East Asian Security Issues: a Summary Review

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

East Asian Security Issues: a Summary Review ABSTRACTS 267 East Asian Security Issues: A Summary Review Kwan-Chi Oh The objective of the paper is to identify emerging security concerns and anxiety in the post-Cold War era in the Asia-Pacific region. Based upon our clear understanding of these factors, we can devise ways to cope with these new security issues. There are at least five reasons for security anxiety: (1) a continuing drawdown of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the advent of economic blocs; (3) the fast rise of China as a future superpower; (4) uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan as a potential superpower; and (5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. The anxiety takes definite forms: misgivings about possible new conflict on the Korean peninsula; the jeopardy of nuclear proliferation; apprehensions about the emerging regional security order, if any; insecurity about the regional economic and trading system; and uneasiness over emerging nonconventional security issues. Because of divergent national interests of major powers in East Asia, it is very unlikely that a stable and cooperative regional security order will emerge unless collective and concerted efforts are made by all countries of the region. In light of the necessity of maintaining a stable security environment congenial to steady economic growth, initiatives must be taken to form a subregional security dialogue in Northeast Asia and then evolve it into a fully institutionalized security arrangement. In Southeast Asia, ARF must be enhanced and institutionalized. These two subregional security arrangements can eventually constitute a region-wide security cooperative regime which may evolve from APEC. KWAN-CHI OH 81 East Asian Security Issues: A Summary Review Kwan-Chi Oh It is paradoxical that Northeast Asian countries, and to a lesser degree Southeast Asian countries, find themselves confronted with a world totally different from the Cold War period. This strange world, in which anxiety rather than certainty and composure is the rule, is not what they expected when the Cold War ended. While the Cold War was being waged, there were no uncertainties about the nature of threats. The identity of both allies and adversaries, the inherent possibility of conflict escalation, and security arrangements were clear to all. The end of the bipolar superpower confrontation, however, fundamentally altered the security envi- ronment and made existing security policies and strategies incon- gruous with reality. As Soviet expansionism ceased to exist, a multitude of unexpected security problems, previously suppressed or unknown, began to emerge. Since the existing security configuration was not designed to address the more complicated, ambiguous and fluid security problems, it is no wonder that countries in the Asia- Pacific region are perplexed with the changed security environment. Asia is groping for a new security arrangement congruent with the new situation. This is particularly so in Northeast Asia where an acute East-West confrontation originated with the outbreak of the Korean War. The problem is exacerbated by the presence of two major regional powers, Japan and China, who have incompatible ideologies and policy orientations, and who compete with each other for regional influence. As the reduction of the US military posture in the region is 82 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS perceived to create a power vacuum, these two regional powers are expected to play a greater regional role for different reasons. China, in spite of its proclaimed “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” is suspected of pursuing expansionism, sometimes overtly and in other cases covertly, by flexing its military muscle. Sharing the same values with North Korea, China is determined to prop up the North Korean regime at the expense of the international community’s confidence. As is succinctly demonstrated by extensive debates on its future role and its return to a “normal state,” Japan does not seem to have settled upon its future regional role in light of the changed strategic environment. The problem with Japan is that much yet remains for it to win confidence from countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, sooner or later, has to formulate its long-term policy toward China as an integral element of its regional security arrangement. The uncertainty surrounding future relations between Japan and China will contribute to and become major sources of the region’s security concerns. Another distinct feature of East Asia is that it is replete with territorial disputes between major regional powers and smaller countries. What makes the region unstable is the fact that these territorial disputes could easily lead to enmity, if not open hostilities, under the new security environment. The unsettled “Northern Territories” issue between Japan and Russia has effectively barred them from not only improving political relations but also advancing economic cooperation. Thus, unless the issue is resolved to both nations’ satisfaction, there is only a remote possibility the two countries will closely cooperate in building confidence and peacefully resolving regional issues. The dispute on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands between Japan and China is another potential source of regional instability. China seems to have decided not to escalate the issue, though it has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the islands. China’s underlying calculation is quite simple: why should it antagonize Japan when Japanese capital and technology are badly needed for its ambitious economic development? Besides, the much- publicized disputes over the Spratly Islands and several other border disputes have dragged on for years, mainly along the Chinese border. Needless to say, these territorial and border disputes, unless KWAN-CHI OH 83 peacefully resolved, will ferment distrust