: The Struggle for Power

Riding the Russian nationalist wave

Ruben Eijkelenberg 12104411 Master thesis History University of Amsterdam (UvA) Thesis supervisor: Professor Michael Kemper Table of contents:

Preface: 5

Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of Dmitry Rogozin 13

Political awakening 13

Addressing the nation 13 (Re)defining politics 14 Constructing the political spectacle 15 Formative elements 17 Elite self-interest prevails 19

Loyalty and ambition 21

Building a platform 21 A failed attempt to regain control 24 The Kremlin improved its game 25 An inglorious retreat 29

Generating prominence in a changing political reality 30

A rising star 30 Reconstructing ’s greatness 31 Centralizing power 32 Rodina 33

Leading the Opposition 39

Taking control 39 Opportunities gone sour 40

Chapter 2: Rogozin’s great return 46

Political revival 46

A changing ideological reality 47 Recentralizing power 47 2

Russia’s path 48 Modernism versus post-modernism 50 Relationship based on equality 50

Alternative reasoning 51 A new approach 51 The unipolar principle under attack 54

Defending the rights of abroad 56 National idea 56 Transnistria 58 A window of opportunity? 59 European disdain 61 Changing dynamic 63

Political intermezzo? 64

Ambassador to NATO 66 A significant appointment 66 Russia-NATO relations 67 Putin’s reinvigoration of Russia-NATO relations fails 69 An (un)expected comeback 71 Calling for support 72 The Georgian War 73 Serving international and domestic interests 77

Chapter 3: Rising to power 80

Rogozin’s return to 80 Public protest 80 Russia’s changing identity framework 82 State managed 83 Legitimizing power 85 A worthy competitor 86 Riding the nationalist tiger 88

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Rogozin’s ever recurring political ambition 91 Rogozin’s role in the crisis 91

Conclusion 95

Bibliography 100

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Preface:

Right after the annexation of Crimea, the West1 started to impose sanctions on Russian and Ukrainian officials as punishment for Russia’s support of Crimea’s referendum. The sanctioned individuals were the ‘key ideologists and architects’ of Russia’s Ukraine policy.2 Among them: Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. A member of Prime Minister ’s government, responsible for the armed forces and arms industry. Known for his hawkish attitude and outspoken nationalist-patriotic rhetoric3, Rogozin strongly rejected the effectiveness of the imposed sanctions during an interview with Rossiya-1 television channel and pointed at the true cause for the sanctions. The Ukrainian crisis was only an excuse to issue the sanctions and a tool to exert pressure on Russia:

‘The real cause was the assumed course towards the independent development of our country, the course towards the independent political policy, the course towards the restoration of the economic might of our country.’4

Despite the fact that Rogozin’s statement hints towards Russia’s increasing assertiveness in foreign politics, the reference to its independent political course and the restoration of the country’s economic might reflects upon the internal development Russia’s political system and society went trough during the last two decades. It touches upon one of the crucial problems of contemporary Russia – the ability to determine the boundaries of its political community.5 After the dissolution of the the image of the so-called ‘we’ has become distorted; Russia was confronted with problems of state-building and nation-building, and the ‘Russian people’ experienced difficulties in getting used to the new borders and their new social identification.6 Russia went trough an ‘identity crisis’ and had to find new foundations for its political existence. A quest that continues today.

1 Starting from March 2014 the United States, , Canada, Australia, Norway and a number of international organisations sanctioned individuals, businesses and officials from Russia and Ukraine as a punishment for their role in the Ukrainian crisis. 2 Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Ukraine (2014), The White House – Office of the Press Secretary, available on: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/background-briefing-senior-administration- officials-ukraine (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 3 Rogozin has provoked the West by commenting on the annexation of Crimea via his account. ‘Crimea. Every stone, every square metre of this land is soaked with Russian blood. That’s why it’s ours’ and ‘Sevastopol.. A city of glory of our fathers & mothers, our great ancestors, as V. Putin said “returned to the home harbour, -to Russia”’, Dmitry Rogozin’s official Twitter account, post of 17 July 2014. Available at: https://twitter.com/drogozin, (Accessed on: 18 June 2015). 4 Russia’s independent political course real cause for Western sanctions — Russian deputy PM (2015), TASS – Russian News Agency (2015), available on: http://tass.ru/en/russia/773254 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 5 Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11 (2008), 174. 6 Emil Pain, ‘Russia between empire and nation’ in: Russian politics and Law, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March-April 2009), 60. 5

Russia’s political system has been labelled by Vladislav Surkov7 as a ‘sovereign democracy’: a regime, which carries two simultaneous messages to Russian society. The first message being that we are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia’s sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats.8 This new ideological horizon is generally conceived as a hypocritical screen9 constructed as a means to galvanize the electorate in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, instead of dismissing the new-found ideology as utter nonsense unable to find support of both the political elite and the general public, it should be conceived as one of the most characteristic manifestations of Russia’s current political nature. The foundation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ is an attempt to secure autonomy of the domestic political space, to protect it from outside influences and to guarantee the sovereignty of Russian democracy.10 The independent political course mentioned by Rogozin.

Russia’s identity debate on the national composition of the country and in particular the question ‘who belongs?’ – ethnic or civic nationalism – has taken central stage over the past decade. Putin clearly understood that ethnic nationalism could seriously endanger Russia’s unity and therefore chose to support the establishment of civic nation.11 Nevertheless, the tide changed and ethno nationalism gained prominence over its civic alternative. After the Kremlin had dealt with the liberal opposition – the fifth column responsible for the antinational reforms of the 1990s – while constructing its ‘vertical of power’, the regime was confronted with a much more powerful and vocal nationalist opposition that found broad support in society. was well aware of the challenge they were facing and started changing both United Russia’s tone of voice by fitting in the inclusive civic version of patriotism and the composition of Russia’s political system.

7 is often characterized as the ‘gray cardinal’ - a behind-the-scenes manipulator. For more than a decade, he has helped shape the ideological message of Russia’s leaders, its governing party, United Russia, of parties in opposition to United Russia, its youth movements, and virtually anything widely published or broadcast in the country. (Ellen Barry, Operating in the Shadows of Power in Russia (2011), The New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/world/europe/after-putin-and-medvedev-vladislav-surkov-is--power- broker.html?_r=0 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 8 Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project? (2007), Russia in Global Affairs, Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9123 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015). 9 Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia: a modern subject faces the post-modern world’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2008), 155. 10 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 163. 11 Vera Tolz, ‘A Search for a National Identity in Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Russia’ in: Yitzhak M. Brudny, Sefani Hoffman and Jonathan Frankel, eds, Restructuring Post-Communist Russia (Cambridge, 2004), 160–78. 6

Putin emphasised the importance of the creation of Russia’s ‘we’ in his speech at the 10th Valdai International Discussion Club while elaborating on Russia’s new foreign policy identity. The question who we are and who we want to be are not only of increasing importance for the Russian society, it moreover gives direction to Russia’s future foreign policy and supports the Russian leadership in defining national interests. What is the essence of Russian identity? What are the key elements of this identity? And last but not least, is the identity restrictive or inclusive to many peoples and countries of the former Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union?12 Central questions in the debate on the construction the Russian ‘we’ in which not only influenced foreign policy, but has also been normative in the creation of Russia’s national political equilibrium. Putin strives to enhance national unity and attempts to install uniformity within the limits of the nation.13

A prominent voice in Russia’s identity debate and someone whose career displays its impact on Russia’s political constitution is Dmitry Rogozin. As one of the protagonists of the nationalist-patriotic movement in Russia over the last two decades, Rogozin has been actively involved in a number of different political organizations. Rogozin was appointed as head of the nationalist-patriotic parliamentary party Rodina – the party received 9.2 per cent of the votes in the 2003 Parliamentary Duma elections, a remarkable result for a new party – but left the political stage already in 2006. After United Russia pressurized Rogozin because of his increasing oppositionist standpoint towards the party of power. However, in 2008 Rogozin was unexpectedly appointed by Putin as Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was even recalled by president Medvedev from Brussels at the end of 2011 to serve in the Russian government as Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the government’s Military-Industrial Commission. Positions he still occupies today. After Rodina’s return to the political stage in 2012, Rogozin allegedly resumed his leadership position of the party and was expected to use it as his personal political vehicle like Medvedev had done with Just Russia in 2007. What position Rogozin exactly fulfilled in the political system during his political career and how his nationalist- patriotic standpoints were valued over time, will be discussed in the current thesis. His involvement in and criticism towards Russia’s foreign policy of the last two decades will be embedded in the analysis of his role within the internal political constellation. Rogozin’s

12 Meets with Members the Valdai International Discussion Club. Transcript of the Speech and the Meeting (2013), Valdai Discussion Club, Available at: http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html (Accessed on: 27 May 20115). 13 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 173. 7

interference in the foreign conflicts and his assignment as Special Presidential Representative for Transnistria in 2012, are not only of importance to understand the impact of Rogozin’s ideology with regard to foreign politics but also reflect upon the development Russia’s foreign policy went trough as a derivative of Russia’s national political developments.

The current international crisis and the intensifying sense of strategic dissonance between Russia and the West did not occur only recently. It comes forth from a deteriorating process in which a number of wider and longer-term problems became increasingly visible over time. After a period in which Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin reached out to the West in order to modernize Russia and reverse its impoverished condition, the leadership realised the West was not willing to modernize its cooperation model with Russia. Despite Putin’s effort to improve the relationship with NATO and other leading Western powers, he was confronted with the Western unwillingness to cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The relationship started to deteriorate.14 Putin criticized the monopolistic dominance in global relations of the United States. He emphasized that Russia was in favour of a democratic multi- polar world and of strengthening the systems of international law. A dialogue was required, but could only be successful when the equality of both parties’ interests would be acknowledged.15 Russia’s foreign policy was no longer submissive to its long aspired wish to improve its relationship with the West. Russia regained its self-confidence and conducted a policy that was increasingly assertive.

Russia’s reaction to the formal request of the Crimean government to annex the peninsula is exemplary for the development the country has lived trough in the last two decades. Putin’s statement in which he emphasises that ‘Russia will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means – from political to economic to operational humanitarian law and the right of self-defence’16 is by no means new and has also been used by predecessor in the mid-1990s. The vigour with which Putin lives up to the statement distinguishes him however from Yeltsin. When Crimea’s president Yuri Meshkov flew to Moscow in 1994 to seek help against Ukraine, shortly after his successful

14 Stanislav Belkovski, Vladimir. De waarheid over Poetin (2014), 166-170. 15 Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy (2007), Kremlin – Diplomacy and External Affairs, Available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml (Accessed on: 12-02-2015). 16 Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives (2014), Kremlin – , Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46131 (Accessed on: 27 May 2015).

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election campaign, the Yeltsin government was not willing to receive him officially. Meshkov was told to act with restraint and not hope for Russian support for any moves that would risk conflict with Kiev. Official or military support for Russian secessionist movements failed to occur. 17 Putin on the other hand does not only use Russia’s image as the patron of all Russians as a rhetorical figure of speech, but acts accordingly. A worker of a Moscow archive tellingly remarked in the late 1990s, while discussing a flag burning ritual in front of the U.S. embassy as part of a protest against the situation in the Balkans, that patriotic rhetoric is cheap and no one was willing to sacrifice his interests for the country: ‘Big deal to burn the flag. I would like to see one person who would burn one American dollar’.18 This situation changed drastically. The Western sanctions, issued after the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s assumed role in the Eastern Ukrainian insurgency, do not only harm the financial interests of the higher echelons of society but are a direct attack on the Russian leadership. After the value of the rouble and the price of crude oil sharply decreased, Russia fears an economic recession of which its economy will only slowly recover over the coming years. However, social unrest failed to occur and the Russian people seem to be prepared to sacrifice some of their interests for the benefit of Russia’s position in the international conflict. Did Putin succeed in creating a mighty nationalistic state that was both respected and feared by the West and in which the Russian people was prepared to pay the price for its international political stance? Or is it the other way around and should the aggressive foreign policy be conceived as a reflection of the nationalistic sentiments that started to dominate the internal political affairs of Russia and the need for Putin to behave accordingly?

The nationalist-leaning forces have been pushed to the forefront of Russia’s political agenda, both within the international as well as the national - changing Russia’s political landscape considerably.19 The political factions that were previously regarded as being relegated to the margins of society have become central to Russia’s political discourse. Rogozin’s political career has been exemplary for this development. Instead of being an oppositional figure in the periphery of the Russian political constellation, Rogozin now holds a prominent position in the centre of the Russian political discourse and exercises power. The discourse changed and Rogozin seemed a true asset for Putin’s government to meet the needs of and answer to the nationalist-patriotic beliefs of the Russian people that grew stronger over

17 A. Lieven, ‘The weakness of ’ in: Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1999), 59. 18 Dmitry Shlapentokh, ‘The illusions and realities of Russian nationalism’ in: The Washington Quaterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, 179. 19 Rafael Khachaturian, ‘The Specter of Russian Nationalism’ in: Dissent, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2009), 19. 9

time. The current research will focus on the life and career of Dmitry Rogozin, with the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic sentiments and the consequences of its dominance for the internal political constellation as central themes. The central question in the broader perspective is pointed at the extent to which the current events should be regarded as the start of a new tendency in Russia’s political discourse? If so, where did it come from and when did it start? Is it a consequence of Russia’s regained self-confidence and self-awareness as a super power during the Putin-era? And how does it relate to Russia’s identity debate and the new ideological horizon of the sovereign democracy? And more specifically with regard to Rogozin, what did his appointment as Permanent Representative to NATO and his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Military-Industrial Commission truly mean? Did the government sincerely intend to give a stronger nationalist-patriotic voice to its own image, or was his appointment a way to eliminate Rogozin by co-optation or by entrusting him an impossible task to perform in order to prove his incapability and eliminate him as an actual threat to Russia’s political power balance? Or with regard to the his alleged re-instatement as leader of Rodina in 2012, did the government need Rogozin and Rodina as a means to provide an alternative for Alexei Navalny’s Progress Party (former: People’s Alliance) after the Bolotnaya demonstrations of 2012 to diffuse its support in Russian society? In general, what does the development of Dmitry Rogozin’s career tell us about the evolution of Russia’s political system and to what extent has the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic sentiments influenced Russia’s internal political constellation in general and Rogozin’s career in particular?

