VIEWPOINTS The Dissolution of Parliament and ’s Bicameral System

By Sasaki Takeshi JAPAN’S recent general attract- House of Councillors. Such a move is each other and, as was the case with the ed a great deal of attention both domes- without precedent in Japanese politics. postal privatization bills, legislation tically and internationally. Leaving Before they were put to the House of that is not passed in both houses can- aside the question of whether the elec- Councillors, the bills had already been not be enacted. tion result will really serve to accelerate passed by the House of Representatives The odd dilemma for this two-house reform in Japan, it is indisputable that despite the opposition of LDP mem- system is as follows. If the House of there have been extraordinary new phe- bers, yet it was this chamber the prime Councillors always makes the same nomena in the political arena. minister dissolved. So the election can- decisions as the House of not help but have a halfway feeling. Representatives, it runs the risk of Two Points This snap election highlighted what being criticized as being a useless, Japan’s bicameral system should be – a carbon copy of the House of First, the Liberal Democratic Party crucial contestation of the country’s Representatives. However, if it pro- (LDP) Diet members who opposed the political system. It will undoubtedly duces the opposite decision to that of postal privatization bills were excluded stimulate future discussions on the par- the House of Representatives, as was Jfrom the list of LDP candidates, leading adigm of Japan’s political system, and the case with the postal privatization to a complex split within the party. this is the point I would like to discuss bills, it can easily lead to criticism that The internal conflict that unfolded in here because this is the institutional the political role of the House of the election campaign drew public problem that has the greatest impact Councillors is excessive. For this rea- attention. This is the first time in the on the function of the cabinet in Japan. son, members of the House of history of the LDP that its President or Councillors are extremely sensitive to Secretary-General has publicly wielded The Structure of Japan’s their political fragility, and very cau- this much power. Prime Minister Bicameral System tious about any constitutional debate Koizumi Junichiro staged the entire to review the function of the House of election around a single campaign issue Japan has adopted a parliamentary Councillors. – the privatization of the postal services system for more than a century, and it Of course, there will be no problems – that is also unprecedented as previous is a basic assumption in comparative if a certain or coalition LDP prime ministers have attempted to politics that the nature of the bicameral has a large number of seats in both maintain political stability by calling system is one of the most important houses and thus can control the without clear campaign issues. factors of a . The behavior of those members. This time, Here we can see Koizumi’s strong Japanese parliament is made up of the though, the LDP/New Komeito coali- desire to use this election to bring dis- House of Representatives and the tion had a majority of more than 30 cipline to Japanese political parties, but House of Councillors and both sets of seats over the opposition in the House judging from politics to date, this was a parliamentarians are directly elected. of Councillors, and yet the bills were gamble of major proportions. The House of Representatives has rejected because the LDP was unable to In its simplest form, this was an advantages in dealing with budgets, secure the allegiance of its members. attempt to change the LDP from a treaties and the appointment of the In this situation, the House of political party that merely participates prime minister, while the prime minis- Councillors becomes the most power- in the ruling process to a more muscu- ter can dissolve it to seek the judge- ful vetting authority, and it was virtual- lar and capable entity that actually does ment of the people. In contrast, the ly impossible to directly overturn their rule. This, of course, is inextricably House of Councillors has a six-year opposition through regular procedures. linked with the strengthening of the term and cannot be dissolved (though Given that situation, Koizumi political status of the prime minister. half of its members stand for reelection employed a new political maneuver. We will see how far it obtains the every three years). Otherwise there is After the House of Councillors rejected desired effect. no great difference between the two in the postal privatization bills, he opted The second point is that Koizumi terms of power, and when it comes to to use public opinion as a battering dissolved the House of Representatives deliberation over bills in particular, ram against the inner citadel of the for a because the postal both powers are roughly the same. The House of Councillors. At the same privatization bills were defeated in the two houses are quite independent of time, Koizumi completely excluded

