Narratives in the Balkans: in the Combat Zone ZAGREB BEOGRAD SARAJEVO Skopje Tirana

Issue 4 September 2018

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE Narratives in the Balkans: In the Combat Zone ZAGREB BEOGRAD SARAJEVO Skopje TiranA

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects, we are part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner projects in approximately 60 countries. The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual openness. We maintain a world wide network with currently 30 international offices. Our work in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia concentrates on the democratization process, political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support and open public fora about topical and marginalized social-political issues and we enable networking of local and international actors close to the Green values. contents

2 foreword Srđan Dvornik introduction 4 in the combat zone Marion Kraske life-shaping narratives 7 understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders Nermina Mujagić 12 how is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived in 2017? Srđan Puhalo 16 how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past? Stevo Đurašković a quest for alternatives 21 what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Asim Mujkić 31 antifascism, communism and the Yugoslavian national idea in the jaws of nationalism Srđan Milošević 34 transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina Senada Šelo Šabić 40 majority, minority and political strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina Mate Subašić (in)surmountable past 43 the taste of nationalism Ildiko Erdei 46 women – active participants in a passive role Đurđa Knežević 50 manipulating war crimes as a narrative used in everyday politics in BiH Lejla Turčilo 54 the dominance of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue Damir Kapidžić 58 the Hague tribunal – reconciliation on hold Nemanja Stjepanović changing narratives, changing histories 62 dormant yet radiant history: memories of the First World War in the Republic of Macedonia Petar Todorov 66 historical revisionism Erich Rathfelder 70 collective glorification of individual guilt - it istheir fault, not ours Zarije Seizović 73 fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword Xhabir Memedi Deralla 2 foreword

foreword

Srđan Dvornik

The conflicts, social and political turmoils a collective right to its own state, which in we have witnessed in the last three decades turn shapes the community in a way which were, in the minds of many leaders and par- consolidates its specificities (language, reli- ticipants, centred around collective identi- gion, customs, tradition... but not yet terri- ties whose differences allegedly could not tory) and underlines its differences from its be settled in a nonviolent way. The position neighbours. Thus, the groundwork for new of Kosovo Albanians within Serbia, the posi- ethnic conflicts was already laid in the old tion of Serbs in Croatia if it were to secede regime. from Yugoslavia, the position of all three The open conflicts in the post-Yugo- ethnic ‘communities’ in Bosnia and Herze- slavian wars provided the advocates (and govina – they all emerged as problematic beneficiaries) of the ethno-nationalist ide- issues, indeed issues with a high potential ologies with an abundance of experiences, for conflict as the worldview that had helped or ‘evidence’, which ‘confirmed’ all the past keep Yugoslavia together began to fall apart. fears and anxieties: ‘they’ (the other eth- Admittedly, in the last decade of Yugoslavia nic collectivities) were really out to ‘get us’. hardly anybody believed in the tenets of its Thus, both the wartime and postwar years political ideology such as the "brotherhood are characterised by the proliferation of new and unity” of ”peoples” and national minor- stories which make the abstract and empty ities, but pragmatic coexistence and hope ideology of ethnic belonging ever more con- in economic prosperity seemed to keep crete and filled with content. The stories of society away from aggression and violence. war crimes and victimization (regardless of However, under the surface, the nationalis- whether they are true or not) cement the tic worldview had been developing since the ideology of belonging as that which consti- late 1960-ies, and was even supported by the tutes the deepest essence of any individual official policies of gradual decentralisation. member of an ethnic community, as well as When the regime collapsed under the their highest duty. This legacy of war works burden of growing ethno-nationalist ten- in combination with another kind of legacy, sions and ingovernability of the almost most apparent in Bosnia and Herzegovina: entirely decentralised system, the emerging the institutional structure determined by new polities (to become future independent the Dayton ‘agreement’, which preserved states) were formally constituted in accord- the very divisions that had led to the con- ance with the more or less typical arrange- flict. That is why today we face the continu- ments of liberal democracy, with political ation of the conflicting narratives, with a pluralism and free markets. But at the same new purpose: to give the nationalist leaders time, most politicians and the majority of legitimacy in the long run. the population understood the emerging At the same time, two decades of relative states as confirmation of their respective peace in most of the post-Yugoslavian coun- ethno-national identities. This understand- tries gave a new relevance to issues related to ing was shaped by a worldview in which an the neglected narrative of liberal democracy. ethnic category was a real community, with It appears in various forms – from desperate foreword 3

appeals to start ‘living normally’ to criticism as deeply rooted and therefore basically of governments and their policies from the immutable. Consistently, they recognised standpoint of economic efficiency, fairness the ethnically defined segments of society as in social relations, and legal security and the parties to the conflict, and took the lead- protection. There is a growing awareness of ers of these parties as legitimate partners in the discrepancies between the two narra- negotiating peace and post-war arrange- tives – the narrative of ethno-national col- ments. Thus, the impact of the divisions con- lectives, with their compulsory unity and solidated through the wars was perpetuated. authoritarian admiration of the nation-state, Whether people shape stories or is it and the narrative of civic polities with plural- the other way around might be an intrigu- ism and responsible governance. The latter ing literary riddle, but when stories involve does not have on its disposal so many sto- whole societies believing in them and act- ries of heroism and victimisation, but there ing upon them, they certainly acquire life is a growing body of information on human and power of their own. Then it becomes rights, their violation and defence, on social very important for a society to be aware not injustice and struggle against it, on misuse just of fake information, but of the entirety of power, complaints against corruption, of the great narratives that constitute the etc., which indicate that this narrative might entire symbolic universe within which shed a new light on the facts of life and give people trust or distrust their leaders, love them a new meaning. Gradually, however, it or hate their neighbours, consider things becomes clearer that the former concept of important (or not) or are manipulated into polity generates the problems in the latter: obedience or aggression. Given that during systemic corruption and state capture are this (in this part of the world) tumultuous enabled by the authoritarian position of the period of thirty years a whole revolution powerholders, while one of the gravest forms took place in ‘the world’ – the revolution in of human rights abuse – discrimination – is a digital communications, which turned the direct consequence of the concept of polity global society into a planetary network and founded on ethnic belonging. increased the number of active communi- A word should be said about the political cators by several ranges of magnitude – the environment too. The key players in interna- production, distribution, development or tional politics relevant to this region – nota- distortion of information and ‘information’, bly, the US, the EU and Russia – have also as well as public, semi-public and artificial played along with with the dominant narra- opinions, now involves hundreds of mil- tives. On one hand, they seem to have taken lions of writers and distributors. Stories seriously the narrative of ethnic identifica- which elaborate the dominant narratives tion as the key factor in political divisions, now pop up everywhere, which makes them social antagonisms and military conflicts. omnipresent, but also vulnerable to obvious Hence, their interventions were never distortions of fake news. To be sure, there is aimed to tackle political and social causes no cure for that, except continuous critical of conflicts, but instead took the hostilities public discourse. 4 introduction

introduction in the combat zone

Marion Kraske

say regardless of which religious group they Misrepresentations and reinterpretations like belong to. this represent a typical pattern of narratives, In such a state, as evidenced by the case with which political actors have been keeping of Croatia, the legal principle is strength- the societies of the former Yugoslavia on their ened and corrupt and criminal political 2 toes since the end of the Balkan wars: Facts are stakeholders have to count on facing legal consequences. It is evident that this is pre- denied, in order to circulate one’s own interpre- cisely what Čović fears – the loss of power tations. In order to manipulate, to exert power, and control over state institutions. to cement power. In this way, the societies are Certainly, the narrative that Islamism kept frozen in combat mode. is gaining ground is being used extensively both by the HDZ in BiH and in the neighbouring country Croatia – it is perfectly suit- "I respect those who want a civic state, but able for vitalising enemy-images which can a civic state in today’s Bosnia and Herzego- be used for one’s own politics, one’s own rad- vina means a classic centralism, in some icalisation. That the Federal Government, form, in theory, which basically means an referring to the Bundesnachrichtendienst Islamic state."1 (BND)3, reacting to a minor enquiry by The remark by Dragan Čović, the Croat Die Linke4 in the Bundestag, established at member of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian about the same time that there was no con- Presidency, cited by media in February 2018, crete evidence of a progressing Islamisation, is noteworthy: A rejection of the civic prin- confirms how void of facts an atmosphere ciple with the justification that – in BiH – it and politics can be created in the Balkans. would lead to an Islamic state. A crude the- Likewise, the President of the Repub- sis. Why should the civic principle in a coun- lika Srpska Milorad Dodik invokes the topic try with a majority Muslim society – and this of "radical Islam" – "Teheran," as he likes is what Čović is hinting at – automatically to call the Bosnian-Herzegovinian capital, lead to centralism? The civic state model, allegedly constitutes a threat to the Serbs. after all, constitutes the exact opposite. For this reason, Dodik even wanted to ini- To contextualize these crude claims, it tiate, together with the Serbian President must be stated that it is precisely Čović and Aleksandar Vučić, a Declaration on the his right-wing nationalist HDZ that are at "Survival of the Serb People"5 – a sad trav- this point doing everything to prevent the esty given the fact that the RS is the product strengthening of the civic principle. Time of ethnic cleansing committed during the after time, the Croat representative has Bosnian War: The non-Serb population was turned against the secular polity, in which 2 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26533990 the dominance of ethnic groups and par- 3 The German Intelligence Service ties is neutralized and the citizens have a 4 See: Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion Die Linke/Auswär- Marion Kraske tiges Amt, Drucksache 19/520, 17 January 2018 Director, 5 https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/nacrt-deklaracije- Heinrich Böll Stiftung 1 http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/covic-u-zagrebu- rs-i-srbije-o-opstanku-srpskog-naroda-je-pri-kraju- Sarajevo gradanska-bih-znaci-islamska-drzava ostale-finese/1jl5qc0 introduction 5

Marion Kraske: In the vicinity of the Partisan Cemetery, Mostar, CC-BY-SA 2.0 systematically displaced, raped, killed. In paign is being orchestrated specifically Srebrenica alone, more than 8000 boys and against the anti-fascist movement during men were killed. Dodik is denying the geno- World War II. The partisans, who triumphed cide to this day. against Nazi-Germany and fascist Croatia, Misrepresentations and reinterpreta- are being reduced solely to their criminal tions like this represent a typical pattern of machinations. Streets and squares named narratives, with which political actors have after Tito are, like in Zagreb, renamed, cem- been keeping the societies of the former eteries, like in Mostar, regularly devastated. Yugoslavia on their toes since the end of the The memory of the victorious parti- Balkan wars: Facts are denied, in order to sans is supposed to be eliminated from the circulate one’s own interpretations. In order public awareness – the remembrance of to manipulate, to exert power, to cement the resistance to fascism is too much of an power. In this way, the societies are kept fro- obstacle to nationalist forces. Fascism as an zen in combat mode. ideology and its radical nature is too close Sometimes it is claimed that the formerly to what happened during the Balkan wars of common language is actually composed the 90’s and has been glorified to this date: of three different languages: Enormous The extinction of life, because it stood in the amounts are being spent to "translate" the way of one’s own ethnic group. three variants (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian) One’s own deeds, the crimes of one’s between one another. A costly endeavour own group are still hailed as heroic deeds to for the already Kafkaesquely inflated Bos- this day – notably the minute of silence in nian-Herzegovinian state apparatus. When the Parliament in Zagreb – in an EU coun- in fall 2017, an initiative of more than 200 try! – honouring Praljak, the Croat-Bosnian linguists6 established that it is one language military officer found guilty in the second with different variants, politics intervened instance. Or the award of honour for already promptly to reply to the scholars not to get sentenced war criminals Plavšić, Karadžić involved. Language politics is power poli- and Krajišnik in the National Assembly of tics. Thus, the three-language myth is cul- Republika Srpska. In Serbia, the sentenced tivated and it is suggested to the population war criminal Vladimir Lazarević is allowed that, together with their language, their own to pass on his knowledge to students at the identity is "in jeopardy". It is propaganda Military Academy in Belgrade. A country that is showing a lasting impact – in the fear aiming to enter the EU has been relying on of the presumed threat, support is given to the "expertise" of a war criminal to train those who loudly promise to save their own future military personnel. (ethnic) group from the "enemies" allegedly In public discourse, in the largely politi- surrounding the nation. cised media, all these leitmotifs have been History is being reinterpreted with cal- used in order to constantly fuel tensions. culation. For instance, a defamation cam- The division in the heads, the dichotomy of "us" against "them" is thus orchestrated in 6 https://derstandard.at/2000055022385/Linguisten- Am-Westbalkan-wird-eine-gemeinsame-Sprache- a continuous loop of a kind; even the most gesprochen banal affairs – such as chocolate for school 6 introduction

In such an environment of a cemented state of emergency, human and individual rights are systematically negated. The individual is only a cog in the collective power structures standing above all – above common law as well. The rule of law is systematically underdeveloped in all Western Balkan countries for a reason.

children7 – are politicised and tied to ethnic electoral rights even 23 years after the war, categories. only the three so-called constituent peo- In such an environment of a cemented ples, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. All other state of emergency, human and individual citizens, for instance the Jews and Roma, rights are systematically negated. The indi- are denied the right to be an equal part of vidual is only a cog in the collective power the political system and to help shape it – structures standing above all – above com- in the Presidency for instance. The three mon law as well. The rule of law is systemat- ethnic oligarchies have power-hungrily ically underdeveloped in all Western Balkan captured the political system, as Slovenian countries for a reason. political scientist Zlatko Hadžidedić puts it, Likewise, the Churches are also getting and are defending it vehemently. That this enthusiastically involved, in order to sow practice is contrary to European standards discord: dissolution of stereotypical roles, was established by the European Court of as diagnosed recently by Berlin-based play- Human Rights already in 2009 – but with no wright and author Ivana Sajko referring to consequences. the hysterical countermovement against What constitutes right and order is being the Istanbul Convention for the protection determined by a small and corrupt class – of women, initiated by the Catholic Church this approach has for decades blocked the and its supporters in Croatia, is interpreted formation of functional democratic sys- as an attack on cultural values and religious tems, in which everyone would have the worldview. opportunity to claim their rights in court. In the region, patriarchal, homophobic The absence of institutions of the rule of and exclusive tendencies are dominating, law is making it easy for nepotistic elites to shaping a climate of intolerance, of exclu- maintain a vacuum, in which a few clans are sion, of the radical negation of all things in charge of distributing state funds among humane and rational. The consequences themselves and their favourites, to allocate are rigid defence mechanisms against pro- jobs in a feudal manner: The phenomenon gressive and secular approaches. Instead of of state capture9 is closely connected to the modernity, instead of establishing welfare narratives of manipulation and abuse of for all, the citizens are kept in a perpetual power described in this edition. combat zone, from which hundreds of thou- In this manner, the Southeast periphery sands are fleeing – without war – in order to of Europe is constantly kept in crisis mode, find their happiness in work and life else- not least due to the poor stance of the EU10. where, beyond the continuing radicalisa- This likewise constitutes an often used nar- tions8. rative to throw sand in the face of the repre- Everything that is abnormal, that extin- sentatives of the international community: guishes life, endangers or threatens it, is They are, political representatives of all considered normal, even heroic – as long persuasions in the Balkans like to assure, as it is useful to one’s own group, one’s own evidently on the "European path". Shake interest. By contrast, people or lifestyles hands, a cheering: "Keep up the good work!" not corresponding to these strictly patriar- And afterwards, they return to their combat chal stereotypes are deemed to be "sick" or zone. "abnormal", or stigmatised as traitors. translated from German by Ivana Nevesinjac An atmosphere prevails in which a brutal devaluation of individuals and their rights is underway: In Bosnia and Her- zegovina, not all citizens possess passive

7 https://www.rferl.org/a/croatia-serbia-chocolates- 9 See: Captured states in the Balkans, Heinrich Böll grabar-kitarovic-scandal/28167622.html Stiftung, Perspectives, 2017 8 See: Documentation of the Heinrich Böll Foundation: 10 The EU´s Failing Policy Initiative for Bosnia and Her- The Quiet Revolution, Sarajevo 2017 cegovina, DCP Policy Paper, Bodo Weber, May 2018 understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders life-shaping narratives 7 life-shaping narratives understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders

Nermina Mujagić

Unions, states, construct different narratives, that they tie their citizenry to special identities (of holder of citizenship, national, ethnic, religious...). Thus, between the EU and its members or the EU and membership candidate countries, or the state vs. demos, a mutual need and orientedness are created. Creating loyal citizens, that is, constant consumers of supra- state and state narratives, also means controlling ‘popular opinion’. But their primary role can be functional, to make it easier for people to make sense of the world, of politics, of certain events and interactions. However, narratives can be invented so as to omit facts, especially in relation to the context, or to give facts inappropriate contexts, and should therefore equally be doubted, as their creators can mythologise them.

This article aims to point to the relative which derives from the adjective gnarus, and occasional nature of borders, as well translated as ‘knowing’ or ‘skillful’. Narra- as the conflict-fostering effects of borders tive can also be a statement on an event or around which every day, narratives are built events, regardless of their truthfulness. that strengthen ethno-political power and An illustrative example of narratives order – which can thus be categorised as from various fields, which is surrounded by strategic narratives. In the hope that state so many controversies, are narratives tied borders will lose the majority of their erst- to the Balkans. Although parts of the Bal- while attributes and that at a certain historic kans are accepted as parts of the geographic moment they will disappear, the author area, in academic circles, in various univer- wishes to highlight the need to reduce the sity departments, there are still discussions conflict-fostering characteristics of borders, around to whom do the Balkans mean what attempting therefore to deconstruct and and how much. If we add to this the theo- weaken narratives produced by ethno-polit- retical potential of Orientalist theories, we ical regimes whilst following the process of will observe that such discussions suggest European integration. that the Balkans are today understood as A narrative or story is any imaginary or the European other. Although the Balkans non-imaginary record (report) about certain are not the Orient – as the ultimate oppo- events, presented in a series of written or site value category to the Western idea – as spoken words or a series of moving images. Edward Said saw it – the Balkans both are Narratives can be found in all forms of and are not European, are and are not Asian, human creativity and art, including speech, are and are not Christian, and are and are writing, poems, film, television, play, pho- not Islamic. The East on the Western con- tography, theatre and visual arts such as tinent, the West in societies of the East – a Nermina Mujagić painting. The word narrative comes from wavering identity, permanently indetermi- Full professor at the Faculty of the Latin verb narrare, meaning ‘to say’, nate, not insignificantly other. Indeed, it is Political Sciences, Sarajevo 8 life-shaping narratives understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders

significantly Other, as it manifests itself as the external border of West European civi- With the help of a non-Europe- lisation – periphery – a space in which the anised Europe, in the even more European slowly fades. In Milica Bakić- non-Europeanised BH and the Hayden’s words, this periphery reproduces Balkans, a caste was born such the Orientalism used by nationalists to culturally and politically discredit the Other, as history has not yet known, a thus reaffirming the European identity. It caste whose means of produc- simultaneously defines itself in the local tion is political rule itself, which narratives in which the vector of time is strong in producing narratives assumes a new meaning. This is not a move- of conflict, hatred, superiority of ment from the past towards the future, but a movement from backwardness to what us over them, narratives of divine is modern (Bakić-Hayden, 2006). "Debal- and historic right to set bounda- kanising the Balkans" or "Europeanising ries, to divisions, corruption, the Balkans" seems to create a new world, egotism and lies. Maybe this is a world where stereotypical and imaginary why Europe needs a new Europe, notions are maintained in the relationship between the EU and the periphery,1 and but likewise the Balkans a new where drawing borders is of more impor- Balkans – a Balkans without tance than living standards. These days the national narratives, which could Socialist-Democrat Party of BH (SDP BH), serve as a model for a different which lays claim to being the leader of the Europe. left in BH, publicly requested an urgent meeting of the BH Council of Ministers in order to ‘protect BH borders’. is difficult to find any kind of procedure of Geographically, the Balkans are a part marking borders that would be bereft of rit- of Europe, but culturally still do not satisfy ual, of ceremonies at the borders. From time the criteria, and are thus defined by a new, to time, the rituals would change, but their political coinage, as the Western Balkans. function remained the same: the essence The countries in question are those that did is in dividing space into ours and not-ours. not yet become EU members, about which Beside physical and psychological barri- nuance-free narratives are maintained, and ers, the institution of the border used to be narratives of ‘imputed ambiguity’. backed up by customary law, and with time, Naturally, narratives have their intro- also by public and international law. The ductions, protagonists, plots and turning newer metanarratives about borders also points leading to solutions. They are sim- confirm this (the arbitration ruling in the ply stories told by a narrator. Narratives are case of the Croatian-Slovenian border, the composed from various motives. For a feel- Pelješac bridge, the bay of Neum, Sutorina, ing of safety, to make the world more logi- the demarcation on the Prevlaka peninsula, cal, to make our existence more predictable, determining the borders between BH and to represent and experience the challenges Serbia, especially the points near the Bajina we experience in a ‘universalist manner’. Bašta and Zvornik points). As much as bor- Among other things, the construct of a nar- ders may be a topic for geographers, the rative emerges as a means of transferring moment they descend into political space, experiences and knowledge to other gen- they come to serve as a means of under- erations, that is, to represent something or standing past, present and future relations someone as eternal. Motives can be under- within which every narrative about Euro- stood as subjective, as someone’s attempt to pean identity and process of European inte- be accepted, to be loved, to profit, to experi- gration is at play. ence catharsis, to show themselves that they Let us remember that the first division can create an alternative world. was geographic, followed by the Roman If we were to return just a little back in limes – Imperium Romanum – which time, we would see that every solidification lasted for four centuries, after which came of borders was accompanied first by narra- the division into Catholics and Orthodox tive, then by religious magic. In literature it Christians, then, with the Ottoman incur- sion, the Ottoman line close to a common 1 By periphery I mean the countries hoping for EU accession – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Islamic influence. Industrialisation too has Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. differentiated Europe, as has the Iron Cur- understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders life-shaping narratives 9

tain, which lasted from 1945 until 1989. The has symbolically been divided into the West most serious division resulted from chang- and the East (Kozminski, 2009). ing state borders between the notorious In a splendid text, Europe without Euro- East – and the democratic West. Therefore, peans, the Slovenian culturologist Aleš starting with the limes – the very existence Debeljak has written that "the absence of a of Europe was conditioned by a clear draw- strict border on the eastern side of the conti- ing of borderlines due to the awareness of nent has determined the need for this sym- the existence of a boundary that demanded bolic geography" (Debeljak, 2013). Here, the separation from the barbarians, non-Euro- East marks the symbolic mark of knowledge, peans, backwardness and similar. It may not a geographical determinant. Certain appear paradoxical, but Europeans’ uni- zones were then defined through mutual versalism has always had boundaries that contradiction, so it seems that Europe has determined, defined, encompassed and traditionally been determined negatively. pointed to their own framework. Its self-perception has grown from what it is In antiquity, the northern part of Europe not, rather than what it is. was symbolically considered a barbarian All this reminds us that unions, states, space, while the southern parts (Greece, construct different narratives, that they the Mediterranean and Asia Minor) were tie their citizenry to special identities (of the sites of civilisation. The Roman limes holder of citizenship, national, ethnic, implied a different understanding of cen- religious...). Thus, between the EU and its tre and periphery, and so to the North and members or the EU and membership can- East, the Empire bordered with the barbar- didate countries, or the state vs. demos, a ian world, the barbarians being all those mutual need and orientedness are created. who did not speak Latin. The South was Creating loyal citizens, that is, constant con- perceived as civilisation. During Renais- sumers of supra-state and state narratives, sance, the conceptual division of Europe also means controlling ‘popular opinion’. was between the North and South, as Italian Therefore, Barthes is precise when he says cities like Florence, Rome and Venice were that "narrative is international, transhistori- centres of the arts and education. Between cal, transcultural: it is simply there, like life the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, itself" (Barthes, 1977). But their primary role Pristina, "Kosova Republikë!” by these centres have moved into Paris, Lon- can be functional, to make it easier for peo- Marco Fieber, don and Amsterdam, since when Europe ple to make sense of the world, of politics, CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 10 life-shaping narratives understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders

of certain events and interactions. However, and everlasting, but history shows them to narratives can be invented so as to omit be delicate, fragile and ephemeral, and that facts, especially in relation to the context, they can disappear in a day. They are most or to give facts inappropriate contexts, and frequently the product of myths (the alleged should therefore equally be doubted, as right acquired by birth, such as for instance their creators can mythologise them. manifest destiny), past achievements (e.g. Invoking tradition, certain obligations conquests) and consensus-based interna- and respect for the law is nothing but a story tional treaties. containing within it an internal or external Of course, narratives can change, and perception of the state and scope of its suc- transformations usually occur due to eco- cess. In modern vernacular, we would say nomic pressures, ideological shifts driven that this is realipolitik that takes off from from within or from without, out of own reality, from real facts that it encounters desires and state’s needs for change both on the ground. But let us ask ourselves locally and globally, out of an increased role who produces such reality, that is, who cre- of other main players in accepting, shaping ates these stories, who distributes them, or declining narratives, by dissidents, all the who controls them and, ultimately, who way to incredible moments of mass conver- spreads and disseminates them. Lately, we sations. have been witness to increasingly frequent We are somehow quick to forget that demands by the capital of Brussels from within the EU, alongside the processes of the region, especially those concerning inclusion, new processes of exclusion also territorial delimitation (Slovenia-Croatia, occur, that with the erasure of some bor- Greece-Macedonia, BH and Croatia, Ser- ders, new ones are also created – both verti- bia-Montenegro, Montenegro-Kosovo). As cal and horizontal – the result of reflections time goes by, this divide expands, as the EU of nationalist logic and sentiments. "While has been addressing the future of the region Europe was proudly flaunting its own uni- and the future of integration (enlargement fication," Dubravka Ugrešić points out policy) by means of antiquated nationalist in The Culture of Lies, "on foreign [soil], it solutions from days of yore. Thus, the pro- supported divisions. While on its own soil cesses of Europeisation and enlargement it highlighted multiculturalism, on others’, policy show how contradictory they are and it contributed to ethnic cleansing. While it how they produce new fragmentation. swore on European norms of honour, it bar- Admittedly, the Union consists of stable gained with criminals and gave them full states that struggle over control of the narra- legitimacy" (Ugrešić, 2008). tives, simultaneously limiting the processes After the fall of the Berlin wall, East- of narrative transformation, both locally ern Europe – especially the part that has and abroad. Historical experience reminds developed under the Communist ideology us that this is pronounced when states are – embraced the western narrative about the losing power (e.g. losing national control, inexistence of borders, but it also quickly good image...). Thus, narratives become a unmasked its attitude towards borders. As certain kind of strategic foreplay. They are the race towards the "world of open borders" usually the consequence of: that symbolised freedom went on, a multi- external international treaties/agree- plication of borders took place (with the ments, whether formal or tacit, Soviet Union an excellent example, as well as deliberate action bringing transform- the border between the Czech Republic and ative drama into governance/rule Slovakia, and the bloody borders within the behaviour of international parties former Yugoslavia). The newly born caste, seeking to ensure that stories envis- ostensibly free of ideologically-Communist aged by the narrators are sustained, or orientation, has embraced narratives about to imply a threat if this really does not borders, simultaneously strengthening two happen. contradictions: a discourse of power – mod- In a word, it is sought to present narra- ernisation, progress, but simultaneously tives to various actors in the play, and they also a rhetoric of division. Thus, metanarra- are a precondition for attaining a certain tives about borders that are discussed daily legitimacy. Such narratives are therefore in the public sphere are nothing but a means most frequently called strategic. We might of strengthening new national antagonisms. say that they are divine right narratives, vic- Although there is nothing more incon- tory/conquest narratives or historic right nar- stant than state borders, public discourse ratives. These narratives may appear firm is teeming with demands for the clearest understanding "strategic narratives" on the Balkans and its borders life-shaping narratives 11

possible demarcations. Merkel congratu- The European (non-)resolving of prob- lates the controversial Haradinaj – and asks lems in the region and creation of entirely him to make state-building, improving the new narratives show that the local political economic situation and defining the border and academic intelligentsia is neither ready with Montenegro the "key steps towards nor willing to detect substantive prob- strengthening Kosovo’s European perspec- lems. Gramsci would call them ‘experts in tive." The question of the BH-Croatia border legitimation’. With the help of a non-Euro- has been so politicised that it is certain to peanised Europe, in the even more non- be a narrative for the upcoming elections. Europeanised BH and the Balkans, a caste The House of Representatives adopted a was born such as history has not yet known, Declaration requesting Croatia to abandon a caste whose means of production is politi- construction of the Pelješac Bridge, which cal rule itself, which is strong in producing was soon followed by a declaration adopted narratives of conflict, hatred, superiority of by the House of Peoples disowning this dec- us over them, narratives of divine and his- laration. Thus, the House of Peoples has toric right to set boundaries, to divisions, adopted a declaration saying that the other corruption, egotism and lies. Maybe this is House’s declaration is not their declaration. why Europe needs a new Europe, but like- Narratives can be regulated by means of wise the Balkans a new Balkans – a Balkans law, force, technology, subsidies etc. Thus, without national narratives, which could every little while an appeal arrives from the serve as a model for a different Europe. Fail- EU that ‘border security’ is the key issue for ing that, we will sing along to a song by the candidate countries. Producing and con- Sarajevo band Konvoj: "Change, you narra- trolling the diffusion of narratives is most tives, now we’re here, now we’re alive; let it often conducted through international be a doubt-free journey, change yourself, let ‘broadcasts’, interventions in social media people be." and similar. The latest EU strategy directed translated by Hana Dvornik towards countries beyond its borders was just an example of one such narrative, from which the future reality of this region can be gleaned: the EU Western Balkans Strategy, marked by its makers as a ‘historic opportunity’ for the future of the countries outside the Union. There is nothing new in this strategy other than a reaffirmation of the EU narrative. The focus of attention is on the elite, the so-called elected representatives of the citizens and peoples in the region, and their negotiating capabilities. The Strategy states that there can only be economic progress if the markets are deregulated and freed from the constraints imposed by the state. (Do they include taxes, which ultimately finance the few social rights remaining in these states?) This strategic document produces a new narrative promoting reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, but ‘reconciliation’ here is merely a means of achieving a market economy unencumbered by the past, not an achievement in itself.2

2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/ eu-western-balkans-strategy-credible-enlargement- perspective_en 12 life-shaping narratives how is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived in 2017?

how is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived in 2017?

