East Asian Security Issues: a Summary Review

ABSTRACTS 267

East Asian Security Issues: A Summary Review

Kwan-Chi Oh

The objective of the paper is to identify emerging security concerns and anxiety in the post-Cold War era in the Asia-Pacific region. Based upon our clear understanding of these factors, we can devise ways to cope with these new security issues. There are at least five reasons for security anxiety: (1) a continuing drawdown of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the advent of economic blocs; (3) the fast rise of China as a future superpower; (4) uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan as a potential superpower; and (5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. The anxiety takes definite forms: misgivings about possible new conflict on the Korean peninsula; the jeopardy of nuclear proliferation; apprehensions about the emerging regional security order, if any; insecurity about the regional economic and trading system; and uneasiness over emerging nonconventional security issues. Because of divergent national interests of major powers in East Asia, it is very unlikely that a stable and cooperative regional security order will emerge unless collective and concerted efforts are made by all countries of the region. In light of the necessity of maintaining a stable security environment congenial to steady economic growth, initiatives must be taken to form a subregional security dialogue in Northeast Asia and then evolve it into a fully institutionalized security arrangement. In Southeast Asia, ARF must be enhanced and institutionalized. These two subregional security arrangements can eventually constitute a region-wide security cooperative regime which may evolve from APEC. KWAN-CHI OH 81

East Asian Security Issues: A Summary Review

Kwan-Chi Oh

It is paradoxical that Northeast Asian countries, and to a lesser degree Southeast Asian countries, find themselves confronted with a world totally different from the Cold War period. This strange world, in which anxiety rather than certainty and composure is the rule, is not what they expected when the Cold War ended. While the Cold War was being waged, there were no uncertainties about the nature of threats. The identity of both allies and adversaries, the inherent possibility of conflict escalation, and security arrangements were clear to all. The end of the bipolar superpower confrontation, however, fundamentally altered the security environment and made existing security policies and strategies incon- gruous with reality. As Soviet expansionism ceased to exist, a multitude of unexpected security problems, previously suppressed or unknown, began to emerge. Since the existing security configuration was not designed to address the more complicated, ambiguous and fluid security problems, it is no wonder that countries in the Asia- Pacific region are perplexed with the changed security environment. Asia is groping for a new security arrangement congruent with the new situation. This is particularly so in Northeast Asia where an acute East-West confrontation originated with the outbreak of the Korean War. The problem is exacerbated by the presence of two major regional powers, Japan and China, who have incompatible ideologies and policy orientations, and who compete with each other for regional influence. As the reduction of the US military posture in the region is 82 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS perceived to create a power vacuum, these two regional powers are expected to play a greater regional role for different reasons. China, in spite of its proclaimed “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” is suspected of pursuing expansionism, sometimes overtly and in other cases covertly, by flexing its military muscle. Sharing the same values with North Korea, China is determined to prop up the North Korean regime at the expense of the international community’s confidence. As is succinctly demonstrated by extensive debates on its future role and its return to a “normal state,” Japan does not seem to have settled upon its future regional role in light of the changed strategic environment. The problem with Japan is that much yet remains for it to win confidence from countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, sooner or later, has to formulate its long-term policy toward China as an integral element of its regional security arrangement. The uncertainty surrounding future relations between Japan and China will contribute to and become major sources of the region’s security concerns. Another distinct feature of East Asia is that it is replete with territorial disputes between major regional powers and smaller countries. What makes the region unstable is the fact that these territorial disputes could easily lead to enmity, if not open hostilities, under the new security environment. The unsettled “Northern Territories” issue between Japan and Russia has effectively barred them from not only improving political relations but also advancing economic cooperation. Thus, unless the issue is resolved to both nations’ satisfaction, there is only a remote possibility the two countries will closely cooperate in building confidence and peacefully resolving regional issues. The dispute on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands between Japan and China is another potential source of regional instability. China seems to have decided not to escalate the issue, though it has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the islands. China’s underlying calculation is quite simple: why should it antagonize Japan when Japanese capital and technology are badly needed for its ambitious economic development? Besides, the much- publicized disputes over the Spratly Islands and several other border disputes have dragged on for years, mainly along the Chinese border. Needless to say, these territorial and border disputes, unless KWAN-CHI OH 83 peacefully resolved, will ferment distrust and enmity, lead to open hostilities, and undermine the stability of the region.

Causes for Security Anxiety

If anxiety and uncertainty characterize East Asia in the post-Cold War world, what causes this? There may be a multitude of variables or factors effecting anxiety and uncertainty, some of which may have originated from past historical interactions. At the risk of oversimplification, however, it can be argued that the following five primary variables or strategic developments have caused the anxiety: (I) a continuing drawdown of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the advent of economic blocs, particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); (3) the rapid rise of China as a future superpower; (4) uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan as a potential superpower; and (5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Of the above five variables, no doubt the overriding one is the countries’ perception of a continuing reduction of US military posture in the Asia-Pacific region.’ Thus, deep in their anxiety lies these countries’ perception that the United States will not sustain its present level of political, economic and security engagements within East Asia, This is the case despite the US government’s repeated assurances of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific which has been substantiated by an ample US military presence.’ The first- phase force drawdown from South Korea, Japan and the Philippines for the period 1990 to 1992 (as prescribed by the Nunn-Warner report) was construed as the onset of US military disengagement in the region. This action was painstakingly explained on the grounds of the significantly increased ability of Asian allies in their own defense. No doubt, the United States planned meticulously and acted with prudence. In South Korea, for example, the US planned to retain a

1 Kyung-won Kim, “Korea-US Relationship in Post-Cold War World,” Karetr Focus (April 1994), p. 10.

2 The US Department of Defense, A Strntegic Franiewwrk for the Asiari Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, July 1992, p. 14. 84 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS ground and air presence to deter aggression from North Korea, while US forces would shift from a leading to a supporting role within the coalition. The US made its position clear by proclaiming the transition of South Korea to the leading role in its own defense as an essential element of US long-term strategy. The US also pledged to continue to assist South Korea’s military in force improvement. Further, coalition structures and capabilities will be adjusted to match the strategy through training. Combined exercises such as Team Spirit, among others, and certain capabilities unaffordable and unattainable over the short and middle term such as strategic and operational intelligence, strategic and tactical air power, naval support and selected ground combat capabilities, will continue to be provided. The US has further envisioned that a US force presence would continue as long as the Korean people and government want it and threats to peace and stability remain.3 In November 199 1, the US decided to postpone the planned phase I1 troop reductions in South Korea because of the danger and uncertainty posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Should reductions have been undertaken as planned, the US combat posture in South Korea would be a composite force of one mechanized and one combat aviation brigade, and one tactical fighter wing-roughly one-third of the strength as compared to the beginning of the force adjustment. It was a timely decision which undoubtedly demonstrated the credibility of US policy to countries in the region who had apprehensively been watching to see if the US would live up to its promises. This was particularly so because in July 199 1, the US Air Force abandoned Clark Air Base in the Philippines, a valuable regional logistics hub which suffered extensive damage from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Trust in US commitments was, however, undermined by a sequence of occurrences thereafter. Right after the departure from Clark Air Base, in late December 1991, the US-Philippines negotiations on the possibility of an extended withdrawal agreement ended abruptly. The US was notified by the Philippine government to withdraw all forces from Subic Naval Base and Cubi Point Naval

