The Use of Strategies in Organized Crime Control

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Volume 61 | Issue 1 Article 10

1970 The seU of Strategies in Organized Crime Control Dwight C. Smith

Ralph F. Salerno

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Recommended Citation Dwight C. Smith, Ralph F. Salerno, The sU e of Strategies in Organized Crime Control, 61 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 101 (1970)

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THE USE OF STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL

DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR. AND RALPH F. SALERNO

Dwight C. Smith, Jr. is presently Director of Institutional Research at the State University of New York at Albany. From 1965 to 1967 h served as Assistant Deputy Director for Systems Planning & Research with the New York State Identification and Intelligence System. He has also served as a Visiting Associate Professor at the John Jay College of Criminal justice. Ralph F. Salerno has, since his retirement in 1967, been a consultant to several legislative and investigative groups. He had served for twenty years in the Central Investigations Bureau of the New York City Police Department investigating major racketeers and organized crime. In 1963 he was as- signed to work with the U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, and in 1966 was the only police office to serve as a consultant to the Task Force on Organized Crime of the President's Crime Com- mission and is coauthor with John Tompkins of Crime Confedraton.-EDiToR.

An earlier article in this journal described briefly each concerned with different aspects of the orga- some research efforts undertaken in New York nizational phenomenon-support this change of State from 1965 to 1967 for the purpose of de- focus and suggest different ways of approaching veloping a theoretical framework for organized the definition question that will contribute sub- crime control.' This project was initiated in con- stantially to the ultimate effectiveness of control junction with a series of conferences, held at efforts. Oyster Bay, Long Island, on combating organized A logical second step in the development of a crime. 2 The discussion at those conferences, as well theory of control would be to determine what as in the research project itself, began with an ef- society's-and particularly law enforcement's- fort to define organized crime in terms that would response should be to the phenomenon defined. contribute to effective control responses. Its ac- The lack of an adequate functional definition of tivities and outward appearance were described- organized crime has restricted this step con- the nature of its crimes and the style of its mem- siderably; but preliminary efforts suggested that bers. But it soon became apparent that descrip- the definition of alternative actions depended also tions of personal behavior and appearance, though on a better understanding of the tools available for ultimately important, were not the key to control. control activities. In particular, a better under- Those descriptions might help in the process of standing dearly was required of the nature and use identifying, apprehending, convicting, and punish- of information in organized crime control. Ac- ing individual members of organized crime, but cordingly, New York State undertook a study of would do little to restrict or contain the organiza- the manner in which national intelligence theory tion itself. Consequently, the focus shifted to the and practice might be modified to meet the cir- organization of organized crime, as a phenomenon cumstances of organized crime. Through that whose functions and internal rationale are more study, which was prepared for the Third Oyster significant to a theory of control than the indi- Bay Conference, three concepts were identified viduals through whom it operates. Subsequent that have a significant bearing upon potential con- studies by Cressey, Gardiner, and Schelling 3- trol measures: the concept of strategic intelligence as a tool for determining and reviewing long-range I See SnTm, Cooperative Action in Organized Crime the concept of a set of inter-jurisdic- Control, J. Cnme L., C. & P.S., December 1968. programs; 2 The first two conferences were described in Cox- tional mechanisms for exchanging information and BATING ORGANIZED CRmE, a Report of the 1965 Oyster coordinating policy and action among separate Bay Conferences on Combating OrganizedCrime (Albany, New York: Office of the Counsel to the Governor, April agencies of government; and the concept of an ac- 1966). tive, analytic intelligence capability at the heart of 2 CRssEy, The Functions and Structures of Criminal strategic intelligence operations.4 Syndicates; GARDINER, Wincanton: the Politics of Cor- ruption; ScHELIN G, Economic Analysis of Organized ing Office, 1967). Also CRassny THEz OF A NATION Crime: President's Commission on Law Enforcement (New York Harper & Row 1969). and Administration of Justice, TAsK FoRcE REPORT: 4 See A Theory of Organized Crime Control: A Pre- ORGAMZE CR (Washington: Government Print- liminary, Statement prepared by the technical staff 10 DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR. & RALPH F. SALERNO [Vol. 61