Srđan Puhalo

It has been twenty-three years since armed Notwithstanding which city the conflict ceased in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although some still claim that we are in a respondent is from, or whether state of war. The events of war are slowly Serb, Croat or Bosniak, all claim turning into myths, politicians have taken that they were caught off guard on the role of the military commanders, ref- by the war, while others made ugees have already become neighbours, and intense preparations for it. They war criminals people’s heroes. Life is trying to return to its normal flow, and we can say are able to list examples of such that in Bosnia and Herzegovina we are in a preparations by the adversaries state of co-existence, but far from concilia- up to several years prior to the tion. Kriesberg1 (1998) defines co-existence beginning of the war in Bosnia as a relationship between people or groups and Herzegovina. It is interest- in which no side is trying to destroy the other. ing how a certain activity may be Although the possibility of an outbrake interpreted in different ways; for of war is constantly being brought up in instance, spending money in the Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is the 90s war 80s could have meant that "they" that represents one of the greatest obsta- knew that "something was afoot" cles to this happening. A great majority of people still remember well all the grief and and that dinars would become suffering, yet we must not forget that new worthless, but also that "we" generations are growing up, who are learn- lived day to day, with no evil on ing about the war in Bosnia and Herzego- our minds. Our unpreparedness vina from their parents and relatives, from for war shows what a naive and ethnically divided media, politicians delib- peace-loving a people we are, erately manipulating numbers and facts, questionable web portals, social networks unlike the others. or Hague rulings. Having all this in mind, a legitimate question emerges: how do inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina perceive all that took place between 1991 and 1995?

1 Kriesberg, L. (1998). Coexistence and the reconcili- Srđan Puhalo ation of communual conflicts, in Weiner, E., ed. The Social psychologist, handbook of interethnic coexistence, New York, The Banjaluka Continuum Publishing Company, pp. 182-198. how is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived in 2017? life-shaping narratives 13

mean nothing in this justification of crimes; the research respondents are willing to reach far into the past, or to the other end of the country in Hoping to find an answer to this question, order to find adequate justification. we carried out a series of focus groups in Having in mind that others are to blame Bihać, Prijedor, Tuzla, Nevesinje and Široki for the war starting, and that we led a defen- Brijeg. In each city we had between eight sive war, others' suffering in war is justified, and ten adult respondents with whom we expected and a result of their lack of judge- talked about certain aspects of the war. We ment. Considering all of the above, it is per- were careful to include a similar number fectly to be expected that coming to terms of men and women in our focus groups, with one's own crimes is a very arduous and of various ages and educational levels and slow process. with different experiences of the war. This way militants, civilians, refugees, displaced Only large trials are followed people, but also those born after the war, all The majority of the respondents only featured in the focus groups. followed the large trials in the Hague This is what we got. (Milošević, Karadžić, Mladić, Plavšić, Šešelj, Regardless of city or ethnic group, we Krajišnik, Gotovina, Orić and similar), can isolate certain common elements char- but even this resembled rooting for your acteristic of all: favourites more than a rational consideration of what could be heard in the course of They were preparing for war, not us the trials. There isn’t a great deal of interest Notwithstanding which city the respondent in trials conducted in Bosnian-Herzegovin- is from, or whether Serb, Croat or Bosniak, ian courts. One reason for this is certainly all claim that they were caught off guard by that trials in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the war, while others made intense prepa- less attractive to the media, and thus less rations for it. They are able to list examples well represented there. Likewise, the local of such preparations by the adversaries up war crimes trials weren’t in the focus of the to several years prior to the beginning of intenational community’s interest, and the the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is local media stood to gain no financial or interesting how a certain activity may be other benefit from reporting on the trials. interpreted in different ways; for instance, The trials were only followed by the family, spending money in the 80s could have relatives, friends and acquaintances, while meant that "they" knew that "something the local community was only interested in was afoot" and that dinars would become the verdicts, that is, the severity of punish- worthless, but also that "we" lived day to ment, rather than the trial and evidentiary day, with no evil on our minds. Our unpre- processes or the testimonies of victims. paredness for war shows what a naive and peace-loving a people we are, unlike the They do not have much trust in the others. Indeed, our unpreparedness for war Hague tribunal, but nor do they trust is among the most important pieces of evi- other courts dence that it was they who attacked, while That Serbs and Croats mistrust both the we merely defended ourselves. Hague tribunal and its verdicts and the verdicts of courts in Bosna and Herzegovina is We merely defended ourselves not news. The Serbs consider it a political Every defensive war is just in and of itself, tribunal, which tallies with the official polit- and when your war is a just one, it is wholly ical opinion of the Republika Srpska author- expected that your people are the victim and ities – a tribunal that only tries them and that it is difficult to talk about war crimes won’t stop at anything to sentence them. It committed by members of your people is safe to say that the Croats are confused against others. This is one of the most famil- and their opinions on the tribunals and war iar alibis justifying one's own war crimes crimes verdicts divided. On the one hand, committed against members of other eth- the Hague acquitted Gotovina and Markač, nic groups. Of course, when certain specific while on the other, sentences for six high- instances of war crimes against members ranking Croat functionaries for war crimes of other people is brought up, there follows in Bosnia and Herzegovina are perceived an admission accompanied by the inevi- as an injustice, an assault and verdict on table "but", justifying or relativising the all Croats. Bosniaks are frustrated by the crime. It is interesting that time and place length of the proceedings being conducted 14 life-shaping narratives how is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived in 2017?

People who experienced and survived the war are in no doubt that it must be talked about and should by no means be forgotten. They are aware that all that we hear in public today concerning the war doesn’t lead towards dealing with the past and reconciliation, but to sowing discord between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dividing them. This conversation must be different but they themselves do not know how. On the other hand, the young wish to leave the war behind and apply themselves to the present and the future. They do not discuss the war, don’t know much about the war, nor is war much spoken about in their families. Nevertheless, they are aware of the existence of three irreconcilable truths about the war, and choose to strategically ignore it. Talk about the war is especially avoided in ethnically mixed groups.

in Hague against Serb politicians and army little more, that is to say, on which they have officers and believe that the whole thing is a clear opinions. These events aren’t related to farce and needs to be expedited. It is impor- the local environment they live in, but are tant to highlight that few read the rulings, determined by the media and politicians as and far more people trust the interpreta- very important within an ethnic group (Sre- tions of politicians and the media than judi- brenica, Dobrovoljačka street, Bugojno and cial documents. similar). If there exists a different perception and interpretation of the events of war, one War both should and should not be that veers away from the ethnic truth, it is talked about not uttered publicly, as the consequences People who experienced and survived the for the individual concerned and his/her war are in no doubt that it must be talked family members can be very serious. about and should by no means be forgotten. They are aware that all that we hear in We do not trust anyone, although we public today concerning the war doesn’t speak like them lead towards dealing with the past and rec- Although citizens of Bosnia and Herzego- onciliation, but to sowing discord between vina claim not to trust anyone (politicians, the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the media, the courts), the arguments used dividing them. This conversation must be to describe certain wartime events, defend different but they themselves do not know war crimes and with which crimes over how. On the other hand, the young wish to one’s own ethnic group are retold, perfectly leave the war behind and apply themselves correspond to the arguments being pushed to the present and the future. They do not and imposed by local politicians and their discuss the war, don’t know much about the media. Not only are the arguments and war, nor is war much spoken about in their language used those we hear daily from families. Nevertheless, they are aware of local politicians and their media allies, but the existence of three irreconcilable truths any questioning of these ethnic truths is about the war, and choose to strategically rejected. It would seem that patriotism is ignore it. Talk about the war is especially more important than the truth. avoided in ethnically mixed groups. Each generation has its own media They know about the war what others Young people most frequently get their want them to know information through web portals and social The impression gained is that it is individ- networks, which on its own puts a question ual histories that dominate the memories of mark over the quality of the information the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As about the war that reaches them through expected, these memories are coloured by these media. On the other hand, their par- strong emotions and are quite enough for ents most frequently rely on the televi- a personal interpretation of the war. This sion for their information. This leaves the is characteristic of respondents who lived impression that citizens prefer video to through and survived the war. There are text. Local web portals are widely read, but events about which all respondents know a information that concerns dealing with the how is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina perceived in 2017? life-shaping narratives 15

"Survey in the RS: Mladić and Karadžić - criminals or heroes" - Al Jazeera Balkans (aired on 11.07.2018), YouTube, CC-BY 2.0 past cannot be found there. It is interesting in place of a conclusion that there is no discussion within families about the events of the war for two reasons, And finally, what to say? It seems that twenty parents refusing to talk about it to their three years since the war ended, not much children because they think they shouldn’t has changed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as burden them with it, while, on the other far as perception of the war and individual hand, young people aren’t very interested in events therein is concerned. Perhaps it learning more about the war. would be better to say it wasn’t given to us for things to change. By whom? Well, primarily the local politicians. Because if we hadn’t done it to them [the other ‘community’]*, they surely would have done it to us. They prepared for the war for ages, while we naively believed in brotherhood and unity. We merely defended ourselves, while they attacked. Our war crimes are incidents committed by sick psychopaths, while their crimes were planned and prepared in detail. Our people died heroes’ deaths, while they deceitfully murdered. We had detention camps, they concentration camps. We were driven out, while they departed voluntarily. But don’t be disheartened. Since everything in Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into Serb, Croat and Bosniak, why shouldn’t we have three war truths about the war? Doesn’t matter whether it is constructive, so long as it is constitutional.

translated by Hana Dvornik

* editor’s note 16 life-shaping narratives how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past?

how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past?

Stevo Đurašković

One of the most common historical claims present in the Croatian public has been that the (Croatian) Serbs occupied between two-thirds and three-quarters of posts in the ranks of the civil service and the police during communism. These claims haven’t been supported by any comprehensive evidence. Statistical data show how Serbs occupied up to 30% of the posts while they represented between 12-18% of population in Socialist Croatia. There are rather comprehensive arguments explaining the overrepresentation: the fact that the Croatian Serbs unanimously sided with Tito’s partisans during WWII, while the Croats were divided between support for the Partisans and for the Nazi-puppet Ustaše regime.

In the seminal essay The Miseries of East the East-European national identity-build- European Small States, the famous Hun- ing processes until the present, since most garian historian István Bibó contends that of the countries of Central-Eastern Europe Central-East Europe suffers from underde- had been subjugated to the Nazi/Soviet veloped and anti-democratic social rela- imperial powers for most of the twentieth tions characterized by small-minded and century, or eventually suffered various kinds aggressive nationalisms. However, depart- of authoritarian regimes until 1989/1990. ing from the condemnation of the East Thus, the main problem with the con- European states, Bibó comprehends how cept of the nations as victims is not that the causes for the above mentioned anti- it is completely false; on the contrary, it is democratic trends can be found in the his- grounded upon historical facts. However, tory of suppression of the nation-building the main problem is that a concept of vic- processes by the imperial state powers, timhood reduces the complexity and con- accompanied by simultaneous competition tingency, inevitably characterizing any between the concurrent national move- historical period as a kind of a fairytale ments over particular territories or/and Manichean struggle of heroes and villains populations. These historical trends eventu- over a metaphysical body of a nation. Even- ally brought about "existential anxiety" for tually, the fairytale historical narration fuels the "community" as a dominant trend in a concept of others as arch-enemies, thus the national identity-building processes in contributing to anti-democratic political Central and Eastern Europe. This existential culture. anxiety in turn brought about the construc- All of the above-stated has been espe- tion of the meaning of national history as cially obvious in the case of Croatia, the Stevo Đurašković an exclusive struggle for statehood, where a country additionally traumatized by the Assistant Professor, nation represented a "thousand-year" vic- legacy of the 1990s Homeland War. The war Faculty of Political Science of Zagreb tim of others. Finally, it is not strange that even further fostered the meaning of the University martyrdom has been a dominant concept in national history as a centuries-long strug- how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past? life-shaping narratives 17

gle for national independence, as well as that the German language was the means the concept of the nation as a centuries- of communication of the imperial state long victim of, respectively, the (Austrian) apparatus, as well as due to the contem- German, Hungarian and eventually Serb poraneously dominant knowledge produc- hegemony. I will show in this article how tion in German, and not as an outcome of the concept of victimhood – although not deliberate Habsburg politics. As writings by entirely false – nevertheless distorts a more Mirjana Gross and Josip Horvat nicely show, comprehensive narrative on Croatian his- the Habsburgs even supported to an extent tory. I will focus on a few selected examples, the Czech and the Croatian national move- since a comprehensive elaboration of the ments, seeing in them a prospective means subject of distortions in interpretations of of restricting the power of the German and history would go far beyond the scope of Hungarian national movements respec- this article. More comprehensive exposi- tively. Moreover, the modernization of the tion on the national narratives in history Monarchy in the 1850s, carried out by the curricula can be found in the journal Pov- notorious absolutist regime, fulfilled almost ijest u nastavi [History Teaching], as well all the social and economic demands pre- as in writings by Damir Agičić, Magdalena viously made by the 1848 Croatian national Najbar-Agičić and Snježana Koren. movement. The history of Croatia in the Habsburg In respect to the Hungarian-Croatian empire has been almost exclusively painted relations during the Habsburg era, the Cro- as a history of the (Austrian) German and atian national identity-building canon por- Hungarian hegemony over the country and trays Hungarian politics exclusively as those especially over its national identity-build- of trying to subjugate Croatia under its own ing. The Habsburg Emperors have been rule. Again, it is the truth, however, the more represented as the exclusive bearers of the comprehensive picture of the Hungarian- processes of Germanization due to ham- Croatian relations that is missing. What is pering the autonomy of the Croatian diet, missing, or is not sufficiently underlined, preventing the annexation of Dalmatia to is that Croatian politics from the late 18th Croatia, and finally to enforcing the Ger- century onwards regularly opted for alli- man language and culture. All these claims ances with Hungary out of fear of Habsburg are partly true; however, they haven’t been absolutism. In that respect, the 1868 Croa- comprehended as part of a broader expla- tian-Hungarian Settlement subordinated nation of how the Habsburg rule was first Croatia to Hungary not only due to Hungar- and foremost concerned with retaining an ian political pressure, but also due to the absolute power, as shown by A.J.P. Taylor’s contemporaneous Croatia’s institutional book The Habsburg Monarchy. The national incapacity to fully exercise financial, infra- movements – and especially the strong- structural and economic policies, as Josip est ones, the German and the Hungarian Horvat nicely shows in his books. Moreover, – represented a lethal danger to Habsburg the Hungarian 1848 national leader Lajos absolutist rule. Thus, the Germanization Kossuth has been portrayed as the most came as a logical concomitant of the fact extreme Hungarian nationalist and thus

"If there were freedom and democracy, there would be Herzeg-Bosnia instead of the Federation", location unknown, Facebook/radiosarajevo.ba, CC-BY 2.0 18 life-shaping narratives how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past?

of the concurrent ideas of "greater nations": In Western Europe, the myths Greater Hungary, Italia Irredenta, Megali take on the structure of the Greece and so on. narrative of the glory of the However, all aforementioned trends of distortion become even stronger as we nation in history, where the come to the history of the two Yugoslavias, French or the English history as they have direct bearing on the contem- is conceptualized as a history porary national identity-building. Thus of enlightenment and progress, the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia has while simultaneously neglecting been portrayed as an overall greater-Serb hegemony, where Croatia was economi- the dark spots, like colonialism cally harshly exploited and national iden- for example. To what extent tity-building brutally suppressed. To some can national history serve as a extent these claims are true; however, the political battlefield in a similar economic exploitation is narrated without way to what has been happen- taking into consideration that the Belgrade ing in the European East was government treated all Austro-Hungarian south Slavic territories as a kind of internal nicely exposed in the case of the colony – as is boldly presented by Ivo Banac’s Great Britain by the book His- The National Question in Yugoslavia or in tory Teaching, Nationhood and writings by Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević. Thus, the State by Robert Phillips. Not the fact that citizens of present-day Croatia, even to mention how painful the Slovenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and, finally, Vojvodina were subject to much higher taxes process of coming to terms with etc. in comparison to the population of Ser- the past in contemporary France bia has been exclusively narrowed down has been, as is well highlighted to the exploitation of the Croats. By the by the book The Vichy Syndrome same token, the fact that the civil servants by Henry Rousso, or by Emanuel and military staff coming from the former Austro-Hungarian administration were in Macron’s speech delivered on the a much inferior position regardless of their occasion of the 75th anniversary nationality compared to their Serbian coun- of the Holocaust in France. terparts has also been omitted. Similarly, the fact that Serbian political parties were also against the 1930’s Royal Dictatorship regime the most extreme anti-Croatian, although is suppressed, as was the meaning of the Ante Starčević advocated ideas that were coalition of the Croatian Peasant Party with the equivalents to Kossuth’s ones. And the Independent Democratic Party, a lead- Ante Starčević is canonized in the Croatian ing party of the Serbs in Croatia; a fact which national identity-building process as the was directly related to the 1928 assassination "Father of the Homeland". of the Croatian Peasant Party representatives The problem of interpreting Lajos including the Party’s leader Stjepan Radić in Kossuth sheds a light on a more general the Yugoslavian Parliament. problem, namely that most of Croatian In respect to Socialist Yugoslavia, things historiography suffers from parochialism, get even more problematic, since the victim- most visible in the exclusion of "Zeitgeist" hood narrative ultimately distorts the his- in interpreting history; the trend nicely tory of a very complex multinational polity, outlined in the article The Use and Misuse as socialist Yugoslavia was. Here I will show of History Teaching in the 1990s Croatia by the distortions on the three most salient Magdalena Najbar-Agičić and Damir Agičić. examples: the trend of overrepresentation of Thus, neither the Croatian nor any of the Serbs in the ranks of the civil service of the concurrent national identity-building pro- socialist Croatia; the issue of the (renewed) cesses have been related to a contempora- economic exploitation of Croatia; and finally neous dominant influence of the German the circumstances of the cracking down on national romanticism and historicism. the 1971 Croatian reformist mass move- Hence, the works of the most important 19th ment, known as the Croatian Spring. century Serb national thinker Vuk Karadžić One of the most common historical turn out to represent an origin of the current claims present in the Croatian public has extreme Serb nationalism, and not just one been that the (Croatian) Serbs occupied how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past? life-shaping narratives 19

between two-thirds and three-quarters of Finally, before moving on to some posts in the ranks of the civil service and the remarks offering a possible solution to police during communism. These claims the victimhood perspective in historical haven’t been supported by any compre- interpretation in Croatia as well as to the hensive evidence. In Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji Manichean master-narrative, I would like 1945-1991: od zajedništva do razlaza [Croa- to address the fact that the countries of the tia in Yugoslavia 1945-1991: From Unity to European West have also not been immune Dissolution], the author Zdenko Radelić to the mythical structure of the national exposes some statistical data showing how identity-building master-narrative. In West- Serbs occupied up to 30% of the posts while ern Europe, the myths take on the structure they represented between 12-18% of popu- of the narrative of the glory of the nation in lation in Socialist Croatia. He subsequently history, where the French or the English his- offers rather comprehensive arguments tory is conceptualized as a history of enlight- explaining the overrepresentation: the fact enment and progress, while simultaneously that the Croatian Serbs unanimously sided neglecting the dark spots, like colonialism with Tito’s partisans during WWII, while the for example. To what extent can national Croats were divided between support for the history serve as a political battlefield in a Partisans and for the Nazi-puppet Ustaše similar way to what has been happening regime; the underdeveloped territories in in the European East was nicely exposed Croatia inhabited by Serbs represented a in the case of the Great Britain by the book natural basin for recruiting military offic- History Teaching, Nationhood and the State ers and servants, unlike the ethnic Croat by Robert Phillips. Not even to mention how population of the underdeveloped parts of painful the process of coming to terms with the country due to the latter’s high level of the past in contemporary France has been, support for the Ustaše. It is important here as is well highlighted by the book The Vichy to stress that Radelić registers how Croat Syndrome by Henry Rousso, or by Emanuel nationalism was suppressed more harshly Macron’s speech delivered on the occasion than Serb nationalism; however, he explains of the 75th anniversary of the Holocaust in why the Communists perceived the former France. So maybe it can be said that only the to represent a greater danger to the regime Scandinavian countries and Germany have then the latter. more or less come to terms with their own When it comes to the issue of economic past(s); the latter mostly due to the heavy exploitation, the Croatian master-narrative burden of the Nazi past. emphasizes that the socialist Croatia paid While we are on the subject of France much more into the federal budget then it and Germany, I think that the process of got back via federal subsidies. This trend is creating the common Franco-German his- true; however, the population of the under- tory textbooks can offer concrete solutions developed federal republics as a recipi- how to replace the Manichean perspective ent of the federal subsidies consumed to a in the Croatian historical master narrative. great extent the consumer goods produced In my opinion, the solution does not lie in in Croatia. So, again, there is a question of alternative textbooks, where a teacher can to what extent Croatia’s payments to a fed- pick the one she finds the most appropriate. eral budget circled back via the market; the Perhaps this can present a good solution in question rather stifled in the Croatian his- consolidated democracies; however, in such torical master-narrative. The same trend a fractured society as the contemporaneous was exposed in the present interpretation Croatian society – where history represents of the crackdown on the Croatian Spring an everlasting political battlefield – alterna- in 1971. Inter alia, the intervention against tive textbooks can present a source of fur- the Croatian reformist leadership was pre- ther fracturing. In my opinion, the possible ceded by opposition by the leaderships of solution would be to assemble a committee all other Yugoslav republics to the Croatian of the most distinguished historians from demands, as is comprehensively explained the right and the left wing of the politi- by Zdenko Radelić as well as by Dennison cal spectrum. The envisioned committee Rusinow’s book The Yugoslav Experiment. should be in charge of two issues: first, to This fact is almost completely absent from create a history-teaching curriculum; sec- the canon, as is an emphasis on the fact that ond, to be in charge of the production of the suppression of the Croatian Spring was textbooks. One could object that the envi- followed by the removal of the reformists in sioned curricula and textbooks would pro- Serbia. spectively suffer from various compromises 20 life-shaping narratives how to come to terms with the concept of the Croatians as the triple victim of the past?

and revisionism(s). I would say that compromises would ensure that no faction felt entirely deprived of its particular perspective, while revisionism will be avoided if all members of the committee shared a common perspective on the concepts of human rights as well on the fundamental concepts the parliamentary democracy lies upon. I think that then, and only then, history would cease to serve as a political battlefield in Croatia, and that finally the Croatian society would come to a more comprehensive public interpretation of history than the present ones have been.

references: Bakić-Hayden, Milica, 2006, Varijacije na temu "Balkan", I. P. "Filip Višnjić", Beograd. Barthes, Roland, 1966, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives. Bijelić, Dušan I. and Savić, Obrad (eds.), 2003, Balkan kao metafora: Između globali- zacije i fragmentacije, Beogradski krug, Beograd. Debeljak, Aleš 2013, Evropa bez Evropljana, Zeničke sveske, no. 13, pp. 211-221. http:// www.zesveske.ba/17_13/1713_3_4.htm. Đerić, Gordana, 2009 "Stereotip i studije o Balkanu", Antropologija, vol. 9, pp. 11-26. Strategija EU za Zapadni Balkan, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu- western-balkans-strategy-credible-enlargement-perspective_en. Evropska civilizacija – zbornik, 2009 (ed. Mećiej Kozminski), Službeni glasnik, Beo- grad. Jansen, Stef, 2001, "Svakodnevni orijentalizam: Doživljaj ‘Balkana’/’Evrope’ u Beo- gradu i Zagrebu", Filozofija i društvo 18, pp. 33-71. Jezernik, Božidar, 2007, Divlja Evropa, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd. Miskimmon, Alister, O’Loughlin Ben and Roselle, Laura, 2014, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, Abingdon: Routledge. Said, Edward W., 1985, Orientalism Reconsidered, Cultural Critique, No. 1. Todorova, Maria, 1996, Konstrukcija zapadnog diskursa o Balkanu, Etnološka tribina: Godišnjak Hrvatskog etnološkog društva, Vol. 26 No. 19, pp. 25-41. https://hrcak.srce. hr/80733. Todorova, Maria, 2006, Imaginarni Balkan, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd. Ugrešić, Dubravka, 2008, Kultura Laži, edicija Reč, Fabrika knjiga, Beograd. what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina? a quest for alternatives 21 a quest for alternatives what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Asim Mujkić

Summary: The author attempts to identify Indeed, what occurs in this the so-called ‘civic option’ as a political, but perspective is that the criticism also cultural and historical alternative to the of one, apparently essentialist, dominant ethno-nationalist conception in universalist option such as liberal Bosnia and Herzegovina. A brief overview of democracy, overshadows the fact the development of this idea with an ideological analysis is given, as well as possible that the challenging perspective future prospects. Contrary to common per- is in itself essentialist. It resides ceptions in contemporary public and politi- on "the essentialist understand- cal discourse, this political option is the ing of ‘ethnic groups’ as political oldest political platform in ‘democratic’ Bos- agents", and therefore on the nia and Herzegovina articulated in opposi- pretension to the universalization to the hegemonic Communist ideology. Paradoxical though it may sound, the author tion of the particular groupness identifies another source of this option in in Bosnia. Or, the mobilization the goals of the anti-fascist struggle set by of ethnic politics – previously The Anti-Fascist People’s Liberation Council initiated in war, through illegal of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1943 and 1944 use of force and by means of with its ‘double-determination’ of Bosnian – surprisingly, civic – Republic as a polity of ethnic cleansing and massive war ‘equal peoples’ and of ‘equal citizens’. Fur- crimes – is itself an instrument ther, the author identifies empirical exam- of demobilization of civic politics, ples of its existence – the Platform of the which are today framed as a Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ‘security threat’. Tuzla Model, and Brčko District – suggest- ing that with a change of political circumstances and a mode of operation typical of political and civic agents affiliated to this idea, the civic option, as an option of ‘value pluralism’, could cease to be just an option.