Rogozin’s biographical delineation will be subdivided in three chapters, in which the division between the different chapters has been determined by combining the defining moments in his personal and professional life and key moments in Russia’s contemporary political history. The first chapter starts with Rogozin’s political awakening and ends with his premature disappearance from the political stage in 2006. Since the sources on his political activities in the late ‘80s are limited, Rogozin’s involvement in the coming to power of Yeltsin and the collapse of the Soviet Union has been chosen as starting point. Subsequently his involvement in the Union of the Russian Revival, the Transnistria secession movement, and the Congress of Russian Communities will be discussed. The 1993 constitutional crisis has been chosen as the next historical demarcation to provide an insight in Yeltsin’s internal political affairs, his attempt to dismiss parliament, his way of dealing with the political opposition and the use of

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Chechnya as a political instrument. Subsequently I switch over to the next defining moment in contemporary Russian history: the election of Vladimir Putin as president of the Russian Federation. Here I will not only elaborate on the change that was implemented in the internal political system, but once again on the way the war in Chechnya played a role in politics and how the ties with the US deteriorated. Finally, Rogozin’s involvement in Rodina, the relationship of the party with the party of power, the 2003 parliamentary elections, the protests surrounding the monetisation law and his disappearance from the political stage will be discussed.

The second chapter will mainly focus on Rogozin’s appointment as Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which effectively meant a turning point in his political career. The Russo-Georgian war, which redefined Russia’s relationship with the West, played a major role in this particular timeframe. Rogozin suddenly held a prominent position in the centre of the Russian political sphere and exercised real power. These defining moments in Rogozin’s personal career took place during the changeover of Putin and Medvedev. What this effectively meant for the political constellation of Russia and the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic sentiments in society will be elaborated upon. Important to note is that this chapter will not focus on Rogozin’s daily work in Brussels, but mainly on the political timeframe he was appointed in and the role he played in it. The final chapter addresses the current developments, starting with Rogozin’s appointment as Deputy Prime Minister in 2011 and his position as Head of the government’s Military-Industrial Commission, all within the framework of Putin’s presidential election campaign of 2012 in a period of severe popular protests and the deteriorating relations with foreign powers with the annexation of Crimea and the role of Russia in the Eastern Ukrainian insurgency as its climax. His alleged position as leader of Rodina after the party returned in the national political arena in 2012 and the consequences of his re-alignment will also be discussed in the final chapter.

It is of importance to clearly emphasise that the current thesis is not intended as an indicator for future developments. No one knows what the future holds for Russia. The decision to study the development of Russian nationalism by writing a biographical piece on Rogozin has been made for a reason. To write a scientific account on such a contemporary theme is already a challenge. I therefore do not intent to speculate on things I cannot foresee and will therefore restrict my research solely to Rogozin’s biographical sources. By embedding them into the

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contemporary Russian political history I will explain what caused Rogozin’s rise to power. Besides studying scientific accounts on Russian nationalism, Russia’s foreign policy, its relationship with NATO and of course accounts on Russian domestic politics and its multi- party system, I will also use articles and interviews in international newspapers, television items and statements made via social media. Rogozin wrote several books and articles on different topics, his autobiographical account ‘The Hawks of Peace. Notes of the Russian Ambassador’ (2012) will however take centre stage in my thesis. The book is not only of interest because Rogozin extensively elaborates on his ideological motivations for his political actions, it is above all an account of its time worth studying for the topics mentioned but maybe even more for the topics not mentioned by Rogozin. Rewriting history with a reason: establishing a legacy in the contemporary Russian political arena. Rogozin’s life story will enable the reader to get a deeper insight into the development of Russia’s political system and society, an insight that has not been provided yet. Rogozin is a topic worth studying and a story worth telling.

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Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of Dmitry Rogozin

Political awakening

Addressing the nation:

‘On the balcony everything was set up for ‘revolutionary leaders’ to address the crowd. In a mere two years these ‘leaders’20would be ripping at each other’s throats over the division of power and would flood the streets of Moscow in puddles of blood of their supporters.. But on that day, 20 August 1991, they stood together, and the human sea beneath them moved and hummed. ... I cannot remember exactly what the freshly resigned Minister of Foreign Affairs was saying but I do remember what happened after his speech. The spokesman said good bye to the “Great Georgian”, turned around, spotted me and inquired, barely hiding his annoyance, “So, are you going to speak, or what?” ... That day saw the awakening of a politician in me.’21

Dmitry Rogozin’s political awakening coincided with one of the key moments in Russia’s contemporary history: the August coup of 1991. Determined by the need to prevent the Union Treaty22 from being signed, the coup was regarded as the last chance to prevent the Union from disintegrating. The indecisiveness and incompetence of the conspirators against Gorbachev, however, greatly hastened the outcome they wished to avoid: the collapse of the Soviet Union.23 was the major victor of the botched coup. While Gorbachev’s resistance to the coup had been hidden from the world, Yeltsin seized the moment. He made his way to the White House, climbed one of the tanks strategically positioned by the conspirators and addressed the nation in the presence of foreign media. Yeltsin emphasised that regardless of the reasons given for the removal from power of the legally elected president, methods of force were unacceptable. Although Yeltsin underlined the importance of the return of Gorbachev as the legally elected president, the relationship between both leaders had changed considerably after the putsch. Gorbachev was increasingly willing to cooperate with Yeltsin in order to secure the Union Treaty and therewith the Soviet Union.

20 President Yeltsin, Vice-President Rutskoy, Chairman of Congress Khasbulatov, Atafiev, Shevardnadze, and many more. 21 Dmitry Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace. Notes from the Russian ambassador (London, 2013), 59-60. The content of Rogozin’s speech is impossible to trace back. 22 The New Union Treaty (Russian: Новый союзный договор) was a draft treaty that would have replaced the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the USSR and thus would have replaced the Soviet Union by a new entity named the Union of Sovereign States, an attempt of Mikhail Gorbachev to salvage and reform the Soviet state. A ceremony of the Russian SFSR signing the treaty was scheduled for 20 August 1991, but was prevented by the Soviet coup attempt of 1991 a day earlier. The preparation of this treaty was known as the Novo-Ogarevo process, named after Novo-Ogaryovo, a governmental estate where the work on the document was carried out and where Gorbachev talked with leaders of Union republics. 23 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 568. 13

Yeltsin however was no longer interested in sharing power. The whole political context had changed24. The events of August 1991 had a profound influence on the course of Rogozin’s life; it was his first political experience and.

(Re)defining politics:

The political transition Russia went trough at the beginning of the 1990s had a big impact on the constellation of its future political system. The manner in which Russia’s ‘instable’ and ‘(dys)functional’ contemporary multi-party system25 came into being and the motivations of the political elite involved in its creation, will be discussed in the current chapter. It is the starting point in getting a better understanding of the development of both Russia’s political system as well as Rogozin’s position in it.

Exemplary for the dynamic and development of Russia’s multi-party system is the manner in which the first elections were initiated when Russia was still part of the Soviet Union. As part of the Soviet Union’s ‘reform from above’26, Gorbachev called for elections in 1989 for the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies. The elections were officially intended as an endorsement for reform, but in reality reflected the elite’s desire to stay in control. Instead of conducting competitive elections to stimulate the diversification of the political spectrum, all candidates needed to be members of the CPSU. No other political parties were allowed to participate. Next to that, by letting the voters choose between several candidates Gorbachev enabled himself to eliminate CPSU hardliners who resisted Perestroika and Glasnost. Reform in this sense meant the party leadership tried to enforce its grip on politics and secure their dominance. Candidates and reform movements abstained from creating political parties, which was the reason why the Russian parliament was not constituted along party lines.27 Nevertheless, the fact that Gorbachev called for elections signalled a promising start of a transition in Russian politics.

The collapse of the Soviet Union however disturbed the process considerably. Despite the fact that no other political parties except for the CPSU were allowed to participate in the elections of 1989 or even had been established, there was an increasing number of societal movements

24 Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 571. 25 Jonathan W. Riggs and Peter J. Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’ in: Demokratizatsiya, Vol.12, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), 26. 26 Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 266. 27 Michael M. McFaul, and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Political Parties, Programs, and Profiles (Stanford, 1993), 21. 14

that potentially could be transformed into real political parties. A diversification of the political system was under way, which signalled an increasing connectedness between society and the political realm. This development was cut short and even reversed when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Jonathan Riggs and Peter Schrader emphasize that it ‘severed the connection of the party system to society and left it to be reconstituted from above by elites in circumstances that limited its connections with the society and the political system’.28 Under these circumstances, the parties started to be dominated by the old elite again; a development that was reinforced in the following election cycles. With the societal circumstances being increasingly hardened by the austerity of the economic reforms, the Russian people retreated from political involvement. The political party roots in society became shallower rather than deeper, which made the party system even more vulnerable to elite interests.

Closely related to the limited connectedness between the civil society and the political realm is the marginal role of political parties in Russia. Neither Yeltsin nor the parliamentary members owed their political positions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to party connections. They legitimized themselves on the basis of being popularly elected, although under the old system.29 ‘Politics became the province of technocratic elites applying democratic formulas from above’.30 The parliament and the president were also not linked to each other by party affiliations. The creation of the Russian presidency in March 1991 was a move by Yeltsin and his allies to secure his hold over power by providing him with a direct electoral mandate in order to protect him from the increasingly conservative Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union.31 The collapse of the Soviet Union highlighted the confrontational relationship between the Russian president and the Soviet parliament. The ill- defined constitution did not clarify who was the dominant force. Only after the bloodshed of October 1993 it became clear that the president prevailed. All of these developments turned the proto-parties32 into pseudo parties33 in the period prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union up to the renewed Constitution of December 1993.

Constructing the political spectacle:

28 Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 266. 29 Ibidem, 267. 30 Ibidem, 267. 31 Ibidem, 267. 32 Proto-parties: parties in an early stage of development. 33 Pseudo-parties: mere imitations of parties. 15

The increasing ability of the political elite to (re)construct Russia’s political landscape is a central theme in the current thesis. To be able to properly understand the political system and the way in which the increasing dominance of the political elite is translated into real political power, I will first discuss the delineation of the political system by Richard Sakwa and Andrew Wilson in order to construct an analytical framework which supports my analysis of the development of Russia’s political system. Important to note is that the applicability of the framework increases as we get closer to the present time.

Richard Sakwa makes a subdivision between two systems. According to him, ‘contemporary Russian politics are characterized as a struggle between the ‘formal constitutional order’, what we call the normative state; and a second world of informal relations, factional conflict and para-constitutional political practices, termed as the administrative regime.’34 Sakwa uses the term ‘para-constitutional’ because the political regime and its factions do not repudiate the formal constitutional framework but operate within its institutional constraints while subverting its spirit.35 Although this subdivision is not solely restricted to the Russian case and is also applicable to the political system in other countries, the fervour and openness with which the Russian elite employs itself of para-constitutional practices is exceptional. This was the reason why the democratic movement of the early 1990s was quickly marginalized, the development of independent parties frustrated and the elite was able to reaffirm its position.

Wilson characterised Russia’s political system as a ‘many-layered pie’: that is, ‘running a variety of ancillary projects to the main ‘party of power’ under various forms of disguise. The pie project gives the authorities more than one throw of the dice. It allows more controversial aspects of official politics to be contracted out, opprobrium to be shared or placed elsewhere, and plausible deniable preserved. Conversely, it also allows various opposition functions to be subcontracted to actors whose covert links to the authorities mean their opposition will never be particularly vigorous. Finally, the pie principle provides the governing elite with a virtual chorus, a supposedly autonomous plurality of opinion that in fact echoes the main priorities of the elite.’36

The many-layered pie principle is closely related to Vladislav Surkov’s definition of Russia’s political system as a ‘sovereign democracy’, in which the government carries two

34 Richard Sakwa, ‘The Dual State in Russia’ in: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2010), 185. 35 Sakwa, ‘The Dual State in Russia’, 185. 36 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, 119. 16

simultaneous messages to Russian society: the first message states that we are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia’s sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats. The foundation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ is an attempt to secure autonomy of the domestic political space, to protect it from outside influences and to guarantee the sovereignty of Russian democracy.37

Formative elements:

Although the many-layered pie principle was only at its initial phase in the early 1990s38, some features can already be distinguished in Rogozin’s involvement in the non-communist patriotic opposition movement in 1990-91 known as the Russian Popular Assembly. Not so much directly with regard to Rogozin’s own position in the political system, but more with regard to the people he was affiliated with at the time. Rogozin had already been politically active since his involvement in the Committee of Youth Organizations in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. However, despite his experience he was not yet in a position to take a leading role in the political system. Nevertheless, his involvement in the period prior to the first free post-Soviet competitive elections has influenced his political career significantly. Especially his ideological stance in politics. The core of the Russian Popular Assembly Rogozin was involved in during the period between 1990 and 1993, was a coalition consisting of three political groups: the Democratic Platform Party of Russia, headed by Nikolay Travkin; the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement led by the energetic philosopher Victor Aksyuchitz; and the Constitutional Democratic Party – the so-called Party of National Freedom – headed by Michael Astafiev.39 The Constitutional Democratic Party and their prominent figures Astafiev, Pavel Milyukov and Pyotr Struve in particular appealed to Rogozin.40

The coalition of the Russian Popular Assembly was a loose coalition and did not make it until the elections of 1993. Conceived as a centrist opposition force, the Russian Democratic Party of Nikolay Travkin was the only one of the former coalition that was able to participate in the 1993 Duma elections. The party focussed on Russia’s sovereignty, development of market

37 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 163. 38 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120. 39 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 50. 40 Ibidem. 17

relations, turning government-run enterprises into stock companies, and raising the living standard of the nation.41 Significant for Travkin’s position in the political equilibrium was the fact that he supported Yeltsin’s Decree No. 1400 of 21 September 1993, which effectively dismissed the constitutional reform under discussion and disbanded the Congress of People’s Deputies. The dissolved parliament needed to be replaced with an entirely new federal legislative structure and accommodate president Yeltsin with increased executive powers.42 The development of Travkin’s political career shows a similar picture.

