bloc. rect role in the new organisation of Cen- For the West, Yugoslavia represented tral and Eastern Europe after the fall a qualitatively diferent entity. It was of the communist regime, can be clearly an independent socialist country, i.e. seen in several scientifc and cultural ac- a completely diferent category than tivities organised by the congress,31 as the rest of the countries on the other well as in writen articles on this topic side of the iron curtain. Therefore, it was published in the SWC Bulletin.32 important for the Western powers to Ofcial records make brief references preserve Yugoslavia’s specifc position to regular meetings with representatives within the Eastern bloc rather than to of the Croatian émigrés in the mid­1970s weaken it. This is the reason why in its and 1980s in South America, namely articles, the SWC Bulletin made sure not

30 Mikuš, Jozef: Zahranično­politická činnosť SKS, p. 133. 31 Ibidem, pp. 133 – 135. 32 See Idem: Budúcnosť Slovenska v strednej Európe. In: Bulletin Svetového kongresu Slovákov, 1971, nr. 4/5, pp. 51 – 54. 33 Správa podpredsedu SKS Alojza Maceka. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1975, nr. 21, p. 8. 34 Slováci v Uruguaji oslávili 50. výročie Slovenského centra. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1981, nr. 49, p. 17. 35 See Molnar, Christopher: The Radicalization of the Croatian Emigré Community in West Germany, 1955 – 1970. In: Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe, pp. 791 – 793. Representatives of Croatian exile eg. In Germany carried out a bombing atack against Yugoslav trade mission in Bonn-Mehlem in November 1962.

88 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives to criticise Yugoslavia even in questions conferences, too, and also cooperated directly connected with the principle in preparing this type of documents. Ex- of self-determination of nations, which isting records give brief account of coop- was so important to the Congress.36 eration between transnational commu- The SWC and its publication were also nities of exiles in Switerland. In May careful when describing the conditions 1977, on the occasion of the Follow-up the Slovak minority had in Yugoslavia. Conference to the Helsinki Accords In this respect, the SWC would repeat- in Belgrade, representatives of expatriate edly declare that Slovaks in Yugoslavia organisations from Central and Eastern had “signifcant opportunities for their na- Europe met, prepared and handed over tional, cultural and religious development.”37 to the Swiss government a Memorandum At the same time, the SWC continuously on the Right to Self-determination and monitored the conditions in which Slo- Human Rights.38 vak minorities lived in other communist Besides direct political negotiations, countries. Especially in Hungary and another good way for establishing con- the Czech Republic, Slovaks were being tacts was to exchange information rapidly denationalised. at a professional level. An important role However, direct political contacts were in this respect was played by several sci- not the only way how to establish relations entifc conferences the Congress organ- between the communities of Slovak and ised in order to acquaint the world with Croatian expatriates. Another platform Slovakia. An example to illustrate this for mutual cooperation between the rep- type of cooperation was the 1979 scien- resentatives of both diasporas were inter- tifc conference “The Right to Self-Determi- national forums, especially the follow-up nation in Central Europe”, which was held conferences to the Helsinki Accords held in Switerland and was accompanied in Belgrade (1978), Madrid (1980) and by a relevant publication.39 Even more Vienna (1986). The SWC regularly sent important in this respect was the In- delegations to participate at these confer- ternational Symposium of Nations that ences and on these occasions also issued took place in November 1981 in Rome, memoranda condemning the violation to which the SWC sent some of its most of human, religious and national rights prominent personalities and which was in Slovakia. Of course, émigrés from oth- atended by representatives of more than er nations published memoranda at these 20 diferent nations.40 The 1981 SWC

36 Löbl, Eugen: Niektoré námietky k princípu samourčenia národov. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1980, nr. 41, pp. 9 – 10. 37 Memorandum on the Violation of the Human Rights in Slovakia presented to the Governments of the Signatory States of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the occasion of the Review conference in Madrid. In: Bulletin Svetového kongresu Slovákov, 1981, nr. 45, p. 25. On several occasions Yugoslavia’ s liberal policy on minorities has been stated. See Národnostná mozaika v Európe. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1983, nr. 61, pp. 12 – 13. 38 Memorandum švajčiarskej vláde k belehradskej konferencii. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1977, nr. 27/28, p. 9. 39 Kniha o samourčení európskych národov. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1980, nr. 41, p. 22. 40 ­jmk­ [Jozef M. Kirschbaum]: Dôstojná reprezentácia Slovákov na „Medzinárodnom sympóziu národov“ v Ríme. In: Bulletin Svetového kongresu Slovákov, 1981, nr. 49, p. 3. Undoubtedly there were other similar conferences mentioned in the SWC Bulletin. See e.g. Slováci na medzinárodnej konferencii v Londýne. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1982, nr. 55, p. 12.

Peter Jašek: Contacts between Slovak and Croatian Political Exiles in the 70s and 80s 89 General Assembly in Toronto includ- Ivan Meštrović. The whole event should ed a scientifc conference on “The Fu- also serve to highlight the friendship be- ture of Central Europe”, which discussed tween Slovaks and Croats in exile. the new organisation of the region af- This article has tried to outline ter the fall of communism. However, the relations between the representa- the contributions concerned only Slova- tives of the Slovak World Congress as kia and its neighbouring countries.41 the supreme institution of the Slovak Alongside meetings and cooperation political exiles and the representatives among political representatives of expa- of the Croatian émigrés. Preparing this triate communities, contacts at a cultural paper unveiled a signifcant lack of sourc- level were equally important. A good ex- es concerning the activities carried out by ample is the performance of Slovak art- Slovaks in this respect. In fact, the ofcial ists from the Slovak-American Cultural periodical of the congress contains very Center at the Croatian Center in New litle information on the mutual relations York in February 1974. In fact, their pres- of the Slovak and Croatian expatriate entation was such a success that they communities.43 Therefore, it was neces- were invited again for another perfor- sary to approach this topic from a wid- mance. The article the SWC Bulletin pub- er perspective to include the relations lished on this event was signifcantly ti- between the SWC and representatives tled “At Our Croatian Brothers” (U bratov of the exile movements of other nations Chorvatov).42 under the infuence of the Soviet Union Slovaks in exile were connected with and the eforts carried out by the SWC to the Croats by the personality of the writer promote the policy of self-determination Martin Kukučín. When in 1978 the SWC of nations for all the peoples of Central proclaimed the Year of Martin Kuku- and Eastern Europe. Future research on cin, one of the important events was the issue should, therefore, focus mainly the ceremony under the Kukucin‘s statue on expanding the existing source base on in Slovak Jesuits at Cambridge, Ontario, issues concerning both the Slovak as well which were created by Croatian sculptor as the Croatian communities of exiles.

41 Konferencia o „Budúcnosti strednej Európy“. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, 1981, nr. 47, p. 18. 42 U bratov Chorvátov. In: Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, nr. 13, 1974, p. 19. 43 Based on research in diferent Slovak archives in Canada, including the personal records of Ján Okál and Jozef Mikuš.

90 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Beáta Katrebová Blehová* The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context: An Outline of the Issue

Rozdelenie Česko­Slovenska v medzinárodnom kontexte: náčrt problematiky / Razlaz Češko­Slovačke u međunarodnom kontekstu: prikaz problematike

Po júnových voľbách v roku 1992 bolo viac než isté, že Česko-slovenská federácia nebude mať trvácnosť a medzi najdôležitejšie otázky spoločných rokovaní medzi víťazmi volieb, Vladimírom Mečiarom a Václavom Klausom, patril spôsob a čas rozdelenia štátu. Z dokumentov uložených v archíve bývalého Ministerstva medzinárodných vzťahov, ktoré dokumentujú stretnutia predsedu vlády Mečiara s diplomatickými zástupcami Európy a Izraela, je zjavné, že slovenská vláda na rozdelenie štátu nebola v dostatočnej miere pripravená a jednoznačne preferovala konfederáciu pred samostatým štátom. Z dokumentov tiež vyplýva, že vlády štátov susediacich so Slovenskom ako aj Francúzsko a Taliansko brali možný rozpad Česko- Slovenska na vedomie, požadovali však ústavný postup, čo bolo v kontexte násilného rozpadu Juhoslávie viac než pochopiteľné. Najmä Poľsko a Ukrajina sa k vyhláseniu štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska stavali pozitívne a podporovali snahy slovenskej vlády. Postoj Spojených štátov amerických je zatiaľ možné verifkovať len na základe rozhovorov prezidenta Georga W. Busha s posledným česko-slovenským prezidentom Václavom Havlom. Z nich vyplýva, že USA síce rozdelenie Česko-Slovenska nevítalo, nepodniklo však žiadne kroky, aby mu zabránilo. Všeobecne však možno konštatovať, že postoj západných štátov, predovšetkým USA ako aj postoj Ruska k vzniku dvoch samostatných štátov v strednej Európe nebol dodnes historickou vedou a prakticky ani širším spoločenským diskurzom náležite refektovaný. Bolo by preto zmysluplné aj s blížiacim sa okrúhlym výročím vzniku samostatnej Slovenskej republiky v roku 2023 venovať medzinárodnému kontextu rozpadu Česko-Slovenska náležitú pozornosť, prípadne usilovať sa o medzinárodný projekt, ktorý by bol prvou hĺbkovou sondou do uvedenej problematiky. Kľúčové slová: Nežná revolúcia, slovenská diplomacia, rozdelenie Česko­Slovenska, Ministerstvo medzinárodných vzťahov

rom the very beginning, the revolu- character and took a diferent course Ftionary events that took place in No- in Slovakia and in the Czech Repub- vember and December 1989 had a diferent lic. In fact, in Slovakia these events are

* Beáta Katrebová Blehová, National Memory Institute, Bratislava (Slovak Republic).

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 91 known as the “gentle” (nežná) revolu- to have been a prologue to the Gentle tion, while the Czechs called it the “vel- Revolution.3 However, its main par- vet” (samatová) revolution. The gener- ticipants speeded up the situation ally accepted denomination worldwide in Bratislava and in Slovakia when derives from the Czech expression; i.e. in the University auditorium they literal- Samtene Revolution in German and Velvet ly overthrew the directives of the Faculty Revolution in English. Slovak historiog- of Arts in the morning of November 19 raphy is, therefore, carrying out eforts and de facto took over the leading posi- to make the notion Sanfte Revolution or tion of the new student movement at this Gentle Revolution generally known and institution.4 The revolutionary situation make it the mater of international dis- at the Faculty of Arts at Comenius Uni- course.1 In Slovakia the Gentle Revolu- versity, where students occupied the au- tion began on November 16, 1989 – a day ditorium and prepared their frst public earlier than in the Czech Republic – with statement, paved the way for the frst a student protest in downtown Bratisla- revolutionary movement against the to- va. The march had not been authorised talitarian regime, known as the Public by the regime and was atended main- Against Violence (VPN) to be established ly by students of the Faculty of Arts on November 19 at Umelecká Bese- at Comenius University who protested da Club, just a few meters away from against the violation of academic free- the turbulent auditorium. Here, it is nec- doms at the university, as well as against essary to point out that this happened the poor conditions in higher education a few hours before its Czech equiva- in Slovakia.2 Although the student march lent, the Civic Forum, was established did not directly trigger the revolution or at the Drama Club in Prague. Equally initiated the creation of the frst strike noteworthy is the fact that the frst reso- commitees, in Slovakia it is considered lutions demanding an investigation into

1 For further details on the 1989 revolutionary processes in connection with the fall of the communist regime in former Czechoslovakia, see: Suk, Jiří: Labyrintem revoluce: Aktéři, zápletky a křižovatky jedné politické krize (od listopadu 1989 do června 1990). Praha: Prostor, 2009; Blehova, Beata: Der Fall des Kommunismus in der Tschechoslowakei. Wien: Lit 2006; Ondruš, Vladimír. Atentát na nežnú revolúciu. Bratislava: Ikar, 2009; Novembrová revolúcia a česko-slovenský rozchod: Od česko-slovenskej federácie k samostatnej demokratickej slovenskej štátnosti: Výber dokumentov a prejavov november 1989 – december 1992. Ed.: Viera Hlavová – Jozef Žatkuliak. Bratislava: Literary information center, 2002; Jašek, Peter: The Fall of the Communist Regime in Slovakia (1989 – 1990). In: Securitas imperii, vol. 26, no. 1, 2015, p. 2 – 27; 1989: Rok zmeny: Zborník z vedeckej konferencie, Bratislava, 4. – 5. novembra 2014. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: National Memory Institute, 2014; 20. výročie Nežnej revolúcie: Zborník z vedeckej konferencie, Bratislava 11. – 12. novembra 2009. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: National Memory Institute, 2010; Die Samtene Revolution: Vorgeschichte – Verlauf – Akteure. Ed.: Niklas Perzi – Beata Blehova – Peter Bachmaier. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009. 2 For more information on the November 16, 1989 student protest march, see: Juraj Kucharík: Students in Bratislava and March in the City on November 16, 1989. In: 1989: Rok zmeny, p. 154 – 184; Milan Novotný: November 1989 at the Faculty of Arts at Comenius University in Bratislava (The Preparation and Course of the 16 November 1989 March). In: 20. výročie Nežnej revolúcie, p. 138 – 145; Študentský prológ k Nežnej revolúcii: Bratislava 16. november 1989. Ed: Mária Miková – Martin Homza – Milan Novotný. Bratislava: History of Slovakia, 2019. 3 See also: Kronika Slovenska 2: Slovensko v 20. storočí. Ed.: Dušan Kováč. Bratislava: Fortuna Print, 1999, p. 503. 4 For details see: Študentský prológ k Nežnej revolúcii, passim.

92 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the events that took place on 17 Novem- the problem of the constitutional order ber at Národní Třída Street in Prague had of Checho-Slovakia that had been cen- no connection whatsoever to each other.5 trally governed for over four decades, re- The frst public discussion on Czech- emerged in all its vigour. The frst serious oslovak Television was broadcast within confict in the relations between Slovaks the Štúdio Dialóg program from Bra- and Czechs was the election of the new tislava on November 24. It was the frst Czecho-Slovak president. Czech dissi- time during the revolution that VPN dent Václav Havel was eventually elected leaders met senior communist ofcials. by a mostly communist Federal Assem- This actually meant bending the state bly with the support of the then federal rules for censorship on television. Dur- prime minister, Marian Čalfa, known ing the public debate, dissident Ján Bu- as the “Slovak from Prague”. Slovak Al- daj, a co­founder of VPN, alongside well­ exander Dubček – the protagonist and known actor Milan Kňažko, demanded symbol of the 1968 reform process and the leading role of the Communist Party who still enjoyed unprecedented pop- to be removed from the Constitution.6 ularity twenty years after his political From the frst demonstration in Brati- fall, – who was also aspiring to the post, slava Hviezdoslav Square on Novem- did not become president despite the fact ber 20, the pressure of the people rally- that he had been nominated by the Pres- ing in squares in practically all major idency of the Slovak National Council cities in Slovakia was so strong that and was very likely to succeed had direct the Central Commitee of the Commu- elections taken place.8 The disputes over nist Party of Slovakia met on November the new constitution, over the new name 26-27 and issued a resolution publicly of the Czech-Slovak country, over the so- demanding the abolition of the leading called Competencies Law (redistribut- role of the Party. This happened before ing competencies between the two re- the Federal Assembly in Prague ofcially publics and the federal authorities) and, voted on the elimination of constitution- last but not least, the arguments over al article no. 4 on November 29.7 the way in which the economic reforms Likewise, it is necessary to point and the overall transformation from out that immediately after the fall a planned to a market economy were of the totalitarian communist regime, to take place, were the main diferences

5 Ondruš, Vladimír: Atentát na nežnú revolúciu, p. 13. For more details on the establishment of VPN, see Jašek, Peter: The Fall of the Communist Regime in Slovakia, p. 11 – 14. 6 Ondruš, Vladimír: Atentát na nežnú revolúciu, p. 14 – 15; Jašek, Peter: The Fall of the Communist Regime, p. 16. 7 Measures dealing with the current situation, adopted at the extraordinary meeting of the Central Commitee of the CPS, 26­27 November 1989. In: Novembrová revolúcia a česko-slovenský rozchod, p. 371 – 372, dok. no. 95. Printed also Pravda, 28 November 1989, p. 1, 4. See also Ondruš, Vladimír: Atentát na nežnú revolúciu, p. 16. 8 For more on the election of the Czecho-Slovak president in December 1989 see Suk, Jiří: Prezidentské drama 1989: Alexander Dubček, nebo Václav Havel? In: Dubček. Ed.: Miroslav Londák – Slavomír Michálek et al.: Bratislava: Veda, 2018, p. 374 – 382. It is believed that the last communist president Gustáv Husák, a Slovak, in an efort to prevent his rival Dubček from replacing him at Prague Castle, appointed Marián Čalfa – who was known as the “Slovak from Prague” and was a communist – President of the Federal Government. According to the valid Federal law it was not possible for another Slovak to become president.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 93 between the Slovak and the Czech lead- a return to the so-called St. Wenceslas’ ers concerning the future of their com- conception of Czech politics, meaning mon country. As this issue has already that the Czechs had turned their eyes received plenty of atention, this paper away from Slovakia and towards Germa- will not approach it in more detail.9 ny as their strategic partner for the future In the frst days after his inauguration, state conception of the Czech Republic.10 the newly elected frst non­communist As a mater of fact, support for Germa- president, Václav Havel, underestimated ny’s reunifcation in the context of Eu- the so-called Slovak question when as rope’s integration was not entirely alien the goal of his frst foreign trip he did not to Czech dissident Charter 77 circles and, choose the capital of the second consti- obviously, the Federal Foreign Afairs tutional republic, Bratislava, but decided Ministry headed by Jiří Dienstbier ad- to go to West Germany instead. In fact, hered to the past initiatives of this dissi- his visit to Bonn can be considered to dent movement.11 be a sign that Czech foreign policy had Havel’s frst speech at the Slovak Na- abandoned its hitherto anti-German tional Council (SNR) on January 12, 1990, orientation. This friendly atitude to- which the SNR presidency considered wards a reunifying Germany signalised “to strengthen the signifcance of the federal

9 For more information on this issue see: Rychlík, Jan: Rozpad Československa. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989 – 1992. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press 2002; Hrnko, Anton: The Establishment of the Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993 (Contribution for discussion). In: Na ceste k štátnej samostatnosti (Na pamiatku 140. výročia Memoranda národa slovenského). Ed.: Ján Bobák. Martin: Matica slovenská, 2002; Hrnko, Anton: Political disputes in Slovakia in the summer and autumn of 1990. In: Historický zborník, a. 11, 2001, nr. 1, p. 69 – 100. See also the document edition Novembrová revolúcia a česko-slovenský rozchod. 10 Hrnko, Anton: The Establishment of the Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993, p. 270. Czech dissident Jan Urban, who knew Havel personally, also commented on the fact that Václav Havel and his group underestimated the Slovak question: J. Urban: Václav Havel and his group completely underestimated Slovakia. In: Teraz.sk, 22. 11. 2019, www.teraz.sk/slovensko/j­urban­ vaclav­havel­a­jeho­skupina­s (22. November 2019); See also: Gál, Fedor – Urban, Jan: Veľký tresk, Bratislava: Petit Press a.s., 2019, p. 96 – 97. Regarding the fundamental turn in Czech foreign policy, the words of the normalisation ideologue of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Jan Fojtík, in the presence of his former classmate and infuential adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, Vadim Medvedev, are interesting: “What do you actually want from us? Do you want to throw us overboard? If so, then it is enough for us to take St. Wenceslas’ crown and take it to the West Germans.” [Čejka, Jaroslav]: Aparát: Soumrak polobohů. Praha: Fajma, 1991, p. 139. See also Blehova, Beata: Der Fall des Kommunismus in der Tschechoslowakei, p. 217. 11 On March 11, 1985, the so-called Prague Appeal was published as document nr. 77/1985 to Charter 77. The Appeal highlighted the idea of European integration as well as an unspecifed “right to self­fulfllment”, which was to be granted to the German nation as well. According to the Appeal, the Germans themselves had to decide how they imagined the future coexistence of their two countries, which did not indirectly exclude the possibility of Germany’s unifcation. The Appeal also proposed the dissolution of military pacts in Europe, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact. The Appeal was signed by Czechs Václav Havel and Jiří Dienstbier, as well as by Slovak Ján Čarnogurský. See Pražská výzva: Dokument Charty 77, nr. 7/1985. www. Usd.cas.cz/wp-content/uploads/prazska_vyzva_listy_1985_2_zm_ocr.pdf (6. December 2019). For details on the relations between Czecho­Slovakia and Germany in the years 1989 – 1992 see: Kunštát, Miroslav: Die deutsche Einheit als erkannte Notwendigkeit: die tschechoslowakische Perspektive. In: Europa und die deutsche Einheit: Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen. Ed.: Michael Gehler – Maximillian Graf. Götingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017, p. 567 – 597.

94 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives system of our country and of Slovakia’s po- wanted to bring back the name the re- sition in it,”12 lacked the relevant states- public had in the interwar period, what manlike dimension, was too formal, also meant adhering to to the Masaryk- and fell short of Slovakia’s expecta- Beneš tradition of Czechoslovakism tions.13 The plan to create the position from the First Republic. Likewise, Prime of vice-president, who would represent Minister Čalfa wanted to continue pre- the interests of Slovakia and the position paring a centralist constitution, known of Slovaks within the country, was also as tripartite. All these moves exacerbated quickly abandoned. Instead, the well- animosity between Slovaks and Czechs.15 known Slovak actor and revolutionary In addition to the long­term eforts tribune leader, Milan Kňažko, became towards Slovak statehood that the Slo- just one of President Havel’s many ad- vak political diaspora had been carrying visers. He was supposed to represent out from 1945, especially the Slovak Lib- the interests of Slovakia, but actually eration Commitee, the Slovak National failed to put the Slovak and Czech inter- Council Abroad, the Slovak Liberation ests in Prague in balance.14 Council and the Slovak World Congress Alongside the transformation process, – a topic that remains litle known and ambitions of Slovak statehood appeared largely ignored by historical science, – in Slovakia immediately after the fall the frst memoranda and political pro- of the Communist Party’s monopoly. On grams demanding the independence the one hand, the struggle for self-deter- of Slovakia began to appear in the coun- mination was the logical continuation try around the spring of 1990. of the historical emancipation process The frst demand to constitutional- Slovaks had been developing at least ly anchor the Slovak Republic as a na- from the second half of the 19th century. tion-state was raised by the Memorandum On the other hand, however, it was a re- of Slovaks from Southern Slovakia from 3 action to some incautious steps by Czech March 1990, which included the need to political leaders, such as the atempt make Slovak the ofcial language in Slo- the federal government made to take vakia.16 This was followed by the Memo- over the necessary competencies to ad- randum of the Sovereign Slovakia Initiative dress the intricate Slovak-Hungarian re- from 23 October 1990, known as Sixty-One lations, which was perceived in Slovakia Steps to Slovak Identity, which was the di- as a manifestation of Prague’s autocratic rect response to the very low familiarity approach. Furthermore, president Havel with Slovakia among the international

12 Introduction by the Speaker of the Slovak National Council (SNR) Rudolf Šuster. For more, see Spoločná česko-slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica. Stenografcká správa o 20. schôdzi SNR, konanej 12. januára 1990. Stenozáznam. Www.nrsr.sk/dl//Browser/Document?documentId=1473 (21. May 2019). 13 Ondruš, Vladimír: Atentát na nežnú revolúciu, p. 64. 14 Ibidem. 15 Hrnko, Anton: The Establishment of the Slovak Republic, p. 271. 16 The so called Šurianske memorandum Slovákov z juhu. For more, see: Hrnko, Anton: Political Disputes in Slovakia, p. 69 – 70; Mulík, Peter. When the Door to Slovak Independence Opened. National Identity and State Sovereignty in Gentle Revolution Documents. In: Slovenské národné noviny, 22. April 2013. snn.sk/ked­sa­otvarali­dvere­slovenskej­samostatnosti (21. May 2019); November 1989 a Slovensko: Chronológia a dokumenty (1985 – 1990). Ed.: Jozef Žatkuliak Bratislava: Milan Šimečka Foundation and Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1999, p. 95.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 95 community in general and the resulting Slovak Ministry of International Rela- Slovak government’s eforts to make Slo- tions, which was established immediate- vakia more visible in Europe and around ly after the June 1990 elections (this topic the world.17 In August 1971, an outstand- will be addressed later on).19 The Mem- ing fgure in the ecclesiastical history orandum of the Sovereign Slovakia In- of Slovakia in the second half of the 20th itiative demanded to declare the laws century, Bishop Pavol Hnilica, who was of the Slovak National Council sovereign consecrated in secret and had lived in ex- over the laws of the Federal Assembly. ile in Rome from 1952, in an interview This, in fact, represented the frst step with the agent that communist Czech- towards achieving state sovereignty. oslovakia’s State Security had deployed In the relaxed 1990 revolutionary at- to spy on him, declared that Slovakia mosphere, nationally oriented associ- was a completely unknown tourism ations and organisations demanding destination due to the fact, among oth- Slovakia’s sovereignty were established, er things, that you could fnd practically such as the Štúr Society and KORENE no promotional material about Slovakia – the Intelligentsia Society of Slovakia. at the Czechoslovak embassies. Similarly, Matica slovenská, the traditional all-na- Bishop Hnilica also pointed out the fact tion cultural institution of the Slovaks, that Slovak science and culture were vir- was also reactivated. All these organisa- tually unknown abroad.18 This is just one tions gradually familiarised the public of many examples of the very litle aware- opinion with the idea of an independent ness the world had of the existence of Slo- Slovakia.20 vaks and Slovakia. As a mater of fact, Since the beginning of 1991, consider- important fgures of Slovakia’s cultural, ations of sovereignty began to material- scientifc and even religious life were too ise into real steps in this direction. It is often said to be Czech or Czechoslovak. in this context that we need to understand For not having a sovereign country of its the Call for the Declaration of Sovereignty own, Slovakia was in fact terra incognita of the Slovak Republic from 14 February at the international scene. 1991, which was forged by transnational Making Slovakia more visible abroad civic organisations,21 as well as the Sec- was one of the key tasks of the new ond Memorandum of the Slovak Nation by

17 Novembrová revolúcia a česko-slovenský rozchod: Výber dokumentov, p. 125. The memorandum has been published as document no. 29 in the sources edition with the same name on pp. 121 – 125. 18 ABS, f. Historical Fund of State Security, H-530, Mission “METÓD”. Record nr. 121/71 (agent under the code name STANO), 6. September 1971, pp. 1 – 3. 19 Mojžita, Miroslav: Kňažko/Demeš/Kňažko: Formovanie slovenskej diplomacie v rokoch 1990 až 1993. Bratislava: Veda, 2019, pp. 17 – 18. 20 On August 25 – 26, 1990, a memorial ceremony for Andrej Hlinka was held in Ružomberok, atended by tens of thousands of people from all over Slovakia. The massive multitude carrying banners “For an Independent Slovakia” urged the government to take steps to anchor the right to self-determination of the Slovak nation in the constitution and to make Slovak the only ofcial language in the whole territory of the Slovak Republic. Hrnko, Anton: Political Disputes in Slovakia in the Summer and Autumn 1990, pp. 82 – 85. 21 The Nationally oriented civic initiatives that compiled the memorandum: Sovereign Slovakia, 31 Steps to Slovak Identity, Korene, Slovakia’s Intelligentsia Association, the Štúr’s Society, Synthesis 90. Document published in Novembrová revolúcia a česko-slovenský rozchod: Výber dokumentov, pp. 170 – 173, document nr. 38: Draft Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, 14 February 1991.

96 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Matica slovenská from 8 June 199122 and recommended that Slovakia join the su- the appeal by the Initiative for a Sovereign pranational structures (European Com- Slovakia on 11 September 1991, which munity) as an “independent political unit.”25 was prepared by Korene, the Intelligent- The June 1992 parliamentary elections sia Society of Slovakia, and which was were de facto a referendum on the future endorsed by important political fgures legal form of Slovakia. As a mater of fact, such as Vladimír Mečiar, Michal Kováč, in these elections the political parties Milan Kňažko and Ján Budaj.23 that demanded that the Slovak Republic On 19 June 1991, at the initiative become an internationally recognised of some MPs, mostly members of the Slo- and accepted independent and sover- vak National Party, the Slovak National eign country defeated those endorsing Council discussed the declaration of sov- the concept of a unitary federation. Un- ereignty. However, the negative atitude der these circumstances, the fact that of government ofcials and VPN lead- the Slovak National Council adopted ers caused the proposal to fail.24 In June the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Slo- 1991, in a special memorandum intended vak Republic on 17 July 1992, the Consti- for the Slovak Government and the Slovak tution of the Slovak Republic on 1 Septem- National Council, the Slovak World Con- ber, 1992; Constitutional Act no. 542/1992 gress (SWC) supported the declaration Coll. on the Dissolution of the Czech and of sovereignty and the creation of a new Slovak Federal Republic on 25 November constitution of the Slovak Republic. 1992, and proclaimed the establishment In the memorandum, the SWC lead- of the independent Slovak Republic on ership backed the “right to self-determi- 1 January 1993, was just the logical cul- nation of the Slovak nation, expressed by its mination of Slovakia’s emancipation full democratic statehood”, which the SWC process. considered to be “the goal of its political The turbulent revolutionary last eforts”, d e c l a r i n g “support for those po- month of 1989, the “year of miracles”, saw litical parties, movements and groups that the frst plans to establish an institution endorse the immediate and most explicit that would allow Slovakia to actively de- ratifcation of the constitution of the sover- velop its own foreign policy. In Decem- eign Slovak Republic.” The document also ber 1989, the so-called Slovak National

22 Dokumenty slovenskej identity a štátnosti, vol. 2. Bratislava: National Literary Center – House of Slovak Literature, 1998, p. 569. 23 The Appeal was signed by Mečiar, Budaj and Kňažko. See Copy of the Appeal with the text: I agree with the appeal of the Initiative For a Sovereign Slovakia from 11 September 1991. Korene Archive (in the author’s archive). The author of this initiative was artist Viliam Hornáček. 24 For more, see Rychlík, Jan: Rozpad Československa, pp. 196 – 198. 25 Memorandum by the Slovak World Congress addressed to Slovakia’s national bodies, June 1991, Bratislava. In: Literárny týždenník: Časopis Spolku slovenských spisovateľov, a. 4, 1991, nr. 25, 21 June, p. 2. The memorandum also recommended a referendum on the adoption of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and accession to supranational organisations, the establishment of the Slovak Press Ofce, to select advisers to Slovak national authorities from among Slovaks expatriates, dual citizenship, the right of Slovak expatriates to vote in Slovakia, to take into account the know-how and experience of Slovak expatriates when establishing Slovakia’s representative ofces abroad, a recommendation to the Slovak national authorities to care for Slovak expatriates, and to establish regular radio broadcasting for Slovak expatriates. The author of this article does not know the background in which the memorandum was adopted or who wrote it.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 97 Understanding Government, the prod- Arpád Gönz, Israeli President Chaum uct of the revolutionary process in Slo- Herzog, Italian President Francesco Cos- vakia and which was intended to bridge siga, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, US the period from the Gentle Revolution to Vice President Dan Quayle, the British the frst free elections, decided to create Heir to the Throne Prince Charles, and the International Relations Department Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitky. As at the Slovak Government Ofce. a mater of fact, these were no longer just The aim of the newly established de- courtesy stops in Bratislava in the frame partment was to carry out foreign policy of a visit to Czecho-Sslovakia, but nego- activities alongside the Federal Ministry tiations for the preparation of relevant of Foreign Afairs. After the June 1990 documents.27 parliamentary elections, the Ministry Prior to the June 1992 elections – of International Relations was estab- which were eventually won by the dom- lished, headed by Milan Kňažko. The rel- inant political parties in the Czech Re- evant department at the government of- public and Slovakia, namely the Civic fce became part of the new ministry. Democratic Party (ODS) led by Vá- In spite of the fact that the Ministry clav Klaus and the Slovak Movement of Foreign Afairs in Prague did not real- for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led ly welcome the new Slovak ministry with by Vladimír Mečiar respectively – it open arms and that establishing it was was already clear that the diferences not an easy and smooth process in the in- between these two parties concerning tricate struggle to overhaul the defective the legal arrangement of the federation federation, its establishment defnitely were just growing bigger. Klaus de- created the conditions necessary for Slo- manded either a functional federation or vakia’s independent foreign policy.26 the split of the country. Mečiar’s HZDS Among the new ministry’s priorities supported a confederation and present- were increasing the awareness of Slova- ed a gradual implementation plan in its kia abroad, as well as developing con- election program, namely: 1. Declaration tacts with Slovak expatriates. Gradually, of Sovereignty by the Slovak Republic, 2. the Ministry’s own activities began to Adoption of the Constitution of the Slo- materialise and the frst foreign visits vak Republic, 3. Granting Slovakia inter- were planned. The list of prominent pol- national legal subjectivity (which would iticians and state ofcials visiting Slova- make it possible for the country to estab- kia was really long. Just in 1991 Slovakia lish direct bilateral relations), 4. Organ- received the visits of German President ising a referendum28 on Slovakia’s sover- Richard von Weizsäcker, Polish Presi- eignty and on revising the relations with dent Lech Wałesa, Hungarian President the Czech Republic, and 5. Conclude

26 For more on the establishment and functioning of the Ministry of International Relations headed by Milan Kňažko and Pavol Demeš, on the vicissitudes of the unequal status of the Federal Foreign Afairs Ministry and the Ministry of International Relations in Bratislava and on the defnition of their competencies, see: Mojžita, Miroslav: Kňažko/Demeš/Kňažko. Formovanie slovenskej diplomacie v rokoch 1990 až 1993, pp. 17 – 39. 27 Ibidem, p. 52. 28 Unlike Czecho-Slovakia, a successful referendum was held in Croatia on 19 May 1991. As many as 93% of the 83% of all eligible voters who took part in it, voted in favour of Croatia’s independence.