Asim Mujkić Full professor, Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo 22 a quest for alternatives what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

would be transformed into a typical ‘nation introduction state’ in which, simply according to statis- tic data, there would be the possibility that Behind the fiercest discussions on the politi- the most numerous constituent people – for cal situation and political future of Bosnia example the Bosniaks, whose total num- and Herzegovina involving domestic and ber, according to the 2013 Census, exceeds international, especially European agents, 50% of the population – would become the a certain spectre seems to be haunting the ‘host-nation’ and impose its political will political elites of this country – the spectre on to the other constituent groups, either of a ‘civic state’. The idea of Bosnia and Her- in the entire state, or at least in one of its zegovina as a common civic state, according entities – namely, the Federation of Bos- to the bitter statements of some ethnona- nia and Herzegovina. Having in mind that tionalist leaders, as well as to the profound an overwhelming majority of Bosniaks is ignorance of the European envoys, seems to of Muslim religious background, the com- be the ultimate danger to the stability of the parison of civic state with ‘Islamic’ state by state. Advocacy for a civic state, according the Bosnian Croat HDZ party chief Dragan to the leader of the Croat ethnonationalist Čović certainly adds cultural, clash-of-civi- party, equates to advocacy for no less than an lizations-type of flavour to an already com- Islamic state. Based on the ‘clear and present plex inter-ethnic problem2. Indeed, what danger’ of a civic option, it is unacceptable occurs in this perspective is that the criti- for ‘Muslim judges’ to have authority over1 cism of one, apparently essentialist, uni- Republika Srpska, according to the leader of versalist option such as liberal democracy, the Bosnian Serb political elite, nominally overshadows the fact that the challenging a social-democrat. However, Bosniak eth- perspective is in itself essentialist. It resides nopolitical leaders publicly speak about the on "the essentialist understanding of ‘ethnic necessity of establishing a balance between groups’ as political agents" (Gagnon, 2004: the ethnic and civic principle, while at the xviii), and therefore on the pretension to the same time, on territories under their politi- universalization of the particular groupness cal domination, they carry on with ‘marking’ in Bosnia. Or, to paraphrase Gagnon, the and ‘nationalization’ of their ethno-national mobilization of ethnic politics – previously territory. Indeed, there is something about initiated in war, through illegal use of force the civic option which causes a stir in appar- and by means of ethnic cleansing and mas- ently straight-forward cases: Bosnia and sive war crimes – is itself an instrument of Herzegovina is constitutionally defined as demobilization of civic politics, which are a state of the three constituent peoples, and today framed as a ‘security threat’. Yet this its political system is based on a balance of contemporary systematic undermining power between the three constituent groups of the legitimacy of the civic option only and ethnic allocation of posts as confirma- uncovers the highly questionable legitimacy tion of the equality of its peoples. of the violent establishment of the current Viewed from this ‘ethnocratic’ perspec- ethnocratic regime. Gagnon points out: tive (Howard, 2012), a non-ethnic political option undermines the very equality of the The immediate purpose of this violence constituent collectives. In fact, there are was to demobilize the wider population, to two main, and interrelated, objections to prevent a successful anti-regime mobiliza- this option. The civic option is rightly iden- tion from toppling the existing structures tified as an option based on the values of of power in the republic shifting the focus civil society, in fact the ‘European values’, or of political discourse and action away from values embedded in the liberal-democratic liberalization toward purported threats moral imaginary (Taylor, 2004). Its crit- to the very existence of the nation newly ics find its universalist nature to be highly defined in very narrow terms. The effect inapplicable to the Bosnian case, the spe- of the violence was also the construction cific three-constituent-peoples context. If of homogeneous political space, that is, applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if this country were organized on civic lines, it 2 "I respect those who want a civic state, but today to say civic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina means classical Unitarism, and in some form, theoretically, 1 Milorad Dodik said that it is "unacceptable to the Gov- it basically means an Islamic state" (‘’Poštujem one ernment that Republika Srpska is judged by Muslim koji žele građansku državu, samo danas u BiH reći judges" (Milorad Dodik je "poručio da je za Vladu građanska država to znači klasičan unitarizam, u ne- neprihvatljivo da RS sude sudije muslimani"). (Dodik, koj formi, teoretskom obliku, a to vam znači u osnovi 2018) islamsku državu’’, rekao je Čović.), (Čović, 2018) what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina? a quest for alternatives 23

political space within which were imposed and political associations and intellectuals anti-liberal, authoritarian notions of Croat- was established in Sarajevo in May 1989. ness (and Serbness), in which the views of It was, according to Gajo Sekulić, "the first challenger elites and the wider population, oppositional civic-political organization in which were not in line with the HDZ right Bosnia and Herzegovina unless the rather were defined as anti-Croat (or anti-Serb). short-lived Association for the protection of (Gagnon, 2004: 122). human rights in Kosovo, founded by the students of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo in the autumn of 1988 is counted" the birth of the civic option: (Sekulić, 2006: 15). 1989-1992 In fact, the first political parties, including those who claimed to represent col- Indeed, what is the civic option in Bosnia lective ethnic rights, such as SDA (for and Herzegovina, and to what extent is it Bosniaks), SDS (for Serbs), and HDZ (for artificial, directed against the being of par- Croats), framed themselves – especially ticular ethnic peoples? Contrary to common during the election campaign of 1990, perceptions in contemporary public and as belonging to the ‘civic option’, or as a political discourse, according to which this civic alternative to Communism. At the political option is usually ascribed to pre- time, civility, civil society, civic vocabu- sent day non-nationalist political parties lary, seemed to be the main language of (social democrats, liberals, etc.), this politi- political articulation, as some kind of ‘pass- cal platform is the oldest, although vague, word’ for entering political arena. So, in political platform in ‘democratic’ Bosnia the beginning, the very loose term of ‘civic and Herzegovina articulated in opposition option’ referred to all non-Communist or to the hegemonic Communist ideology. anti-Communist political agents willing to It originated during 1989 and beginning compete in the first multiparty elections in of 1990 in the wake of Yugoslavian Prime Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1990. Minister Ante Marković’s economic liberal It was only after the elections that ‘people’s reforms, initially in the fields of cultural parties’, having overwhelmingly won the rights (various initiatives to re-open insti- elections, gradually shifted the paradigm tutions of ethnic-national identity that had of political articulation, revealing their been previously banned by the Communist ethnopolitical agenda. This rather short regime, forums for protection of cultural period of time between autumn 1988 and rights, etc.) and liberal, mainly student the outbreak of war in April 1992 could be youth media such as Valter and Naši dani. considered the time of the beginning, and UJDI (Association for Yugoslav Democratic at the same time the defeat of ‘civil soci- Initiative), a grouping of Yugoslav civic ety’ and "its liberal-democratic and social-

Skopje, March for Tolerance 2014 by CoalitionMargins, CC-BY 2.0 24 a quest for alternatives what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

democratic potential" (Sekulić, 2006: 14) mous, answering to the parliament. The to the benefit of ethno-nationalist, nation- President of the Republic is directly elected state-founding political forces. The first for a mandate of 5 years; the Parliament is organized expression of ‘civic option’ as a unicameral, while the special focus is on the reaction to the inevitable fall of the Yugo- protection of minorities, local self-govern- slavian Communist hegemony was UJDI ment, and ethnic equality (Raguž, 1991). (the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative) which had, as indicated in their It is important to note that according to name, a rather Yugoslavian agenda. They this draft constitution Bosnia and Herzego- opted for top-down democratization, advo- vina, economywise, is a capitalist republic. cating democratic elections on the Yugosla- Article 52 states that "economic and social vian level before elections in the republics. organization is based on free enterprise Since the elections were held in the repub- and free flow of labour, goods and capital", lics first, this option slowly faded and made guaranteeing in further provisions property way for the civic option in the republics. In rights (Article 55) and equal terms in the that light, the first clear political articula- market (Article 53). From the very begin- tion of the Bosnian ‘civic option’ has been ning it was clear to those who advocated undertaken by the Alliance of Socialist the ‘civic option’ that Bosnia and Herze- Youth – Democratic Alliance of Bosnia and govina, unlike the rest of the Yugoslavian Herzegovina (future Liberal Party). In a 15 republics, was not a monoethnic nation March 1991 document entitled the Mem- state, but rather a multiethnic polity, and orandum of Bosnia and Herzegovina of that "with such a plural inheritance people (clearly aiming to counter-act the national- cannot reasonably expect that political and ist Memorandum of the Serbian Academy national allegiance will express a deep cul- of Sciences and Arts of 1986, which in the ture of common values" (Gray, 2016: 147). opinion of many serious analysts initiated But it was reasonably expected "that peo- the processes of ethnic-nationalization and ple have in common enough respect for the ethnic ‘un-mixing’ in Yugoslavia that even- ruling ideas of a civil society – ideas of tol- tually led to its final dissolution), written by eration, of responsibility and equality under intellectuals and activists: Zdravko Grebo, the rule of law – for diversity in society to be Tarik Haverić, Đorđe Latinović and Martin fruitful rather than an occasion for division" Raguž, a draft of the constitution of a civic (Gray, 2016: 147). This ‘rational’ expectation republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was – though seriously undermined by subse- offered. As Raguž explains, this civic draft quent war atrocities and Dayton realpoli- "is free from all ideological markers. Con- tik of ‘contained’ virulent nationalisms – is ceptually, it starts with the citizen as carrier still the ultimate horizon for advocates of of sovereignty; Bosnia and Herzegovina is civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina. defined as the state of its citizens based on The fragility of this ‘expectation’ was best human rights, freedoms, the rule of law and expressed by one of the authors of the draft social justice, with a Preamble referring to constitution, Professor Zdravko Grebo, who the historical circumstances of the founda- seriously doubted the feasibility of the civic tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the sov- option – not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina ereign and indivisible state of Serbs, Croats but also in the other Yugoslavian republics and Muslims" (Raguž, 1991). – faced with heavily armed nationalisms. Raguž has continued to describe the He said that not only were serious precon- proposed document containing the fun- ditions for a civic society absent, but "there damental principles and ideas of a ‘civic are no basic conditions for the establish- option’ to this day: ment of civilized political life" (Grebo, 1992). The dominant place in this text is the chap- What is further interesting is that Grebo ter on human rights and freedoms which posed the fundamental dilemma that, is in concordance with the best European as it seems, still haunts the supporters of democratic tradition. Furthermore, the the ‘civic option’. Since he highlighted the document consequently deduces the division very weak chances that this option might of powers into legislative, executive and become viable, a journalist asked him why judicial branches with a semi-presidential he bothered writing and fighting for such an political system where the presidential option and endorsing it. What is maybe sur- authority is essentially restricted by the prising is the very existential tone of Grebo’s Constitution. The government is autono- answer. He said that his endeavour reflects what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina? a quest for alternatives 25

Only in a superficial sense could the position of Bosniak ethnonationalists be considered different from Bosnian Serb and Croat views. Although Bos- niak ethnopolitics refers to elements of the ‘civic option’ as their political platform, in the territories with Bosniak majority, all elements of nationalization are effectively already present. However, the Bosniak political elite must be ‘forced’ or ‘unwillingly’ led to the ‘three-nation-state’ option due to enormous ideological discrepancy with the proclaimed imperatives of its ethnopolitics on the ‘indivisibility’ of Bosnia. In this subtle ethnopolitical strategy, Bosniak nationalism takes some elements of the ‘civic option’, distorts them to serve their nationalist agenda and thus compromises it in its entirety.

the need that despite the unfavourable of force in order to establish its ‘national circumstances, certain things that are constituent unit’, and afterwards, after the considered as undoubtedly belonging to the Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed, legacy of civilization, things which I per- continuing with extreme nationalist politics ceive as literally my existential interest /are of separation. worth striving for/ such as: protection of my Although the civic option has lost the privacy, protection of my differing opinion, 1990 elections, further historical develop- protection from arbitrary police repres- ments, especially armed nationalization sion, creation of conditions for free political and fragmentation of the republic not only competition, for an independent judiciary, kept this option alive, but meant that fright- for genuine public opinion, independent ened citizens, confronted with inevitability media, etc. (Grebo, 1992). of war, reached for its vocabulary to articu- late their opposition to nationalism and Indeed, history unfolded in the way further fragmentation. On two occasions – Professor Grebo had anticipated. The three March 1 and April 5-6, 1992 – two massive leading nationalist parties accepted so- civic demonstrations clearly opposed the called ‘Cutileiro Plan’ of March 18, 1992, ethnonationalist direction their republic which redefined Bosnia and Herzegovina was led into. As demonstrators managed in ethno-territorial terms: "Bosnia and to enter the Parliament and Government Herzegovina shall be a state consisting of buildings on April 5, they established an the three constituent units based on the open forum, a ‘people’s parliament’ and national principle and with respect to eco- requested that the nationalists step down. nomic, geographic and other criteria". This Unfortunately, shots were fired, the par- Plan envisioned Bosnia as a confederacy, or liament building was shelled, and this loose union of the three ethnic republics, civic initiative was drowned at birth. The sovereign nation states. Even worse, now exhausting, brutal nationalist war started. with the support of the international com- Nevertheless, one of the greatest achieve- munity, for the first time in the history of ments of the civic option and ideas was this country, the principle of ethnic territo- the document entitled "The Platform on riality has been introduced and legitimized the Operation of the Presidency of Bosnia and will remain in the background of all and Herzegovina in the Conditions of War", subsequent deliberations and negotiations adopted by the Presidency of the republic in on the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. June 1992. The Platform reiterated the firm Even worse, this ‘League-of-nations’-type attachment of the Bosnian government to of institutional and political rearrange- multiculturalism, equality of peoples and ment of Bosnia and Herzegovina further citizens, the rule of law, and other civic encouraged nationalist forces, especially values. Unfortunately, due to the force of Serb nationalists backed by the Yugosla- weaponry, and ‘tacit consent’ of the inter- vian Army, to engage first in the armed national community, the Platform was mar- ‘implementation’ of the plan, meaning ginalized by numerous ‘peace plans’, each initiating and carrying out ethnic and ter- of them fully observant of the ethno-territo- ritorial ‘redistribution’ within Bosnia by use rial claims of armed nationalist forces. 26 a quest for alternatives what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

olitical sentiments from 1990 onwards. The the ‘communist’ roots of the second pillar is the ZAVNOBiH principle of civic option equality of the peoples and citizens, a de facto Communist principle. In fact, attach- Another source of inspiration, besides the ment to this principle and the heritage of set of ‘European values’, for the Bosnian anti-fascist struggle has remained a strong civic option is to be found not in any known dividing line between the civic option and universalist recipe, but in the very local, ethnopolitical parties up to this day. There particular, contextual heritage of the mod- is also the question to what extent it is rea- ern Bosnian polity. This source is found in sonable to talk about two pillars since the the goals of the anti-fascist struggle set by principle of human rights and freedoms is ZAVNOBIH: The Anti-Fascist People’s Liber- already included in ZAVNOBiH documents. ation Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in The earliest advocates of the civic option, 1943. This covenant led by the Communist such as Zdravko Grebo, reintroduced the resistance, constituted Bosnia and Herze- long-forgotten Second Declaration of govina as a sovereign republic of all its peo- Human Rights of the citizens of Bosnia, ples: Serbs, Croats and Muslims (Bosniaks), clearly implying that rather stricter imple- defining it as a republic belonging equally to mentation of it would suffice for the democ- all three, and at the same time belonging to ratization of the republic. Therefore, it could none of them in particular. This formula for be concluded that ZAVNOBiH’s double Bosnia and Herzegovina thus surpassed the determination of the republic as a polity of common one-nation state solution equally equal peoples and of equal citizens, reinter- endorsed by the capitalist West and social- preted in the light of the heritage of human ist East. Instead of dividing Bosnia accord- rights struggles, indeed remains the funda- ing to ethnic lines, or imposing one of its mental principle of the civic option. And by peoples as the Bosnian host-nation, the the outbreak of war, this option was already subject of sovereignty was delegated to the sharply contrasted to the ethnonationalist sphere of vivid inter-group relations, that platform for the new constitutional organi- is, to the space between them encourag- zation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ing their unity, common features, multilay- ered interactions that have shaped Bosnian social identity for centuries. the living civility: the ‘Tuzla Furthermore, the second Declaration, way’ and Brčko District entitled the Declaration of Human Rights of the Citizens of Bosnia of 1944, redefined Contrary to the hegemonic perspective that Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic deter- implies that Bosnia is viable as a country mined in two ways: as a community of equal only if the principle of ethnic territoriality peoples, but also as a community of equal is met, a few empirical examples of non- citizens. The significance of these docu- national organization seem to contradict ments, which had established the mod- this view. In his brilliant study entitled Poli- ern Bosnian polity is that they reached far tics and society in Tuzla from 1992 to 1995, beyond strict ideological confines. Regard- Ioannis Armakolas focuses on the case of less of the subsequent, rather poor Com- Tuzla, the only civic polity after the first munist performance, especially in the field election and its struggle against nationalist of individual rights and freedoms, on the pretensions throughout the war from out- level of principles this ‘double’ determina- side and from within. Based on comprehen- tion of the Bosnian civic republic – of equal sive empirical research, the author distils a peoples and of equal citizens – remained the few key characteristics of the so called ‘Tuzla founding idea of the Bosnian civic option. In Way’, that is, of the civic alternative option, addition, within such a framework, Bosnia contrasted to the nationalist and socialist- and Herzegovina recorded unprecedented Yugoslavian options available back in the development in the fields of economy, cul- beginning of 1990s: ture, but also in its political agency during Bosniannes, [political, cultural, not its ‘socialist phase’. So, though it may sound ethnic: A.M.]; as a paradox, ideologically, the civic option Bosnian tradition of living together in clearly has two pillars – the values of the difference; liberal-democratic imaginary that boosted Anti-fascist tradition of Tuzla [here we anti-Communist regime sentiments prior could add 'and Bosnia and Herzego- to the 1990 election, but also anti-ethnop- vina': A.M.]; what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina? a quest for alternatives 27

So, the contemporary nationalists’ talk of the ‘spectre’ of the ‘civic state’ reveals itself as a handy instrument of ideological mobilization by all three ethnonationalist elites, whereby the Serb and Croat elites present themselves as victims of the hegemonic and unitary pretensions of the Bosniaks, while the Bosniak elite develops the theme of being the victim of separatist activities by the other two. This victimological stance is the ‘ground zero’ of ethnic mobilization on all sides, resulting in the ‘win-win’ context encouraging the production of separate realities, societies, and in the end, of separate territorial and political entities, ‘ethnopolises’, or nuclei of future monoethnic states.

New mild communitarianism: respect true – nationalist – nature of Bosniak civic for traditional institutions; less po- option emerged, according to Armakolas, liticized; expansion or stressing the at an opportune moment during the war unifying elements, marginalization of in Tuzla, when SDA attempted to radicalise those that divide; the citizenry of Tuzla and take over political Flexible ethnic ‘keys’ [rotation of eth- power. However, what enabled the survival nic allocation to important political of the ‘Tuzla model’ was the condition of positions: A.M.], support for civic and war that led to the armament of the bear- liberal aspirations; ers of the civic option on one side, and on Inter-ethnic coexistence in the con- the other, control over resources. Yet, as text of Bosnian unity; celebration of Armakolas notices, this agency of the civic ethnic mixing and cultural diversity; option has steadily weakened as a result of The pride of Tuzla, local patriotism; the general reconstruction of state organi- (Armakolas, 2016: 118). zation that has become more and more Within the ‘civic discourse’ of Bosniak nationalist (see Armakolas, 2016: 119). The ethnopolitics promoted by SDA during the ethnopolitical state structure, total control war and still today, the above-mentioned over institutions, public resources, media, elements become distorted, and in Arma- and even over civil society in an atmosphere kolas’ analysis they look like this: of permanent conflict and threatening ‘final Bosniannes, with overemphasis on countdown’, control and instrumentaliza- Bosniak identity; tion of repressive and ideological state appa- Bosnian tradition of living together ratuses, economic and existential extortion in difference [but with one element produced the political bodies of voters that already overemphasized, advocating legitimate ‘nationalizing’ elites, at the same living together ceases to be persuasive time marginalizing the civic option. – A,M.]; The civic option was not a functional Resistance to recognition of the anti- reality only in Tuzla. To a significant degree fascist tradition – powerful revisionist it is still present in Brčko District of Bosnia tendencies; and Herzegovina. A civic, or non-nationalist Stronger communitarianism: tradi- line of reasoning, or the principle of ZAVNO- tional institutions and communities BiH’s double-determination also functions in the centre of society and politics; within contexts other than socialist, as is Stronger element of communitarian- visible in the Brčko Arbitration Award of ism in politics; 1999. By stating clearly that Inter-ethnic coexistence based on the tribunal, rather than handing a trophy communitarian lines; discourage- to one side or the other, should take af- ment of mixing and opposition to cul- firmative steps to provide immediate relief, tural diversity; both in terms of human rights and in terms Local identity interwoven with Bos- of economic revitalization, for the thou- niak tradition and Islamic religion. sands of poverty-stricken individuals who (Armakolas, 2016: 118). live in, and want to make their home in, This list of comparisons by Armako- Brčko. (Arbitration Tribunal Award, 1999). las clearly indicates the level of distortion, or difference between the ‘Bosniak civic option’ and the common ‘civic option’. The 28 a quest for alternatives what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

The Arbitration Tribunal based its Only in a superficial sense could the deliberation on the principles of equity position of Bosniak ethnonationalists be stemming from the perspective of local considered different from Bosnian Serb and individual inhabitants’ interests, finally Croat views. Although Bosniak ethnopo- according the disputed area the status of litics refers to elements of the ‘civic option’ condominium, echoing the ZAVNOBiH as their political platform, in the territo- principle, which determined that Brčko ries with Bosniak majority, all elements of District belongs equally to both entities nationalization are effectively already pre- and to neither in particular. The exclusion sent. However, just as the political elite of of the ethnic territorial principle by the Serbia that ‘somehow’ has to be forced from Tribunal’s Award has in effect set precondi- outside to accept the departure of Kosovo, tions for a rather prosperous liberal-dem- the Bosniak political elite must be ‘forced’ or ocratic, or civic community with relatively ‘unwillingly’ led to the ‘three-nation-state’ weaker communitarian elements clearly option due to enormous ideological dis- showing that Bosnia and Herzegovina crepancy with the proclaimed imperatives is not doomed to ethnocracy. A. Moore of its ethnopolitics on the ‘indivisibility’ of points out in that respect that "Brčko has Bosnia. In this subtle ethnopolitical strategy, served as an exemplar of what multiethnic Bosniak nationalism takes some elements of Bosnia could be – rather than the ethno- the ‘civic option’, distorts them to serve their territorial division of the country otherwise nationalist agenda and thus compromises established by the DPA" (Moore, 2013: 162). it in its entirety. The political option claiming an affiliation to the civic option has not in reality achieved anything in the field of conclusion: further reintegration of the society of Bosnia and perspectives Herzegovina. On the contrary, this political option is heavily engaged, together with the Contrary to the nationalist discourses’ other two, in the production of three sepa- implication that the civic option intends to rate societies within Bosnia. impose the universal abstract solutions for So, the contemporary nationalists’ talk the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the ‘spectre’ of the ‘civic state’ reveals with Cutileiro’s and all of the subsequent itself as a handy instrument of ideologi- plans, the only conception that has really cal mobilization by all three ethnonation- been imposed in the domain of ‘realpolitik’ alist elites, whereby the Serb and Croat was in fact the universalist pattern of the elites present themselves as victims of the construction of the nation state in the par- hegemonic and unitary pretensions of the ticular territorial portion of Bosnia and Her- Bosniaks, while the Bosniak elite develops zegovina. The ‘minoritarian’ discourse of the the theme of being the victim of separatist ethnonationalist elites, especially of Bos- activities by the other two. This victimo- nian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, developed logical stance is the ‘ground zero’ of ethnic against the ‘majoritarian’ threat of Bosniaks, mobilization on all sides, resulting in the will obviously remain dominant until the ‘win-win’ context encouraging the produc- highest possible level of nation-statehood is tion of separate realities, societies, and in achieved on the territories previously con- the end, of separate territorial and political quered by force and after massive ethnic entities, ‘ethnopolises’ (Mujkić, 2007), or engineering. It is exactly this idea of nation- nuclei of future monoethnic states. In such alizing the claimed territories of Bosnia and a context, the civic option is something Herzegovina that has introduced the ethnic like collateral damage. For one nationalist animosities and never-ending circles of eth- option – the Bosniak one – it is the starting nic mobilizations on all three sides, which in point. The political vocabulary of this elite is a rather perverse way should end up in three abundant with civic metaphors and terms, separate (or loosely confederated) national yet the political practice is nationalization. ‘civic’ states. Once the domination of a host For the other two nationalist options – the people is undisputed on a certain territory, Serb and Croat options – the civic option is all minority rights can be guaranteed, and the endpoint. They say yes to liberal democ- in such a way, according to Bosnian eth- racy, but only after the reorganization of the nonationalist elites, liberal-democracy and entire country, after certain conditions are organization of the state in accordance to met, primarily, the conditions of clear ter- "European values" can be achieved. ritorial hegemony of a host ethnic nation what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina? a quest for alternatives 29

over a particular portion of Bosnia and Her- and Serb areas, some new ideas as to party zegovina. All of the three nationalist options organization must be discussed. As repre- are at the same time nationalizing options sentative democracy is generally in a deep in possession of institutions, of key sources crisis of legitimacy, new forms of political of economic power, of the entire network organization and articulation must be con- of the ideological state apparatuses deeply sidered. The election victories of Macron, engaged in the process of production of Syriza, even Most in Croatia clearly indicate their respective peoples and their respec- that one of the future shapes of political tive societies. organization will be some kind of combina- What is the political future of this tion of political party and movement with option, attached to the idea of society in its close ties to citizens. These events showed overwhelming complexity and free play of that, contrary to the dominant views in its plural life-forms? Contemporary politi- both political theory and practice, the peo- cal agents, which consist of political parties ple, individual citizens do indeed want to who vaguely claim the ‘civic option’ as their be heard, consulted, asked. In fact, as H. political agenda, such as the Social Demo- Arendt convincingly concludes, "the right cratic Party, the Democratic Front, the Civic to have rights is a fundamentally political Party and Our Party, seem to be rather weak. right; it is the right to belong significantly to There are various reasons for that. First of a political space" (Birmingham, 2006: 59). all, it is their inherent ideological vague- The ruling ethnocracy is based on exactly ness. Most of them use ‘civic option’ and the opposite – on not personally belonging ‘leftist option’ interchangeably. Although it to a political space. The political relevance is true that both social democratic and lib- of a citizen is exhausted in his or her mem- eral parties throughout Europe face identity bership in this or that group, whereby her crises, with the tide of ultra-conservative or his voice is irretrievably silenced to the nationalism, a certain platform of social- benefit of screaming and shouting eth- liberal alliance could be desirable; a more nonationalist oligarchies. The effective focused and articulated ideology of these contact and participation of citizens within parties could be helpful in their distinctive the movement and with the party’s higher visibility for voters. That would also help echelons needs to be facilitated. Political them to become visible and credible in the agents must concentrate on creating condi- still politically monolithic areas under the tions for a significant public appearance of strict grip of the Serb and Croat nationalist a citizen. Political "leadership, then, if it is elites. Second, the leadership issues reduc- still to have a role, must exercise an entre- ing political actions and disputes to inter- preneurial function, not dictating to others personal relations are a deadly cancer of or acting in their name or even claiming to this political block. Third and most impor- represent them but as a simple operator of tant, in my view, since the agents of the assembly within a multitude that is self- civic option must in the foreseeable future organized and cooperates in freedom and operate within a hostile ethnocratic insti- equality to produce "wealth" (Hardt, Negri, tutional arrangement, they must come up 2017: xviii). As a form of ‘democratic entre- with more effective, and subversive, ways preneurship’, grounded in the dynamics of of coping with it. Until present, their per- everyday social life characterized by numer- formance, even when they win an election ous interactions, new solidarity networks, and are effectively in power as in 2000 and ways of cooperation, grounded, if you will, in 2010, has been rather poor. Of course, in a common language spoken by all of the part of the blame goes to the ethnically dis- ‘deeply divided’ Bosnian peoples, the civic criminatory institutional organization of option has a chance, for it unflinchingly Bosnia and Herzegovina, which forces the resides in the idea developed by J. Gray, that winner to enter coalitions with ideologi- "we do not need common values in order cally opposite partners. But an excuse is not to live together in peace. We need common an option. In that regard, besides the goal institutions in which many forms of life can of strengthening the party base in the Croat coexist" (Gray, 2016: 25). 30 a quest for alternatives what is the civic option in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

references: Armakolas, 2016: Armakolas, Ioannis, Politika i društvo u Tuzli od 1992. do 1995. go- dine (Sarajevo: University Press, UMHIS, 2016). Birmingham, 2006: Birmingham, Peg, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights (Blooming- ton: Indiana University Press, 2006). Gagnon, 2004: Gagnon, V. P., The Myth of Ethnic War (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 2004). Gray, 2016: Gray, John, Gray’s Anatomy (Penguin Books, 2016). Grebo, 1992: Grebo, Zdravko: "Da li će ikad doći proljeće???", interview, Sarajevo, Spektar – Dodatak, January 1992, 1-2. Hardt, Negri, 2017: Hardt, Michael, and Negri, Antonio, Assembly (Oxford University Press, 2017). Howard, 2012: Howard, Lisa Morje: "The Ethnocracy Trap", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, 2012; 155-169. Moore, 2013: Moore, Adam, The Localized Dynamics of Peacebuilding (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013). Mujkić, 2007: Mujkić, Asim, "We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis", Constellations, March 2007 – Vol. 14 Issue 1, pp.: 112-128. Raguž, 1991: Raguž, Martin: Uvod. Nacrt Ustava Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Sara- jevo, Naši dani - Dodatak, 15 March 1992. Sekulić, 2006: Sekulić, Gajo, Individuum i nasilje (Sarajevo: Rabić, 2006). Taylor, 2004: Taylor, Charles, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004).

