College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2007 Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction Neal Devins William & Mary Law School,
[email protected] Repository Citation Devins, Neal, "Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction" (2007). Faculty Publications. 345. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/345 Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs Essay Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction Neal Devinst By turning a statute limiting court jurisdiction into a dele gation of power by Congress to the Supreme Court, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1 is a political masterstroke. In the pages that follow, I explain why "the least dangerous branch" felt empowered to ignore congressional limits on its authority, repudiate presidentially created military tribunals, and conclude that the Geneva Convention applies to Guanbinamo detainees. In so do ing, I will use the Court's Hamdan ruling to extend my contri bution to last year's Minnesota Law Review Symposium on the future of the Supreme Court. In that Essay, Should the Su preme Court Fear Congress?, I examined recent proposals to strip court jurisdiction on divisive social issues and concluded that the Supreme Court has little reason to fear a backlash from Congress.2 For identical reasons, the Hamdan Court had no reason to fear Congress.