and enmity, lead to open hostilities, and undermine the stability of the region. Causes for Security Anxiety If anxiety and uncertainty characterize East Asia in the post-Cold War world, what causes this? There may be a multitude of variables or factors effecting anxiety and uncertainty, some of which may have originated from past historical interactions. At the risk of oversimplification, however, it can be argued that the following five primary variables or strategic developments have caused the anxiety: (I) a continuing drawdown of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the advent of economic blocs, particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); (3) the rapid rise of China as a future superpower; (4) uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan as a potential superpower; and (5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Of the above five variables, no doubt the overriding one is the countries’ perception of a continuing reduction of US military posture in the Asia-Pacific region.’ Thus, deep in their anxiety lies these countries’ perception that the United States will not sustain its present level of political, economic and security engagements within East Asia, This is the case despite the US government’s repeated assurances of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific which has been substantiated by an ample US military presence.’ The first- phase force drawdown from South Korea, Japan and the Philippines for the period 1990 to 1992 (as prescribed by the Nunn-Warner report) was construed as the onset of US military disengagement in the region. This action was painstakingly explained on the grounds of the significantly increased ability of Asian allies in their own defense. No doubt, the United States planned meticulously and acted with prudence. In South Korea, for example, the US planned to retain a 1 Kyung-won Kim, “Korea-US Relationship in Post-Cold War World,” Karetr Focus (April 1994), p. 10. 2 The US Department of Defense, A Strntegic Franiewwrk for the Asiari Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, July 1992, p. 14. 84 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS ground and air presence to deter aggression from North Korea, while US forces would shift from a leading to a supporting role within the coalition. The US made its position clear by proclaiming the transition of South Korea to the leading role in its own defense as an essential element of US long-term strategy. The US also pledged to continue to assist South Korea’s military in force improvement. Further, coalition structures and capabilities will be adjusted to match the strategy through training. Combined exercises such as Team Spirit, among others, and certain capabilities unaffordable and unattainable over the short and middle term such as strategic and operational intelligence, strategic and tactical air power, naval support and selected ground combat capabilities, will continue to be provided. The US has further envisioned that a US force presence would continue as long as the Korean people and government want it and threats to peace and stability remain.3 In November 199 1, the US decided to postpone the planned phase I1 troop reductions in South Korea because of the danger and uncertainty posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Should reductions have been undertaken as planned, the US combat posture in South Korea would be a composite force of one mechanized and one combat aviation brigade, and one tactical fighter wing-roughly one-third of the strength as compared to the beginning of the force adjustment. It was a timely decision which undoubtedly demonstrated the credibility of US policy to countries in the region who had apprehensively been watching to see if the US would live up to its promises. This was particularly so because in July 199 1, the US Air Force abandoned Clark Air Base in the Philippines, a valuable regional logistics hub which suffered extensive damage from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Trust in US commitments was, however, undermined by a sequence of occurrences thereafter. Right after the departure from Clark Air Base, in late December 1991, the US-Philippines negotiations on the possibility of an extended withdrawal agreement ended abruptly.
Recommended publications
  • Negotiation Philosophy in Chinese Characters
    6 Ancient Wisdom for the Modern Negotiator: What Chinese Characters Have to Offer Negotiation Pedagogy Andrew Wei-Min Lee* Editors’ Note: In a project that from its inception has been devoted to second generation updates, it is instructive nonetheless to realize how much we have to learn from the past. We believe Lee’s chapter on Chinese characters and their implications for negotiation is groundbreaking. With luck, it will prove to be a harbinger of a whole variety of new ways of looking at our field that will emerge from our next round of discussion. Introduction To the non-Chinese speaker, Chinese characters can look like a cha- otic mess of dots, lines and circles. It is said that Chinese is the most difficult language in the world to learn, and since there is no alpha- bet, the struggling student has no choice but to learn every single Chinese character by sheer force of memory – and there are tens of thousands! I suggest a different perspective. While Chinese is perhaps not the easiest language to learn, there is a very definite logic and sys- tem to the formation of Chinese characters. Some of these characters date back almost eight thousand years – and embedded in their make-up is an extraordinary amount of cultural history and wisdom. * Andrew Wei-Min Lee is founder and president of the Leading Negotiation Institute, whose mission is to promote negotiation pedagogy in China. He also teaches negotiation at Peking University Law School. His email address is an- [email protected]. This article draws primarily upon the work of Feng Ying Yu, who has spent over three hundred hours poring over ancient Chinese texts to analyze and decipher the make-up of modern Chinese characters.
