ABSTRACTS 267 East Asian Security Issues: A Summary Review Kwan-Chi Oh The objective of the paper is to identify emerging security concerns and anxiety in the post-Cold War era in the Asia-Pacific region. Based upon our clear understanding of these factors, we can devise ways to cope with these new security issues. There are at least five reasons for security anxiety: (1) a continuing drawdown of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the advent of economic blocs; (3) the fast rise of China as a future superpower; (4) uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan as a potential superpower; and (5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. The anxiety takes definite forms: misgivings about possible new conflict on the Korean peninsula; the jeopardy of nuclear proliferation; apprehensions about the emerging regional security order, if any; insecurity about the regional economic and trading system; and uneasiness over emerging nonconventional security issues. Because of divergent national interests of major powers in East Asia, it is very unlikely that a stable and cooperative regional security order will emerge unless collective and concerted efforts are made by all countries of the region. In light of the necessity of maintaining a stable security environment congenial to steady economic growth, initiatives must be taken to form a subregional security dialogue in Northeast Asia and then evolve it into a fully institutionalized security arrangement. In Southeast Asia, ARF must be enhanced and institutionalized. These two subregional security arrangements can eventually constitute a region-wide security cooperative regime which may evolve from APEC. KWAN-CHI OH 81 East Asian Security Issues: A Summary Review Kwan-Chi Oh It is paradoxical that Northeast Asian countries, and to a lesser degree Southeast Asian countries, find themselves confronted with a world totally different from the Cold War period. This strange world, in which anxiety rather than certainty and composure is the rule, is not what they expected when the Cold War ended. While the Cold War was being waged, there were no uncertainties about the nature of threats. The identity of both allies and adversaries, the inherent possibility of conflict escalation, and security arrangements were clear to all. The end of the bipolar superpower confrontation, however, fundamentally altered the security envi- ronment and made existing security policies and strategies incon- gruous with reality. As Soviet expansionism ceased to exist, a multitude of unexpected security problems, previously suppressed or unknown, began to emerge. Since the existing security configuration was not designed to address the more complicated, ambiguous and fluid security problems, it is no wonder that countries in the Asia- Pacific region are perplexed with the changed security environment. Asia is groping for a new security arrangement congruent with the new situation. This is particularly so in Northeast Asia where an acute East-West confrontation originated with the outbreak of the Korean War. The problem is exacerbated by the presence of two major regional powers, Japan and China, who have incompatible ideologies and policy orientations, and who compete with each other for regional influence. As the reduction of the US military posture in the region is 82 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS perceived to create a power vacuum, these two regional powers are expected to play a greater regional role for different reasons. China, in spite of its proclaimed “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” is suspected of pursuing expansionism, sometimes overtly and in other cases covertly, by flexing its military muscle. Sharing the same values with North Korea, China is determined to prop up the North Korean regime at the expense of the international community’s confidence. As is succinctly demonstrated by extensive debates on its future role and its return to a “normal state,” Japan does not seem to have settled upon its future regional role in light of the changed strategic environment. The problem with Japan is that much yet remains for it to win confidence from countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, sooner or later, has to formulate its long-term policy toward China as an integral element of its regional security arrangement. The uncertainty surrounding future relations between Japan and China will contribute to and become major sources of the region’s security concerns. Another distinct feature of East Asia is that it is replete with territorial disputes between major regional powers and smaller countries. What makes the region unstable is the fact that these territorial disputes could easily lead to enmity, if not open hostilities, under the new security environment. The unsettled “Northern Territories” issue between Japan and Russia has effectively barred them from not only improving political relations but also advancing economic cooperation. Thus, unless the issue is resolved to both nations’ satisfaction, there is only a remote possibility the two countries will closely cooperate in building confidence and peacefully resolving regional issues. The dispute on the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands between Japan and China is another potential source of regional instability. China seems to have decided not to escalate the issue, though it has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the islands. China’s underlying calculation is quite simple: why should it antagonize Japan when Japanese capital and technology are badly needed for its ambitious economic development? Besides, the much- publicized disputes over the Spratly Islands and several other border disputes have dragged on for years, mainly along the Chinese border. Needless to say, these territorial and border disputes, unless KWAN-CHI OH 83 peacefully resolved, will ferment distrust and enmity, lead to open hostilities, and undermine the stability of the region. Causes for Security Anxiety If anxiety and uncertainty characterize East Asia in the post-Cold War world, what causes this? There may be a multitude of variables or factors effecting anxiety and uncertainty, some of which may have originated from past historical interactions. At the risk of oversimplification, however, it can be argued that the following five primary variables or strategic developments have caused the anxiety: (I) a continuing drawdown of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region; (2) the advent of economic blocs, particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); (3) the rapid rise of China as a future superpower; (4) uncertainties and unpredictability of the future identity of Japan as a potential superpower; and (5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Of the above five variables, no doubt the overriding one is the countries’ perception of a continuing reduction of US military posture in the Asia-Pacific region.’ Thus, deep in their anxiety lies these countries’ perception that the United States will not sustain its present level of political, economic and security engagements within East Asia, This is the case despite the US government’s repeated assurances of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific which has been substantiated by an ample US military presence.’ The first- phase force drawdown from South Korea, Japan and the Philippines for the period 1990 to 1992 (as prescribed by the Nunn-Warner report) was construed as the onset of US military disengagement in the region. This action was painstakingly explained on the grounds of the significantly increased ability of Asian allies in their own defense. No doubt, the United States planned meticulously and acted with prudence. In South Korea, for example, the US planned to retain a 1 Kyung-won Kim, “Korea-US Relationship in Post-Cold War World,” Karetr Focus (April 1994), p. 10. 2 The US Department of Defense, A Strntegic Franiewwrk for the Asiari Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, July 1992, p. 14. 84 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS ground and air presence to deter aggression from North Korea, while US forces would shift from a leading to a supporting role within the coalition. The US made its position clear by proclaiming the transition of South Korea to the leading role in its own defense as an essential element of US long-term strategy. The US also pledged to continue to assist South Korea’s military in force improvement. Further, coalition structures and capabilities will be adjusted to match the strategy through training. Combined exercises such as Team Spirit, among others, and certain capabilities unaffordable and unattainable over the short and middle term such as strategic and operational intelligence, strategic and tactical air power, naval support and selected ground combat capabilities, will continue to be provided. The US has further envisioned that a US force presence would continue as long as the Korean people and government want it and threats to peace and stability remain.3 In November 199 1, the US decided to postpone the planned phase I1 troop reductions in South Korea because of the danger and uncertainty posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Should reductions have been undertaken as planned, the US combat posture in South Korea would be a composite force of one mechanized and one combat aviation brigade, and one tactical fighter wing-roughly one-third of the strength as compared to the beginning of the force adjustment. It was a timely decision which undoubtedly demonstrated the credibility of US policy to countries in the region who had apprehensively been watching to see if the US would live up to its promises. This was particularly so because in July 199 1, the US Air Force abandoned Clark Air Base in the Philippines, a valuable regional logistics hub which suffered extensive damage from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Trust in US commitments was, however, undermined by a sequence of occurrences thereafter. Right after the departure from Clark Air Base, in late December 1991, the US-Philippines negotiations on the possibility of an extended withdrawal agreement ended abruptly.