3 Ibid., p. 3 I. KWAN-CHI OH 85

Air Station by the end of 1992. Because of the indispensable geostrategic value of Subic and Cubi Point facilities for US naval operations in the Asia-Pacific region, countries in East Asia took the untimely closure of the bases, though apparently decided by the Philippines, as another US-planned measure to disengage from or to reduce its military profile in the region. As the region’s doubts about the US military posture to maintain political and security engagements in the Asia-Pacific region mounted, so did doubts about US will to engage in the region. Countries in the region appear to be frustrated by US indecisiveness in dealing with Serbia; instead of taking a resolute step against it, the US looked on with folded arms. Then, how can the region be confident of US will to engage in regional affairs when American lives and resources are at risk? As if responding to the region’s concern, on February 27, 1995, the US Department of Defense released the East Asia Strategy Report which assures that stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is a matter of vital American national interest. Hence, the US will maintain a force structure of 100,000 forward-deployed personnel in the region. The US reassurance will certainly help allay the region’s apprehension, but the problem is whether or not US security policy will be consistent and robust enough not to waver over disputes about trade practices, burden sharing, and other international affairs which can be resolved only by arduous neg0tiations.l The often-cited extraordinary economic dynamism of the region cannot be sustained without the huge absorption capability of the American market and an open global trading system led by the US and upheld by a US military presence.s The conclusion of NAFTA was apprehensively perceived by the region as a first step taken by the US to form a regional bloc to effectively cut off North America from competition from East Asian countries. Thus, it bodes ill for the future economic growth of the region. The immediate shock of NAFTA on the region was particularly telling in light of the fact that

4 The US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy far the East Asia- Ptrcifit. Region, February 27, 1995.

5 Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States in East Asia: Holding the Ring,”AdeIphi Puper, No. 275 (March 1993). p. 69. 86 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS no state was prepared to provide the region a fungible market in place of America’s. The rather devastating impact of NAFTA was somewhat relieved by the Clinton administration’s policy to concurrently pursue a “New Pacific Community” that might be constructed around an organization devoted to the economic and security concerns of the region. A strong candidate for the organization appears to be the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. But APEC, for the foreseeable future, is not expected to provide either collective security or an environment for significant economic cooperation.” Almost everybody seems to feel optimistic about China’s economic future, which is not, in fact, groundless in light of its remarkable past performance. Annual growth rates averaged over nine percent in the 1980s and thereby doubled its GNP during the first decade of reform. Furthermore, as the Chinese economy rapidly integrates with the world economy, the economic interdependence between China and other open economies has also been deepened. Yet in spite of all the good news, the region cannot dispel the suspicion that an economically powerful but politically authoritarian China may not be at peace with its neighbors.’ As a power vacuum, genuine or imagined, concomitant with US adjustment of military posture in the Asia-Pacific region develops, questions have arisen both within and outside Japan. How will Japan react to the changed circumstances and reorient its political, economic and security roles? Will Japan continue to uphold the US- Japan security treaty even if the Russian threat is diminished? Japan has encouraged regional security thinking and was a moving force behind the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) post- ministerial dealing with regional security issues. Furthermore, it was Japan who painstakingly tried to persuade ASEAN to recognize that a US military presence is vital to their security. But what if the US has to reduce its military profile in the region because of domestic

6 James A. Gregor, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy in East Asia,” Globti/ Affairs (Fall I993), p. 66.

7 Melvin Gurtov, “The Future of’ China’s Rise,” Asirin Perspective, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 1994). p. 110. KWAN-CHI OH 87 politics? Will Japan take over the security role hitherto played by the US? Thus, uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan give rise to the anxiety of the region. Needlessly to say, every country in the Asia-Pacific region fully understands the seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, which may trigger eventual nuclear proliferation in the region and fundamentally alter the regional security equation. The dilemma is that the region lacks effective measures to induce or force North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program. Thus, even if a regional approach for dealing with North Korea’s fixation on nuclear weapons seems to be desirable, no corporate movement has taken place. China was expected to play a key role in dissuading North Korea from holding fast to its nuclear weapons development program, but it has disappointed advocates of nonproliferation by not exercising economic and political leverage. China appears to be erroneously calculating that benefits of keeping a pliable North Korean regime outweigh the expected cost of a nuclearized North Korea. Furthermore, China is suspected of skillfully taking advantage of the North Korean nuclear problem in negotiating with the US, Japan and Korea. China’s frequent abstention from voting on North Korea’s nuclear issue at the United Nations and the IAEA seems to clearly signify this. On October 2 1, 1994, after many complications, the US and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework in Geneva to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.x Besides setting a bad precedent of rewarding a nation in violation of international laws, the accord exempts North Korea from some of the obligations of the FAEA safeguards agreement-namely, challenge inspections of suspected facilities for at least another five years. This signifies that North Korea will not only be immune from past noncompliance and possible violation of the safeguards agreement by extracting weapon- grade plutonium, but also has been given another five years to hold the plutonium or perfect a nuclear weapon. Notwithstanding the conclusion of the accord between the US and North Korea, we have to wait at least another five years to see whether or not the nuclear

8 Korerr Tirnes, October 22, 1994 88 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS issue can be completely resolved. Furthermore, in light of North Korea’s past record of noncompliance, it is open to doubt whether North Korea will faithfully live up to the Geneva framework agreement.

Security Concerns

The five primary variables discussed above seem to generate the anxiety in East Asia. The anxiety caused by these variables takes on more definite forms: misgivings about possible new conflict on the Korean peninsula; the jeopardy of nuclear proliferation; apprehension about the emerging regional security order; insecurity about the regional economic and trading systems; and uneasiness over the emerging nonconventional security issues. The nonconventional security issues encompass territorial disputes, the security of sealanes, drug-trafficking, environmental degradation, and the development of oceanic and seabed resources among others.