    [Show full text]
  • The Historical Origin of the Chinese Taoist and Tai Chi
    DOI: 10.7763/IPEDR. 2012. V58. 25 The Historical Origin of the Chinese Taoist and Tai Chi Jian-sheng Wen1and Min Su Department of Physical Education of Northwestern Polytechnical University, ShaanxiXi´an, 710072 Abstract. Chinese martial arts and Taoism has a long historical origin, this article reveals that the formation of tai chi means traditional Chinese Taoist culture having a clear external expression form, at the same time having bidirectional authentication method (inward regimen validated and outward fighting verified). When Chinese Taoists to Zhang Sanfeng, Inner life cultivation and life formed holographic deduction in the universe had been completed. Marking the Taoist introverted experience practicing was already clear and maturation. But the Taoist within the practice also needs external practicing avenue and intuitive form. Finally in the right historical period, Taoism and the martial art met. Keywords: Taoism, Chinese Martial Art, Tai Chi, Life Cultivation, Zhang San-feng. 1. Introduction Yang style, etc. every style tai chi respects Zhang San feng for the founder. Either from tai chi name or from the statue of the founder, Taoist and tai chi both have a deeply historical origin,and means that The two value orientations are convergence. In modern times, many tai chi practitioners, tai chi has become one of the world's most widespread categories of traditional Chinese culture. People can generally feel the the Taoist culture behind it, but the Taoist culture system is still to make people feel mysterious. What the intrinsic link is between the two? Whether can have a glimpse of the true face of the Taoist culture through tai chi? This article reveals that the formation of tai chi means traditional Chinese Taoist culture having a clear external expression form, at the same time having bidirectional authentication method (inward regimen validated and outward fighting verified).
    [Show full text]
  • African Logistics Agents and Middlemen As Cultural Brokers in Guangzhou, In: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 44, 4, 117–144
    Journal of Current Chinese Affairs China aktuell Topical Issue: Foreign Lives in a Globalising City: Africans in Guangzhou Guest Editor: Gordon Mathews Mathews, Gordon (2015), African Logistics Agents and Middlemen as Cultural Brokers in Guangzhou, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 44, 4, 117–144. URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9163 ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) The online version of this article and the other articles can be found at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> Published by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies and Hamburg University Press. The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. To subscribe to the print edition: <[email protected]> For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs and Journal of Politics in Latin America: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 4/2015: 117–144 African Logistics Agents and Middlemen as Cultural Brokers in Guangzhou Gordon MATHEWS Abstract: This article begins by asking how African traders learn to adjust to the foreign world of Guangzhou, China, and suggests that African logistics agents and middlemen serve as cultural brokers for these traders. After defining “cultural broker” and discussing why these brokers are not usually Chinese, it explores this role as played by ten logistics agents/middlemen from Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
    [Show full text]
  • Learning Chinese
    Learning Chinese Chinese is the native language of over a billion speakers, more Language Family people than any other language. It is spoken in China, Singapore, Sino-Tibetan Malaysia, and in many overseas Chinese communities. Dialect 4UBOEBSE.BOEBSJOJTCBTFEPO/PSUIFSO Writing Systems: Chinese dialects. Standard Mandarin is Simplified, Traditional, and Pinyin the language of business, education, and the media in all regions of China, and is tSimplified Chinese (e.g. 汉语) characters are widely used in the People’s widely understood in almost every corner Republic of China. They are based on and share most of their characters of the Chinese-speaking world. with traditional Chinese characters. t Traditional Chinese (e.g. 漢語) characters are in widespread use in Your Learning Options Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and in many overseas Chinese communities. t3PTFUUB4UPOFPGGFSTZPVUIFDIPJDFPG Knowledge of traditional characters will also allow you to recognize many Simplified or Traditional characters characters in classical Chinese texts. for your course. Simplified Traditional tPinyin (e.g. hàn yǔ) is a method of writing Chinese using the Roman alphabet. Pinyin is a transliteration of characters into the Roman script and is used for teaching the language phonetically and for typing Chinese. t3PTFUUB4UPOFBMTPBMMPXTZPVUPMFBSOUP speak and understand spoken Chinese Language Tips without learning Chinese characters. t$IJOFTFJTXSJUUFOXJUIOPTQBDFTCFUXFFOXPSET If this is your objective, you can study your course in the pinyin script. t&BDIDIBSBDUFSJO$IJOFTFDPSSFTQPOETUPBTJOHMFTZMMBCMF tThe meaning of a Chinese syllable depends on the tone with which it is spoken. Chinese has four tones: t3PTFUUB4UPOFHJWFTZPVUIFBCJMJUZUP mā má mǎ mà view pinyin along with the characters. steady high 2 high rising 3 low falling-rising 4 falling You can use this feature as a t"UPOFNBZDIBOHFTMJHIUMZEFQFOEJOHPOUIFUPOFTPGJUTOFJHICPSJOH pronunciation guide for the characters you encounter in the course.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Investors Are Funding Malign PRC Companies on Major Indices