Already in May 1990 Travkin was involved in the split of the Democratic Party of Russia. The party that was potentially ‘the’ party for the urban Russian intelligentsia with an anti- Kremlin attitude. Travkin played his role as ‘the mole from within’ and caused the party to split. The more fundamental anti-communist members such as Lev Ponomarev left the party and in April and December 1991 the party once more went trough two formal schisms. In 1993 the party was able to win 5.5 per cent of the votes in the Duma elections, but soon after split into a pro- (Travkin) and anti-Kremlin faction.43 If we consider the further course of his career we can determine his role in the political system even better. Travkin would become active for Our Home is Russia, Yabloko and finally in the Union of Right Forces, all parties regarded as loyal satellite projects of the Kremlin. Although the numerous switches to different parties is not uncommon, a closer look at the background of the above mentioned parties suggests Travkin’s close relationship with the Kremlin. He served his superiors well and fulfilled his job within the many-layered pie with grace.

The other two parties involved in the Russian Popular Assembly do not provide us with a closer insight in the way the political system functioned, but deserve some attention since they give us a deeper insight in the ideology Rogozin felt connected to right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian-Christian Democratic Movement could be regarded as a representative of the xenophobic and ultra-nationalist streak in Russian politics.44 The group was hardly Christian and definitely not democratic. Party-leader Aksyuchin was not able to gather the minimum amount of signatures to participate in the 1993 Duma elections. The Constitutional-Democratic Party (The Party of People’s Freedom) also failed to qualify for the elections. It was an ultra-nationalist party governed by Russian chauvinists like Mikhail

41 Jeffrey B. Gayner, Natalia Kuznetsova and Ariel Cohen, ‘Who’s who in the Russian elections’ in: F.Y.I. (Washington D.C., 1993), 5. 42 Gayner, Kuznetsova and Cohen, ‘Who’s who in the Russian elections’, 5. 43 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 152. 44 Gayner, Kuznetsova and Cohen, ‘Who’s who in the Russian elections’, 7. 18

Astafiev, anti-Semitists like Alexander Shafarevich and people with a background in security services like Alexander Nevzorov.45 The party developed from a pro-reform and pro- democracy position and even as member of the Democratic Russia coalition - until late 1991 - into a nationalist opposition to Yeltsin. After Astafiev decided to join the radical communist- nationalist opposition to the Yeltsin government with the Constitutional-Democratic Party, a number of party members resigned. Both the Russian-Christian Democratic Movement and the Constitutional-Democratic Party were only minor political players. However, with regard to analysing Rogozin they were the first organizations in which Rogozin publicly demonstrated his ideological stance. Rogozin was mainly concerned with the management and communication strategies of the party and supported the foundation of the first regional branches in Obninsk, Perm, and Leningrad.

Elite self-interest prevails:

Despite the temporary cooperation between all opposition figures and parties in August 1991 in order to protect the country from the coup, the tension between them rose immediately after the conspirators had been defeated. Like Rogozin mentioned in the opening quote of this chapter. Although parliament had been Yeltsin’s powerbase before 1991 and he had defended it during the coup by calling for the Russian people to protect it from the tanks of the coup pledgers, his relationship with parliament deteriorated quickly. Resulting in the Russian Constitutional Crisis of 1993. The crisis was a political standoff between the Russian president and the Russian parliament, but above all a tipping point in the development of the political constellation of Russia. The political chaos of the first years of the Russian democracy ended, power was centralised, presidentialism enforced and the domination of the political spectrum by the elite was increasingly shaped by the role of the political technologists. Yeltsin had shown how he, as president of the Russian Federation, could dissolve the country’s legislature, although the constitution did not allow him to do so. He made clear that if the parliament was not willing to subordinate to the result of a referendum in order to justify his actions, all within the borders of the legal framework, he was not afraid to use force to support his point of view and storm the Supreme Soviet.

The result of the election of 1993 was a reflection of the limited capacity in the first democratic period to totally structure the political scene and manipulate the outcome of

45 Gayner, Kuznetsova and Cohen, ‘Who’s who in the Russian elections’, 8. 19

elections. Despite the fact that the political elite was familiar with the tradition of political manipulation - also displayed during the Gorbachev era - the post-Soviet elites were unsure how to behave after the events of 1991. It would take the modern political technologists until the electoral cycle of 1995/6 to develop into dominant factors in the political system, after which their dominance only increased. Furthermore, the uncontrolled and unexpected outcome of the elections was fostered by the indecisiveness of the Kremlin officials, who were divided into reformers and statists.46 There was not yet an overall consensus within the Kremlin and both camps were even further subdivided. There was no electoral incentive to unite the ranks or divide the opposition like there would be in 1995. This caused a sheer overproduction of party projects. The Kremlin made its first attempt to create a loyal two- party system by backing both Russia’s Choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord – and making sure that eight of the twenty-one parties or blocs that sought to take part were kept of the ballot.47 This so-called democracy by design was not as successful as the directed democracy. Russia’s Choice got 15.5 per cent of the votes and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord only a meagre 6.7 per cent.48 This meant that the Kremlin had failed to construct parties that would be able to control the parliamentary agenda or impose the will of the president on the Duma. Not long after the elections the parties vanished from the political scene. The mixed electoral system too, which required half of the 450 Duma members to be elected by a party list system of proportional representation, and half to be elected as individual representatives from single-member districts, caused a significant instability since the individual representatives were able to influence the balance of power significantly by switching between parliamentary groups or forming groups of independent deputies.49 It gave way to the political elites to continue defending their personal interest, but caused some difficulties for the Kremlin to control the system effectively. There were already a couple of parties participating in the elections of 1993 with covert links to the Kremlin. However, the Kremlin fell short of coordinating the political spectrum and the political initiatives were too often competitive and therefore ineffective. Not only Russia’s Choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord performed beneath contempt, the other Kremlin satellites too performed poorly. The Civic Union received 1,9 per cent of the vote, New Names won 1,25 per cent and Cedar got only 0,8 per cent of the vote.

46 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 110. 47 Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 271. 48 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120. 49 Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 268. 20

Wilson emphasised that there were also parties of the ‘transitional’ type: he did not mean a transition towards proper electoral vehicles in accordance to the Western ideal, but in the transition from acting as fairly independent launch pads to becoming (after the elections) full creatures of the Kremlin (the Agrarian Party, Women of Russia, Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democrats).50 Despite the elite’s inability to either manipulate or manage the 1993 elections, they were not the complete catastrophe for the authorities analysts claimed it to be at the time. Wilson emphasised that ‘the parties of the potential Kremlin pie won almost half of the vote – or, more exactly, at least half the parties were susceptible to Kremlin influence after the event.’ Although of influence, it was not the shelling of the Russian White House in October 1993 per se but the increasing control of the elite over the political system that determined the often passive behaviour of it successor parliament in 1993-95.51 Riggs and Schraeder point at the constantly changing party affiliations and explain this as an act of self-interest. Party activity became more centred on elite-to-elite, instead of elite-to-society interaction.52 Russian politics is increasingly becoming restricted to private, top-level intrigues. Faction leaders seemed to agree to transform the committee system into a means to serve their own purposes rather than the purpose of governing their country.53 This also meant that the political structure stayed fragmented, a characteristic that even further increased with the 1995/6 election cycle coming-up. There were parties looking to find a niche, like KRO did.54 Only thirteen parties and blocs were permitted to participate in the Duma elections of 1993, in 1995 the amount rose to a staggering number of fourty-three parties and blocs of which twenty- three succeeded in winning seats. Four parties dominated the political spectrum.55 The Communist Party continued to be a dominant force in Russian politics. With a total 65 seats in the 1993 Duma elections, a solid third place after Russia’s Choice and the Liberal Democratic Party, and a big victory in the 1995 legislative elections with a staggering amount of 157 seats in the Duma, it was clear the Kremlin had not yet been able to eliminate or even control the communist threat.

Loyalty and Ambition

Building a platform:

50 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120. 51 Ibidem, 121. 52 Riggs and Schraeder, ‘Russia's political party system as an impediment to democratization’, 266. 53 Ibidem, 270. 54 Ibidem, 271. 55 Ibidem. 21

The ability to determine the boundaries of Russia’s political community, which has been described in the introduction as the crucial problem of contemporary Russia, and the quest for new foundations for Russia’s political existence, stand at the forefront of the establishment of the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) in March 1993. The new patriotic organisation was an international union designed to legally protect the rights of the Russians beyond national borders. The ideological base of KRO, a party structured as a network of independently run local Russian communities with an executive representation in Moscow responsible for the coordination of the network, came forth from the Manifesto of Russian Revival which was written by Rogozin in cooperation with Eldar Kovrighin, Andrey Saveliev and Sergey Pykdrin.56 The manifesto stated that KRO was a platform on which the national patriotic movement had to stand. Its tone of voice was moderate and constructive as if the founders of the party wanted to emphasise the party’s ability to become a real political force and not simply the next oppositionist movements without any influence on the course of events. KRO was instituted as a serious political movement that answered to the tendencies in society:

This is a platform on which the national patriotic movement has to stand, if it aims to affirm ethical and civilised forms of nationalism without demeaning itself by resorting to aggressive and extreme manifestations of patriotism.’57

The establishment of KRO came forth from Rogozin’s grievance after being confronted with the tragic consequences of the cessation of the Soviet Union with regard to the Transnistrian conflict. The impact of this particular conflict on Russian politics is illustrative for the political circumstances the party was established in and the role it played at the time. Although the nature of the conflict – ethnic or political – is still debated, the effect it had on Russian politics was considerable. The fact that Russia was able to intervene in the ‘near abroad’58 without serious criticism from the West pushed the Russian elite towards a stronger interventionist position.59 While the Kremlin had tried to temper the interventionist sentiments in Russian society, the Bendery battle60 fed feelings of ethnic solidarity for the Transnistrians

56 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 90-91. 57 Ibidem, 91. 58 The Transnistrian War broke out in November 1990 between pro-Transnistria forces, supported by the Russian 14th Army, and pro- forces. Fighting intensified on 1 March 1992 until a ceasefire was declared on 21 July 1992. The conflict still remains unsolved. 59 Stuart J. Kaufman and Stephen R. Bowers, ‘Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict’ in: Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1998), 133. 60 The Bendery battle signalled the re-eruption of the full scale conflict in Transniestria after regular Moldovan forces entered the city of Bendery in an attemt to reestablish the authority of Moldova there. 22

that were directed against Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy.61 Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev had publicly denounced the Bendery intervention since he was convinced it would harm Russia’s relationship with the West.62 However, after the Western countries refrained from denouncing the role of Russia in the breakaway of the Transnistrian Republic, his position began to change. Kozyrev up to that point had pursued Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ policy in which military force was dismissed since it created enemies instead of asserting interests.63 It was clear that the impact of the issue of the ‘endangered Russians’ strengthened the position of the neo-imperialist right considerably and accelerated Kozyrev’s loss of influence over Russian foreign policy toward the ‘Near Abroad’.64 ‘Providing further impetus in the direction of interventionism’.65

According to Rogozin the KRO was a thorn in Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s flesh. ‘Its actions to protect the rights of Russians both beyond and within the national borders, exposed the total helplessness and irresponsiveness of Yeltsin’s (foreign) policies in protecting the Russian national dignity and human rights of Russia’s citizens.’66 Rogozin as one of the prominent figures of the party met with president Shevardnadze of Georgia to discuss the evacuation of the Russian population from the war zone of Abkhazia67, met with president Kravchuk of Ukraine to discuss an attack on the Russian Culture Centre in Lviv, freed four servicemen of a Russian parachute regiment out of the hands of Moldavian nationalists, and was even able to win a court case in which the Russian community in Sebastopol was sued by the public prosecution office under the instructions of Kiev for their anti-Ukrainian stance in the debate about the legal status of Sebastopol.68 The KRO achieved something the Russian government and Kozyrev in particular had failed to do: to protect the honour and dignity of Russian compatriots abroad. But also in Russia itself the KRO proved to be an efficient organisation capable of protecting the rights of Russian citizens when they stood up against mayor Luzhkov of Moscow and prevented the Neskuchny Garden from being demolished and also prevented a mosque along with an Islamic cultural centre from being erected in the Troparevo

61 Kaufman and Bowers, ‘Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict’, 134 62 Ibidem, 134-136. 63 Gorbachev and New Thinking in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1987-88, U.S. Department of State – Archive, Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/108225.htm (Accessed on: 28 May 2015). 64 Kaufman and Bowers, ‘Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict’, 134. 65 Ibidem. 66 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 96. 67 Ibidem, 93. 68 Ibidem, 101. 23

Park, one of the highest spots in Moscow.69 The reputation of the KRO grew stronger over time and with every achievement in campaigning for civil rights of the Russian compatriots in the former Soviet Republics.