Potential for New Conflict on the Korean Peninsula

Renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula would completely disrupt the fragile regional order and deprive the region of any chance to deliberate on confidence- and security-building arrangements. No one in the region will benefit by the new conflict except North Korea, the only potential provoker. China will suffer most as its whole modernization programs are at stake. Open hostilities on the Korean peninsula will certainly make the business environment less favorable to foreigners and increase the risk of their investment in China disproportionately. Since China is practically the only ally of North Korea, Beijing could be forced to get involved in the war. If China supports North Korea by taking political measures in the international arena, supplying war materiel, by sending an army of volunteers, an array of economic sanctions will necessarily be imposed on China. As a consequence, foreigners doing business with China will be forced to withdraw their investments from China. Since the Chinese communist regime can continue to claim its legitimacy only with rapid improvement of the standard of living of KWAN-CHI OH 89 its people In this age of market democracy, China may have a strong disincentive to get involved in a war provokedby North Korea. If China, to minimize the damage to its economy caused by the conflict, refrains from taking sides with North Korea, then relations between Beijing and Pyongyang will turn sour and could eventually be broken. This is not what China wants either. In the already dwindled socialist camp, China badly needs solidarity between the remaining communist countries to legitimize upholding communism as an official ideology. All other countries in the region will also suffer a loss, large or small, from a renewed war, especially South Korea and the US. Therefore, peace and stability on the Korean peninsula benefits every member in the region. Nevertheless, there is danger of a renewed war on the Korean peninsula provoked by North Korea. Chances of open hostilities increase as the North Korean regime realizes that a more favorable and feasible way out of a multitude of crises could be unification by force on Pyongyang’s terms. Evidence indicates that North Korea is beleaguered with manifold ideological, economic and diplomatic crises as well as the more fundamental crises of its identity and legitimacy. In the process of political development, an identity crisis occurs when a nation finds that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physical and psychological definitions of its collective self are no longer acceptable under new historic condition^.^ This is precisely the case for North Korea because the Soviet military government after World War I1 rooted out the then prevailing social institutions of Korea’s traditional society and replaced them with socialist ones quite alien to the people. The North Korean people underwent an unprecedented social mobilization and were driven to a fratricidal war by Kim I1 Sung, a Soviet protCgC who was installed as the head of the North Korean regime by the Kremlin. All this adds up to the fact that North Korea’s identity problem could be suppressed by its intensive programs of political socialization only to recur when the

9 Lucian W. Pye, “Identity and the Political Culture,” in Leonard Binder et al., Crises und Sequences irz Political Develqment (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 110. 90 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS regime’s capacity for social control deteriorates. This occurred when communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed. Confronted with the same danger, North Korea launched an extensive propaganda offensive to persuade people to safeguard its socialist system.“’ This implies that North Korea perceived itself to be in an identity as well as ideological crisis which could trigger revolutionary transformation of the society. The North Korean regime claims that the legitimacy of its political power is derived from democratic political processes. This is nothing but a pure falsehood. Contrary to its claim, the regime tried to legitimize its power by: Kim I1 Sung’s armed struggle against imperialist Japan to win Korea’s independence; the great achievements of the regime under Kim’s guidance since 1945; and the indispensability of Kim’s leadership to build a communist utopia. These three foundations were extensively fabricated as shown by the personality cult for Kim I1 Sung. Consequently, they can hardly be maintained once the society is opened. While Kim I1 Sung was alive, the North Korean regime tried to legitimize Kim Jong 11’s succession to power by first arguing that he would be the only candidate who could insure an undistorted continuity of the revolution to realize a communist society started by Kim I1 Sung. The regime accordingly launched, a personality cult campaign for Kim Jong I1 concurrently with a gradual transfer of power. Nevertheless, the new North Korean leadership did not seem confident it could convince its people of the legitimacy of the power succession and, consequently, after the death of Kim I1 Sung the leadership borrowed the will of the deceased to further justify the junior Kim’s succession to power.I2 All of this signifies that the legitimacy of Kim Jong 11’s succession to power has been derived from his father. Evidence seems to indicate that North Korea is beleaguered with economic difficulties. For the past five consecutive years (1990 to 1994) the economy was estimated to record average annual growth

10 Typical of this was Kim Jong 11’s address, “Our Own Socialism Centered on People Is Bound to Win a Victory,” delivered to the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party on May’ 27, 1991.

11 Hankook Ilbo, September 1994. KWAN-CHI OH 91 rates of minus 5 percent. Many factors contributed to this poor performance: the unfavorable weather; the loss of sources of cheap energy and capital goods; dwindled foreign trade with Russia, other CIS states, East European countries, and China; the inefficiency of its economic system; and excessive military expenditures. The economic retrogression not only brought about an ever-falling standard of living, but also enlarged the feeling of a relative deprivation in view of South Korean material life. Since this is diametrically opposite to what was promised by the regime, North Korea’s economic crises connote strong political implications. The end of an ideological confrontation and subsequent spread of market democracy, and the pursuit of economic interests as an overriding trend of the world has rapidly deprived North Korea of its diplomatic base. It is not difficult to appreciate North Korea’s diplomatic dilemma simply by noting the demise of the Soviet Union. This was a complete loss of its ideological foundation, an ally, a source of capital, technology, cheap energy and modern weapons, and the principal foreign market for its exports. North Korea used to maintain some influence over the Third World until the collapse of the former Soviet Union. It completely lost its influence in the post- Cold War era when their dominant interests were economic rather than ideological. Even if China established formal diplomatic relations with South Korea, that it will support North Korea without reservation on any issue cannot be taken for granted. In brief, North Korea is encountering a diplomatic crisis. If North Korea’s crises are compounded by the fundamental contradictions of its socialist system, they will certainly undermine its social system and bring about a radical social transformation as amply attested by East European countries. This will also happen in North Korea because the totalitarian dictatorship has created intrinsic contradictions. The most important of these contradictions are: between the totalitarian utopian or eschatological visions, in the name of which Kim I1 Sung had legitimized himself, and the poor performance of the regime; between the participatory democratic and the totalitarian components of the legitimization of the regime; between the high level of social mobilization effected by the regime and the attempts to totally control all the mobilized groups; between 92 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS the need for educated elites required by modernization and the attempts to control flow of information; and between a shift in generations and the refusal to change.’*These systemic contradictions have gradually alienated the people from the regime and created a cynicism-ruled atmosphere in the society. The synergism of the crises and the contradictions of the totalitarian dictatorship of North Korea will generate powerful social forces which may threaten the very survival of the regime. Kim Jong- il may still feel confident that potentially threatening forces can be restrained if the regime can keep society from being opened to the outside world, particularly to South Korea. He also appears to fully appreciate that if North Korean society is exposed to South Korea, the synergistic effects of crises and contradiction will be so explosive as to cause the collapse of the regime. An opened North Korean society will quickly and thoroughly be penetrated by South Korea, as was observed in East Germany, further deepening the manifold crises and making the contradictions even more acute. As was pointed out, the legitimacy of the North Korean regime relied solely upon the charisma of Kim I1 Sung, which has, in turn, been built upon his exaggerated independence movement during the 1930s and 1940s against imperialist Japan.” Throwing open North Korean society to the outside world will certainly disclose the fabrication of Kim’s achievements and lead to the disenchantment of the people. In light of an anticipated fatal blow to the regime that would result from opening the system, policy options for the North Korean regime are quite limited. Even the Chinese model of economic development can hardly be an option since it will certainly create channels for external information. On the same grounds, the regime is apprehensive of prospects for peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea as proved by its outright refusal to exchange letters and

~ 12 S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Breakdown of Communist Regimes and the Vicissitudes of Modernity,” Daedulus (Spring 1992), pp. 28-29. The second and third contradictions are from Eisenstadt.