With this preliminary description of the nat ure nals in contrast to that applied to incidental or of organized crime and the basic intelligence tools street crime may be varied, of course, depending that would be required for an effective control pro- upon assessment of local conditions. The main gram, the question of response returned to the approach has been and continues to be the appre- * foreground. What can, and should, be done about hension of a person who is violating (or has vio- organized crime? The act of stating the question in lated) the law by means of penalties calculated to advance of action implies, of course, that the re- remove him from society and, using his confine- sponse is (and will be) a series of deliberate deci- ment as an example, to deter others from similar sions based upon prior investigation and analysis, activities. Investigating and prosecuting agencies not an automatic or mechanical reaction to a par- strive to put individual criminals in prison for the ticular stimulus. The respondent tries to under- most serious charge on which a case may be made. stand and define (particularly in terms of criminal Often for lack of sufficient court admissible evi- law) the organized crime problem; identifies an dence, law enforcement agencies must be content objective-such as successful prosecution for a with obtaining contempt or perjury indictments specific crime-to be achieved; and deploys re- via investigative commission or grand jury hear- sources to meet that objective. In other words, ings. existing methods of operation employ strategies, This traditional approach is certainly best suited however simple and rudimentary they may be. for coping with individual criminals. But in the The focus, then, is not upon defining a new tool but case of organized crime, such losses can be ab- upon understanding better (and thereby increasing sorbed; even higher attrition rates than are now its potency), and utilizing more effectively, an obtained by present efforts could probably be existing tool. sustained, because this is essentially an attrition of nonentities as far as organized crime is con- CURRENT STRATEGIES. cerned; it scarcely touches the "higher-ups." Ex- cept for the increased business overhead occasioned The purpose of any strategy is to provide a by the need to provide lawyers and maintain planning and action framework in which existing families during incarceration of their supporters knowledge and resources can be utilized for ef- and by consequent disruption of the daily ac- fective achievement of stated goals. The goal in tivities of affected members, the organization is not this instance is control of organized crime. In brief, harmed by attrition. Individual units continue to present strategies employed in law enforcement function unimpaired. Even important decisions activities can be summarized as being aimed pri- can continue to be rendered from within prison marily at the individuals in organized crime, rather walls. The strategy would have to be applied more than at the organization itself. That focus arises frequently and involve "successful" convictions from the fact that law enforcement's response to (i.e., convictions that will survive appeals to organized crime has, by and large, been merely an hikher courts-presently a discouragingly negative extension of its response to other, "unorganized" factor in application of the attrition strategy) and crime. But, as will be noted later, the peculiar sentences for much longer prison terms entailing nature of organized crime necessitates different more isolated confinement before it would be likely responses than those appropriate for ordinary to be at all effective. crime. In absolute terms, however, the potential ef- Current strategies fall mainly into four cate- fectiveness of attrition remains low. The primary gories: attrition, exposure, harassment, and the limitation can be illuminated by reference to the "Ostrich" practice. A brief description of each stimulus of the attrition strategy. The investiga- category follows. tion, arrest, and prosecution cycle that is char- 1. Attrition. The most commonly employed acteristic of current attrition policies is almost strategy is that of attrition, in which individual always a reaction to an overt act and the reaction suspects are apprehended and prosecuted for ten ds to be directed primarily at the perpetrator specific alleged crimes under due process of law. of the act. While this is desirable and necessary, The intensity of effort devoted to organized crimi- organized crime is managed and directed from one and consultants of the New York State Identification level of the organization while the actual crimes and Intelligence System, as a background paper for the are carried out by personnel within another level. Third Oyster Bay Conference (Albany, New York: NYSIIS, April 1966). Thus, reaction to an overt act currently results in STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL a majority of the available law enforcement re- torically associated. Finally, there is the harried sodrces being expended on the least valuable, most chief of police who is doing the best he can, despite easily replaced members of the organization. public apathy and the lack of sufficient resources, Moreover, since the levels of authority within the to combat organized criminals operating in his criminal organization are very thoroughly in- city. He may feel that he cannot afford to advertise sulated from one another, any attempt to expand his lack of success. Unfortunately, this practice, the prosecution to superiors and other members of whatever the reason for its use, operates in most the organization usually ends in failure. • instances against the public interest rather than 2. Exposure. A second strategy frequently em- against organized crime, since it effectively under- ployed is exposure. Congressional investigating mines nearly every obstacle that law enforcement committees, state investigating commissions, and might be able to raise. citizen crime commissions have been powerful means for focusing public attention on the prob- PROBLEMS IN DEINNG STRATEGrEs lem. Often tighter legislation and stricter applica- Current law enforcement measures directed tion of the attrition strategy is obtained as a by- against organized crime as an entity apart from product of such investigations. However, public incidental or predatory crime are largely ineffec- invariably subsides upon the conclusion of interest tive. The members of one work group at the Second an investigation. Without sustained application, or Oyster Bay Conference on Combating Organized utilization of related actions when appropriate, the Crime concluded that "The percentage of con- is ineffective in the long run. Indeed, in strategy victions in cases involving the leaders of organized some instances exposure may be self-defeating as a crime is so low as to cast some doubt upon the strategy. A notorious public reputation-in- value of further prosecutions." At the same time, creased by public attention-aids coercive ac- they noted that "where prosecution has been activities and creates fear in all who are affected by tive, organized crime... definitely may be cur- the subject. He may become so notorious that he tailed.... (Consequently, every) available legal never has to actually use threatening words; his means should be employed to continue prosecution victims all "think" to the same effect. in appropriate instances." I 3. Harassment. To the distress of many citizens The infiectiveness of present measures is due concerned with fair and equitable application of largely to the fact that law enforcement is con- law, a strategy of harassment has sometimes been fronted with a real dilemma in its choice of strat- employed. The strategy may use the technique of egies to deal with organized crime. By definition, frequent arrests for vagrancy or other relatively and by all available proof, its adversary is well charges; it has many other techniques. For minor organized. In contrast, law enforcement is con- general purposes, the strategy probably costs more strained by fragmented authority, procedural than it is worth in law enforcement resources, and limitations, and a conventional approach to law also produce undesirable public relation it may enforcement in which action is directed essentially side effects. Recent changes in the New York State against isolated individuals rather than the organi- Code have, in any event, eliminated many of Penal zation to which they belong. the pertinent offenses (other than indirect harass- It is apparent that the traditional law enforcement, as with traffic violations), such as vagrancy, ment approach of prosecuting individual criminals that might be used within that state. for specific crimes must not only be drastically 4. The Ostrich Practice. Another- practice-pri- improved but must be supplemented with new marily defensive or passive in outlook-is to ignore strategies and techniques that weaken the ef- organized crime and to stoutly maintain that it is fectiveuess of criminal organizations, while main- in a given jurisdiction. There are nonexistent taining a basic posture that is consistent with varied reasons for this practice. Most community existing procedural law. officials try to avoid bad pub- leaders and public But how well can new strategies be defined? At licity for their city; they want to remain con- the outset, several comments about "strategies" in vinced that organized crime is not a local problem. relation to organized crime may be pertinent. is offended. Then, too, the local sense of propriety First, there are several levels at which strategies Most people would like to believe that their com- may be identified. Indeed, the concept can be ap- munity is not an attractive market for the forms 5 of vice with which organized crime has been his- ComBAIn=G ORGA DzzCImE, op. ci., p. 40. DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR. & RALPH F. SALERNO [Vol. 61