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesperson For Immediate Release FACT SHEET December 8, 2020 U.S. Investors Are Funding Malign PRC Companies on Major Indices “Under Xi Jinping, the CCP has prioritized something called ‘military-civil fusion.’ … Chinese companies and researchers must… under penalty of law – share technology with the Chinese military. The goal is to ensure that the People’s Liberation Army has military dominance. And the PLA’s core mission is to sustain the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power.” – Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, January 13, 2020 The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) threat to American national security extends into our financial markets and impacts American investors. Many major stock and bond indices developed by index providers like MSCI and FTSE include malign People’s Republic of China (PRC) companies that are listed on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List and/or the Department of Defense’s List of “Communist Chinese military companies” (CCMCs). The money flowing into these index funds – often passively, from U.S. retail investors – supports Chinese companies involved in both civilian and military production. Some of these companies produce technologies for the surveillance of civilians and repression of human rights, as is the case with Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China, as well as in other repressive regimes, such as Iran and Venezuela. As of December 2020, at least 24 of the 35 parent-level CCMCs had affiliates’ securities included on a major securities index. This includes at least 71 distinct affiliate-level securities issuers.
    [Show full text]
  • By Xiao Chi An* Wang Li Embezzled 3,000 Yuan (US$439) When She Worked for Blue Moon, a Guangzhou-Based Chemical Company. Her
    By Xiao Chi An* Wang Li embezzled 3,000 yuan (US$439) when she worked for Blue Moon, a Guangzhou-based chemical company. Her husband, Hong Bo, says Guangzhou police detained her in her home in Xingtai, Hebei province, at the end of April 2009. Hong, a man in his thirties, went to Guangzhou in early May to ask lawyer Li Sheng for advice. “You probably need to pay them 20,000 yuan (US$2,929),” Li told Hong, referring to how much money Hong should pay to bribe the policeman in charge of his wife’s case. But things did not turn out quite as badly as Li predicted. When Hong invited the policeman who detained Wang to have dinner and “a talk,” the policeman replied, “OK. Don’t worry; your wife will be released if you return the money to the company. We will be in a better mood to have a meal after her release.” A week later, Wang was released, even though Hong had not repaid the embezzled funds. Hong, Wang, their friend Zhang Chong and three policemen sat together in a fancy restaurant and had a “very happy talk.” After the meal, each of the three police officers was given ten packages of cigarettes as “small gifts of appreciation.” “I spent a total of 2,500 yuan (US$366) tonight,” Hong told Zhang. “These policemen are very nice men. It is true that Wang Li’s wrongdoing is too minor for her to be jailed for, but if the police make trouble for me, I am afraid I will have to pay 20,000 yuan (US$2,929), the amount that Li had said was required to save Wang Li.” “Don’t you think the police were being corrupt by attending the dinner and taking the cigarettes?” Zhang asked.
    [Show full text]
  • Li Chi: 1896-1979
    Li Chi: 1896-1979 Received 19 November 1981 K. C. CHANG FTER ALMOST SIXTY YEARS, first as the father and later as the dean of Chinese archaeology, Li Chi has left indelible contributions to the science of humankind A and ofhistory, and his thinking still dominates his discipline in China. Born in Hupei, Li Chi grew up at home and in Peking at a time when the old country, forced by encounters with the West, was taking its initial steps on the long road to mod­ ernization. Then, as now, bright young students were sent to Western countries to learn their scientific secrets. After his graduation from the elite Tsinghua Academy, Li Chi was sent to the United States, where he studied psychology and sociology at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, and then anthropology at Harvard. According to an inter­ view with Wilma Fairbank in 1977, Li Chi said that he went to Clark because a psychol­ ogy teacher at Tsinghua, a Dr. Wolcott, had told him that Clark was the place to be for psychology. While at Clark, Li Chi developed the habit ofspending every Saturday morn­ ing browsing in the open shelves of the library. There he happened upon anthropology books and was fascinated by this subject, ofwhich he had had no previous knowledge. At Harvard, where he earned a doctorate in 1923, Li Chi studied with Hooten, Tozzer, and Dixon, and from these three mentors he learned, respectively, physical anthropology, archaeology, and ethnology, all ofwhich he made use of, both in his doctoral dissertation (1928) and in his subsequent sixty-year career in China.