documents: ‘Cutileiro Plan’ of March 18: "Izjava o principima za novo ustavno uređenje BiH", Sa- rajevo, Oslobođenje, 19 March 1992. Arbitration Tribunal Award, 1999: Essential Legal Texts of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Brčko: Skupština Brčko Distrikta BiH, 2009). Čović, 2018: "Građanska država - islamska država", http://www.rtvbn.com/3895898/ gradjanska-drzava-islamska-drzava, 22 March 18. Dodik, 2018: Milorad Dodik: Sud BiH sudi RS na nacionalnoj osnovi by D. Šajinović 10.12.2008, http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Milorad-Dodik-Sud-BiH-sudi- RS-na-nacionalnoj-osnovi/33926, 22 March 18. antifascism, communism and the Yugoslavian national idea in the jaws of nationalism a quest for alternatives 31

antifascism, communism and the Yugoslavian national idea in the jaws of nationalism

Srđan Milošević

Following the breakdown of Yugoslavia and Antifascism acquired the status it the abandonment of the Marxist paradigm in understanding the national question, has today in stages, although the after many trials and tribulations, Antifas- various substances correspond- cism as an ideologeme became the most ing to each stage co-exist today: important secondary thing in the process the difference being merely of constructing post-Yugoslavian national which of the existing paradigms identities. Nevertheless, the aforementioned trials were not a matter of creative dominates in any given moment. envisioning and fruitful reinterpretation of To wit, understood as the strug- a significant subject such as the legacy of gle against Fascist occupiers the Antifascist struggle. They were rather and their collaborators during ramblings and roundabout paths that did World War II in Yugoslavia, in not lead the societies on to the right path in understanding Antifascism, even though the post-Yugoslavian period, the term itself has regained significance. As especially in Croatia and Serbia the author of this essay sees it, the reason for Antifascism was mostly judged in the aforementioned rambling and sidepaths two ways: rejected as a decep- lies in the attitudes towards Yugoslavianness tion, a mistaken commitment by and the Yugoslavian Communists, whose negativity borders on the irrational. wayward apostate renegades Antifascism acquired the status it has of national ideals; and accepted today in stages, although the various sub- as an authentic (exclusive or stances corresponding to each stage co- dominant) marker of one’s own exist today: the difference being merely body national, while "others" are which of the existing paradigms dominates portrayed as Fascists or Fascist in any given moment. To wit, understood as the struggle against Fascist occupiers and collaborators, or completely ig- their collaborators during World War II in nored at best. Both these under- Yugoslavia, in the post-Yugoslavian period, standings were revisionist in the especially in Croatia and Serbia Antifascism deepest sense of the word. was mostly judged in two ways: rejected as a deception, a mistaken commitment by wayward apostate renegades of national ideals; and accepted as an authentic (exclusive or dominant) marker of one’s own body national*, while "others" are portrayed as Fascists or Fascist collaborators, or com- Srđan Milošević Historian, researcher at the Institute for the * analogous to ‘body politic’; also below, ‘body ethnic’ – Recent History of Serbia, editor’s note Belgrade 32 a quest for alternatives antifascism, communism and the Yugoslavian national idea in the jaws of nationalism

pletely ignored at best. Both these under- standings were revisionist in the deepest The Communists’ Yugoslavian sense of the word.1 alignment merely served to In rejecting Antifascism (both histori- underline this arbitrary qualifica- cally and today), linking it to the Commu- tion, as in the dominant interpre- nists, and through them to Yugoslavia, is fundamental. It is evident in this interpreta- tations, Yugoslavia itself, as an tion that the Antifascist struggle was largely idea of a state, became a symbol the work of the Yugoslavian Communist of national oppression. This is Party (CPY), which took leadership of the how it is perceived in all nation- liberation struggle, whose goal, in addi- alist narratives, without exception to defeating Fascism, was to renew and reorganise Yugoslavia as a state. Both tion. Since it was Communist these beliefs - Antifascist and Yugoslavian and Yugoslavian, the People’s – became undesirable. The criterion was Liberation Struggle Antifascism national, in effect – nationalist. Commu- therefore itself became unac- nists were declared traitors to the national ceptable. In the most extreme interests, which in turn were understood as alleged needs, invented rights and bigoted interpretations of this tendency, claims of specific ethnies with respect to even Fascist collaboration could others. Standing opposite to such demands, be justified as "nationally re- the Communists were perceived as the ulti- sponsible" conduct, while crimes mate enemy within one’s own body ethnic. in the name of the nation were The Communists’ Yugoslavian alignment either denied or justified. merely served to underline this arbitrary qualification, as in the dominant interpretations, Yugoslavia itself, as an idea itself became unacceptable. In the most of a state, became a symbol of national extreme interpretations of this tendency, oppression. This is how it is perceived in even Fascist collaboration could be justi- all nationalist narratives, without excep- fied as "nationally responsible" conduct, tion. (It should be stressed here that not while crimes in the name of the nation were all beliefs that favoured the disappearance either denied or justified. of this state framework in the specific his- Once Antifascism was thus banished torical circumstances are mere national- from the culture of remembering, its tra- ist anti-Yugoslavianism. Quite simply, an dition survived at the margins of society, insight that a multiethnic state framework occasionally – though entirely lifelessly – has become unsustainable is a perfectly turning up in a holiday calendar or noticed legitimate stance towards that idea. It is in passing, when it seemed opportune from another thing to believe that the very idea a nationalist point of view. As the round, of such a polity is a priori undesirable as sixtieth anniversary of the victory over it would include members of one or other Fascism approached, and given Europe’s nation perceived as hostile.) Since it was determination to appropriately mark this Communist and Yugoslavian, the People’s date, Antifascism has suddenly become a Liberation Struggle Antifascism therefore subject recognised as a significant source of European legitimation. Of the coun- 1 Due to frequent objections that revisionism is in fact a tries that were formed after the breakup of welcome phenomenon, a result of freedom of thinking Yugoslavia, Serbia retained a formal align- about the past and interpreting events, it is important to note the following: revisionism as a concept, a tech- ment with a presumed Antifascism, but nical term, denotes primarily the ideological, political a hysterically anti-Titoist mood created a imposition onto a particular historical narrative, schizophrenia that could just not be man- whether historiographic or belonging to the sphere of the culture of remembering, the assumption being that aged: to disassociate Tito from Antifascism the "revised" narrative is based on reliably established appeared arbitrary even from the viewpoint facts and is interpretatively credible. Naturally, this narrative itself may not be, and usually is not, value- of a nationalism inclined towards any kind neutral. Although different interpretations are both of arbitrariness. To bring Tito back into the possible and desirable, not all are equally credible. game was unacceptable, and so the false When it is not an open falsification of history, revisionism is reliably and demonstrably its misinterpreta- Antifascism languished in its own con- tion. Science and the culture of remembering based tradiction, as meaningless as Milošević’s upon it, do not need revision, but improving scientific knowledge, its evolution. They do not need historians "defence of Yugoslavia". However, when in as revisers, but as responsible scholars of the past. the context of the aforementioned celebra- antifascism, communism and the Yugoslavian national idea in the jaws of nationalism a quest for alternatives 33

tion, Antifascism started to gain the occasional burst of prominence, corresponding reactions on other sides began to emerge: Partisans suddenly became acceptable, the slogan, "Antifascism – yes, Communism – no", was gone, the Antifascist movement was "cleared" of its leadership, while the platitude that "not all Partisans were Com- munists" gained frequency, all the while emphasising exclusively the contribu- tions of members of one’s own people. This formula became so powerful that it was completely neglected that organising the Antifascist struggle was still largely the work of the CPY, without which there probably wouldn’t have been a People’s Liberation Movement – precisely the fact that had previously been used to dismiss or ignore Anti- "Communism got colours” by fascism. It also became unimportant that slavian Antifascism, presenting themselves Usman Malik, CC-BY-NC 2.0 of the civic (non-Communist) actors, only as its only real representatives, narrowing its some were militant Antifascists, while every base to only Serbs. The situation in Croatia last one of the Communists was. Something was somewhat similar, but a far larger prob- else that had used to serve to "compromise" lem than an overemphasised highlighting Antifascism also became unimportant: the of the importance of Croats in the PLM was inseparability of its actors from the Yugosla- the near-total erasure of the Serbs. In Bos- vian idea, even when these actors were not nia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska Communists. It was completely overlooked and its "Chetnik Partisanry" played a par- that Antifascism in Yugoslavia was what it ticularly destructive role, while the Bosniaks was, and achieved what it achieved thanks have a tendency to downplay the negative to the fact that it grew on the principle of role the Bosniak collaborationists played in fraternity and unity of the peoples of Yugo- World War II. The role of the Serb factor in slavia, that is, the cooperation between the the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars of Antifascist forces among the members of the Nineties greatly influenced the lack of each of these peoples. A huge majority of sympathy for the Serb victims of 1941-1945. Croat, Bosniak, Serb and other Antifascists This was how the bizarre formula of anti- were Yugoslavian Antifascists. Yugoslavian, anti-Communist, anti-Titoist Stressing the significance of Antifas- and ethnocentric Antifascism was reached, cism, which in the post-Yugoslavian phase that is, national Antifascisms that resemble first intensified in Croatia, especially dis- in all aspects the precise thing they ostensi- turbed the spirits in Serbia, where sud- bly oppose. denly the Partisan liberation struggle Everyone should find it acceptable that became vital to identity: the Partisans were admitting the truth of the Yugoslavian and primarily Serbs, while others only took a (organisationally) dominantly Communist marginal part in the struggle. Serb PLM character of Antifascism does not imply members were acknowledged to an extent, invoking the return of either the Commu- but Tito remained completely obscured nists or Yugoslavia. This truth must teach us by intentional, and therefore mendacious that cooperation is possible, and that com- forgetfulness. Under the influence of the mon efforts directed towards an important monopolising of Antifascism within the goal are grounded in history: the experience European framework that was increas- is important, even if the common goal today ingly spreading from the Kremlin, Serbian may be, and is, different from the goal from nationalists wholly appropriated the Yugo- several decades ago.

translated by Hana Dvornik 34 a quest for alternatives transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina

transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina

Senada Šelo Šabić

the limits of Consociational solutions are consociationalism costly, complex and rigid. They do not allow for transformations Consociationalism, or a power-sharing that any dynamic, progressive so- mechanism, is used for managing con- ciety naturally undergoes. They flicts in deeply divided societies. There is no unique consociational model – their cement the division of power details depend on the specific contexts that had existed at the end of in which they are adopted. The building a conflict and petrify politics. blocks of a consociational model can be the In BiH this has resulted in the proportionality principle in elections and ethnicization of politics. Every- in administrative appointments, territorial autonomy, recognition of group rights, pro- thing in Bosnian politics revolves tection of minority rights, federal or confed- around ethnicity – elections, eral arrangements and other methods.1 The forming governments, education, Netherlands and Belgium are two classic regional development, diplomacy, examples in Europe, as are Northern Ireland infrastructure, media, social poli- and Cyprus. Beyond Europe, consociational cies, the judiciary and much else. agreements in different forms were applied in Lebanon, Nigeria, Burundi, East Timor, Afghanistan, Cambodia and so on. Closer Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has not made to Bosnia and Herzegovina, one can look at significant breakthroughs in functionality forms of consociationalism applied in Mac- and prosperity since the war ended in 1995. edonia and Kosovo. One crisis after another – this is what the A trajectory of the application of the Bosnian political reality looks like in 2018. model in recent history indicates that it has Is there an end to this turmoil? This essay become a toolbox used to end wars in dif- argues that the Dayton Peace Agreement, ferent parts of the world. The international which introduced a consociational regime community has developed a preference for to end the war in BiH, can no longer be con- incorporating power-sharing solutions into sidered a credible framework for the crea- peace agreements. In other words, "power- tion of a stable, functional and prosperous sharing has become the international com- Bosnia and Herzegovina, a would-be EU munity’s preferred remedy for building member state. peace and democracy after civil wars".2

1 Timothy Sisk (1996) Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington, D.C.: USIP. 2 Matthijs Bogaards compiling from P. G. Roeder and D. Rothchild, eds. (2005) Sustainable Peace. Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Cornell UP. M. Bogaards Senada Šelo Šabić (2006) Democracy and Power-Sharing in Multina- Institute for Development and tional States: Thematic Introduction. International International Relations, Zagreb Journal on Multicultural Societies 8(2):121. transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina a quest for alternatives 35

Despite an increase in the frequency of What is then to be done? its application, its success rate in creating Every case is a universe in itself. The lit- conditions for lasting peace is questiona- erature on consociationalism concedes that ble.3 A power-sharing agreement may be a there are no fixed models and that even the good basis for ending wars, but its ability to traditional examples described in literature, contribute to lasting peace is much slimmer. like the Netherlands or Belgium, have been Its main drawback is that in the long run it theoretically fuzzy to start with.7 Resting on limits democracy. Democracy should not the intrinsic characteristics of particular be traded for peace, but reality in life often cases, the theory offers little enlightenment makes for such unpopular trade-offs. What on how to overcome long-term challenges most authors on power-sharing agreements to the functionality and stability of a coun- agree on, though, is that these are best seen try that adopts a consociational regime. Two as short term solutions that, ideally, are to features can be emphasized: be replaced by more inclusive and pluralist Consociational regimes tend to be- policies when political conditions permit. come rigid over time, leaving little The risks associated with long-term space for adaptation to changed cir- power-sharing agreements are "limits on cumstances that are the reality of the democracy, the creation of institutional political life of any country weapons for ethnic entrepreneurs, a focus Consociational regimes are elite- on inter-ethnic allocation, the problem of driven agreements where deals are outbidding and extremism, governmen- reached by elites and in which the tal inefficiency, governmental rigidity, and non-involvement of citizens is a pre- inadequate enforcement."4 ferred, almost a required condition.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina has experi- Let us dwell a bit on both of these fea- enced all of the risks listed above and is tures with reference to Bosnia and Herze- experiencing a "severe stalemate".5 Conso- govina today, taking into account the legacy ciational solutions are costly, complex and created by the Dayton Peace Agreement rigid. They do not allow for transformations while bearing in mind the goal of making that any dynamic, progressive society natu- BiH a stable, functional and prosperous rally undergoes. They cement the division state, a prospective member of the EU. of power that had existed at the end of a The rigidity of political life reduces the conflict and petrify politics. In BiH this has capacity of a country to react to changes that resulted in the ethnicization of politics. Eve- inevitably take place both on the domestic rything in Bosnian politics revolves around and international fronts. BiH twenty years ethnicity – elections, forming governments, ago and BiH today exist in two different education, regional development, diplo- worlds. Innovation, technological revolu- macy, infrastructure, media, social policies, tion, economic development, advanced the judiciary and much else. education standards, security challenges, Timothy Sisk summed up the precari- health priorities, fast transportation, new ous dynamic between the desire to deliver communication channels, environmen- peace in the short term and the capacity of tal concerns, migration and demographic a power-sharing agreement to make this change irreversibly changed our world in the peace long-lasting. "While power-shar- last two decades. Successful states are adapt- ing may be desirable, and necessary as able and resilient, not rigid. Weak countries, an immediate exit to deadly ethnic wars, where decision-making is slow, where lead- power-sharing is not a viable long-term ers’ diverging interests pull it in different solution to managing uncertainty in ethni- directions, where there is no commitment cally divided societies."6 to the greater public good, and where fear rather than trust feeds politics, are set to fail. The second feature of consociationalism is its elitism. However, if exclusion of

7 Kris Deschouwer (2006) And the peace goes on? Consociational democracy and Belgian politics in the twenty-first century. West European Politics (29)5:896. 3 Bogaards, 2006: 121. 8 K. Deschouwer (2006), taking from Luc Huyse 4 Ibid. (1971) Passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuildheid in de 5 Donald L. Horowitz (2014) Ethnic Power Sharing: Belgische politiek. Antwerpen: Standaard Wetenschap- Three Big Problems. Journal of Democracy 25(2): pelijke Uitgeverij. See also Rudy B. Andeweg (2000) 5-20. Consociational democracy. Annual Review of Political 6 Ibid. Science 3(1): 509-536. 36 a quest for alternatives transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina

citizens from decision-making was possible in the past, changes in political culture Judging by the claims of ethnic make citizens less likely to grant a few lead- entrepreneurs, there is one coun- ers the exclusive right to decide on a host terintuitive answer. Respondents of issues affecting their lives. Inclusion of are asked to choose one out of citizens in politics can be messy, time-con- suming, and incoherent. Actually, it almost six possible answers why they always is. Yet, the times when kings and sul- oppose the EU integration of tans enjoyed the privilege of determining BiH. Respondents consistently their subjects’ destinies belong to the his- and overwhelmingly choose fear tory books. Despite the possible messiness of higher taxes and increased and complexity of citizens’ involvement in costs of living (2015 – 62.3%; politics, it is a norm in advanced democracies, even when, as it frequently happens, 2016 – 51.1%; 2017 – 55.4%). citizens’ engagement does not necessarily A considerably smaller number offer progressive ideas. selected loss of cultural diversity This year 27 EU member states joined as an answer (2015 – 12.3%; an initiative to hold a dialogue with their 2016 – 5.3%; 2017 – 5.2%). citizens on a wide range of topics. The rel- What this means is that a rela- evance of this initiative need not be exaggerated, nor should it be understated. A tively small percentage of people prospective member of the EU, as Bosnia in BiH considers identity issues and Herzegovina presents itself, should take as relevant in opposing EU note of the political reality of an organiza- integration. The same, by exten- tion it wants to join. sion, could be applied to their a civic state own state – a significantly larger number of people in BiH consid- Already aware of the limits to the functional- ers economic issues as being the ity and prosperity of BiH that result from the most important to them. ethnic division of power, the authors of the Dayton Peace Agreement have also included a civic principle in the system, which had society into a political union of individuals been extended for a period, mostly under who enjoy equal rights and are bound by international pressure. During the last dec- state laws. Civic nationalism draws its inspi- ade, the civic element in BiH politics had ration from liberalism, a political ideology been systematically undermined by ethnic based on the principles of liberty and equal- leaders. Deeper ethnic divisions contrib- ity of all human beings. It gave foundation uted to political and economic deteriora- to values such as freedom of speech, religion tion. Citizens are leaving en masse, eager to and association, to name a few. The Oxford find a better place to work and live, far from dictionary describes civic nationalism in BiH. the following way: "A political attitude of The antithesis to ethnic politics in BiH is devotion to and vigorous support for one’s the civic concept. This has been vigorously country combined with a feeling of shared criticized by the very same ethnic politi- community with fellow citizens, especially cal entrepreneurs claiming that a civic BiH as contrasted with a similar attitude based would equal a unitary state where Bosniaks on ethnicity, race, or religion."10 would have predominance.9 But what is it in Historically, "people of a shared the concept of a civic state that is so repul- ethno-linguistic group formed nations".11 sive to ethnic entrepreneurs? However, philosophers in the period of A civic state is based on civic national- Enlightenment started to question the his- ism, which creates a sense of belonging to torical foundations of the state. Liberalism the state based on the principle of citizen- was born in the Enlightenment. The Ameri- ship, i.e. inclusion of all members of a given can Declaration of Independence of 1776,

9 Srna (2018) Dodik: SAD i dalje pokušavaju izgraditi 10 See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ BiH kao unitarnu državu. Nezavisne novine. 23 Janu- civic_nationalism ary https://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Dodik- 11 What is civic nationalism? Definition and Examples. SAD-i-dalje-pokusavaju-izgraditi-BiH-kao-unitarnu- Available at https://study.com/academy/lesson/what- drzavu/461693 is-civic-nationalism-definition-examples.html transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina a quest for alternatives 37

Signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, "20 years since NATO’s first major peacekeeping operation” by NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 espousing rights to Life, Liberty and the Pur- suit of Happiness, and the French Declara- who does ethnic division tion of Rights of 1789 championing liberté, serve? égalité, fraternité were written with liberal values in mind. Those who insist on ethnic particularisms Despite obstacles, liberal princi- and stress the impossibility of coopera- ples have permeated the world. They are tion claim that ensuring ethnic exclusivity encoded in constitutions across the globe in representation and applying the ethnic and serve as a basis for developing open, principle in all policy matters leads to peace progressive societies. The European Union and progress. is based on liberal democratic values. On the basis of which studies and analy- How BiH plans to be part of the mod- sis do they make such claims? Leaving aside ern world, not to mention a member of the the normative arguments discussed in the EU, if it shies away from freedom, equality, previous section, let us dwell a bit on eco- openness and inclusion, and, instead, draws nomic arguments. How is a relatively poor inspiration from division, separation, clo- country of around 3.8 million12 inhabit- sure and exclusivity of group rights? Citizens ants financially able to sustain five state are not leaving BiH to live in countries that and entity presidents, 16 parliaments and are more closed, divided and unregulated, 14 governments? How rich does a country in which one has rights only if s/he belongs have to be to pay salaries to so many presi- to a certain group. No, they seek prosperity dents, prime ministers, ministers, chiefs of and happiness in countries that are open, cabinets, advisors, secretaries and drivers? pluralist, regulated and respect the rights of In terms of the overall employment individuals. rate, BiH is ranked 187th out of 218 coun- Change in BiH cannot take place over- tries in the world, immediately preceded by night or by imposition. If a significant num- Malawi and followed by French Polynesia.13 ber of its citizens seek their recognition In this ranking, BiH is closely neighboured through a group identity, this is a legitimate by North Korea (194), the Gaza Strip and the position that has to be respected. The ques- West Bank, ranked 196 and 197 respectively, tion is how to design policies that ensure followed by Yemen (198), Afghanistan (209) rights and mitigate fears while keeping and Syria (215), where ongoing conflicts focus on policies that generate develop- obstruct normal economic activities.14 ment? Accepting the current reality, the The already meagre GDP in 2010 (17.18 answer comes by knowing where BiH wants billion USD) shrank to 16.91 billion USD to be ten years from now? fifty years? What is in 2016.15 The weak foreign direct invest- the vision that drives the country? ment in 2010 of 444 million USD could only Mechanisms to protect group rights can be integrated into a Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 Take into account also ft. 17. 13 CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/ that is becoming more liberal. Safeguarding publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2129rank. particularisms and maintaining exclusiv- html#bk ity absorb creative energy that could be 14 Ibid. 15 World Bank. Country Profile http://databank. otherwise used to improve, for example, worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget. education and health in the country, to aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57& tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=B&H; https:// build a new bridge or buy a new ultrasound www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/B&H-svrstana-me-u-najsiro- machine. masnije-zemlje-u-europi-1202577 38 a quest for alternatives transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina

be dreamed of in 2016, when it scored 273 neurs, there is one counterintuitive answer. million USD.16 With negative demographic Respondents are asked to choose one out of trends and declining population (3.72 mil- six possible answers why they oppose the lion in 2010 to 3.52 million in 2016), World EU integration of BiH. Respondents con- Bank statistics do not promise a better sistently and overwhelmingly choose fear future.17 of higher taxes and increased costs of living How can anyone boast of success in a (2015 – 62.3%; 2016 – 51.1%; 2017 – 55.4%). A country which officially holds the world’s considerably smaller number selected loss record with a 62.3% youth unemployed of cultural diversity as an answer (2015 – rate?18 The fight against corruption in BiH 12.3%; 2016 – 5.3%; 2017 – 5.2%).21 What this never picked up, but it nonetheless man- means is that a relatively small percentage aged to stagnate for six years and has of people in BiH considers identity issues since last year regressed, according to the as relevant in opposing EU integration. The Transparency International team in BiH in same, by extension, could be applied to their its report for 2017.19 Successive polls and own state – a significantly larger number of research, conducted using different meth- people in BiH considers economic issues as odologies and different samples of respond- being the most important to them. ents, come up with similar results: citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina identify unem- civic vs islamic ployment, corruption and poverty among the top three problems. Politicians are, by As if a warning against unitarism was not default, perceived as among the most cor- enough, as of recently, the idea of creating rupt.20 a civic state has been branded as disguis- The BiH Directorate for European Inte- ing a desire to create an Islamic state.22 Two gration conducts annual polls on citizens’ clear antipodes – the model of a liberal state attitudes towards the EU. The last three and the model of a religious-fundamentalist reports (years 2017, 2016 and 2015) confirm state – are brought into equation by a sin- some already known facts – that citizens cite gle variable: Bosniaks. It was not enough to employment opportunities and the fight accuse proponents of the civic concept in against corruption as the greatest benefits of BiH of being Bosniak nationalists (declared EU membership. Citizens believe, also quite or hidden), but Bosniaks need now to be expectedly, that young people will predom- exposed for what they really are - Islamic inantly enjoy the benefits of integration. fundamentalists. Judging by the claims of ethnic entrepre- But let us ask ourselves: is it easier to create a civic Islamic rather than a liberal 16 Ibid. civic state? If Bosnian peoples are incapable 17 Ibid. of creating a functional consociational state, 18 CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2229rank. or Bosniak nationalists a unitary civic state, html#bk are Bosniak Islamic fundamentalists the 19 Transparency International BiH. Indeks percepcije ko- only ones capable of such a project? Are they rupcije: Eskalacija korupcije, posljedice razarajuće. 22 February 2018 https://ti-B&H.org/indeks-percepcije- so well organized and financed that they will korupcije-eskalacija-korupcije-posljedice-razarajuce/ one day simply confront us with an Islamic 20 Transparency International BiH. Skoro četvrtina građana BiH bila u situaciji da im se traži mito. 15 state, presumably spanning the whole ter- February 2016 https://ti-B&H.org/skoro-cetvrtina- ritory of BiH, as the civic concept from gradana-bila-u-situaciji-da-im-se-trazi-mito/ ; which it draws inspiration envisages? On N.N. Istraživanje: Trećina bh. Građana smatra da demokratija nije adekvatna za našu zemlju. Klix. that day, a few women (we can only suspect ba. 20 May 2016. Presentation of the results of a they are women) wearing burkas will walk survey of BH citizens’ political opinions, conducted as part of a Balkan-wide comparative research study. silently through deserted streets as their https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/B&H/istrazivanje-trecina- men will be fighting infidels in Pale, Banja bh-gradjana-smatra-da-demokratija-nije-adekvatna- za-nasu-zemlju/160520035; Center for the Study of Democracy. Izvješće o procjeni korupcije u 2016. 21 Directorate for European Integration. All reports, godini. The report brings results of measuring corrup- dating back to 2008, are available here http:// tion using the SELDI method in Southast European www.dei.gov.ba/dei/media_servis/istrazivanje/ countries http://integrityobservers.eu/UserDocsIm- default.aspx?id=1905&langTag=bs-BA&template_ ages/izvjesce_o_procjeni_korupcije_2016_HR.pdf; id=120&pageIndex=1 A 2017 poll identifies unemployment as the biggest 22 Dragan Čović. 2018. Građanska BiH bila bi islamska problem (55%) perceived by citizens of BiH. More at država. Al Jazeera Balkans. 6 February http://bal- Center for Insights in Survey Research. Bosnia and kans.aljazeera.net/video/covic-gradanska-B&H-bila- Herzegovina: Attitudes on Violent Extremism and bi-islamska-drzava ; Dženana Karabegović. 2018. Foreign Influence. January 4 – February 3, 2017. Čovićeva ‘islamizacija’ BiH. Radio Slobodna Evropa. International Republican Institute http://www.iri.org/ 7 February https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/covic- sites/default/files/iri_bosnia_poll_february_2017.pdf islamska-drzava-B&H/29025454.html transcending consociationalism: in support of civic Bosnia and Herzegovina a quest for alternatives 39