The alleged outrage of Yeltsin and Kozyrev with regard to KRO’s activities and Rogozin’s prominence in foreign and internal political affairs, as described in Rogozin’s book ‘The Hawks of Peace’, is conceivable and doubtful at the same time and should at least be brought into perspective. Kozyrev’s anger is understandable since Rogozin was a true competitor to him who seemed to be more successful in his foreign activities than Kozyrev was at the time. The relationship between Yeltsin and Rogozin is however not as troublesome as Rogozin described it. Rogozin without doubt did not agree with Yeltsin’s political position and many of his decisions regarding the situation of Russian compatriots abroad. However, when analysing Rogozin’s position in the internal political system a totally different picture appears.

A failed attempt to regain control:

Like I have mentioned above, the election cycle of 1995 differed strongly from the Duma elections of 1993. Less rigid registration procedures made political involvement more accessible, which resulted in a staggering amount of forty-three parties and blocs participating in the 1995 lections, an enormous increase in comparison with the poor number of thirteen parties and blocks permitted to participate in 1993. It seemed as if Yeltsin had encouraged his courtiers to pitch in with their own projects in order to increase the Kremlin’s room to manoeuvre.70 Although the Kremlin was not yet proficient in controlling the political spectrum, as it would be in the near future, its efforts had already a profound effect on the results. Nearly half of the electorate (49.5 per cent) voted for parties that failed to pass the threshold of 5 per cent, compared to only 13 per cent in 1993.71 Still, the Kremlin was unable to eliminate the Communist threat. The Communist party won 22 per cent of the votes and became the biggest party in the Duma with 157 seats at its disposal. Something needed to be done in order to secure the presidency in 1996.

Exemplary for the Kremlin’s degree of proficiency to control the political equilibrium was the disappointing election results for Our Home is Russia (OHR) and the KRO, which were Kremlin projects expected to take away votes from the Communists and the Liberal

69 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 96. 70 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120-122. 71 Ibidem, 121. 24

Democrats.72 Our Home is Russia received a disappointing 10.1 per cent of the vote, the result of their supposed partner the Rybkin bloc was even worse with a staggering 1.1 per cent.73 Although KRO’s 4.3 per cent was also unexpectedly low for a party created as a reserve variant of the ‘party of power’74, it succeeded in a far more important task set by the Kremlin: to draw votes from nationalist parties that were not under Kremlin control. As opposed to 1993 when nationalist movements boycotted the elections, twelve nationalist groups competed in the 1995 elections. The KRO failed to pas the threshold but succeeded in restraining other right parties from winning seats in the parliament: the Derzhava party led by former vice president Rutskoy only won 2.6 per cent of the vote, Power of the People led by Duma deputy chair received only 1.6 per cent of the vote and other nationalist parties like the Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc (1.0 per cent), Boris Gromov’s My Fatherland (0.7 per cent) and Nikolai Lysenko’s National-Republican Party (0.5 per cent) received even less.75 The Kremlin initially tried to control the above mentioned parties from within but failed. The KRO was needed to control the political equilibrium and retain the ‘independent’ nationalist parties from getting real political power. The KRO was supposed to negatively influence the growth of the radical right, Rogozin was well aware of his mission. His open aversion of Yeltsin is therefore not so much explained by their ideological differences – Rogozin was an actor in Yeltsin’s political system – but maybe more because of the marginal role granted to him.

The Kremlin improved its game:

Yeltsin’s campaign for the presidential elections of 1996 showed how fast the Russian political technologists improved their game. While not being able to simultaneously develop several of its strands in parliament during the 1995 Duma elections campaign, the Kremlin proved capable of running a satellite project in the presidential election campaign of 199676: former Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Ground Forces General Aleksandr Lebed. Rogozin and Lebed met for the first time during Rogozin’s political awakening - the days of the August coup of 1991 - and Lebed would play a significant role in Rogozin’s (political) life. Lebed was one of the patriots who gained prominence in the political scenery due to the Transnistrian dispute. Conceived as one of the most respected and articulate spokesman for

72 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 120-122. 73 Ibidem, 120-122. 74 Ibidem, 122. 75 Ibidem, 122. 76 Ibidem, 120-130. 25

the idea of Russia’s need for a more assertive foreign policy in order to regain its self-respect and the respect of the international community, Lebed became one of the leading politicians in Russia.77 His political position is closely related to the role KRO played in a changing political climate in which neo-imperialists predominated. His role in the presidential elections of 1996 is however also of interest and deserves some explanation.

Lebed was already involved in the parliamentary elections of 1995 as KRO’s number two on the electoral list after Yuri Skokov, Boris Yeltsin’s close adviser working as Secretary of the Security Council. Skokov’s real power as party leader was however limited and his close affiliation with Yeltsin and the Kremlin in general seemed to be the prime reason for his leadership position at KRO, a party intended to fulfil its role as a spoiler party and eliminate possible threats on the right side of the political spectrum. In 1995 Rogozin was asked by Skokov to go to Transnistria to facilitate the return of the newly resigned commander of the 14th Army to Moscow.78 Having the popular Lebed on the election list, popular interest in the KRO increased. The internal competition between Skokov and Lebed over the party leadership had a great impact on KRO’s success in the parliamentary elections. Despite KRO being a spoiler party with Skokov as its ‘manager’, Lebed’s ambition was much bigger than being a puppet of the Kremlin. Lebed’s popular support, the main reason for Skokov to get him involved in the party, convinced Lebed he had real chance to become a prominent political force. An ambition that needed to be encapsulated or at least controlled. The party failed to pass the threshold and Skokov consequently resigned from his post as party leader. Lebed was however by no means willing to surrender and erected the movement ‘Honour and Motherland’ to facilitate his campaign for the forthcoming presidential elections.79 The political coalition of the KRO fell apart right after the failed election campaign of 1995 and Lebed’s participation in the presidential elections provided Rogozin with an opportunity to reinstate the party literally from scratch. On 28 December 1995 Lebed announced his candidacy for the presidential elections.

Lebed’s nomination as presidential candidate was surrounded by haziness and provoked political commentators to speculate on his role in the election cycle. Especially the remark that he intended to run ‘in agreement’ with the Communist Party – which would have made

77 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 135. 78 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 158. 79 Ibidem, 158 -161 26

him the instant front-runner in the presidential election campaign - caused a stir.80 Yeltsin’s political position had severely weakened over the previous years; the political, economical and social reality of Russia was disastrous. Yeltsin’s approval rates were in single figures and had the 1996 election not been manipulated, his re-election had been impossible.81 To win the Kremlin he made a pact with the new business tycoons and together they started to turn Russia into a ‘managed democracy’. The oligarchs were unable to accept the Communist Party to be reinstated into power since it would nullify all efforts that generated their leading position. A power system based on patronage was established and in exchange for bankrolling an overpowering media campaign they were allowed to privatize the most valuable assets of the Russian economy for their loyalty; a system known as ‘loans-for-shares.82 The patronage system did however not only consist of media campaigns, but also strengthened the many- layered pie principle further enabling the elite - increasingly dominated by the oligarchs - to effectively control Russia’s political landscape.

In trying to define Lebed’s position in the system, the announcement to run ‘in agreement’ with the Communists led the political analysts to assume that Lebed would form a strong bloc with the Communists against Yeltsin. It convinced them of Lebed’s probable election as president of the Russian Federation. In a 1995 article by Michael Specter in the New York Times the situation was described as:

‘There is little doubt which way the Communists would like to move. And if they were linked with General Lebed, who has already called for a referendum on the Government's spotty program of reforms, their force would be even more compelling in a country filled with people who are weary of the unrealized promises and harsh realities of their new freedoms.

“They would be a very strong and very dangerous combination for Russia," said Yuri Levada, a poll taker with democratic and reform leanings. "He has a slightly different base of support than the Communists. But if they did unite nobody could be stronger."83

The coalition between Lebed and the Communist Party has in spite of its promising potential

80 Army Hero Enters Russian Race, Posing a Big Threat to Reformers (1995), The New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/29/world/army-hero-enters-russian-race-posing-a-big-threat-to-reformers.html (Accessed on: 28 May 2015). 81 Judah, Fragile Empire, 23. 82 Ibidem, 24. 83 Army Hero Enters Russian Race, Posing a Big Threat to Reformers (1995), The New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/29/world/army-hero-enters-russian-race-posing-a-big-threat-to-reformers.html (Accessed on: 28 May 2015). 27

never been realized. The reason for it to fail had nothing to do with possible ideological differences, but above all with the underlying reason for Lebed to participate in the elections in the first place. General Lebed’s candidacy was a satellite project, a dummy candidate project designed by Berezovsky to take nationalist votes away from the Communist leader Zyuganov.84 Lebed’s candidacy was intended as a ‘relay race’ in which a fake candidate more capable of posing as, in this case, an anti-establishment populist first stakes out the electorate and then passes the baton to a covert co-worker, in this case Yeltsin, the intended ultimate recipient of the votes.85 Lebed received 14.5 per cent of the vote in the first round, which was won by Yeltsin with a meagre 35.8 per cent over 32.5 per cent for Zyuganov. Lebed’s participation had proven to be essential for Yeltsin to win the first round. In the runoff election Lebed endorsed Yeltsin, who eventually received 54.5 per cent of the vote over 40.7 per cent for Zyuganov. In comparison with the Duma elections of 1995, the political technologists improved their game and succeeded in using Lebed’s popular support to secure Yeltsin’s position in power.

A closer analyses by Wilson of the origin of the administrative resources needed for Lebed’s campaign confirmed not only Lebed’s role in the many-layered pie, but also Rogozin’s involvement. Rogozin does not deny his involvement in Lebed’s presidential election campaign. He regarded it as an opportunity to reinstate the KRO literally from scratch after it had been wiped away during the parliamentary elections of 1995. However, according to Rogozin Lebed’s decision to accept Berezovsky’s offer to provide him with considerable financial and informational support in exchange for luring voters away from Zyuganov did not meet his approval. Lebed became a ‘Trojan Horse’86, a dummy candidate project as opposed a true oppositional force Rogozin had envisaged him to be. According to Rogozin Lebed’s soul underwent a big transformation and he got a bigger distance to the man he once so much admired. Rogozin asked Lebed to denounce the deal, to quit urging people to give their vote to Yeltsin and to refuse the posts of Secretary of the Security Council and National Security Advisor to the president out of Yeltsin’s hands, which were offered to him in exchange for his support to Yeltsin.87 Rogozin warned him he would end up covered in dirt and thrown aside. These warnings proved justified. Rogozin emphasized he distanced himself from Lebed after Lebed decided to cooperate with Yeltsin. Though, considering both KRO’s

84 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 123. 85 Ibidem. 86 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 162. 87 Ibidem, 163. 28

and Lebed’s role in the political system and Rogozin’s involvement in both the KRO and Lebed’s election campaign, makes it plausible Rogozin’s attitude towards Yeltsin wasn’t as hostile as he depicted it. Both Rogozin and Yeltsin shared an interest in Lebed: Yeltsin needed his support to weaken his political opponents and win the presidential elections, Rogozin was above all interested in using Lebed’s popular support to gain prominence for both KRO and support his own political ambitions. Furthermore, KRO’s role as a spoiler party in Russia’s political system of the mid-1990s in support of the powers-that-be is also significant in determining the relationship between Rogozin and Yeltsin and the actual meaning of his hostility towards Yeltsin at the time. In order to survive in politics, Rogozin was obliged to play his role and obey the Kremlin’s orders.

An inglorious retreat:

Soon after Yeltsin was re-elected in the presidential elections of 1996, Chubais went after Lebed and politically neutralized him by creating a governing body parallel to the Security Council, by accusing Lebed of forming unlawful armed units under the umbrella of the Security Council and eventually by putting him in charge of the Chechen affairs. Correctly assuming he was bound to fail there.88 Defending Russia’s unity was the main argument of Yeltsin’s public proclamation as to the primary reason for the military intervention in December 1994 which officially started the First Chechen War.89 The eventual outcome of the conflict, a formal ceasefire agreement between General Lebed and General Mashkhadov signed on 30 August 1996, proved to be the exact opposite. The agreement entailed the demilitarization of Grozny and the withdrawal of all federal forces from Chechnya by 31 December 1996. Lebed had not only handed the total control over Chechnya over to the separatists and acknowledged their independence, but also officially recognized that Russia had lost the war.

Rogozin by no means approved the Khasavyurt Accords and issued a statement on behalf of the KRO on 24 September 1996 detailing the measures necessary to formalize the Peace Treaty and in which the KRO distanced itself from Lebed. Rogozin deprived Lebed of his political support and abandoned his former hero. Lebed was elected as governor of

88 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 164. 89 Anatol Lieven, “The Russian Decision to Intervene and the Geopolitics of Oil,” “The Anarchy of Russian Decision- Making,” and “Russian Strategy in Chechnya,” from Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 93. 29

Krasnoyarsk Kray in May 1998 and held this position until his death in a helicopter crash on 28 April 2002. According to Rogozin, the Kremlin had cynically used the charismatic General for the purpose of securing Yeltsin’s power and afterwards threw him aside like some processed material.90 Question was to what account Rogozin shared the Kremlin’s approach. Had he sincerely admired Lebed as his tutor and example or had he just used Lebed’s popular support in order to become a more prominent politician? His admiration was sincere, however, the way in which he distanced himself from Lebed is remarkable. Although the KRO failed to survive and its existence had been inglorious, Rogozin had shown his loyalty to the people in power. The party had eliminated all possible threats on the right side of the political spectrum and Rogozin weakened Lebed’s position by depriving him of KRO’s support. In a way Rogozin facilitated the Kremlin’s elimination procedure by politically isolating him. The end of the KRO and Lebed’s prominence only proved to be the beginning of a long and increasingly successful political career for Dmitry Rogozin.