98 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives an agreement with the Czech Republic. to disarmament, and commit to setle by Except for the referendum, HZDS actu- agreement all questions concerning State ally fulflled all of these pre­election pro- succession and regional disputes.30 gram points.29 In the frst weeks after the 1992 elec- After the elections, building up tions, reelected Slovak Prime Minister the Slovak Ministry of International Re- Vladimír Mečiar carried out a series lations and its cooperation with its Fed- of meetings with diplomats accredited eral counterpart in Prague’s Czernin at Prague and Bratislava embassies as Palace reached a completely diferent well as with foreign politicians, aimed to level, especially in connection with Slo- inform their governments about the cur- vakia’s declaration of sovereignty on July rent situation and acquaint them with 17, 1992. It was already imminent that Slovakia’s stance concerning this devel- federal Czecho-Slovakia would not last opment. Part of these reports is stored beyond the end of the year. Therefore, it in the diplomatic archive of the Min- was necessary to develop eforts towards istry of Foreign and European Afairs making Slovakia accepted and de jure rec- of the Slovak Republic in Bratislava. Most ognised by the international community. of these meetings took place at the Slo- An important recommendation deter- vak Government Ofce, more exactly mining the ministry’s strategy to gaining at the Department of International Rela- recognition for the Slovak Republic was tions and Diplomatic Protocol, in the pres- the outcome of the December 1991 Brus- ence of the head of the department and sels meeting of the Council of the Euro- an interpreter. At these talks, the Slovak pean Communities. At these meeting, Prime Minister made an introductory the member states adopted the Guide- speech presenting the government’s po- lines on the Recognition of New States sition on the main constitutional issues. in Eastern Europe and in the Former So- From these words it is evident that in June viet Union. Recognition under these prin- and July 1992 he preferred a Confeder- ciples required the new states to respect ation, even after Slovakia’s sovereignty the provisions of the Charter of the United declaration. At a courtesy visit on July Nations, provide guarantees for the hu- 22, Mečiar literally told Dutch Ambas- man rights and the rights of ethnic and sador Hans J. Heinemann that Slovakia national groups and minorities, respect aimed to have a status of equality with the inviolability of all frontiers, accept the Czech Republic, “becoming a Confeder- all relevant commitments with regard ation, but the Czech Republic demands either

The Serbian minority in Croatia boycoted the referendum. On 25 June 1991, the Croatian Parliament ratifed Croatia’s state independence in line with the result of the referendum. However, Croatia’s independence was not internationally recognised until 15 January 1992 after military operations between Croatian military forces and the Yugoslav army, which left many casualties on both sides. See Edgar Hösch: Geschichte der Balkanländer: Von der Frühzeit bis zur Gegenwart, 4th updated and extended edition. Munich: Beck, 2002, pp. 276. 29 The State of Law in the election programs of the political parties and movements that made it to the Slovak National Council, 5 – 6 June 1992, In: Dokumenty slovenskej identity a štátnosti 2, nr. 313, pp. 575 – 576. See also Rychlík, Jan: Rozpad Československa, p. 274 – 275. In his book, Rychlík does not pay any atention to the Czech election program. The ODS must have had a plan for the division of the federation, though. This is a topic historiography has generally paid litle atention to. 30 For more details, see Mojžita, Miroslav: Kňažko/Demeš/Kňažko, pp. 71 – 72.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 99 the current status or an immediate break-up” was going through a crisis as there was which, in his opinion, was not in the in- no will to continue together. The Czechs terests of neither republic.31 On the same were pushing the split of the country day he told German Ambassador Her- by the end of September 1992. This, mann Huber that “while the Slovaks were however, was completely unacceptable still moving at an ideological level, the Czech for Slovakia. Mečiar also stated that leaders had been preparing for the split the federal interior ministry, television of the country for over one year.”32 and radio were trying to isolate Slovakia Mečiar told Special Commissioner from the world. He even used the term of Austria’s Foreign Afairs Minister, “Cold War” to describe this regretable Albert Rohan, who arrived in Bratislava situation. Slovak PM added that there on July 20 for an update on the situation were eforts to present the Czech Repub- in Slovakia, that the Czechs had reject- lic as the only successor state. The Czechs ed all common priorities proposed by would have prepared a secret report Slovakia in felds like a common market in case of the division of the republic, on and currency, state defence, civil rights which they had been working since 1990. protection, free movement of capital and To this, the Polish ambassador replied individuals, and foreign policy coordi- that “evidently Slovaks are not trying to nation. The Slovak PM emphasised that unilaterally break up the republic” and that the Slovak government wanted to stick to Poland was ready to become a stabilising the constitutional process, but admited factor.35 These brief statements by the Pol- that the Czechs were considering taking ish ambassador seem to support the split unilateral steps. Before Rohan, Mečiar of Czecho-Slovakia. However, he also also commented on the succession rights: spoke of the necessity to fnd a suitable “The Constitution of the Czech and Slovak solution to the rights of the Hungarian Federal Republic grants succession rights minority in Slovakia. In fact, according to both republics, but the Czechs are pulling to the ambassador “a deterioration of these strings to take over full succession.”33 The Slo- relations would necessarily lead to the deteri- vak PM was even more open to Polish oration of the relations between Poland and ambassador Jacek Baluch.34 At the begin- Slovakia.”36 ning of their meeting, Mečiar told Baluch The Slovak Prime Minister was ex- the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic traordinarily open in an interview with

31 Diplomatic archives of the Ministry of Foreign and European Afairs (MZVaEZ), Ministry of International Relations Fund (MMV), scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of the Dutch ambassador, 22 July 1992. 32 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of the FRG in ČSFR, 22 July 1992. 33 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of Commissioner A. Mock, 20 July 1992, pp. 1 – 2. 34 Prof. Jacek Baluch (1940 – 2019) – Prominent Polish Polonist and Bohemist, literary historian, expert in Czech and Slovak literature, worked at Jagiellonian University and was Polish ambassador in Prague from 1990 to 1995. For more, see: O życiu, ambasadorowaniu i miłości do literatury: Rozmowa z profesorem Jackiem Baluchem. In: Kontakty XVII. Bratislava: Slovensko- poľská komisia humanitných vied, 2019, pp. 81 – 98. 35 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of Polish ambassador, 22 July 1992. 36 Ibidem.

100 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the French ambassador, who showed Mečiar repeated this same claim about concerns about bringing over war from Slovakia not being ready for independ- Yugoslavia to Central Europe. Mečiar re- ence to the Ambassador of the Great assured him that Slovakia had not inten- Duchy of Luxembourg during a courtesy tions of becoming a destabilising factor. visit to the Slovak Government Ofce on In his opinion, a more imminent threat 16 July 1992.38 Similar statements were was the development in Hungary, which made before the leaders of the World was witnessing growing nationalism, Jewish Congress who visited the Slovak demanding collective rights for Hun- Government Ofce on July 10. Mečiar garian minorities abroad and, in this re- told them that Slovakia would welcome spect, expressed concerns the Hungarian being part of a confederation and declar- minority in Slovakia might want to split ing its sovereignty, but that the Czechs up. He literally said: emphatically rejected this possibility. He also said the Czech Republic was “Hungarian nationalist-oriented par- beter prepared to become an independ- ties [in Slovakia] are receiving strong ent country and did not want to wait support from Hungary. That is why beyond the end of 1992. The President they made it into the parliament. They of the World Jewish Congress, L. Keller, have created a picture of the Hungarian replied: “it is sad to see the Czech and Slo- minority being in danger.” vak Federal Republic split” and said that the World Jewish Congress still hoped Regarding President Havel’s resig- the republic would not divide. He also nation, Mečiar told him that Havel expressed concerns about the spread was geting ready to run for Presi- of anti-Semitism.39 dent of the Czech Republic. Further Except for the leaders of the World into the meeting, Mečiar acquainted Jewish Congress, these diplomats did not the French diplomat with the develop- object to the split of Czecho­Slovakia, but ment that was expected to take place in general adopted a pragmatic approach after both republics adopted their new and simply accepted the ongoing devel- constitutions: the Czechs would insist on opment. The Slovak Prime Minister was the split of the country on September 30 reassured several times that their gov- or December 31, 1992 at the latest. The Slo- ernments were ready to accept the Slovak vaks would continue supporting the idea Republic as an equal partner. The con- of a confederation, or at least the appli- cerns they expressed during these talks cation of the Maastricht agreements be- only regarded the way the federation tween the Czech and Slovak Republics. was to be divided. The international He explicitly said Slovakia was not ready community wanted to make sure that to split and would insist on a constitu- what happened in Yugoslavia would not tional procedure and a referendum.37 repeat and that Czecho-Slovakia would

37 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of French ambassador in ČSFR, 20 July 1992. 38 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of the ambassador of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg E. Bremer, 16 July 1992. 39 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), a record of the visit of the delegation of the World Jewish Congress, 10 July 1992.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 101 split in a constitutional way without the Slovak minority in Hungary being any use of violence. The Slovak Prime assimilated. He concluded by saying Minister provided all these guarantees that he had repeatedly assured his Czech to his foreign partners. The biggest con- counterpart that not a single shot would cerns western politicians had regard- be fred from Slovakia.41 ed the domestic political development. In August 1992, Deputy Prime Min- At a meeting with Mečiar on 12 July 1992, ister and Minister of International Rela- Catherine Lalumière, Secretary Gener- tions, Milan Kňažko, submited a gov- al of the Council of Europe, expressed ernment proposal to change the name these concerns about Slovakia’s domestic of the Ministry of International Relations development, which in her words was for Ministry of Foreign Afairs and Ex- marked by “nationalism, ultranationalism, ternal Economic Relations. The reason chauvinism and anti-Semitism.” She was for this move was that it was the new also concerned that a war like that in Yu- ministry’s responsibility to integrate goslavia might follow and, as she literally the Slovak Republic into the internation- put it, she was “panic-stricken” by such al community, which logically resulted a possibility. She called the governing from the requirement to anchor interna- HZDS party a “national socialist move- tional legal subjectivity in Mečiar’s gov- ment,” which was to evoke associations ernment program.42 with the past [regime]. Despite these con- In this respect, the primary task was cerns, Lalumière assured the Slovak PM to deepen Slovakia’s bilateral relations that “the West respects the right of nations with its neighbouring countries, and to to self-determination” and that the devel- gain support for Slovakia’s imminent opment in the Czech and Slovak Federal independence. In the autumn of 1992 Republic was perceived as an internal Minister Kňažko made several trips mater.40 To complete the overall pic- to neighbouring countries: in Septem- ture of this conversation, it is necessary ber he visited Italy, in October France, to add that Slovakia’s PM dissipated all in November Austria and Ukraine, and the concerns of the Secretary General in December Poland. Back in April 1992, of the Council of Europe. He assured his predecessor, Pavol Demeš, had vis- her that there were no “nationalist de- ited Budapest and, reciprocally, Hunga- viations” in Slovakia’s political parties, ry’s Foreign Afairs Minister, Géza Jesze- that HZDS was a social­democratic nszky, visited Bratislava in September movement, and that the basis of the Slo- 1992.43 At the very same time, Hungary vak constitution would be the Charter unilaterally terminated the Gabčíkovo of Human Rights. He also denied that – Nagymaros Waterworks agreement the Slovak government wanted to drive and the leaders of the Hungarian minor- out members of the Hungarian minority ity parties in Slovakia raised a demand and, in turn, expressed concerns about for the territorial autonomy of southern

40 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 54 (diplomatic reports on visits), report on the visit of the Council Of Europe delegation, 12 July 1992. 41 Ibidem. 42 Mojžita, Miroslav: Kňažko/Demeš/Kňažko, p. 73. 43 For more on the visit of Géza Jeszenszky, a descendant of Hungarian squires from Turec, see Ibidem, p. 76.

102 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Slovakia. In spite of the fact that Hun- and the Primate of Poland, Cardinal gary formally recognised the right Józef Glemp, represented an efusive of Slovaks to self-determination, it also welcome to the new country on the eve tried to obstruct Slovakia’s admission to of its establishment. It was also a signal the Conference of Security and Coop- to the Hungarian government that Po- eration in Europe (CSCE), the Council land did not intend to question Slova- of Europe, and the Central European In- kia’s sovereignty.46 itiative.44 At an interview with Minister In October 1992, Slovak Foreign Min- Kňažko during his visit to Poland in ear- ister incited and paid a visit to France ly December 1992, Polish Prime Minister, with the aim to deepen bilateral rela- Hanna Suchocka, also acknowledged ob- tions with such an important partner stacles being laid by Hungary.45 for Slovakia as France has undoubted- The notorious December 1992 visit ly always been. French Foreign Minis- of Slovakia’s Foreign Ministry delega- ter, Roland Dumas, declared that in his tion to Poland, and the very fact that opinion the search for sovereignty was Kňažko was received by the highest an essential part of the whole Europe- state representatives of this country, an process. Minister Kňažko informed namely Polish Foreign Minister Krzyst- him in detail about the development of Skubiszewski, Prime Minister Hana of the Slovak-Czech negotiations and Suchocka, President Lech Wałesa, Senate the situation of the Hungarian minority Marshal August Chelkowski, Deputy in Slovakia. In turn, Dumas promised Marshal of the Sejm Jacek Kurczewski, to provide other member governments

44 Ibidem, p. 77. The visit of International Relations Minister Pavel Demeš to Budapest took place on 22 April 1992 invited by Hungary’s Foreign Minister. This was the frst invitation at foreign ministers level by Hungary. They discussed various issues concerning mutual Slovak-Hungarian relations, especially the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovak minority in Hungary. Both ministers also addressed the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In this respect, Hungarian Foreign Minister said that Hungary had good relations with Slovenia and Croatia, but not with Serbia. They agreed to strengthen the Slovak-Hungarian border crossings, as well as bilateral regional cooperation. Demeš drew atention to the “non­standard” meeting of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia with the State Secretary of Hungary’s Foreign Ministry, historian A. Gergely in Komárno, without prior notice to Slovakia’s Foreign Ministry and said that many members of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia do not speak Slovak. For more, see: Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, reports from business trips abroad, reg. nr. 111 – 113, Travel report from an ofcial working visit to the Republic of Hungary on 22 April 1992, pp. 2 – 6. 45 According to the travel report from the ofcial working visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Milan Kňažko, Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka said that signing a Free Trade Agreement between the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia would be advantageous for Slovakia for political reasons “given that Hungary is trying to hinder Slovakia’s entry into international life through various channels.” Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 66 (Ministry Ofce, travel reports), Travel report from the ofcial working visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Milan Kňažko in Poland 8 – 9 December 1992, p. 3. 46 On the visit to Poland see: Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 66 (Minister Ofce, travel reports), Travel report from the ofcial working visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Milan Kňažko in Poland 8 – 9 December 1992. In an interview with the National Memory Institute, Kňažko admited that he felt the greatest understanding towards Slovakia’s independence in Poland. For more, see Milan Kňažko: S otvorenými očami. The interviewers were historians of the National Memory Institute Ondrej Podolec, Peter Jašek and (Beáta Katrebová Blehová). Banská Bystrica: TBB, 2019, p. 140.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 103 of the European Community with a pos- and promised not to make any territo- itive report on this visit and the issues rial claims. In general, the reports from discussed in it.47 On 6 November 1992, the ofcial foreign trips Minister Kňažko at an ofcial visit to Vienna initiated by made in the autumn of 1992 show that Austrian Foreign Minister, Alois Mock, the Ukraine welcomed Slovakia’s strug- Austria recommended that the assess- gle for independence. ment of the transfer of the contractual So far, it has not been able to estab- obligations between the Czech and Slo- lish whether any of the world powers, vak Federal Republic and Austria to Slo- i.e. the United States, the Soviet Union, vakia and the Czech Republic be made France, Germany and the United King- in an accelerated succession process dom, had a positive or negative atitude based on meetings of expert groups. This towards the split of Czecho-Slovakia and basically meant that Austria did not pose the resulting two new independent states any obstacles to building proper bilater- in Central Europe. Practically no research al relations with independent Slovakia.48 has been carried out on this issue. This The ofcial working visit of a Slovak del- is mostly due to the fact that access to egation to Ukraine on 25-26 November the diplomatic archives of these coun- was received with the standards corre- tries is restricted. Nevertheless, in some sponding to bilateral relations between cases there are reasons to believe that two sovereign states. Ukraine, just like the right diplomatic moves would make Poland, looked at Slovakia’s emancipa- these sources accessible to some extent to tion eforts with understanding and was specialised Slovak institutions. Especial- ready to be among the frst to recognise ly important appears to be the position the Slovak Republic as a subject of inter- of the United States of America, which national law and to establish diplomat- traditionally considers Czecho-Slovakia ic relations with it.49 Ukrainian Foreign to be an achievement of their own. In fact, Afairs Minister, Anatoly Zlenko, ex- the country originated in 1918 in the frame- pressed his gratitude in connection with work of post-war Versailles peace trea- the building that was being prepared ty as the ofspring of liberal democracy for the Embassy of Ukraine on Bratisla- based on the right of nations to self-de- va’s Radvanska Street. Slovakia appre- termination, which President Woodrow ciated the Ukrainian government’s un- Wilson anchored in 14 points in January biassed position towards the Slovakia 1918. Although the United States referred – Hungary dispute over the Gabčíkovo to the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 – Nagymaros Waterworks at the Dan- and ultimately to the Charter of the Unit- ube Commission negotiation meetings, ed Nations itself on the right of nations to

47 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 7 (Minister Department), Travel report from foreign business trip to France on 7 – 11 October 1992. 48 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, scatula 66 (Minister Ofce, travel reports), Travel report from ofcial working visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Milan Kňažko in the Republic of Austria on 6 November 1992. 49 Diplomatic archive MZVaEZ, f. MMV, Reports from business trips abroad, reg. nr. 111 – 103, Travel report from the ofcial working visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Milan Kňažko in Ukraine, Kiev, 25 – 26 November 1992, p. 1.

104 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives self-determination, in the case of Slovakia Sidor. In June 1950, Sidor had personally this right was actually ignored. This hap- visited the State Department.51 Likewise, pened in spite of the fact that there was in June 1943, being Slovakia’s ambassa- a strong community of American Slovaks dor to the Holy See, he had handed over in the United States throughout the 20th the memorandum La Question Slovaquie century, and despite the strong eforts to American diplomat Harold Titman.52 the Slovak diaspora in the United States Last but not least, the establishment and had been carrying out to support the idea activities of the Slovak World Congress of an independent Slovakia (in particular, in 1970 greatly helped make the Slo- the Slovak National Council Abroad and vak issue visible to the public all over its USA branch, which operated directly the world.53 in Washington and New York and was Some insight into the atitude US headed by Slovak diplomat Jozef Mikuš, President George W. Bush had to- and after 1970 the Slovak World Congress wards the Slovak question in 1990 and led by Štefan Boleslav Roman). From 1992 can be obtained from documents the very moment the joint Czechoslovak in the George Bush Presidential Library broadcast within Radio Free Europe was (College Station, Texas). It is mostly tran- created, prominent Slovak expatriates scripts of talks between him, his team cooperating with it saw the necessity to of advisers, and members of Czech and create a separate Slovak section. Howev- Slovak delegations led mostly by Presi- er, their demands were equally ignored. dent Havel during visits to the White In fact, this requirement was not fulflled House in Washington. In the frst place, until the day the Slovak Republic was es- these talks show that Bush really re- tablished on 1 January 1993.50 On the oth- spected and trusted President Hav- er hand, it is necessary to point out that el. For example, in August 1991, when the leaders of the American government the Soviet Union was scheming a mili- were familiar with the Slovak question, tary coup against Gorbachev, President mainly thanks to the Slovak League Bush called Prague and reassured Hav- in America, which had contacts within el that Czecho-Slovakia had nothing to the State Department by means of Karol fear from Moscow (sic!).54 At a personal

50 Beáta Katrebová Blehová: Radio Free Europe and the Slovak World Congress. In: Svetový kongres Slovákov: Zborník z vedeckej konferencie, Bratislava, June 2015. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: National Memory Institute, 2018, pp. 186 – 209. 51 Department of State (Confdential). Memorandum of Conversation, June 14, 1950. Subject: Activities and Views of Karol Sidor. Document in the author’s private archive. My gratitude to Mr. Igor Uhrík for providing me with it. See also: Beáta Katrebová Blehová: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku 1945 – 1950. Bratislava – Rím: Slovak Historical Institute in Rome, 2019, pp. 64 – 66. 52 For more, see Beáta Katrebová Blehová: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku 1945 – 1950, pp. 22 – 23. 53 For more on the activities of the Slovak World Congress, see Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase proti komunistickému režimu. Ed.: Peter Jašek. Bratislava: National Memory Institute, 2018. 54 In this telephone conversation, Bush literally told Havel: “We see no Soviet threat to the security of Czechoslovakia nor do we believe they will want to give you any trouble because they have plenty of their own.” George Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas). Memorandum of telephone conversation (with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia), 19. August 1991. My gratitude to Prof. Marek Kramer for providing me with documents from George Bush Presidential Library from Davies Center for Cold War Studies.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 105 interview at the CSCE summit in Hel- to decide what kind of state they wish to sinki on 9 July 1992, Bush expressed full live in. We support a federal solution by confdence and great respect for Havel.55 constitutional and legal means. We shall It is no secret that President Bush con- never use power to impose it.“56 sidered the tense relations between Slo- vakia and the Czech Republic resulting President Bush told Havel he saw from the negotiations on the new con- the developments in Czecho-Slovakia as stitutional order of the federation to be an internal political issue and that he was an internal mater of Czecho­Slovakia. confdent the federation would prevail. On 22 October 1991, at one of the most At the same time, however, he added important meetings between the pres- that the US government was ready to es- idents of the US and Czecho-Slovakia tablish a consulate general in Bratislava in Washington, Bush asked Havel to instead of the existing consulate, in order describe in detail the relations between to strengthen relations with Slovakia: Czechs and Slovaks. Havel told him: Czecho-Slovakia has three alternatives, “[We] are prepared to upgrade our either to continue the federation in more consulate in Bratislava to a consulate democratic conditions or to split into general. We hope this will strengthen two separate states. In Havel’s opinion, contacts with Slovakia and be symboli- the second option seemed less likely. cally helpful as well.“57 The third and worst possibility was le- gal chaos. Later on, Havel said he had After the June 1992 parliamentary proposed a referendum on the future elections, when Havel met the US Pres- of the country. However, he said some ident again at the CSCE summit in Hel- Slovak politicians had rejected it. Havel sinki, they already spoke of the split told President Bush that only one po- of the country. Havel described to Bush litical party in Slovakia sought inde- in detail how this was going to be done. pendence. According to Havel, Slovakia He also reassured his US counterpart demanded maximum autonomy, but that constitutionality was going to be the Czechs believed that such a common observed and both countries would re- state would sooner or later become inop- frain from any kind of violence. Presi- erative. He literally said: dent Bush replied that the United States respected this process as an internal “I favour a federation but do not want mater [of Czechoslovakia] and did not to impose it. The people have the right want to interfere with it. At the same

55 “A s the President of the United States, I want to express my full confdence in President Havel and my great respect for him.” George Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas). Memorandum of Conversation (Meeting with President Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 9 July 1992, p. 1. 56 George Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas). Memorandum of conversation (Meeting with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia), 22 October 1991, p. 2. 57 Ibidem. The request to re-establish a US Consulate in the Slovak capital was presented in a Slovak World Congress memorandum to the State Department on November 4, 1989. Memorandum to the Department of State. SNA, f. Dušan Tóth, scatula 15. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar repeated this request before the American President. George Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas). Memorandum of Conversation. Meeting with Slovak Leaders, 17 November 1990.

106 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives time, Bush made it clear that he accepted We believe in the trans-atlantic dimen- the development towards the independ- sion, not only in the security feld, but ence of the Czech Republic and Slova- also the civilisational ties between our kia. He literally said: “if there are two sep- countries.”60 arate countries, we want to work with both of them.”58 Anyway, President Bush open- During his frst visit to the United ly asked if there was anything the US States as president of Czecho-Slova- government could do within the limits kia in February 1990, Havel had spoken of international law to maintain federal in favour of dissolving all military alli- Czecho-Slovakia, showing a clear prefer- ances in Europe. Eventually, however, he ence for the federation. seemed to agree with the idea of NATO The biggest concern of the USA after expanding to Central Europe, which ob- the end of the Cold War was not whether viously pleased the American president.61 Gorbachev’s perestroika would prevail or A diplomatic report from 6 March 1990 fail. What the US diplomacy was afraid by Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslova- of was that Gorbachev’s idea of a “com- kia, Viktor Lomakin, mentions that Hav- mon European house” could become true el supported the presence of the USA and that the CSCE would become the new in Europe. This suggests that immediate- security structure replacing the Warsaw ly after returning from his ofcial visit to Pact as well as the North Atlantic Alliance. the United States in February 1990, Havel According to Mary Elise Sarote, a US began to favour the presence of NATO history professor at Harvard University, in Europe. The secret report by Lomakin the main purpose of Washington’s (and states that the priorities of Czechoslova- Bonn’s) policy in the early 1990s was to kia’s foreign policy had changed towards speed up events, to present to the world a clear pro-Western orientation. In his re- one fait accompli after another in order to port, Lomakin quotes Havel saying that keep NATO in Europe.59 The US admin- “a united Europe shall guarantee a worthy istration intended to expand the Atlantic place for the world’s strongest democracy, idea over Central Europe. In this respect, the US.” He added that the US and NATO at their October 1991 meeting in the White would become a stabilising factor, and ex- House, Havel reassured Bush: pressed support for US troops remaining in Europe. In this respect, Lomakin writes “Czechoslovakia is convinced that that “this completely new approach in Czech- the US should be present in Europe (…). oslovakia’s foreign policy is dominant.”62

58 George Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas). Memorandum of Conversation (Meeting with President Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 9 July 1992, p. 2. 59 Mary E. Sarotte: Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In. In: International Security, a. 35, 2010, nr. 1, p. 136. 60 George Bush Presidential Library (College Station, Texas). Memorandum of conversation (Meeting with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia), 22 October 1991, p. 4. 61 For more, see Beáta Katrebová Blehová: “Novoje myšlenie” as a revolutionary changes factor in East and Central Europe. In: 1989: Rok zmeny, p. 35. 62 Političeskoje pismo posla SSSR v ČSSR V. P. Lomakina „O vnešnepolitičeskich aspektach izmenenij v Vostočnoj Jevrope.“, 6 March 1990 (tajné). In: Konec epochi: SSSR i revoľucii v stranach Vostočnoj Jevropy v 1989 – 1991 gg.: Dokumenty. Ed.: I. V. Kazarina – T. M. Kuzmičeva – M. J. Prozumenščikov – P. Ruggentaler. Moscow: Rosspen, 2015, pp. 704 – 705.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 107 The current lack of archival sources to the report, the non-interventionist at- does not make it possible to complete- titude of the Soviet leadership and its ly reconstruct the atitude of the Soviet subsequent reluctance to reconsider Union and the Russian Federation to- the events of 1968 were the main obsta- wards the division of Czecho-Slovakia. cles hindering economic and political re- The documents that have hitherto been forms in former Czecho-Slovakia.65 made public, mainly from the former During a visit to Slovakia from Central Commitee of the Communist April 4 to 9, 1989, the Ambassador’s ad- Party of the Soviet Union, which de- viser at the Soviet Embassy in Prague, termined the Soviet government’s ap- Marat Kuznetsov, met Ignác Janák, proach towards the countries of Eastern the First Secretary of the Central Com- Europe, make no mention whatsoever mitee of the Communist Party of Slo- of the Slovak question.63 The same ap- vakia (CPS), Slovak Prime Minister Ivan plies for the reports by the Institute Knotek, and Slovak National Council of Economics of the World Socialist Sys- Speaker Viliam Šalgovič. Kuznetsov tem at the Soviet Academy of Sciences traveled virtually throughout the whole (IEMSS) headed by Oleg Bogomolov, Slovakia, met top party ofcials at dis- a renowned expert on Eastern Europe. trict and regional level, and discussed As a mater of fact, the IEMSS analysis with them the political situation on the development in Czecho-Slovakia in the country. However, in the only re- from the Prague Spring to Perestroi- port published so far, Kuznetsov makes ka, prepared for the Central Commitee no mention of the Slovak question as of the CPSU – the part that has been such. Only partially does the report deal made public, to be exact – does not ad- with the relations between Czechs and dress the Slovak question or the relations Slovaks mentioning that the Slovak com- between Slovaks and Czechs at all.64 munist leaders were against the Com- The published part of the report criti- munist Party being federalised. On cises Gorbachev’s passive atitude to- the other hand, however, these ofcials wards the communist nomenclature criticised the insufcient representation in the Socialist Republic of Czechoslova- of Slovaks in the federal bodies as well as kia, and proposes to replace Soviet Am- Prague’s eforts to centralise the econo- bassador Viktor Lomakin who did not my.66 Therefore, Moscow must have been support the new Soviet line. According at least partly familiar with the fact that

63 See, for instance, Karner, Stefan –Kramer, Mark –Ruggenthaler, Peter –Wilke, Manfred et al.: Der Kreml und die Wende 1989: Interne Analysen der sowjetischen Führung zum Fall der kommunistischen Regime: Dokumente. Innsbruck – Wien – Bozen: StudienVerlag, 2014. 64 The original analysis, which is stored in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow, has 143 pages. It is, therefore, possible that the Slovak question is addressed to some extent in the original document. See Die Lage in der Tschechoslowakei “muss geradezu Unruhe hervorrufen. Den sowjetischen Botschafter und führende Sowjetdiplomaten in Prag auszutauschen.” Bericht des Leiters des Wirtschaftsinstituts der Sowjetischen Akademie der Wissenschaften O. T. Bogomolovs an das ZK der KPdSU, 16 March 1989. In: Karner, Stefan et al.: Der Kreml und die Wende, pp. 308 – 313, document nr. 44. 65 Ibidem. 66 Dubček, Alexander: “Meine Zeit wird kommen.” Bericht der sowjetischen Botschaft in Prag, 18 April 1989. In: Karner, Stefan et al.: Der Kreml und die Wende, pp. 335 – 338, document nr. 50.