plied simultaneously to a broad goal, such as re- utilized--as others have suggested in relation to duction in the volume of gambling activity in a international affairs'--through which "tolerable" community, and to a major segment of that plan, levels of organized crime activity and behavior such as the development of criteria for determining can be defined and monitored? Alternatively, where, when, and how to initiate continued sur- should the public focus be upon modifying present veillance of certain aspects of the suspected gain- legal sanctions on human behavior, or present re- bling operation. The multi-level nature of strat- strictions on corporate action, that lead to the egies need not be confusing in practice if they are frictions that nourish organized crime? How can dearly defined in terms of objective and context. the public be persuaded that the functions of Second, there is a wide range of strategies which organized crime are neither beneficial nor harm- can be combined in different measures for different less, so that its excursions into legitimate society circumstances. Some may relate directly to specific will be rejected or blocked at the outset? What- enforcement activity, such as a surveillance that is ever objective, or group of objectives, are chosen intended to lead to apprehension; some may be will dearly influence the kinds of strategies that concerned with intelligence collection or analysis as might be adopted. a prelude to enforcement action; some may be con- Sixth, the range of strategies available will be cerned with counter-measures that would deny governed by what is legal. For example, selective success to an organized crime activity without assassination might be a highly useful (and even directly suppressing it; some may involve re- appealing!) strategy in some instances, but it source development, such as the training of would not be legal. The same could be said for pro- specialized manpower for organized crime control. visions governing excessive detention, confessions, Even the simple listing of some categories of strat- admissibility of evidence, etc. If organized crimi- egies suggests their range and potential interrela- nals could be handled as enemies in time of war, tionships. rather than as citizens with the rights of due Third, every strategy depends upon available process, they might have been eliminated long ago. knowledge of organized crime. Such knowledge The privileges of citizenship, as exemplified by today is fragmentary (particularly in the light of "due process," are fumdamental to our form of the lack of mechanisms for sharing the data and government, however, and must be preserved even analyses that do exist); accordingly, the ability to if their enforcement appears to give undue pro- identify the best or optimum strategies is limited. tection to persons who have rejected the re- With proper nurture knowledge of organized crime sponsibilities of citizenship. will grow, however, and with it should come the Finally, the range of useful strategies will be development of greater sophistication in defining governed by the mechanisms available to support and utilizing strategies. In the foreseeable future, them-preliminary intelligence, subsequent action the parallel growth in understanding and capabil- mechanisms, lublic support, and- governmental ities will be dear. resistance to corruption. Strategies depend upon Fourth, strategies must be dynamic in order to the amount and level of available intelligence con- keep pace with a dynamic adversary. There will be cerning the object of their attention; the extent to a continuing process of defining, testing, evaluat- which strategies can be implemented will depend ing, and modifying. Thus, even if intelligence con- upon available directing and action agencies, cerning/organized crime were highly developed, public approval and support, and honest govern- specific strategies would be difficult to define in any ment in all areas concerned with criminal justice. final sense. These mechanisms are not automatically available Fifth, strategies can be defined meaningfully in to the dedicated opponent of organized crime. terms of public policies which are by no means clear They cannot be obtained by law enforcement act- today. What is society's ultimate objective con- ing solely on its own initiative and authority. In- cerning organized crime? Do we intend to eliminate deed, the manner in which they can be obtained it in the long run? (parenthetically, if it is the needs to be the subject of considerable, intensive objective, how realistic is it?) Or do we intend to analysis and strategic planning. control its activity, either at existing levels or at As these comments indicate, this paper cannot some earlier and lower level? If the real objective is 6 For example, ScxLiNG AND HALPEIN, STRATEGY some level of control rather than elimination, how AND Aius CONTROL (New York: Twentieth Century can mechanisms be identified, studied, and Fund, 1961). STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL possibly cover all, or even many, of the strategies breed internal dissention, to capitalize on existing that are pertinent to organized crime control. In dissention or to create distrust and suspicion. any case, the discussion that follows is within the b. Alienation: a wide variety of tactics devised context of an assumed definition of organized to demonstrate and emphasize the disadvantages crime that dearly needs further analysis and re- of membership in organized crime, and to alienate finement. Some strategies pertinent to law enforce- aspirant members from recruiters. ment can be described, however, to demonstrate c. Disruption: concentrated effort to disrupt or the general usefulness of the concept of "strategies" dislocate organized crime activities, thus reducing as an analytic and planning tool; and through the the return on investments or, alternatively, in- law enforcement situation, the potential signifi- creasing the cost of the enterprise. cance to organized crime control of high-order d. Penetration: efforts to buy information or intelligence resources and interjurisdictional informants, or to penetrate organized crime with coordination can be demonstrated. That demon- law enforcement representatives. stration may contribute to the larger problem of e. Blocking: the use of public education to obtaining adequate support mechanisms. assist concerned persons to confine or eliminate Organized crime derives its strength from an ef- further organized crime activities in their fields of fective organization much as trained infantry interest. gains its strength under stress from unit cohesion The utilization of any of these strategies must be and esprit de corps, and not from the mere addition based on a recognition that due process of law must of the firepower of its rifles. For both types of be observed at all times. In addition, considerable organizations, individuals including top leaders are study, preparation, and realignment of available expendable. The effects of constant attrition can be resources will be required. The legal aspects of new overcome, unless the rate of attrition is quite high. strategies and techniques must be carefully con- If, as is frequently conceded, the current active sidered to protect the civil liberties of those in- strategies of attrition, harassment, or exposure, volved and to ensure that all resulting law en- are not succeeding, if we cannot attack organized forcement activities remain within the law. When criminals as though they were a foreign enemy in aggressively used, however, in combination with the field, and if the underlying strength of organ- the attrition and exposure strategies, the new ized crime is to be found in its organization, then it strategies will place the initiative, the prerequisite seems evident that new strategies directed against to successful combat, in the hands of law enforce- the organization itself must be devised. These ment personnel. strategies must be designed to exploit the poten- The strategies suggested here are useful to the tial limitations to organization strength that extent that they illustrate the nature of a strategic arise from the peculiarities of individuals or groups approach to the problem of organized crime con- or that take advantage of weaknesses in their trol. But the utility of any strategy-and, to a organizational code. degree, th6 value of the strategic approach-de- As previously noted, the strategies and tech- pends upon its relationship to the real world. To niques currently in use will curtail organized crime test these relationships, three tactics can be ana- to some extent when they result in successful lyzed that are used in organized crime control- prosecution but to have any lasting or significant raids, intensive investigations, and cooperative effect, the rate at which criminals engaged in actions-through which the usefulness of new organized crime are brought to prosecution must be strategies may be illuminated. increased. Because it is not practical to multiply current efforts (and concurrently multiply their THE APPLICATION Or SriATEGIEs costs) in-order to increase the prosecution rate, new 1. The Raid. As noted above, anti-organizational strategies and techniques must be developed that strategies "must be designed to exploit the po- will produce higher attrition rates for the effort tential limitations to organization strength that expended or will disrupt the equilibrium of the arise from the peculiarities of individuals or organization suiciently to reduce its strength. groups .... 1"One such potential limitation lies in Five potential strategies may be suggested that the fact that organizations require some degree of would attack the organization of organized crime direction .which, in anything short of an absolute as well as its individual members: dictatorship, means occasional policy meetings of a. Subversion: tactical actions calculated to individuals (or their representatives) occupying DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR. & RALPH F. SALERNO [Vol. 61