Luka, Mostar, Kupres, Bijeljina, Foča and Tomislav Grad. In the name of the Islamic conclusion state, they will hunt down infidels who imi- tate Westerners by skiing on slopes of Jaho- The international community’s interven- rina and Bjelašnica. A special treat will be tionist policy cannot go on indefinitely if reserved for those Islamic state-builders BiH wants to mature into a stable, func- who are granted the pleasure to crash win- tional and prosperous state. Bosnian lead- dows, break chairs and tables, smash bottles ers and citizens need to find a formula for and run infidels of both sexes out of cafes. peace and progress. Drawing on the values To create a proper civic Islamic state, they of liberal democracy carries the most poten- will demolish all fitness centres as places of tial to design a successful model. utter sin and drain out the few functioning Ethnic entrepreneurs quite rationally swimming pools. And when they kill, hurt, want to continue forever to abuse the ethnic frighten and expel infidels and enemies, the division of power, as that allows them almost masterminds of the project of an Islamic unchecked reign in their zones of influence. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be left in peace They have been quite successful, to give by everybody else to enjoy their victory and them credit, in achieving their goals. The live happily ever after. question is what are those who are dissatis- If this answer was not academic enough, fied with the situation in BiH ready to do? let us offer a few brief remarks on the flimsy Political projects that aspire to carve out argument that claims that a civic BiH would ethnically-dominated territories as a way to actually be an Islamic BiH. manage conflicts in multiethnic states are First, it is not made in good faith as it civilizationally retrograde, morally appre- attempts to qualify Bosniaks as Islamic fun- hensive, politically expensive and economi- damentalists. cally self-defeating.25 If we disregard modern Second, it implies that Bosniaks are a political thinkers and those who regard coherent, religiously politicized group with things exclusively from a moral standpoint, no pluralism of opinion. and just decide to think pragmatically, we Third, it implies that the Bosniaks pos- again confront the problem of territorial sess the potential for strategic planning, division as a solution for managing conflicts execution and ability to reach their ultimate in multiethnic societies. Such projects are goal while successfully withstanding and extremely hard to operationalize and imple- resisting external pressure, and simultane- ment. They often fail even when resorting ously maintaining strong internal cohesion. to extreme tools - the use of arms. The costs None of the above assumptions are of such violent attempts are far greater to a correct. society in terms of human and material loss Data shows that all Bosnians over- than it is to invest resources in searching for whelmingly reject the idea of an Islamic progressive viable solutions. state (89%).23 When disaggregated by eth- What is thus ‘wrong’ with the civic con- nicity, Bosniaks come out as the group cept in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Why is it with the highest percentage of people with impossible to imagine a country of around an absolute preference for a secular state 3.8 million people in Southeast Europe as a (58%), in comparison to 56% of Croats and functional democratic state with account- 49% of Serbs.24 able leadership, based on the rule of law, in which all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or religion, class or gender, political affiliation or geographical background, or any other identity trait, are equal and prosperous? One of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics is that you end up being governed by your inferiors. (Plato)

25 On economic effects of ethnic diversity see Adnan 23 Center for Insights in Survey Research. Bosnia and Efendić and Geoff Pugh (2018) The effect of ethnic Herzegovina: Attitudes on Violent Extremism and diversity on income – an empirical investigation Foreign Influence. January 4 – February 3, 2017. using survey data from a post-conflict environment. International Republican Institute http://www.iri.org/ Economics e-journal. 2018-17. 28 March http:// sites/default/files/iri_bosnia_poll_february_2017.pdf www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarti- 24 Ibid. cles/2018-17 40 a quest for alternatives majority, minority and political strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina

majority, minority and political strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mate Subašić

Nationalist projects continue to be maintained, backed by an even stronger argument now that an absolute majority exists within the society. One could argue that veto power guarantees that there is no need for fear. However, for nationalists, formal institutions are not perceived only through their instrumental value. For them, formal institutions may also be the symbols that embody narratives about group identity, possessing varying degrees of emotional salience. Therefore, the policies being advocated by particular ethnic groups seem reasonable from this perspective.

Within nationalism studies, scholars either ferent meaning for different people. How- deal with majority nationalism or minority ever, in practical terms, the question reflects nationalism. Both approaches have devel- the right and the power to make a decision oped throughout time. New insights from on the future of the respective group. the former led to new investigations within Further on, as the state is a legal con- the latter and the other way around. What cept which presumes a certain territory, it brings the two approaches together, beside is highly unlikely that the territory would nationalism, is the fact that in the late 20th be congruent with the ethnic group’s ter- century nationalism seems to have become ritorial dispersion. The fact that most war ethnicised. and post-war policies initiated by the three Ethnic identity is considered to bound peo- constitutive ethnic groups within Bosnia ple through an objective relationship, which and Herzegovina were aiming at territoriali- stems from a common culture and ancestry. sation brings us to the conclusion that the National identity, however, reflects the ques- goal was to establish a state congruent with tion of social organisation and in particular an ethnic group. As in other similar cases, loyalty to the institutions of society – states. there are always members of other groups in Every state, once it is created aims to a territory, particularly in communities such develop a sense of commonness and loyalty as Bosnian and Herzegovinian. to its structure among its citizens regard- The minority will be perceived by the less of their ethnic identity. Following this, majority as a threat to its security. The nationalism being ethnicised means that majority will portray them as disloyal. This an ethnic group tends to create social insti- is the consequence of the fact that the state tutions which reflect only its own interests. seeks loyalty based on ethnicity. The minor- It aims at creating a state congruent with ity will, therefore, feel endangered by the itself. nationalising policies of such a state. They Once such a state is created, the nation- will request a certain level of autonomy alising policies will reflect only the identity ranging from cultural institutions all the Mate Subašić PhD candidate in Politics, of the respective group. Identity though way to the introduction of some form of University of Liverpool. seems to be a blurred concept having a dif- federative mechanisms or even separation majority, minority and political strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina a quest for alternatives 41

from the state. Those institutions will allow the minority to protect their identity or to decide on their own about their future. It becomes clear that if one belongs to the majority within a given state one won’t be concerned about the ethnic majoritarian policies that state seeks to pursue. Those policies will certainly reflect their identity. On the other hand, if one belongs to a minority one will demand that the state Radiosarajevo.ba, acknowledge their autonomy with regard CC-BY 2.0 to the nationalising policies being pursued. One will seek protection and guarantees. around the country. In such circumstances, The fear of becoming a minority1 is a one would have felt safer where one is the therefore a strong determinant of the politi- majority. The institutions have had com- cal strategies that an ethnic group might pletely the opposite effect compared to the choose. Therefore it is better to be the intention of the Agreement itself. majority in a smaller state than to become a Nationalist projects continue to be minority within a larger state. In the case of maintained, backed by an even stronger Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace argument now that an absolute majority Agreement was aiming to prevent such fears exists within the society. One could argue by introducing the right of veto for all three that veto power guarantees that there is constituent ethnic groups. However, within no need for fear. However, for national- the nationalist environment that has devel- ists, formal institutions are not perceived oped during the war and that was insti- only through their instrumental value. For tutionalised with the implementation of them, formal institutions may also be the the Agreement, the fear did not disappear. symbols that embody narratives about On the contrary, it led two ethnic groups, group identity, possessing varying degrees the relative minorities, Serbs and Croats, of emotional salience2. Therefore, the poli- blocking all attempts by the state to intro- cies being advocated by particular ethnic duce policies aiming at creating the sense groups seem reasonable from this perspec- of commonness and loyalty to the state. tive. The fact that their neighbouring kin-states Bosniaks have always supported a state introduced similar national projects, creat- which would maintain overarching iden- ing states for the majority ethnic groups has tity. Due to the asymmetrical organisation just amplified the fears. of the state their position might have been The recently published census makes understood as they were in the majority. the argument of the fear of becoming a Within the Federation of Bosnia and Herze- minority ever more present. Even with such govina, Bosniaks are in the majority. At the protection as veto powers, both groups state level the Federation is the territorially have become not only relative but absolute larger part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At minorities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same time, members of the Parliament whereas the Bosniak share of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina coming from has grown to over 50%. The idea to estab- the Federation occupy two-thirds of the lish a separate territorial community for its seats. If the agreement would be reached at group reflects exactly this development. the Federation level between Bosniaks and The international community did expect Croats, Bosniaks would certainly be on the that with time, an overarching identity and majority side at the state level. Further on, therefore state policies might be developed overarching identity would allow for Bos- due to the right of veto. However, instead of niaks to become overall the majority within an overarching identity, what has happened the state. This would be particularly benefi- in last decades was that three nationalising cial for Bosniaks living in Republika Srpska policies were being pursued at the same where they currently form a minority. The time, creating minorities and majorities all population census results make Bosniak’s claims even stronger as there is no fear of 1 Dejan Jović introduced the term; he argues that this becoming a minority. fear has been one of the main motivators for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. I argue that within Bosnian 2 Basta, Karlo (2016 ) Imagined institutions: The and Herzegovinian society this fear still has a strong Symbolic Power of Formal Rules in Bosnia and Herze- symbolic value embedded in the nationalist narrative. govina. Slavic Review, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 944-969. 42 a quest for alternatives majority, minority and political strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The paradox in this situation is that the whole structure is based on the idea that no group should find themselves in the minority when it comes to the decision-making process. However, the census results make nationalist claims ever more appealing to voters due to the symbolic meaning assigned through the narrative. This in turn makes elections rather plebiscitary. As the fear of becoming a minority has grown stronger, the ethnic group’s narrative will only sound more appealing to voters, at least to the voters of minority groups.

To a certain degree, the war in Bosnia and making process. However, the census results Herzegovina started due to the fact that the make nationalist claims ever more appeal- Serb population wanted to decide for them- ing to voters due to the symbolic mean- selves on their future. They didn’t want to be ing assigned through the narrative. This in a minority in any circumstances and allow turn makes elections rather plebiscitary. As others to decide for them. Therefore they the fear of becoming a minority has grown created a para-state which later became part stronger, the ethnic group’s narrative will of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their only goal only sound more appealing to voters, at seems to be to preserve the smaller entity least to the voters of minority groups. where they would be in the majority. Within Within the framework of nationalist nationalist discourse and studies, this seems studies, the behaviour of political leaders in like a reasonable act. The fact that the veto Bosnia and Herzegovina seems reasonable vote would prevent them being outvoted and rational. It is hard to imagine an agree- does not figure so strongly anymore as it is ment which would accommodate all the obvious that the system which was supposed interests. However, the existing situation not to produce a majority had produced it. does not reflect the situation on the ground. Croats within Federation of Bosnia and Even the assumption that the Dayton Peace Herzegovina have really been outvoted in Agreement secures a status quo does not the elections for the member of Presidency work anymore. This again brings us back to of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their fear is more nationalism rather than less. even stronger because, they argue, even Future policy proposals, particularly the laws introduced with the Agreement those referring to institutional change, have prevented them from choosing their should acknowledge the situation as own representatives. They follow the same described and seek a solution within the minority nationalist line of argument. They nationalist framework. Any other attempt argue in favour of the smaller ethnically will cause only more fears and lead further defined unit rather than risking their inter- to even broader requests for autonomy. ests being an even minor minority within Only once all three groups feel safe within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina will other forms of and Bosnia and Herzegovina overall. political strategies become realistic. Only The paradox in this situation is that the when the symbolic value they assigned to whole structure is based on the idea that the institutions reflects their narrative, will no group should find themselves in the it become possible to expect a different kind minority when it comes to the decision- of politics. the taste of nationalism (in)surmountable past 43

(in)surmountable past the taste of nationalism

Ildiko Erdei

Who could remember what it was about at all? And even if someone were able to recall the "Serbian chocolates" affair, it might seem as irrelevant compared to the emergence of this current conflict. Nevertheless, I still think that it is worth reminding readers of the now almost forgotten political dispute over the chocolates produced in Serbia that found their way to consumers in Croatia and the public reactions that this provoked. Mostly because it can legitimately be supposed that this episode is not an "episode" at all, that it goes well beyond its possible surface meanings.

It’s hard to stick to the previously made plan affair, it might seem as irrelevant compared and write on practices of "banal", mundane, to the emergence of this current conflict. "cold" nationalism in today’s, post-war Ser- Nevertheless, I still think that it is worth bia and Croatia, when the exchange of polit- reminding readers of the now almost for- ical statements and accusations between gotten political dispute over the chocolates politicians in Serbia and Croatia is getting produced in Serbia that found their way to more and more inflammatory as I am writ- consumers in Croatia and the public reac- ing these lines. Flags were being prepared to tions that this provoked. Mostly because it be waved again, threatening and insulting can legitimately be supposed that this epi- words that we remember from the Nineties sode is not an "episode" at all, that it goes have started to circulate along the known well beyond its possible surface meanings roads, painful memories were revisited (as of a bizarre incident or historical bit of and revived, old wounds reopened, and the trivia) and that it could be symptomatic of, Croatian PM even quoted the familiar line generally speaking, new ways of maintain- from a popular Yugoslav TV series, stressing ing a certain political and social order, or, that, "as Đuza Stojiljković says, yes, we do simply put, "playing politics". like theatre*, but not in our home". Firstly, this episode belongs to the thread True, considering it from this point in political and economic history known as of view, the episode I was planning to "economic nationalism" or "economic pat- write about, which was meant to illus- riotism". It had also been documented dur- trate the workings of everyday, mundane, ing the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. banal nationalism in the context of "set- From the example of the consumer boycott tled national states", seems of secondary in the late eighties (a state-inspired boycott importance. Who could remember what of products from Slovenia by consumers it was about at all? And even if someone in Serbia), through the thoroughly ethno- were able to recall the "Serbian chocolates" nationalized economies of former Yugoslav republics during the Nineties, to the subse- Ildiko Erdei * he used the word "pozorište", a Serbian word for Associate Professor, "theatre", referring to the erstwhile famous sitcom quent boycott "Buy domestic" campaigns, a Faculty of Philosophy, "Pozorište u kući" (Theatre at Home) close relationship was established between Belgrade 44 (in)surmountable past the taste of nationalism

a chocolate from Serbia "from the hands of Although the story was put aside the President". "I had to post this on social after only a few days, it still con- networks so that you could see what kind veyed those "nearly subliminal of country we live in. My child’s kindergar- ten went to see the President, and the chil- signals" that banal nationalism dren received from her hands a chocolate consists of, and it did attempt to from Serbia. That is really sad – and it all reinforce the idea that (some) happened on the Day of the Defenders of Serbian and Croatian citizens Dubrovnik. Bravo!". "are in the end nationals of a Still, it was not his reaction that stirred up the debate, but the answer to it, given wonderful nationality". Economic by the President herself, that actually patriotism as the semantic twin confirmed this kind of "reasoning" and of economic nationalism thus legitimised it. She decided that she should appears as just another way to apologize for the "mistake" and offered an describe how national animosi- "explanation" that the packages were in ties, which in many cases find fact bought by a "Croatian" company (as if, again, companies are national subjects, expression in ethnic wars, con- or have some ethnic essence and therefore a tinue to exist. clear national or ethnic identity). "Serbian" chocolates, announced the Office of the economic – mainly consumer – practices President, constituted a minor part of the and political identifications on one side, packages, that were otherwise full of "Croa- and collective and personal identities on the tian products", and "it happened by acci- other. Secondly, it reveals how consumption dent that among three hundred products today is enthroned as the main technique for there were several of the questionable prod- producing new subjectivities, both collective ucts". Grabar Kitarović offered an apology and individual, and hence became a perfect to anyone whose "feelings were hurt", and idiom for the workings of banal nationalism. expressed disappointment with the case, This kind (or rather register) of nationalism, for, as she said, she personally supports the argues social psychologist Michael Billig, Let’s Buy Croatian campaign: "The Croatian presents itself as an "incessant stream of President must promote Croatian products, repetitive, every-day-every-hour, nearly sub- and this will not happen again. We will apol- liminal signals sent to the citizen-consumer ogize to the parents who have received these reinforcing the idea that she or he is in the chocolates and we will send them Croatian end a national, and should be very glad and products". proud of this wonderful nationality". This On the Serbian side, officials were taken happens on a daily basis, through seem- by surprise, but not for long. As soon as ingly trivial activities that function as inter- they managed to find their punchline, they polations of ideology. Ultimately, the case of responded with remarks questioning the "Serbian chocolates" (not "chocolates from political maturity of Croatian officials. The Serbia", as if goods themselves have nation- Minister of Trade and Tourism Rasim Ljajić alities or ethnic identities) shows us how food said: "The statement by the Croatian Presi- is connected with culturally defined senses dent is un-democratic and un-European". and tastes, and how deeply is it incorporated He also used this opportunity to point to in our bodies, our souls and our minds as a the fact that the number of Croatian com- building block for identification. panies operating in Serbia was much higher But let’s remind readers of what hap- than the number of Serbian companies pened in December 2016. During an official selling their products in Croatia, implying visit to Dubrovnik, the Croatian President that the Serbian market (as if markets have Kolinda Grabar Kitarović met with a group personalities, and as if these personalities of children and gave them packages of pre- correspond with national characters) is sents. In the packages, among other things, more open than the Croatian market, and were chocolates of, it would appear, suspi- hence leaning more toward reconciliation cious origin, for they were produced in Ser- and establishment of good relations. Ljajić bia. Soon after the visit, one of the parents used this opportunity to admonish the had alarmed the public, outraged by the politicians in Croatia, asking: "what kind fact, as he noted, that his child had received of normalization of relations in the region the taste of nationalism (in)surmountable past 45

signals" that banal nationalism consists of, and it did attempt to reinforce the idea that (some) Serbian and Croatian citizens "are in the end nationals of a wonderful nationality". Economic patriotism as the semantic twin of economic nationalism thus appears as just another way to describe how national animosities, which in many cases find expression in ethnic wars, continue to exist. It is a weapon of choice and a means of division, that is still active long after the war is officially over. Interestingly enough, however, apart from being rooted in the everyday realities and activities of the social actors, stories of this kind function on a less evident level, keeping alive fantasies about "hostile others" who claim the right to "our pleasures". The phantasm of the "stolen pleasure", according to Žižek, is built on the idea that something that is dear to us could be taken from us, and that it could become a source of someone else’s pleasure instead "Keep calm and eat Mony” factory Pionir from Serbia tweets an ironic response to the "Chocogate affair" of exclusively ours (be it natural resources, Copyright by Pionir cultural goods or "a way of life"). Žižek argues that in many cases national iden- can we talk about if such a level of ethnic tity and also ethnic tensions are organized intolerance can be caused by a single choc- around the idea that the "other" wants to olate"? Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić steal our enjoyment and deprive "us" of our also voiced his opinion that the Croatian pleasures. These pleasures are materialized, president’s apology was "a clear sign that among other things, in the bitter and sweet Croatia does not want good relations with chocolate bar, that seems to have a nation- Serbia" and that talk about reconciliation ality, and which should be either kept at a has "crumbled." Some humorous remarks safe distance from our children ("Serbian" and ironic comments on social networks chocolates in this case) or handed down put things into more sober, reasonable per- to children whose feelings were allegedly spective, as did public actions on the streets hurt ("Croatian" chocolates together with of Zagreb, which ridiculed the seriousness the picture of Grabar Kitarović, sent as an with which the issue of ethnically marked "apology"). And there it was - a clear dem- chocolates was taken on both sides of the onstration of how the boundaries of our political/national divide. And although the tastes became boundaries of our national story was put aside after only a few days, identities. And vice versa. Simple and banal it still conveyed those "nearly subliminal as that. 46 (in)surmountable past women – active participants in a passive role

women – active participants in a passive role

Đurđa Knežević

In this article I will discuss the attitudes of When traditional structures of women’s groups in Croatia who were/are openly advocating a nationalist ideology domination are shaken, a need and the narratives supporting nationalist- for the mobilization of the whole state project(s). The phrase "national pro- population arises. At the same ject" implies a range of collective strategies time, a crisis of existing social oriented towards the perceived needs of a norms enables women to over- nation, nationalism being one of the fundamental strategies.1 Of particular interest come the traditional boundaries is the way in which women with national- of their place within society. A ist orientations perceive themselves while period of crisis can appear as forming their identities through identifica- a new opportunity. However, if tion with the nation. that only represents a transition Whenever deep social changes take place, when a society seems threatened, to the collectivist ‘solution’, as is and furthermore, when there is a critical nationalism and the nation state, period of nation-state formation, women then the involvement of women are "invited" to participate actively in public in public life does not include life. When traditional structures of domina- active participation. The woman tion are shaken, a need for the mobilization of the whole population arises. At the is welcomed as a mother-symbol, same time, a crisis of existing social norms a symbol of the community to enables women to overcome the traditional which an individual owes his or boundaries of their place within society. A her existence/birth. period of crisis can appear as a new opportunity. However, if that only represents a transition to the collectivist ‘solution’, as and, together with the nationalist political is nationalism and the nation state, then parties, it is also fundamentally supported the involvement of women in public life by most of religions. Very recently we have does not include active participation. The witnessed it in the rough form during the woman is welcomed as a mother-symbol, politically heated debate about the Istanbul a symbol of the community to which an Convention, as well as the simultaneous individual owes his or her existence/birth. debate about a new abortion law in Croatia, In short, mothers appear as an ideal symbol which almost threw the country into politi- of an authoritarian community in which the cal crisis. duties of the individual towards the commu- Basically, the roles women can play in nity prevail over his/her rights. This attitude public are limited to the displaying of suf- is nothing new, it spans a long period of time fering as the basis for the condemnation of the "enemy" (every nationalist commu- Đurđa Knežević Writer and publicist, 1 Sylvia Walby, Woman and Nation, in: Journal of Com- nity legitimizes itself through its own vic- Nerežišća (Croatia) parative Sociology, London, September 1990. timization), and to the role of caretakers. women – active participants in a passive role (in)surmountable past 47

As long as women’s power helps in maintaining the nation state, that is, (re)establishing male domination in society, women as a social group will receive political recognition and a certain access to the public. In the case of Croatia, the turmoil that happened, primarily caused by the war, initiated various developments. The form and dynamics of gender relations changed. The support of women, a large social group, was, in fact, crucial. Still, the scope and form of women’s political presence and activity was created and controlled by male power and limited to a mere supporting role.