108 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the Slovak communists were not happy in mind that there are moods favouring with the situation in the de facto inopera- the full independence of Slovakia.”68 tive federation. The most unambiguous stance con- From this unique report from the So- cerning the relations of Slovaks and viet Ministry of Foreign Afairs, it is pos- Czechs can be found in the report by sible to conclude that Moscow counted the Soviet Foreign Afairs Ministry, with the possibility of Slovakia becom- which was prepared for the Internation- ing independent as early as in the spring al Department of the Central Commitee of 1990. In view of the regular diplomatic of the CPSU at the Department of So- relations that existed between the So- cialist States in Europe on May 16, 1990, viet Union and Slovakia between 1939 that is, immediately before the frst free and 1941, this might not be such a big elections in Czecho-Slovakia.67 In gen- surprise.69 eral, the report describes big changes The division of Czechoslovakia and, in the political system, a fundamen- more exactly, the atitude of the Western tal turn in its foreign policy, the strong democracies and Russia to having two infuence of the Christian Democratic new independent states in Central Eu- Movement in Slovakia, as well as “grow- rope, which emerged as the successor ing religious trends in Czechoslovak so- states of the Czech and Slovak federa- ciety after the visit of Pope John Paul II” tion, still needs to be properly studied by which would result in the Civic Forum historical science and become the subject being displaced by the Christian Demo- of a wider social discourse. In fact, it is crats in the approaching parliamentary the complete opposite situation to that elections. Regarding the Slovak issue, of the German unifcation process (and the report reads: the stance of the international communi- ty towards it), which actually constitutes “The issue of Slovak self-determina- one of the most exhaustively processed tion seems to be a serious problem events in world and, above all, Europe- for the future of Czechoslovakia. With an history. Likewise, historians have the end of the restrictive government shown notorious interest in the disinte- of the Communist Party, Slovak nation- gration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Un- alism is becoming uncontrollable. It is ion. Therefore, it seems necessary to pay necessary to prepare for Czechoslovakia due atention to the international context becoming a confederation but keeping of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia,

67 Informacia upravlenia stran Evropy MID SSSR „Vnutripolitičeskaja obstanovka v Čechoslovakii i perspektivy jejo rozvitia,“ 16 May 1990. In: I. V. Kazarina, et al.: Konec epochi, pp. 713 – 715. The report was writen and sent to the International Department of the Central Commitee of the CPSU by the Director of the Department of Socialist States at the Soviet MID G. Gorinovich, with the knowledge of I. P. Aboimov. The head of the secretariat of the International Department of the Central Commitee of the CPSU, V. Carenko, became acquainted with it on 31 May 1990. I. P. Aboimov was Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR. 68 Ibidem, p. 715. 69 For more on the Slovak-Soviet relations, see: Beáta Katrebová Blehová: Die slowakisch- sowjetischen Beziehungen, 1939 – 1941: eine ungleiche Partnerschaft. In: Prague Papers on the history of international relations. Praha: Karlova Univerzita, 2008, pp. 375 – 428.

Beáta Katrebová Blehová: The Split of the Czecho-Slovakia in an International Context 109 or to initiate an international project that to Slovakia’s declaration of independ- can become the frst deep study of this ence was that of Poland and Ukraine. On issue, especially bearing in mind the ap- the contrary, they also reveal that Hun- proaching round anniversary of the in- gary’s diplomatic circles tried to slow dependent Slovak Republic in 2023. down the integration eforts of the Slovak Due to the ongoing war in Yugosla- Republic after its establishment. via, none of the world powers were really Although the shaping of Slova- interested in slowing down or reversing kia’s diplomacy and the frst years, or rath- the split of the Czech and Slovak federa- er months, of its activities are also very tion in the second half of 1992. However, it interesting, litle atention has been paid is necessary to consider – and Slovak his- to this topic. The birth of Slovak diploma- torical science should pay more atention cy can be dated back to the revolutionary to this issue – up to what extent this more changes in Slovakia during the Gentle or less welcoming atitude of the world Revolution in November and December powers and neighbouring countries to- 1989. Litle known remain the eforts car- wards Slovakia was the result of fears ried out by the Slovak diaspora, especial- that the war in Yugoslavia would repeat ly the Slovak World Congress, the Slovak in Central Europe, as well as up to what League in America – one of the most im- extent it was the result of more deeply portant expatriate organisations – and rooted historical circumstances. Respect other organisations of Slovak exiles that for the right to self-determination of na- gradually emerged in the free world af- tions enshrined in all binding interna- ter 1945. This paper can, therefore, be tional standards, particularly in the 1948 considered the frst excursion into the in- Charter of the United Nations, seems to ternational circumstances surrounding have played an essential role in this re- the division of Czecho-Slovakia, and gard. The so far available archival sourc- the frst of many and more scrutinising es show that the most favourable atitude studies in this feld.

110 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Ondrej Podolec* Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia in the 20th Century (Parallels with Croatia)** Štátoprávne míľniky Slovenska v 20. storočí (paralely s Chorvátskom) / Međaši razvitka državno­pravnoga statusa Slovačke u 20. stoljeću (Paralele s Hrvatskom) Štúdia sa zaoberá štátoprávnym vývojom Slovenska predovšetkým v 20. storočí aj s čiastočným zreteľom na paralely pri komparácii s vývojom v Chorvátsku, kde je možné nájsť množstvo spoločných znakov. Slovensko bolo až do konca dvadsiateho storočia súčasťou viacnárodných štátov, Slováci tak zdieľali osud viacerých slovanských národov strednej a (juho)východnej Európy. V rámci nich bola limitom štátoprávnych ambícií všetkých slovenských politických reprezentácií až do konca tridsiatych rokov dvadsiateho storočia autonómia. K jej realizácii nakoniec došlo až po dvadsaťročí existencie Československej republiky, za zložitých okolností po Mníchovskej dohode v roku 1938, pričom vývoj dospel až k vzniku samostatnému štátu, ktorý bol v satelitnom postavení voči nacistickému Nemecku. Vývoj postavenia Slovenska v rámci obnoveného Československa v povojnových rokoch 1945 – 1948 bol charakterizovaný zavedením asymetrického modelu vzťahov, postupným okliešťovaním právomocí autonómnych slovenských národných orgánov až po návrat k unitárnej podobe štátu. Centralistický model riadenia komunistického československého štátu po roku 1948 sa v najkoncentrovanejšej podobe odzrkadlil v ústave z roku 1960 (tv. socialistickej). K zásadnejšej úprave česko-slovenského vzťahu potom došlo až federalizáciou Československa v roku 1968. Obnovením politickej plurality po páde komunistického režimu v roku 1989 sa problematika národnej emancipácie, ktorú totalitný režim neumožňujúci slobodu prejavu len „zakonzervoval“, okamžite stala kľúčovou témou domácej politiky. Po kultivovanom procese rozdelenia štátu vývoj vyvrcholil vznikom dvoch nástupníckych samostatných štátov v roku 1993.

Kľúčové slová: Dejiny, štát, právo, ústava, Slovensko, Československo, Juhoslávia, Chorvátsko, národ, právo na sebaurčenie, autonómia, federácia, druhá svetová vojna, komunizmus, nacizmus, fašizmus, 1989

ntil the end of the 20th century, Slo- Eastern Europe. This article deals with Uvakia formed part of diferent mul- the diferent constitutional forms Slo- tinational states. For this reason Slovaks vakia went through in the 20th century shared a common fate with several oth- and, in line with the spirit of this pub- er Slavic nations in Central and (South) lication, compares this development to

* Ondrej Podolec, National Memory Institute, Bratislava and Department of Legal History and Comparative Law at the Faculty of Law at Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovak Republic). ** The study was prepared as part of the solution of the VEGA project nr. 1/0379/19 Exile from Slovakia po communist coup in 1948 - identity, integration, assimilation.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 111 that in Croatia while pointing out some emerged on the ruins of the Austro-Hun- existing parallels. garian Monarchy, namely the Czech- It is really remarkable to fnd so many oslovak Republic and the Kingdom common features in the development of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that would of the legal form of these two countries eventually become Yugoslavia. How- (nations). From a “sociological” point ever, neither the Slovaks nor the Croats of view, both countries are Slavic in na- were what could be called the dominant ture, have very similar populations, and or “ruling” nation of their respective are predominantly Catholic in their countries, whose members would occu- confession. Before WWI (especially py a major part of the positions within in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries), the highest constitutional bodies. From both nations were among those strug- their very establishment, both countries gling for their national existence within had a multinational character. Neverthe- the multi-ethnic Kingdom of Hungary. less, also from their early stages they un- The main diference being that unlike derwent increasing centralisation that, Croatia, Slovakia did not have any type in turn, found expression in the respec- of legal personality. The “spring of na- tive constitutions.2 Czechoslovakia and tions” in the revolutionary years 1848/49 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slo- saw some close cooperation between venes (or Yugoslavia) cooperated closely representatives of these two peoples. in the frame of the Litle Entente,3 as both Worth mentioning are several activities countries feared Hungarian irredentism. Count Josip Jelačič carried out in favour As for national emancipation among of Slovaks.1 Another major chapter is Slovaks, autonomy within a multination- the scientifc, cultural, political and reli- al state was the pinnacle Slovak politi- gious relations between them. In the case cal leaders could aspire to until the end of Slovakia, worth mentioning are the ac- of the 1930s. However, due to the fact that tivities carried out by Štefan Moyzes, Ju- Slovakia formed part of multinational raj Haulík and Martin Kukučín. countries, which had a unitary character, After 1918, Slovakia and Croatia be- most of these ambitions never came true. came “state-building” elements of two The frst struggle for autonomy in Slova- multinational Slavic successor states kia date back to the mid 19th century, i.e. that following the Treaty of Versailles during the revolutionary years of 1848/49,

1 For more information, see: Československo a Juhoslávia: Z dejín československo-juhoslovanských vzťahov. Ed. Jozef Hrozienčik. Bratislava: Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 1968; Podolan, Peter – Viršinská, Miriam: Slovenské dejiny, vol. III: 1780 – 1914.Bratislava: Literary Information Centre, 2014, p. 158 et seq., Podrimavský Milan et al.: Dejiny Slovenska, vol. III: Od roku 1848 do konca 19. storočia. Bratislava: Veda Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1992, p. 26 et seq. 2 For more information, see: Tejchman, Miroslav: Balkán ve 20. století. Praha: Karolinum, 2017; Pirjevac, Jože: Jugoslávie 1918 – 1992. Praha: Argo, 2000; Havlíková, Lubomíra et. al.: Dějiny jihoslovanských zemí. Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2001; Československo a Juhoslávia. Z dejín československo-juhoslovanských vzťahov. Ed.: Jozef Hrozienčik. Bratislava: Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1968. 3 For more information, see: Sládek, Zdeněk: Malá dohoda 1919 – 1938. Praha: Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2000; Ferenčuhová, Bohumila: Sovietske Rusko a Malá dohoda. Bratislava: Veda Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1988.

112 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives when the wave of awakening nationalism as a self-governing body.4 More specifc that swept over the whole Europe did not demands for autonomy were formulat- spare the Slovak people either. This pro- ed in the 1861 Memorandum of the Slovak cess included the frst rather comprehen- Nation. However, the frst really com- sive eforts to defne the administrative prehensive and precisely formulated boundaries of the territory with a pre- document striving to achieve Slovak au- dominantly Slovak population, which tonomy were the Privileges of the Upper was to be administered by self-govern- Hungary Slovak District (Privilégium Slov- ing bodies within the defned compe- enského okolia) presented on 12 December tencies. The Demands of the Slovak Nation, of the same year in Vienna. It was a kind announced in the city of Liptovský Svätý of legally revised version of the original Mikuláš (today’s Liptovský Mikuláš) on memorandum and as such was present- 10 May 1848, included diferent civil and ed to the monarch in Vienna by a depu- social issues but – most importantly – tation headed by Bishop Štefan Moyzes. a demand for Slovak autonomy. Unlike The state entity it proposed, the Slovak later documents of the kind, this one District, whose boundaries were precise- did not include any institutional or ter- ly delimited, was to consist of fve pre- ritorial defnitions. The only legal insti- dominantly Slovak counties5 as well as tution the document specifed in more of several mostly Slovak parts of other detail was a kind of national assembly ethnically mixed counties.6

Fig. 1: Map of the Upper Hungary Slovak District (according to Martin Homza and Daniel Gurňák)

4 Demands of the Slovak Nation. In: Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti, vol. I. Bratislava: National Literary Centre – House of Slovak Literature, 1998, pp. 307 – 310. 5 The issue here were the Trenčín, Orava, Turiec, Liptov and Zvolen Counties. 6 These counties were considered to have a mixed population: Bratislava, Nitra, Tekov, Hont, Novohrad, Gemer, Spiš, Šariš, Turna and Abov.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 113 World War I meant a turning point this time was its position more clear- for Slovakia. Weakened by the lasting ly specifed. State administration and repressive policy of the Hungarian King- the judiciary were to be autonomous as dom, the complete break-out of the Aus- well. Alongside these expatriate organ- tro-Hungarian monarchy meant such isations, a key player in the agreement an ambitious goal for the political lead- creating the Czechoslovak Republic ers of the Slovak people that they failed was Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, chair- to address with the necessary strength man of the leading body of the foreign the conditions that would guarantee resistance – the Czecho­Slovak National the position of Slovakia within the fu- Council, who drafted the document him- ture Czechoslovak state. Far more far- self. The Pitsburgh Agreement also played sighted in this respect – and in many an important role as one of the key argu- others – were the representatives of dif- ments in the ensuing domestic political ferent Slovak expatriate organisations struggle for Slovak autonomy (alongside in North America who, hand in hand the role the future president had played with their Czech counterparts, devel- in its creation). Undoubtedly, it repre- oped notorious eforts to support the cre- sented a strong political commitment, ation of Czechoslovakia. Being the main although the opponents to Slovak auto- donors of foreign resistance capital, nomy argued mainly that the document they were in the position to demand was not legally binding for the further guarantees to secure Slovakia’s position development of Czechoslovakia.8 in the proposed common country. These However, the Czechoslovak Republic guarantees were anchored in the agree- (which in the Treaty of Versailles appears ments that defned the future legal rela- as the Czech­Slovak Republic) was even- tions of the constitutive nations, which tually established as a centralist country, were concluded in the USA. The 1915 and the notion of a unifed Czechoslovak Cleveland Agreement stipulated a federal, nation – known as Czechoslovakism – i.e. symmetrical conception whose mem- was anchored in the 1920 constitution ber bodies were to manage their afairs as one of its basic state doctrines.9 This autonomously. These were intended to idea was legitimately justifed at the mo- have a wide range of competencies, in- ment the country was created as it paved cluding fnancial autonomy and an sep- the way for its international recogni- arately managed state administration.7 tion and, perhaps, also from a domes- The 1918 Pitsburgh Agreement enshrined tic political perspective, in order to an asymmetric model in which Slova- guarantee the security of the emerging kia was to represent an autonomous state. For Slovakia, however, it became entity. That meant, in fact, a backdown a regressive factor in the further devel- from the original model stipulated opment of Czechoslovakia. From a legal in the Cleveland Agreement. Once more, viewpoint, the Slovak people was con- the cornerstone of self-government was sidered to be kind of an eastern branch to be an assembly. However, neither of the “state-building” “Czechoslovak

7 Cleveland Agreement. In: Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti I, 1998, pp. 445 – 447. 8 Pitsburg Agreement. In: Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti I, pp. 485 – 487. 9 Constitutional Law No. 121/1920 Sb. Coll. et seq.

114 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives nation,” and their language, Slovak, and security of the new country, some a form of “Czechoslovakian”. The ofcial fexibility was still expected to allow state policy aimed at gradually making compromises concerning some extent this legal fction come true, i.e. a politi- of decentralisation.11 cal nation that would eventually merge Demands for autonomy thus became into a single ethnic element as well. As one of the central issues of Slovak politics for both nations having their own dis- in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic. tinct languages – which is one of the at- The key question of the existence of a dis- tributes of national identity – a parallel tinct Slovak nation enjoying the right to situation can be found in Yugoslavia as self-determination conditioned the char- well, namely in connection with the state acter of the demanded autonomy. If its policy towards the Serbian-Croatian existence and right to self-determina- relation, i.e. Serbian and Croatian vs. tion were recognised, this would mean “Serbo-Croatian”. Demands for auton- the achievement of their legitimate legal omy could have been raised from two ambitions within the existing country. diferent points of view. First, following On the contrary, in the context of the of- a “state-building” conception, i.e. the na- cial state doctrine, which acknowledged tion in question is a state-building ele- just one Czechoslovak nation, only some ment of the country. The second one is local specifcities would be taken into the right to self-determination of a nation account for regional administration pur- living as a minority within the country. poses, i.e. the degree of decentralisation Therefore, it would not be a minori- of public administration. Assuming ty group of a nation that has achieved the non-existence of a separate Slovak its self-determination in a neighbour- nation, and based on the assumption that ing country, but rather an analogy to the state works most efectively when the population of Subcarpathian Rus’ it is unitary and centralised, autonomy (also known as Carpathian Ruthenia and in the international political and securi- Transcarpathian Ukraine).10 ty situation of the time had no rational Despite the fact that Slovaks already justifcation. had the status of state-forming nation Politically, the dispute over the form in the new Czechoslovakia, and this of Slovakia’s legal status was not only new country objectively created the con- a struggle Slovak autonomists led against ditions for the modern Slovak nation to the political centre, Prague, but also continue to evolve, until 1938 there were an internal political and ideological dis- no signifcant changes in its legal position pute among Slovaks themselves. For even from the status stipulated in the adopted among the Slovak political leaders there constitution. While interwar centralism were some who – for various reasons was seen as a temporary concession made and with diferent intensity – support- by Slovaks in favour of the consolidation ed not only a centralist system, but also

10 Vládní nařízení no. 17/192 Sb. Col. et seq.; Law No. 122/1920 Sb. Col. et seq.; The Joint Czech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, National Assembly 1935 (1935 – 1938), Senát – tisky Senát Narodního shromáždění R. Čs. r. 1938., IV. volební období. 7. zasedání, Tisk 713. (citované 17. júna 2019). See htp://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Default?legId=8&termNr=1935 11 Letz, Róbert: Slovenské dejiny, vol. IV: 1914 – 1938. Bratislava: Literárne informačné centrum, 2010, p. 156.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 115 the concept of a single “Czechoslovak of the National Assembly. For this rea- nation”. Opponents to the autonomy pro- son, decentralisation proposals made by gram usually argued that Slovakia did other parties (perhaps with the excep- not need any autonomy or that it already tion of the Slovak National Party) tend- had it, de facto.12 Those who adhered to ed to avoid this notion. The lack of po- the idea of Czechoslovakism were right litical and conceptual agreement – both to see in the demands of the Slovak Peo- on the side of supporters and opponents ple’s Party (HSĽS) an obstacle hinder- – made it even more difcult to defne ing the creation of a unifed political the necessary clear constitutional foun- and, eventually, also ethnic nation. Like dations to demand autonomy. the “centralists”, in Slovakia’s autono- Slovak autonomy fnally came true my policy they saw a threat to the unity (simultaneously with Subcarpathian of the country and the germ of separa- Rus’) only under the radically changed tism, and accused those who supported domestic political conditions created by it of cooperating with the hostile stances the Munich Agreement in 1938. The sig- of Hungary, Poland and Germany.13 nifcantly weakened centre of Prague, Many of them were aware that with- moreover, facing the possibility of Slova- in a self-governing unit they could be kia spliting up completely with the sup- outnumbered in democratic elections by port of Germany, was forced to accept the Slovak People’s Party (HSĽS), which the autonomist demands of the two east- was stronger and – except for a short ern parts of the republic.14 period – had always been in the oppo- From a geopolitical point of view, sition. Consequently, the existing po- the penetration of Nazi Germany into litical system did not make it possible Central and Eastern Europe led to the dis- for the election results in Slovakia to “fnd integration of two multinational states, refection” in actual positions of power. namely Czechoslovakia and Yugosla- Slovakia’s demand for autonomy was via. The democratic powers of Europe then a kind of “fagship” of the politi- gave up the Versailles system of Euro- cal program of the predominantly op- pean borders, whose existence they had position party HSLS, and eforts to en- guaranteed until then, ceding this geo- force it were formulated in several bills graphical area to the sphere of interest submited to the Chamber of Deputies of the Third Reich (or Mussolini’s Italy).

12 Ibidem, pp. 156 – 158. 13 Ibidem, p. 155. 14 For more information on the domestic political development in the period of the Second Czech- Slovak Republic, see: Gebhart, Jan –Kuklík, Jan: Druhá republika 1938 – 1939: Svár demokracie a totality v politickém, spoločenském a kulturním životě. Praha – Litomyšl: Paseka, 2004; Bystrický, Valerián: Od autonómie k vzniku Slovenského štátu: Bratislava: Prodama, 2008; Rataj, Jan: O autoritatívní narodní stát: Ideologické proměny české politiky v druhé republice 1938 – 1939. Praha: Karolinum 1997; Hoensch, Jörg K.: Slovensko a Hitlerova východná politika: Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana medzi autonómiou a separatizmom. Bratislava: Veda Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2001; Bystrický, Valerián – Deák, Ladislav: Od Mníchova k rozbitiu Česko­Slovenska. In: Slovensko v Československu 1918 – 1939. Eds.: Milan Zemko – Valerián Bystrický. Bratislava: Veda Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2004, pp. 199 – 239; Bystrický, Valerián: Prestavba republiky na federáciu v roku 1938. In: Slovensko v politickom systéme Československa (Materiály z vedeckého sympózia Častá 11. – 13. novembra 1991). Bratislava: Veda Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1992, pp. 65 – 67.

116 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives In both cases, it was in the interest of Hit- reasons, at least in the frst phase. The In- ler’s policy to break up the two states dependent State of Croatia (Nezavisna that had been “products” of peace agree- Država Hrvatska) could only to a lesser ments after WWI. extent rely on the efectiveness of state For this purpose, he made use power. Moreover, its efective applica- of the unfulflled national emancipation tion throughout the whole country was ambitions of Slovaks and Croats to change questionable.16 When comparing the two them into independent countries as cli- undemocratic political regimes, it is pos- ent-states of Germany (or Italy in the case sible to say that the one in Croatia had of Croatia).15 A remarkable coincidence is a more repressive character. that in both cases, the declaration of in- Both client states and their political dependence was preceded by the central regimes faced domestic and foreign an- government being forced by the circum- ti-fascist resistance, which grew into up- stances to grant autonomy to both na- risings and partisan-like warfare. In both tions (the Autonomous Land of Slovakia cases, the resistance set the restoration and the Banovina of Croatia). Moreover, of the interwar multinational countries, in both cases these were territorial units i.e. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as that had formed part of the administra- one of their main program goals. tive system of the preceding countries, The creation of the Slovak State was i.e. they did not need to be created anew. ofcially presented internally and exter- When comparing them, the Slovak nally as the exercise of the nation’s right to State (later on the Slovak Republic) ap- self-determination by means of the par- pears to be a more consolidated inde- liament as its representative body. From pendent state entity in terms of basic the- an international point of view, it was rec- oretical atributes (efective state power, ognised (at various diplomatic levels) by state territory, population), as well as a relatively high number of states (27),17 in terms of international recognition. including the West European democratic Its existence was also based on great- powers, namely Great Britain and France er support from the population, most (diplomatic relations with them lasted of whom identifed with it for diferent until the outbreak of World War II).18

15 Rychlík, Jan: Slovenský štát a Nezavisna država Hrvatska. In: Ve službách česko-slovenského porozumění/porozumenia. Eds.: Ivan Guba – Michal Macháček – Marek Syrný. Praha: Československé dokumentační středisko, o.p.s., Praha,ve spolupráci s Fakultou politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov Univerzity Mateja Bela a s Múzeom Slovenského národného povstania v Banskej Bystrici, 2016, pp. 154 – 160; Rychlík, Jan – Perenčevič, Milan: Dějiny Chorvatska. Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2011; Tejchman, Miroslav: Balkán ve válce a revoluci 1939 – 1945. Praha: Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2008; Tkáč, Ján: Slovensko­juhoslovanské a slovensko­ chorvátske vzťahy v rokoch 1939 – 1941. In: Historický zborník, a. 19, 2009, nr. 1, p. 154 – 168; Idem: Chorvátsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941 – 1945. In: Historický časopis, a. 58, 2010, nr. 4, pp. 659 – 683; Hradská, Katarína – Kamenec, Ivan et al.: Slovenská republika 1939 – 1945. Bratislava: Veda, 2015. 16 Rychlík, Jan: Slovenský štát a Nezavisna država Hrvatska, pp. 154 – 160; Idem – Perenčevič, Milan: Dějiny Chorvatska; Tejchman, Miroslav: Balkán ve válce a revoluci 1939 – 1945. Praha: Nakladatelství Karolinum 2008. 17 Petruf, Pavol: Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945. Bratislava: Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Publishing House Typoset print, ltd., 2011, p. 55. 18 Ibidem, pp. 150 – 170.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 117 From the constitutional point of view, the German Reich a kind of “Protector” however, there are several factors that over the Slovak State and its task was make it difcult to perceive the establish- to guarantee the political independence ment of a country simply as the exercise and territorial integrity of its “protégée”. of a nation’s right to self-determination. The treaty allowed Germany to establish The way the Assembly of the Slovak a “Zone of Protection” covering a wide State was created – under the conditions strip along the border, in which it could of an authoritarian state – cast a shad- deploy troops. The treaty also estab- ow over its legitimacy. Although there lished extraterritorial jurisdiction of Ger- really was a self-determination process many’s legislation and judiciary for Ger- of the Slovak nation aimed to obtain man nationals in that territory. Other certain forms of statehood, and it had two articles of the treaty subordinated the potential to evolve into full accom- Slovakia’s foreign policy and armed forc- plishment in the form of an independ- es, which needed to follow the line ent country, the lack of a greater degree of the German Reich.20 There was also of free will questioned whether it was a secret protocol on economic and fnan- legitimate for them to exercise their right cial cooperation, which subjected Slova- to self-determination. In fact, the Slovak kia’s economic and fnancial policies to State was declared under the ultima- control by the Reich.21 tum of the German führer and under The borders of the Slovak State did the real threat of Slovakia being occu- not correspond to the current borders pied. From an international legal view- of the Slovak Republic. (Also in this re- point, the political leadership at the time spect there is a parallel with the devel- was under pressure from Germany and opment in Croatia.) In fact, it was afect- its neighbouring states, that is, in con- ed by the territorial changes caused by ditions of overwhelming coercion and the intervention of Nazi Germany into extreme need.19 A fundamental limita- the Versailles system by means of the Mu- tion to the sovereignty of the new coun- nich Agreement (Czechoslovakia had lost try was its relationship with Germany. some territories). Based on it, Germany It was regulated by the Protection Treaty occupied strategic parts of the capital (Schutvertrag) signed on March 18th and Bratislava (the right bank of the Dan- 23rd 1939 in Vienna and Berlin for a pe- ube, i.e. Petržalka, as well as the village riod of 25 years. This treaty codifed and of Devín at the confuence of the Danube deepened Slovakia’s subordinate status and the Moravia), Poland used the ulti- to the dominant power in the region, matum to annex several municipalities which could be traced back to the Sec- in the north, and after the First Vienna ond Czecho-Slovak Republic. It made Award, Hungary took control of a strip

19 Beňa, Jozef: Vývoj slovenského právneho poriadku. Banská Bystrica: Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica, 2001, pp. 46 – 50. 20 Agreement on the Protective Relationship Between the German Reich and the Slovak State nr. 226/1940 Code of Laws of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter Sl. z.). 21 Ibidem, compare: Mičko, Peter. Hospodárska politika Slovenského štátu. Kapitoly z hospodárskych dejín Slovenska v rokoch 1938 – 1945. Krakov: Spolok Slovákov v Poľsku, 2010, pp. 105 – 108.

118 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives of territory along the border. Some other Territories that had been part minor adjustments to the borders were of the Kingdom of Hungary until 1918 done during the frst year of existence and were ceded to Poland after WWI of the new country before they were def- were also annexed. By the end of WWII nitely setled. Shortly after the Slovak State they were occupied by Slovakia but be- was diplomatically recognised, neigh- came part of Poland again after the bor- bouring Hungary atacked it militarily ders of Czechoslovakia returned to their from the territory of Subcarpathian Rus’, pre-Munich form.23 which it had occupied on March 15, 1939. The ofcial name of the country was While in the Vienna Award Hungary had Slovak State and it had a constitutional- pledged itself to respect the Slovak-Hun- ly provisory political system. Its bodies garian border, the occupation of Subcar- originated or gradually evolved to ft pathian Rus’ allowed it to question its the conditions of an independent coun- new eastern section, which had formed try although their mutual interconnec- the administrative border of two admin- tion was often vaguely defned. istrative units within the Czech-Slovak The constitutional foundations for Republic (i.e. Slovakia and Subcarpathian the establishment of the Slovak State Rus’. This military aggression initiated were laid by Act no. 1/1939 of the Slovak a military confict, which would become Code of Laws (hereinafter Sl. z.) of 14 known as the Litle War. The advance March 1939. In § 1, the Autonomous Land of the Hungarian army was stopped, of Slovakia was declared an independent but the already occupied territories were country and the Assembly of the Land left under Hungarian possession with became the Assembly of the Slovak State the consent of Germany. (These were are- (also called Slovak Assembly). Paragraph as around Snina and Sobraniec with over 2 provisionally established the high- 40,000 inhabitants.)22 The northern bor- est executive body of the government, der of the country also saw some territo- which was appointed by the Presiden- rial changes. Slovak Army units took part cy of the Assembly. Most ministries as in Germany’s military aggression against well as the Ofce of the Prime Minister Poland, which began on September 1, were able to follow up on the relevant 1939. Once Poland was defeated, Slovakia Ministry of the Autonomous Govern- issued a constitutional law incorporating ment or on the Ofce of the Prime Min- to its territory those areas that had been ister of the Land of Slovakia. The Minis- part of Czechoslovakia before September try of Foreign Afairs and the Ministry 30, 1938 but Poland had occupied based of National Defence needed to be built on the ultimatum resulting from the Mu- from the beginning, though. Act no. nich Agreement. 1/1939 Sl. z. was, therefore, a kind of small

22 For more information, see: Malá vojna (Vojenský konfikt medzi Maďarskom a Slovenskom v marci 1939). Ed.: Ladislav Deák. Bratislava: Stála konferencia slovenskej inteligencie Slovakia plus, 1993; Podolec, Ondrej: Vojenský konfikt na pozadí prvých týždňov samostatného štátu. In: Malá vojna v marci 1939 a jej miesto v pamäti národa: Zborník z konferencie organizovanej Ústavom pamäti národa a mestom Spišská Nová Ves v dňoch 19. – 20. marca 2015. Ed.: Martin Lacko – Michal Malatinský. Bratislava: Spolok Slovákov v Poľsku, o.z. Múzeum ozbrojených zložiek SR 1939 – 1945, pp. 76 – 92. 23 Constitutional Law Nr. 325/1939 Sl. z.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 119 provisional sui generis constitution24 citizenship and racial laws), it was pre- that defned the “constitutional core” pared based on the constitutions of Ita- of the emerging country in the form ly, Portugal and Austria. Despite Slova- of its two highest bodies of legislative kia’s afliation to the sphere of interest and executive power, i.e. the parliament of Nazi Germany from 1939 to 1945, its and the government, and regulated their political system did not copy the Nazi mutual relationship. model. It only copied some provisions As for the judicial power, no rad- regulating the recognition of citizen- ical changes were done immediately ship and several racial legislation issues. after Slovakia’s independence. In fact, The conservative wing, led by Prime the courts in the Autonomous Land Minister Jozef Tiso, identifed more with of Slovakia had been completely sepa- the authoritarian corporatist models rated from the Czechoslovak system on of Portugal, former Austria and, in part, the basis of the November Constitutional Italy. The fnal form of the hybrid politi- Act. The new country was able to take cal system was infuenced by several fac- over the existing judicial structure as tors, mainly the dominant position of Ti- a whole, as well as the corps of judges and so’s supporters in the legislative process, civil servants. Under the 15 March 1939 the constitutional traditions of former decree, the only condition to be appoint- Czechoslovakia, and the development ed to these posts was to take an oath to of Nazi Germany’s policy towards its sat- the new country.25 The only urgent task to ellite state. In its essence the state worked be solved was establishing the Supreme on a traditional parliamentary govern- Court to replace the one in Brno, which mental model30 but also allowed for pro- was temporarily functioning as the high- fessional organisations to be established. est judicial instance for the Autonomous The codifed name of the country was Land of Slovakia. Consequently, the gov- Slovak Republic, but Slovak State contin- ernment issued the relevant decrees es- ued to be commonplace. tablishing the Slovak Supreme Court,26 Four basic factors shaped the fnal the Supreme Administrative Court27 and form of the political system: 1. domestic the Main Insurance Court.28 political struggle, 2. the policy of the “pro- The fnal structure of the constitution- tective power”, 3. the atitudes and activ- al bodies was only defned by the state ities of the legally literate community constitution adopted by the parliament of “lawmakers” and of the law enforce- in July 1939.29 Besides the models tak- ment bodies, 4. foreign models copying en over from the “protector power,” i.e. European authoritarian and totalitari- Nazi Germany (concerning, above all, an political regimes, and 5. the fact that

24 Law nr. 1/1939 Sl. z. 25 Government Regulation zo 6/1939 Sl.z. Sudcovskí čakatelia skladali túto prísahu „Prisahám na Boha živého, že vždy budem verný Slovenskému štátu a poslušný jeho vláde, prísahám, že budem plniť povinnosti svojho úradu usilovne, svedomite a nestranne podľa zákonov a že úradné tajomstvo neprezradím. Tak mi Pán Boh pomáhaj.“ 26 Government Regulation nr. 49/1939 Sl. z. 27 Government Regulation nr. 62/1939 Sl. z. 28 Government Regulation nr. 27/1939 Sl. z. 29 Constitutional Law nr. 185/1939 Sl. z. 30 Slovak National Archives (SNA), Assembly of the Slovak Republic Fund, facs. 68.