power positions within the organization. In the associates) of the several Cosa Nostra groups in case of organized crime, with its basically de- the New York City metropolitan area would centralized structure of operations, the central have to meet for such discussions and a subse- function may be mediative or judicial in purpose quent decision that could be relayed to the rest If those meetings can be discovered and disrupted, of organized crime. If the decision had in fact the ability of the organization to function effec- already been made, surveillance might reveal tively may be impaired. The key to success is who had been selected for a new and more im- knowledge about an intended or existent meeting. portant role. It is apparent that organized crime requires such A group of people were identified who might meetings; two policy meetings that were discovered attend such a meeting, or whose activities would and disrupted under different circumstances were indicate the identity of a new leader already cho- the Apalachin meeting of November 14, 1957, and sen. Surveilances were established within the the La Stella restaurant meeting of September 22, limitations of manpower available; through one 1966. such surveillance the New York City Police De- The Apalachin meeting was discovered by then- partment was led to the La Stella Restaurant Sergeant Edgar Crosswell, of the New York State meeting. Police as part of his one-man intelligence effort to A significant difference between the two meetings watch the activities of Joseph Barbara, Sr., a local concerned their respective locations. Since the resident whom he knew to have an impressive Apalachin meeting took place on private property, criminal background, and whom he suspected of police action was limited. The two State troopers certain legal violations. Crosswell's immediate and two agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit of the interest on November 13th was a chance circum- Treasury Department who conducted the raid, stance of observing Joseph Barbara Jr. making had to defer all action until the attendees departed motel reservations for expected guests. The chance the private premises and reached a public road in nature of Crosswell's discovery is emphasized by the now infamous "hurried departure." Because of the state of law enforcement intelligence activities this technicality, only 63 persons were identified as within New York State at that time. The only being present, when later evidence indicated the law enforcement body within the state which had true number to be over 100. a functioning intelligence unit was the New York The Queens meeting, on the other hand, was in a City Police Department. The Federal Narcotics public restaurant where police action was not Bureau, in enforcing laws over which it had juris- similarly inhibited; and the detectives concerned diction, did gather some intelligence information knew the identity of many of the attendees, includ- in the State about known and suspected violators; ing some of those from out of town, before any ac- but the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not tion was taken. have similar jurisdiction in areas relating to Another difference related to legal.circumstances. organized crime until (primarily) new legislation In the Apalachin case, legal opinion was that there was enacted in 1961. were no clearcut grounds for arrest or detention Discovery of the La Stella meeting, on the other beyond routine requirements such as identification hand, followed years of gathering and analyzing of motor vehicle operators. Nine years later in the intelligence concerning the current organized crime La Stella case, consultations between the District scene, and field operations undertaken in response Attorney and police intelligence personnel con- to intelligence conclusions. It had been known for firmed that the 13 persons apprehended could be some time that Thomas Luchese (alias "Three- expected to have information of value to a grand Finger Brown") had been hospitalized for surgery iury investigating several crimes of violence; they to remove a brain tumor, and that his prognosis were thus ordered to be taken into custody as was not good. This knowledge, related to other material witnesses. knowledge concerning the procedures and methods Following the earlier meeting perhaps the most of the Cosa Nostra, led to the following analysis: effective action taken was by the State Commission It would be likely that Luchese's illness would of Investigation which subpoenaed a number of the lead to discussions about an interim leader and/ delegates and jailed four of the principals for con- or eventual successor. The leaders (or trusted tempt of court because of their refusal to answer questions. The contempt detentions were for as 7 See CxassEY. op. cif.,pp. 33-34. THEFT OF A NATION, p. 111. long as 16 months, longer "sentences" than they 19701 STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL

had obtained in cases where they had been indicted of the underlying assumption that the strategy has for murder. value, or to study whether gains other than or- The primary action of the federal government ganizational disruption are really more significant took the form of prosecution for conspiracy to ob- in this form of combat. The latter point is particu- struct justice. The attorney in charge of the case larly important, because there are serious questions had to identify all the law enforcement personnel to be asked about the value of any raid. It may be who had conducted interviews either on November that the real business of organized crime is more 14, 1957 or subsequently, when the conspirators decentralized and that the only significance of had returned to their own homes. Written reports apprehending a gathering of known and powerful had to be gathered where they could be found; in members of organized crime is a short burst of some jurisdictions there were no written reports of publicity, not a significant disruption in policy interviews because of an underestimation of the coordination. A more useful strategy might be to importance of the event. allow the meeting to occur and to attempt to obtain In Queens county in 1966, however, there was an and utilize as soon as possible the conclusions of the immediate coordinated gathering of personnel and meeting. For example, identifying a newly chosen reports which could be helpful to the District leader, and exposing that knowledge at an occasion Attorney. In addition to the New York City embarrassing to the new boss, might be an effective Police, the state police, F.B.I., Federal Narcotics way of undermining organized crime's confidence Bureau, U.S. Marshal's Office, U.S. Immigration, in its invulnerability. But if the publicity attendant and other agencies participated in a review of per- upon a raid undermines the confidence of sub- tinent information. District Attorneys' offices with ordinates in their leadership (an assumption that parallel interests and previous experience with the also would require careful exploration before it parties concerned also cooperated fully. could be accepted), a different and useful form of The final test in either case is its results. Twenty- disruption and organizational impairment might one attendees at the Apalachin meeting were tried have been served. in federal courts with 20 convicted; but the con- In any event, it is clear that current assessments victions were reversed in the appellate courts. In of strategy are limited by our lack of knowledge The La Stella case, since Grand Jury questioning concerning the organization and behavior of or- had to be limited to crimes in Queens County, the ganized crime and by the absence of tested evalua- five dinner guests from out of town were excused tion techniques for measuring the effect of a partic- after satisfying the Grand Jury that they had no ular strategy. direct knowledge of local crimes. Of the eight other 2. Intensive Investigation. A law enforcement diners, one was excused for health reasons; the officer was assaulted by a group of persons includ- remaining seven were indicted for criminal con- ing Carmine Lombardozzi, a known and powerful tempt of court for refusal to answer questions of the member of organized crime. The assault precipi- grand jury. In either case, then, has there yet been tated an intensive effort by the officer's agency to significant and lasting success in applying the apprehend and punish publicly the attackers, the Attrition strategy. But in terms of "increasing the objective being to discredit Lombardozz i among cost" of directing organized crime, it would appear his friends. Many members of Lomba rdozzi's that something was gained in terms of a Disruption "family" were detained for questioning; during strategy. Even that gain was limited, however, the course of the investigation an attempt was because the strategy has not been systematically made (and discovered) by the "family" to intimi- and continuously followed. The successful utiliza- date a principal witness. tion of intelligence data and analysis at several The investigation was conducted in a way that stages in the La Stella case indicates that the would emphasize the role of the initial assault, and strategy could be exploited if there were (a) con- Lombardozzi's part in it, in spurring the investiga- tinuing intelligence concerning organizational tion. No one in his family could miss the point that behavior on the part of organized crime, including it was Lombardozzi's "fault." This led, as intended, intelligence regarding its tactical adjustments to to disenchantment on the part of many of Lom- counter the strategy; (b) an interjurisdictional bardozzi's associates, and to his demotion within mechanism for coordinating the disruption of simi- the "family" because of all the attention, or lar policy meetings wherever they might occur; and "heat," that he had brought upon his fellows. (c) further research and analysis to test the validity Thus, Alienation and Subversion strategies em- DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR. & RALPH F. SALERNO [Vol. 61