Generating prominence in a changing political reality

A rising star:

Rogozin played a significant role in Russian politics during the mid-1990s but mainly proved himself behind the scenes: he was the organizer and facilitator of different political initiatives, and always needed to work with renowned politicians in order to attract the attention of the general public. With the extinction of KRO after the defeat of the 1995 parliamentary election and the presidential election of 1996, Rogozin’s public subordination to other politicians came to an end. His moment to step into the spotlights had come. In March 1997, after an exhausting campaign as an independent candidate against his communist opponent, Rogozin was elected Deputy of the .91 Rogozin started right away to profile himself as a fierce nationalist-patriotic politician and continued the line he started during his time at KRO. Rogozin continued to defend the rights of Russians in domestic and foreign affairs and his voice increasingly received resonance. His star was rising. Rogozin’s re-election as State Duma Deputy in December 1999 and his subsequent election as the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of International Affairs coincided with Vladimir Putin’s rise to power as Boris Yeltsin’s successor. Putin wanted to end the crisis Russia had been in for over a decade, stop it from falling and regain Russia’s position as one of the strongest global

90 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 164. 91 Ibidem, 225. 30

powers. Building a strong state power was essential, without compromising the modernization and democratization process Russia went trough over the years.

Reconstructing Russia’s greatness: In constructing a strong state power by means of a democratic system, the political technologists ought to further develop the ‘many-layered pie principle’. The 1996 presidential elections already convinced the political elite to play for higher stakes in the 1999 Duma elections, since Zyuganov’s opposition was fierce. Although the Communist Party suffered a defeat in the parliamentary elections of 1999 and Unity was able to control the Duma by closely cooperating with its satellite parties, the Kremlin was still not able to fully control the system. The incentive for elites to push their own projects was still too strong and Russia’s parties continued to be elite-oriented organizations in the 1990s in which the political party was used to harness the electorate to the will and likewise to the interests of the party leader. Putin would, however, soon get control over the situation and increasingly centralize power.

Putin’s election characterized a clear break with Yeltsin’s period in power. Although Putin inherited the Kremlin, the crisis, Yeltsin’s war in Chechnya and was chosen by the same people that supported Yeltsin to become Russia’s next president and above all their ‘bulldog protector’92, Putin’s political approach was drastically different. Putin’s first term was heavily shaped by Yeltsin’s legacy, but he soon managed to change the situation. The open conflict with Gusinsky, Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky was a clear indicator of the new era that was about to come. Putin’s ability to control the people that brought him into power is however not of primary importance for the present thesis. His goals for Russia, outlined in a speech on 30 December 1999, however, are. They touch upon the crucial problems of contemporary Russia: the ability to determine the boundaries of its political community and resolve its identity crisis.93 Putin wanted Russia to stop from falling down and was determined to succeed where Yeltsin had failed. Russia faced an enormous challenge:

‘Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in the past 200-300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running out of time for removing this threat. We must strain

92 Judah, Fragile Empire, 27. 93 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 174. 31

all intellectual, physical and moral forces of the nation.94

Putin recounted the difficult period Russia had lived trough during the 1990s and the way in which it affected the Russian society. However, to be able to turn the tide the Russian people needed to ‘achieve a social accord on such basic issues as the aims, values and orientations of development, which would be desirable for and attractive to the overwhelming majority of Russians’.95 Putin emphasized that the nation needed be occupied with handling the concrete tasks of Russia’s renewal and that political squabbling would only slow Russia’s development down. The result of the 1999 Duma parliamentary elections was a positive sign with regard to much needed stability in order to turn towards a social accord in society. The overwhelming majority of Russians had rejected radicalism, extremism and revolutionarism of any kind. Unity, the new party of the powers-that-be, was the big winner of the elections, together with the Union of Rightist Forces. The Communist Party, the Zhirinovsky Bloc and Yabloko had lost much of its support and former pro-Kremlin parties that played a prominent role in previous elections moved to the margins of the political arena. Putin stated that ‘it is probably the first time since the reforms have begun that such favourable conditions have been created for constructive cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of power’.96

Putin’s appeal to the constructive cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of power is of interest for the present thesis, especially when combined with Putin’s conception of the importance of a strong state power. According to him, Russia was at a stage at the beginning of the new millennium ‘where even the most correct economic and social policy starts misfiring while being realized due to the weakness of the state power, of the managerial bodies’. Russia could only recover if the government’s sphere of influence increased. This however did not mean that Putin proposed to constitute a totalitarian system. Despite the shortcomings of a democratic system, a strong state power in Russia could only be a democratic, law-based, workable federative state.97

Centralizing power:

94 Vladimir Putin, Russia at the turn of the Millenium (30 December 1999), Available at: http://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm (Accessed on: 28 May 2015). 95 Ibidem. 96 Ibidem. 97 Putin, Russia at the turn of the Millenium, Available at: http://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm (Accessed on: 28 May 2015). 32

Russia could according to Putin only recover if the weakness of the state power would be properly resolved. The political technologists found the solution for their problems after studying Mexico’s political system and the way in which Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was able to control it.98 In the build-up to the parliamentary elections of 2003, the Kremlin intended to combine both systems used by the PRI.99 As opposed to previous elections in which too many parties participated and got into each other’s way, from 2003 onwards no one dared to launch a party without the Kremlin’s approval. The Kremlin swept the board and only three parties shared the Duma with United Russia: the Liberal Democrats, the Communists and Rogozin’s Rodina.

Although the Communist Party lost 44 seats in the Duma, it remained a political threat to the powers-that-be in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle by defeating Unity (respectively 24.3 against 23.3 per cent of the votes). The communist electorate proved to be faithful to its party and the electorate as a whole was expected to drift to the left; something needed to be done to neutralize the communist threat. Simultaneously the Kremlin increasingly turned its attention towards mainstream nationalism.100 Spoiler parties like the Russia-Eurasia Bloc (0.3 per cent of the vote) and the United Russian Party of Rus (0.25 per cent) were created as spoiler parties by the Kremlin but failed miserably. The merger of Unity and Fatherland – all Russia into United Russia, however, proved to be successful and was a sign of the governments turn towards mainstream nationalism. United Russia was established to serve as the party of the powers-that-be and holds this position until today. Still the Kremlin stood above all parties, not in the sense that it is totally independent from the political parties, but more to indicate that the Kremlin is the creator of nearly all parties and controls the system. If United Russia would no longer suffice, a new party will be created to take its place, as is the case for all the other parties connected to the Kremlin.

Rodina:

98 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 126. 99 The Mexican type party system the political technologists contemplated, could be interpreted in two ways according to Wilson. First, the preference of this particular system could be explained by dominance the PRI had in the 1929-88 period. Presidential elections were always won by well over 70 per cent of the vote, resulting in a near-absolute control over the political system. Second, the political technologists also reviewed the subsequent period in the Mexican political history. PRI prolonged its dominance by exploiting virtual satellite parties to take votes from the real opposition and by transforming opposition parties into spoiler parties by covertly providing money to the party itself or to their candidates directly in order to ensure the authorities of political support in areas the powers-that-be are weaker. 100 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 211-221. 33

Besides the establishment of United Russia, the prominence of Rogozin’s political party Rodina (Motherland – National Patriotic Union) too could be considered as a sign of the rise of Russian nationalism. Rodina is however a special case since it combines ideological characteristics of both nationalism and communism. In depicting Rodina’s ideological background and its place within the political spectrum, some analysts characterized the party as far-right; others qualified it as a left-wing party. The questions what Rodina actually was and where the party came from helps us to determine Rogozin’s political position.

The establishment of the party in September 2003 – as a bloc consisting of the Party of Russian Regions, the Socialist United Party of Russia and People’s Will – in the build-up to the parliamentary elections of December 2003, is described by Rogozin as ‘an initiative which met both the country’s need of a real political alternative and Putin’s demand for a political force able to balance the political system and provide it with a healthy opposition’.101 According to Rogozin it was necessary to form an electoral coalition since the ‘Duma was unbalanced and its composition did not reflect the interests or demands of society’. United Russia obtained a monopoly over the Duma and was supported in its governance by the ‘opposition’ parties Union of Right Forces, the Liberal Democratic Party as well as the Communist faction. The level of public trust decreased according to Rogozin and with the Duma becoming ‘impotent’, proper governance of the state was heavily undermined.102 A strong opposition was needed. Rogozin shared his views with Putin and they were met with approval. After Rogozin told Putin he intended to work together with , a man he already worked with in the KRO, Putin informed Rogozin on a conversation he already had with Glazyev about the possibility to launch a socio-democratic project in order to offer an alternative for the Communist Party, supposedly a modern-thinking left-wing party. Rogozin considered himself however more a traditionalist; the left-centrist ideas did not excite him. Though, a combination of healthy conservatism with the struggle for social justice was not infeasible. Rogozin contacted Glazyev, informed on the conversation he had with the president and suggested to discuss a possible cooperation. Glazyev was not immediately convinced of his ideas.103

Glazyev – former minister for external economic relations, advisor to General Lebed, author

101 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 281. 102 Ibidem. 103 Ibidem, 282. 34

of the Communist Party’s economic programme, and chairman of the Duma commission on economic policy104 – was planning to run independently in the election of 2003 and lead a bloc consisting of the Communist Party, the Agrarians and their numerous junior partners in the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia.105 He however failed to establish it. Together with political technologist Marat Guelman, Glazyev started to overtly focus on the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia.106 Glazyev became co-chairman of the KRO in March 2003, co- chairman of the Party of Russian Regions in June 2003 and leader of the Socialist United Party of Russia (SUPR) in September. Already in August 2003 he was the first signatory of an agreement on the cooperation of the People’s Patriotic Forces intended to function as a bloc under the name Tovarishch (Comrade), which already in September 2003 was changed into Rodina.107 The second who signed the cooperation agreement between the People’s Patriotic Forces was Glazyev’s former comrade at the KRO Yuri Skokov. He founded the Party of Russian Regions in 1998 and operated from June 2003 onwards as its co-chairman. Skokov was the main mover and organiser; Glazyev was the bloc’s face and had to attract voters. The internal composition of the bloc changed considerably after Sergey Baburin’s People’s Will and Rogozin joined the team. Instead of being unambiguously left-wing and socially oriented, the bloc increasingly displayed a strong nationalist character.108 The sudden change of its political direction did not contribute to the party’s desire to be regarded as ‘a source of fresh ideas and the initiative which would prevent the Duma from becoming impotent’.109 The country needed a real alternative, however, the party’s sudden change of its ideological position, caused the true nature of the party to be questioned and indicated the virtual nature of the project.

Rogozin more or less confirms the non-existence of opposition parties in the run-up to the 2003 elections and by stating that both he and Glazyev discussed their plans for the future with the president does not make the political independence of the political party system more convincing. Their cooperation with Marat Guelman – director of the first national television channel – and the amount of airtime on national television granted to Rodina during the campaign also didn’t contribute to it. All media was controlled by the oligarchs and carefully

104 Alexei Titkov, Party number Four. Rodina: Whence and Why? (Moscow, 2006), 11. 105 The People’s Patriotic Union of Russia was large and entirely decorative umbrella for organizations controlled by the communist partyor collaborate with it that has existed since August 1996. 106 Titkov, Party number Four, 13. 107 Ibidem, 55-56. 108 Ibidem, 14. 109 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 281. 35

used to support the position of the powers that be. Besides this, the three main politicians of the party had all been involved in the KRO or even Lebed’s presidential campaign. As I have pointed out above the political independence of both the KRO and Lebed was questionable; they were connected to the Kremlin and both served the interests of the powers-that-be. The true nature of Rodina as an oppositional force in the political arena is also questionable if we try to explain its role in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Rodina played a significant role in safeguarding the Kremlin’s dominance over the parliament and was primarily established to prevent the Communist Party from gaining support in a country in which the electorate as a whole was thought to be drifting to the left. As I already explained, United Russia had moved more to the right of the political spectrum, the Kremlin therefore needed a trustworthy spoiler party on the left in order to curb the possible success of the Communist Party.

The Kremlin first tried to weaken the CPRF in the run-up to the 2003 elections from the inside by trying to cause a major split in the Communist Party. Gennady Seleznev, former speaker of the Duma for the Communist Party, was given the task to pull as many pawns away from the communists as possible110, but failed. After elaborating on the need for the Communist Party to adapt to the new generation and create a Eurocommunist party by adopting liberal social values, Seleznev was expelled from the party by Zyuganov. The Communist Party proved once more to be internally disciplined, which prevented the party from a major split. The Kremlin therefore needed to come up with an alternative plan and decided to create a strong spoiler party to steal away votes.

The Kremlin learned from its previous attempts and knew the CPRF would maintain most of its traditional electorate. The goal of the spoiler party tactic was to ‘launch three to four mini- projects, who would all take a couple of percentages each and push the CPRF to a safe second place after United Russia’.111 Wilson clearly explains that the Kremlin’s plan focused on ‘turning the Communists’ own long-standing ‘two-bloc’ strategy against them, by expanding its traditional ‘second-column, the ‘patriotic bloc’, at the CPRF’s own expense’.112 This initiative was combined with Berezovsky’s ambition to create an anti-Kremlin nationalist initiative, which was stolen from him by the Kremlin and reflected on Rodina. Dugin’s Eurasian Party, Podberezkin’s Socialist Union Party, Seleznev’s Party of Russian Rebirth and

110 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 231. 111 Ibidem, 260. 112 Ibidem. 36

Leonid Ivashov’s Military Power Union were all part of the spoiler party tactic carried out by the Kremlin to secure its dominance over parliament.113 Rodina was however the main strand of the Kremlin’s approach.