13 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim I1 Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 60. Kim even claimed that he returned to Korea in 1945 triumphantly waging a joint operation of his revolutionary army with the Soviet forces to defeat the fleeing Japanese imperialist army. KWAN-CHI OH 93 visits among families separated in the North and the South. It should be stressed that North Korea’s phobia against opening its society is derived from its cognizance that synergistic effects of the regime’s manifold crises and contradictions will be so explosive as to break down the system. This would be particularly so because South Korea, a nation of the same people, but under a different social system, furnishes an authentic frame of reference and a source of truth to the North Korean people. No state can completely control information flows. There is no exception even in the case of North Korea: Korean-Chinese visitors from neighboring China carry information about South Korea to their relatives in North Korea. Information about South Korea also flows in through foreign visitors, firms, travelers abroad, students returning from studying abroad, foreign envoys, North Korean visitors to the South and various publications. Thus, it is just a matter of time before North Korea is penetrated by the South, the consequences of which the North Korean leaders must clearly perceive. In this regard, the North’s regime is haunted by the thought that a threat of absorption of the North into the South is real and ever-mounting and that it needs to take decisive actions to reverse the tide.14 The logical conclusion is, of course, to root out the very source of the threat. This is the way the North Korean regime views the matter of national reunification. It is not so much “desirab1e”as a matter of life and death for them. This is why there exists a structural instability on the Korean peninsula and concerns about a renewed conflict still remain.

Nuclear Proliferation

North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program constitutes the core of the nuclear-proliferation issue in the Asia-Pacific region. According to a former high-ranking North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea in 1991, there is consensus among North Korea’s diplomats that “no country will insult or threaten North Korea once it possesses nuclear weapons.”Is Though the statement

14 Yon Hyong-muk, the keynote speech at the fourth round of the inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks, October 24, 199 1, p. 9. 94 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS apparently connotes a defensive purpose for North Korea’s nuclear program, it should not be literally interpreted. A more precise interpretation is as follows: whatever North Korea may do, no country will hold it in check once it possesses nuclear weapons. If we accept the proposition that the very existence of South Korea in the southern part of the peninsula is perceived by the North Korean regime as posing an ever-mounting threat to its survival, then the apparently irrational behavior of the regime can be construed as perfectly rational. Thus, the development of nuclear weapons should be recognized as a logical consequence of the regime’s threat perception. We should not, however, jump to the conclusion that North Korea’s regime can be dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons by alleviating its threat perception or by guaranteeing its security as advocated by so many scholars and policy makers.I6 As succinctly expounded, the perceived threat is not a military one, and hence, there is little room for any outsiders to help as long as the North sticks to its own way. To cope with the perceived threat, the North Korean regime has concentrated its energies on how to unify the peninsula on its own terms. The North, in order to attain unification, mapped out two strategies, the so-called “liberation war” and subversion, the latter being supplementary in nature. It is no secret that North Korea built up its armed forces to attempt another surprise attack on South Korea. The North Korean military edge over the South is so great that the North Korean leadership must feel quite confident of a military victory. With a lightening strike it could realize its long-cherished dream of a communized peninsula if it could somehow block US intervention in the war. The North Korean leadership calculates. to ensure US nonintervention, it needs to foster circumstances under which the US is obliged to withdraw it‘s forces from the South and be

15 Yeong-moo Yeo, “Testimony of Defector KO Yong-hwan, a former North Korean Diplomat,” Shin Dong-A, November 1991, p. 397.

16 See, for example, Andrew Mack, “North Korea and the Bomb,” Foreign Policy, No. 83 (Summer 1991), pp. 99; William Epstein, “Nuclear Security for the Korean Peninsula,” Korean Journul of Defense Analysis, Vol. IV,No. 2(Winter 1992), pp. 56-57; and Darryl Howlett, “Nuclearization or Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Aug. 1994), p. 184. KWAN-CHI OH 95 further restrained from intervening in Korean affairs. This is why we witnessed North Korea for decades making persistent demands for a peace treaty between the US and North Korea and a nonaggression pact between the South and the N0rth.l’ Once the treaties are concluded, the North calculates that it can stir up public opinion in the US to demand withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula. Why should US forces continue to be stationed on the peninsula when peace is firmly secured between the two Koreas? From the viewpoint of the North Korean leadership the inter- Korean accord, “Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation” concluded on December 13, 199 1, is nothing but a nonaggression pact. From the very beginning the North insisted upon adoption of a joint declaration of nonaggression rather than a comprehensive accord dealing with multifaceted exchanges and cooperation. North Korea, however, gave an unwilling consent to the inter-Korean agreement because it thought it could still achieve its long-standing goal by intentionally making all the other clauses dead letters except the clause on nonaggression. This could easily be done by employing stalling tactics in negotiations on how to implement exchanges and cooperation in humanitarian, economic, cultural and diplomatic fields, whereas a propaganda offensive could be launched to emboss the nonaggression clause. Having achieved its first objective, North Korea will no doubt press for the attainment of the second objective of its grand design, a peace treaty with the US. We have already witnessed North Korea’s demand for the peace treaty as an agenda item at the Geneva meeting.’* While promoting a peace offensive, the North Korean regime must have searched for an alternative means to win the conceived liberation war and arrived at the conclusion of the nuclear option.I9 Nuclear weapons can, the North realizes, be employed for multifaceted uses. Some of the more important ones include:

The possession of tactical nuclear weapons, with their potential

17 Kim I1 Sung, “Ten-point Program of Great Unity of the Whole Nation for Reunification of the Country,” Rodong Shinrnun, April 7, 1993.

18 Chnsun Ilho, May 3, 1994. 96 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

for swiftly incapacitating defense forces, would provide the means to launch a successful all-out surprise attack on the South. The North’s development and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons prove how eager it is to achieve just such a capability to invade the South. Nuclear weapons would neutralize the threat of US nuclear retaliation for the North Korean aggression on the South. If a conventional attack on the South were to fail and a massive retaliation by the ROK-US combined forces were imminent, nuclear weapons might successfully deter such retaliation by threatening a nuclear attack on Seoul or the Combined Forces. Nuclear weapons can be a very effective political leverage. To obtain political and economic concessions from the South, or to press for compliance with their demands, the North Korean regime would never cease using nuclear blackmail. This will certainly extend to the international arena. North Korea may threaten to target US forces in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula. This will certainly influence public opinion in America and possibly create political pressure for a massive reduction of US forces from Korea. From an operational viewpoint, the threat to use nuclear weapons on US forces would render wartime deployment of the forces extremely complicated.