120 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives WWII was going on, which often made (Berater). These included the solution it necessary to adopt the mentioned ad of the so-called Jewish question as well hoc measures, and resulted in substantial as interventions in the Slovak economy reforms being postponed. A completely in order to ensure the material needs unprecedented element in the legal order of the Wehrmacht. Even within Nazi cir- was racial legislation, which afected all cles, there was no uniform strategy on legal sectors. It defned the constitutional the extent of interference with the internal human and civil rights of Jews, interfered afairs of their satellite states. Some of its with their property rights to movable members even claimed that National So- and immovable property and buted into cialism was not an “export item.” Never- lease arrangements concerning build- theless, some domestic Slovak political ings and land. It excluded Jews from any forces carried out eforts to create a bi- standard relations in all areas regulating zarre synthesis of National Socialism and relations in administrative law, includ- political Catholicism. Over the last years ing professional associations. This legis- of the war, it is beter to talk about political lation was prepared under the direction pragmatism whose main priority was to of the pro-Nazi political wing and was maintain a political status quo that would the area in which most German mod- guarantee the Wehrmacht safe condi- els were adopted.31 The political reality tions at the front. In the case of Slovakia, of the authoritarian state corresponded this meant maintaining a power balance only partially to its writen constitution, between the pro-Nazi and the conserv- and its application was limited and ad- ative-clerical wing, or at least to main- justed according to the current power tain fair enough positions for the group and political conditions. around Vojtech Tuka, which had already The position of Germany’s policy lost the domestic struggle for power.32 line concerning its interference with A major turning point in the develop- that of Slovakia was not clearly defned, ment of the Slovak Republic was the out- mostly due to the fact that determining break of the Slovak National Uprising the exact form or structure of the politi- (SNU) on 29 August 1944. From that mo- cal system of the satellite country was not ment on, the liberating front advanced a priority. Rather, it focused on specifc through the territory of Slovakia dividing issues, which it addressed either ad hoc it into two separate states whose exist- or, in the long run by means of an adviser ence and legitimacy mutually excluded

31 A comprehensive overview of anti-Jewish legislation is provided in the edition of documents Holokaust na Slovensku, vol. 2: Prezident, vláda, Snem SR a Štátna rada o židovskej otázke (1939 – 1945): Dokumenty. Ed.: Eduard Nižňanský – Ivan Kamenec. Bratislava: Milan Šimečka Foundation – Jewish Religious Community, 2003. 32 For more information, see Nižňanský, Eduard: Rokovania nacistického Nemecka o deportáciách Židov v roku 1942 – príklad Slovenska, Rumunska a Maďarska. In: Historický časopis, a. 58, 2010, nr. 3, pp. 471 – 495; Podolec, Ondrej: Až do poslednej chvíle… (Činnosť vlády Štefana Tisu). In: Slovak Republic 1939 – 1945 očami mladých historikov V. (Slovak Republic medzi Povstaním a zánikom 1944 – 1945). Ed.: Michal Šmigeľ – Peter Mičko – Marek Syrný. Banská Bystrica: Ústav vedy a výskumu UMB – Katedra histórie FHV UMB – Štátna vedecká knižnica, 2006, pp. 15 – 31; Slovenské národné povstanie: Nemci a Slovensko 1944: Dokumenty. Ed.: Vilém Prečan. Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1965; Schvarc, Michal: Pod „ochranou“ tretej ríše. In: Mičev, Stanislav et al. Slovenské národné povstanie 1944. Banská Bystrica: Múzeum Slovenského národného povstania, 2009, pp. 18 – 25.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 121 each other. The western part, which was in which the Slovak National Council – still controlled by Germany was the Slo- which was constituted during the SNU vak Republic. In the east was Czechoslo- – seized power. On 4 April 1945, when vakia, whose legal renewed existence had the Red Army conquered Bratisla- already been recognised by the anti-Hit- va, the highest constitutional ofcials ler coalition countries, which considered of the Slovak Republic, i.e. the president it an occupied country after the Munich and the government, left the territory Agreement. The authorities of Czecho- of Slovakia and were temporarily evacu- slovakia could actually exercise execu- ated to Holíč and Skalica. Later on, while tive power over the insurgent territory, exiled in Austria, they became prison- although the legal relationship between ers of war of the United States. Several the Slovak National Council (hereinafter of them (including the president) were SNC) and the bodies of the Czechoslovak subsequently repatriated by force to face government-in-exile, also known as Pro- retributive justice along with other mem- visional Government of Czechoslovakia bers of the former regime. in London remained full of contradic- The Slovak and Croatian post-war tions. The existence of the Slovak Re- diasporas in the West found themselves public, on the other hand, depended on in a very similar situation. Their activi- the persistence of the order established ties (especially towards the representa- by Nazi Germany in Europe. tives of the Western democratic powers) A visible sign of the new domes- were problematic because in addition tic political situation, or rather the be- to their eforts to restore the independ- ginning of a new stage in the develop- ent statehood of their nations, they were ment of the country, was the change “tainted” for having been allies of Nazi of government. After the suppression Germany and fascist Italy, and for the un- of the Slovak National Uprising, Slo- democratic political regime their recent vakia was de facto a militarily occupied “war” statehood was associated with. country. Therefore, the biggest problem This troublesome factor was exacerbated of Štefan Tiso’s new government was its by the fact that several of their represent- limited ability to actually exercise ex- atives had been members of these former ecutive power in the territory of Slova- regimes (often even high representatives kia as it was, in fact, unable to prevent of ruling parties or constitutional bod- any arbitrary practices by the German ies). The number of Slovak exiles from armed forces. The front line advanc- 1945 outnumbered the “parallel” group ing through Slovakia practically divid- of émigrés that adhered to Czechoslo- ed the shrinking territory of the Slovak vak statehood. Their position was not Republic (under the jurisdiction of Bra- only against the communist regime, but tislava’s government) and the territory also against the renewed Czechoslovak of the renewing Czechoslovak Republic, Republic.33

33 For more information, see: Špetko, Jozef: Líšky kontra ježe: Slovenská politická emigrácia 1948 – 1989. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2002; Vondrášek, Václav – Pešek, Jan: Slovenský poválečný exil a jeho aktivity 1945 – 1970. Bratislava: Veda, Ústav politických vied SAV, 2011. Slovenský politický exil v zápase za samostanté Slovensko. Ed.: Vladimír Repka. Bratislava: Dom zahraničných Slovákov, 1996; Kaplan, Karel: Poúnorový exil 1948 – 49. Liberec: Dialog 2007; Katrebová Blehová, Beáta: Slovenská emigrácia v Taliansku v rokoch 1915 – 1950. Bratislava – Roma: Slovak Historical Institute in Rome, 2019.

122 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives The end of WWII and the defeat of post-war Czechoslovakia, the develop- of Nazi Germany meant restitutio ad in- ment of WWII was the determining fac- tegrum in the case of Slovaks and Croats, tor leading to the inclusion of the coun- i.e. the return to the interwar arrange- try in the area of interest of the victorious ment of states within their interwar communist superpower. The front pass- borders. While post-war Yugoslavia ing through its territory translated into was built as a federation of national re- military occupation or, in other words, publics from the beginning of its resto- to the presence of Red Army units as ration, Czechoslovakia still saw political an allied country. The diferent ways struggle for the recognition of a separate the countries were freed from the do- Slovak nation.34 Post-war Czechoslova- minion of Nazi Germany (or fascist It- kia did not try to become a federation, aly) also predetermined the diferent the legal state oder of the multination- satellite character the two communist al communist states within the Soviet countries had towards the USSR, as Mos- bloc, especially the Union of Soviet So- cow looked at any atempts at a more cialist Republics (USSR) and the Social- “independent” policy line by a satellite ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (un- communist country to be a dangerous til 1963 the Federal People’s Republic and unacceptable precedent. The eforts of Yugoslavia).35 the leading fgure of Yugoslavia’s resist- The arrival of the totalitarian com- ance and post-war Yugoslavia, Josip Broz munist regime kind of “suppressed” this Tito, made for a partially independent “national issue” in both countries. How- policy eventually resulted in a confron- ever, as soon as the conditions within tation with the USSR personifed by Jo- the regime began to relax, this question seph Vissarionovich Stalin and in Yugo- found itself again in the spotlight. In fact, slavia’s isolation from the entire Soviet the result of “Slovakia’s Early Spring” bloc for many years. A similar atempt from 1963 – 1967 as well as of “Czecho- at emancipation and at developing their slovakia’s Spring” in 1968 was Czecho- own political line was Czecho-Slova- slovakia becoming a federation. kia’s Spring in 1968. The diferent posi- The onset of the communist regime tion of the two countries also showed was diferent in both countries.36 In Yu- in the approach the communist super- goslavia, the communist resistance even- power chose to “solve” such atempts. tually became the dominant element While the pinnacle of Stalin’s confronta- of the resistance tackling the German tional line was just a form of “expulsion” and Italian occupation (or in this case (or isolation) of Yugoslavia’s regime, rather a kind of protectorate) basically on his successor chose to retreat and try its own. In the case of Slovakia as a part to gradually normalise their relations.

34 Klimeš, Miloš – Lesjuk, Petr – Malá, Irena – Prečan, Vilém: Cesta ke Květnu Vznik lidové demokracie v Československu do února 1948, vol. 1. Praha: Nakladatelství československé akademie věd, 1965, pp. 425 – 437. 35 For more information, see Zdobinský, Stanislav et al.: Státní zřízení evropských socialistických zemí. Praha: Orbis 1973; Zdobinský, Stanislav et al.: Státní právo evropských socialistických zemí. Praha: Orbis, 1976. 36 For more information, see Vykoukal, Jiří – Litera, Bohuslav – Tejchman, Miroslav: Východ: Vznik a, vývoj a rozpad Sovětského bloku 1944 – 1989. Praha: Nakladatelství Libri, 2000.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 123 On the contrary, Moscow considered Republic only from an international legal Dubček’s policy to be an acute threat to perspective (as a subject of international the integrity of the Soviet bloc and a po- law). Concerning the validity of the Con- tential disruption of the geopolitical line stitution, the SNC adopted the following the Red Army had fought out in WWII.37 stance at a secret session on 29 Septem- Its August military intervention was im- ber 1944: mediately preceded by an ofcial visit by J. B. Tito to Czechoslovakia, which can be “Due to the needs of the resistance interpreted as a gesture of support.38 movement at home and abroad, the actu- The constitutional development in al development overcame many essential Slovakia after 1945 had (at least initially) principles of the 1920 constitution and, a completely autonomous character. Dur- in fact, the revolutionary bodies in exile ing the Slovak National Uprising, after contravened them in many respects. “picking power up from the sidewalk”, We are, therefore, of the opinion that the illegal SNC declared itself the sole the constitution as a whole cannot serve bearer of all power in Slovakia, and as the basis for the new inner political until the so-called three Prague Agree- order of the Czechoslovak Republic”.40 ments, it managed to keep its legislative sovereignty in the country. The validity Regarding the eforts by President of any legal regulation by the compe- Edvard Beneš to subordinate the SNC as tent national authorities was, therefore, a local national commitee (it would just conditioned by approval by the SNC. be an executor, not a sovereign bearer Besides that, its presidency had several of power), this body took a clear stance head-of-state-like powers. The SNC had refusing to submit to his powers. also created its own executive bodies Immediately after the restoration called commissions. Likewise, a pro- of Czechoslovakia, the division of com- visory separate judiciary was created petencies between the government and within the rebel territory. The existing the SNC was dealt with on a “case-by- lower instance courts were subordinated case” basis. Later on, it gradually be- to the newly created higher instances.39 came determined by the three Prague Especially in view of Slovakia’s position Agreements. in renewed Czechoslovakia, the SNC au- Instead of renewing the interwar tomatically refused to recognise the va- constitution,- the Košice Government lidity of Czecholovakia’s 1920 constitu- Programme (Programme of the New Czech- tion, as from its viewpoint the idea was oslovak Government of the National Front to establish an internally new (or newly of Czechs and Slovaks from 5 April 1945) formed) country. The SNC recognised was a kind of unofcial sui generis consti- the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak tution. This program represented a new

37 For more information on the development in Slovakia in Czechoslovakia in 1968 see Londák, Miroslav – Sikora, Stanislav – Londáková, Elena: Od predjaria k normalizácii. Bratislava: Veda 2017. 38 Another exponent of a “more independent” policy also visited Czechoslovakia at that time – the leader of communist Romania, Nicolae Caucescu. 39 Beňa, Jozef: Vývoj slovenského právneho poriadku, p. 124. 40 Prečan, Vilém: Slovenské národné povstanie. Dokumenty. p. 600; Beňa, Jozef: Vývoj slovenského právneho poriadku, p. 126.

124 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives stage in the development of the “Slovak for the rise of a totalitarian communist question” in post-war Czechoslovakia. regime in February 1948. It was precisely the question of Slova- The Communist Party made use of its kia’s position the most controversial issue dominant negotiating position (the ne- during the negotiations on its content.41 gotiations took place in Moscow, Czech- Czech political parties were unwilling to oslovakia became part of the Soviet bloc acknowledge that Slovaks were a distinct and Soviet army units were located in its nation (Czechoslovak National Socialist territory) to push many elements that Party members even temporarily left had no precedence in the interwar First the talks in protest). On the other hand, Republic of Czechoslovakia. Among the Slovak National Council delegation them, were for example the declared strove for a federal country. In the end, turn in its foreign policy orientation article VI of the Program recognised (in favour of the Soviet Union), socialis- Slovaks as a separate nation (for the frst ing measures in the national economy time ever the ofcial Czechoslovak au- (nationalisation), and a new local gov- thorities did so), enshrined an asymmet- ernment system (national commitees). rical arrangement of Czechoslovakia Once the government program was and the existence of autonomous Slo- adopted, the existence of an independent vak national authorities. At that time, it Slovak nation was no longer controver- was loftily called the new “Magna Carta sial. The new basic issue was the extent of the Slovak Nation”. of the competencies of the national auton- The Košice Government Program was omy. The autonomous bodies, the legisla- the result of negotiations in Moscow tive ones, i.e. the Slovak National Council in March 1945 between the Czechoslo- and the Executive Board of Commission- vak political parties in exile in London ers, were ofcially called Slovak National and the Communist Party of Czechoslo- Bodies. Later on, some Marxism-Lenin- vakia. President Edvard Beneš appoint- ism elements (proletarian international- ed the new government, led by former ism) were used as an ideological pretext Czechoslovak envoy to Moscow, Zdeněk to weaken their competencies (the Board Fierlinger, in Košice on 4 April 1945. Al- of Commissioners was completely abol- though the Košice Government Program ished). The February 1948 commu- did not contain any formal legal regu- nist coup actually meant the return to lations, it laid the foundations for a new the unitary character of the country. post-war political system, known as The re-establishment of central- people’s democracy. It contained sever- ist Czechoslovakia, i.e. the SNC and al authoritarian elements, did not fore- the Board of Commissioners being grad- see any kind of political opposition, ually deprived of all relevant powers, and limited political pluralism by pre- was defnitely anchored in the so­called venting free competition among politi- three Prague Agreements.42 Like the Košice cal parties. In the end, it paved the path Government Program, these agreements

41 Klimeš, Miloš – Lesjuk, Petr – Malá, Irena – Prečan, Vilém: Cesta ke Květnu Vznik lidové demokracie v Československu do února 1948, vol. 1. Praha: Nakladatelství československé akademie věd, 1965, pp. 378 – 453. 42 Kvetko, Martin: Dohody o štátoprávnom usporiadaní Čechov a Slovákov v oslobodenej vlasti. Bratislava: Bystrica, vydavateľské a podnikateľské družstvo, 1947.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 125 were considered generally binding, possible conficts between the Slovak and although they did not take the form the countrywide laws, a coordinating of a law. In fact, the First Prague Agree- body was established within the Prime ment was published as an annex to a de- Minister’s Ofce with equal representa- cree of the Minister of the Interior.43 Nev- tion of Czechs and Slovaks.47 ertheless, a constitutional law also made The form of the Third Prague Agree- reference to it.44 ment48 was fundamentally infuenced by The First Prague Agreement45 conclud- the success of the Democratic Party in Slo- ed on 2 June 1945, which was the result vakia in the 1946 elections and the result- of negotiations between the countrywide ing fundamental change in the policy government and the SNC Presidency, of the Communist Party of Slovakia. Its enshrined Slovakia’s political autonomy sudden afnity with Prague centralism with some elements of federalism. In it, resulted from the fact that it was loosing the SNC was declared the bearer of state its position within the Slovak national au- power in Slovakia, but its competency thorities and, therefore, it opted for their was limited to the areas not covered by total marginalisation. The addendum to the central authorities. In fact, the coun- the agreement made the area of domes- trywide authorities were given exhaus- tic administration part of the common tive powers in twentieth areas, which countrywide afairs. The most signifcant covered almost the entire government change refecting Czechoslovakia’s re- agenda. It even dealt with, for example, turn to centralism was the new status the representation of Slovaks within of the Slovak national authorities. They the highest instance courts. were no longer power bearers, but just The Second Prague Agreement,46 con- the executors in Slovakia of decisions cluded on 11 April 1946, basically limited made by countrywide authorities. Any the powers of the Slovak national author- regulations adopted by the SNC needed ities in personnel maters transferring to be subjected to preventive and poste- them to the President of the Republic. rior control by the government in order It also merged the two supreme courts to establish whether the new legal regu- into one based in Brno, and strength- lation concerned maters of countrywide ened the position of the countrywide nature. The SNC, the legislative body authorities in issues having to do with of Slovakia, was in fact subordinate to the economy (prices, central planning, the executive body at countrywide level. statistics and control). At the same time, In the area of executive power, the contracting parties stated in the ad- the minister of the countrywide govern- dendum that the regulations published ment could decide whether to exercise in the Collection of Laws had countrywide their authority in Slovakia directly or by validity and efectiveness. To resolve any means of a subordinate commissioner.

43 Interior Minister Decree nr. 66/1946 Col. 44 Constitutional Law nr. 65/1946 Col. 45 Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti, vol. II. Bratislava: National Literary Centre – House of Slovak Literature, 1998, pp. 430 – 432. 46 Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti II, pp. 442 – 444. 47 Beňa, Jozef: Vývoj slovenského právneho poriadku, p. 196 et seq. 48 Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti II, pp. 445 – 448.

126 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives The coordinating body created to Party of Czechoslovakia, Antonín No- resolve discrepancies between country- votný, was the abolition of Slovakia’s his- wide and Slovak legislation was replaced torical symbol in its coat of arms, a dou- by a unifcation commission appointed ble cross standing on the middle peak by the central government whose task of a mountain consisting of three peaks, was to replace older SNC regulations which was replaced by a non-heraldic with countrywide ones. The agreement new creation (a partisan bonfre under was concluded between the parties Mount Kriváň).51 of the Czech and Slovak national fronts and had the legal relevance of a govern- ment resolution. The defnite subordination of the Board of Commissioners to the countrywide government was achieved by an amend- ment to the Third Prague Agreement in the form of a “Binding Interpretation of the Provisions of Article II. Paragraph 2 of the Third Prague Agreement” from 18 No- vember 1947. The Government was given a veto right over appointments to these posts, as well as the possibility to revoke the commissioner at any time without Fig. 2: Bonfre under Mount Kriváň giving a reason. At the same time, it as the new symbol of socialist Slovakia. could easily take over the direct nom- ination of the commissioners.49 There- The development of Slovakia’s po- fore, appointing the commissioners by sition within Czechoslovakia after the Slovak National Council was nothing 1945 was characterised by the reestab- but a formality. This division was more lishment of the asymmetric mode and or less reproduced in the frst commu- the gradual curtailment of the powers nist constitution of Czechoslovakia from of Slovakia’s autonomous authorities un- 1948 (the Ninth-of-May Constitution).50 til the fnal return to unitary Czechoslo- The centralist model of commu- vakia. The relationship between Czechs nist Czechoslovakia’s government was and Slovaks did not change much until most evident in the 1960 constitution 1968 when Czechoslovakia became a fed- (known as Socialist). The Slovak nation- eration and the asymmetric model was al authorities were deprived of their re- abandoned for the very frst time. maining symbolic competencies, and In fact, the federal model was the only their executive body, the Board of Com- “achievement” of the atempt to democ- missioners, was abolished. Another il- ratise the communist regime in Czecho- lustrative example of the political line slovakia’s 1968 Spring, which was trun- of the First Secretary of the Communist cated by the troops of fve Warsaw Pact

49 Ibidem, p. 454. 50 Constitutional Law nr. 150/1948 Col. 51 Constitutional Law nr. 100/1960 Col.

Ondrej Podolec: Milestones in the Development of the State Legal Status of Slovakia 127 states. This way, Czechoslovakia joined the Chamber of the Nations of the feder- the USSR and Yugoslavia as the third al parliament, i.e. the Federal Assembly), communist federation in Eastern Europe. only became relevant in the “standard” The new symmetrical model created two political struggle that followed the fall national republics (the Socialist Republic of the communist regime. of Slovakia and the Czech Socialist Re- The return of political pluralism fol- public) with their parliaments and gov- lowing the fall of the communist re- ernments, which were subordinated to gimes immediately opened the question the federal bodies (also parliament and of the rearrangement or continued exist- government).52 However, right at the be- ence of the multinational post-communist ginning of the so-called normalisation countries. The new key topic in domes- period, some centralising adjustments tic politics was national emancipation, were made to the original project. Moreo- a question the totalitarian regime, which ver, the real centre of power, i.e. the Com- did not allow freedom of speech, had just munist Party of Czechoslovakia, was “suppressed”. While the republics of for- not federalised. Instead, it continued to mer Yugoslavia did not constitute ethni- operate following the traditional asym- cally homogeneous units and, therefore, metric model in which the inhabitants the price for their independence was of the Slovak Socialist Republic were for- a vicious war, there were no relevant ter- mally members of the Communist Party ritorial disputes between the Czech and of Slovakia, which was, in turn, subordi- Slovak parts of the Czechoslovak Repub- nated to the “countrywide” Communist lic. Paradoxically, the Czech leadership, Party of Czechoslovakia. confronted with Slovakia’s unbreakable In a communist regime, the consti- constitutional veto, eventually became tutional bodies are nothing but exec- the driving force behind the peaceful utors of decisions made by the leader- and cultivated dissolution of the country ship of the ruling party. Therefore, their into two successor republics.53 At pres- mutual arrangement in the constitution ent, it is the general opinion in both re- has a merely symbolic character. Slova- publics that their mutual relations are kia’a constitutionally enshrined “veto” now beter than in the times they lived (a tool to avoid being outnumbered by in one common country.

52 Constitutional Law nr. 143/1968 Col. 53 For more information, see Rychlík, Jan: Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989 – 1992. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2002; Stein, Eric: Česko-Slovensko konfikt roztržka, rozpad. Praha: Academia, 2000; Gjuričová, Adéla – Zahradníček, Tomáš: Návrat parlamentu: Češi a Slováci ve Federálním shromáždění 1989 – 1992. Praha: Argo, 2018.

128 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Ana Holjevac Tuković* The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations and Peaceful Reintegration

Koniec chorvátskej občianskej vojny: Vojenské operácie a mierová reintegrácia / Završetak Domovinskog rata u Hrvatskoj: vojne operacije i mirna reintegracija

Nakon što je zaustavila srpsku i crnogorsku agresiju do kraja 1991., te postigla međunarodni legitimitet priznanjem država Europske zajednice 15. siječnja 1992. i primanjem u članstvo Ujedinjenih naroda 22. svibnja 1992., temeljni cilj hrvatske politike bio je ostvarivanje punog suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta u njenim međunarodno priznatim granicama. Do potpune realizacije toga cilja došlo je tek 15. siječnja 1998. godine, predajom uprave Hrvatskog Podunavlja iz nadležnosti UN-a (UNTAES – United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia) pod ingerenciju hrvatskih vlasti. Ključni događaj koji je inicirao politički okvir mirne reintegracije preostalog dijela Hrvatske (Hrvatsko Podunavlje), bila je vojno-redarstvena operacija „Oluja“ 1995. godine. Ključne riječi: Vojni redarstvene operacije Oluja, Bljesak, Hrvatsko Podunavlje, Erdutski sporazum, UNTAES.

n the multiparty elections (1990) after (whose entry into force was deferred by Ithe fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the Cro- three months so that the negotiations on ats, as well as the majority of European a peaceful setlement of the Yugoslav cri- peoples, said no to communism. In ac- sis could be resumed) and the Charter on cordance with the will of the citizens as the Rights of the Serbs and Other National- expressed in the 19 May 1991 referendum, ities in the Republic of Croatia.1 However, on 25 June the Croatian Parliament adopt- the Serbian leadership, after refusing to ed the Constitutional Decision on the Sov- recognize the democratically elected gov- ereign and Independent Republic of Croatia, ernment in Croatia and accept any reform the Declaration on the Establishment of a Sov- of Yugoslavia, pressed ahead with its ereign and Independent Republic of Croatia Greater Serbian plans. It frst organized

* Ana Holjevac Tuković, Croatian Homeland War Memorial and Documentation Centre, Zagreb (the Republic of Croatia). 1 Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia, Declaration on the Proclamation of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia, Charter of the Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities in the Republic of Croatia, see – Narodne novine, a. 1991, nr. 31, 25 June 1991. See also Domovinski rat – pregled političke i diplomatske povijesti. Ed.: Ante Nazor – Tomislav Pušek. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus – Hrvatski memorijalno dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata. 2018, pp. 93 – 95.

Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations 129 a rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia, which after the international recognition of Bos- was followed by the merciless aggres- nia and Herzegovina in April 1992 (Cro- sion of the federal army („Yugoslav Peo- atia immediately recognized Bosnia and ple’s Army”) and Serb and Montenegrin Herzegovina as an independent and troops which by the end of 1991 result- sovereign state), the Serbs, with the help ed in the occupation of almost one third of the Yugoslav People’s Army, launched of Croatia, which at the start of the aggres- a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. sion was disarmed (as ordered by the then During 1992, 1993 and 1994, the Gov- state government) and practically without ernment of the Republic of Croatia tried its own army. In the occupied territories mostly by peaceful means and with the Serbs commited numerous crimes the help of European and international against Croats, with almost all non-Serbs diplomacy and the newly-arrived UN being expelled.2 Peace Forces to restore the occupied parts Despite the forecasts of military an- of its territory.4 At the same time, due to alysts that were based on the aggre- the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cro- ssor’s unrivalled supremacy both in atia also had to both provide for the de- terms of weaponry and technology, Cro- fence of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina atia was not conquered. Croatian defend- and prevent Serb troops from threaten- ers succeeded in stopping the advance ing the territorial integrity of the Repub- of aggressors on all Croatian fronts and lic of Croatia from their positions in Bos- towards the end of the year the frst ma- nia and Herzegovina. As a consequence jor liberation operations were carried of the Serb aggression against Bosnia out in Western Slavonia. This resulted and Herzegovina and the breaking out in the conclusion of a peace treaty in Sa- of the Croatian-Muslim war in Bosnia rajevo (2 January 1992) which temporar- and Herzegovina, more than 400,000 ily suspended largescale military opera- Croats were forced to leave their home- tions in Croatia.3 land. By mid-October 1994, and therefore Croatia achieved its international af- also during the Croatian-Muslim war frmation by the member states of the Eu- in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than ropean Community on 15 January 1992. 600,000 refugees and displaced persons Then, on 22 May 1992, Croatia, togeth- from Bosnia and Herzegovina were giv- er with the former Yugoslav republics en refuge in Croatia (around 425,000 Bos- of Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, niak Muslims, around 170,000 Croats and became a member of the UN. However, around 5,000 others).5

2 Živic, Dražen: The Demographic Framework and Losses: The Creation of the Croatian State and the Homeland War. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest. Školska knjiga, 2006, p. 470; Branđolica, Renato: Witness of time. In: Domovinski rat: Ana, Holjevac Tuković - Petar Mijić (eds.). Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata. 2019, pp. 11 – 12. 3 Nazor, Ante: Greater-Serbian Aggression on Croatia in the 90’s. Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno­ dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2011, pp. 105 – 106. 4 Holjevac Tuković, Ana: The Croatian East through the Operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Homeland War. In: Croatian East in the Homeland War – Experiences, Cognition and Consequences: Proceedings of the Ivo Pilar Institute, Book 48. Zagreb: Institut Ivo Pilar, 2015, pp. 121 – 141. 5 Report of the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the progress of return and care of and exiles, refugees and displaced persons so far. In: Narodne novine, a. 1998, nr. 92 / 1248, 7 July 1998.

130 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives The existence of the occupied area, defeat the Serb forces and liberate the oc- ie the self-proclaimed “Republika Srps- cupied area of western Slavonia, reach ka Krajina” in the heart of the Croatian the Sava River and establish a defensive state, was a serious obstacle to the polit- line along the river. The operation started ical and economic development of Cro- on May 1, 1995. It took the Croatian forc- atia. On the eve of the liberation oper- es only a day to soundly defeat the Serb ations of the Croatian forces Flash and forces. Some Serb troops managed to re- Storm in Croatia were registered 210,592 treat across the Sava River to Bosnia and displaced persons (83,683 displaced per- Herzegovina. The encircled Serb forces sons from the Croatian Podunavlje and near Pakrac surrendered on May 4. With 126,909 displaced persons from the oc- Operation Flash the Croatian Army liber- cupied territories about to be released ated western Slavonia – UN Sector West in the above mentioned operations) (about 600 km2) and accomplished all and 188,672 refugees from Bosnia and the objectives. In only two days, on 1 and Herzegovina and FRY, which means 2 May – the resistance of Serbian units that the Republic of Croatia then cared was crushed, and Okucani, Jasenovac for a total of 399,264 displaced persons and Stara Gradiška liberated. The rem- and refugees.6 nants of defeated 18th Corps of the “Serbi- In early 1995 the leadership of the in- an Army of Krajina” surrendered at Pa- surgent Serbs turned down another pro- krac in the afternoon hours on 4 May. posal of the international community Organized resistance of the special forc- – the so­called Z-4 Plan on the political es of the insurgent Serbs ceased the next resolution of the crisis in Croatia. The plan morning at 06.00 hours at Omanovac. envisioned an exceptionally wide-rang- Croatian casualties included killed and ing autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia, 162 wounded. The Serb losses are esti- almost a “state within a state”, in the ar- mated at 350 – 459 killed and more than eas of the districts of Knin and Glina, 1,000 wounded.7 which would comprise all the munici- In retaliation, the Serbian leadership palities with a majority Serbian popula- ordered the rocketing of Croatian towns. tion. With their refusal the Serbian pol- One of the cities atacked was Zagreb, iticians clearly showed that they would the Croatian capital: the Children’s Hos- not under any condition accept peaceful pital, the Academy of Dramatic Arts reintegration into the constitutional sys- and a secondary school were among tem of the Republic of Croatia, or coex- the many buildings hit; seven civilians istence with the Croats. Since all later at- were killed and at least 176 wounded. tempts of the Croatian government and During and after Flash Croatian author- the international community to deal with ities ensured humane treatment and all the issue of occupied territory also failed, civil rights to the Serbian population, and in early May 1995 Croatia launched an- members of Serbian units were guaranteed other liberation military&police action protection under the Amnesty Act. In spite Flash. The aim of Operation Flash was to of that, the majority of the Serbian population

6 Ibidem. 7 Marijan, Davor: Homeland war. Zagreb: Despot infnitus – Hrvatski institut za povijest. 2016. pp. 330 – 335.

Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations 131 in the occupied part of Western Slavonia immediate solution for the problem of left the area on the eve of and during Op- occupied Croatian territory but also for eration Flash. Under the great pressure the Bihac crisis. of the Serbian leadership and faced with Operation Storm, by which the self-pro- the threat of the resumed shelling of Za- claimed „RSK“ was completed, took place greb the UN organized the Safe Passage in a broader context than Operation Flash, operation in which most of the remain- that is, it was closely related to operations ing Serbian population left Western that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovi- Slavonia.8 During the entire occupation na. The President of the Republic of Cro- of a part of the Croatian territory, and of- atia Franjo Tuđman and the President fcially since the beginning of 1993, there of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herze- was a constant threat of artillery atacks, govina Alija Izetbegović, signed the Dec- and in fact actual terrorist atacks, by laration on the renewal of the Washington the Serbian units from the occupied are- Agreement, joint defence from the Serbian ag- as to the cities and towns in the free Cro- gression and realization of a political solution atian territory (the so-called „real threat with the aid of the international community. strategy”), which rebel Serbs in Croatia The immediate aim of this agreement intended to use to force the Croats to was to enable the Croatian forces to le- give up the liberation of the occupied ter- gitimately participate in the unblock- ritory. Accordingly, in response to Flash ing of the besieged and atacked Bihac, Operation, the Serbian forces atacked in which the BiH Army had a hard time Sisak and Karlovac along with Zagreb.9 resisting the atacks of the Republika Srp- After their defeat in Flash, the Serbian ska Army and the Serbian Krajina Army. leadership tried to unite the remaining Based on the agreement reached by occupied territory of Croatia with parts Tuđman and Izetbegović in Split on July of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serbi- 22, 1995, the Croatian forces mounted an control. The process climaxed in July an operation for helping Bihać by advanc- 1995 with the drafting of the Constitution ing in the direction of Livno – Bosansko of the United Serbian Republic.10At the same Grahovo and in the direction of Livno – time, Serbian forces were about to enter Glamoč. In doing so, they stop the enemy Bihać (a town in Bosnia and Herzegovi- ofensive against Bihać and create condi- na close to the border with the Republic tions for the liberation of Knin and other of Croatia). The conquest of Bihac would areas under Serb occupation in Dalmatia have been a strategically important vic- and Lika. Operation Summer-95 started tory for the Serbs, and it would have pro- on July 25, 1995, and ended by the end voked a new humanitarian disaster and of the month. All the objectives were a huge loss of civilian life in the area. achieved.11 Because of all this, military action nec- On the political scene, the last atempt essarily turned out to be the only and for a peaceful solution of the problem

8 Nazor, Ante: Greater-Serbian Aggression on Croatia in the 90’s., pp. 167 – 168. 9 Sisak and Karlovac on strike again. In: Večernji list, 02 May 1995. pp. 5. 10 Decision of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska Krajina on Accession to the Implementation of the Unifcation of the RSK and the Republika Srpska. In: Službeni glasnik RSK, a. 1995, nr. 5, p 135. 11 Marijan, Davor: Homeland war, pp. 345 – 346.