That means that the "enemy" always exists, humanity, perceive "their proper place" in sometimes more visible and threatening, the same way as their male dominated envi- sometimes less, depending on whether the ronment does. That is to say, they acknowl- political relations between nations are in a edge their role as subordinated, passive; as a state of crisis or not. Fulfilling these roles, matter of fact, second-rate citizens. however, allows women to reach a high level It is clear that throughout the period of of public visibility and political recognition, the establishment of new states following bound by the stereotype that they never take the fall of FY until today, nationalism has active part in high politics. The invitation to basically exploited the notions of gender. political participation is limited in two ways. Its narratives changed only on the surface, The first limitation consists of the frame- according to the socio-political conditions. work within which women are allowed to In wartime, there was a wide range of sup- use in their political/public activity, while port women could give, first and foremost the second one is related to the content of in the form of mass voting for parties that their political claims. pursued nationalist projects. Furthermore, As long as women’s power helps in we could notice a sudden increase in activ- maintaining the nation state, that is, (re) ism oriented towards organizing social and establishing male domination in society, humanitarian help for "our cause" and "our women as a social group will receive politi- boys". Simultaneously, groups appeared cal recognition and a certain access to the exerting political pressure with programs public. In the case of Croatia, the turmoil based on patriarchal values in combination that happened, primarily caused by the war, with strong emotional and often religious initiated various developments. The form sentiments. and dynamics of gender relations changed. All of this lasted until the structure of The support of women, a large social group, the state was consolidated. This form of was, in fact, crucial. Still, the scope and form activities was then no longer needed for of women’s political presence and activity the development of a national project; the was created and controlled by male power public/political work of the groups which and limited to a mere supporting role. The carried it out was either terminated, or their obvious fact is, however, that the majority activism took on a different form. Their sta- of women, due to the patriarchal history of tus was put in hibernation so that they could

thousands of people at a protest march in Split by citizen´s initiative ‘Croatia against Istanbul Convention’ photo provided courtesy of Hina/Fenix-magazin 48 (in)surmountable past women – active participants in a passive role

be (mis)used again on the next political sition, religious sentiments, and mother- occasion, as it happened trough the above- hood. mentioned debate on the Istanbul Conven- The role of the media in creating and tion a few months ago. Namely, more or less, supporting such narratives should not be the same organizations (meaning, the same overlooked. As an example, in hundreds group of people), which were active at the of photographs taken of demonstrations time of, and briefly after, the war in Croa- in front of the headquarters of interna- tia, have reappeared now with slightly dif- tional organizations like UNPROFOR, one ferent political claims. While during the war image stands out: women dressed in black, nationalist women’s organisations fought with candles and flowers and small chil- for the nation state and focused their activi- dren around them. In a word, everything is ties on helping Croatian soldiers, now their focused on the creation of a religious image, political focus has shifted to defending "tra- an icon of ‘Mater Dolorosa’. It has to be said ditional Croatian values", meaning, oppos- that the media are/were playing a funda- ing the concept of sex and gender binary mental role in supporting and maintaining while advocating the traditional division such narratives. There are usually two lev- of male-female roles, fighting against the els of understanding such media messages rights of the LGBT population, and simi- as photos and statements. First of all, there lar. It has to be noted that then, as now, the are, without a doubt, understandable and names of organizations were rooted in the legitimate claims for the women’s dead or language of war. The Croatian Background disappeared husbands and/or relatives. Front was the most active and publicly There are, however, always overt or discrete present among these organizations, while elements that advocate, follow and support at present, the Croatian Soldiers’ Widows the state’s nationalist politics. This hypoth- stands out. However, the only way women esis becomes clear in the following quotes: can get political recognition (and public space) is when acting congruent to com- "this horrible war took thousands of young mon stereotypes of women and their role people’s lives, physically and mentally in society. Since our society (or societies) is/ wounded countless people, but it did not are male dominated, women can only play kill goodness and our will to defend our a subordinate role. In short, women can be homeland"3. supporters but not agents. During wartime in Croatia, according to or: their own understanding of, and agreement with their given role, women’s organizations "...they went to the front-line, many of them gave a number of statements like the follow- in jeans and sneakers, but with a heart for ing: Croatia... For thirty-four young Croatian "Dear Croatian soldiers in the battle- fighters the war was their last duty in their fields, in hospitals, wherever you are... we lives. Bodies become ashes, the goal they give you our tribute and express our grati- died for is achieved. Croatia is free."4 tude for your selfless love for ‘Our Beautiful’ [Lijepa naša, the initial words of the Croa- In fact, most of the latter statement tian national anthem, used when expressing quoted in the Vjesnik article (many more tender feelings for the homeland – DK] and similar statements appeared in the Croa- for your heroism in the Patriotic (Homeland) tian media) supports the above-mentioned War. We are a miniature part of the Croatian hypothesis. Almost as a rule, in images in nation that loves you and respect s all that both printed and broadcast media, sup- you gave up and sacrificed in defending Cro- porting politicians stand discreetly in the atia, our beloved homeland",2 or this one: background. Instead of information about "We started to help our boys who went to the the event, the same – emotion-mobilizing, front in blue-jeans and sneakers. We said, ‘let abstract, (quasi-religious) image is con- the state take care of the weapons, we, the stantly repeated. At the end of the day, women, will take care of underwear, pants, abstract, religious images mobilize emo- socks, gloves." Women are a miniature part, tions. subordinate, carers..., the domain reserved for women is spiritual, an emotional dispo- 3 Statement of the We - For Our Guard association, article entitled "Let the People Enjoy Peace and Freedom", Vjesnik, 1994, April 1 2 Mi za našu gardu (women’s association), Vjesnik, 4 "Mothers, Thanks a Lot", article in Vjesnik, 1993, 1994, April 1 November 24th women – active participants in a passive role (in)surmountable past 49

All this draws a clear distinction As mentioned before, the same pattern between the roles of women and men. is still valid today. Mothers before, today Women are just helping "our boys" who widows. Then, during wartime, the lives of belong to modernity, while simultaneously sons and husbands had to be protected and and almost automatically taking the lesser needed motherly care. Now foetuses have to position, the traditional position of a person be protected trough anti-abortion measures, in the background. The state, represented by as well as the traditional family as the place the strong, dominating male figure, should which protects traditional male-female take adequate responsibility to supply "our roles and the similar. As long as women are boys" with the weapons that are of funda- constrained by this narrative, they can be mental importance. Women will take care recognized as active participants in social of things which are ephemeral, less essen- life – but only as a group that is limited in tial, and yet the whole sentence expresses both the social and political sense. That cre- female tenderness in harmonious balance ates a political and psychological balance with male toughness. It also shows the com- with women’s own self-understanding of plexity and ambiguity of male-female rela- subordination, low self-esteem, orientation tions at the symbolic level. Here we have, towards the spiritual, emotional and merely therefore, the state playing the symbolic role supporting role. of the tough father and, in contrast, women who are tender, caring, mothers of "our boys". Finally we have "our boys" themselves who are in a poorly defined position. As fighters they have a greater responsibility and therefore hold a higher position in the social hierarchy than women. Women, however, being mothers, treat them (the young boys) as small, effeminate sons who need their care and protection. All this sheds a slightly tragic light on the young boys, for both sides, both mothers and fathers, sacrifice them pro patria, for the Father(land). 50 (in)surmountable past manipulating war crimes as a narrative used in everyday politics in BiH

manipulating war crimes as a narrative used in everyday politics in BiH

Lejla Turčilo

introduction: media Boosting national identity might narratives as "tools" for be the most accurate description shaping public opinion and of the dominant media narratives public discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How- ever, this national identity does It is well known that the media have signifi- not serve itself, it mainly serves cant influence on shaping public opinion, especially on sensitive issues. The media political purposes. Nationalist shape public opinion by putting certain rhetoric serves, first of all, the issues on the agenda (in the spotlight), purpose of mobilizing the public channelling public debate on them, shaping to support certain decisions and the context of certain events, giving legiti- actions by political elites. Media macy to certain actors (or depriving some of it) and provoking certain reaction in the culture in BiH is mainly a culture audience (which can significantly influ- of monologue, not dialogue, a ence the functioning of the society). In that culture of spectacle and stereo- context, we say that media are not neutral types, and a culture of non-toler- channels of distribution of news and infor- ance and discrimination. mation, but rather important actors in the public scene, which, by providing dominant narratives, produce specific societal situ- establishes certain order and creates pat- ations. The term "media culture" is being terns of meaning" with regard to the topic, used to describe how "images, sounds, and that is, "helps media to shape our knowledge spectacles help produce the fabric of eve- about the world" (Gillespie, 2006:83). In the ryday life, dominating leisure time, shap- interpretation of narratives it is also impor- ing political views and social behavior, and tant to observe the respective positions of providing the materials out of which people the source of information, media and the forge their very identities. (...) Media cul- public and to be aware that "things that are ture helps shape the prevalent view of the omitted in text are as important as those world and deepest values: it defines what is selected to be part of the text" (Gillespie, considered good or bad, positive or nega- 2006:82). Media narratives create a gen- tive, moral or evil. Media stories and images eral public discourse on reality and society, provide the symbols, myths, and resources that is, "the way that we talk about issues in which help constitute a common culture for public, which both reflects and determines the majority of individuals in many parts of what solutions are considered desirable or the world today." (Kellner, 2004: 5 / 1) These plausible in the commonplace logics that Lejla Turčilo stories and pictures in the media are, in fact, shape the politics of a particular moment. Full professor, Faculty the constituents of media narratives. Close attention to public discourse not of Political Science, University of Sarajevo In this context, we follow Gillespie’s defi- only allows us to keep up with politics as it [email protected] nition of a narrative as a media text "which happens, but also reveals important truths manipulating war crimes as a narrative used in everyday politics in BiH (in)surmountable past 51

about the meaning, linkages, and effects of the non-discursive activities we tradition- The key question is usually: "is ally consider political." (Woodly, 2015:7). the verdict fair?" And it is ex- It is more than clear that media narra- actly this question that provokes tives are influenced by and used for politi- different interpretations and cal purposes. The main goal is to win the attention of the audience for certain issues produces different narratives. and win the acceptance of the public on cer- Those media that find sentences tain political solutions to these issues. That lower than deserved then use is why we say that media do have power to the voices of victims to explain shape public opinion, but those who man- the scale of the crimes, while age to influence the media have power to create general public discourse by using those who find them higher than media narratives. deserved speak about those accused as heroes, those "who only defended their people" etc. "This dominant media narratives is a verdict against all ... people" in Bosnia-Herzegovina on (Croat people, Serb people) is war crimes and Hague trials also a quite often used trope, as well is "our sacrifice and our "Bosnia-Herzegovina is a young country victims were for nothing", which with many problems. As such, instead of is a strategy to provoke strong dealing with solving specific problems of public mobilization. its citizens, it often tries to construct and empower national identities in a space defined by variables of fear and national pride. The inclination towards these vari- entity and ethnic lines, such approach by ables in media representation leads, of the media additionally deepens these divi- course, to the general patriotization of the sions and makes society more divided. media instead of creating more intelligent Since the war of 1992-1995 was the most content that would stimulate readers to recent event with such devastating conse- think beyond the narrow patriotic frame- quences for the BiH state, society and peo- work." (Pejković, 2016) Indeed, boosting ple, wartime events are heavily interpreted national identity might be the most accu- and manipulated in and by the media, rate description of the dominant media each of them providing their version of narratives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the "truth" on what was happening during this national identity does not serve itself, wartime. Dominant media narratives about it mainly serves political purposes. Nation- the war are using the "us" and "them" para- alist rhetoric serves, first of all, the purpose digm, in which "us" always means "victims" of mobilizing the public to support certain and "them" means "perpetrators" of crimes. decisions and actions by political elites. In this context, the matrix of "our heroes "Media culture in BiH is mainly a culture of and their criminals" is easily recognized in monologue, not dialogue, a culture of spec- media reporting, especially with regard to tacle and stereotypes, and a culture of non- war crimes and Hague Tribunal cases. tolerance and discrimination." (Turčilo, When it comes to media reporting on 2017:82). The media are under strong politi- war crimes, Džihana and Hodžić (2011) say cal pressures and influences, their agenda that "nationalist news coverage represents predominantly conforms to the agenda of the dominant paradigm when reporting political actors, they present the views of about events on which there is a consen- certain ethnic groups instead of the entire sus at the level of ethno-national elites, but population, thus channelling public debate there are also great differences between only within certain ethnic "circles"; they the Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian political mostly deprive those who do not agree with elites (...) and reporting strategies coincide the mainstream from a chance to speak in with ethno-national lines" (p. 14). the media and they provoke public reac- If we use the 5W matrix to try to explain tions that conform to the interests of those the dominant media narratives on war who dominate political life. Having in mind crimes and their manipulation for political the fact that the public is divided along purposes, we may say the following: 52 (in)surmountable past manipulating war crimes as a narrative used in everyday politics in BiH

Bullet taken from the Luka detention facility near Brcko, Bosnia and Herzegovina. - photo provided courtesy of the ICTY, CC-BY 2.0

WHO speaks about war crimes and WHEN is it published in media? It is not the Hague trials? – We could divide the rare that verdicts are commented on even key speakers into three groups: a.) victims before they are announced, which mainly (mainly well-established individuals repre- serves the purpose of raising tensions in senting victims’ organizations and associa- the public and provoking strong reactions tions; their statements are used mainly for among people. The frequency of discus- the purpose of provoking emotional reac- sions about the Hague trials is the highest tions in the public); b.) publicly recognized immediately after verdicts are made, but it people (legal experts for example, but also also grows when elections approach, as a other people who may attract attention, mechanism for mobilizing people to sup- such as political analysts, who are often port "our party as the defender of our nation asked "how will this verdict influence inter- from others and from international actors". ethnic relations", or former Hague convicts, Also, stories on war crimes become more who may be asked questions like "how was frequent on some specific dates (July 11, life in the Hague") and c.) representatives of the Srebrenica genocide memorial day or international organizations (who are used others). to delivering the message that, to a certain WHERE is it published? Stories on war extent, the international community is a crimes and Hague trials are published guarantee that events in the Hague will not in almost all media, but with different jeopardize peace in the county). This shows approaches and in different contexts. It how fragile is the consensus on Hague itself, is very rare that certain media, oriented as well as how superficial the media are in towards certain ethnic groups, report on reporting on it, mainly focusing on the con- crimes in which it is not the victims, but the sequences of Hague verdicts. perpetrators that are members of the eth- WHAT is the key message? Depending nic group in question (with the exception on which media, key messages are different. of the reporting by some Sarajevo media However, we may say that the key question is on the "Kazani" case even during wartime). usually: "is the verdict fair?" And it is exactly This lack of readiness to report on all crimes this question that provokes different inter- regardless of the ethnic backgrounds of the pretations and produces different narratives. victims and perpetrators shows that domi- Those media that find sentences lower than nant media narratives follow ethnic lines. deserved then use the voices of victims to WHY is it published? Unfortunately, we explain the scale of the crimes, while those cannot say that the media report on war who find them higher than deserved speak crimes and Hague trials for the purpose of about those accused as heroes, those "who finding the truth on what really happened only defended their people" etc. "This is a in the period 1992-1995. It is more often verdict against all ... people" (Croat people, that they use these tragic events for the Serb people) is also a quite often used trope, purpose of political manipulation, provok- as well is "our sacrifice and our victims were ing emotional reactions among the public for nothing", which is a strategy to provoke when elections approach (some politicians, strong public mobilization. for example, wear "The Flower of Srebren- manipulating war crimes as a narrative used in everyday politics in BiH (in)surmountable past 53

ica" brooch during campaigning as a way to identify themselves as "those who care conclusion: what could be about victims", which is an obvious case of done differently? political manipulation with the victims of Srebrenica) and mobilizing people to sup- If we agree that the media manipulate port certain ideas as a way to defend their wartime events, war crimes and trials for ethnic group and ethnic identity, so that perpetrators for the purpose of political "the crimes never again happen to us". manipulation and emotional mobilization If we wanted to give a brief answer to the of the public, then a logical answer to the question of HOW the media report on war question: "what could be done differently" crimes and the Hague trials we could say would be: "more professional reporting". that they report in a sensationalistic manner However, in order to achieve that goal, we (which was more than obvious in the most would need at least several pre-conditions recent case of the suicide of the Hague con- to be met. First of all, a society more open vict Slobodan Praljak), manipulating emo- to accepting the truth and facts about the tions (which is more than obvious in many events of 1992-1995 and more ready to deal media when reporting on Srebrenica), using with the past for the purpose of peace- "big words" ("Heroes, not Criminals", "Crim- building and reconciliation. Secondly, such inals Should be Convicted, but our Heroes in society would need a more truth-oriented the Hague are Certainly not Criminals" are media, which would provide the tool for some of the headlines that appeared in the citizens to learn about the past, live in the media) and selectively reporting on crimes present and learn lessons for the future. (often ignoring crimes done by "us"). And thirdly, such media would need a pub- In many media, thus, we can find lic that is resistant to manipulation, open examples of narratives on war crimes that to accepting facts and ready to see beyond "establish certain order and create patterns their ethnic lines. So, the difficult task of of meaning" and "help media to shape finding the truth on war crimes is not only a our knowledge about the world" as said by task for the media and journalists. It is a task Gillespie (2006:83). These meanings shape of all of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. the society in BiH as a divided one and do As we usually say, the media is the mirror of not contribute to reconciliation and find- society. And the picture that we see in that ing the full truth about the war. Of course, mirror at the moment is not a nice one. If there are exceptions – professional, honest we, who are reflected in it, do not change, it and truthful media and journalists, but they won’t change either. are exactly that – exceptions, not the mainstream.

sources: Džihana A. Volčić Z. (2011). Media and National Ideologies. Sarajevo: Media Centar, Available at: http://www.media.ba/mcsonline/files/shared/MEDIA_AND_NATION- AL_IDEOLOGIES_-_za_web.pdf Gillespie, M. (2006). ‘Narrative Analysis’ in Gillespie, M. and Toynbee, J. (eds) Analys- ing Media Texts. Maidenhead and New York: Open University Press Kellner, D. (2004). Medijska kultura. Beograd: Clio [Douglas Kellner, Media Culture. Cultural studies, identity and politics between the modern and the postmodern, Rout- ledge, London and New York 1995] Pejković, A. Konstrukcije koncepta "bosanski ponos" u elektronskim medijima u BiH. Available at: http://www.media.ba/bs/magazin-novinarstvo/konstrukcije-koncepta- bosanski-ponos-u-elektronskim-medijima-u-bih Turčilo, L. (2017). (P)ogledi o medijima i društvu: članci, eseji, istraživanja. Sarajevo: Vlastita naklada Woodly, D. (2015). The Politics of Common Sense: How Social Movements Use Public Discourse to Change Politics and Win Acceptance". Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online 54 (in)surmountable past the dominance of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue

the dominance of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue

Damir Kapidžić

Ethnic parties have dominated politics in The main goal of consociational Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) for over 25 years. While some narratives look towards democracy is to govern social multi-ethnic parties as vehicles for political cleavages in non-violent ways change, I argue that this is not supported through electoral and communi- by empirical evidence. Ethnic party politics cative practices. Party elites cul- are inherent to consociational democracy tivate narratives that reinforce in BiH and it is possible to distinguish four separate party subsystems defined by eth- social cleavages while competing nicity. Electoral support is constant over to win the most votes among time for parties of the same ethnic category their ethnic group. The conso- with negligible cross-ethnic voting. The nar- ciational political system of BiH ratives of (ethnic) party leaders reflect and emphasizes competition between reinforce this system. It is not feasible to expect change from multi-ethnic politics in parties of the same ethnic affili- a country whose institutions are built on the ation, while inter-ethnic elec- notion of ethnic representation. toral competition is minimized. However, this was realized at the cost of reinforcing societal divi- BiH democracy: a sions and splitting the electorate competitive struggle for the along ethnic lines. ethnic vote to speak of a divided party system in BiH, or Political parties are central to representative more precisely of a party system with sev- democracy. They have a key role to coordi- eral distinct party subsystems. This setup nate between elected leaders and citizens as favors ethnic parties and makes multiethnic the link between citizens’ interests and the politics especially difficult. political system of a country. Through elec- Political parties form around politically tions the party system is bound to reflect relevant social cleavages. In much of West- social cleavages and divisions within society ern Europe these include relations between and this is no different in BiH. Since the first center and periphery, religious and secu- elections in 1990, parties representing the lar, urban and rural, economic cleavages three main ethnic groups have dominated between capital and labor, as well as mate- BiH politics, while multiethnic and non- rialist and post-materialist values.1 Party ethnic parties have not managed to take interactions and competition along such hold across the whole country. The narra- cleavages are what constitutes a party sys- tives of party leaders also reflect this divide, Damir Kapidžić in contrast to narratives by (mostly) interna- Assistant Professor of 1 Lipset, S.M. & Rokkan, S. (eds.). 1967. Party Sys- Comparative Politics at the tional actors that see multiethnic parties as tems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspec- University of Sarajevo vehicles of change. Essentially it is possible tives. New York: The Free Press. the dominance of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue (in)surmountable past 55

tem.2 For a long time in BiH confessional govern social cleavages in non-violent ways affiliation was the only politically relevant through electoral and communicative prac- factor. In the absence of a unifying nation- tices. Party elites cultivate narratives that building process, social movements based reinforce social cleavages while competing on faith led to the emergence of three main to win the most votes among their ethnic ethno-political groups, along the religious group.3 The consociational political system divide of the population. Thus, Croat par- of BiH emphasizes competition between ties developed that were affiliated with parties of the same ethnic affiliation, while the Catholic church, just like Serb parties inter-ethnic electoral competition is mini- close to Orthodox Christian institutions, mized. However, this was realized at the cost and Bosniak parties with ties to the Islamic of reinforcing societal divisions and splitting Community in BiH. As a rejection of politi- the electorate along ethnic lines. cized religion, secular parties emerged with Today, political contest in BiH takes strong links to organized labor. All this hap- place within ethnically defined segments pened in the late 19th and early 20th cen- of the population, creating three ethnically tury. bound party subsystems with a high degree During the first democratic elections in of independence, in addition to one less 1990, this initial form of party system was re- well defined non-ethnic party subsystem. established after decades of one-party rule. This can be empirically verified by looking The dominance of the secular Communist at voting patterns for ethnically defined Party of Yugoslavia was challenged by three party groups across time for the BiH Parlia- ethnic parties that brought together Croa- ment. Using Sartori’s terminology, in BiH we tian, Serb or Bosniak members but with a can identify a complex party system with great diversity of interests within each party. a dominant role for the three ethnically At this moment we could rather speak of defined party sub-systems and one non- three national movements of the particular ethnic party subsystem. ethnic groups, which also incorporated the narratives and political heritage of national and cultural organizations and parties from the four party subsystems the early 20th century. The decisive victory of BiH of the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA), the Serbian Dem- The elections for the House of Representa- ocratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, tives of the BiH Parliament are the only con- SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Union test in which all relevant political parties in BiH (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica the country compete against each other. BiH, HDZBiH) in these elections shaped a Between 1996 and 2014, seven elections multi-party system predominantly based were held with 114 political organizations on ethnicity. The three parties, in addition filing candidates, out of which 93 were polit- to the former Communist Party, now called ical parties and 21 pre-electoral coalitions.4 the Social Democratic Party (Socijalde- Both the coalitions and the parties running mokratska partija, SDP) form the four main in elections regularly changed and only two segments within the contemporary BiH parties ran independently in all seven elec- party system. All new parties today were tions. The vast majority of parties and coali- primarily established through splits within tions, more precisely 58%, won seats only these four core parties, and only occasion- in a single election, while only one quarter ally through the transformation of previ- won seats in more than two elections. ously existing societal organizations. While this hints at significant and While the first elections brought ethnic persistent shifts in voter support, a more interests to the forefront, wartime events detailed analysis is needed. In order to do and the post-war political system further so, the measure of electoral volatility is used, reinforced their dominance. The politi- which looks at the total change of electoral cal system established through the Dayton

Peace Agreement placed an emphasis on 3 Deschouwer, K. 2001. Freezing pillars and frozen the institutionalization of ethnicity through cleavages: party systems and voter alignments in a consociational model of democracy. The the consociational democracies. In: Karvonen, L. & Kuhnle, S. (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments main goal of consociational democracy is to Revisited. London & New York: Routledge. 4 Author’s calculations based on data from: BiH Central Election Commission (Središnje izborno povjerenstvo). 2 Sartori, G. 2005. Parties and Party Systems. Colches- 2018. Statistike i rezultat izbora. http://www.izbori. ter: ECPR Press. ba/, accessed 16 03 2018. 56 (in)surmountable past the dominance of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue

same subsystems there is negligible political distance. Instead of aiming to generate broad political support, political narratives focus on how to best represent the interests of one’s own ethnic group. The resulting narratives employed by leaders of ethnic parties

Derelict buildings in often lead to ethnic outbidding and neglect Sarajevo city center cooperative discourses. plastered with 2016 election campaign posters, klix.ba, Photo by Nedim Grabovica uncooperative elites in a consociational democracy support for parties from one election to the next.5 General volatility for the BiH Parlia- Elections and electoral campaigns are a ment elections is very high, tentatively sug- regular feature of politics in BiH. Alternat- gesting an extremely unstable party system. ing between the local and national levels, There is also significant change over time elections are held every two years.7 This cre- where voter support shifted by 30% to 74% ates an atmosphere of continuous electoral between two elections. Even if we take into contest framed in the terms of the ethnic account changing pre-electoral coalitions, party subsystems within which competi- the values still range between 18% and 29%. tion occurs. Narratives employed by politi- This, however, does not mean that voters cal parties and their leaders are thus largely in BIH are willing to support any political directed towards their ethnic electorates alternative. and serve to mobilize and coalesce voters. In order to test shifts in voter support Take for example three common nar- between ethnic and multiethnic parties, the ratives, those of ethnic federalism, referen- 114 political organizations are divided into dums, and centralization, that are differently four general categories based on the crite- perceived within each ethnic party category. rion of ethnic representation.6 Accordingly, Ethnic federalism, strongly ingrained any party can be identified as Croat, Bos- within the narrative of a third Croat-dom- niak, Serb or multi-ethnic and any coalition inated subnational entity, is supported by can equally be grouped into one of these almost all Croat political parties. HDZBiH four categories. Electoral volatility between especially uses the narrative in an attempt the four categories is very low, with an aver- to push for more group autonomy. At the age of 5.8%. This means that there is almost same time this narrative is vilified by Bos- no shift of votes between parties that belong niak and multi-ethnic parties as it runs to different ethnic categories. For example, against their narrative for more centralized voters will always choose to vote for a Bos- and effective policy-making. What could niak party, even though their choice of par- be framed as a debate on decentralization ticular Bosniak party can change. Especially becomes distorted into an ethnic competi- voters that voted for Serb or Croat parties tion. Both narratives serve not to shift vot- almost never vote outside of their ethnic ers between party subsystems, but rather to category (on average 1.6%), which limits boost political support for parties that best the ability of multi-ethnic parties to attract represent group interests within their own such voters. ethnic categories. Using electoral volatility, it is empiri- Another example is the use of the refer- cally possible to identify four distinct party endum narrative amongst Serb parties. In subsystems in BiH based on ethno-polit- this case an enacted consultative referen- ical social cleavages. In such a segmented dum on judicial authority and a proposed multi-party system, electoral competition referendum on secession were strategically is focused on winning votes from one’s own employed by the Serb-dominated Alliance ethnic group and there is virtually no cross- of Independent Social Democrats (Savez ethnic voting. Among the parties within the nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD) in the runup to several recent elections. By creating a common and undisputable cause 5 As the House of Representatives of the BiH Parlia- ment has only 42 members, the measure of electoral within their ethnic party subsystem, the volatility is based on the volatility of votes instead of seats as this is more precise. 6 Chandra, K. 2011. What is an ethnic party, Party 7 Elections at the entity and cantonal levels are held Politics 17(2): 151-169. simultaneously with national elections. the dominance of ethnic parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue (in)surmountable past 57

Using electoral volatility, it is empirically possible to identify four distinct party subsystems in BiH based on ethno-political social cleavages. In such a segmented multi-party system, electoral competition is focused on winning votes from one’s own ethnic group and there is virtually no cross-ethnic voting. Among the parties within the same subsystems there is negligible political distance. Instead of aiming to generate broad political support, political narratives focus on how to best represent the interests of one’s own ethnic group. The resulting narratives employed by leaders of ethnic parties often lead to ethnic outbidding and neglect cooperative discourses. ruling party of Republika Srpska was effec- As such, all ethnic political narratives have tively able to sideline all opposition as pas- to be seen through the lens of electoral sive bystanders during the pre-electoral politics, as their main purpose is generating campaign. Simultaneously, the referendum voter support. narrative provoked a strong reaction from High stakes policies, such as the recent Bosniak parties, which coalesced voters of reform of the electoral law, are viewed along both ethnic party subsystems. these conflicting narratives. In all its itera- Such political narratives are self-serving tions the proposal for electoral law reform and further the divisions within the BiH exclusively deals with notions of descrip- party system. On the one hand, they solidify tive representation by linking the electoral the ethnic party subsystems and prevent choice of voters to the dominant ethnicity the loss of cross-ethnic voters by creating a of electoral units. As a result, parties in BiH strong difference between us and them. On ensure that they are not just an expression the other hand, they allow for a more radi- of voters’ choice but the main guarantor cal expression of ethnic interests and com- of ethnic self-governance, replacing state petition among parties of the same ethnic institutions as the primary mechanism to category at who best represents the group. ensure group representation. 58 (in)surmountable past the Hague tribunal – reconciliation on hold

the Hague tribunal – reconciliation on hold

Nemanja Stjepanović

The facts of the genocide in Srebrenica, Today, the region is in a situa- the siege of Sarajevo, concentration camps in Prijedor, rape in Foča, Serb and later tion the like of which it has not Croat ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks in BH, encountered in its history follow- Serb crimes against the Croats and Croat ing a traumatic period of war, of crimes against the Serbs in Croatia, mass which there were many. This is murders and the ethnic cleansing of some the first time that a historic nar- 800,000 Albanians from Kosovo are today denied only by the stupid and the malevo- rative can be entirely built upon lent. Unsuccessfully from the viewpoint facts, rather than myth. For the of opposing facts, successfully in terms of first time, it is possible to have a acceptance of their theories in the region. clear factual insight into the illu- That more or less depicts the 25 years of sions of the past, and an oppor- operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the tunity to contemplate the perni- Hague (the Hague Tribunal) – it unearthed, ciousness of dreams of territorial while others followed it reburying; it shed enlargement and national delimi- light, others obfuscated, it clarified, others tation in the Balkans. However, blurred. this has not occurred. Partly, this Who are these others? Regional official political circles, mainly governing, and was due to "our people believing those on their payroll, loyalists and fellow in phantoms more than facts", travellers. All those in whose interest it was but partly also because these for the truth about the wars in the former phantoms are presented by the Yugoslavia not to be uncovered. These were political leadership as the truth, political, military and police institutions and facts as unnecessary prattle and individuals involved in the wars and war crimes or who made fortunes in the by the courts. wars, and are now seeking by any means possible to preserve their positions, to con- ceal their roles and bar any thought of court proceedings that might be pursued against them. When the UN Security Council founded the Hague Tribunal in 1993, one of the aims of the tribunal’s work was to contribute to reconciliation in the region. Along with all the mistakes and oversights, during its

Nemanja Stjepanović Humanitarian Law Cenre, Belgrade the Hague tribunal – reconciliation on hold (in)surmountable past 59

Ligature used to bind victims' hands in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, unearthed during an exhumation. Photo provided courtesy of the ICTY, CC-BY 2.0