Thus, the North Korean regime might be convinced that nuclear weapons will enable it to successfully launch an all-out surprise

I9 Some scholars misleadingly argue that due to the North’s deteriorating international and domestic military and political position relative to that of South Korea, North Korea may have been highly motivated to obtain its own nuclear weapons. See, for example, Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990). p. 212.

20 For a discussion of some of issues related to North Korea’s nuclear program see James Cotton, “North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Adelphi Paper, No. 275 (March 1993), pp. 94-106. See also Paul Bracken, “Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 137-53. Though Bracken provides very illuminating insight into North Korea’s military and economy, as well as policy recommendations for the North’s nuclear problem, he does not give a full analysis of North Korea’s motivation for its nuclear program. KWAN-CHI OH 97 attack on the South and that any counterattack by the ROK-US Combined Forces could be deterred.” The implication of this is straightforward: North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons will make the North’s military provocations much easier and safer. Therefore, the military tension and risk of war on the peninsula would be greatly heightened by North Korean development of nuclear weapons. It is not expected that North Korea’s nuclear development would, at least in the short term, trigger a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. Neither Japan nor South Korea is expected to launch a nuclear weapons development program to cope with the North Korean nuclear threat, even though their threat increases by a quantum leap. Once the North completes the development of Rodong missiles and arms them with nuclear warheads, Japan will immediately be threatened. Japan will be subjected to North Korean nuclear blackmail in connection with negotiations on diplomatic relations, with attempts to control illegal monetary remittances to the North, and with Japan’s active participation in UN sanctions on North Korea, if imposed. Furthermore, North Korea may threaten to target US military bases in Japan in the event of an all-out war. The threat will materialize if the North miscalculates that such a nuclear attack will successfully eliminate the threat of US military intervention in the conflict on the Korean peninsula, or if the North is driven to despair by a complete defeat in the war. If the North Korean nuclear threat is serious, Japan will face a dilemma: should Japan develop a military capability to launch a preemptive strike at North Korean targets, or should a demand be made for the withdrawal of US forces in Japan and a ban on the use of ports by US naval forces, or should Japan resort to relying on US retaliatory forces augmented by a theater missile defense system as discussed with the US? The first alternative will certainly arouse the region’s misgivings about Japanese militarism which may trigger an unprecedented arms race among regional powers and lesser ones as well. The second alternative will tear the US-Japan alliance apart and fundamentally change the regional security equation. Should Japan opt for this, Japanese public opinion will change to demand a military 98 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS buildup and, sooner or later, a militarily strong Japan will emerge. Furthermore, the US will be obliged to restructure its military role and deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, possibly toward an accelerated troop reduction. Thus, opting for either of the first two alternatives will drastically decrease regional stability. At this moment it is more likely that Japan will rely on US retaliatory capabilities to deter any future North Korean nuclear attacks. Whatever course of action Japan may take, there is no question about the destabilizing impact of North Korean nuclear development.

The Emerging Regional Security Order

Nothing can be certain and concrete when a region is in a transitional period undergoing a complete change. East Asia’s future security order seems to far exceed that of any other region experiencing a similar transformation at the end of the East-West confrontation. Geographical vastness, cultural plurality and uneven economic development may contribute to this but the more fundamental variables that shape the emerging security order are: first, contending values among the four major players: second, the perception that the US is in decline and disengaging from East Asia; third, the relative rise of Japan and China with ambiguity of their strategic concepts; and fourth, the uncertainty of the economic reforms and political development in Russia. Countries with mutually incompatible ideologies could live together as long as political, economic and security interactions are so limited that each can pursue its own policies without affecting the others. This, however, is not the case in East Asia. As China, holding fast to socialism, assumes an intransigent stance toward dissenters and shuns any political reforms, not infrequent ideological disputes with the democratic camp would arise because of ever-deepening economic interdependence. The disputes over Chinese violations of human rights are nothing but an indicator of the ideological dispute. We can hardly expect these disputes to foster an environment conducive to confidence- and security-building. If confidence cannot be built and mistrust prevails among major regional powers, no one can hope that a stable and peaceful regional security order would KWAN-CHI OH 99 emerge as time passes. Thus, apprehensions about the emerging regional security order will linger on as long as regional powers are divided into two opposing camps by mutually contending ideologies and values. As far as the US desire to engage and continue to play a leadership role in political, economic, and military affairs in East Asia is concerned, it is accepted without any reservations by most countries in the region except China. But when it comes to the calculus of costs and benefits of the US leadership role after the end of the Soviet threat, no one seems to feel convinced of the US will to remain as a leading security partner in East ‘4sia and to sustain its military profile commensurate with the leadership role. To sustain the role of a leader in the security partnership, the US has to lower costs associated with the leadership role and implement two conditions: first, allies will be required to contribute to mutual security: second, allies must be sensitive to the linkages between a sustained US commitment to their security and areas such as trade policy, technology transfer and participation in multinational security operations.?’ If any of these conditions are not met by any ally, disputes will arise with US. If the dispute is not resolved smoothly, the US government will not be able to sustain the military posture required to play the security leadership role. Thus, countries in the region are worried that the explicit conditions for sustaining US security leadership and generosity are gone. The nature of the misgivings, however, is more complex when it comes to smaller allies relative to Japan. According to Ezra Vogel, many Americans now feel the Japanese took advantage of their generosity by pursuing their own narrow interests. That even when the Japanese became rich, they did not assume their fair share of the burdens of maintaining peace, that Japan unfairly protected its markets from foreign goods, copied American technology, and engaged in predatory practices to destroy American industry.?*

21 Les Aspin, US Secretary of Defense, Annutif Report to the President and the Congress, January 1994, p. 9.

22 Ezra F. Vogel, “Japanese-American Relations after the Cold War,” Daedafus (Fall 1992), p. 38. 100 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Suppose the US government is obliged to draw down US forces in Japan under political pressure. Then other countries, who indirectly have benefited from US forces in Japan, will also lose because the security services rendered by the US forces are not divisible. This is the well-known textbook case of public goods in which the exclusion principle cannot be applied, that is, other countries in the region cannot be prevented from consuming the security services rendered by US forces simply because they do not pay for them.’3 Thus, other countries are subsidized for their security by Japan who pays for the stationing of US forces and, in this sense, they are free riders. By the same logic, Japan cannot be prevented from consuming security services rendered by US forces in other countries even if Japan does not pay for them. As a consequence, the quantity of security services rendered by US forces is less than what otherwise would be if Japan were charged for the services. Therefore, any disputes between the US and Japan and a resultant reduction of US military presence in Japan will adversely affect other smaller allies’ security in East Asia. The past decade’s record of security consultations with China clearly exhibited the limitations on how far major regional powers with contending ideologies and values could cooperate in security affairs. This is not surprising in view of the Chinese political tradition and its national strategy, in addition to the resurgence of conservatism after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. According to Zhengyuan Fu, China is a society which can be characterized by the following dominant characteristics: concentration of power in the hands of a few elites without institutional checks; law as a tool to control the populace; omnipotent state power; and individuals as subject and property of the state.24 The Chinese autocracy has always pursued: a security policy which combines force and appeasement measures; a military strategy allying with a distant country to subjugate a neighboring one; and a foreign policy employing a less threatening barbarian to bridle a more

~ 23 Bernard Herber, Moderri Public Finance (Howewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 24.