132 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives – the occupation of part of Croatian terri- all the possibilities for a peaceful solution tory – was made on 3 August in Genthod of the occupied territory of the Croatian near Geneva at the meeting of the rep- state and all the possibilities for a peace- resentatives of the Croatian government fulsolution of the occupied territory and of the insurgent Serbs from Knin. of the Croatian state.12 The requests of the Croatian delegation The fnal military police operation were almost identical to the requests for the liberation of the occupied areas, made in the peace initiative of Presi- called Storm, was launched by Croatia dent Franjo Tuđman in November 1993: between 4 and 7, that is until 10 August immediate peaceful reintegration of oc- 1995. In the frst hour of Storm the Pres- cupied areas; immediate opening of all ident of the Republic of Croatia Franjo communications across the occupied ar- Tuđman called on members of hostile eas, in particular the opening of the Za- units to surrender their weapons guar- greb­Split rail route via Knin; the open- anteeing amnesty to all those who had ing of the oil pipeline within 24 hours not perpetrated war crimes under Cro- of the completion of the negotiations, atian laws, and citizens of Serbian na- under control of the Croatian authorities tionality in the formerly occupied are- along the entire pipeline route; immedi- as were invited to remain at home and ate enforcement, in the occupied areas, await Croatian authorities without any of the Constitution of the Republic of Cro- fear.13 The Croatian Army and special atia and of the provisions of the Consti- police units atacked on 4 August at 04.00 tutional Act on the rights of the Serbian hours along a front line long more than ethnic community to which the Croatian 630 kilometres, from Bosansko Graho- government guarantees political, civil vo in the south to Jasenovac in the east. and ethnic rights; surrender of weap- Croatian forces in Eastern Slavonia and ons to Croatian authorities, witnessed southern Dalmatia were put on alert by UNCRO, within 3 to 8 days, with because of possible atacks by the Yugo- the guarantee of civil safety and general slav Army and the Army of Republika amnesty to all persons other than perpe- Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina. trators of war crimes. The insurgent Serbs The greatest success during the opera- of Croatia were also ofered the holding tion was achieved in the morning hours of free elections for local selfgovernment, on 5 August, when the 4th and 7th Croa- and participation in civil and police au- tian guards brigades (whose members thorities in line with the ethnic compo- originated from Dalmatia, Bosnia and sition of the population as of 1991, and Herzegovina, Zagorje and other areas) the implementation of the other provi- liberated Knin. Over the next few days sions of the Constitutional Act. However, the Croatian forces reached and secured the leadership of the insurgent Serbs the state borders, and then started to clear turn down the proposals and draw out the liberated areas of northern Dalmatia, the negotiation process. This exhausted Lika, Banovina and Kordun (about 10,500

12 Nazor, Ante: Greater-Serbian Aggression on Croatia in the 90’s., pp. 168 – 169. 13 Marijan, Davor: Storm. Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2007, pp. 138 – 140.

Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations 133 sq.km. or 18.4% of the total area of the Re- the Erdut Agreement was agreed which public of Croatia).14 At the same time, started the process of peaceful reintegra- during these operations the majority tion of the remaining occupied territory of the Serb population, who lived there of the Republic of Croatia (Croatian Dan- during the four-year occupation, left that ube Region). area (according to data from the 1998 The issue of reintegration of occu- Government Report, about 130,000).15 pied areas under the care of the United Following Operation Storm and pursu- Nations into Croatia proper was given ant to the agreement between President new meaning during key political ne- of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman gotiations in the end of 1995. Despite and President of the Presidency of Bos- the readiness of the Croatian army nia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic and a strong pressure by the Croatian signed in Split (the Split Declaration of 22 public to return the occupied parts July 1995), the Croatian forces continued of the Croatian Danube region and Vu- fghting against the Serb forces in the ter- kovar, the symbol of defence and sufer- ritory of the neighbouring Bosnia and ing of Croatia during the Homeland war, Herzegovina. With their victorious oper- through a military action, the leadership ations (Maestral in September and South- of the Republic of Croatia decided to ne- ern Move in October 1995) the Croatian gotiate with the insurgent Serbs i.e. oc- forces, in coordination with the Army cupational authorities. Thanks to the ne- of Bosnia and Herzegovina, liberated gotiations of the Croatian government a signifcant part of the occupied territo- and the Serbian occupational forces and ries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dealt the efort to peacefully resolve the prob- a deadly blow to the Serb army. In such lem of the remaining occupied territory, circumstances, the international commu- it became possible to reach an agreement nity forced the warring parties to reach regarding a peaceful and gradual tran- an agreement in Dayton, USA, in No- sition of that area under Croatian au- vember 1995 (the Dayton Agreement).16 thority. Croatian government and Serb In conclusion, it could be said that leadership signed the Basic agreement re- the military-police Operation Storm garding Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West- was a key event that changed the bal- ern Srijem (the Erdut Agreement) on No- ance of power and created a new geopo- vember 12, 1995, in Erdut and in Zagreb. litical reality. The defeat of Serb forces The agreement enabled the establish- in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina ment of stability in that area, previously paved the way for political negotiations destroyed by wartime actions, human and the achievement of the Dayton Peace sufering, migrations and general social Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and economic regression. Aside from which was signed in Paris in December the peace brokers, the Agreement was 1995. With this agreement, the war in BiH signed by Hrvoje Šarinić, the represent- ceased, and during the Dayton Agreement, ative of the Government of Croatia and

14 Nazor, Ante: Greater-Serbian Aggression on Croatia in the 90’s., p. 172. 15 Report of the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the progress of return and care of and exiles, refugees and displaced persons so far. In: Narodne novine, a. 1998, nr. 92 / 1248 (7 July 1998). 16 Marijan, Davor: Homeland war, p. 383 – 386.

134 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Milan Milanović, for the Serbian side. Paul Klein. The resolution ensured and The Agreement envisioned a transition afrmed the reintegration of the occu- period of one to two years during which pied area into Croatia by conducting it the Croatian Danube region would be in an agreed upon time period.18 placed under the administrative super- The execution of peace accords from vision of the UN. This made the peace- the Agreement included the disarma- ful reintegration possible, as well as ment of Serbian forces, demilitarization the establishment of peace and the return of the Croatian Danube region, organ- of Croatian sovereignty in the Croatian izing free and just local elections and state territory with no need for further the return of the Croatian Danube region military operations and, most important- into the constitutional and legal system ly, with no new casualties. In the course of the Republic of Croatia. The goals of the two-year process of peaceful rein- of the mission were maintaining mul- tegration, the participants of the process ti-ethnic and multicultural character faced a series of problems and issues that of that area and respect for the highest manifested themselves through the con- standards of human rights and basic sequences of war time destruction as well freedoms. It was necessary to promote as the necessity of acceptance of the fact the climate of trust and allow all refugees of the breakdown of a political ideolo- and displaced persons to return to their gy that spoke in favour of the idea of all homes freely. The successful execution Serbs living in a single country. Regard- of the process of peaceful reintegration less, the mission was successful thanks included the reintegration of social and to the well thought-out diplomatic moves economic structures, particularly of ed- of the Croatian government in various ucation, health, trafc, communication world institutions such as the United Na- and municipal infrastructure. For that tions and the European Union, as well as purpose, it was necessary to promote the cooperation in the feld of the Croa- the development and reconstruction tian authorities, part of the Serb com- of the area. Therefore, Croatia invested munity and the transitional Authority US$ 1.7 billion from its budget and pub- of the United Nations.17 lic companies into Croatian Danube area The realization of the peace accord be- during the process of peaceful reintegra- gun with the acceptance of the Resolution tion. Only 2 percent of the money was 1037 of the UN Security Council on Jan- donated by the international communi- uary 15, 1996. The resolution introduced ty, i.e. US$ 34 million.19 This means that the Transitional Authority of the United Croatia was the one that has borne al- Nations (UNTAES – United Nations Tran- most all the consequences of the aggres- sitional Authority to Eastern Slavonia), sion of the Yugoslav people’s army and headed by the American general Jacques the Serbian forces.

17 Holjevac Tuković, Ana: The Process of Peaceful Reintegration of the Croatian Danube Region. Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata – Despot infnitus, 2015, pp. 79 – 87. 18 Ibidem. 19 Government of the Republic of Croatia, 6.7.2.4, Report of the Republic of Croatia on the Implementation of the leter from the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the completion of the peaceful reintegration process (September 22, 1997).

Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations 135 The basic prerequisite for the success- the stability of the UNTAES-adminis- ful completion of the process of peaceful tered areas. When compared to the other reintegration was focused on the demili- programs that took place in the imme- tarisation of the Croatian Danube region. diate vicinity (Bosnia and Herzegovina, When the UNTAES forces arrived to Macedonia, Kosovo), only the Weapons the area of Eastern Slavonia and Western Buy-Back Program in Croatia included Srijem, the 11th corps of the army of Ser- money compensation for people who bian Krajina consisting of some 15000 to brought the weapons they owned. 20000 soldiers was there and new forc- The Government of the Republic of Croa- es were expected, particularly forces tia paid about 1.6 million USD for the im- of the local militia (around 1500 people) plementation of this program.21 and paramilitary forces (Arkan’s tigers, One of the main prerequisites for Scorpios, Vipers) consisting of some 2000 the return of refugees was demining. personnel. The demilitarization was Since the demining process begun in July completed with no incidents in the pre- 1996 and lasted until September 1997, viously agreed upon time and includ- 8 364 183 square kilometres of the Cro- ed around 15000 Serbian soldiers, 118 atian Danube region were classifed as tanks, 19 armoured vehicles, more than demined out of the total of 760 million 150 pieces of artillery weapons and 40 square kilometre of the territory that had to 50 anti-aircraft systems. In the course to be demined in the Republic of Croatia. of a full month, which is how long the de- The total of 3653 objects were checked militarization lasted, some 90% of heavy for mines and debris was removed from weaponry were withdrawn (the majority 170 273 cubic kilometres, 6000 diferent of 100 tanks was taken to Socialist Re- mines and explosive devices were found public of Yugoslavia). 20 and destroyed. The process of demining In addition to the aforementioned in the Croatian Danube region that last- demilitarization process, UNTAES or- ed from July 1996 until June 1997 cost ganized the so-called Weapons Buy- 81.506,673 kn.22 Back Program – a very successful op- According to the provision regarding eration during which the Croatian the conduct of the peacekeeping mis- government bought weapons and oth- sion under the administrative supervi- er military equipment from civilians. sion of the UN, a multinational police In this way, 9,700 rifes, 6,375 anti­tank force was supposed to be established on weapons, about 15,000 hand grenades the territory of the Croatian Danube re- and 2 million rounds of ammunition gion. In April 1996 the frst group of po- were collected. The Weapons Buy-Back lice ofcers left for Budapest where they Program was rated as very success- were supposed to be trained as a mul- ful by the UN and, together with other ti­ethnic force. This was also the frst aspects of the peace process, enabled atempt to conduct a programme which

20 Holjevac Tuković, Ana: The Process of Peaceful Reintegration, p. 93. 21 Boothby, Derek: The UNTAES Experience: Weapons Buy­backin Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Croatia, Bonn: Internacional center for conversion. In: Brief, a. 12, 1998, pp. 16 – 22. 22 Government of the Republic of Croatia, 6.7.2.4, Report of the Republic of Croatia on the Implementation of the leter from the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the completion of the peaceful reintegration process (September 22, 1997).

136 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives included both Croatians and Serbs. signing the Agreement of normaliza- The training in Budapest was supposed tion of relationships, Serbia recognized to prepare them for joint work as well as the international borders of Croatia and, work in ethnically divided areas.23 in a way, publicly denounced its terri- On December 15, 1997 the Minis- torial claims on Croatia.26 It can be said try of Internal Afairs of the Repub- that this was also a strong message to lic of Croatia took command of 1715 the Serbs in the Croatian Danube Region members of transitional police forces to turn to Zagreb and accept geopolitical (829 Croats, 834 Serbs and 52 members realities. Serbian leadership and church of other national minorities). By includ- representatives of the Serbian orthodox ing the transitional police forces into church clearly advised the Serbian in- the Croatian Ministry of Internal Afairs, habitants of the Croatian Danube region the process of reconstruction of police to remain living in that area. Although forces in the Croatian Danube region there were cases of people deciding to was completed. The numeric conditions emigrate to Serbia, a large part of the Ser- of the national composition of the po- bian population of that area listened to lice force were met and that constituted that advice. the guarantor of safety for all citizens One of key moments in the return of that area. Regardless of that, following of the legitimate Croatian authority to the request of the Croatian government, the Croatian Danube region were local the UN civil police forces remained ac- elections to municipal and city councils tive for nine additional months after as well as the councils of Osijek­Baranja the departure of the UNTAES, which and Vukovar­Srijem counties. The condi- was confrmed by the Resolution 1145, tion for voting in the elections and real- that provided additional security to izing other rights on Croatian territory the inhabitants of that area.24 was the acceptance of Croatian docu- The peaceful reintegration of the Cro- ments. Regardless of terrible crimes that atian Danube region infuenced the be- had happened in its territory, Croatia ginning of the normalization of intergov- was sometimes forced into painful com- ernmental relationship between Croatia promises in order for the reintegration and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia process to end successfully. One of them (FRY) on a regional level as well as the be- was the Amnesty Law that granted amnes- ginning of normalization of the Croa- ty to the participants of armed uprising tian-Serbian relationships in the Republic and protected them from criminal prose- of Croatia. The Agreement of the nor- cution in the Republic of Croatia. malization of relationships between Cro- Until August 31, 1997, 154,443 cer- atia and the FRY was signed on August tifcates of nationality were issued. 23, 1996, based on mutual recognition The number of Serbs who received cer- and respect of territorial integrity.25 By tifcates of nationality was signifcantly

23 Holjevac Tuković, Ana: The Process of Peaceful Reintegration, p. 105. 24 Ibidem, p. 110. 25 Agreement on normalization of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In: Narodne novine. International Treaties, a. 1996, nr. 10, September 24, 1996. 26 Nobilo, Mario. Croatian Phoenix: Diplomatic processes behind closed doors 1990 – 1997. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000, pp. 518 – 519.

Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations 137 higher than the pre-war number Stanimirović. The commitee for Vukovar of them in the Croatian Danube region was founded on November 3, 1997.29 (1991: 70,000) and was higher than their The peaceful integration of the Cro- number before the arrival of UNTAES atian Danube region infuenced the be- (1996: 120,000). According to the report ginning of normalization of intergovern- of the Government of the Republic of Cro- mental relationships between Croatia atia “as many as 50,000 people, previously and FR of Yugoslavia regionally, as well related to the riot, then displaced in the region, as the beginning of the normalization received Croatian documents, and 34,443 of relationships between Serbs and Cro- people now living in other countries in the re- ats in the Republic of Croatia. The is- gion” also received Croatian documents, sue of return of refugees and displaced i.e. certifcates of nationality.27 persons was one of the main points The elections were held on April 13, of the Basic Agreement and a prereq- 1997 and the political system that was uisite for the successful completion established was identical to the one ex- of the process of peaceful reintegration. isting in other parts of the Croatian ter- In accordance with the assumed respon- ritory. By participating in the elections, sibilities, Croatia guaranteed to respect the members of the Serbian minority minority and human rights in the spir- were given the opportunity to elect their it of European standards. A common legitimate representatives to the bodies task-force in charge of the return of ref- of local government and self-govern- ugees and displaced persons consisting ment. After the elections, Serbian popu- of representatives of the Government lation took an active part in the political of the Republic of Croatia, UNTAES and life of Croatia and has been participating UNHCR-a (United Nations High Com- in its executive government. The same missioner for Refugees), upon reaching was allowed Serbian ofcials from the agreement on April 24, 1997, signed the time of the Republic of Serbian Kraji- the Agreement of the work group regarding na by the Law of Amnesty.28 operational procedure of return.30 The Agree- To conclude the process of peaceful ment defnes the basic principles of return reintegration successfully, the Croatian to the Croatian Danube region and from President dr. Franjo Tuđman founded the Croatian Danube region to other parts the National commitee for the reestab- of the Republic of Croatia. According to lishment of trust, speedy return and the data from the Ofce for refugees and normalization of life in war-torn areas displaced persons of the Government of Croatia in October 1997. The Commit- of the Republic of Croatia from 1998, tee chair was Vesna Škare Ožbolt, and her 13500 people of Serbian nationality re- deputies were Ivica Vrkić and dr. Vojislav turned from the Croatian Danube region

27 Government of the Republic of Croatia, 6.7.2.4, Report of the Republic of Croatia on the Implementation of the leter from the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the completion of the peaceful reintegration process (September 22, 1997). 28 General forgiveness act of 20 September 1996. In: Narodne novine, a. 1996, nr. 80. 29 Holjevac Tuković, Ana: The Process of Peaceful Reintegration, p. 259. 30 Croatian National Archives, Zagreb: Croatian ofce for the EC Monitoring Mission, Working group agreement on operational return procedures, April 1997, scatula 36.

138 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives to other parts of Croatia and 18700 peo- liberated the occupied territory in west- ple of Serbian nationality returned from ern Slavonia and in Dalmatia, Lika, Kor- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and dun and Banovina by Operation Flash and Republic of Srpska to the Republic of Cro- Storm. After the defeat of the rebellious atia.31 The UN Security Council fully Serbian forces in the course of the mili- supported the conclusion of the UNTAES tary – police operations the only remain- mission to Croatia by Resolution 1145, ing part of the Croatian territory still dated December 19, 1997. Despite prob- held by the rebellious Serbs was the one lems and issues that followed the peace- located in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and ful integration and had become a part the Western Syrmia. The Croatian polit- of the heritage of that area (and still are, ical leaders decided to restore occupied even today), the peaceful reintegration parts peacefully, starting the negotiations was conducted with no new casualties with the Serb representatives from Dan- or material damage, proving that Croatia ube Region. The process of peaceful rein- is fully devoted to the ideas of peace, de- tegration ended on January 15, 1998 when mocracy and coexistence.32 the Republic of Croatia established full In conclusion, the key event that initi- control over its territory within its inter- ated the political framework for the peace- nationally recognized borders. Based on ful reintegration of the rest of Croatia various experiences regarding the run- (the Danube Region of Croatia) was ning of the process of peaceful reintegra- the 1995 military-police operation Storm. tion, the UNTAES mission is considered After a series of negotiations, the crisis to be one of the most successful missions created by the rebellion and war in Croa- of the UN in the world and Republic tia was resolved by the fnal military op- of Croatia one of the few countries that, erations that followed in 1995. In May and following military operations, managed August 1995, the Croatian Armed Forces to end the war peacefully.

31 Report of the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the progress of return and care of and exiles, refugees and displaced persons so far. In: Narodne novine, a. 1998, nr. 92 / 1248 (7 July 1998). 32 Holjevac Tuković, Ana: The Process of Peaceful Reintegration, p. 265.

Ana Holjevac Tuković: The End of the Croatian Homeland War: Military Operations 139 Tomáš Černák* Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s in Croatia and Slovakia

Politická situácia a prejavy násilia na futbalových štadiónoch na začiatku 90. rokov v Chorvátsku a na Slovensku / Politička situacija i nasilje na nogometnim stadionima ranih 1990­ih u Hrvatskoj i Slovačkoj

Predkladaná štúdia sa snaží priblížiť, ako sa turbulentná politická situácia a zložité národnostné vzťahy pretransformovali do správania sa spoločnosti na verejných podujatiach. Keďže emócie a skutočné názory i vnútorné pocity ľudí sa najčastejšie naplno prejavia počas vypätých situácií, štúdia približuje násilné udalosti počas vypätých futbalových zápasov. Práve prejavy diváckeho násilia na štadiónoch boli neraz spôsobené, resp. do veľkej miery podnietené, komplikovanou vnútropolitickou či medzinárodnopolitickou situáciou. Navyše, futbal bol a je, tak v Chorvátsku, ako aj na Slovensku, najpopulárnejším a najviac navštevovaným športom. Z tohto dôvodu štúdia približuje všetky tieto faktory na príklade nikdy neodohraného futbalového zápasu medzi Dinamom Záhreb a Červenou hviezdou Belehrad z 13. mája 1990 (teda chorvátsko – srbský konfikt) a porovnáva ho so situáciou na Slovensku počas zápasov Slovana Bratislava so Spartou Praha a Ferencvárosom Budapešť z rokov 1991 – 1992. Pretože, paradoxne, medzi obyvateľmi rozpadajúceho sa Česko-Slovenska boli oveľa horšie vzťahy medzi Slovákmi a maďarskou národnostnou menšinou, než medzi Slovákmi a Čechmi. Začiatok 90. rokov bol na území bývalej Juhoslávie, ako aj v bývalom Česko-Slovensku, veľmi komplikovaný. Prejavovalo sa to najmä v národnostných vzťahoch. V krajinách bývalej Juhoslávie vyústil tento stav až do krvavej občianskej vojny, kým v česko-slovenskom prípade do relatívne pokojného rozdelenia štátu. Key words: Football, Violence, Ethnic Relations, Football Fans, Yugoslavia

his article describes the turbulent manifestations of violence at stadiums Tpolitical situation and the tense rela- have often resulted from or been fuelled tions among diferent nationalities, and by an intricate domestic or international how they afected people’s behaviour political situation. Moreover, football is at public events. For this purpose I have the most popular and most visited sport chosen a sport, namely football, as it is both in Croatia and Slovakia. Therefore, in tense situations that people show their I would like to present all these factors purest emotions and opinions. In fact, on the example of the football match

* Tomáš Černák, Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Arts, Department of Slovak History (Slovak Republic).

140 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star law was passed allowing free elections.1 Belgrade that was supposed to take place On 28 February 1990, the inaugural on May 13, 1990 but was never played convention of the Croatian Democratic (the confict between Croats and Serbs), Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajed- and compare it with the situation in Slo- nica) was chaired by a former gener- vakia at the matches Slovan Bratislava al of the People’s Army of Yugoslavia, played against Sparta Prague and Fer- political prisoner and historian Franjo encváros Budapest in 1991 – 1992. Par- Tudjman. As a mater of fact, this par- adoxically, crumbling Czechoslovakia ty became the strongest political force saw more edginess between the Slovak in Croatia. At that time the ofcial name and Hungarian populations than be- of the country was still Socialist Repub- tween Slovaks and Czechs. lic of Croatia (Socijalistička Republika The early 1990s was a very trouble- Hrvatska – SRH), and it was still one some period for both former Yugosla- of the republics forming the Socialist via and former Czechoslovakia. This Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijal- showed best in the agitated relations istička Federativna Republika Jugoslavi- among the diferent nationalities. While ja – SFRY). in the countries of former Yugoslavia In its program and at pre-election this situation led to a vicious civil war, assemblies, Tudjman’s party empha- in the case of Czechs and Slovaks it re- sised the national demands of the Cro- sulted in the relatively peaceful split atian people. These gradually evolved of their country. Perhaps the frst ma- into expressions of radical nationalism jor manifestation of growing animosity and anti-communism. Party represent- among the diferent nationalities in for- atives would not restrain from display- mer Yugoslavia were the riots at Mak- ing anti-Serbian animosity either. As simir Stadium in Zagreb before the Dina- for the form of the country, the Croatian mo Zagreb vs. Red Star Belgrade football Democratic Union initially proposed match on May 13, 1990. This happened a confederation. As historian Jan Rychlík in the middle of increasing friction be- put it, the term confederation was intend- tween Serbs and Croats, which eventual- ed to make the program of the Croatian ly resulted in a war. Democratic Union more acceptable to This period also saw a lot of funda- pro-Yugoslavia oriented Croats who did mental political changes. The Croatian not want the country to break up com- constitution had been amended as early pletely.2 However, total independence as January 11, 1990, which would make ambitions became increasingly popular it possible for non-communist political and were accompanied by growing rad- parties to appear and free elections to ical nationalism. Consequently, those take place. Indeed, new political par- Serbs who lived in Croatia and wished to ties were created and a new electoral remain in Yugoslavia began to object to

1 For more on the development in Croatia at the beginning of the 90s see: Rychlík, Jan – Perenćević, Milan: Dějiny Chorvatska. Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2007, pp. 357 – 376 or Mosković, Boris: Mezi Titem and Tudjmanem: Chorvatsko v letech 1989 – 1990. Prague: Faculty of Arts at Charles University 2017, pp. 221 – 263. 2 Rychlík, Jan – Perenćević, Milan: Dějiny Chorvatska, p. 361.

Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s 141 this policy and the frst Serbian political – which has a symbolic character for Cro- parties were formed. ats – the crowds chanted slogans such as The Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska “We do not want division”, “This is Serbia” demokratska stranka – SDS), established or “Death to Tudjman”. 5 in February 1990, became the strong- Most Croats took this demonstration est and most infuential Serbian party as a provocation, and the already dete- in Croatia. Psychiatrist Jovan Rašković riorating relations between the two na- from Knin became its leader and from tions got even worse. Animosity grew the very beginning the party followed on both sides as the day of the elections the spirit of Rašković’s ideas.3 In fact, draw nearer. Elections were scheduled the city of Knin had become a kind of po- for April 22-23, 1990 with a second round litical centre of the Serbs living in Croa- on May 7. The frst round clearly showed tia. This was no surprise, as up to 88% that the Croatian Democratic Union of the Serbian population in Croatia lived was going to win a landslide victory. in the Knin County. It is necessary to Only fve representatives of the Serbian mention that Serbs accounted for about Democratic Party made it to the Cro- 12% of the total population of Croatia.4 atian sabor (parliament), too few giv- There were also Serbs living in the larg- en the Serbian population in Croatia. est Croatian cities such as Split, Rijeka, After the vote, Jovan Rašković issued Osijek and, of course, Zagreb. a relatively moderate statement asking Animosity between Croats and the Serbian population to remain calm. Serbs had been increasing sharply from He even acknowledged that no one could the early 1990s, literally from month to deny the Croatian people the right to month. This was fuelled mainly by an- their own country, and suggested that ti-Serbian statements made by represent- the Serbian population should work side atives of the Croatian Democratic Un- by side with the Croatian people to build ion. Among other things, these leaders up a common country.6 There was also refused to grant the Serbian population a meeting between Rašković and Tud- the status of second state-building nation jman, which at frst glance seemed to in the new constitution. Serbian Dem- have had a positive outcome. However, ocratic Party politicians, in turn, began Tudjman and his followers did practi- to make use of Greater Serbia rhetoric, cally nothing to ease the tension among bringing up the genocide against Serbs the Serbs.7 A short spell of tranquility promoted by the Croatian Revolutionary between Serbs and Croats lasted for just Movement, known as Ustasha, during a few days before the animosity – which WWII. Many of them claimed that noth- had not disappeared – showed again ing good could await Serbs in an inde- fuelled, among other things, by the foot- pendent Croatia. At a great rally of Serbs ball match between Dinamo Zagreb and held on March 4, 1990 at Petrova Gora Red Star Belgrade.

3 Mosković, Boris: Mezi Titem a Tudjmanem, p. 247. 4 Rychlík, Jan – Perenćević, Milan: Dějiny Chorvatska, p. 367. 5 Ibidem, pp. 362 – 363. 6 Mosković, Boris: Mezi Titem a Tudjmanem, p. 259. 7 Pirjevec, Jože: Jugoslávie 1918 – 1992: Vznik, vývoj a rozpad Karadjordjevićovy a Titovy Jugoslávie. Prague: Argo, 2000, p. 469.

142 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives This was the heated socio-political at- beter known as “Arkan”. He was to en- mosphere in which the risky match was sure the safety of the Belgrade group to take place.8 Dinamo Zagreb and Red and did not join the other Red Star fans Star Belgrade were the most successful in the stands. Serbian fans arrived in Za- and popular clubs in their respective greb not only from Belgrade, but from countries, Red Star being perceived al- virtually all areas of Yugoslavia where most as a national symbol of Serbia. Serbs lived. Trains heading to Zagreb Both clubs had a huge fan base outside from Belgrade gradually flled up with Croatia and Serbia, so a very tense and fans from Syrmia, Slavonia, as well as risky match was to be expected. The Di- from Knin and surrounding areas. Ser- namo Zagreb fan base has a very active bian fans headed for Zagreb not only by group called Bad Blue Boys, while the Red train, by also bus or hitchhiking. Star Belgrade fan base has the Delije or The situation on the other side was “Brave studs”. Later on, members of both not any diferent. Croatian fans focked groups would join diferent paramilitary to support Dinamo from other towns units fghting in the war. and villages, not only Zagreb. Paradox- Supporters of both clubs prepared ically, the Torcida fan group of Hajduk for this match very intensively, exac- Split, the biggest rival of Dinamo Zagreb erbated by the tense political situation within Croatia, also went to support in Croatia and the strained Croatian-Ser- Dinamo at Maksimir Stadium. In other bian relations. It was not just fans root- words, in the Dinamo – Red Star match ing for their favourite club, as it would people saw a duel between Croats and be the case at other matches. It was Serbs. For both parties the recent elec- more than that. In spite of the fact that tions in Croatia and following develop- the championship title was already clear ment were still vivid and sore. – as Red Star was leading the standings The clashes between Serbian and Cro- with 47 points, followed by Dinamo with atian fans broke out right after the frst 42 points and with only two matches to Red Star supporters arrived in Zagreb, the end of the competition (at that time on Sunday morning, May 13, 1990. Fights a win represented just two points) – both began at the railway station, continued teams still wanted to win and prepared in downtown Zagreb, mainly in Zrinje- for the match thoroughly, and so did vac Park and Republic Square (today – their fans. It was a question of nation- Ban Josip Jelačić Square), and gradually al prestige. The standings did not real- made their way towards Maksimir Sta- ly mater. Before the match, it was clear dium.10 In the city centre this unrest left the situation was going to be tense.9 shop windows, shops and cafes broken On Sunday, May 13, 1990, about and destroyed and even some injured 3,000 Red Star fans travelled to Zagreb victims. The police had to intervene for the football match, including the man and they actually managed to suppress who would eventually lead the Tigers the riots and escort the Red Star fans to paramilitary group, Željka Ražnatovič, the south stand of Maksimir Stadium.

8 A documentary flm on this match is available on the Internet: htps://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4d8Rw2kp160. 9 See, for instance: Borba, a. 69, 1990, nr. 134, May 12 – 13, p. 17. 10 Borba, a. 69, 1990, nr. 135, 14. May, p. 1.

Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s 143 No one can accuse the police of hav- the feld. They were able to take hold ing underestimated the situation. Tele- of several visitors’ fags. It was already vision footage available on the Internet clear that the match would not take shows body and bag searches at the gates place. Only then did the police inter- of the stadium in order to prevent weap- vene but met a raging crowd of domes- ons from being brought in.11 However, tic fans who started fghting them right the organisers placed the segregated vis- there on the feld. The police used water itors zone in the lower southern stand, cannons and tear gas against the hordes while local fans were in the upper part. of local fans, who were throwing stones There was no robust barrier to separate at them and atacking them with any- the two groups. So, it was just a question thing they could take hold of. Natural- of time for collision to get underway. That ly, there were plenty of injuries both on moment came when the teams appeared the side of the police and of the specta- on the feld to warm up for the match. tors. The editor of the Borba daily, M. Mi- At that time, the Serbs started shout- trović, wrote that he felt he was a war ing slogans such as “Zagreb je Srbija” (“Za- correspondent from Beirut and that he greb is Serbia”) and “Ubit ćemo Tudjmana” had never seen anything like it.12 (Kill Tudjman), while the Croats chanted Meanwhile, Red Star fans stood iso- “Srbe na vrbe” (“Serbs to the Willows [gal- lated in the upper sectors of the south lows]”). The Dinamo fans in the stands stand staring at what was going on be- above the visitors zone began throwing low them. The home fans tried to atack stones and verbally insulting the Serbs them throwing stones from the feld, but below. Before long, the guests managed the police were already pushing them to brake through the barriers and start- out of the stadium. However, the ri- ed to tear of advertising hoardings and ots continued outside the stadium and seats, and eventually made their way to- the police had great difculty to sup- wards the Dinamo fans. Only a few po- press them. Later on, the Croatian side lice ofcers were guarding the southern accused the police of tolerating the dis- stand, so they had no chance of prevent- orders caused by the Serbian fans while ing acts of violence to spark. In short, intervening against the locals harshly. the police failed to intervene resolutely In their opinion this was because the po- and the Delije had no problem atacking lice was predominantly Serbian. It was the Croatian fans and expelling them not that simple, though, for the police from the stands. Both enemy camps used corps were formed by Croats, Serbs and torn seats as weapons, throwing them Muslims. As a mater of fact, the com- all over the southern grandstand. Any- position of the police corps refected one failing to escape would be lynched. the population of multi-ethnic Yugosla- Literally. via. Several Dinamo players remained Wanting to respond to this atack, on the feld trying to defend their fans Dinamo’s Bad Blue Boys tried to make from the police. It would later became their way towards the Red Star fans, infamous how footballer Zvonimir frst through the stands, then through Boban kicked a police ofcer in the chest.

11 See, for instance htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UYLkPHIcFQ. 12 Borba, a. 69, 1990, nr. 135, May 14, p. 1.

144 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Ironically, that ofcer was not a Serb, “The biggest scandal in the histo- but a Muslim named Refk Ahmetović. ry of Yugoslav sport occurred before Boban was proclaimed a national hero the frst league match between Dinamo for the Croats. For the Serbians he be- Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade. Both fan came a Croatian nationalist. camps started to fght at the stadium, The next day the press accused the po- fuelled by the national disputes be- lice of having failed to intervene in time, tween Serbs and Croats, so the direc- when the riots were still in the bud. tor of the stadium decided to cancel “The question that bears asking is why the po- the match.”15 lice did not react, why they did not prevent the fans of Dinamo and Red Star to collide,” The editor of the Slovak daily Smena, read an article in the Borba.13 With re- Ivan Drábek, presented an interesting gard to the atack, Zvonimir Boban said: opinion on the whole incident in an arti- “He hit me frst, so I automatically hit back. cle with the title A Defeat on Both Sides I saw that policeman baton striking our play- at Maksimir: er Škrinjar and, as the captain I am, I had to defend my player.”14 It was great luck such “Apparently the sports arena was just turmoil left no casualties. the background for an outburst of an- The press informed that the Football imosity that has been accumulating Association of Yugoslavia (Futbalski among the peoples and nationalities savez Jugoslavije) reacted very quickly of Yugoslavia. Such an incident was to the incident and began to investigate bound to happen wherever thousands it. The riots in Zagreb did not go un- of Croats and Serbs met face to face as noticed in other European countries or it happened in Maksimir. If someone within the UEFA either. The whole situa- thinks that the fghts between the fans tion was all the more critical as the 1990 of Dinamo and Red Star, which resulted World Cup in Italy was drawing near in ninety people with minor and ten and the national team of Yugoslavia was with severe injuries, is just an act of out- one of the participants. In the end, they rageous football behaviour, they do not traveled to the World Cup without Zvo- understand anything. In the last but one nimir Boban, who had been suspended league round, neither Dinamo or Red for six months for kicking the police of- Star had anything to win. Unfortunate- fcer. This is how one of the best players ly, in the end it was the whole Yugoslav of Yugoslavia paid for his actions. But federation that sufer a terrible defeat. not only him, the whole national team sufered as they would have been strong- Not by chance did yesterday’s Borba, er with Boban. Red Star was awarded in connection with last Sunday’s Cro- a walkover victory of the match. atian-Serbian riots, wondered whether On May 15, 1990, the Czech and Slo- this cannot not the beginning of some- vak press reported on the riots at Mak- thing dreadful, something the hos- simir Stadium: tile nationalist hordes on both sides

13 Ibidem, p. 11. 14 Ibidem. 15 Československý sport, a. 37, 1990, nr. 112, May 15.

Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s 145 of the barricades are just waiting for. However, the game brought to light The Belgrade gazete goes even further the real situation between the two eth- claiming that the fghts between the fans nicities. If these riots had not taken place had been prepared in advance by forces here, similar unrest would have bro- that are now ready to use them for their ken out on any other occasion, at which chauvinistic goals. a larger number of Croats and Serbs would meet face to face. Concerns that Zagreb’s ‘football war’ As for the situation in former Czech- could trigger a wave of violence are not oslovakia in the early 1990s, animosities at all infated. Yugoslavia, with its ffteen between Slovaks and Czechs were nev- ethnic groups, over a dozen languages, er as bad as between Serbs and Croats. six republics and two diferent alphabets, Nevertheless, displays of national in- has recently been more of a compromise tolerance could also be seen at football than a united country… However, matches between the best Czech and Slo- the future of Yugoslavia, its further vak teams. Its most common form were existence, will most likely be decided ofensive slogans being shouted, and less by Belgrade and Zagreb, the capitals often major confrontations of fans. This of the two largest and strongest repub- applied mostly for clubs with a wide fan lics. This is why both Serbs and Croats base that were popular and often com- need to learn as much as possible from peted for the frst slots in the standings. Sunday’s defeat on both sides at Mak- From the very beginning, fans simir. In fact, if one of the parties longed had been predisposed by the political for retaliation and began to call for blood events that erupted right after the fall and violence, it would be pushing of the communist regime. The frst dis- the whole country into a fratricidal civil pute started over the new name of the re- war Yugoslavia would hardly be able to public, which had ceased to be “socialist”. overcome.”16 The Czechs wanted to call it Czecho- slovak Republic, but this proposal was The violence at Maksimir Stadium turned over by the leaders of Slovakia, in Zagreb provoked a great deal of re- as it reminded of the interwar republic actions throughout the then Yugoslavia. and its ofcial ideology of Czechoslova- Both parts blamed each other of plan- kism. These disputes went on for two ning to ignite acts of violence. The polit- months, from February to April 1990, ical elites of Croatia and Serbia did not and strained the relations between Slo- hesitate to try to get political proft from vaks and Czechs even more. In the end, these riots. Today, foreign media still a compromise was reached and the new consider these events to be the beginning country was named Czech and Slovak of the war between Croats and Serbs. This Federal Republic (CSFR). claim seems exaggerated, though. These The relations of Slovaks and Czechs riots were just one in a series of displays were also afected by the negotiations of growing animosity between Serbs and over the further character of the fed- Croats, not the beginning of anything. eration, namely over the competencies

16 Smena, a. 43, 1990, nr. 112, May 15.

146 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives of the national and federal bodies. Slo- football and in the end it made it to vaks demanded a more loose federation the stands of the stadiums. Hostility and and greater competencies for the national vulgar insults on both sides as well as authorities. At the same time, ambitions tension in the stands were commonplace of total independence for Slovakia grad- at football matches between the best Slo- ually grew stronger among the political vak and Czech teams. The more edgy elites of the country. The diferences re- the political situation between the two garding the form of the common coun- nations became, the more this refected try of Czechs and Slovaks did not dis- in the stands. And not just there. In fact, appear until the summer of 1992, when violent clashes spread onto the streets as the fnal decision was made to dissolve well. More and more often, the police had the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to intervene during football matches. Es- and create two independent states. This pecially risky were those games Slovan federal republic lasted for two and a half Bratislava played against Sparta Prague, years and witnessed constant disputes Slavia Prague and Baník Ostrava. between the Slovak and Czech political It is important to keep in mind the cir- representatives. cumstances of the political events going Slovakia, however, also struggled with on at the background of these matches. animosity between its Slovak population The disputes between the Czech and Slo- and its large Hungarian minority living vak political leaders regarding the fur- in the country. The leaders of this Hungar- ther advance of the common state were ian community demanded greater rights escalating. On 14 March 1991 at SNP and even autonomy for their people. This Square in Bratislava, during the celebra- situation did not help to ease the ten- tions of the 52nd anniversary of the es- sions with Hungary, which were already tablishment of the frst Slovak Repub- deteriorated by the Slovak-Hungarian lic, Slovak protesters kicked and spat dispute over the Gabčíkovo­Nagyma- upon the convoy in which the President ros waterworks. These tensions showed of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, at football matches between Slovak teams Václav Havel, was passing by. The same and the FC DAC Dunajská Streda, whose situation repeated at the very same place fan base consists of Hungarians living on October 28th 1991. Meanwhile, voices in Slovakia. Thus, at the stadiums Slovak demanding the independence of Slova- football fans had frictions not only with kia were growing louder. their Czech opponents but also with their Slovakia saw a really turbulent 1991 Hungarian rivals. spring, a situation that came into light The beginning of the 1990s saw Slovan in the stands. Aversion towards Slovaks Bratislava, which had become one of Slo- was growing in the Czech Republic and vakia’s national symbols, trying to usurp vice-versa. Moravia, whose inhabitants the frst position in the standings from also began to defne themselves against Sparta Prague. As a mater of fact, the big- the Czechs, was an exception in this gest federal derby matches between these regard. Therefore, it is not surprising two rivals took place in 1991 – 1993, ex- that Slovan Bratislava also had its fans acerbated by the fact that the common in South Moravia. state of both nations was falling apart According to a police report, only sev- and animosity between them was grow- enteen Sparta Prague fans arrived in Bra- ing stronger. Politics could not avoid tislava for the match between Slovan

Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s 147 and Sparta at the beginning of May Slovan won, the championship title 1991. They had a segregated visitors sec- would be most probably theirs. There- tor at Bratislava’s Tehelné Pole Stadium. fore, the match against Sparta literally set Since they were expecting much higher the whole Slovakia in motion. Fans from numbers, both the stadium crew as well all over the country, including eastern as the police troops guarding the stadi- Slovakia, focked to Bratislava to atend um had been strengthened, and a corri- it. However, Slovan did not perform very dor for the visiting fan sector had been well and sufered a 0:3 defeat at home. created. According to the press, the situ- Surprisingly, there were no incidents ation at the stadium was relatively peace- during the match. This, however, cannot ful, except for a few nationalistic slogans be said of another ethnically motivated being heard. At the end of the match, it incident at a stadium. was the Slovan players – not the Czechs This time it was the relations between —who had to put up with a load of in- Slovaks and Hungarians that were to sults for their poor performance. Unrest be tested during the matches of the frst only occurred after the game. round of the European Cup between Groups of domestic fans were trying Slovan Bratislava and Ferencváros Buda- to make their way towards the Spartan pest. Both matches took place in Septem- fan sector, so the police ofered to take ber 1992. It was the frst duel in Bratislava the visiting fans in their cars to the train that poured oil into the fre that had bro- station. However, when the Spartans ken out between Slovaks and Hungar- were geting into the police cars, riots be- ians after the fall of the communist re- tween Slovan fans and the police broke gime. In fact, democracy unveiled many out. Fans threw stones and other objects latent ethnic problems socialism had just at the police which, in turn, used batons suppressed. The Hungarian minority against them and detained nine local feared the creation of an independent fans. One police ofcer was injured.17 Slovakia claiming that their fundamen- At that time this kind of scenarios were tal rights and freedoms would not be commonplace at similar derby matches. guaranteed after the split of the Czech The same applied for the matches Slovan and Slovak Federal Republic. In Hun- played in Prague or Ostrava, just that gary some political leaders shared this – as can be expected – in Bohemia and view and the Hungarian press addressed northern Moravia it was Slovan fans who this issue again and again. And neither were atacked. of them hesitated to use this football Another match against Sparta Prague match to support their arguments. in the spring of 1992 in Bratislava was Even before the game there were con- supposed to be a football celebration cerns about what might happen. When for the whole federation and for Slovakia asked about the possible risks in the stands in particular. Slovan had played a series and outside the stadium, Ferencváros of 27 matches without a loss and this at- President, István Szivos, said: “Sport and tracted about 43,000 spectators to Bra- politics are two diferent things. I expect both tislava’s Tehelné Pole stadium. In case camps to be noisy but rise to the challenge.”18

17 Pravda, a. 72, 1991, May 7, p. 17. 18 Už som hral proti Galisovi. In: Denník Šport, a. 46, 1992, nr. 219. September 16.

148 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Coach Tibor Nyilasi spoke in a similar Šport. Well-organised hooligans, in turn, vein. It is necessary to add that among atacked the police and provoked fghts the supporters of his team there were with Slovak fans. also large numbers of fans coming from The commander of the police unit the south of Slovakia. At that time they guarding sector C, Major Ludek Buchar, were still Czech-Slovak citizens of Hun- later said: garian nationality. This fact was no relief for the organisers. Nevertheless, neither “After Slovan scored their frst goal, you the organisers or the fans were expect- could hear nasty nationalistic insults, and ing riots, nor the resulting police inter- the sufocating atmosphere escalated with vention to reach the proportions they every further goal the locals scored. After were about to witness. It was precisely the third goal, both camps started throw- the intervention of the Slovak police and, ing at each other cans full of beer and above all, that of a special commando de- soda, stones, iron items wrapped in fabric ployed against the Hungarian fans that and dangerous glass marbles. In an efort escalated animosity in the Slovak-Hun- to separate the two camps, the police garian relations and aroused intense needed to intervene vigorously using all protests and passions in Hungary. the means the law allows. “About 60 fans Violent clashes between fans had tak- were expelled from the stadium.”19 en place the day before and culminated on the day of the match. About ten thou- This resolute intervention included sand fans, mostly from southern Slova- an anti-terrorist commando in balacla- kia, streamed to Bratislava to support vas coming to sector C and baton strik- Ferencváros. Although before the match ing Hungarian fans. Tear gas was also the police confscated from Ferencváros used. The Police literally drove many fans knives, brass knuckles, sprays, Ferencváros fans out of the stadium. iron bars and nunchakus, several other The stands applauded the intervention. objects were smuggled into the stadi- However, there was imminent dan- um. This was the scenario in which one ger that some people could get tram- of the most risky matches in the history pled in a panic stampede trying to avoid of Slovak football began at 5:00 p.m. on the police batons. The commander of se- 16 September 1992. curity procedures at the stadium, Lieu- Part of the Ferencváros fans were not tenant Colonel Anton Kršák, commented able to cope with the impending defeat as follows: of their team, and started throwing cans, cups, pieces of concrete, and various “Every police intervention was a re- iron items onto the pitch. The amount sponse to fans breaking the law. At about of fying objects grew in direct propor- half past six, a fght broke out in the low- tion to the number of balls making it into er rows of the AS stand. Our ofcers the goal of Hungarian goalkeeper Balogh. detained the main initiator, a Hungarian A piece of concrete broke the head of pho- fan. As he was being led out of the stadi- to reporter Dušan Koutný, of the daily um, a Ferencváros supporter approached

19 Hanba. In: Smena, a. 45, 1992, nr. 220, September 17.

Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s 149 and hit one of the policemen in the eye, to help them but also got their share. probably with brass knuckles. The ofcer I saw with my own eyes how members sufered corneal damage and is still unft of the Ferencváros fght group kissed for work. their leader, who was wearing a green scarf, after a successful atack.”21 Three city police ofcers were also injured by Hungarian fans in the parking The match and, above all, the follow- lot outside the nearby Inter stadium. ing events provoked a wave of reactions The commander of Sector C asked me and protests in Slovakia and Hunga- for reinforcements. These were members ry. After the match, the news the Hun- of the Emergency Squad. Had I not given garian media reported would make the order to intervene, the confict could a third-party reader think it was about have evolved into a mass fght in which the then war-torn Yugoslavia. They fans would be trampled to death. We also spoke of dead fans, national intolerance, feared that the fences would collapse and police beating people just for being Hun- that the whole stadium would become garians, the Hungarian minority in Slo- a batlefeld. Every police ofcer is re- vakia being in danger, etc. These events sponsible for the intensity of the coercive even made it to the negotiation tables means they use. But in my opinion, even of the Hungarian and Slovak govern- if they went beyond the regular limits, ments, and exacerbated the already poor it was not on purpose. Before the match, relations on both sides of the Danube. I instructed everyone responsible The Magyar Nemzet wrote: for maintaining order to keep in mind not to cause any severe injuries.”20 “Of course, you also have to see the re- sponsibility of Ferencváros fans, several The commander leading the interven- of whom had already got a few slaps from tion in Sector C commented on the action the police all over Europe. The bru- as follows: “It [The intervention] was real- tal way the Slovak police intervened ly justifed and proportionate. In line with was also caused by the fact that some the law. We made use of grabs, kicks and ba- of the Hungarian fans were defant, pro- ton strikes.” When asked if he did not fear vocative and arrogant. In the end, these that a stampede might occur resulting inebriated green eagles in the stands in fans geting trampled, he said: foolishly walked into the trap Slovaks had prepared for them. The Ferencváros play- “Absolutely. We very much knew what ers on the feld did not get any luckier.” direction the fans would run. The hoo- ligans went right onto the street behind The ÚJ Magyarország went even stand C… The most aggressive groups further: were very well organised in groups of 10 to 20 and they tried to isolate and “Ferencváros Fans went through physically atack our ofcers. Our Hun- an ordeal just for being Hungarians… garian colleagues in plain clothes wanted the police were systematically going

20 Futbalogika. In: Smena, a. 45, 1992, nr. 222, September 19. 21 Fradi tromfi rowdies. In: ibidem.

150 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives from sector to sector looking for Hungar- Bratislava, Jaroslav Čaniga, as well as ians to beat them. Seeing these events, the then legal adviser of the club, František we really need to be concerned over Laurinec, to appear before them in per- the Hungarian population in Slova- son. Of course, the Slovan representatives kia. In fact, independent Slovakia has needed to provide the UEFA authorities already found its new enemy, this time with a writen statement on the whole at a football match.” incident. The fnal result of the match remained unchanged, though. In fact, The Magyar Hírlap had a more sober UEFA confrmed the fnal score but pe- opinion: nalised both clubs with fnancial fnes. Ferencváros for the riots caused by their “Obviously underneath the surface there fans, and Slovan for the shortcomings is hidden tension in the Hungarian-Slo- in the organisation of the match. UEFA vak relations. So, what can be done? also declared the retaliatory match to be The competent Hungarian authorities of high risk. must prevent something similar from The Czech-Slovak embassy in Buda- happening in the Budapest retaliation pest also had to go through some un- match. In this respect, it would be pleasant days following the game. On good to ponder whether the Hungar- September 17, 1992, the then Ambassador ian authorities did everything they Rudolf Chmel wrote in his diary: could have before the match to prevent the clashes.”22 “This morning (in fact, since last night) we have been dealing with wave The Hungarian Government dis- of protests: Slovak police ofcers beat cussed the issue at one of its sessions and Ferencváros fans (Slovan won 4:1). Even described the intervention of the emer- the Hungarian Foreign Ministry pro- gency units as unprecedented and un- tested – I did not go but sent my second justifed. The Foreign Afairs Commitee secretary, Michal Černý. Lots of phone at the Hungarian Parliament approached calls. An anonymous man threatened the topic in a similar way. The Consu- to blow up the embassy. What a nice late General of the Republic of Hungary and pleasant situation! One more slap in Bratislava also protested against the in- somewhere in a pub and a local confict tervention. The chairman of Ferencváros can break out. A raucous Hungarian fan issued a statement stating that the inter- would have smashed the car of the editor vention of the police units against their of the Rudé Právo daily at a crossroads fans had also afected the mental con- in Budapest if he had not said he was dition of the players and, therefore, also from Prague. What a great, bright protested against the irregularities at Te- future!”23 helné Pole stadium. Thus, the UEFA in Zurich also dealt A few days later, the Foreign Afairs with this European Cup frst round Commitee at the Hungarian Parliament match and asked the president of Slovan met:

22 Hungarian Press Reactions. In: Denník Šport, a. 46, 1992, nr. 221, September 18. 23 Chmel, Rudolf: Moja maďarská otázka. Bratislava: Kalligram, 1996, p. 249.

Tomáš Černák: Political Situation and Acts of Violence at Football Stadiums in the Early 90s 151 “The Foreign Afairs Commitee commonplace. Also Slovan Bratislava at the Hungarian Parliament con- received threatening leters. For this rea- siders the intervention of the police son, organising the retaliation game be- troops at the Slovan – Ferencváros came a major issue. Slovan fans had got match to have been groundless and tickets for the revenge match even be- brutal. The Minister of the Interior, fore the frst one, but atending the game Péter Boross, and the State Secretary would have been too dangerous giv- of the Ministry of Foreign Afairs, en the circumstances. Except for one András Kelemen, also commented on Slovan fan, in the end no one traveled to the whole incident and stated, among Budapest. other things, that Bratislava must Before the retaliation game, groups identify the perpetrators of the atroc- of Ferencváros hooligans combed Bu- ities against Hungarian citizens and dapest looking for Slovan fans in order that those responsible need to apologise to take revenge for what had happened and pay for the caused damages.” How in Bratislava. In some statements they touching!”24 made later on, they even said they could imagine the revenge in Budapest ending Indeed, the situation in Hungary was up with casualties.25 Thanks to the fact tense and critical at the time. The po- that Slovan supporters stayed at home, lice intervention at Tehelné Pole became there were no incidents to regret. How- the number one topic in the country ever, the whole Bratislava team had to be for many days. Both, media and poli- escorted to the stadium in secret. As soon ticians instigated animosity to the ex- as the local fans saw them approaching treme. It was dangerous, as Rudolf Chmel the stadium, they started to throw stones fnally put it, to drive through Budapest at their bus. During the retaliation, with Czechoslovak plates or just to uter which ended 0:0, you could feel the very a word in Slovak in public. Sappers need- tense atmosphere. Animosity in the rela- ed to inspect the embassy of the Czech- tions of Slovaks and Hungarians did not oslovak Federal Republic twice due to disappear even after the establishment bomb threats. Telephone threats were of the independent Slovak Republic.

24 Ibidem, p. 250. 25 Mareš, Miroslav – Smolík, Josef – Suchánek, Marek: Fotbaloví chuligáni: Evropská dimenze subkultury. Brno: Strategic Studies Centre, 2004, p. 103.

152 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Albert Bing* Croatia’s Transition to the European Union

Chorvátska cesta do Európskej únie / Put Hrvatske u Europsku uniju

Prilog se bavi dugotrajnim procesom pristupanja Hrvatske Europskoj Uniji. Uz pregled najznačajnijih događaja i tranzicijskih procesa apostrofrani su problemi s kojima se Hrvatska suočavala na svom „europskom putu“. Raspad jugoslavenske države, državno osamostaljenje Hrvatske te nametnuti rat obilježili su formativno razdoblje hrvatske tranzicije. Te okolnosti u bitnom su obilježile proces priključivanja EU. Kao osnovni motiv naznačen je kontinuitet euroatlatske orijentacije Hrvatske unatoč značajnim oscilacijama u raspoloženju građana – od izrazitog entuzijazma za priključivanjem EU do euroskepticizma. Članak uključuje i osvrt na držanje međunarodne zajednice, posebice EZ/EU prema Hrvatskoj i bivšoj Jugoslaviji, što je u bitnome odredilo dinamiku pridruživanja euroatlantskim strukturama. Ključne riječi: Hrvatska, Europska unija, tranzicija, Bivša Jugoslavija, rat u Hrvatskoj i BiH, euroskepticizam

robably no current member of the EU made by sociologist Slaven Letica in his Phad such the complex and dramatic collection of articles under the meaning- process of joining a European Union like ful title Obećana zemlja (The Promised Land): Croatia. Specifc circumstances that signif- icantly characterized Croatia’s European “For the Croatian people and all citizens integration were the dramatic breakup of Croatia, the twentieth century did not of the Yugoslav state and the wars that bring much good historical fortune or waged in the soil of Croatia and neigh- a happy life. (…) The Croatian people are boring BiH in the frst half of the 1990s. leaving a multiply ruined history behind The achievement of statehood in 1992 them: three wars (two World Wars and and the liberation of the country in 1995 this most recent Serbian-Croat war), two were imposed as priority goals in relation failed ideologies (fascist and communist) to transition processes and accession to to which only a minority adhered, two the desired Euro-Atlantic associations. All bankrupt etatist ideas (Austro-Hungari- of these problems have been compound- an and Yugoslav), a quarter-century un- ed due to Croatia’s very complex past. der a Greater Serbian dictatorship and The briefest summary of Croatian histo- king (1918 – 1941) and a half century ry in the twentieth century was probably under communism.”1

* Albert Bing, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb (the Republic of Croatia). 1 Letica, Slaven: Obećana zemlja – Politički antimemoari. Zagreb: Globus International, 1992, book cover.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 153 All of these historical ftures represent- to which Croatia was a federal unit, ed the important components of the con- was used by its communist sover- temporary Croatian history refex.2 eign, Josip Broz Tito, in promotion of Throughout history, Croatia has been the bloc’s non-alignment and so-called the border-land: “bloc” third path. With disintegration of the Yugoslav state, Croatia becomes “At a peripheral distance from the East a border area again towards the unin- and from the West alike, Croatianhood tegrated and proverbially unstable Bal- (Croatia) never in the history the East, kan space. Today, after a long journey to and never entirely the West – under Europe, it has fnally become a member the fatal infux of strong civilizations, of the European Union, its space is once southern Mediterranean and northern again a border area; zone of the over- German, a transitional area of strong lapping of interests of EU and NATO economic interests and conceptions in all and on the other hand forces of global four directions of the compass – to week infuence of large states like Russia, Chi- to be formed into an autonomous polit- na and Turkey. ical and state body, and yet so resistant Despite the complex historical and that it is not melted down (overturned) cultural heritage (polycentricity of Cro- (…) Croatianhood, always equally ane- atian history and culture), geopolitical mic and wounded as a persecuted beast and ideological changes, Croatia has in hunt of disproportionately stronger persisted in its Western European ori- forces, with only one thought to save entation. At the time of the epochal col- itself from the miserable peasant condi- lapse of communism in the late 1980s, tions and the most primitive life.”3 pro-Western orientation in almost all social classes was clearly articulated The location of the periphery be- in Croatia. In the process of promoting tween East and West is one of the impor- political pluralism in 1989/1990, and es- tant geopolitical and cultural features pecially after the state’s independence that, through the capricious centuries, and the start of functioning of the Cro- left traces in the identities – history and atian state as a sovereign internation- culture of both the Croatian and other al legal entity, Croatia’s main strategic (South) Slavic peoples.4 In the specifc goal was to enter the full membership geopolitical circumstances of the Cold of the Euro­Atlantic structures – the Eu- War, the position of the Yugoslav state, ropean Community (later the Union) and

2 The Second World War left behind a particularly traumatic heritage in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, the most relevant period for recent Croatian history is the period after the Second World War, i.e. the period of socialist Yugoslavia and its collapse and the establishment of an independent Croatian state at the beginning of the 1990s. 3 Krleža, Miroslav: Malograđanska historijska shema: Deset krvavih godina i drugi politički eseji. Zagreb: Zora, 1957, p. 100. 4 Miloš Đurić, for example, it defnes the defnition of Slavic culture through the term “Slavic souls” which “groans in labor pains between East and West.” According to Đurić, Slavs are a nation that “escapes identifcation with the East or the West and that is why their mission is to synthesize these two cultural circles”. Đurić, Miloš: Pred slovenskim vidicima: Prilozi flosofji slovenske kulture. Beograd: Sveslovenska knjižara, 1928, pp. 41 – 43, 57. See Prpa, Branka: Traganja za identitetom: Beograd. In: Republika, 1999, nr. 218 – 219.

154 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives join the NATO pact. This path was nei- skepticism towards membership had ther easy nor short-lived. And it was not grown, and was the highest just before without controversies either: entering the membership.”6

“The dominant pro-European orien- Croatia’s European orientation and tation of both political authorities and connections with European integration citizens, and a broad political consensus processes can be traced back to the last regarding the Croatian accession to decade of Yugoslavia. Institutional ties the European Union were an essential between the Socialist Republic of Croa- prerequisite for the realization of the ac- tia (SRH) and the European Community cession process, but not sufcient.“5 were regulated by various instruments through the Yugoslav state, until the for- The EU required the achievement mal state independence of Croatia in Jan- of concrete democratic values and stand- uary 1992. The institutional relations ards and on the other hand didn’t deve- of the EC and Yugoslavia were already lope a clear and efective politics towards determined by the Cooperation Agree- the participans in the process of dissolu- ment of 1980 (entered into force on 1 tion of Yugoslav state. One of the conse- April 1983). Under the Agreement, Yugo- quence of the complex condition was delay slavia was treated as “a non-aligned, Euro- of development of democracy and gener- pean, Mediterranean country and a member ally the failure of a successful transitions: of Group 77” and received “double treat- ment” by the European Community; “The extended accession period did not accelerate democratization as much as “The general positions on country poli- it strengthened Euroskepticism and cy, including the institutional framework suspicion towards the EU. Thence for co-operation, were defned in the con- stems the ambivalent atitude toward text of global Mediterranean policy, the Croatian accession, and the advan- while the former Yugoslavia was treated tages and disadvantages of EU mem- as a Central European country by multi- bership. A certain paradox is visible: lateral assistance programs (PHARE).” during the period when Croatia did not have the necessary democratic stand- Such a double treatment, “like no other ards, commitment to EU accession was European country”, has favored Croatia as relatively high. Conversely, in parallel a Mediterranean and Central European with achieving the necessary standards, country.7

5 Maldini, Pero – Pauković, Davor (eds.): Croatia and the European Union – Changes and Development. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015, p. 4. 6 Ibidem. 7 Samarđija, Višnja: Europska unija i Hrvatska – Putevi povezivanja i suradnje. Zagreb: IRMO, 1994, p. 160. In addition to the Cooperation Agreement, in the same year (1980), an additional Agreement was signed between the European Coal and Steel Community. Protocols regulating the issue of trade arrangements between the EC and Yugoslavia were added to the renewal of the 1987 Agreement, and in 1991 a transport co-operation agreement was signed, which was important for the then Socialist Republic of Croatia (the second economic branch of Croatia immediately after industrial production), and before the infux from tourism, there was transit

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 155 In this context, one can speak was connected to broather historical of the continuity and diferent character and cultural Croatian heritage. The ope- of the relationship between Croatia and ness of Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin the EC, which represented a potential split in 1948 also led to a strong infuence comparative advantage in the process of Western culture. Economic activities of accession to European integrations such as tourism and transit trafc also (either within the Yugoslav convention connected Croatia and the West. Cro- or as an independent state).8 Following atia also had the strongest emigration the radical economic reforms of the last in western countries. Furthermore, Cro- Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic, atsa dominated among Yugoslav citizens in 1989, which began Yugoslavia’s re- who went abroad for temporary word, covery from the severe economic crisis, especially to Western Germany. a federal initiative to change the sta- The question of the (Western) Euro- tus of Yugoslavia towards the Europe- pean orientation of Croatia was often an Community was launched. In 1990, emphasized in Croatian intellectual cir- Yugoslavia formally sought the status cles. Until the intensifcation of intereth- of an associate member of the EU; ne- nic conficts – especially after Slobodan gotiations were opened on the inclusion Milosevic came to power in 1987 with of Yugoslavia in the Council of Europe his policy of Greater Serbia – integration followed by the initiative to conclude with the West was considered within an agreement with Yugoslavia as an as- the Yugoslav framework. Joining Eu- sociate member of the European Com- ropean integration was closely linked munity (a special resolution in June 1991 to the needs of economic and political on the crisis in Yugoslavia articulated reforms, including the introduction German Bundestag).9 At the same time, of an open market with clear indications the European Free Trade Association of promoting pluralistic democracy. (EFTA) opened the possibility of opening In this context, it is important to distin- a free trade zone.10 By the outbreak of war, guish liberal values (the adoption of po- all these processes were suspended. litical, economic and social acquis) from Even before state independence, institutional and / or geopolitical frame- there was a distinct sense of inclination works. Having on mind the multination- in the West in Croatia. After the evi- al structure of the EC / EU community dent collapse and fnally disintegration of peoples, it is sometimes compared to of communism, a high level of aware- Austro-Hungarian and even Tito’s Yu- ness of the values of the liberal West goslavia (Tito himself was interpreted as came to the fore; in this context, the mo- the “last Habsburg”). However, unlike tive for joining European integrations in Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Yu- appears. The inclination to the West goslavia in which the social model was im-

trafc). However, with the outbreak of war, all these shifts lose their meaning. Thus, the EC­ Yugoslavia Treaty on the so­called the third Financial Protocol for the fve­year ECU 807 million aid period (June 1991) and withdrawn prior to the formal dissolution of the Yugoslav state. 8 Ibidem. 9 Ibidem and Ivanković, Nenad: Bonn – druga hrvatska fronta. Zagreb: Mladost, 1993, pp. 175 – 176. 10 Samarđija, Višnja: Europska unija i Hrvatska, p. 163.

