Dmitry Rogozin: The Struggle for Power Riding the Russian nationalist wave Ruben Eijkelenberg 12104411 Master thesis History University of Amsterdam (UvA) Thesis supervisor: Professor Michael Kemper Table of contents: Preface: 5 Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of Dmitry Rogozin 13 Political awakening 13 Addressing the nation 13 (Re)defining politics 14 Constructing the political spectacle 15 Formative elements 17 Elite self-interest prevails 19 Loyalty and ambition 21 Building a platform 21 A failed attempt to regain control 24 The Kremlin improved its game 25 An inglorious retreat 29 Generating prominence in a changing political reality 30 A rising star 30 Reconstructing Russia’s greatness 31 Centralizing power 32 Rodina 33 Leading the Opposition 39 Taking control 39 Opportunities gone sour 40 Chapter 2: Rogozin’s great return 46 Political revival 46 A changing ideological reality 47 Recentralizing power 47 2 Russia’s path 48 Modernism versus post-modernism 50 Relationship based on equality 50 Alternative reasoning 51 A new approach 51 The unipolar principle under attack 54 Defending the rights of Russians abroad 56 National idea 56 Transnistria 58 A window of opportunity? 59 European disdain 61 Changing dynamic 63 Political intermezzo? 64 Ambassador to NATO 66 A significant appointment 66 Russia-NATO relations 67 Putin’s reinvigoration of Russia-NATO relations fails 69 An (un)expected comeback 71 Calling for support 72 The Georgian War 73 Serving international and domestic interests 77 Chapter 3: Rising to power 80 Rogozin’s return to Moscow 80 Public protest 80 Russia’s changing identity framework 82 State managed nationalism 83 Legitimizing power 85 A worthy competitor 86 Riding the nationalist tiger 88 3 Rogozin’s ever recurring political ambition 91 Rogozin’s role in the Ukraine crisis 91 Conclusion 95 Bibliography 100 4 Preface: Right after the annexation of Crimea, the West1 started to impose sanctions on Russian and Ukrainian officials as punishment for Russia’s support of Crimea’s referendum. The sanctioned individuals were the ‘key ideologists and architects’ of Russia’s Ukraine policy.2 Among them: Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. A member of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s government, responsible for the armed forces and arms industry. Known for his hawkish attitude and outspoken nationalist-patriotic rhetoric3, Rogozin strongly rejected the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions during an interview with Rossiya-1 television channel and pointed at the true cause for the sanctions. The Ukrainian crisis was only an excuse to issue the sanctions and a tool to exert pressure on Russia: ‘The real cause was the assumed course towards the independent development of our country, the course towards the independent political policy, the course towards the restoration of the economic might of our country.’4 Despite the fact that Rogozin’s statement hints towards Russia’s increasing assertiveness in foreign politics, the reference to its independent political course and the restoration of the country’s economic might reflects upon the internal development Russia’s political system and society went trough during the last two decades. It touches upon one of the crucial problems of contemporary Russia – the ability to determine the boundaries of its political community.5 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the image of the so-called ‘we’ has become distorted; Russia was confronted with problems of state-building and nation-building, and the ‘Russian people’ experienced difficulties in getting used to the new borders and their new social identification.6 Russia went trough an ‘identity crisis’ and had to find new foundations for its political existence. A quest that continues today. 1 Starting from March 2014 the United States, European Union, Canada, Australia, Norway and a number of international organisations sanctioned individuals, businesses and officials from Russia and Ukraine as a punishment for their role in the Ukrainian crisis. 2 Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Ukraine (2014), The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, available on: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/background-briefing-senior-administration- officials-ukraine (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 3 Rogozin has provoked the West by commenting on the annexation of Crimea via his Twitter account. ‘Crimea. Every stone, every square metre of this land is soaked with Russian blood. That’s why it’s ours’ and ‘Sevastopol.. A city of glory of our fathers & mothers, our great ancestors, as V. Putin said “returned to the home harbour, -to Russia”’, Dmitry Rogozin’s official Twitter account, post of 17 July 2014. Available at: https://twitter.com/drogozin, (Accessed on: 18 June 2015). 4 Russia’s independent political course real cause for Western sanctions — Russian deputy PM (2015), TASS – Russian News Agency (2015), available on: http://tass.ru/en/russia/773254 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 5 Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11 (2008), 174. 6 Emil Pain, ‘Russia between empire and nation’ in: Russian politics and Law, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March-April 2009), 60. 5 Russia’s political system has been labelled by Vladislav Surkov7 as a ‘sovereign democracy’: a regime, which carries two simultaneous messages to Russian society. The first message being that we are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia’s sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats.8 This new ideological horizon is generally conceived as a hypocritical screen9 constructed as a means to galvanize the electorate in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, instead of dismissing the new-found ideology as utter nonsense unable to find support of both the political elite and the general public, it should be conceived as one of the most characteristic manifestations of Russia’s current political nature. The foundation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ is an attempt to secure autonomy of the domestic political space, to protect it from outside influences and to guarantee the sovereignty of Russian democracy.10 The independent political course mentioned by Rogozin. Russia’s identity debate on the national composition of the country and in particular the question ‘who belongs?’ – ethnic or civic nationalism – has taken central stage over the past decade. Putin clearly understood that ethnic nationalism could seriously endanger Russia’s unity and therefore chose to support the establishment of civic nation.11 Nevertheless, the tide changed and ethno nationalism gained prominence over its civic alternative. After the Kremlin had dealt with the liberal opposition – the fifth column responsible for the antinational reforms of the 1990s – while constructing its ‘vertical of power’, the regime was confronted with a much more powerful and vocal nationalist opposition that found broad support in society. United Russia was well aware of the challenge they were facing and started changing both United Russia’s tone of voice by fitting in the inclusive civic version of patriotism and the composition of Russia’s political system. 7 Vladislav Surkov is often characterized as the ‘gray cardinal’ - a behind-the-scenes manipulator. For more than a decade, he has helped shape the ideological message of Russia’s leaders, its governing party, United Russia, of parties in opposition to United Russia, its youth movements, and virtually anything widely published or broadcast in the country. (Ellen Barry, Operating in the Shadows of Power in Russia (2011), The New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/world/europe/after-putin-and-medvedev-vladislav-surkov-is-russias-power- broker.html?_r=0 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 8 Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project? (2007), Russia in Global Affairs, Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9123 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 9 Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2008), 155. 10 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 163. 11 Vera Tolz, ‘A Search for a National Identity in Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russia’ in: Yitzhak M. Brudny, Sefani Hoffman and Jonathan Frankel, eds, Restructuring Post-Communist Russia (Cambridge, 2004), 160–78. 6 Putin emphasised the importance of the creation of Russia’s ‘we’ in his speech at the 10th Valdai International Discussion Club while elaborating on Russia’s new foreign policy identity. The question who we are and who we want to be are not only of increasing importance for the Russian society, it moreover gives direction to Russia’s future foreign policy and supports the Russian leadership in defining national interests. What is the essence of Russian identity? What are the key elements of this identity? And last but not least, is the identity restrictive or inclusive to many peoples and countries of the former Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union?12 Central questions in the debate on the construction the Russian ‘we’ in which not only influenced foreign policy, but has also been normative in the creation of Russia’s national political equilibrium. Putin strives to enhance national unity and attempts to install uniformity within the limits of the nation.13 A prominent voice in Russia’s identity debate and someone whose career displays its impact on Russia’s political constitution is Dmitry Rogozin. As one of the protagonists of the nationalist-patriotic movement in Russia over the last two decades, Rogozin has been actively involved in a number of different political organizations.