24 Zhengyuan Fu, “Continuities of Chinese Political Tradition,” Stirdies of’ Comparative Communisrn, Vol. XXIV. No. 3 (September 1991 ), p. 262. KWAN-CHI OH 101 threatening one. A harmonious and peaceful world based on shared values, is totally incompatible with Chinese autocracy. Only cool- headed calculations of costs and benefits determine Chinese security policy. China, apprehensive of a militarily strong Japan, recognizes some merit in a US-Japanese alliance which can effectively hold the resurgence of Japanese militarism in check. On the other hand, the same US-Japanese alliance will become a powerful prop and main stay of East Asia, which will also contain possible Chinese expansionism and adventurism in the region. Thus, in this post-Cold War era it is the single objective of Chinese policy toward Japan that Japan remains an independent civilian power with an abrogated US- Japanese security treaty, while expanding the Chinese-Japanese economic cooperation. China’s attitude toward the US appears basically to be hostile. To China the US is the only power which has both political will and military capability to circumscribe its exercise of hegemony and power projection, not to mention US demands for protection of human rights, cease of oppressing ethnic minorities and opening Chinese markets for US exports with the continued threat of economic sanctions. Though there remain uncertainties as to the future of Chinese security policy, depending upon the direction of its domestic development, the region has noted many omens which forebode a more assertive and uncooperative China in coming decades: the ruthless use of force in 1974 in the Paracel operation to oust the South Vietnamese garrison force; the military occupation of six Spratly Islands after a naval engagement in 1988; the unilateral promulgation of a statute declaring the Paracel and Spratly Islands chain integral parts of the mainland; the grant of an offshore oil concession to Crestone Energy Corporation of Colorado. which humiliated Vietnam; and a particularly rapid increase in the Chinese defense budget-doubling over the past five years. An economically and militarily stronger China will be a regional power with a wider global commitment but fewer responsibilities and less caution, contending for hegemonial patrimony in the region.’s Japan seems to realize that it should prepare to bear its share of costs for maintaining a stable international economic and political 102 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS order in a system of plural leadership by major economic powers, since the US is no longer willing and able to endure the burden.2h Some tasks suggested for Japan in a system of plural leadership are a greater responsibility in international financial markets, the promotion of economic and regional cooperation, an efficient allocation of its foreign aid, the initiation of world environmental protection and the creation of a global partnership with the US.27 Note that discussion of Japan’s military role is totally missing here. It was expounded that Japan’s security policy is formulated as a comprehensive concept centered on economic and political dimensions of national security. Furthermore, Japan’s security policy is mainly determined by domestic factors, the structure of the state, i.e., institutions ensuring civilian control over the military, and socio- legal norms, i.e., a strong aversion to militarism.2XConsequently,

~ 25 Gerald Segal. “As China Grows Strong,” lnternationnl Afiairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 1988). p. 23 1. Segal, however, presents more relaxed views later. See his recent essay, “China’s Changing Shape,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1YY4), pp. 43-58. See also, James R. Lilley, “American Security in Asia.” Global Affrrirs (Fall 1YY3), p. 75; Monte R. Bullard, “US-China Relations: The Strategic Calculus,” Pcirtrrneter (Summer 1YY3), p. 93; Huang Yasheng, “China’s Economic Development: Implications for Its Political and Security Roles,” Adelphi Paper (March 1993). p. 57; James A. Gregor, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy in East Asia,” op. cit., pp. 63-65; Melvin Gurtov, “The Future of China’s Rise,” Asiun Perspective, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 19Y4), pp. 124-26; Richard Mansbach. “The New Order in Northeast Asia: A Theoretical Overview,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 1 YY3), pp. 1 1 - 13; Harry Harding, “China at the Crossroads: Conservatism, Reform or Decay‘?”AdelphiPaper. No. 275 (March 1YY3), p. 48; and Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer IYY4), pp. 149-50. For a very insightful but somewhat high-handed discussion of Chinese historical memories and East Asian security issues see Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” Survivml. Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1YY4), pp. 4-7. For an opposing view that China’s threat to East Asia is largely unfounded, see Michael G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea,” Ititernational Security, Vol. 19, No. I (Summer 1Y94), pp. 169-94.

26 Hideo Sato, “Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World,” Current History, Vol. YO, No. 555 (April 199 I), p. 145.

27 bid., pp. 147-48.

28 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security,” Internationul Securitv, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1YY3), p. 86. KWAN-CHI OH 103

Japan’s contribution to regional and world security will have to be basically nonmilitary in the post- Cold War era.2yTherefore, Japan’s thinking on security affairs invites many questions. What if the US reduces its military posture in the Asia-Pacific region? Will a comprehensive security policy centered on economic and political dimensions without the military dimension guarantee the security of Japan and stability of the region? Can Japan justify the formulation of its security policy solely in the context of domestic factors without due regard to changes of the outside world? Thus, Japan’s future security role in the region, despite Japan’s seemingly noble concept of a comprehensive security, is yet to be defined. Because of Russia’s sheer size there is no question about the critical importance of Russia’s future economic and political development on the security of East Asia. We, however, cannot be certain of Russia’s future due to the political leadership’s recurrent wavering in their resolution to push economic reform forward, which will without doubt determine the destiny of the nation. This is understandable in view of grave risks posed by its massive unemployment somewhere between 12 and 20 million-more than one-fifth of Russia’s work force as inefficient factories are dismantled by cutting back or eliminating subsidies to industries.3o The only way to avoid massive unemployment is to create jobs by promoting private business while the government continues to restructure large state enterprises and reduce subsidies to inefficient industries. But, creating private enterprises to absorb the layoffs from large state ones takes time, while saving jobs at the latter by subsidies may be more tempting for the political leadership. Besides the prospects for economic reform, there is some reservation about Russia’s political system becoming democratic in the full sense because: too much power rests with the president; no new judiciary exists; and there is no real role for independent political organizations such as trade unions and political parties. Thus, with only partly institutionalized democracy, there is apprehension about

29 Hideo Sato, p. 146.

30 US News & World Report, August 22, 1994, p. 48. 104 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS the possibility of the resurgence of an authoritarian regime or slavic nationalism which will have adverse repercussions on Russia’s foreign policy and security role in East Asia. The variables just surveyed are likely to interact with each other to give rise to amplified uncertainty and unpredictability of the future regional order in the Asia-Pacific region. Since major regional powers are supposed to play a leading role to shape the order and the above-mentioned variables are closely associated with them, we can hardly expect that a stable and cooperative regional order will emerge in the coming decades unless collective efforts are made to moderate major actors’ behavior to foster a new and enduring one. Should the region fail to do so, it will be more likely to be interspersed with recurring tensions caused by assertive Chinese foreign and military policies, and the region’s enervation and appeasement toward China.”