25-year existence1, the Hague tribunal has charged were also tried. Second, it removed done a lot – for a start, it has convicted 90 a number of regional warlords and leaders persons out of the 161 that were charged. of wide-reaching criminal campaigns from Among them were senior politicians of the government structures or made it impossi- region’s states and entities, military and ble for them to return there – for instance, police officers, as well as some of the most the former president of SR Yugoslavia, Slo- brutal murderers from the bottom of the bodan Milošević, the leaders of the Bos- formal structures. More importantly, the nian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Tribunal has collected extensive material Mladić, or the leader of the Bosnian Croats, on the wars of the nineties, on the basis of Jadranko Prlić. The Hague Tribunal has per- which it reached factual conclusions about suaded the states of the region to deliver the wartime events of the nineties. it archival material, conducted compre- All this could have contributed to recon- hensive investigations on the ground, and ciliation. But it takes two for reconciliation. thus obtained several tens of thousands of The other, that is, the states that emerged military and police documents, intercepted in the bloody dissolution of the former conversations, video recordings, photo- Yugoslavia, did not want the reconciliation, graphs, minutes of meetings of high-level at least not one grounded in a fact-based state bodies. It managed to find and inter- understanding of history. view 4,650 witnesses – survivors, relatives of From the very founding of the Hague those murdered, but also insiders from vari- Tribunal, the region’s states’ political ous political and military structures – and authorities, above all in Serbia and Croatia, record their statements in around two and have made various attempts to stymie its a half million pages of transcripts. work – by refusing to extradite the accused Today, the region is in a situation the and furnish documentation from their like of which it has not encountered in its archives, instructing witnesses not to speak history following a traumatic period of war, the truth in the state’s interest and all man- of which there were many. This is the first ner of throwing spanners in its works. time that a historic narrative can be entirely In spite of everything, the Hague Tribu- built upon facts, rather than myth. For the nal has managed to overcome the obstruc- first time, it is possible to have a clear factual tions and deliver the region the results insight into the illusions of the past, and an that noone had expected at the outset of opportunity to contemplate the pernicious- its work. First, it managed to bring all the ness of dreams of territorial enlargement fugitives to justice – all those who were and national delimitation in the Balkans. However, this has not occurred. Partly, this 1 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former was due to "our people believing in phan- Yugoslavia has concluded its work on 31 December toms more than facts", in the words of the 2017. Jurisdiction over unconcluded cases (those of Stanišić and Simatović before the Trial Chamber, Sarajevo journalist Boro Kontić, but partly and of Vojislav Šešelj, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko also because these phantoms are presented Mladić before the Appeals Chamber) was transferred to the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, by the political leadership as the truth, and also based in the Hague. facts as unnecessary talk by the courts. 60 (in)surmountable past the Hague tribunal – reconciliation on hold

However, if we start with Serbia and the Serbian side in the war, the Hague files will The generation born after World show us that the wars of 1991-1995 were War II waged the wars of the conducted out of Belgrade, with the clear nineties in the former Yugoslavia. goal of occupying and ethnically cleansing These are people who had no parts of Croatia and BH, if possible annex- ing them to Serbia; that all was planned in experience of war, but listened advance, and that in the course of realisa- to romantic stories about it and tion of this plan tens of thousands of civil- whose education was grounded ians were killed and hundreds of thousands in myth-based narratives. If displaced. It is also clear that the military history teaches us anything, it and police structures of Serbia and Ser- bian political formations in BH and Croa- is that this scenario must not be tia took part in realisation of this concept. repeated. The generation born Some might say that Serbia’s role in the war after the wars of the nineties in BH, for instance, is not mentioned in is growing up alongside us, and Hague verdicts such as those against Rado- we are once again raising it on van Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. True, it is not explicitly stated that Serbia conducted a narrative based on myth and the war in BH, but the Hague evidentiary romantic stories of war heroes. database and facts established in court give Only this time, unlike World War us a clear picture of the political support II, the declared war heroes are the Belgrade authorities gave the Bosnian actually common criminals. Serb authorities, of military assistance to units that committed crimes and presence of Serbian police and military units in BH tion in the summer of 1995, the evidence throughout the war. Finally, Ratko Mladić nevertheless clearly shows that crimes have and the officers in his army who planned been committed against the Serbs, and any- and put through the Srebrenica genocide, one who can read can be in no doubt that terrorised Sarajevo for 44 war months they were planned and carried out by the and developed a system of concentration state of Croatia. camps all over BH, were paid from Belgrade With a little effort, even matters that all through the war, from the budget of the were not the subject of trials, such as the Yugoslavian Army. A huge number of these agreement between Serbia and Croatia to officers, lead by Ratko Mladić, today receive divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, can today their pensions from the Republic of Serbia. be found in verdicts and evidence gathered The evidence likewise clearly shows by the Hague Tribunal. that the murders of several thousands and This is only a portion of the conclusions displacement of at least 800,000 Kosovar that arise from the work of the Hague Tribu- Albanians during the NATO intervention nal, that can help us to properly consider the against SR Yugoslavia in 1999 were commit- past, to take stand on the illusions we were ted by Serbian army and police units, as well once inclined towards and once and for all as that on orders from the state leadership, relinquish the concepts that led to wars and the police transported around 1000 bodies mass crimes against civilians. But no, we of Albanian civilians from Kosovo to mass do precisely the opposite – we sweep facts graves in Serbia. under the carpet and turn our heads away Let us go on. The example of Croatia in from them. Because it is easier that way. BH. Here, the Hague files clearly show that Not only is it easier, but that way, there is no the idea of the Croatian state leadership talk about criminal, moral, or any respon- was to capture, ethnically cleanse part of sibility of various current civil servants and BH and annex it to Croatia, with the aid of politicians in government who took part in the Bosnian Croat military-political authori- wars, gave their support to their nations’ ties. With that goal in mind, Bosniaks in the war goals and not infrequently took part in imagined Croatian territory were killed, planning and committing war crimes. To imprisoned, tortured and driven out. give an example, the President of Serbia, Although a shameful appeal verdict freed Aleksandar Vučić, who was a member of the Croatian generals from responsibility for radical pro-war political faction during the crimes against Serbs in Krajina committed war, has for years denied the achievements during and after the Oluja military opera- of the Hague Tribunal and had nothing to the Hague tribunal – reconciliation on hold (in)surmountable past 61

say about it but to criticise it, whilst at the viewed as a sports competition, counting same time repeating day in day out that we how many of ours and how many of theirs should not dwell on what happened in the were convicted, each verdict met with tears past, but look into the future. "If I had a past by one side and songs of joy by the other, like that, I’d also only look at the future," a although no-one who sang or wept has Belgrade journalist replied to him. ever read a single verdict. Thanks to politi- Therefore, this is the reason why rec- cians’ and media lies, people believe that onciliation in the region is having hiccups. the accused were convicted in the Hague Those who most resent the Hague Tribunal merely owing to their being Serbs or Croats, for not contributing to reconciliation, that that judges spend sleepless nights thinking is, politicians in Serbia above all, followed by how to do us wrong, how to turn us all into those in Croatia and elsewhere in the region, criminals and saddle us with collective guilt. have also done the most to keep the facts Maybe that is the catch – fleeing from that this court has found invisible to most collective guilt, we managed to flee from citizens. Politicians are those who in the responsibility. Because, if we are not all face of evidence of planned crimes speak of guilty of crimes, we nevertheless have a their people’s defence, who sneak in stories certain responsibility for what happened in of renegade extremists as perpetrators in the past. Whether as followers of the politi- place of evidence on the state’s complicity in cal paths that led to the crimes or as indif- crimes, who, rather than remove convicted ferent citizens who never stood up to such war criminals from public life, celebrate politics. them and cooperate with them. However, today we bear the greatest While we’re at it, let us ask how exactly responsibility – to learn as much as possible could the Hague Tribunal reconcile us if we about past events and pass our knowledge return the war criminals it had convicted on to new generations, all with the aim that into state institutions and elevate them into these crimes are never repeated. The gen- societies’ moral authorities. For instance, eration born after World War II waged the having completed the sentence handed wars of the nineties in the former Yugosla- down to him by the Tribunal, Vladimir via. These are people who had no experi- Lazarević, the Serbian general convicted of ence of war, but listened to romantic stories war crimes against Albanian civilians in Kos- about it and whose education was grounded ovo, was returned to Serbia on a government in myth-based narratives. If history teaches plane, at the airport, he was given a hero’s us anything, it is that this scenario must not welcome attended by government min- be repeated. The generation born after the isters, the Chief of the General Staff of the wars of the nineties is growing up alongside Serbian Armed Forces, church dignitaries. us, and we are once again raising it on a nar- The same general soon became a lecturer rative based on myth and romantic stories at the state Military Academy. Before him, of war heroes. Only this time, unlike World another convict, Milošević’s ‘Kosovo man’ War II, the declared war heroes are actually Nikola Šainović, was promptly coopted on common criminals. Failure to acquaint this serving his sentence into the general com- new generation with the facts of the wars mittee of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia may lead to these young people, once they (the erstwhile party of Slobodan Milošević). come of age and become decision-makers, The other ruling party – Aleksandar Vučić’s embarking on new wars with the old, unre- Serbian Progressive Party – has brought Ves- alised dreams. elin Šljivančanin, convicted in the Hague of The Hague Tribunal can certainly be of crimes against Croats in Vukovar, to public help here. Nevertheless, it would be a mis- discussions. Tomislav Nikolić, former presi- take to take it as the end of the story of the dent of Serbia and also a member of the past. On the contrary, it should be the begin- Serbian Progressive Party, received Momčilo ning of an honest regional conversation Krajišnik, likewise a Hague convict, the war- about what we did in the nineties and why time right hand of Radovan Karadžić, to the we did it, a solid foundation upon which to Presidency of Serbia for consultations. What build the house of long-lasting peace in the could they have been consulting about? Balkans. There is resentment against the Hague translated by Hana Dvornik Tribunal for merely contributing to divisions among peoples in the Balkans that are already divided. That is true, but how did it exactly come to this? Because its work was 62 changing narratives, changing histories dormant yet radiant history: memories of the First World War in the Republic of Macedonia

changing narratives, changing histories dormant yet radiant history: memories of the First World War in the Republic of Macedonia

Petar Todorov

History is seen mainly as political history, whose role is to serve the goals of the nation. In such context, WWI is mostly regarded as military history, which explains why historians studying WWI are focusing on a topic related to the national idea and completely ignore the social aspects of the war.

This essay addresses the image(s) of the radiant, because it has a huge impact on the First World War in the Macedonian society. development of the present historical and The history of the war has been dominantly political myths in the Republic of Macedo- defined as the most tragic event in the Mace- nia and has had a strong impact on the eve- donian national history. This interpretation ryday life of the local population for decades has had a strong impact on the Macedonian after the war. One of the best-known novels national historical and political narrative of the Macedonian literature, Pirej (1980), and on the development of the present his- represents a solid example of the impor- torical and political myths in the Republic of tance of the history of the First World War Macedonia. Taking this into consideration, (WWI) in Macedonia and the place it holds. the essay focuses on three important points. The novel, as well as the historical narra- The first is the historiographic production tive, underlines the sufferings and the vic- in both the socialist/Yugoslavian and post- timhood of the Macedonian people in the socialist/post-Yugoslavian context and the wars from 1912 to 1918. Moreover, the his- creation of ethno-nationalist discourse. The tory of WWI represents only one piece of a second point is the partnership between long series of events that shape the myth of politics and history, or how political thought victimhood in the Macedonian historiogra- influenced historiographic production dur- phy, one of the most important and strong- ing the recent years, and the role played by est myths. However, the historical narratives historians who presented themselves as also shape other myths such as the myth of political and national preachers, ignoring eternal enemies or a siege mentality. the critical approach in studying history. Beside the novel, a discovery of a The last point is public discourse, the poli- grenade or artillery shell from WWI in tics of memory and commemorations i.e. someone’s backyard or a field is the most the way the present day Macedonian society common way citizens of Macedonia are reacts to the history of the First World War. reminded of WWI history and its devastat- No other event in the Macedonian his- ing consequences. Although many regions torical ethno-national narrative can be in the Republic of Macedonia, especially defined as dormant yet radiant; dormant those near the front line, still keep memo- because it has a great potential for aca- ries of WWI and its consequences, today in Petar Todorov demic research due to the fact that what Macedonia there is no national monument PhD, the Institute of National is perceived to be one of "the most tragic or memorial commemorating its history. History in Skopje; a visiting researcher at the University events in Macedonian history" is not sub- However, there are many other memorials of New York Tirana ject to continuous academic research, and and monuments such as military cemeter- dormant yet radiant history: memories of the First World War in the Republic of Macedonia changing narratives, changing histories 63

ies. Until the 1990s, many of these cemeter- Regarding the history of WWI and Mac- ies were neglected. After independence, edonian historiography from its foundation many of them were reconstructed, like the in the 1950s until the present day, there are Bulgarian military cemeteries in the south- no more than 10 books and articles dedi- eastern part of Macedonia. The renovation cated only to the history of WWI in both the of these cemeteries showed an increase in socialist/Yugoslavian and post-socialist/ nationalist reactions on the part of many post-Yugoslavian context. Moreover, some historians and media, blaming the govern- of these academic works are taking WWI ment for allowing the reconstruction of the into account only as part of a long series of cemeteries of an "occupying force". Such wars from 1912 until 1918. However, the his- reactions represent a good example of the tory of WWI and questions considered to be abuse of history and the influence of the his- of importance to national history are exam- torical narrative in the Macedonian society. ined in studies dealing with broader ques- Namely, we do not witness such reactions tions. For example, we frequently read about in the case of other cemeteries (French, the history of WWI in Macedonia in studies German, British), whose armies helped the dealing with the question of the "Macedo- other "occupiers" to re-establish their rule nian national movement", the politics of in the present Republic of Macedonia. the Balkan countries and the Great Powers It is at the cemeteries that commemora- or the activities of certain groups fighting tions take place every 11 November. Ambas- for autonomous Macedonia – in short, top- sadors from the European Union (EU) ics dealing only with issues of political and countries and government officials pay vis- national history. No study has attempted to its to the WWI military cemeteries and give examine WWI from the viewpoint of social speeches about the importance of peace history. and reconciliation in the region. However, The reasons behind this are many, but in many other cases, messages of peace two of them are important to underline. The and reconciliation from Macedonian rep- first explains the nature of the Macedonian resentatives are absent, yet political élites historiography and the understanding of abuse the past with an aim to mobilize the the history of Macedonia. Namely, history public to support them and legitimize them is seen mainly as political history, whose and their policies. This political discourse is role is to serve the goals of the nation. In strongly influenced by the work of historians such context, WWI is mostly regarded as on the other side, who present themselves military history, which explains why histo- as victims of the interests of the politicians rians studying WWI are focusing on a topic and their interference in the historians’ related to the national idea and completely affairs. On the other hand, many histori- ignore the social aspects of the war. The sec- ans see themselves as state historians and ond reason is the role of some Macedonian statesmen/stateswomen and make political activists during WWI. Their controversial statements not only in public speeches and role and allegiance to Bulgaria, considered interviews, but also in their works. to be the enemy of the Macedonian people

Statue of Alexander the Great, part of the controversial Skopje 2014 project by kristofarndt, CC-BY-ND 2.0 64 changing narratives, changing histories dormant yet radiant history: memories of the First World War in the Republic of Macedonia

occupying forces were questions elabo- With the dissolution of Yugosla- rated in almost all presentations that dealt via and the socio-economic and with the WWI. Until the present day, this political changes, we witness approach has not significantly changed, except in terms of ideology and some modi- changes in the interpretations of fications in the interpretation of the roles WWI, but more importantly we played by some personalities and political also witness an increase in the groups. The history of WWI remains politi- nationalist rhetoric in historical cal and military history. studies. However, this has not Regarding the narrative in the socialist/Yugoslavian context, studies dealing led to increased interest in re- with WWI represent a good example of searching WWI. Since the 1990s the Marxist and nationalist historiogra- we have seen less than 5 books phy, accompanied by an intense rheto- and/or articles on the topic. ric of national victimization. Namely, we Moreover, like in the previous often read about Macedonian victimhood context, the history of WWI is and the division and occupation of Mac- edonia (often represented as an economic part of the studies dealing with and political subject, not as an imagined questions considered to be im- geographical region) ignoring other ethno- portant to the national history. religious communities and the complexity of the Ottoman and post-Ottoman geography, economy and politics. Regarding and the Macedonian national idea, has put the Marxist narrative, WWI is defined as an the historians in a difficult position. How- imperialist war. Moreover, some events are ever, the neglect of the history of WWI and defined through the paradigm of class, as the selectivity in studying this event has well as the paradigm of events of 1917, i.e. not prevented the historians from using it the October revolution. Regardless of the in shaping the myth of victimhood and the question whether or not the October revo- siege mentality. Moreover, the wars from lution had significant influence, or other 1912 to 1918 are defined as a turning point regional socio-economic factors, the prob- in the historic development of the Macedo- lem with these interpretations is the selec- nian people. tive approach in studying these topics. It is The first study on WWI in Macedonia exactly the selectivity, the frequency of the written in Macedonian was published back writings of crimes committed against the in 1969. Its author was a member of the first Macedonians and their framing that are generation of the Macedonian national central to the creation of the myth of vic- historians. He authored a monograph that timhood, but also to the myth of continu- paved the path for studying the history of ous resistance of the Macedonians against WWI in Macedonia in terms of chronology their enemies (Bulgarians, Serbians and and topics. Namely, in terms of chronology, Greeks, supported by the Great Powers). WWI is only a segment of the wars fought The selectivity in the interpretation from 1912 until 1918. This chronological and the way in which some Macedonian concept was followed by scholars in the political and national activists are viewed following decades. As an illustration of this and portrayed is also worth mentioning. point, in 1988, a conference on the Balkan Namely, while left-wing oriented political Wars and the First World War was organized activists are viewed as being on the positive by the Macedonian Academy of Sciences side of the history, those who are right wing and Arts. Regarding the topics discussed in are usually portrayed as collaborators and this conference, questions like the recruit- traitors to the Macedonian national cause. ment of Macedonians in the Balkan armies, It is exactly the exploitation of this term that Macedonia under the occupation, the Mac- makes historical interpretation and the role edonian question in the politics of the Cen- of historians very controversial in the devel- tral Powers and their allies, military history, opment of the narrative of patriots vs. trai- i.e. the battlefield and different forms of the tors in the Macedonian political discourse. Macedonian people’s resistance against the Another point worth mentioning is the con- dormant yet radiant history: memories of the First World War in the Republic of Macedonia changing narratives, changing histories 65

tinuous insistence on a separate Macedo- remain unchanged. The war and its con- nian ethno-national identity. This reveals sequences are defined as catastrophic for the main concern of Macedonian historiog- the Macedonian people as we read inter- raphy, i.e. to prove the existence of a distinct pretations like: "great obstruction of the Macedonian ethno-national identity. historical development" of the Macedo- With the dissolution of Yugoslavia and nian people. Moreover, the neighbouring the socio-economic and political changes, countries, helped by the Great Powers, who we witness changes in the interpretations of "took part in the partition of Macedonia" WWI, but more importantly we also witness are responsible for the catastrophe. In addi- an increase in the nationalist rhetoric in his- tion to the question of the dominant narra- torical studies. However, this has not led to tive, terms like traitors or people betraying increased interest in researching WWI. Since the national cause are still used in shaping the 1990s we have seen less than 5 books the national narrative of the struggle of the and/or articles on the topic. Moreover, like Macedonian people for independence. in the previous context, the history of WWI To summarize, Macedonian historiog- is part of the studies dealing with questions raphy defines the history of WWI in Mac- considered to be important to the national edonia through an ethnic prism, ignoring history. In many ways, the topics and the its complexity. Moreover, the history of interpretation offered in all these studies WWI is politically charged, i.e. in specific repeat the previously established views on periods this history serves more the needs the character and consequences of WWI of the official policies of the government for Macedonia and the Macedonian peo- than the purpose of better understand- ple. It is only the Marxist rhetoric that has ing the past. The recent political develop- been removed, but is not completely absent. ments are strong proof of the (ab)use of Terms such as "imperialist conflict" are still history, or more precisely, the narratives used and some events still defined through of the past. Namely, the rhetoric of victim- the paradigm of class. However, 1917 and hood and the role of the Great Powers in the October revolution and its impact are the Macedonian question are frequently much less exploited in the interpretation of exploited in political speeches. Thus, in the some events and in some studies they are context of the last political crisis in Mac- completely absent. edonia, President Gjorgji Ivanov and the We see more important changes in the former prime minister and president of the portrayal of some political activists and VMRO-DPMNE, Nikola Gruevski, claimed groups, previously defined as collaborators in their later speeches that foreign actors with the enemies and traitors to the Mac- (the international community or the Great edonian national cause. Namely, their role Powers) supported by local politicians and has been reexamined, and now they are rep- political parties are attempting to desta- resented in either neutral or positive light. bilize Macedonia with the ultimate aim of However, some historians still continue to redefining the country. These are examples underline their collaboration with Bulgaria. of statements in which the Great Powers Today, these interpretations represent one and "traitors to the nation" are defined of the most important debates between as the enemy of Macedonia and the Mac- historians, a debate strongly influenced by edonians. Moreover, the recent examples the now former ruling party, the right-wing of increasing abuse of history and intense VMRO-DPMNE. Another change worth nationalist rhetoric led to the worsening mentioning which also serves as testimony of the neighbourly relations between Bul- to the increasingly nationalist rhetoric and garia and Macedonia. Namely, last Novem- development of the myth of victimhood is ber, a Bulgarian delegation placed a plaque the change in how the main battlefront in commemorating the Bulgarian soldiers the Balkans, i.e. the Macedonian front or fallen during WWI on the summit of the Salonika front or Front d’Orient, is referred Kaimakchalan mountain, i.e. the border- to. Namely, while in the Yugoslavian period line between Macedonia and Greece. A few the front was exclusively named the days later the plaque was destroyed by a Salonika front, today Macedonian histo- nationalist group led by a person who was rians insist on naming it the Macedonian an ardent supporter and advocate of the front. Other interpretations related to WWI VMRO-DPMNE policies. 66 changing narratives, changing histories historical revisionism

historical revisionism

Erich Rathfelder

In the village Slatine, located on the Dal- reinterpreting history matian island Čiovo, the memorial to those killed in action is held in esteem. Almost all After the wars of the 1990s, a comprehen- the names of the families that have lived here sive reinterpretation of history began in the for generations are listed here. The major- region of former Yugoslavia. Not only were ity of the men died in 1943, in the famous Partisan monuments changed, desecrated battles of the Neretva and Sutjeska rivers, or destroyed, the names of schools, public which brought about the turning point of buildings and especially streets were also the Second World War in the Balkans. At the adapted to the new-old ideologies. Thus, time, several tens of thousands of Partisans many Partisans’ names were replaced by defeated 120 000 German and Italian troops those of Ustasha and Chetnik leaders. Even and their allies, the Croat Ustasha and the in Sarajevo, ethno-national religious Mus- Serb Chetniks. These victories represented lim circles are trying to rename Marshall the beginning of the complete liberation of Tito Street to Alija Izetbegović Boulevard. Yugoslavia from German occupation and In the Croatian public, the process of – as Partisan leader Tito himself believed – coming to terms with the Second World War from Fascism. is reduced to the massacres committed by Apparently, the latter was not com- the Communist Partisans against members pletely successful. The memorial in the vil- of the Croatian Home Guard and supporters lage to honour those fighters was erected of the Ustasha regime after their surrender after the Second World War. But honouring at Bleiburg in 1945. By contrast, the crimes the Partisans today does not suit the preva- of the Ustasha dictatorship are downplayed lent ideology in Croatia. Although people or denied by the conservative-nationalist still wish to keep the memory of their fore- and Catholic side. The annual drama sur- fathers alive, they are no longer allowed to rounding the days of commemorations be Partisans. This is a compromise. A new at the Jasenovac concentration camp, in inscription can be read on the memorial: which alone over 80 000 Serbs, Jews, Roma "They fought against Croatia’s enemies." and oppositionists were murdered, testifies Thereby, the traces of their connection to this. The cynical Ustasha slogan "Za dom to the Partisans have been blurred. Follow- spremni" (for the home – ready!) set recently ing the Independence War of Croatia against by right-wing extremists near the location Yugoslavia from 1991 – 1995, the Partisans of the concentration camp and the merely of Slatine were incorporated without much half-hearted dissociation of the government ado into the current Croat nationalism. in Zagreb indicate that the historical revi- However, as this nationalism relates to the sionism process in Croatia has not yet been state made by the grace of Hitler and Musso- completed. This also includes the Catholic lini, to the Ustasha regime from 1941-45, the Church’s denial up to the present day of its current inscription on the memorial even partially active role in the persecution of turns the real history upside down. dissidents and the Serb, Roma and Jewish Erich Rathfelder Journalist, correspondent of minorities up to 1945. Tageszeitung historical revisionism changing narratives, changing histories 67

On the whole, the role of the multi-national Partisans and the Social- ist Tito regime is considered in both states to be an obstacle to "national liberation." The Chetnik crimes are denied by nationalists in Serbia just like those of the Ustasha are by Croatian nationalists. Moreover, the revision of history aims to cover up the crimes committed during the last war. Bosnian-Croat war criminals, such as Jadranko Prlić, tried in The Hague are glorified as national heroes. It is no different on the Serb side in the case of war criminals Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. A comprehensive discussion between the societies in the successor states to former Yugoslavia only continues to exist in civil society circles.

to the radicalisation of the Serb population propaganda in Serbia prior to the wars of the 1990s. Within such a worldview, the manifold By contrast, the crimes committed by the collaborations of Serb nationalists with Ustasha regime and their concentration the German occupation force need to be camps – Jasenovac, Gradiška and others – denied. But directly after the occupation of still remain in the centre of the Serbian pub- Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, a Quisling lic debate on the bloody past of the region. regime was established in Belgrade with Although the remembrance of the manifold the approval of Hitler – the Nedić regime, persecutions by the Ustasha regime was also which for all intents and purposes had the the subject of public discussions during the sympathy of the populace. On the other Tito period, dealing with the past was too hand, the Chetniks loyal to the king turn at centred by the Partisans on their own glorifi- first were opposed to the occupation forces, cation and not on an objective presentation but veered already in fall 1942 and saw their of history covering the whole context. greatest enemy in the multinational Par- The memory of the events within the tisans and in Tito. Afterwards, the Chetnik families and local communities did not troops lead by Draža Mihailović collabo- necessarily correspond to the official ver- rated with the occupation forces. sions. Because of this, the ground was ready For Serbian historian Dubravka for the substantial rehabilitation in Croa- Stojanović, a historical legend is being tia and Serbia of the nationalist positions, worked on in Serbia, in which the crimes of which had been promoted already prior to the Serbian Nedić regime, which collabo- the 1990s war by the Serb nationalist side. rated with the German National Socialists, The propagandist instrumentalisation of are downplayed, and the crimes of the roy- the memory of the persecution of Serbs alist Chetniks and their collaboration with in Croatia and Western Bosnia – with alto- the German occupation forces is relativ- gether greatly exaggerated casualty figures ized. The image of a nationalist anti-fascist (it has even been claimed that there were movement is supposed to be designed for 1.5 million victims) – was indeed essential the Chetniks. In Serbia, the Chetnik leader

"Herceg-Bosna, your time will come" - Photo taken in Mostar by Štefica Galić CC-BY-NC 2.0 68 changing narratives, changing histories historical revisionism