ployed by law enforcement reached th6 point where known or otherwise unobtainable to the questioner. the target's value to his organization was seriously In unorganized crime the risk of revealing as much questioned. There were even discussions of violent, information as is elicited is seldom high, because punitive action that the organization might take the convicted defendant cannot immediately use against him. Without question, this resulted in what he may learn. But the member of organized disruption of his usual activities, as well as the crime has supporters and a continuing mechanism activities of others. He lost his usual aplomb and, available to pursue his cause for him. Unlike together with a loyal friend, fell into a behavior "unorganized" crime, the game is not called after pattern which became the basis for their being sent the first out. to prison for violating a parole given as part of a 3. Coordinated Actions. Although not in itself a suspended sentence for an eailier court conviction. strategy, coordination of effort as a strategic So far, the strategies appeared successful. They principle can be of great benefit. It can result in a were based upon sound intelligence and an appre- tremendous increase of manpower and other re- ciation of what would happen if sufficient pressure sources applied to a particular case without individ- and notoriety were brought to bear on a vulnerable, ual agency expenses rising unnecessarily. Con- or potentially vulnerable, member of organized versely, the lack of cooperation can lead to crime. interagency friction, expensive duplication of effort But then, the strategy backfired. In an effect, and, more significantly, the exposure of each the law enforcement agency had "told" organized separate project as the total amount of uncoordi- crime that assaulting a law enforcement officer was nated activity becomes visible. For example, two beyond the line of tolerable conduct. In the "tell- or three separate surveillances in a relatively quiet ing," the organized crime family came off second neighborhood are more likely to arouse suspicion best; but the law enforcement unit failed to con- concerning some surveillance (no matter how sider what counter-move organized -crime might many) than one, well conducted surveillance. made. The nature of the investigation-the persons Unfortunately, there are cases on record where interrogated and the questions asked-demon- more than one agency has been found to be con- strated to organized crime not only that one of its ducting a surveillance of the same person or event members had misbehaved but, more importantly, without any effort being made at coordination. A that there had been some previous penetration of joint effort between three agencies could lead to the organization. Someone on the inside had been savings of 50 % to 663 % of manpower, with each talking. The organized crime group realized that of the three agencies obtaining the same amount of their defensive structure needed mending, and they information through the use of two pieces of carbon responded by analyzing law enforcement's intelli- paper to type three copies of the same report. gence information. They noted which of their men There are some examples of useful cooperative were interviewed, how much information could be action. At the present time, for example, airport determined from the questions asked of them, etc. coverage is provided at Toronto and Montreal by Their analysis was successful: they identified a three-man teams representing the Royal Canadian person who had penetrated their ranks, and they Mounted Police, the Provincial (State) Police, and closed the gap by killing him. the local metropolitan police department. Their There may be several lessons to be learned from inquiries for cooperation on the American side of this experience, but certainly two of the most im- the border, however, have made it evident that portant ones are that increased use of sensitive similar coordinated and cooperative efforts seldom information requires delicate handling, and that exist in the United States. there is an absolute necessity to think beyond im- Another example of cooperative action may be mediate circumstances. What organized crime found in the raid, conducted on May 8, 1967, on a might learn about the extent of law enforcement restaurant meeting of organized crime personalities information must be kept to a minimum; and the (and others) in Buffalo, New York. In this case, chain of responses and counteractions that may the local police and the FBI jointly conducted the follow any situation must be recognized and antici- raid, with representatives of the State Police on pated. The lessons are similar to the ones already hand as observers. Since the action involved 23 law familiar to the district attorney or detective who enforcement officers, the opportunity to share may need to convince a witness, by skillful ques- manpower costs was a clear economic benefit to tioning, to admit to information previously un- each agency. STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL

Another real but seldom recognized return from of organized crime often are so much wider than the cooperative action may be its deterrent effect on jurisdiction of enforcement agencies .... -" 9 The corruption. Although it can be argued that a secu- answer-which cries for recognition-is coopera- rity risk is taken when two or morelaw enforcement tive action. agencies engage in joint planning and operations, it is equally true that cooperative action increases CONCLUSION: THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS the risk of exposure inherent in corruption. Law The preceding three examples of the enforcement is not alone in having some secrets it uses of strategy in organized wants to keep; the corrupter from organized crime crime control do not in any is equally uninterested in discovery. If two agencies sense cover the range of applications that would be possible in a well-planned engage in routine exchanges of information con- and executed control program. Nevertheless, cerning investigative actions, the chances are in- they say enough about the subject to creased of discovering the signs of corruption, such demonstrate how strategies and strategic concepts can as the suppression of data, the showing of "favorit- be used and how dependent they are upon ism," or a pattern of systematically ignoring or an adequate understanding of the intelligence failing to pursue signs of organized crime activity. process. Knowing that their efforts are being reviewed That process, as it applies to organized crime might help both units to maintain a standard of control, was described in the working paper noted integrity and objectivity; also, the routine ex- earlier in this article, prepared for the Third Oyster Bay Conference on change of information could help each unit to organized crime. For our pres- evaluate its own personnel. ent purpose it is sufficient to note that its over- riding requirement, as exemplified in the situations The latter point was demonstrated in the 1965 suspension of two vice squad detectives in Roches- presented here, is a constant ability and willingness ter, New York. The detectives had made a secret, to think. Although it may sound trite, it is dear unauthorized visit to the hangout of a local orga- that law enforcement has yet to discover the prac- nized crime figure. Their visit was observed by an tical limits of thinking--as the heart of intelligence FBI surveillance team; the Rochester police de- analysis and as a prelude to planning and action. partment learned of the visit when the FBI asked It is particularly dear that more attention must why it had not received the customary copy of the be given to anticipating the countermove in the vice squad report which detectives would have development of any specific action strategy. Or- prepared if their visit had been a legitimate one. ganized crime does not want to lose; it is flexible, and The case, which was explored extensively by the willing, in most instances, to adjust its activities to protect its State Investigations Commission,' illustrates the future. The "Raid" tactic discussed maxim that a person's standard of behavior can be earlier is perhaps a case in point. The Apalachin governed by whether he believes his actions will be meeting was attended by representatives of all of seen and reported. the major organized crime families that are under- Perhaps the most important value of cooperative stood to be represented on the "Board of Direc- action, however, is one which unfortunately can tors." Consequently, final policy decisions could be never be measured. To what extent is the possibil- made at that time. But at the La Stella meeting, ity of cooperative action precluded by the lack of only five families were represented. Where were opportunities or mechanisms for them? Without the others? There is no dear evidence, but it seems question, the potential for cooperative action has possible and likely that representatives of the other hardly been tapped; that untapped potential is a families met elsewhere and that some mechanism real loss to organized crime control. As suggested had been arranged to consolidate the views of the previously in this journal, "Some law enforcement two groups into a single policy position. This sug- representatives understand the problem of orga- gests a significant difference between 1957 and nized crime and have invested significant resources 1966 in the pattern of high-level meetings. The in control activities. But their effectiveness all too difference does not appear to be one of convenience, often is discouragingly small because the activities but rather an adjustment to a higher level of risk occasioned by increased unfavorable publicity and 8 State of New York Commission on Investigation, increased law Report of at Investigation of Certain Organized Crime enforcement activity in the decade Activities and Problems of Law Enforcenent in Roch- between the two meetings. ester, New York (New York: State Commission on In- vestigations, September 1966). 9 SMITH, op. cit. DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR. & RALPH F. SALERNO [VCol. 61