Insecurity of the Regional Economic System

Were it not for a stable international economic and trading system upheld by the US military presence and the provision of markets for the.region’s exports by the US, the dynamic economic growth of East Asia would not have been possible. This will also be true in the coming decades in view of the rather limited absorption capacity of other current and future super-economies, Japan and China. Hence, it is quite natural that countries in East Asia have misgivings about US-Japan trade disputes which might eventually trigger an ever- escalating economic war or arouse an American sentiment which reflects growing doubts about the ability of US corporations to compete against Japanse firms, to provide jobs and to offer a promising economic future for the next generation of Americans.32 Either case will be followed by political pressure to reduce the US

3 1 See, for example, Geoffrey Wisenian, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” PaciJic Rrvirw, Vol. 5, No. I, 1992. pp. 45-48, For a similar pessimistic conclusion that was reached from different dimensions, see Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, op. (.it., pp. 18-20.

32 Ezra F. Vogel, p. 45 KWAN-CHI OH 105 military profile in the region and form a regional bloc to effectively cut off foreign competition.73The initial Asian concerns over the NAFTA can be construed in this context. Thus, a trade dispute between the US and Japan could lead to a loss of American markets for regional exports which will deprive the region of an opportunity for future economic prosperity. It is noteworthy that the US has recorded trade deficits not only with Japan but also with the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in East Asia. In 1992, for example, the US had a trade deficit of $52.6 billion with Japan and $28.9 billion deficit with the NIEs in East Asia, while the NIEs had a trade deficit of $10.8 billion with Japan. Thus, it is quite understandable how seriously countries in the region are following US-Japanese trade talks which will, depending upon their final outcomes, decisively affect the countries’ economic security in coming decades.

Nonconventional Security Issues

With the diminished conventional military threat in East Asia, nonconventional security issues are gaining weight and need to be addressed properly. Some of the more important issues are territorial disputes, security of sea lanes, drug-trafficking, environmental degradation, and disputes concerning development of oceanic and seabed resources. At issue in territorial and boundary disputes are oil, gas and fish resources believed to lie beneath and nearby islands, particularly in the region around the islands in the East and South China Seas. Of the 15 maritime borders in the South China Sea, 12 are in dispute, most involving China.34As previously stated, China declared the Senkaku, the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, the associated surrounding waters, and the subsea shelf as inalienable parts of the People’s Republic. The reason why China is so assertive toward these islands is quite simple: the surrounding waters are estimated to hold oil reserves of up to 100 billion China, in

33 Stuart Harris, “The Economic Aspects of Pacific Security,” Adelphi Paper. No. 275 (March 1993). pp. 18-19.

34 Ibid., p. 21. 106 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS the face of protests from Japan and Southeast Asian countries, took a seemingly conciliatory posture by making remarks that China would resolve the disputes peacefully and by making overtures for the joint development of oceanic and seabed resources.76Southeast Asians are, however, suspicious of China’s suggestion. China may manipulate any agreements on joint development so as to force the signatories to acquiesce to Chinese claims of sovereignty over the disputed territories. Besides the economic resources, the strategic implications of China’s formal claims in these waters should not be overlooked. China, having laid the legal foundation to protect its claimed territories and resources within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, can control the sea lanes vital to East Asia. In fact, China’s statute on territorial waters explicitly stipulates China’s right to use military force to prevent unauthorized foreign ships from entering its territorial waters surrounding the islands in the East and South China Seas. If enforced, this means no foreign ships or aircraft can enter this region without China’s authorization. In this regard, frequent piracy committed by the Chinese Navy in the South China Sea is not irrelevant to the territorial disputes. Of the total 98 piracies that occurred in the 18 months since the middle of 1992, China was involved in 47.37The number of incidents increased after the Chinese government issued special orders to the Chinese Navy, the National Maritime Police and the customhouse to stamp out the smuggling of goods into China. Since the government’s measures to eliminate smuggling includes a prize for uncovering contraband, the navy and others are too zealous to respect the freedom of navigation on the open seas. The Chinese government, however, pretended to be unaware of the piracy since these outlaws serve the government’s claimed sovereignty over the seas. Thus, China’s moves with respect to the Spratly Islands have succinctly disclosed its strategic intentions as it grows stronger militarily on the basis of rapid

3.5 Fur Eastern Ecorinriiic Review,May 28, 1992, p. 23.

36 Kjw~g-Hyitif:Shiiriiiun, July 4. 1992, p. 5.

37 Ckosun Ilho, March 22, 1994, p. 8. KWAN-CHI OH 107 economic growth? Southeast Asia continues to remain a major producer of illicit opium despite the initiatives of the governments concerned to eradicate illicit opium poppy cultivation.39Illicit heroin laboratories also continue to operate in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia in particular are increasingly being used as transit points for illicit consignments of heroin from Southeast Asia destined for Australia, Canada and the US, as well as for countries in In addition to heroin, East and Southeast Asia also pose a major problem for the illicit manufacture of, trafficking in, and abuse of amphetamines. Taiwan remains a major supplier of methamphetamine for Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, but the illicit manufacture of the drug also takes place in mainland China and Thailand. Last August, there was a report on the arrest of two North Korean security policemen by Russian authorities on charges of drug-trafficking.41 Two North Koreans were carrying 8.5 kilograms of heroin when they were arrested. For all these reasons the control of narcotics is increasingly becoming a serious security concern in the Asia-Pacific region. East Asian countries are learning how expensive it is to restore the environment once damaged by the reckless pursuit of rapid industrialization. Acid rain is a common phenomenon; the density of sulfur-dioxide compounds in the air far exceeds the world average.

38 Carl W. Ford, Jr., “Key Strategic and Security Issues in East Asia: the China Factor,” a paper presented at the Conference on the Clinton Administration’s Policy toward the PRC and Taiwan, sponsored by the Center for East Asian Studies, the Pennsylvania State University, and the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies, held at the Gaston Sigur Center, George Washington University, February 5, 1994, p. 13.