Draža Mihailović, sentenced to death in front of a court in Sarajevo in 1946, is already The commemorative culture being rehabilitated, with the filming of a remains pre-political. It became glorifying feature film. political in the youth and workers’ the case Mladen Stojanović movement in 2014 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which challenged Serbian historical revisionism becomes the political structures and the especially apparent – and relevant for our power of the ethno-nationalist film – with regard to the former Partisan parties, initially in Tuzla. The commander still popular in Serbia today, party offices of the Croat and the Mladen Stojanović from Prijedor in Western Bosnia. After Hitler’s invasion of the USSR Bosniak nationalist parties HDZ in June 1941, the doctor and Communist and SDA in Mostar were at- Mladen Stojanović was urging the work- tacked by an angry crowd. With ers in the ore mines of the region – Omar- its plenary assembly culture, di- ska, Tomašica, Ljubija – to strike and then rect democratic participation cre- to begin armed resistance. However, the German occupier considered ore mines ated in the cantons, and its fight essential to the war effort. Therefore, the against corruption, the movement resistance had to be broken with all military drew on the self-government force. The Partisans did succeed in continu- structure of the Partisans. How- ing to offer resistance, however, with their ever, it was literally washed away military forces far too weak, they could no by the rain and the major floods longer protect the over 40 000 civilians who had fled to the Kozara mountain – primarily during the spring of 2014. Serbs, but also Jews and Roma – from depor- tation to Jasenovac. by the Serb side in Prijedor. The rehabilita- Ustasha and Chetnik troops fought tion of Serb nationalist extremists as anti- together with the Germans against the Par- fascist resistance fighters is being pushed tisans. Various evidence exists thereof. The on in the whole Serb public. Serb Stojanović became the Partisan commander for the whole region of Western Bosnia. He was wounded in late March 1942 the historical revisionism of and murdered ten days later by a group of the nationalists Serbian Chetniks. In the endeavour of Serbian histori- Partisan monuments have largely been cal revisionists to depict the Chetniks as destroyed in the former Yugoslavia. In Croa- resistance fighters against the Germans tia, streets are being named after well-known and as anti-fascist, the historic image of supporters of the Ustasha regime in the Sec- the still popular war hero Stojanović had ond World War. On the whole, the role of the to be changed. The major media have been multi-national Partisans and the Socialist maintaining the "new line" for several years. Tito regime is considered in both states to Stojanović was murdered by Partisans, it is be an obstacle to "national liberation." The now claimed, Partisans who wore Chetnik Chetnik crimes are denied by nationalists uniforms, in order to belittle the Chetniks in in Serbia just like those of the Ustasha are the eyes of the populace. by Croatian nationalists. Moreover, the revi- This adventurous historical theory is sion of history aims to cover up the crimes being vigorously pushed by the authorities committed during the last war. Bosnian- of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Her- Croat war criminals, such as Jadranko Prlić, zegovina. Even a former Serb Partisan who tried in The Hague are glorified as national is over 90 years old, who had accused the heroes. It is no different on the Serb side in Chetniks of Stojanović’s murder in a private the case of war criminals Ratko Mladić and conversation, backpedalled when he was Radovan Karadžić. A comprehensive discus- supposed to repeat this in front of a cam- sion between the societies in the successor era. He was afraid that his pension might be states to former Yugoslavia only continues reduced and that his son might lose his job. to exist in civil society circles. The genera- The new interpretation of Stojanović’s death tion of critical and productive intellectuals has become the official account of history raised under Tito is slowly dying out, while historical revisionism changing narratives, changing histories 69

the majority of the generation already raised cafes that exist in some cities. Many peo- in the successor states no longer wishes to ple are frequenting the Partisan veteran’s deal with the overall context. The civil soci- meetings again. But this commemorative ety groups that had blossomed during and culture remains pre-political. It became after the wars of the 1990s have thinned out, political in the youth and workers’ move- funds from the EU and other Western coun- ment in 2014 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, tries have dried up. which challenged the political structures Additionally, the national elites have and the power of the ethno-nationalist par- succeeded in isolating these civil society ties, initially in Tuzla. The party offices of groups by portraying them as being con- the Croat and the Bosniak nationalist par- trolled from abroad or as traitors to their ties HDZ and SDA in Mostar were attacked country, such as Sonja Biserko and Nataša by an angry crowd. With its plenary assem- Kandić in Belgrade. Long before Hungary, bly culture, direct democratic participation the elites in former Yugoslavia have been created in the cantons, and its fight against trying to prevent the activities of the billion- corruption, the movement drew on the aire George Soros’s foundations, which have self-government structure of the Partisans. co-financed many civil-society and cultural However, it was literally washed away by the projects. At least several independent and rain and the major floods during the spring self-sustaining projects have developed, of 2014. Unfortunately, after the collapse of offering independent information and dis- this movement, only splinter groups remain cussions primarily on the internet. active. But at least other groups are being founded though, suddenly anti-fascist film nevertheless, resistance is festivals are emerging, suddenly hundreds growing of young people are demanding the solving of the murder of a young fellow citizen, The memory of the Tito regime has not com- as happened in May 2018 in Banja Luka. pletely faded among the population. Those Independent positions have not been com- who experienced the 1980s remember a rel- pletely forced out of public life in Bosnia atively well-functioning state with pensions and Herzegovina, Croatia, or Serbia. Inter- and medical insurance, with higher wages, linked in internet forums across national with a passport enabling one to travel any- borders, these people are taking not incon- where, open discussion in the media, the siderable risks however, in order to fight shared music, film and theatre culture. back against the ruling nationalist parties The nostalgia manifests itself not only and ideas. We wish to illustrate their by no in the renewed popularity of the culture means easy confrontation with nationalists of those times, also in the crowded Tito from all sides.

translated from German by Ivana Nevesinjac 70 changing narratives, changing histories collective glorification of individual guilt

collective glorification of individual guilt it is their fault, not ours

Zarije Seizović

in place of an introduction It appears that perception of col- The paper describes, analyses and explains lective guilt, a seemingly una- the unbearable Bosnian (and Balkan) ‘tradi- voidable destiny of the irrational- tion’, custom, habit and practice of glorifying ism of the Balkans will remain sentenced war criminals. Despite the fact in place for at least decades to that the International Criminal Tribunal for come. Why is that so? Are there the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has rendered a number of verdicts sentencing individuals any institutional or any other for war crimes, these individuals are objects mechanism/s that should be put of worship within their respective ethnic in place to heal the wounds and groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). It treat that contagious and danger- appears that perception of collective guilt, a ous ‘collective mental disease’? seemingly unavoidable destiny of the irra- tionalism of the Balkans will remain in place for at least decades to come. Why is that Herzegovina, the Office of the High Repre- so? Are there any institutional or any other sentative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) mechanism/s that should be put in place to as well as the US Embassy condemned the heal the wounds and treat that contagious glorification of the sentenced war crimi- and dangerous ‘collective mental disease’? nals in the NARS and expressed their disap- Let us explore a few recent examples that proval. match the title of this paper. On 22 June 2014, Dario Kordić, a Bosnian Croat, arrived in his home town of Busovača, Central Bosnia. Prior to coming to Busovača, factual and legal he landed at the Zagreb Airport where he was background greeted by a lively crowd of his friends and others believing him innocent of the crimes On 24 October 2017, the National Assem- for which he was sentenced and served two bly of the Republic of Srpska (NARS) gave thirds of a 25 year prison sentence. He had plaques of recognition to former politi- been found guilty for war crimes committed cians that were credited with the creation by the military force of the Croatian Defence of the Republic of Srpska. And there would Council (HVO), including crimes in the vil- be nothing to wonder about but for the fact lage of Ahmići, near the Central-Bosnian that those persons have been sentenced for town of Vitez. The welcome itself was not war crimes by the ICTY. Momčilo Krajišnik forbidden whatsoever, and therefore it was (27 years) and Biljana Plavšić (11 years) legal. There were a few hundred people wel- had served their sentences, while Radovan coming Kordić, while in Sveti Anto Church in Karadžić has so far been sentenced in the Busovača a prayer was held. Later on, Kordić Zarije Seizović first instance (40 years) inter alia for the addressed a group of friends and support- full professor, Faculty of Political Science, most severe war crime: genocide. The Dele- ers on a local football pitch and his speech Sarajevo gation of the European Union in Bosnia and was shot through with religious content. The collective glorification of individual guilt changing narratives, changing histories 71

welcome party was attended by Mr. Dragan not commit the crime/s, they did. Let us also Čović, at the time the speaker of the House shed some light on the arrest of the former of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of high-ranking military officers of the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina (currently a mem- Orašje that provoked vehement reactions in ber of the BH Presidency). There was also Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially in Ms. Borjana Krišto, at the time an MP in the neighbouring Republic of Croatia. On the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary 31 October 2016, on the order of the State Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Prosecutor’s Office, the State Investigation Mr. Marinko Čavara, at the time an MP in the and Protection Agency (SIPA) arrested 9 House of Representatives of the Federation persons in the area of Orašje, a town situ- Parliament, as well as other VIPs of the Croa- ated in Northern Bosnia. They were charged tian Democratic Union of BH (HDZ BiH). with war crimes committed against Serb On 22 April 2008, the Appeals Chamber victims in the town of Orašje and its sur- of the ICTY pronounced the retired Bos- rounding area between April 1992 and July nian Army (Armija RBiH) general Enver 1993. Namely, they were accused of having Hadžihasanović guilty and sentenced him to committed war crimes in their capacity as 3.5 years of imprisonment for crimes com- wardens in prison and detention facilities mitted in Central Bosnia against Croats and there. A specific curiosity was that one of the Serbs during 1993. A highly ranked officer arrested officers was an ex-deputy director of the Bosnian Army, Ibrahim Kubura, was of the SIPA. Following the arrest, the highest sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment. As political figures of the Republic of Croatia – to reactions caused by the verdicts, it is the Prime Minister, the President and some worth singling out the statement by Mir- of the Ministers – rather openly challenged sad Ćeman, at the time highly positioned the work of the highest judicial institu- member of the Party of Democratic Action tions of BH, claiming even that some of the (SDA), now holding the role of Chief Justice arrested were innocent. Despite the justified of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and fear caused by the fact, confirmed later, that Herzegovina, who said that the acquittal the military forces of the Republic of Croatia was expected. were involved in the war in the territory of In light of the cases described above, it BH and that its officers were in command is crystal clear that the main narrative in all of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), the cases was: our people are innocent; we did Croatian officials’ reactions constituted a

"Nationalism" by Henry Lawford, CC-BY-2.0 72 changing narratives, changing histories collective glorification of individual guilt

A crime is an individual act. A particular verdict pronouncing guilt and sending to jail a member of a certain ethno-religious community should under no circumstances be taken as verdict that holds guilty the entire ethnic or religious community the perpetrator belongs to. Peoples and/or communities cannot be perpetrators and cannot be held collectively responsible for a specific crime or crimes committed by its individual members.

sharp departure from diplomatic language a spark of hope will arise on the horizon and the conduct commonly used between witnessing that it could be possible to live State officials. On the other side, BH – a state together, have a decent life, free from bur- that is still considered a legal, political and den made out of tears, blood and savagery military arena for crossing of swords of the from the past. key players in the international community What is the pressing need in Bosnia and – gave an unconvincingly mild response, Herzegovina and the Balkans region and which was consistent with the major feature what can ordinary people achieve? What of Bosnian politics – the reaction of a coun- would be the international community’s try that has been politically and/or militar- role? It is Transitional justice – a new sci- ily usurped by its neighbouring countries entific discipline being taught and imple- for centuries. mented as a specific method and process of dealing with the past within the socie- is there a common future? ties encumbered by the heritage of heavy crimes and mass and systematic atroci- All things considered – these deviant events ties and human rights violations as well as produced no substantial consequences and violations of international humanitarian nothing is going to change either in Bos- law. It offers a variety of mechanisms and nian or the Balkans states’ politics. It seems comparative international experiences that there will always be an astonishing lack and achievements to heal the wounds and of responsibility, accountability, morality make life bearable for all those interested and honesty. Yet, there is an adequate way and involved. It is beyond question that war to tackle this unbearable malformation. crime trials before the ICTY and national Ordinary people and above all politicians at courts in the region, fact finding and truth all government levels should be aware that telling processes, as well as restitutions, a crime is an individual act contra legem. compensations and rehabilitations can They should also be aware that a particular guarantee the efficiency of this method. verdict pronouncing guilt and sending to It is also beyond any doubt that ethno- jail a member of a certain ethno-religious religious elites holding power do not want to community should under no circum- see transitional justice in full swing. Memo- stances be taken as verdict that holds guilty rialisation, commemorations and culture the entire ethnic or religious community of remembrance (as opposed to the culture the perpetrator belongs to. Peoples and/or of denial), peace and state-building and communities cannot be perpetrators and ‘enforcing democracy’, legal reform, vetting cannot be held collectively responsible for processes, NGO activities, a comprehensive a specific crime or crimes committed by its Transitional Justice Strategy in BiH will be individual members. There is no collective an additional tool and safeguard for fulfill- guilt – therefore identification of an ordi- ing tasks of transitional justice that can be nary citizen with the war criminal based labelled as ‘society recovery’. International on the mere fact that they both belong to community, i.e. its key players in BH and the same ethno-religious community is the region should raise funds and resources wrong, terribly wrong. Additionally, it is to back up said mechanisms, enabling wrong, terribly wrong to consider the sen- them to develop through different phases. tenced criminal innocent solely because of The mechanisms should focus on the soci- a shared ethnic and/or religious affiliation. ety and state and their relation to victims, If and when each individual becomes sin- justice, fact finding, apology, reconciliation cere and mature to a level that makes him and, eventually, if the conditions are ever able to differentiate between good and bad, met – mercy and forgiveness. fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword changing narratives, changing histories 73 fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword

Xhabir Memedi Deralla

Asked by a journalist if he found it right that the government organizes such a welcome for a person convicted of war crimes, the then Prime Minister Gruevski answered briefly and ironically: "It is alright". Jankulov- ska and Gruevski are now standing trials for corruption and many other serious criminal acts, on charges brought by the Special Public Prosecu- tor. No one has yet raised criminal charges against Ivanov, who is serving a second term as the country’s president after heavy vote rigging in 2014 (also a case with the Special Prosecutor), but his abuse of office is certainly publicly condemned as one of the causes of the Colourful Revo- lution in 2016. Gruevski’s regime may have lost in elections in 2016, but what truly brought it down was certainly the Colourful Revolution.

The image of unspeakable horrors of ethnic cleansing and war is still vivid in the no fair future for the memories the Balkan people. Hundreds of Balkan people thousands have scattered around the world after the Balkan wars of the 90s, mostly as Coldblooded murderers and criminal mani- migrants. Few of them have easily applied as acs likewise led hordes of outlaws, rap- "professionals" who offer their knowledge ists and slaughterers to an unprecedented and experience in torture and mass killings agony in the 90s. Their media servants to structures that may have "big and patri- helped them praise themselves as national otic" plans for their countries... Graves are heroes and liberators from the "others". still fresh, wounds are still open, and rage Now, many of them are respected members and grief are still pounding the minds of peo- of the communities that they divided with ple, making them easy prey for those who fire. Many of them are filthy rich and show want more blood and even more money, off as benefactors who build places of wor- manipulating those who were struck by trag- ship or occasionally provide money for kids edies to seek justice where justice is nonex- who need an urgent operation abroad, for istent. Behind the impeccable and flashy TV the health systems in the Balkan countries studios stands a bloodthirsty propaganda have been robbed and ruined. Many of machinery of the murderous criminals who them are part of the political landscape and neatly sowed the seeds of fear and hate in hold societies hostage to fear and hate – the the fabric of their programming. Mass mur- two edges of the same sword. der, pogroms, executions, ethnic cleansing, The Balkans were covered with blood Xhabir Memedi Deralla concentration camps... are now covered by for too long (one victim is too many) before Human rights activist and the thin refined silk of the new vocabulary of the peace accords were signed and immedi- multimedia artist, leader and co-founder of CIVIL rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech... ately shirked by those who signed them. The - Center for Freedom, Balkans at the end of the 2010s... international community was mainly "very Macedonia 74 changing narratives, changing histories fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword

worried" and "concerned" in the beginning, war dogs from entirely different parts of the after which they brought everyone to the world. They speak of peace, democracy and green table – to negotiate. And a few of them rule of law, but they use force, wiretapping got indicted by the ICTY. A nice story. Then and electoral fraud to remain in power. And, donors came and poured millions in for- most of all, they use fear and hate to divide eign currencies into the booming NGO and and rule, or gain power. And more power. media sectors, to reshape society and pro- And more money. mote the values of the developed democracies. Even nicer story. Success? Not such a praising the war criminals nice story. More than a decade in, we have the Bal- They sign peace accords and various inter- kans divided, but at peace. We have authori- national treaties, come under pressure of tarian and semi-authoritarian regimes the international criminal courts, but praise (Macedonia became liberated a year ago), war criminals as heroes at home. Let’s look who don’t look (too much) over the national at the Macedonian example, though it is far borders, but enjoy exploiting every possi- from being the only one. bility to make more money and grow their The Hague Justice Portal1 brings a pro- power within national borders. And Bosnia file of a war criminal sentenced to 12 years (BiH), the saddest example of how local in prison: "Johan Tarčulovski ordered, thugs, politicians and diplomats can blow planned and organised the crimes during things up on account of people who got the attack on the Albanian village of Ljubo- stuck between the alchemy of earning their ten on 12 August 2001 and personally took daily bread and avoiding the sword of fear part in the attack himself. [...] Tarčulovski and hate. Of course, Bosnia is the saddest, was charged with three counts of murder, not the only example. All in all, the Balkans wanton destruction of cities, towns or vil- or, more precisely, those who "did their best" lages, and cruel treatment as violations of to stay out of the EU, remain a powder keg. the laws or customs of war. According to And all this is so well-known, extensively the indictment, Tarčulovski, or members of elaborated and discussed at international, the police unit which he led, participated national (internationally sponsored), and in the murder of seven Albanian men, the political, cultural, scholar and coffee-house destruction of at least 14 Albanian houses, levels that it is sickening. It is sickening for it and the beating, humiliation, harassment seems to be endless, fruitless, hopeless, and and psychological abuse of over 100 villag- several other words ending with -less. And it ers in Ljuboten." is boring, nevertheless. This should be enough to make this Why is there (still) no fair future for the person and his commanders ashamed Balkan people? At times openly or through for the rest of their lives. Yet, thousands of subtle propaganda, corrupt politicians and euro (Macedonian tax-payers’ money) were run-of-the-mill intellectuals from the Bal- spent every month on legal protection for kans tend to explain that the Balkan tragedy his wife and the rest of his family and to is caused by some foreign conspiracy and allow them a luxurious life, for the entire viciously envious forces of the West. Those duration of this war criminal’s prison sen- are the same characters who enable the tence. And this was not the end. On return- penetration of organized crime and politics ing home in April 2013, the war criminal from Kremlin, Ankara and few other centres Tarčulovski was welcomed as a hero by the (no less destructive if not mentioned here). highest institutions in the country. The Western bureaucracies, on the other Back then, President Gjorge Ivanov hand, only managed to turn the Balkans couldn’t be more cynical and arrogant into the Achilles heel of Europe. Slow and when he said that Tarčulovski’s return to the disunited, national administrations within country will help the process of reconcilia- the EU have neither time nor will, to help tion. The Interior Minister Jankulovska said this troubled peninsula. Some would say she’s "proud to welcome a person who did – no one can help the Balkans, and prob- everything he could in the interest of the ably will be at least partly right. The humble Republic of Macedonia. He was welcomed author of these lines would say, well, if we as a national hero..." Asked by a journal- don’t help ourselves, no one can. ist if he found it right that the government However... Their (politicians’) mouths

are full of Euro-Atlantic integrations, but 1 http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6045 they strike deals with criminals and former (accessed august 2018) fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword changing narratives, changing histories 75

Victimization campaigns always preceded the wars. It was always "the other side" that was preparing for a horrid aggression. And, always, the aggressor was found behind "their own lines of defence" first – the treacherous dark forces who spoil the holiness of the blood and values. Those who thought and spoke of peace and dialogue were enemies... Those who were in ethnically mixed marriages or had "mixed blood" were enemies... At the same time, we saw the unspeakable crimes of all sorts of armies, paramilitaries and armed gangs bearing the names of their leaders, some animal or other, or the colour of their berets. Carefully and sometimes not so carefully observed by blue helmets and other international missions that are as expensive as they are inefficient. organizes such a welcome for a person plane. The media were racing to run stories convicted of war crimes, Prime Minister about the atmosphere of relief and happi- Gruevski answered briefly and ironically: ness upon Tarčulovski’s release. The then "It is alright". Jankulovska and Gruevski are pro-government private TV broadcasters now standing trials for corruption and many Sitel, Kanal 5, the radio and television pub- other serious criminal acts, on charges lic broadcasting service and so many others brought by the Special Public Prosecutor. No featured disgusting and pathetic features in one has yet raised criminal charges against their programs about the welcoming party Ivanov, who is serving a second term as the that Gruevski’s government had organized. country’s president after heavy vote rigging Macedonian ambassadors to Germany and in 2014 (also a case with the Special Pros- the Netherlands rushed to welcome him at ecutor), but his abuse of office is certainly the gates of the German prison, where this publicly condemned as one of the causes of murderer of civilians had served his prison the Colourful Revolution in 2016. Gruevski’s sentence. The main square of the country’s regime may have lost in elections in 2016, capital, already defaced by the infamous but what truly brought it down was certainly Skopje 2014 project, hosted a pompous the Colourful Revolution. and kitschy celebration, welcoming the Back to Johan Tarčulovski... He was sen- war criminal through the so-called Porta tenced by the ICTY to 12 years in prison for Macedonia (grotesquely pretending to be a his chief role in the Ljuboten massacre2... Triumphal Arch), where singers and actors This war criminal was given a lift from the tried to create a heroic and patriotic ambi- prison in Germany in the government’s air- ence with their trembling voices on the square filled with thousands of people. This 2 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/macedonia/ is still a vivid memory, depicting the regime,

"Special Prosecution Office", logo designed as a sign of support by Nebojša Gelevski-Bane, CC-BY 2.0 76 changing narratives, changing histories fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword

but also the political culture that has been suffocated societies with the stench of their nurtured through the years of the Balkan- wicked fantasies and uncontrolled criminal style political and moral decay. appetites. Meanwhile, the fate of the 12 ethnic Mac- Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Mac- edonians and 6 ethnic Albanians who went edonia... They all cried when their "heroic missing during the conflict in 2001 remains sons" got indicted by the Hague Tribunal unknown. The case of the construction (ICTY)3 and gave them majestic welcomes workers tortured by UCK militants remains upon their arrivals back home. That is not unsolved. Those and other cases were closed the way these societies can prosper. And, by the parliament’s vote for total amnesty of the treatment of war criminals is only one all cases of alleged war crimes committed detail of the whole story. by Ali Ahmeti’s "freedom fighters" in 2001. One will rightfully ask: Does that great word, Reconciliation, also not mean serving jus- when radicals pretend to be tice? However, Ahmeti has been a part of the victims... Gruevski’s corrupt and autocratic government for almost a decade, and has bought Contradicting voices resonate from differ- himself a first row ticket for the current one. ent corners of Balkan societies... Yes, he was a part of the government that High time for telling the truth... But how? has spent an unknown amount of money Don’t all people and groups in society have and resources to please war criminals and the right to express their own truth, no mat- to organize welcome celebrations for them. ter how wrong it is? ...Forget about manners, Tarčulovski’s history as a war criminal we need to call things their real names... No, was entirely forgotten in a political and do not let hard talk spoil the process, do not social sense, and he was VMRO-DPMNE’s aggravate the opponents and chase them candidate for mayor in one of Skopje’s away from the table... If democratic and municipalities at the local elections in 2017. progressive leaders, intellectuals, and insti- He didn’t win the elections, but the message tutions were more decisive, and if people was clear – the rightwing nationalist VMRO- were less silent, the evil deeds would have DPMNE carries on with its extreme nation- not taken place... alism and is comfortable with war criminals The centuries-long dilemma of every in its ranks. progressive group in any society: are We see other Balkan countries sinking decency and moderate talk ever going to in the vicious spiral of fear and hate, while prevail over the poisonous language of these criminal structures enjoy the wicked those who call to arms against "the others"? fruits of their inhuman and immoral ways, "Poor, unarmed people" claimed they contaminating entire societies. Long is the were victims and called for protection in shadow of the Balkan butchers... the beginning of the 1990s. All Balkan peo- People living in the Balkans witnessed ples were "victims", being driven away from how after the era of butchers like Milošević, their "eternal homes" by the bloodthirsty politicians, regardless of how democratic enemies. Those who were fellow citizens their declared post-war concepts were, in the former federation, became arch- have flirted with the ideas that had led to enemies overnight. They had to be extermi- bloodshed. Their networks had hidden nated in a "sacred war". Talking to them was war criminals as long as they could, mak- impossible, on the contrary, it was treated as ing international justice slow and ineffi- high treason. "Sacred" were the night raids cient. Meanwhile, despite their statements in which villages and towns were looted, and in favour of the international authorities, civilians robbed, raped and killed across the they worked hard on modelling societies in embattled zones, where "proud" nations which thugs and criminals became virtuous emerged after years of insane destruction and respected members who believe in god and killing. After sweeping some village and nurture "family values"; they’ve been clean of civilians, trucks were loaded with carefully and systematically developing TV sets, refrigerators, stoves and sound anti-Western sentiments during their unof- equipment. All that was holy prey for the ficial field campaigns, describing the Hague "heroes" who protected some "other, poor, Tribunal as an institution of evil enemies unarmed people" who were quite "heav- and conspirators who work for the "other enly" at the same time. side". By doing so, they managed to build their own little delinquent sultanates, and 3 http://www.icty.org/ fear and hate – the two edges of the same sword changing narratives, changing histories 77

Victimization campaigns always pre- The propaganda always claimed that ceded the wars. It was always "the other those who started and conducted atrocities side" that was preparing for a horrid aggres- were the actual victims. This kind of victimi- sion. And, always, the aggressor was found zation was the wicked tool for mobilization. behind "their own lines of defence" first – To spread fear and hate, fill their ranks with the treacherous dark forces who spoil the soldiers before they start with the slaughter. holiness of the blood and values. Those Just as the Nazis or the Soviets and other who thought and spoke of peace and dia- totalitarian regimes and religious fanat- logue were enemies... Those who were in ics tried to justify their hate and calls for ethnically mixed marriages or had "mixed murderous marches against political oppo- blood" were enemies... At the same time, nents, Jews, Roma, other ethnic minorities, we saw the unspeakable crimes of all sorts homosexuals, prostitutes, persons with dis- of armies, paramilitaries and armed gangs abilities... bearing the names of their leaders, some Wars were interrupted, but never ended. animal or other, or the colour of their berets. And now, we see them, "heroes and defend- Carefully and sometimes not so carefully ers of good old God and the blood and the observed by blue helmets and other inter- holy land and the ancient nation", abusing national missions that are as expensive as weak democracies and taking cover within they are inefficient. corrupt power structures and institutions, continuing with their dirty work. Integra- I spoke to my father on the phone at the tion, equality and peace are false brands beginning of 1992. I asked him to come concealing the true nature of the "Western over, to Macedonia, since it was quite clear demons". Their sponsors, whether they are what was going to happen to BiH. "No, my domestic, from across the border, or come son, don’t you worry about me. Everybody from Kremlin, Ankara or Qatar, use the legal loves me here" – he said. That was the last frameworks of the countries to "democrati- time we spoke. He was one of the first ci- cally" support the "victims". So, while politi- vilian victims in the town where he lived as cians calculate, and the media, intellectuals, a high school arts teacher. Killed in broad and NGOs continue being snobbishly nice daylight by armed "victims" who "defended" and polite, radicals are growing, while play- themselves from someone who threatened ing poor "victims". the "holiness" of their bloody rampage... It was 1999, when I told a Western journalist: "See you next war". It wasn’t the first time I said that to a foreign journalist. Unfortunately, I think it wasn’t the last time either.

Heinrich Böll Stiftung - Office for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania BiH – Čekaluša 42 71000 Sarajevo P +387-33-260 450 F +387-33-260 460 E [email protected] W www.ba.boell.org

Publication information Publisher Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Sarajevo On behalf of the publisher Marion Kraske Publication Date September 2018 Project coordination Alma Sukić Editor-in-chief Srđan Dvornik Language editor Hana Dvornik Cover Design Maja Ilić, Art4Smart Layout Triptih d.o.o. Sarajevo Print AMOS GRAF d.o.o., Sarajevo, 2018. Edition 500 copies The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily constitute the views and opinions of the publisher.

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