It is dear that these two patterns are not the system which can predict accurately the moves of only mechanisms through which national policy is organized crime, in advance; it then would be established within organized crime. The Apalachin possible to take preventive action in advance of meeting illustrates a traditional pattern followed the overt criminal activity. Space does not permit a by an organization not fearful of discovery or dis- full exploration of the values derived from antici- ruption (that such a feeling was justified may be pating and forestalling criminal action; its signifi- shown in the fact that the only previous occasion cance in "unorganized" crime cases is generally that a meeting was disrupted was in Cleveland in recognized, and parallels can be drawn from them. 1928, nearly thirty years before). Ray Martin has It is also clear that law enforcement should be suggested that another pattern was observed in concerned about "getting the most for its money." Miami Beach in 1962: This principle has several aspects, only one of "The Mafia anticipated that its conclave which is the need for cooperative actio as dis- would be under surveillance. The dons did not cussed above. Another aspect is the value of exten- intend to repeat the debacle at Apalachin, where sive use of intelligence analysis. The best invest- they were trapped in the home of Joseph Barbara ment an agency may make is to have the right long enough to be held up for embarrassing person sitting in an office and "just thinking." He national inspection. Their new tactics were sim- may not appear productive, in terms of arrests ple but ingenious. The crime delegates checked being made and beats being patrolled, but his in at different fashionable hotels and motels at efforts can increase substantially the productivity the height of the vacation season. They convened of the entire agency. A third aspect of this principle in no single hotel suite, conference room, or is that of protecting intelligence, in order to obtain auditorium. Instead, they met in pairs by pre- the most from it. The less organized crime knows arrangement. They gathered in cocktail lounges about the nature and content of law enforcement and coffee shops. They discussed their business intelligence, the less it can adjust its activities for quietly, came to fundamental understandings, self-protection The Lombardozzi incident demon- and parted. They reached agreements by chain- strates the point. If the law enforcement agency letter techniques. Even if tails had been attached concerned had attempted to determine what to every mobster and taps placed on every tele- organized crime might learn from the investigation, phone-which could not and did not happen--it would have been impossible for outsiders to learn precisely who said what to whom. The syndicate had business to attend to and it was determined to attend to it. .. ,10 E~C The conclusion that policy communications in organized crime are responsive to fear of discovery is, of course, tentative; it rests on very slim evidence. But there is enough surface logic to suggest that someone should be studying the patterns of FIGURE 1 communication in organized crime more inten- sively, in order to determine (a) what further pattern shifts.might occur; (b) how those shifts would be tracked; and (c) what is the most effective way to disrupt the establishment of high-level policy--i.e., what strategy should be followed in a dynamic environment. In addition, there is room for greater law enforcement appreciation for anticipating and pre- venting organized crime activity. Current practice is often to react to an accomplished criminal act or a continuing criminal situation, such as a gambling joint. The ultimate aim must be to achieve a ff] 10MARim, REVOLT ix T= MArIA (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1963), pp. 222-223. FIGURE 2 STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL and had taken greater efforts to camouflage the been attempted, more and better intelligence infor- role and identity of its informant, the final conse- mation has resulted because the analysis has moved quence of his exposure might have been avoided. from the central target "A" outward along lines A fourth aspect of this principle of economy which clearly led to "B" and "C" and "". From concerns the intelligence process itself. At the them, additional lines have been developed to other present time targets for intelligence investigation satellites, with perhaps a return flow from some of are selected on an uncoordinated, or random, basis. them to "A". With this approach, more targets are Manpower is directed at targets 'B" and- "C" and covered, the development of investigations is more "D". When information is gathered and analyzed orderly and better patterns develop: in sum, an revealing that the three targets are connected to intelligence operation has been created which can "A", the result is considered an effective intelli- be given high marks for productivity and perform- gence product (fig. 1). ance. But note that the flow of information is from the This discussion of the uses of strategy in or- three to the one. A better way of linking associates, ganized crime control can be summarized by noting interests, and relationships would be a "radical" its emphasis on sophisticated planning for develop- system, which would produce a greater yield, with ment of resources, based upon a broad understand- less usage of manpower and in a shorter period of ing of the intentions and capabilitiesof the adversary. time (fig. 2). He is organized, dynamic, and self-perpetuating; in In this instance, the prior focus is on predicting response, our government strategies must be where information is likely to cross, and in which flexible, sustained and grounded in effective intelli- directions it may move. Where this approach has gence operations.