39 United Nations, Report ($the Ititeriitrtionul Nurcotics Control Board for 1993, pp. 39-40; Far Emtern Economic RevieM,, January 20, 1994, pp. 22-24.

40 Internatio’nal drug traffickers who formerly used Thailand as the prime conduit for heroin produced in Burma’s Golden Triangle are now reported to route their shipments further east through Laos and Cambodia. See Fur Eastern Economic Review, March 18, 1993, pp. 24-25.

41 Hunkook Ilbo, August 6, 1994. 108 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS

River contamination is rapidly drying up sources for waterworks, and seawater pollution is rapidly ruining coastal fishery. Because of the strong external effects of environmental destruction, region-wide cooperative policies and actions are essential. In this regard, the initiative of Northeast Asian countries to regulate seawater contamination is welcomed.." Besides disputes over resource development in the South China Sea, there exist some potential disputes over the development of seabed resources in other waters. In the Yellow Sea, for example, there are latent disputes over the mining rights for the continental shelf between China and South Korea, and between China and Japan. Clashes have also been reported between South Korean and Chinese fishing boats on the open seas, which possibly reflects potential disputes over fishing rights between the two countries. Other possible security concerns include refugee relief, the safeguarding of human rights and the prevention of international crimes. There are a few potential sources of mass refugees in the region, namely Hong Kong, Taiwan and North Korea. The Chinese government repeatedly warns against democratic reforms instituted by the Hong Kong government. If China abolishes democratic institutions in Hong Kong after 1997, this could trigger an exodus. China's invasion of Taiwan or a sudden collapse of North Korea could also give rise to a mass of refugees. Another issue is the serious violations of human rights in North Korea and China. Any future regional economic cooperation with those encroaching on human rights should be properly regulated by regional corporate action. Internationally organized crime rings based in Hong Kong were suspected of getting involved in the illegal entry of more than 80,000 Chinese into the US for two years prior to early 1992.43The crime rings hired out Taiwanese trawlers to carry the stowaways for a fare of $50,000 per head. TRIAD is an internationally organized crime ring based in Hong Kong and is known for large-scale trafficking of

42 Hankook Ilbo, January 10, 1994.

43 Harikook Ilbo, March 23, 1992, p. 10. KWAN-CHI OH 109 heroin from Southeast Asia to North America and Europe through East Asian transit countries. This group was reportedly looking for alternative bases in preparation for the return of Hong Kong to Chi naJJ

Future Security Framework for East Asia

To foster and maintain an amicable environment for sustained economic growth, it is mandatory for East Asia to build a regional security network which can effectively meet challenges of the post- Cold War era. Then the fundamental question is whether a multilateral security regime is feasible for East Asia. Though we cannot guarantee that regional players will come to an agreement, nor can we say what agreement will be reached, there are many regional traits which seem to indicate the existence of a self-enforcing solution: first, a truly competitive situation prevails in the region; second, almost all major powers of the region have strong incentives to maintain peace and stability in the region; third, players are believed to be rational; fourth, regional actors have been communicating with each other on security matters in one way or another; and finally, because of ever-deepening economic interdependence any actor can hardly expect to enhance its security by expansion even if it wants to? To pursue a multilateral security regime, each of the two distinct subregions of East Asia (Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia) needs first to either develop a new subregional security network or enhance its already existing one, and then integrate the two subregional arrangements into a regional one. The already existing regional security dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), is not expected to play a role as an East Asia region-wide security network because of poor leadership and a conflict of narrow interests among ASEAN members. Furthermore, there are substantial differences in security

44 Segve llho, January 12, 1994, p. 23.

45 For a pioneering study on conditions for forming a security regime see Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” Interncitionul Orgcinizution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 360-62. 110 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS interests between the two subregions which may justify a two-tier approach. Northeast Asia is besieged with the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula, an ideological contention, a potential arms race, and trade disputes, while Southeast Asian countries are mainly concerned with nonconventional security issues such as territorial disputes, drug trafficking, and the security of sealanes. A Northeast Asian security cooperation regime can be built upon four pillars: the Charter of the United Nations; a founding charter; institutions; and measures. The regime should be a regional arrangement in’ accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Institutionalization of the regime must actively be pursued, possibly by patterning after the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Though there are some scholars who argue that a security arrangement modeled on the OSCE will not fit East Asia well, it is not easy to understand why it will not. A closer look into the nature of problems for the OSCE clearly reveals that East Asian security concerns do not differ much from Europe’s. Consequently, East Asia can profitably learn lessons from the OSCE’s institutionalization efforts. In light of divergent security interests of Northeast Asia countries, a regional security network can be better promoted by taking a gradual approach. Thus, countries in the region should initiate bilateral security dialogues and then form a Northeast Asian security dialogue as a formal organization. This dialogue may comprise regular semi-annual consultative meetings of ambassadors as a working-level discussion body. The security dialogue will discuss and exchange views on security issues and negotiate how to resolve them. It would be a provisional institution to evolve into a fully institutionalized regional security organization. In Southeast Asia the ARF could be further enhanced to function first as a subregional security dialogue and then to evolve into a fully institutionalized security organization. Each subregional security organization may invite representatives from the other subregion as security dialogue partners to maintain communication and facilitate inter-regional cooperation. KWAN-CHI OH 111

Conclusion

It is noteworthy that in the post-Cold War era varying degrees of uneasiness, from misgivings to apprehension, prevail in East Asia. ,Broadly speaking, there are five variables which have given rise to regional anxiety: a perceived reduction of US forces; the advent of NAFTA; the rapid rise of China; uncertainties surrounding the identity of future Japan; and North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. These five variables generate anxiety about nuclear proliferation, possible new conflict on the Korean peninsula, the future regional security order, the regional economic and trading system, and emerging nonconventional security issues. From the viewpoint of East Asian countries, almost all the variables listed above are uncontrollable to varying degrees, which signifies that any attempts to maintain the status quo are bound to fail. These countries, however, either out of ignorance, an illusion, or sheer selfishness, seem to be tantalizingly slow and enervated in making corporate endeavors to address the changed security environment. In the post-Cold War era no country in East Asia will be allowed to receive a free ride, and, hence, every country should be prepared to share a legitimate burden for a stable and peaceful regional security order upon which their freedom and prosperity entirely depends. Because of divergent national interests of major powers in East Asia, it is very unlikely that a stable and cooperative regional security order will emerge unless collective and concerted efforts are made by all countries of the region. In light of the necessity of maintaining stable security environment congenial to steady economic growth, initiatives must be taken to form a subregional security dialogue in Northeast Asia and then evolve it into a fully institutionalized security arrangement. In Southeast Asia, the ARF must be enhanced and institutionalized. These two subregional security arrangements can eventually constitute a region-wide security cooperative regime which may be evolved from APEC.