156 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives posed, the model of European integration and Slavko Goldstein”.12 As HR transmit- was based on the sharing of common ted, Goldstein and Korošić advocated: liberal values and “botom­up” integra- tion. The conceptual basis of European “an open economy with great opportu- integration from its very beginnings was nities for private individuals, various respect for the “four fundamental freedoms: types of property, the release of exports freedom of movement for persons, goods, ser- and imports of all bonds, the suspension vices and capital (frst six members, Rome of work on the change of the Consti- Treaties 1957)”.11 In this sense, European tution, the establishment of a tempo- values and civilizational heritage must rary government with special powers be distinguished from mere belonging to for a transitional period, the development a “club”. This important distinction was of Republican pluralism in the economy also relevant to Croatia’s relationship and politics, the abolition of the Fund with the EU. In the period leading up for Underdevelopment and the estab- to the breakup of the Yugoslav state and lishment of the Bank for Development, the creation of nation states on its ruins, the departure from the poor Third World its relation to Europe was manifested and the approaching of the European by its relation to European values from Community and abandoning the Al- the Yugoslav, and then after wars, na- liance of Communists from the role tional perspective. In the case of Slovenia of the ‘ruling party’ to become the leader and Croatia, in the early 1990s, the Eu- in the development of multi-program / ro-Atlantic orientation expressed a will pluralist / socialist democracy”.13 to embrace the values of liberalism. It be- came an important political distinctive The severe economic crisis that shook feature in relation to the “Serbian” bloc Yugoslavia and the intensifcation of in- led by Slobodan Milosević. ternational relations in the 1980s put into One of the many examples of Western the question the monopolistic position orientation was the public appearance of the Communist Party (the League of two prominent Croatian intellectuals of Communists of Yugoslavia). Self­gov- in the infuential weekly Danas; their ernment and the delegate system, which public statement atracted the atention was considered the backbone of “social- of Croatian political emigrant communi- ist democracy”, did not advance reform ty (pronounced with anti-Yugoslav and eforts, and more and more questions anti­communist orientations). The most were raised about alternatives in the form eminent immigrant journal for culture, of promoting a new type of pluralistic re- the Croatian Review writes (HR) in 1988 lations. On this track, in the late 1980s, on the reform propositions of “two prom- various movements were activated. Thus, inent Croatian economists, Marijan Korošić in an exhaustive study of the period,

11 Stančić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju. Zagreb: Ljevak, 2005, pp. 44 and 55. 12 For his book Yugoslavia in Crisis, Marijan Korosić received the prestigious Nin Prize in 1988, and Slavko Goldstein became the frst elected president of the frst registered political party in Croatia, the Croatian Social- Liberal Party of Croatia. 13 The original text of Korošić and Goldstein was published in the weekly newspaper Danas on December 1, 1998 and transmited and commented on in Hrvatska revija, Mart 1988. See Bing, Albert: Socialist Self-Management between Politics and Economy. In: Acta Historiae, a. 27, 2019, nr. 1, pp. 23 – 24.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 157 Davor Pauković states that “environmental The very beginnings of political plu- initiatives and actions can rightly be consid- ralism in Croatia were closely related to ered as the frst indications of the matura- the European orientation. Back in August tion of the post-totalitarian order in Croatia 1988, Slavko Goldstein publicly called in the second half of the 1980s” the environ- for “the adoption of European standards and mental movement was also recognized as the introduction of a multi-party system”.16 a “political movement” (Nikola Visković), Together with prominent intellectuals and the promotion of green initiatives Vlado Gotovac, Božo Kovačević and oth- coincided with important aspects of EC ers, Goldstein launched the Croatian So- policy.14 The activity of the Association cial Liberal Alliance (HSLS), which will for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, become the frst registered non­com- founded in February 1989, was atended munist party. In the initial stages of its by many prominent intellectuals with activities, the HSLS saw the solution to the aim of afrming a market economy the crisis in Yugoslavia in the demo- and democracy (President was a prom- cratic reconstruction of the Yugoslav inent economic expert Branko Horvat). state; in doing so, HSLS made contacts However, despite numerous initiatives, with organizations that advocated lib- members of the communist apparatus eral ideas and European orientation, believed that “self-governing democracy al- such as the Society for Yugoslav-Euro- ready includes non-partisan pluralism” (Ivo pean Cooperation (organizing the 200th Druzic) and that the emergence of par- anniversary of the French Revolution ty pluralism could lead to “greater polit- in Croatia). Multy­party system was le- ical tensions, party struggles, imputation, galized at the end of January 1990, fol- insinuations, manipulations, good promises, lowed by the parliamentary elections and multinational communities to ethnic in the spring of the same year. HSLS frictions” (Predrag Vranicki).15 Certainly, became a political party that gradual- broader cooperation with the EC- which ly left the Yugoslav framework, but has is based on the foundations of a market consistently remained focused on Euro- economy and liberal democracy – would pean liberal values. The electoral winner not have been possible without radical after the frst democratic elections was economic as well as political reforms. the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), The eforts of Prime Minister Ante Mark- party which primarily positions Croa- ović, who began radical reforms with tia’s national interests, without giving the help of world experts (Jefry Sachs) up – like almost all emerging political in 1989, have been hampered by Slobodan parties – clear European orientations. Milosević’s Greater Serbian nationalist Thanks to its good organization, afli- policy, which has resulted in heightened ation with the Croatian expatriate com- national tensions and accelerated ero- munity, the Catholic Church, but also sion of the institutions of the Yugoslav with a strong foothold in communist federation. structures in Croatia, the HDZ becomes

14 Pauković, Davor: Usred Oluje – Politička tranzicija u Hrvatskoj 1989/90. Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2018, p. 55. As part of the earmarked funds granted by the EC to Yugoslavia environmental protection was concerned. See Samarđija, Višnja: Europska unija i Hrvatska, p. 163. 15 Pauković, Davor: Usred Oluje – Politička tranzicija u Hrvatskoj 1989/90, pp. 70 – 71. 16 Ibidem, p. 75.

158 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives the leading force of the growing Cro- activities of the EC, and as much as 89% atian national movement.17 HDZ, and expressed a positive atitude towards especially its president – later Presi- closer cooperation, that is, direct involve- dent of the Republic of Croatia – Franjo ment of Croatia in the European Com- Tuđman, will mark the turning points munity. During this period – the great of recent Croatian history in the 1990s: turmoil in Yugoslavia – 73% of Croats the split with SFRY, international recog- thought that gaining full membership nition of the Croatian state and winning could be realized within fve years.18 the imposed war. The enormous enthusiasm that Despite the rapid erosion of federal the people of Croatia had for joining institutions, the European orientation the community of European peoples was of Croats culminated after the 1990 mul- in line with the Croatian-Slovenian pro- ti-party elections. This is evidenced by posals for a confederal transformation a poll conducted in the Yugoslav repub- of Yugoslavia, since both Slovenia and lics at the initiative of the EC in 1991, just Croatia, unlike the Serbian bloc, clearly before the outbreak of war and the al- expressed a desire for closer cooperation ready evident disintegration of the Yu- with the EU. Referring to the Constitution goslav state. The same survey was also of the Republic of Croatia, on 21 February conducted in three countries of Central 1991, the Croatian Parliament adopted Europe, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and a Resolution on the procedure for separa- Poland. According to the results of a sur- tion from the SFRY and possible associa- vey conducted in Croatia, it appeared tion with the Federation of Sovereign Re- that Croatian citizens have a signifcant- publics. In a referendum held on May 19, ly higher level of knowledge and under- 1991, 94.17% (83.56% of the total elector- standing of the EC at the time – includ- ate) voted for the option that legitimized ing the benefts of the common market state independence, with the possibility – than other citizens of Central Europe- of a confederate rearrangement of Yugosla- an countries surveyed. On average, 53% via.19 On the basis of the results of the ref- of respondents considered themselves erendum, on 25 June 1991, the Croatian well or even very well informed about Parliament adopted a constitutional de- the EC’s objectives and tasks, while cision on the sovereignty and independ- these indicators were at a signifcantly ence of the Republic of Croatia, while also lower level in Czechoslovakia, Hungary adopting the Declaration on the Proclama- and Poland. 78% of the population had tion of the Sovereign and Independent Repub- a positive atitude towards the goals and lic of Croatia. Following the intervention

17 At the end of October 1989, as the strongest opposition party to the League of Communists of Croatia, the HDZ already had about 30,000 members by the end of October 1989, which was ten times more than the HSLS. 18 Sirotić, Sonja: Povezivanje s Europskom zajednicom – stavovi stanovništva. Zagreb: IRMO, 1992, p. 94; Samarđija, Višnja: Europska unija i Hrvatska, pp. 157. – 158. 19 The referendum questions were asked as follows: 1. Are you in favor of the Republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, to form an alliance of sovereign states with other republics (according to the proposal of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia for the solution of the state crisis of the SFRY)? 2. Are you in favor of the Republic of Croatia remaining in Yugoslavia as a single federal state?

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 159 of the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) the democratic West, given its clear com- in Slovenia and the outbreak of conficts mitment to joining Western integrations in Croatia, diplomacy of the Europe- and organizations. The second reason an Community became involved. After for optimism can be seen in the already their intervention, a consensual deci- existing institutional structure of rela- sion on a moratorium of 3 months was tions with the European Community and reached. However, clashes continued. On regional co-operation (e.g. Alps Adriatic the expiry of the moratorium on 8 Octo- Working Community) developed by Cro- ber 1991, the Republic of Croatia broke atia already in the period of Yugoslavia. of state­legal relations with the other At the time of the formation of the Vy- republics of Yugoslavia and declared sehrad Group in early 1991, Croatia had independence. failed to join the association, whose Immediately after the breakdown of common goal was to join the European institutional ties with Yugoslavia, Croa- Community and NATO.21 According to tia proclaimed as a major strategic goal some interpretations of Croatia’s with- joining the Euro­Atlantic structures. drawal, it was motivated by the desire The outbreak of war made these aspira- for “Croatia to enter the European Commu- tions unrealistic: nity without staying in a transitional waiting room.”22Similarly, the invitation of the Vy- “In times of armed conficts, this seemed sehrad Initiative for the accession of Cro- like a fantasy. It was not yet clear what atia to CEFTA was rejected in Krakow would be the outcome and how will in December 1992. this area, including Croatia, would look The reaction of the international com- like at all. The EC did not manage, did munity was not in line with Croatian not know how to respond to this frst expectations. After American state sec- armed confict after World War II in its retary “James Baker’s half-hearted eforts ‘back yard’.”20 in Belgrade”, in June 1991, the US “made it clear it consider Yugoslavia as Europe’s prob- Nevertheless, Croatia had expec- lem”; „Europe was happy to tackle the chal- tations that the internationalization lenge”. 23 This European resignation by of the Yugoslav crisis would atract the US appeared at a time of triumphal

20 Staničić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, p. 95. 21 The Vysehrad Group was formed on February 15, 1991 with the aim of developing regional economic, cultural, energy and military cooperation at the initiative of the charismatic Czechoslovak leader Vaclav Havel, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. 22 According to the same source, Croatian President Tudjman’s views difered substantially from “Havel’s national, left-liberal rhetoric”, and did not match “Antall’s preference for sharp reform cuts in the economy.” Vresnik, Viktor: Znamo li 30 godina nakon pada socijalizma kakvu Hrvatsku želimo? In: Jutarnji list, 19 October 2019. The model of peaceful separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia has shown that it is impossible to reconcile individual national interests based on the aspiration of an independent state and the common interest of joining the desirable wider integrations. Following the 1993. breakup, both sovereign continue to operate through the Višegrad Group (together with Poland and Hungary) with the aim of regional cooperation, accession to European integration and NATO.

160 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives validation of European unity; the twelve “was initially characterized by a mixture members of the European Community of opportunism, ignorance, wrong-head- announced the formation of the Euro- ed assessments and aimlessness. (…) It pean Union, directly aimed at estab- seemed that many Western politicians lishing a common market (the largest would have preferred to deal with the old in the world) and the planned develop- Yugoslavia, with a single, albeit left/ ment of institutions to conduct a com- fascist, Marxist party – but nonetheless mon foreign policy and create joint se- one government – and not, suddenly, curity mechanisms. The hand-over several states, with several governments of the problem to Europe occurred and even more parties”.26 at the moment when the Yugoslav cri- sis grew into the frst armed confict on The key moves by the international European soil since World War II. Full community, led by the EC, generally con- of enthusiasm Europe took up the chal- stituted unsuccessful atempts to keep lenge; moreover, this occasion “present- pace with the outbreak of war, which ed the historic challenge that Europe needed after the brief Slovenian episode, moved to prove its singleness of purpose. Jacques with full ferocity to Croatia. The Brijuni Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, de- Declaration (July 1991) arranged a cease- clared: ‘The age of Europe has dawned’.”24 fre (that was not observed) and a three­ While Italian Foreign Minister Gianni month moratorium on the independence De Michelis announced more active en- proclaimed by Croatia and Slovenia. gagement by the Europeans – EC “would It also initiated the International Confer- be briefng the Americans on its activities, ence on Yugoslavia (September 1991) and but not consulting them”, Poos was even drafted the so-called Vance Plan (De- more unequivocal: “If one problem could be cember 1991), which was a basis for UN solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav peacekeeping forces deployment in the problem. This is a European country and it territory of the former Yugoslavia; at the is not up to the Americans. It is not up to same time it showed Yugoslavia, proved anyone else”. 25 to be half-hearted and belated solutions.27 Despite the pompous announcement, While Europe and the international com- the European “twelve” demonstrated no munity were seting down the postulates commitment to aligning the Yugoslav for human rights – as the foundations political realities with the principles they “of peace and security which crucially con- advocated in promoting European unity. tribute to the prevention of confict” – con- “The international community’s reaction to ficts and violations of human rights were the civil war”, as formulated by Alois Mock, escalating in Yugoslavia. The unfolding

23 Silber, Laura – Little, Allan: Smrt Jugoslavije. Opatija: Otokar Keršovani, 1996, p. 154. 24 Ibidem. 25 Almond, Mark: Europe’s Backyard War. London: Mandarin Paperback, 1994, p. 32. 26 Mook, Alois: Dossier Balkan i Hrvatska. Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1998, p. 14. 27 Nikić, Gorazd (ed.): Croatia Between Aggression and Peace. Zagreb: AGM, 1994. See in Bing, Albert: Croatia’s State Independence: Between Principle and Realpolitik. In: Review of Croatian History, a. 7, 2011, nr. 1, p. 219.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 161 Yugoslav crisis and relativisation of prin- the international community, including ciples by European moderators showed a majority of the EC member-states, did that a relatively unjust outcome was not not wish to engage themselves in the Yu- an alternative to an even bloodier war, goslav quagmire. Some, ignoring pre- but rather its guarantor. As observed by dictions, preferred an ostrich policy, Patrick Buchanan, “For the Croats, the road hoping that the crisis would go away by to hell” in 1991 was truly “paved with good itself, and, in general, the political will to intentions”. 28 frame an efective policy was absent.”30 Observations made by German dip- lomat Geert-Hinrich Ahrens indicate The indefnite posturing of the West, the extent to which Europe’s options above all the US and EC, from which were actually limited: Croatia expected support and assistance due to a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation, “Confict management in the inter- will signifcantly contribute to the escala- nal problems of a third country was, tion of the war (in the second half of 1992 at the end of the eighties, beyond the war spread to BiH) and changed Cro- the horizon of experience for the EC ats’ perceptions of the EC and the inter- member-countries. Existing instru- national community. One consequence ments – political contacts and economic was a loss of faith in “European values” assistance – were not suited for a crisis and a democratic standards. Failure to of such dimensions. Modern interna- adhere to the principles will pave the way tional concepts such as pre-confict for unprincipled realpolitik maneuvers, peace building, preventive deployment in which international moderators have of foreign military forces, or a ‘respon- participated alongside the “Balkan” sibility to protect,’ had not yet been ones.31 The Croatian enthusiasm for Eu- developed, and could not yet be the basis rope after the announcement of democrat- of the international intervention ic change and then the disappointment in Yugoslavia”29. which followed the West’s indiference were lucidly illustrated by Stanko Lasić, In addition, “Yugoslavia was not a writer and member of the Croatian the highest international priori- Council of the European Movement: ty. The impending disintegration of the Soviet Union, the frst Iraq “The Croatian people went into the war war, and developments in the EC and with enormous confdence in Europe and the newly reunited Germany command- in the rules of democracy. It saw Europe ed more atention than the ‛signs on as a natural ally and thus believed that the wall’ in Yugoslavia. For all these Europe would use the case of Croatia to reasons, it was not surprising that that show how it defended the right of peoples

28 Buchman, Patrick: The New A new indiferent order, U.S. taking a back seat. In: Washington Times, 25 October 1991 29 Ahrens, Geert-Hinrich: Diplomacy on the Edge-Containment of the Ethnic Confict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia. Washington DC / Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, p. 487. 30 Ibidem, p. 486. 31 Bing, Albert: Croatia’s State Independence, p. 219.

162 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives to self-determination, how it rushed to rights, Jacques Delors behaved like the aid of those atacked, how it con- an arrogant bureaucrat who knows that demned aggressors, how it analyzed these presidents whom he ‘summoned’ the historical situation, how it sympa- and ‘received one by one’ could do noth- thized with sufering”.32 ing to him, so he twisted the facts as he pleased just to remove any blame from Instead of policy which was suppose to Europe”.34 comply with its own principles, Lasić high- lighted the hypocrisy in the statements The international recognition of of European leaders. He therefore noted the Republic of Croatia in January 1992 the statement made by European Commis- raised new hopes for Croatia’s accession sion President Jacques Delors, who to Western integrations. However, with the transfer of the war to Bosnia and “standing on his pedestal of authority Herzegovina in the fall of 1992, Croa- and with false modesty, created this tia’s European path was again delayed, amalgam: ‘History is tragic’, ‘destructive this time indefnitely. In the period 1992 forces in it always await in ambush’, – 1995 a war spread to BiH, and result- ‘and Croatia and Serbia are responsible, ed with mass ethnic cleansig. Reactions each in its own way’. (…) ‘At the begin- from the international community were ning of the crisis, I received, one by one, slow and delayed. As noted in 1994 by each of the presidents of the Yugoslav Canadian Louise Gentile, who worked republics, and told them: Your inde- in Banja Luka for the U.N. High Com- pendence? I agree. The right to self-de- missioner for Refugees, termination? I agree. But, in line with the Helsinki Charter, are you prepared to “the terror continues, terror of atacks respect the rights of your minorities, to by armed men at night, rape and murder, refrain from changing borders by force, children unable to sleep, huddling in fear to democratize your administrations? (…) To those who said to themselves af- The only response I heard was drivel’.”33 ter seeing Schindler’s List, ‘Never again’: It is happening again. The so-called Lasić ironically, and caustically, com- leaders of the western world have known mented on Delors’ observations: what is happening here for the last year and the half. They receive play-by- “A masterful amalgam. Everything is play reports. They talk of prosecuting mixed together, nobody is guilty, all war criminals, but do nothing to stop in the same basket. Instead of saying the crimes. May God forgive them. May which president wanted to change God forgive us all.”35 borders by force, which president would not democratize his administration, who The ambivalent atitude of Croatia (in principle) does not respect minority towards BiH was a problem that not

32 Lasić, Stanko: Three Essays on Europe. Zagreb: The Croatian Council of the European Movement, 1992, p. 40. 33 Ibidem, pp. 44 – 45. 34 Ibidem, p. 45. 35 Maas, Peter: Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War. London: Papermac, 1996, p. 116.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 163 only slowed Croatia’s path to the EU, Such development has widened but stopped it altogether. Croatia was the gap between Croatia and the EC. among the frst to recognize BiH’s state The Community of European Nations independence, receive hundreds of thou- was based on respect for diversity – (e.g. sands of refugees and actively participate Milan Kundera saw Europe „as a maxi- in their care. In his public speeches, Pres- mum of diversity in minimum space“) – as ident Tudjman emphasized “how Croatia a fundamental heritage of European recognizes BiH within the former republi- history and culture. The achievement can borders”; however, many of his state- of European cohesion stemmed from ments called that into question: “Croatia economic integration but also respect recognizes an independent Bosnia and Her- for common civilizational achievements zegovina, but if Serbia shows aspirations to such as human rights, inviolability some of its parts, then Croatia may claim of borders, etc. The principles of Euro- other parts as well.”36 Greater Serbian ag- pean integration were diametrically op- gression was further compounded by posed to the events and policies that led the confict of victims of that aggression – to the breakup of the Yugoslav state. As Bosniaks and BiH Croats; many members Ivo Banac noted there was of the international community began to equalize Serbian and Croatian politics “an underlying patern that continues in BiH. Regardless of Tudjman’s views across the conficts in the former Yu- (which also divided the Croatian public), goslavia, from the atack on Slovenia the fact remains that the international right the way through to the campaign community itself – led by the EC until in Kosovo and even its spill-over into 1994 and then the United States – con- Macedonia in 2001, namely that ethnic tributed directly to such developments cleansing and the construction of nation- with its assessments and realpolitical ally homogenous states were not the con- compromises. In this context, it can be sequence of but rather the aim of war.“ said that the events in the former Yugo- slavia were an absolute negation of civ- Although „this proposition might not ilization’s reach and European values. have been obvious to all parties in the en- Croatia’s military victory in 1995 ended counter at the beginning of the war“, and the Greater Serbian aggression and cre- it certainly wasn’t the same in diferent ated the preconditions for a peace agree- parts of Yugoslavia (as well as in vari- ment in Dayton at the end of the same ous segments of Yugoslav society), it be- year. Croatian cooperation was also a key came their common stock in the course contribution to the peaceful reintegra- of the confict; the concept of national tion of the Croatian Danube region (1996 homogeneity became the predominant – 1998). Nevertheless, Croatia remained political patern: in a sort of international isolation un- til the death of the frst Croatian presi- “The leaders of the Serb, Croat, Bosniac, dent in December 1999. Of course, this Kosovar Albanian and other national stopped the process of joining the Euro- communities, with variations evidently pean integrations. believed that national homogeniety,

36 Staničić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, p. 98.

164 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives that is, statehood without minorities, and his associates thought that the Tribunal constitued political stability and ofered would not deal with ‘individual’ violations the only genuine chance for peace.”37 of international law commited in a defensive war.”40 The ICTY did not meet these ex- In this context, the question of re- pectations and insufcient cooperation sponsibility for the dire consequenc- with the Tribunal became the causes es of the bloody disintegration of Yu- of international isolation in the late 1990s. goslavia “along the national seams” was EU representatives maintained that full raised. As observed by Michael Ignatief compliance with the ICTY would serve the frst politician to begin exploiting “as a proof of atainment of democratic stand- nationalist rhetoric anywhere in Eastern ards”. Furtheremore, “sufcient cooperation Europe was Slobodan Milošević.38 His with The Hague Tribunal would thus signal so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution” Croatia’s readiness for the process of EU mem- and “homogenization of the Serbian na- bership negotiations.”41 Practically, the iso- tion” sparked rebellion of Croatian Serbs lation lasted until the death of Croatian who became the ffth column of Greater president (Decemeber 1999). When new Serbia aspirations. The ultimate conse- goverment changed the ofcial stance quence of Milošević’s demagogic atempt towards the ICTY in 2000 the isolation to reconcile “the communist notion of unity came to an end and enabled further steps with national homogenisation” ended – to to EU and NATO integration. paraphrase Philip Gourevitch – in occur- After the 2000 parliamentary elec- rence of “genocide as an exercise in building tions, 6 coalition parties took over community.”39 the government, creating the precondi- The circumstances of the breakup tions for a new policy towards the EU. of Yugoslavia led the international com- In the spring of 2000, the project “Croa- munity to set up the International Crim- tia in the 21st Century” began, as the part inal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of the strategy of Croatia’s accession to (ICTY) on May 25, 1993. Croats from BiH the EU . It was considered as a prior- and Croatia also found themselves on ity issue. A number of prominent ex- the indictment bench, prompting violent perts participated in the development reactions in Croatia: “Many Croatian cit- of the strategy in cooperation with izens saw the prosecution of war crimes as the Ministry of Foreign Afairs and an external atempt to undermine the coun- the Ministry of European Integration. try’s sovereignty and challenge the estab- One of the priority objectives of the Strat- lished national identity;” Among the pol- egy was to “achieve readiness for full EU iticians there was a widespread believe membership by 2006 and enter full mem- that ICTY “would primarily punish ‘the ag- bership no later than 2008 – 2010. After gressor’ (Serbia) and confrm Croatia’s status two years, the strategy was neither re- as victim of Greater Serbia policy. Tuđman jected nor accepted. It was evaluated “as

37 Banac, Ivo: The Politics of National Homogeneity. In: War and Change in the Balkans, Nationalism, Confict and Cooperation. Ed.: Brad K. Blitz. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 30. 38 Ignatieff, Michael: Blood and Belonging. London: 1994., p. 75. 39 Svendsen, Lars: Filozofja zla. Zagreb: Tim press, 2011, p. 121. 40 Maldini, Pero – Pauković, Davor (eds.): Croatia and the European Union, p. 43. 41 Ibidem.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 165 good analytical material”, but the President an important step towards afrming in- of the Croatian Government’s Coordina- ternational economic and monetary uni- tion for Internal and Foreign Policy con- ty political entity.43 With the accession cluded that it was an unnecessary docu- of ten new members on May 1, 2004, ment because the alleged strategic steps the “milestone phase of the EU’s develop- and objectives proposed had already ment as international integration” began; been presented in several documents, for the frst time in European integration, so it was not needed to bring another the border of ideological and civiliza- one.42 The reason for such confusion can tional models, as well as the division into be sought in the inability of the Croatian the West and the East, was crossed. Sub- state bureaucracy, which neglected EU sequent conclusions from the EU-NA- accession strategy in four years period. TO leaders meeting revealed that it was Nevertheless, at the end of 2002, the Cro- “more about the political than an economic atian Parliament adopted by consensus project aimed at establishing a long-term zone a resolution on the need to join the EU. of stability and security in Europe”. In ad- At the time of Croatia’s frst steps dition, the criteria for admission of new in implementing the EU accession pro- members were further harmonized.44 cess, major changes were taking place In short, the EU was in a dynam- within the Union itself. Thus, a resolution ic process of structural, administrative of the European Parliament of 5 Septem- and institutional change, which certain- ber 2001 established a formal framework ly infuenced the process of its “eastward for the formation of ESDP (European Se- expansion”. 45 curity and Defense Policy) military and In doing so, there was a gap in Cro- civilian structures, which confrmed atian preparations in relation to chang- the previously expressed initiative to es within the Union itself. For example, form a European Security Force (ap- at the moment when the Strategy was proximately 60,000 troops). At a meeting launched, Croatia has not yet signed of European leaders in Laeken the same the EU Stabilization and Association Agree- year, a draft of the new EU Constitution ment (it was signed on 19 October 2001), – the “Convention for the Future of Europe” which was an important prerequisite – was created to strengthen the political for further steps in accession.46 EU inte- and international sovereignty of the Un- gration progress has had to be monitored ion; The EU Constitution was signed by and coordinated in Croatia. Awareness the 25 Member States in October 2004. of the challenges of adapting all seg- Following the “abolition” of borders by ments of Croatian society to EU criteria the Schengen Treaty (1985) and the intro- and standards was not really clearly pre- duction of the common European cur- sented to the Croatian public. A major ob- rency in early 2002, the EU has taken stacle was the country’s unpreparedness

42 Staničić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, p. 213. 43 Ibidem, pp. 66 – 69. 44 Ibidem, p. 180. 45 The European Council initially set the conditions for a new EU membership in June 1993 with the so-called Copenhagen criteria. 46 The Stabilization and Association Agreement established the initial framework for Croatia’s EU accession process. The three most important parts were related to the economy, legislative and institutional adjustment.

166 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives for judicial reforms and economic adjust- cause democratic defects. In addition, ments that required “a whole new and much the problems with acceptance of ICTY more professional and rational approach to indictments revealed issues with the full business.”47 The ofcial application for Cro- acceptance of rule of law and thus pointed atia’s accession to the European Union to the poor functioning of the third par- was submited on 21 February 2003. tial regime, i.e. the civic rights regime.”49 In July 2003, Croatia received a ques- tionnaire with 4560 questions based The beginning of the formal process on the draft of the European Commis- of Croatia’s accession to the EU has raised sion’s opinion. It was answered by the many problems. The specifcs of the Cro- Croatian side in October of the same year. atian transition, frst of all the war cir- Following a successful evaluation, Croa- cumstances in the frst half of the 1990s, tia was granted candidate status in June and then the isolation of Croatia until 2004. The start of negotiations on full EU the end of the decade, disturbed “many membership was scheduled for March civilization criteria in its internal relations,” 2005. Negotiations were delayed due to as well as relations with the internation- the negative report about Croatia’s coop- al community. Problems were expressed eration with the ICTY. The reason was in all social segments. One of the biggest the indictment against Croatian General problem was the “incredible and highly Ante Gotovina who few toward the Cro- corrupt justice system”; according to a poll atian authorities involvement in Got- by Transparency International, conduct- ovina’s escape EU postponed the start ed in November 2004, as many as 38% of accession negotiations with Croatia. examinee believed “the Croatian justice The Croatian public predominantly be- system is the most corrupt of all other Cro- lieved that any part of the indictment atian institutions”. 50 The inefcient econ- against Gotovina “represented an atempt omy ravaged by the war and transition to criminalize the Croatian Homeland War. problems exhibited many weaknesses. Thus, Gotovina became a symbol of what Croatia had excellent economic experts numerous Croatians perceived as unjust who actively participated in the devel- treatment by The Hague Tribunal.”48 After opment of transition economic models the transfer of Gotovina to The Hague, in the early 1990s, however, the decision the ICTY ceased to be the main topic to privatize social ownership was made regarding Croatia’s EU accession but by the Croatian political leadership. the public opinion presented more scep- President Tudjman himself “saw swift ticism toward the EU. The troublesome privatization as a means of Westernizing and relation of Croatia with the ICTY Europeanizing Croatia and clearing the path for full independence and international rec- “has highlighted how unresolved ognition.” The managerial elite consisted statehood and nationhood issues can of old communist technocrats and new afect democratic consolidation and elites closely related to government,

47 Staničić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, p. 72. These two aspects will remain a major problem for Croatia after its formal accession to the EU. 48 Maldini, Pero – Pauković, Davor (eds.): Croatia and the European Union, p. 44. 49 Ibidem, p. 46. 50 Staničić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, p. 249.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 167 “either through party membership or In one poll conducted in 2011, 58 percent through informal networks of kinship of citizens voted in favor of Croatia’s EU and regional or local origin. The dis- accession, and 31 percent opposed it.54 tribution of wealth and power and Studies of the perceptions of the pros the allocation of key posts and functions and cons of Croatia’s EU accession have according to patrimonial, paternalistic also shown polarization. Eurosceptic cit- and clientelistic paterns turned Cro- izens believed that Croatia’s accession to atia’s transitional economy into crony the EU “will lead to loss of hers long-awaited capitalism.”51 sovereignty, that is, it will be completely lost among all these developed countries.” Ac- Due to such situation the 2005–2009 cording to these considerations, Croatia European Commission progress reports “should frst regulate itself in order to become objected that “further privatization was pro- a member of a large European market and so- gressing too slowly”, partially due to a “large ciety.” Similarly, many felt that “Croatia is number of lawsuits against the Croatian Pri- not qualifed as a state in which every indi- vatization Fund” and that was considered vidual can be efectively and fairly tried” and as “a sign of bad preparation for the EU com- that “there is no European worldview and mon market”. T he problem s of “national political culture that entails responsibility” protectivism and government control” was (the argument was that the ruling HDZ also perceived as the cause of poor com- government does not know which chap- pliance to European market standards.52 ters had being negotiated).55 Other argu- Added to this is a “mental set that has hardly ments related to an inefcient economy adapted to the basic elements of liberalism”. 53 (high rate of unemployment), the view All these complex social problems will that education in Croatia “lacks the capaci- remain present in Croatian society even ty to produce competent professionals at glob- after formal accession to the EU. al levels and that there is insufcient invest- Despite expectations, Croatia’s path to ment in research and development”. This the EU has taken another decade (more was followed by allegations that Croatia than twenty years after state independ- is not prone to invasive problem-solving ence). The European Parliament gave its and dialogue with civil society, and that consent to the accession of the Republic Croatians have “a very low level of political of Croatia to the European Union only culture and would not be able to cope with on 9 December 2011. The process of join- the EU’s challenges”. Therefore, if Croa- ing the desirable community of Europe- tia joins the EU, it will remain a country an countries has proved to be extremely of unequal opportunities in which cor- complex and painstaking and has pro- ruption and bad rule contribute to the bit- voked very conficting views of citizens terness of a nation that no longer knows on Croatia’s European perspectives. what to think, to whom it should trust,

51 Maldini, Pero – Pauković, Davor (eds.): Croatia and the European Union, pp. 39 – 40. 52 Ibidem. 53 Staničić, Mladen: Dugo putovanje Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, pp. 202 – 204. 54 Opinion polling was regularly carried out by three diferent agencies; since May 2011, percentages supporting EU membership ranged between 55% and 63%. 55 Marelja, Magdalena: Dobre i loše strane ulaska Hrvatske u Europsku uniju, htp://www.unidu.hr/ novost.php?idvijest=1757. Internet access May 13, 2019.