The original project Tovarishch (Comrade), managed by Glazyev, was regarded as an excellent candidate to the left-centre electorate.114 Its abrupt rightward transformation and name change into Rodina – National Patriotic Union aroused suspicion about the true nature of the new political initiative. Some people worried that a project such as Glazyev’s might be too successful and would harm the Kremlin as much as it would profit from it by taking as many votes from the CPRF as from United Russia. The Zhirinovsky scenario of 1993 in which the satellite party slipped Kremlin control was also discussed with regard to Glazyev’s political initiative. Rodina was therefore initially seen as a party with a deliberate unstable setup in order to guarantee Glazyev’s failure. The Kremlin seemed uncertain what line to take, doubtful about the way in which it could achieve the maximum result against the Communists. However, despite the fact that the establishment of Rodina out of Tovarishch aroused suspicion and the ideological transformation supposedly weakened the initiative since the nature of the party was diffused, Rodina contained a lot of real, ambitious politicians115 who were not willing to be restricted in politics and wanted to vigorously support the party in order to launch their political career.

In comparison to the election campaign of 1999, the CPRF was brutally attacked in the media and the radical rhetoric from among others Rogozin crushed Zyuganov. The results of the election proved Rodina to be an extremely successful spoiler party with an unexpected result of 9.2 per cent of the votes. The excessive support for the virtual communist ‘flies’ caused the CPRF’s steep decline from 24.3 per cent of the vote in 1999 to only 12.7 per cent in 2003. For Rogozin personally the 2003 elections were even more successful since he was elected in the single mandate constituency of Voronezh with a country record of 79.3 per cent.116 According to Wilson, Rodina’s design bore striking resemblances to that of Unity in 1999: ‘a virtual PR construction formed on the eve of the elections on the basis of a “strike” troika’.117 However, Rodina’s attempt to play a political game of its own, resulting in serious internal conflicts and

113 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 260. 114 Ibidem, 261. 115 Ibidem, 205. 116 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 291. 117 Wilson, Virtual Politics, 195. 37

its eventual exclusion from participating in the political arena in 2006, bear witness the general and deep seated tendencies in Russian politics.118

Rodina’s true nature as an oppositional force and the importance of its close affiliation with and subordination to the Kremlin was immediately after the parliamentary elections of 2003 revealed when Glazyev decided to participate in the presidential elections of 2004. Glazyev had spearheaded Rodina’s party list and had never concealed to be ambitious. Although nobody, not even Glazyev, questioned Putin’s victory, he aimed to become second and consequently the unchallenged leader of the left-wing opposition. It would provide Glazyev with the desired start for the presidential elections of 2008.119 This type of reasoning exposed two core problems of Rodina as a political bloc: firstly it consisted of politicians and parties too diverse and too ambitious to obtain internal harmony and stability and secondly its initial success during the parliamentary elections was only achieved because of Rodina’s functionality as a spoiler party for the powers-that-be. Without the Kremlin’s support, Rodina’s success was anything but certain. When Glazyev decided to participate in the presidential elections of 2004, he turned from an ally into a rival. Support stopped and instead of the 15-20 per cent of the votes he hoped for, he only won 4.1 per cent of the votes. A disappointing result.

Even more striking than the result is the fact that Glazyev didn’t participate as a nominee of Rodina but as an independent candidate. The Supreme Council of the Rodina Bloc had already nominated Viktor Gershchenko at the end of 2003 as a candidate for the presidential elections. However, after Glazyev nominated himself and Rogozin and Glazyev started to communicate conflicting messages on the nomination of Glazyev as candidate for the Rodina Bloc, voters were confronted with the internal rivalry and instability of the bloc. After Gerashchenko was denied registration by the Central Election Commission in January 2004120, Glazyev expected this would end the rivalry since he was the only remaining candidate. His effort to consolidate his position within the bloc met with fierce resistance from Rogozin and eventually resulted in Glazyev’s removal from the leadership position in the Rodina bloc Duma faction, replacing him with Rogozin.

118 Titkov, Party number Four, 4. 119 Ibidem, 18. 120 Ibidem, 19. 38

Although the course of events was one of the worst possible scenarios for both Glazyev and Rodina, it did not indicate the end of their role in politics. Rodina’s parliamentary faction remained relatively stable and the result of Glazyev’s participation in the presidential elections too was by no means catastrophic. Rodina transformed from a political bloc into a political party by which it became a more organized political entity. Not all members of the former bloc participated in it, but its transformation into a solid political entity proved to be symptomatic for its development in the near future. The bloc was once initiated by the Kremlin as a loose collection of parties in order to steal votes from the CPRF and guarantee the Kremlin’s dominance over parliament. After the regional elections of 2004-5 proved that the party got about the same amount of supporters as the Rodina bloc had in 2003 and the effect of the internal struggle between Glazyev and Rogozin seemed to only to be limited, the party leaders decided the moment had come to shake off the Kremlin’s dominance and become a true opposition force.121 2005 proved to be the ‘year of truth’ for the party.

Leading the Opposition

Taking control:

Before I continue to elaborate upon the transformation of Rodina from a spoiler party into an oppositional party, I first would like to explain under which circumstances this transformation took place in order to be able to clarify the reasoning of Rodina’s leadership to use this particular moment to drive the party into power and also to explain why the Kremlin desperately needed to shut the party down. Besides the arguments directed at the development of Rodina, this particular period has been crucial for the Putin-era as a whole. 2003 proved to be Putin’s great turn; he distanced himself from his image as Yeltsin’s heir and sent a clear message to the oligarchs not to interfere in politics. It was the moment when Russia, according to many commentators, lurched decisively into an authoritarian regime.122

Both the domestic and foreign developments have influenced Putin’s course of action considerably and contributed to the changing political reality in Russia. The Georgian Rose revolution (2003), the Ukrainian (2004) and the Kyrgyz Tulip revolution (2005) have greatly influenced Putin’s outlook on the need to alter the Russian political

121 Titkov, Party number Four, 20. 122 Judah, Fragile Empire, 55. 39

composition. The Nord-Ost Siege (2002), the ongoing unrest in Chechnya and the school hostage crisis in Beslan (2004) have also contributed to the changing political paradigm. Especially the Beslan massacre proved to be a turning point in Putin’s political career. Five years after Putin had come to power, Beslan demonstrated the government failed to keep Russia safe.123 Which only further pushed Putin into a form of government directed at ‘limiting risks’. After the Beslan siege Putin was frightened of real political competition and launched a series of anti-constitutional reforms to eliminate the risk of losing power.124 The rules for registering parties were tightened, the threshold to enter the Duma was raised from five to seven per cent, Putin abolished regional governors’ elections and made the election of individuals as members of parliament impossible by insisting that all members had to be elected on party lists.

The Russian elite already controlled the political spectrum from 1995 onwards. However, times had changed and it were no longer the private interests of the oligarchs that determined the political course of the country. Putin started to control the system on his own, demanding obedience of the elite. The Orange revolution in Ukraine had clearly shown that despite of the best ‘political technology’ money can buy, it turned out to be impossible to eliminate all risks. Putin’s foreign policy machine did not only fail to secure Russia’s interests in the near abroad, it also proved that key figures in the establishment were not able to overcome popular protest. Putin decided to change his course of action in order to eliminate risks and secure his position in power for the future. Precisely at this moment in time Rodina decided to present itself as ‘the only true opposition force’125 and Rogozin even stated as its party leader that Rodina was ‘no longer the president’s special task force’.126 The moment had come to shake off the Kremlin’s dominance and Rogozin decided to use the surge in genuine popular nationalism to ride popular protest into power.127

Opportunities gone sour:

After the dust of the presidential elections of 2004 had settled, Rodina started to rebuild the party to be able to respond to the surge of genuine popular nationalism in Russia. Rogozin and

123 Judah, Fragile Empire, 82. 124 Ibidem, 83. 125 Titkov, Party number Four, 20 126 Chernega, ‘Dmitrii Rogozin vykinul zolotistyi flag. Lider “Rodiny” raspustil “spetznaz prezidenta”’ in: Kommersant, 21 February 2005. 127 Ray Finch, Biographical Sketch: Dmitry Rogozin and Russian Nationalism, 25. 40

Glazyev decided to resume their cooperation and immediately started to attack United Russia and the powers-that-be. Rodina’s leadership was well aware that if they wanted to stand out among the general chorus of critics they had to find an effective method to both increase their visibility and at the same time show that the party was determined to protect the rights of the Russian people, abroad as well as in Russia. Popular protest was to be their most powerful weapon. The wave of protests across Russia against a new law abolishing a wide range of social benefits for the country’s 32 million pensioners, veterans and disabled in the beginning of January 2005 was an ideal moment to invigorate their appeal on social protest. The protests against the Monetization Law128 were the largest and most passionate since Putin came to power in 2000 and ‘tapped into a latent discontent with his government and the parliamentary dominance of United Russia’.129 After Patriarch Alexei II even questioned the law and the way in which the government implemented it, Putin knew he was facing serious problems in Russia. Social unrest and the oppositional parties’ anticipation formed a liability for his position in power and therefore needed to be dealt with.

Rogozin’s rhetoric became more inflammatory over time and he increasingly dared to threaten the authorities publicly. He used Putin’s biggest fear – social unrest – as his most powerful weapon:

‘Then there will be not thousands, but hundreds of thousands of us, and if the authorities decide to hinder us, their water-jets will choke on their own water. If they use force against us, then those who do this will choke on their own blood.’130

Putin could no longer accept Rodina’s abuse of popular unrest as a weapon directed against him and started to fight his former ally. Besides smaller signs of repression like the last minute ban on Rodina’s procession through the centre of Moscow in mid-2005, the scandal caused by the ‘Letter of 500’ was a serious attack on the oppositional party’s appeal to the masses. It highlighted the danger of populist dominance in political affairs and pointed

128 The law, which took effect on Jan. 1, replaced benefits like free public transportation and subsidies for housing, prescriptions, telephones and other basic services with monthly cash payments starting at a little more than $7. Mr. Putin and United Russia's leaders have defended the law as an important reform ending a vestige of the old Soviet Communist system, but they clearly failed to anticipate the depth of opposition from those who relied most on the subsidies: millions of Russians living on pensions of less than $100 a month. The protesters have denounced the payments as insufficient to cover the cost of the benefits and as miserly for a country that recently reported a budget surplus of nearly $25 billion. 129 Steven Lee Meyers (January 2005), Putin Reforms Greeted by Street Protests, The New York Times, Available on: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/16/international/europe/16moscow.html?_r=0 130 From a speech at a mass-meeting on Moscow’s Teatralnaia Ploshchad on 12 June 2005. Quoted in: I Dmitriev (2005), Rodina stala revoliucionnoi, NewsWeekly.ru, Available at: http://www.newswwekly.ru/government/article.shtml?2005/06/14/425 (Accessed on: 18 June 2015). 41

directly at Rodina and the CPRF, the two parties leading the social uproar. The ‘Letter of 500’, a petition driven among government officials – which gained 15.000 citizen signatures – demanding a country-wide ban on all Jewish organizations was already submitted to the Prosecutor General’s Office in January 2005, but only caused a scandal a year later after two socialist parties publicly condemned it. Jewish communities and newspapers picked it up and caused a nation-wide scandal. Both Rodina and the CPRF were forced to publicly denounce the statement and expel the members who it.131

While the controversy about Rodina’s involvement in the anti-Semite ‘Letter of 500’ petition, the party’s Duma faction split. Sergey Baburin, who had been expelled from Rodina’s parliamentary faction after making a number of harsh statements about the party in June 2005, decided to secede from the party together with ten People’s Will deputies.132 Baburin was allowed to keep the post of Duma vice chairman by the management of the State Duma and the new fraction ‘Rodina (People’s Will – SUPR)’ was registered despite the fact that it had five times fewer deputies than requisite according to Duma regulations. Whether the faction was initiated by the Kremlin and whether Baburin was a Kremlin mole instructed to split Rodina is not clear and cannot be proved. However, the methods used are similar. The split of Rodina’s Duma faction and its involvement in the controversy surrounding the ‘Letter of 500’ were not the last incidents the party had to cope with.

In the run-up to the Moscow elections, the party chose to launch a campaign directed against illegal immigrants and the corrupt officials profiting from their presence in Moscow. Their slogan ‘Let us purge Moscow of rubbish!’ was directed against Caucasians and Central Asians and gave expression to the sentiments of the average Muscovite towards these ethnicities.133 However, the fierce nationalist and even xenophobe tone used in their campaign caused a new disturbance. Members of Zhirinovsky’s LDPR filed a legal suit against Rodina after which the party was removed from the ballots of the Moscow elections. It turned out to be the end of the party’s ride into power; Rodina failed to become the only true opposition force since the Kremlin did not allow them to. The year of truth proved to be fatal for Rodina’s aspiration to become a party of power. Its leadership had inadequately appreciated Putin’s political power and misjudged the political circumstances Russia was in at

131 Attempt to ban Jewish organizations is comical - Federation official (January 2006), Interfax, Available at: http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=812 (Accessed on: 15 June 2015). 132 Titkov, Party number Four, 24. 133 Ibidem, 26-28. 42

that particular period in time. The party leadership understood they had to accommodate to the new political reality in which they had been marginalized in order to survive until the upcoming Duma elections of 2007.134

With regard to Rogozin’s political career, Rodina’s removal from the ballots had a great effect. Rogozin felt he had to resign from both the party and the parliamentary faction in order to protect the future of his political creation.135 Rogozin called for an Extraordinary Party Congress to get an answer to the question if the party activists were prepared to maintain him as their leader, or if they were willing to accept his resignation in order to stop the blackmail, threats and persecutions from outside enemies and thereby safeguarding the party’s existence. On 25 March 2006 the congress accepted Rogozin’s resignation and appointed as his successor. Rogozin’s remark in his book ‘The Hawks of Peace. Notes of the Russian Ambassador’ that he could not understand where he had made a mistake is hardly believable. He wanted to seize the opportunity and used the societal circumstances in an attempt to drive into power. The Kremlin had given him spoiler party to restrain the communist threat; Rogozin’s personal ambitions were however so strong he disobeyed Kremlin’s orders. Rogozin acted as if he really didn’t understand why the Kremlin forced him to leave and the party members accepted his resignation:

‘The main thing was that I could not understand where I had gone wrong. I managed to organize a vivacious election campaign that resulted in the unexpected success of the new political force. It was under my leadership that the Rodina Political Party evolved from a parliamentary faction (and not vice versa!) and united hundreds of thousands of activists in one short year of its existence. Rodina confidently took the second place in elections, stepping on toes of the Russian bureaucrats. And then, all of a sudden, a total defeat.’136

Significant for Rodina’s role in the political system and Rogozin’s removal from the party is an account of a conversation between Rogozin and Babakov on the night of his resignation. Babakov informs Rogozin on Yury Skokov’s, who as a press secretary presided over the congress, address to the congress in which he stated the following:

“We fulfilled our promise. Now we expect that the Presidential Administration fulfils theirs.”