38 JAPAN SPOTLIGHT • November / December 2005 VIEWPOINTS

rebels within the LDP who voted Reform of the House of attempt to use, or chose to ignore, the against the bills and pushed them into Councillors options offered by the Diet’s internal political no-man’s land. While this is regulating functions. This further politically understandable, it can be Japan’s bicameral system has long complicates the debate over the pros seen in quite a different light in terms been a subject of debate. The Diet is a and cons of this snap election. of a political institution. combination of two quite different Much of the discussion on reform of Koizumi’s maneuver is based on the chambers, and it possesses very little in the House of Councillors has focused implicit premise that parliament is one the way of internal regulating func- upon how the powers of each chamber entity. I term this the “assumptive uni- tions. The relationship between the should be divided, and what actual lim- cameral approach.” This suggests that, cabinet and House of Representatives its this would place on the power of the rather than decision-making based basically follows the parliamentary House of Councillors. Such reforms upon a strict demarcation between the model, but the one between the cabinet have not been well received in the House of Representatives and the and the House of Councillors is clearly House of Councillors, and there has House of Councillors, decision-making different. There are aspects of the lat- been no significant progress. should be, and indeed must be, some- ter relationship that are best under- Amendments to the Constitution are thing that the Diet does as a whole. stood in the context of a presidential being discussed, but political parties This suggests that both houses can be system: The House of Councillors does show no enthusiasm whatsoever about treated as one, and that the rejection of not have a strong voice in the forma- the reform of the House of Councillors, a bill in the House of Councillors can tion of the cabinet, and it cannot be and there are no useful proposals on actually be reversed by the dissolution dissolved. In other words, the House the table. On the other hand, public of the House of Representatives and of Councillors has a high degree of opinion clearly supports fundamental public support. independence from the cabinet, and reform of the bicameral system. However, this approach does not with regard to lawmaking, it has the In political terms, reforms to reallo- resolve the problem institutionally. Of same authority as the House of cate the powers of the two chambers course, the prime minister has the Representatives. However, this does are virtually impossible. This would authority to dissolve the House of not necessarily mean that its relation- only be realistic if Japan were to switch Representatives, but there is no ship with the cabinet is remote and the to a federal set-up and create a second inevitable link to any specific decision members are regularly appointed to the chamber that would be appropriate for of the House of Councillors to reject cabinet, as is the case with the House of such a system. Considering recent the bills. In fact, there was a strong Representatives. It indicates that political developments, the best impression during the election cam- despite these two houses being based approach is to reduce the systemic paign that something that had no con- on different institutional premises, it asymmetry between the two chambers nection in institutional terms was ended up in reality treating both mem- and aim to unify, then ultimately forcibly tied for political purposes. bers politically equally. brings a single chamber system into What stands out here is that the status In terms of the mutual adjustments view. The goal of this approach is to of the members of the House of between the two houses, when conflict- heighten the political responsiveness of Councillors was not affected by the ing decisions are forthcoming on a bill, the House of Councillors, and review- election, while the members of the there is a process whereby the represen- ing both the length of the councilor House of Representatives who thought tatives of each house hold a committee term and the reelection system should that they had played their part by pro- and revisit the decisions based upon the be considered. Moreover, it may be viding a majority in favor of the postal outcome of the committee. In addi- more realistic to allow for the dissolu- privatization bills then found them- tion, under the constitution there is tion of the House of Councillors rather selves having to contest an election. special provision stating that a bill that than seeking to reduce its powers. This No one can deny that this is quite is rejected by the House of Councillors is the most important institutional incongruous. Therefore, it will be no can still become law if it is passed a issue that this snap election left behind surprise if members of the House of second time by the House of and it should be the subject of lively Representatives argue and complain Representatives by a majority of two- discussion. about this “assumptive unicameral thirds or more of the members present. approach,” basing their argument on On this occasion, Koizumi and the LDP – This is the last article of the series – the independence of the House of executive did not resort to either of Representatives. In this respect, this these procedures, and instead dissolved Sasaki Takeshi is a professor of Gakushuin snap election hid a problem that deeply the House of Representatives immedi- University. He specializes in politics and affects the very framework of Japan’s ately after the bill failed in the House political history. parliamentary system. of Councillors. They have made no

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