    [Show full text]
  • Student Handbook
    KSMY MARTIAL ARTS STUDENT HANDBOOK World Kido Federation/Han Min Jok Hapkido Association 3200-A Riverside Boulevard, Sacramento, CA 95818 916-970-5044 ! KSMY Marial Ars School Currculum Before attempting Kuk Sool training, students must first understand the principles and values that form the foundation for martial art practitioners. Students must become familiarized with the rules and regulations of the do-jang. Students must also learn preparatory movements of fundamental techniques. This preparation will not only help students learn Kuk Sool techniques safely and accurately but to help them progress at a fast rate. The following is a list of content that will be discussed in this handbook: Ancient History & Modern History Martial Arts Creed - “Martial Art Spirit” Student Creed Martial Arts Code of Behavior Bowing Do-jang Rules & Regulations Parents & Guest Rules Belt Ranks Stances - Gi Bon Ja Se Gi Breathing Techniques - Gi Cho Jja Gi Falling Techniques - Nak Beop Hand Techniques - Su Gi Leg Techniques - Jok Sul Techniques - Ho Sin Sul Forms - Hyeong Empty Hand Forms Weapon Forms Sparring Guidelines Kuk Sool Useful Terminology How to Tie Your Belt & Fold Your Uniform Ancient History Welcome to the world of Korean historic martial arts! In this synopsis, we will briefly explore the history of Kuk Sool, and the purpose and authority of the Korea Kido Association, the World Kido Federation and Han Min Jok Hapkido Association. The history of Korean martial arts is as old as the land itself and can be traced as far back as the prehistoric era, where primitive weapons made of wood and stone were used for hunting and fighting.
    [Show full text]
  • The Fundamental Cartographical Technology of Ancient China ─ Forward Intersection
    THE FUNDAMENTAL CARTOGRAPHICAL TECHNOLOGY OF ANCIENT CHINA ─ FORWARD INTERSECTION Zilan WANG1 Keling WANG Institute of History and Philosophy of Science University of Wuhan P.R.China Email: [email protected] Institute of Historical Geography University of Wuhan P.R.China Most available ancient Chinese maps were not based on field survey but were compiled indoor using direct or indirect travel and exploration records. The map preparation process can be roughly divided into the following steps. Firstly, the position of a geographical object is marked on the sketch map using its orientation and distance. The orientation data is based on the 8-orientation system in which the circumference is divided into 8 parts. The distance data is mainly based on the Chinese distance unit “Li”, but a smaller unit “Bu” will be used for detailed description. Secondly, the rectification by “intersection” method is carried out in order to minimize the errors in the relative positions of a geographical object caused by the intrinsic “roughness” of the aforementioned spatial model. This “intersection” rectification method, which is similar to the “forward intersection” in modern survey technology, was analyzed in this article from three angles: (1) the simulation study of the 2nd century B.C. survey map “Mawang Dui Map”, (2) the analysis of the traditional survey theory recorded in Zhou Bi Suan Jing and Jiu Zhang Suan Shu (including Liu Hui’s annotation of the latter), and (3) the new interpretation of the Fei Niao model proposed by Shen Kuo. In addition, travel records of “intersection” observation and the technique and historical background of forward intersection were found in related historical and geographical documents.