134 Titkov, Party number Four, 28. 135 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 311. 136 Ibidem, 312. 43

It clearly suggests that the Kremlin was involved in Rogozin’s resignation, as they had been in the attack on Rodina from 2005 onwards. I render it impossible that a man who cooperated so closely with the Kremlin during his political career did not understand he and his party overstepped their game. Established as a spoiler party, Rodina was never designed to become a party in power and Rogozin should have known this. His resignation was therefore by no means surprising. Putin intended to create a political system existing of two legs; United Russia had slowly moved to a right-centrist position in order to become the right leg, Rodina on the other hand had been established to steal away votes from the CPRF and potentially to become the left leg of the system with a left-centrist ideology. By combining Glazyev’s social voice with Rogozin’s nationalist-patriotic beliefs, the Kremlin and its political technologists were convinced they had created a strong bloc for the 2003 parliamentary elections, resulting in a successful result of 9.2 per cent of the vote.

The course the bloc took right after the elections had however not been foreseen. The ambitious leadership saw their chance to ride into power under the influence of the changing social atmosphere and developed into a serious threat for the powers-that-be. On 28 October 2006 Rodina merged with the Russian Party of Life and the Russian Pensioners’ Party and formed A Just Russia. The new party called for a new type of socialism in order to guarantee the rights and freedoms of the individual and at the same time to ensure the welfare state to function properly. The Kremlin finally created a stable left leg for its political system to lean on and a potential power party at the same time. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections Putin chose to head United Russia’s national list. A harsh blow for A Just Russia, since they hoped to ride on Putin’s popularity. Just Russia was the forth party to pass the threshold with a disappointing 7.7 per cent of the vote. The party’s co-nomination of Dmitry Medvedev as their candidate for the 2008 presidential elections proved to be more successful.

Rogozin over the years developed from a loyal organizer and facilitator of various political initiatives, mainly working behind the scenes, into a prominent politician. His aspiration to gain political power and his understanding of the dynamic of Russian politics have strongly contributed to Rogozin’s upsurge as a politician. The same vigorous ambition, however, also caused his downfall. Despite Rogozin’s experience as party leader of the biggest spoiler party in Russia in 2003 and his awareness his disobedience of the Kremlin’s orders would cause trouble, Rogozin seized the opportunity. Putin was confronted with domestic and foreign

44

unrest, his power base was weakened and he seemed unable to get in control. Rogozin transformed Rodina from a spoiler party into a true opposition force and intended to use the societal unrest to ride into power. Rogozin failed. He lost his power base after his resignation as party leader was accepted by the party members and Rodina itself ceased to exist. Rogozin’s political career seemed to be over.

45

Chapter 2: Rogozin’s great return

Political revival:

After Rogozin’s elimination as leader of Rodina in 2006, his political career seemed to be over. Launched as the leader of a spoiler party, Rogozin had proven his loyalty to the Kremlin from 1992 onwards. The presidential elections of 2004 however caused a change in his attitude towards the Kremlin. Rogozin was convinced of the emergence of a strong nationalist sentiment in Russian society and considered it to be a pre-eminent moment to seize the opportunity to change the course of his political career. Rogozin was no longer willing to function in the margins of the political spectrum; he was ambitious and wanted to have his prominent position in the nationalist-patriotic movement being translated into a position in power. By doing so Rogozin overstepped his game, was accused of being unloyal to the powers-that-be and became a real threat to the Kremlin. He was deprived of the party leadership of Rodina in 2006 and left the party without putting up a fight. Rogozin had operated in a system he knew as no other and understood that if he wanted to stay active in politics, he had to obey the decision of the party and therewith the Kremlin.

Rogozin’s political revival is remarkable for someone who disobeyed the orders of the Kremlin. As we have seen in the previous chapter with General Lebed, political projects that lose their value to the powers-that-be are generally dismissed and mitigated if they try to challenge the Kremlin. Question is why Rogozin was able to not only politically survive but even rise to a prominent position in power? For some reason Rogozin was able to turn this crisis situation into the launch of a new career. In 2008 he was appointed as Russia’s permanent representative to NATO and in 2012 he was even appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation by Medvedev. In order to explain how Rogozin managed to do so, I will first elaborate upon Russia’s changing political outlook, its increased assertiveness in foreign politics and its new ‘ideological’ position in the political discourse all contributed to Rogozin’s political revival. Then the period between his dismissal in 2006 and his appointment in 2008 will be discussed. A period wrongly conceived as a moment in which Rogozin withdrawn from active political life.137 Although the current chapter focuses on Rogozin’s time as permanent representative to NATO and the meaning of his appointment for Russia’s political course, it does not overtly focus on his actual work in Brussels. Rogozin’s

137 Finch, Biographical Sketch, 27. 46

appointment is set as a turning point in his political career, the international and domestic developments this took place in form the actual core of this chapter. Rogozin’s ideological position has remained relatively stable over time. The changing ideological position of the Kremlin proved to be essential for Rogozin’s march into power.

A changing ideological reality

Recentralizing power:

Former Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov’s call for a new ideological triad for Russia consisting of a sovereign democracy, a strong economy and military might in 2007 is exemplary for the Kremlin’s changing ideological position.138 Russia had gone trough a transformation period and the upward cycle during Putin’s first presidency was dramatic even by the standards of Russian history.139 The economic boom returned Russia into a solvent actor at the world stage, in early 2005 Russia was capable of paying of its entire balance of IMF debts - three and a half years ahead of schedule - and in 2007 the World Bank even heralded the country for its ‘unprecedented macro-economic stability’140. Consumer power rose strongly and the emergence of the middle-class ballooned during this period.141 The Russian government heralded its achievements and covered up serious structural weaknesses that posed long-term threats to the country’s development. In an interview during the G-8 meeting of 2007 Putin emphasised the results achieved by his government:

‘Historians will be the judges of what my people and I achieved in eight years. We re- established Russia’s territorial integrity, strengthened the state, moved in the direction of a multi-party system and re-established the potential of our armed forces.’142

As I already discussed in the previous chapter, the Russian people did not calmly accept the newborn Russian reality as described by Putin. From the mid-2000s onwards there had been several incidents regarding the government’s course and the way this affected the domestic political constellation. The government had to formulate and answer to demands of a part of the Russian society in order to secure its position both within Russia and in the international political arena.

138 Lilia Shevtsova, Lost in Transisition: the Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington DC, 2007), 174. 139 Judah, Fragile Empire, 138. 140 Konstantin Rozhnov (2007), Russia attracts investors despite image, BBC-News, Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7096426.stm (Accessed on: 3 June 2015). 141 Judah, Fragile Empire, 138-141. 142 Der Spiegel, 2007. 47

In Russia the vertical of power was instated which enabled the Kremlin to control the political opposition within the multi party democratic system. In order to prevent Russia from sliding back into chaos, Putin build a system that would only answer to him. Working as senior official charged with regional affairs under Yeltsin at the end of the 1990s, Putin had seen how weak the Kremlin’s control over its own territories really was.143 His systematic dismantlement of Russian Federalism and the instatement of United Russia as a ‘tool to control the parliament, designed as a bureaucratic patronage network dressed in mass-party clothes’144, as Ben Judah describes it, were both intended to recentralize power and regain control over the course of the political development and renationalize all politicians into a single structure that the Kremlin could use to control and discipline them.

The new ideological disposition mainly focussed on Russia’s right to conduct independent policy both domestically and in the international arena. It was generally conceived as a ‘restorationist turn’ in which the Russian state was compared with the Soviet ‘golden age’.145 The new ideology was supposed to justify Russia’s political course in which it tried to secure domestic stability and prosperity, Russia’s international status as a world power and at the same time support its effort to adapt ‘its neo-imperial identity to the unprecedented and utterly uncertain boundaries of the emerging political community’.146 The restorationist turn had been further endorsed by Putin by framing the revolution of the late 1980s to the early 1990s as the ‘historical other’ and by publicly stating during his 2005 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly that the collapse of the Soviet Union needed to be regarded as a geopolitical catastrophe.147 At the same time Putin emphasised that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of the young Russian democracy did not result in the end of Russian statehood. On the contrary, Putin was convinced the time had come in 2005 to dwell on a number of fundamental ideological issues in order to determine a course of action for the next decade. It proved to be the beginning of a new course in Russian politics which expressed both the increased self-confidence of the Russian leadership with its increased assertiveness in foreign politics which emanated from it and at the same time its conviction of the importance of implementing a democratic political system in order to be able to compete with the West.

143 Judah, Fragile Empire, 96. 144 Ibidem, 96. 145 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’,172. 146 Ibidem. 147 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (2005), Kremlin, Available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml (Accessed on: 2 June 2015). 48

Russia’s path:

The Kremlin seemed to be looking for its ideal combination of features of the political systems that had been in play from the Brezhnev-era onwards. The value of a democratic system was despite its poor performance during the 1990s by no means completely discredited. However, the democratic features needed to be adapted to the Russian reality in order to be successful. Putin elaborated upon the importance for Russia to find its own path in his 2005 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation:

‘I consider the development of Russia as a free and democratic state to be our main political and ideological goal. We use these words fairly frequently, but rarely care to reveal how the deeper meaning of such values as freedom and democracy, justice and legality is translated into life. (...)

Many thought or seemed to think at the time that our young democracy was not a continuation of Russian statehood, but its ultimate collapse, the prolonged agony of the Soviet system. But they were mistaken.

That was precisely the period when the significant developments took place in Russia. Our society was generating not only the energy of self-preservation, but also the will for a new and free life. In those difficult years, the people of Russia had to both uphold their state sovereignty and make an unerring choice in selecting a new vector of development in the thousand years of their history. They had to accomplish the most difficult task: how to safeguard their own values, not to squander undeniable achievements, and confirm the viability of Russian democracy. We had to find our own path in order to build a democratic, free and just society and state.’148

Morozov’s statement that ‘the need to restore or, rather, to create a modern political subject lies at the core of sovereign democracy as a project’149 cuts straight to the hart of the matter. The idea of state subjectivity is leading for Putin’s policies ever since he came to power. He always seeked to obtain autonomy in both the domestic as well as the international political space and for example fended of the influence of the oligarchs by making a statement in 2000 on the equal distance between the state and the private enterprise, which effectively served as a means to free the state from the oligarchs control. There are many more examples for this

148 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (2005), Kremlin, Available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml (Accessed on: 2 June 2015). 149 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 152. 49

type of reasoning, however the underlying meaning is much more interesting and connects us directly to the consequences of this policy on Russia’s foreign policy and its identity debate.

Modernism versus post-modernism:

In the previous chapter I have already discussed what it means for Putin to create a modern political subject. It effectively reverts to the centrality of the nation state and the ability to secure its home territory and control and even change the composition of the population within its borders. The problem Russia faces in this respect is their identity crisis and the inability to formulate a definite answer to the question ‘Who belongs?’. Formulated as a reaction to the above stated is the post-modernist conception of most of the western powers which strongly believe in the universal value of the democratic system, the uselessness of national borders, the rejection of the use of force to resolve disputes and a strong interdependency when it comes down to safeguarding peace. The contradiction between the modernist and post-modernist position is characteristic for Russia’s relationship with the West, as described by Morozov. He states that Russia’s reactionary modernization faces a hostile attitude from the post-modern world.150 Putin’s desire to reconstruct Russia as a modern sovereign subject is domestically ‘hampered by the ambiguity of the nature and boundaries of its political community’151, a topic that will be elaborated upon at the end of this chapter, but has also proven to be challenging in the international scene. The sovereignty principle has turned into one of the most important battlegrounds of today’s global politics.152

Relationship based on equality:

The relationship between Putin’s Russia and the West has however not always been of a conflicting nature and even today Russia’s attitude is not so much directed against the West but above all to gain a relationship with the West based on equality. But at the start of Putin’s reign, his attitude towards the West was different. According to Stanislav Belkovsky, Putin was not interested in a hostile position towards the West. He wanted to guarantee Russia’s status as a super power in Russia itself and propagate the idea of the country’s resurrection. In foreign politics he wanted to act as an ally and a friend to the West. It was time to leave the competitive attitude behind.153 Putin wanted to be a collocutor to his Western colleagues who

150 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 168. 151 Ibidem, 167. 152 Sibylle Scheipers, ‘Civilization vs Toleration: The New UN Human Rights Council and the Normative Foundations of the International Order’ in: Journal of International Relations and Development Vol. 10, No. 3, 223-4. 153 Belkovski, Vladimir, 168-9. 50

respected each other’s interests and treat him with respect as an equal partner. In 2001 Putin closed radar installations on Cuba and Vietnam, he was the first world leader who expressed his condolences and offered Russia’s support after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and even instated an access corridor for American military personal to fly to Afghanistan through Russian airspace.154 Putin respected the interests of his Western partners, but would soon find out they were less generous themselves with regard to Russia.