168 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives and will eventually turn into a subjective has at its disposal such as people, space, type of political culture, where people the Adriatic Sea, geopolitical position are aware of the situation in the country and various natural resources are good but does nothing. “Negative experienc- grounds for creating wealth for Croa- es of the EU’s relations with weaker mem- tian citizens. Croatia is one of the few bers were cited by the current case of Greek countries with sea and plains, but also ‛debt bondage’.” The example of Iceland hills and mountains in one place. But to as a non-EU country was highlighted, as achieve this, capital, modern technology a sovereign state which opposed the dic- and a reasonable organization of Croa- tates of powerful Union members such tian society are needed, all that Croatia as UK in time of crises. It is interesting lacks and is abundant in the EU.” that Euroscepticism was represented by many members of civil society organiza- Support for Croatia’s EU acces- tions as well as radical national groups – sion was expressed by the then leaders otherwise opposed political views.56 of Croatia, President Ivo Josipović, Prime The benefts of Croatia’s acces- Minister Jadranka Kosor and many other sion to the EU were seen in entering leaders.57 a natural geo-political framework that The referendum on Croatia’s acces- will strengthen democratic processes sion to the European Union was held on in Croatia, provide a security zone de- January 22, 2012. The turnout for the ref- void of Balkan uncertainty and elimi- erendum was relatively weak; only 43.51 nate the negative efects of transition. percent of the total registered electorate Joining the single European market with came out to declare Croatia’s European free fow of capital, technology and labor fate. Despite the support of the majority force was expected to halt the relative lag of citizens to Croatia’s EU accession (66.67 of Croatia. It was somewhat bizarre to percent) even 33.33 percent was against. think that with “entry into the common Eu- When these fgures are compared with ropean labor market, Croatian workers will the results of the 1991 referendum on be able to compete in a market where 30 mil- independence, marked by the Europhil- lion jobs are created”, since after the acces- ia of Croats, it is clear that enthusiasm sion to the EU there was a mass exodus for European integration has experi- of working-age population from Croatia enced signifcant erosion. In the spring with unprecedented demographic, eco- of 2012, the Croatian Parliament ratifed nomic and social consequences. Opti- the Treaty on the Accession of the Re- mists also emphasized that by joining public of Croatia to the European Union, the Union, Croatia will become more at- and the entry into the force of the Treaty tractive to foreign investors and through took place on 1 July 2013. This act pre- its interaction with the developed Eu- sented a new period of Croatian history. rope, will realize its potential: In all former communist states, the de- feat of communism created a natural ten- “Although Croatia is one of the relatively dency to promote liberal values, both poorer EU countries, the resources it politically and economically. At the time

56 Ibidem. 57 Ibidem.

Albert Bing: Croatia’s Transition to the European Union 169 of the collapse of communism, Croatia civilization values. The consequence was one of the former socialist entities was the development of Euroscepti- with the best prospects for a successful cism among Croats. All this gave rise transition and accession to the European to doubts about Croatia’s accession to Community. However, the imposed war the EU. Due to problems with the inter- halted this process and delayed that goal national community, Croatia found itself for more than two decades. The war that in a kind of isolation in the second half took place on the soil of Croatia and Bos- of the 1990s, which practically stopped nia and Herzegovina was the last and the way to the desired integrations. only war in Europe after World War II, In the background of war, state-building and the disintegration of the Yugoslav and post-war-reconstruction, problemat- state was a process inverse to European ic privatization of former socially owned integration. The tragedy was manifest- property took place, which over the dec- ed in the complete defeat of European ades resulted in the continued plunder values. The international community, and devastation of national resources. led by Europe, emphasized internation- The general emergence of clientelism, al conventions and principles without corruption, nepotism and inefective a principled determination to enforce judiciary have slowed the development it on the actors of the Yugoslav Rasho- of democratic institutions. This was re- mon. Due to the lack of mechanisms, fected in a slow adoption of democrat- lack of consensus and lack of political ic and economic standards, which were will, none of the signifcant internation- a prerequisite for an efective approach al actors or associations was prepared to to European integration. All these cir- take efective action against those partic- cumstances and factors led to a long ipants in the Balkan drama who violated Croatian path to the European Union.

170 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives Aleksandar Jakir* The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia

Výzva na riešenie zložitelj minulosti v Chorvátsku / Izazov bavljenja problematičnom prošlošću u Hrvatskoj

Konkurirajuće interpretacije tv. „bolnih“ ili „osjetljivih“ tema suvremene hrvatske povijesti ne izazivaju samo rasprave u historiografji nego i u javnosti u Hrvatskoj, a nerijetko i političke prijepore. Ako pogledamo javne rasprave koje se vode u Hrvatskoj o različitim povijesnim temama koje se odnose na povijest 20. stojeća, mogli bismo čak govoriti o ratovima sjećanja koji se vode u javnom prostoru. Zasigurno ne postoji manjak tekstova i izjava u javnom prostoru u Hrvatskoj o tome što se smatra „ispravnom“ interpretacijom različitih aspekata povijesti 20. stoljeća, naročito kad se radi o takozvanim „osjetljivim pitanjima“ kao što je, primjerice, masovno nasilje počinjeno od pobjedničkih komunista 1945. godine. Suprotstavljene interpretacije ovakvih tema suvremene hrvatske povijesti ne pokreću samo rasprave među povjesničarima nego čak u većoj mjeri izazivaju javne rasprave u Hrvatskoj, s tim da se rasprave oko različitih interpretacija prošlosti često pretvaraju u neku vrstu nadmetanja na političkom bojištu. Ključne riječi: Drugi svjetski rat, kontroverze, „teška“ ili „problematična“ prošlost, kolektivno pamćenje, Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, klasni neprijatelji, „kriva“ strana, ideologizacija

discussion about what notions seems an important element for under- Aof the past were, and how the past standing these debates in Croatian soci- was presented and interpreted during ety today. It could be said that the top- the time of communism, seems to be ic how a society is dealing with difcult helpful in trying to understand why issues of traumatic historical experiences the topic of mass violence commited is of paramount importance for a beter by the victorious communists in 1945 understanding also of the historical pro- is still so fercly debated in Croatia. cesses that led to the collapse of socialist How the regime in power after WW II ideology and hence to the establishment dealt with the past, during more or less of a democratic Croatian state in 1990. the entire time of existence of the so- However, the aim of this essay is merely cialist state and its ideology, and how to make some brief remarks concerning these interpetations of the past had the challanges of dealing with a difcult been passed on to new generations, still past in Croatia by addressing the debates

* Aleksandar Jakir, the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Split (the Republic of Croatia).

Aleksandar Jakir: The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia 171 in Croatian public and historiography subject to the needs of the present. Every connected with the traumatic historical observer of the political debates in Cro- legacy concerning the mass violence that atia on historical topics will easily come occured after the end of WW II.1 to the conclusion of how deep the divi- Generally, the controversies on re- sions in Croatian society are, which in- membering and forgeting certain aspects terwine the traumatic cultural memo- of the past is, of course, not only in Cro- ries, especially of the wars fought during atia a most debated subject. It seems safe the 20th century. to say that competing narratives and in- Dealing with the past during the times terpretations, as the controversies show, of state socialism meant that there were mark a deep rift in Croatian society. In that certain ofcial interpretations expected sense we defnitely can speak of a „dif- by a political regime that for several dec- cult“ or „problematic“ past. French soci- ades had the power to shape the politics ologist Maurice Halbwachs argued quite of remembrance and memory in society. a long time ago in his work on collective The role of the construction of the past memory that all memory is socially con- in legitimizing socialism surely should structed. There can be litle doubt that not be underestimated. If we take into ac- both institutionalized memory – the in- count that the revolutionary origins of so- terpretations of the past constructed by cialist Yugoslavia in 1945 were directly political elites, their supporters, and their connected with a policy of mass violence opponents – and individual memory are that included also ethnic purifcation,2

1 Here I will use some arguments partly also presented in the following publications of mine, where also further bibliographical reference can be found: Jakir, Aleksandar: Memories in Confict: Remembering the Partisans, the Second World War and Bleiburg in Croatia. In: Balkan Memories: Media Constructions of National and Transnational History. Ed.: Tanja Zimmermann: Bielefeld: transcript, 2012, pp. 187 – 205 and Idem – Vulić, Paulinka: Recepcija Bleiburga u hrvatskoj javnosti kao tema povijesnog istraživanja [The Reception of Bleiburg in the Croatian public as research topic]. In. Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Splitu, nr. 6/7, 2015, pp. 195 – 206. 2 The question of migration of population, in the Yugoslav case mostly the expulsion of ethnic Germans and Italians, pose special problems when we try to come to a historic assessment. Of course, this can only be properly understood when put in a broader context of post WW II developments. At the end of the Second World War, Central and Eastern Europe in general were marked by the process of massive population migration. As is well known, at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Allies confrmed the plan they had coordinated already during the war and which envisaged a post-war Europe formed on the basis, wherever possible, “ethnically homogenous countries”. Surely the modern development of nation states contributed to the establishment of this idea, as Michael Mann in his study “The dark side of democracy” (2005) argued. In the frst place it was the fate of the so­called Volksdeutsche, the ethnic Germans, that was sealed, as they lost their homes where they had lived for centuries. It has been calculated that more than 12 million German-speaking civilians in Europe were driven from their homes in the wake of WW II. All countries of Central and Eastern Europe saw more or less forced migrations in the form of expulsion, deportation, population exchange, options etc., as minorities in principle were considered as a source of instability, and after the Third Reich especially an existing German minority. In the case in Yugoslavia, although the Allies had never ofcially sanctioned deportations, the expulsions of Germans was accomplished with and accompanied by great violence. During the time of socialism an ofcial policy of silence existed over the fact that half a million former citizens of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had disappeared from the territory of the successor state.

172 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives we have to ask ourselves how this was the Heart of Darkness of Yugoslav social- portrayed in ofcial accounts of the past? ism. A system that for a long time, after It seems that the one­sided ofcial inter- the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, to the outside pretations of the past during socialist world was presented as the most liberal times layed the basis for the deep rift and free type of socialism never con- within Croatian society, and that even fronted itself with the mass crimes that thirty years after the end of communism were commited with the aim to come a part of the Croatian society is still not to power and to preserve it. It was not willing to confront itself with the dimen- talked about the fact that Socialist Revo- sions of mass violence connected with lution in Yugoslavia implied and sought the rise to power of the Communist par- fatalities in great numbers. How radical ty of Yugoslavia (as there sadly are also the eforts were to establish socialism other parts of society who are not will- in Yugoslavia becomes clear when we ing to accept the dimensions of mass look at the number of „enemies” and crimes commited by the Ustasha during „traitors” killed at the end of the war, and WWII and the Independent State of Cro- after the war had ended. Many of those atia, a puppet sate of the Axis Powers). who were identifed by the Communist For the purpose of this essay I would Party as actual or potential enemies, like to concentrate on the fact that and as an obstacle to establish the new the aspect of violence connected with regime, were killed without any trial the establishment of Communist rule in the spring of 1945. after 1945 is often neglected in historical One of the best experts on this sub- accounts of Yugoslav socialism. There ject, the historian Vladimir Geiger from can be litle doubt that the Yugoslav Zagreb, who has been dealing with these communists after their victory in 1945 questions for decades points to the fact introduced a system with key totalitar- (after analyzing a great range of ac- ian features as one-party system, mass cessible sources as well as the existing extra­judicial executions, control of mass scientifc literature, and taking into ac- media with the propagation of the of- count various methodological calcula- cial communist ideology, establishment tion methods), that the number of vic- of a „political armed force” subordinate tims in the immediate post-war period to the Communist Party etc. In my point – and this number does not (!) include war of view the fact of mass violence during casualties – amounts to „at least“ 70,000 communist revolution (that also included to 80,000 dead, including the number ethnic violence3), using the famous title of „around 50,000 to 55,000“ Croatians of Joseph Conrad´s novel, we could call killed.4 Michael Portmann in his works

3 Shortly after 1945 the Germans, mostly from Vojvodina and Slavonia, numbering over one­half million, as well as Italian so­called “optants” had to leave through forcible deportation and fight. 4 See Geiger, Vladimir: Brojčani pokazatelji o ljudskim gubicima Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću. Represija i zločini komunističkog režima u Hrvatskoj: Zbornik radova. Ed.: Romana Horvat. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2012, pp. 51 – 90, here 77 with reference on Grahek Ravančić, Martina: Razmišljanje o broju pogubljenih i stradalih na Bleiburgu i Križnom putu. In: Časopis za suvremenu povijest, a. 40, 2008, nr. 3, pp. 851 – 868 and from the same author.: Eadem: Bleiburg i Križni put 1945: Historiografja, publicistika i memoarska literature. In: Ibidem, pp. 317 – 333 and Eadem: Bleiburg i Križni put. Zagreb: Hrvatski insitut za povjest, 2009; also Geiger, Vladimir: Josip Broz Tito i ratni zločini: Bleiburg – Folksdojčeri. Zagreb: Hrvatski insitut za Povjest, 2013.

Aleksandar Jakir: The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia 173 estimates the number of killed as 80,000.5 and after WWII communists excessively There can be no reasonable doubt that used accusations of collaboration with massive violence and terror was used by the foreign powers that occupied Yugo- the victorious partisans in 1945 against slavia during 1941-45 against their real real or percieved enemies.6 Proof for that or perceived enemies. Also, so-called claim can be easily found in published class enemies, as well as other ideological editions of documents and recent mon- and political enemies, were eliminated ographs that are also based on a great under accusations that there were col- number of sources.7 It surely can be laborators of the Axis powers during said that without violence and terror WW II. In the eyes of the new regime the Communist Party would have hardly enemies and perceived enemies had to been able to seize power in 1945. be removed without mercy. The goal This fact was neither mentioned nor of this strategy was to silence, marginal- discussed in ofcial accounts of the past ize, and demobilize potential challengers during socialist times. For decades it was and their supporters in order to create as considered a taboo topic within Yugo- much political homogeneity as possible. It slavia to discuss what the establishment seems reasonable to assume that the role of communist authority in Croatia and that violence played in the destruction elsewhere in Yugoslavia in 1945 real- of bonds of shared community was enor- ly meant. Hence the waves of arrests mous. In all these processes we have and liquidations, and how opponents to be aware of the crucial implications or assumed opponents of communist that the hegemonic role of the commu- authority were removed, massivly and nist party in politics and in the process mercilessly, for long decades were no of shaping the society had. The political topic of substantial research. During will of the victors was extraordinarily

5 Portmann, Michael: Kommunistische Abrechnung mit Kriegsverbrechern, Kollaborateuren, „Volksfeinden“ und „Verrätern“ in Jugoslawien während des Zweiten Weltkriegs und unmitelbar danach (Magisterarbeit). Wien: Grin Verlag, 2002 and Idem: Die kommunistische Revolution in der Vojvodina 1944 – 1952: Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Kultur. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008. 6 See Hrvatski državni arhiv (ed): Zapisnici Politbiroa Centralnoga komiteta Komunističke partije Hrvatske 1945 – 1952., Svezak 1 1945 – 1948, priredila Branislava Vojnović. Zagreb 2005; Hrvatski državni arhiv (ed.): Zapisnici Politbiroa Centralnoga komiteta Komunističke partije Hrvatske 1945 – 1952., Svezak 2 1949 – 1952, priredila Branislava Vojnović. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006; Hrvatski institut za povijest – Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje (ed.): Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. – 1946. Dokumenti, knjiga 4 Dalmacija. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2011; Hrvatski institut za povijest – Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje (ed): Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944. – 1946. Dokumenti (drugo izdanje). Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2005; Matković, Blanka and Štimac, Stjepan (eds.): Vrgorska krajina, Makarsko primorje i neretvanski kraj u dokumentima Ozne i Udbe i Narodne milicije (1944. – 1965.): Likvidacije i progoni. Zagreb: Hrvatska družba povjesničara “Dr. Rudolf Horvat”, 2018 and Matković, Blanka (ed..): Split i srednja Dalmacija u dokumentima OZN-e i UDB-e (1944. – 1962). Likvidacije i zarobljenički logori. Trilj: Hrvatska družba povjesničara “Dr. Rudolf Horvat” 2017. 7 Starič, Jera Vodušek: Kako su komunisti osvojili vlast 1944. – 1946. Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2006; Represija i zločini komunističkog režima u Hrvatskoj: Zbornik radova. Eds.: Romana Horvat; Zorislav Lukić; Luka Vukušić i Vesna Zednik. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2012 and Matkovich, Blanka: Croatia and Slovenia at the End and After the Second World War (1944 – 1945): Mass Crimes and Human Rights Violations Commited by the Communist Regime. Irvine [CA]: Brown Walker Press, 2017.

174 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives powerful in the immediate aftermath that lost their lives as allies of the parti- of 1945. That also meant that the relations san movement.11 between the new regime and the reli- All in all we can say that the ofcial gious communities in the frst years af- Yugoslav fgures never came close to ter WW II were extremely bad, and that the real extent of the violence in the af- the regime often used repressive means termath of WWII. Ofcially it was only and violence, as sources and literature on admited that the martial courts in Yugo- the topic indicate. In Croatia the Catho- slavia pronounced 5,484 death sentences lic church was by far the most important during the course of 1945, of which 4,864 anti-communist institution, and the re- were handed down to civilians (even gime treated it as ideological adversary. these fgures could be considered as 8 Some authors even spoke of the „war an indicator of how violent the new re- against organised religion“ in the frst gime came to power) . However, in reality years of Tito’s Yugoslavia.9 Jozo Tomase- these numbers were much much high- vich listed 354 killed catholic prieest dur- er. Well­founded fgures for the number ing the war and 31 that were killed after of those who lost their lives in Yugosla- the end of the war, in total 385 mem- via’s territory at the hands of the commu- bers of the catholic clergy that lost their nist led army and the communist author- lives.10 On the other hand there were also ities during the Second World War and catholic priests who joined the anti­fas- post-war years clearly indicate how mas- cist struggle during the war under lead- sive this violence was. The establishment ership of the Communist, with 46 priests of communist rule in Yugoslavia meant

8 See Akmadža, Miroslav: Crkva i država: Dopisivanje i razgovori između predstavnika Katoličke crkve i komunističke državne vlasti u Jugoslaviji, vol. 1: 1945 – 1952; vol. 2: 1953 – 1960; vol. 3: 1961 – 1963. Zagreb – Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2008 – 2012. Idem: Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945. – 1966. Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 2004; Idem: Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni odnosi od 1945. do 1966. godine: Primjer Zagrebačke nadbiskupije. Zagreb: Društvo za povjesnicu Zagrebačke nadbiskupije „Tkalčić“, 2003; Idem: Stradanja svećenika Đakovačke i Srijemske biskupije 1944. – 1960. Slavonski Brod – Đakovo: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2012; Idem: Položaj Katoličke crkve u Hercegovini u prvim godinama komunističke vladavine. In: Hum i Hercegovina kroz povijest: Zbornik radova s međunarodnog znanstvenog skupa održanog u Mostaru 5. i 6. studenoga 2009., knj. II. Ed.: Ivica Lučić. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2011, str. 491 – 508; Stella, Alexander: Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Karaula, Marijan: Žrtve i mučenici stradanja bosanskih franjevaca u Drugom svjeskom ratu i komunizmu. Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi, 1999; Kožul, Stjepan: Stradanja u zagrebačkoj nadbiskupiji za vrijeme Drugoga svjetskoga rata i poraća. Zagreb: Društvo za povjesnicu, 2004 and Krišto, Jure: Katolička crkva u totalitarizmu 1945 – 1990.: Razmatranja o Crkvi u Hrvatskoj pod komunizmom. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1997. 9 Ramet, Sabrina P.: Die drei Jugoslawien: Eine Geschichte der Staatsbildungen und ihrer Probleme. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011, p. 277. 10 Tomasevich, Jozo: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941 – 1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 572. See also Akmadža, Miroslav: Primjena represivnog sustava prema Katoličkoj crkvi. In: Komisija Hrvatske biskupske konferencije i Biskupske konferencije Bosne i Hercegovina za hrvatski martirologij: Hrvatski mučenici i žrtve iz vremena komunističke vladavine: Zbornik radova s međunarodnog znanstvenog skupa održanog u Zagrebu 24. i 25. travnja 2012. godine. Ed.: Mile Bogović. Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 2013, pp. 85 – 106. 11 Petešić, Ćiril: Katoličko svećenstvo u NOB 1941 – 1945. Zagreb: Vjesnikova Press agencija, 1982, pp. 274 – 276 and Matijević, Margareta: Između partizana i „pristojnosti“: Život i doba Svetozara Ritiga (1873. – 1961.). Zagreb: Plejada­Hrvatski institut za povijest Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, 2019.

Aleksandar Jakir: The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia 175 persecution of hundreds of thousands in public. If we want to understand the full of real or imagined war criminals, col- legacy of the communist system we can laborators, and „people’s enemies”, and not turn away from the fact that during millions of people (mostly civilians) were the existence of this system never any expelled or were forced to leave their responsibility for the perpetators were homes by the new authorities. This collec- sought. Historiography during the so- tive experience of mass violence was long cialist period generally „resolved” prob- kept under the surface but never ceased lems of guilt and responsibility for those to exist in the memories of those who sur- who were victimized by the mass killings vived, and were transmited to their fami- in 1945 in such a way that it did not occu- ly members and next generations through py itself with them, and there was even unofcial channels as long as the monop- an opinion that all those condemned to oly of ofcial interpretation within the so- death or who were killed without trial cialist state existed. Even nowadays, al- deserved such a fate. On the other hand, though the extremely high human losses a revisionist historiography generally both among combatants and among civil- interpreted the crimes that were commit- ians during and after WW II are a much ted very superfcially and schematically debated topic, up to the present day no as hatred for everything Croatian, or as consensus about even some basic facts hatred for the church when dealing with seems is in sight in Croatia, not within crimes towards the clergy. It sure lacked historiography not in society. There is an analysis of the broader Croatian, Yu- no consensus even about plain facts con- goslavian context. And so Croatian his- cerning numbers of fatalities, casualties torical science and the public fnd them- and victims of war and revolution, not selves in the position that not even today to speak about largely accepted historical have they achieved consensus regarding narratives. What we have are compet- the problem of guilt and responsibility, ing narratives of resentment and blame, and the destiny of hundreds of thousands as Sabrina Ramet has once put it. Un- of people who fell victim in the confict fortunately, to the present day numbers with the „people’s enemy“, with or with- of victims are intentionally exaggerated out court convictions. or diminished out of political reasons. Like the number of victims after Also, the origin of the victims and their 1945, also the question of human losses structure still is often suppressed and ob- in the Second World War in general be- scured, and very diferent numbers are came a frst­class political issue, and has used and misused in political and ideo- remained so to this day. The problem is logical debates. Discussions in Croatia not merely a lack of original archival ma- today still often revolve around the exist- terials, i.e. a lack of sources and reliable ence or non-existence of guilt and respon- indicators, but obviously also the lacking sibility. A consensus over this has not yet „good will” to properly examine specifc been achieved neither by historians, nor issues.12 In this short statement I can not

12 It seems that still the most systematic statistical calculations of human losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War are those conducted by Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić at the end of the 1980s. Kočović’s estimate of the actual losses for Yugoslavia is 1,014,000 and 1,985,000 in demographic losses, while Žerjavić’s estimate of actual losses for Yugoslavia are 1,027,000 and 2,022,000 in demographic losses.

176 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives dwell upon numbers, but I would like which the communist party in power to point to the fact that various studies legitimised its role in society. In short, on mass killings, post-war population during the period of socialist Yugosla- migration, forced migration have so far via, the partisan struggle was uncriti- yielded fundamental fndings mostly cally glorifed. Nevertheless it could be by using comparative and transnational argued that there was a lack of shared methodological approaches that enabled historical narratives within society. them to surpass the limits of national The historical narratives were diferent historiographies. It seems to me that such – because of diferent memories. There an approach could also help us to under- can be no doubt that the ofcial version stand beter the developments in former of the memory of World War II in social- communist countries in general, as well ist Yugoslavia did not refect plurality, as in the Croatian case. Such a compar- nor did it atempt to integrate dissenting ative and transnational approach to is- views. It promoted the memories that en- sues related to communist conquest and dorsed the regime and its ideology, and the features of these systems would, in my repressed other narratives. In present view, be useful to come to a beter under- day Croatia questions connected with standing of many issues of contemporary the partisan movement and World War II history in the former socialist countries, trigger competing narratives of the past, and of course also in the Croatian case. and obviously until today diferent nar- Finally, I would like to return once again ratives exist parallely. However, the task to the phenomenon of a diferent con- of todays historians, in Croatia as well as ception of “historical truth” about World anywhere else, should be to promote and War II and the emergence in Croatian conduct methodical research and schol- public discourse. Some of the problems arship that will help in dealing with we face are surely connected with difer- „difcult heritages” by contextualizing ent traumatic cultural memories. How controversial events and interpretations. these events are remembered remains The (non)confrontation with the mass a political batlefeld because the “of- violence immediately after the war cre- cial” historical narrative during the rule ated very diferent forms of historical of Communist Party was the only one ac- memory, which often depend on individ- cepted in public as long as the Commu- ual biographical and family experiences. nist Party ruled, and afterwords a coun- The discourse of opposing “historical ter-narrative was accepted from large truths” remains a political batleground parts of society that completely tried to in Croatia because the former “ofcial” challenge the formarly ofcial narrative. historical narrative during the Commu- Also we have to take into account that nist Party’s reign, then the only one with Partisan victory in World War II formed the right to vote in public, left its deep the basic myth of socialist Yugoslavia mark in a section of society, even though and served as a doubly diferentiating other parts of society completely disput- characteristic in relation to both West- ed that version of history, which until ern countries and the socialist countries 1990 was the “ofcial” and the public of the former Soviet bloc. In the decades „truth“. In many families conficting in- after World War II, the socialist regime terpretations were transmited, creating appealed to the achievements of the so- a completely contrary historical memo- called National Liberation Struggle with ry from that of the “ofcial” one. Again,

Aleksandar Jakir: The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia 177 we must bear in mind that the victory and a tendency to re-evaluate many of the partisans in World War II formed of the past “historical truths” in a large the basic myth of socialist Yugoslavia. part of the public is evident, and it is ev- Socialist Yugoslavia was proud of its in- ident that diferent narratives, which are digenous victorious partisan movement, mutually exclusive, persist in Croatian which liberated the country itself from society to this day. However, the task occupiers and domestic traitors, as the of- of today’s historians, in Croatia as else- fcial version of history read. In the dec- where, should be to conduct methodo- ades following the Second World War, logically-based and grounded research the socialist regime repeatedly invoked whose results will serve as the basis and the achievements of the National Libera- impetus for confronting society with this tion Struggle, led by Tito and the Commu- “grave historical legacy”, which is unlikely nist Party, thereby legitimizing the Com- to be possible without wider contextu- munist Party’s leading role in society. alisation of the “painful” or “sensitive” Accordingly, during the existence of so- topics on which Croatian society is divid- cialist Yugoslavia, the partisan struggle ed today. The hope remains that new re- was uncritically celebrated in the public search by a new generation of historians space, and the darkest stains on the glit- will succeed in fostering dialogue in so- tering victory could not be talked about ciety, which seems the only right way to for a long time, until the end of socialism at least mitigate today’s divisions around came and some of the painful topics were interpretations of so-called “sensitive” raised. However, due to diferent memo- issues in society and to create the neces- ries, at least in one part of society, histori- sary prerequisites for openly exchanging cal memory and interpretation of history arguments and views on controversial within Croatian society difered signif- issues of contemporary Croatian histo- icantly from the ofcial version of his- ry. However, as stated in the Dialogue tory, at least for those whose ancestors Document,13 the issue of human rights found themselves on the “wrong” side violations cannot and should not be rel- at the end of the war. Certainly the of- ativized in today’s Croatian society, and cial version of the remembrance of World a clear condemnation of human rights vi- War II in socialist Yugoslavia did not re- olations involving the mass victims of all fect any plurality, nor did it even atempt undemocratic regimes, condemnation to integrate diferent views and histori- of such practices and legal norms and il- cal experiences. Only the memories and legal acts that made it possible should be interpretations of events that supported accepted by everybody. There is no such the regime and its ideology were pro- political objective as to justify mass hu- moted, other narratives suppressed. man casualties and systematic violations After the end of socialism, many issues of fundamental human rights. related to the partisan movement and Socially coping with the consequenc- the Second World War began to be dis- es of the rule of non-democratic regimes cussed completely diferently in public, will certainly not be possible without

13 See Dialogue Document provided by the Council for Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes that aimed to deliver comprehensive recommendations for political decision-making and law- framing in an atempt to face the difcult past and socially contested symbolic expressions Dialogue document in English.

178 The Slovaks and the Croats on their Way to Independence : History and Perspectives systematic research and identifcation of and contextualizing the facts found in the facts about the nature and consequences sources can make an important contribu- of these regimes. Conficts and divisions tion to overcome ideologization. There- in Croatian society cannot be understood fore, full availability of archival material, without contextualization, which places as one of the main preconditions for sci- them in the political, worldview, cultur- entifc research, is also necessary. al, religious and other antagonisms that Condemnation of all crimes, depar- have marked European and world history ture from all undemocratic regimes, and in the 20th century. A traumatic historical acceptance of multiperspectivity and legacy and exclusive and mutually con- the fact that plural memories exist must ficting collective memories have led to go hand in hand with a commitment to conficting and irreconcilable diferences a social consensus based on the accept- in the understanding of that history. ance of constitutional values. In doing so, The undemocratic character of go- any atribution of collective guilt of any vern ment throughout the 20th century in category should be avoided. Crime is Croatia has had signifcant re per cussions always individual. Without a multi-per- for the entire society, one of them being spective and pluralistic approach to the creation of ideologized narratives the most controversial issues of our past, that are still recognizable in a section of I believe that we will not be able to reach society, depending on the individual and a deeper understanding or reconciliation family biographies that afect such po- of mutual respect and the long-term nec- litical and world views. A scientifcally essary, democratically mediated cohe- grounded way of dealing with the past sion of Croatian democratic society.

Aleksandar Jakir: The Challenge of Dealing with a Difcult Past in Croatia 179