    [Show full text]
  • Transfer of Perceptual Expertise: the Case of Simplified and Traditional Chinese Character Recognition
    Cognitive Science (2016) 1–28 Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN: 0364-0213 print / 1551-6709 online DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12307 Transfer of Perceptual Expertise: The Case of Simplified and Traditional Chinese Character Recognition Tianyin Liu,a Tin Yim Chuk,a Su-Ling Yeh,b Janet H. Hsiaoa aDepartment of Psychology, University of Hong Kong bDepartment of Psychology, National Taiwan University Received 10 June 2014; received in revised form 23 July 2015; accepted 3 August 2015 Abstract Expertise in Chinese character recognition is marked by reduced holistic processing (HP), which depends mainly on writing rather than reading experience. Here we show that, while simpli- fied and traditional Chinese readers demonstrated a similar level of HP when processing characters shared between the simplified and traditional scripts, simplified Chinese readers were less holistic than traditional Chinese readers in perceiving simplified characters; this effect depended mainly on their writing rather than reading performance. However, the two groups did not differ in HP of traditional characters, regardless of their difference in reading and writing performances. Our image analysis showed high visual similarity between the two character types, with a larger vari- ance among simplified characters; this may allow simplified Chinese readers to interpolate and generalize their skills to traditional characters. Thus, transfer of perceptual expertise may be con- strained by both the similarity in feature and the difference in exemplar variance between the cate- gories. Keywords: Holistic processing; Chinese character recognition; Reading; Writing 1. Introduction Holistic processing (i.e., gluing features together into a Gestalt) has been found to be a behavioral visual expertise marker for the recognition of faces (Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and many other nonface objects, such as cars (Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003), fingerprints (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005), and greebles (a kind of artificial stimuli; Gau- thier & Tarr, 1997).
    [Show full text]
  • A "Chinese Eratosthenes" Reconsidered: Chinese and Greek Calculations and Categories1
    134 EASTM 19 (2002) A "Chinese Eratosthenes" Reconsidered: Chinese and Greek Calculations and Categories1 Lisa Raphals [Lisa Raphals is Professor of Chinese and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Riverside. She is author of Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (1992), Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China (1998), and a range of studies in comparative philosophy, history of science and early Taoism. Recent and forthcoming publications include: "The Treatment of Women in a Second-Century Medical Casebook" (Chinese Science, 1998), "Arguments by Women in Early Chinese Texts" (Nan Nü, 2001), and "Fate, Fortune, Chance and Luck in Chinese and Greek: A Comparative Semantic History" (Philosophy East & West 2003, forthcoming).] * * * In the third century B.C.E., Eratosthenes of Cyrene (276-196) attempted to calculate the circumference of the earth using gnomon measurements and the properties of similar triangles. His calculation is widely taken as one of the great achievements of Greek science. In "A Chinese Eratosthenes of the flat earth: a study of a fragment of cosmology in Huai Nan tzu ," Christopher Cullen remarks that a comparison of Greek and Chinese calculations provides a good example of the characteristics of success and failure in science. Eratosthenes had two hypotheses of considerable predictive power, despite the fact that he would have found some difficulty in justifying them: (a) the earth is spherical; (b) the sun is for practical purposes at an infinite distance so that its rays reach the earth sensibly parallel. As it will appear, the Chinese author believed neither of these things.2 1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented in the conference "Rethinking Science and Civilization: The Ideologies, Disciplines, and Rhetorics of World History," Stanford University May 21-23, 1999; at the Needham Research Institute, September 10, 1999; and in the Mathematics Colloquium of the University of California at Riverside (April 27, 2000).
    [Show full text]
  • History of Chinese Economic Thought: Overview and Recent Works
    History of Political Economy 19:3 01987 by Duke University Press CCC 0018-2702/87/$1.50 History of Chinese economic thought: overview and recent works James L. I: Chang The purpose of this essay is twofold: to present an overview of history of Chinese economic thought, and to introduce Chung-kuo ching-chi ssu- hsiang shih (History of Chinese economic thought), untranslated, cited below as the History (3 vols., 1962, 1963, 1981, 1757 pp., Shanghai) by Jichuang Hu. I. Overview of the History of Chinese Economic Thought‘ 1. Literature review While the literature on classical Chinese philosophy and history is vo- luminous in European languages, works on the history of Chinese eco- nomic thought are exceedingly scarce outside China, reflecting in part the formative state of the inquiry in China. Following increased contact with the Western world in the wake of the 1840 Opium War, Chinese intellec- tuals came to be exposed to unfamiliar foreign ideas, and some began to look into their own countrymen’s works in early times. Liang Ch’i-chao (1 873-1929), an eloquent intellectual leader around the turn of the century, analyzed Kuan tzu, Mo Ti, and a few others during 1905-22 (later com- piled in Liang 1936), and inspired generations of learned men. Early publications carrying the title of history of Chinese economic thought include three brief monographs, two of which, authored by Kan (1924) and Hsiong (1 930), were comprehensive but confined to pre-Ch’in times with limited depth, while a third, written by Li Chuan Shih (1926), went beyond the Ch’in dynasty.
    [Show full text]