Already in 2003 the relationship with the West was ruptured after the United States decided to invade Iraq without any real evidence of Saddam Hussein’s involvement in the production of weapons of mass destruction. Putin could not understand why the United States were not consulting other countries, disregarded not only Russia’s but also France’s and Germany’s opinion on the matter and were moreover not even willing to present the issue to the Security Council of the United Nations. It became clear to Putin that the equal partnership he had strived for, was not within reach. However, the war in Iraq was only the beginning of a deterioration process of the relationship between Russia and the West. The Western involvement in regional revolutionary movements within Russia’s sphere of influence caused a dramatic reversal in Russia’s foreign policy. After the Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution in 2005, Putin knew he would never become an equal partner to the West. The international political arena was unipolar and the United States would never allow Russia to adopt an alternative view on political affairs.

Alternative reasoning

A new approach:

Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007 highlighted Russia’s new approach towards international political issues. The conception of this speech as being a prelude to a new Cold War era has proven to be a misconception. It was more a complaint against the injustice of the international political system, dominated by the Western powers, in which Putin was critical but by no means dismissive; he wanted to change the system, not destroy it.155 Putin emphasises that the basic principle that ‘security for one is security for all’

154 Belkovski, Vladimir, 170. 155 Vladimir Putin, Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (February 2007), , Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html (Accessed on: 5 June 2015). 51

- once expressed by Franklin D. Rooseveld at the beginning of World War II - is still topical today.156 With democracy as the only acceptable form of government able to ensure security for all. Putin however warned for the hegemonic use of the term ‘democracy’ and emphasised that hegemonic unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War had never been established and above al did not answer to the current needs of the international community.

‘The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy’. However, this type of reasoning has never proven to be successful and Putin emphasized that the system with one global sovereign is ‘pernicious’ for everyone including the sovereign itself. This system has nothing to do with democracy.

‘What is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making. It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within. And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.’

Putin is by no means a supporter of the unipolar model as it is according to him not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. He strongly doubts the possibility of creating moral foundations for modern civilization, which will only cause human tragedies and not resolve any of the problems the world faces today. Closely related to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which triggered Putin to be more alert on the intentions of his ‘allies’, he stated that ‘in international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate’.157 A dangerous development since it results in a reality in which no one feels safe. The time has come according to Putin to re-evaluate the architecture of the global security and restructure it according to the present-day needs:

‘I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security. And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable

156 Putin, Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (February 2007), The Washington Post, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html (Accessed on: 5 June 2015). 157 Ibidem. 52

balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly - changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions. There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.’158

Russia’s new ideological strand of ‘sovereign democracy’ needed to be accepted as a serious alternative. The Kremlin was not comfortable with the prospect of an open confrontation with the West and at the base of Putin’s remarks was the wish to become a member of the ‘community of civilized nations’.159 Both Putin and Medvedev stated that real democracy exists in Russia, but its form had been slightly adapted to the regional circumstances. Democracy exists as an abstract principle and this principle can be put into political practice in many different ways.160 The problem with the unipolar appreciation of the term and its hegemonic features is that the standards of democracy are set by comparison with the U.S. and the European Union. A liberal universalist hegemony over the term. Russia, however, tried to offer an alternative way of implementing the democratic values.

Vladislav Surkov endorsed Putin’s statements in 2008 in his speech ‘The View from Utopia’ by pointing out that the new democratic order in Russia has its origin in European civilisation, but at the same time can only be viable if it does not reject Russian political culture but is part of it. According to Surkov Russian democracy is in some ways like democracy everywhere and in some ways unique.161 Tensions between Russia and the West are difficulties of translation and difficulties in communication among European cultures that have the same roots but are profoundly different in spirit.162 ‘A rapprochement among cultures is possible and necessary, however this does not implicate their unification or renunciation of their diversity’.163 Precisely his emphasis on diversity and the importance of incorporating the European originating basics of the democratic model within a specific national culture, help him in defending the concept of sovereign democracy, which most closely corresponds to the foundations of Russia’s political culture. Without elaborating on the specifics of this concept,

158 Putin, Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (February 2007), The Washington Post, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html (Accessed on: 5 June 2015). 159 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 171 160 Ibidem. 161 Vladislav Surkov, ‘Russian Political Culture. The View from Utopia’ in: Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 46, No. 5, 11. 162 Surkov, ‘Russian Politcal Culture’, 20. 163 Ibidem. 53

it is the description of the international political constellation that is worthwhile to explain since it projects Russia idea about a multipolar global political system. According to Surkov a global federation based on treaties among free nations would suffice:

‘All the units of such a federation must be equal. This does not mean that the federation will be culturally and economically homogeneous: some units will be more equal than others. As a unit of a utopian global federation, I would like Russia to be a donor region, a leading nation, one of the centres of intellectual life.’164

Russia’s core message directed towards the West remained the same. Russia wanted to cooperate but only if the West treated Russia as an equal partner.

The unipolar principle under attack:

The difference between the way Putin talked about the political equality in 2000 and in 2007 was the fierceness of the message combined with the assertiveness in the international political arena. Putin was however still convinced of the importance of the global federation, based on a multipolar principle.165 The decision to support Medvedev’s candidacy for the 2008 presidential elections and the simultaneous appointment of Rogozin as Ambassador to the NATO exemplified Putin’s stance in this discourse. Although Western commentators were well aware of the close tie between Medvedev and Putin and everybody expected him to continue Putin’s course of action, Medvedev’s inauguration speech in which he pledged to develop ‘civil and economic freedom’ in Russia was considered as an indication of the country’s changing course under Medvedev. He was a true liberal and although he clearly stated he would continue Putin’s course, Western powers considered his inauguration a possibility to revive relations with Russia. In hindsight we now know that the Medvedev proved to be a loyal servant to Putin, who retook his presidency again in 2012 after having served as prime minister. Nevertheless, the fact that Putin chose a true liberal able to implement a rapprochement to the West as his successor and didn’t execute the idea put forward by some of his followers to change the constitution and run for a third consecutive term as president, proved to be a signal of Putin’s esteem for the constitution and the core principles of the democratic system in general. He still wanted to cooperate with the West and to some extent needed to in order to further develop Russia.

164 Surkov, ‘Russian Politcal Culture’, 22. 165 Thomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, ‘Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors’ in: Journal of Contempory Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2015), 54. 54

But if Putin’s choose to endorse Medvedev as his successor in order to reach out to the West and to enable the rapprochement without loosing control over power, why would he then appoint one of the fierce voices of the Russian patriotic-nationalist movement Ambassador to NATO? Why would he use two politicians so different from each other in the international political realm? In my opinion this question can only be answered by looking at the statements on the global federation of powers and the multipolar political system discussed above. Putin recognizes the importance of a body able to perpetuate global security and defend the importance of a ‘universal international law, both in the conception and application of its norms’.166 Especially the universal character of this endeavour is vital for its eventual success. In his speech during the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy this topic was discussed:

‘I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn't hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.’

Putin’s outspoken disdain for the Italian Defence Minister’s remark that both NATO and EU should be regarded as legitimate defenders of global security and international law, equal to the UN, display Russia’s displeasure about the Western unipolar worldview. According to Putin only the UN is capable of uniting the forces of international community and can really react to events in various countries. The UN is the global federation Russia wants to be part of and simultaneously a platform in which Russia is able to act as donor region, a leading nation, one of the centres of intellectual life, as Surkov described it in his speech ‘The view from

166 Putin, Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (February 2007), The Washington Post, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html (Accessed on: 5 June 2015). 55

Utopia’.167 Putin’s endorsement of Medvedev as his successor could be conceived as a sign of his willingness to reach out to the West in order to fulfil his wish to become a member of the ‘community of civilized nations’. Rogozin appointment on the other hand was also fully in line with his statements of Munich and was intended as an attack on the illegitimacy of NATO as a defender of the Western unipolar worldview in which Russia would never achieve equality. Rogozin had proven to be a defender of the rights of the Russian people both in Russia and abroad and was expected to do the same in Brussels. The appointment of one of Russia’s patriotic-nationalist protagonists would also give Putin some leverage with respect to the increasing power of nationalist tendencies in Russian domestic politics.

Defending the rights of Russians abroad

National idea:

Rogozin’s involvement in ‘foreign’ political affairs has been determinative for his image as a politician and touched upon one of the crucial problems of contemporary Russia – the ability to determine the boundaries of its political community.168 Rogozin’s answer to the question ‘Who belongs?’ displays similarities with the restorationist attitude of the Kremlin. According to Rogozin:

‘The Russian federation is the successor of the statutory tradition of the USSR. Russia inherited Soviet assets, debts, international agreements, its status of national power as well as the permanent membership of the Security Council of the UN. The disintegration of the USSR was a spontaneous detachment of various Russian territories. It was Russia’s duty to take under her umbrella all ex-Soviet citizens, regardless of their ethnicity and domicile, who refused to adopt the citizenship of the newly formed independent states’.169

In his book ‘The Hawks of Peace’ Rogozin spells out his vision on Russia’s national idea, a response to communist or liberal governance in which nations are not in contraposition to one another. A nation is supposed to be a master of its own house and its people have the right of existence and national reunion within an indigenous environment. A nation preserves the right for self-conservation. They have the right of self-identification, a right to think and communicate in one’s native language, a right to sovereignty, self-determination, and self- governance, a right to have a motherland, and a right to cultural identity and to involvement in

167 Surkov, ‘Russian Politcal Culture’, 22. 168 Morozov, ‘Sovereignty and democracy in contemporary Russia’, 174. 169 Rogozin, The hawks of peace, 76-78. 56

national history and civilisation.170 The national idea is an indisputable prerogative of the nation to reunite. Rogozin also states that the national idea would be at risk of regressing into the vulgar propaganda of national superiority if the universal democratic and social values would be disregarded. He is not fond of bewildered national romanticism in foreign relations – pointing at Slavophil romanticism171 as a threat – and preaches national egoism instead. The national interests of Russia should be the sole motivation of the country.

Rogozin strongly believes in the power of the nation and according to him the state is always subordinate to nation. Only god is above the nation.

‘A state is a form of national self-actualisation; it serves to protect a nation’s interests; it serves to maintain a nation’s territory and its geopolitical influence. A nation should inhabit its indigenous territory. If a part of the inhabited indigenous territory happens to under foreign control as a result of a war or treachery, then this nation must seek historical revanche.’172

This so-called ‘historical revanche’ has been central to Rogozin’s career. He has always been committed to the nation’s interest and the nation’s unification in particular. It is important to note that Rogozin is no ethnic nationalist, but a civic nationalist instead. He has no interest in diminishing the rights of minorities in Russia, although he clearly considers Russians more equal than others. According to Rogozin ‘Russians have demonstrated that a right of a nation to self-determination can mean and should mean a right to live alongside Russians within one state’.173 In order to fulfil its ambition to join the ranks of the world powers again and being regarded as an equal partner to the West, a certain level of national unity should be achieved. ‘Russians must be reconsolidated: it is necessary to reunite the fraternal indigenous nations of Russia by means of love and common interests and causes.’ At the moment however, the Russian people are still disoriented and the nation segregated. Russia still has a long way to go.

170 Rogozin, The hawks of peace, 121-122. 171 Rogozin’s disapproval of slavophil romanticism deserves a footnote. Despite his disapproval, he displays a certain sensitivity for it. In his book ‘The Hawks of Peace’ Rogozin elaborates upon his involvement in the Third Balkan War (1991- 2001) in the capacity of a journalist. He had often been – according to Rogozin – at the frontline of the Serbian defense and met with its leaders Karadzic and Mladic. Relations between Russia and Serbia have always been strong because of the ethnic and cultural similarities (orthodox slavs) and Serbia became a key partner for Russia in Southeast Europe. The fact that Rogozin has been involved in the Third Balkan War as a Russian civilian indicates his sensitivity for Slavic romanticism to say the least. The Serbs had received support from volunteers from Orthodox Christian countries, including Russia. Rogozin’s involvement could be explained as a form of support for his Slavic Orthodox brothers abroad. The Third Balkan War also proved to be a decisive moment for future Russia-NATO relations. 172 Rogozin, The hawks of peace, 124-125. 173 Ibidem, 125. 57

Transnistria:

In order to prevent Russia from disintegrating and support its unification, Rogozin always had a special interest in defending the rights of Russians abroad. Already during his involvement in the KRO Rogozin proved to be a true defender of the rights of Russian compatriots in the former Soviet republics. He has personally been involved in conflicts in Serbia, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine and was even appointed Special Presidential Representative to in 2000. The KRO became known for winning a couple of notorious court cases, such as a lawsuit against the leader of the Russian community in Estonia Pyotr Rozhok, a lawsuit against Raisa Telyatkinova who headed the Russian community in Sevastopol, KRO facilitated the release of journalist Boris Suprunyuk from imprisonment in and won a number of cases in defence of honour and dignity of dozens of Russian patriots and human right campaigners.174 Rogozin has also been involved in foreign affairs during other phases of his political life. His involvement in the conflicts in Chechnya, Kaliningrad, Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia all played an important role. Transnistria deserves special attention since it runs like a threat trough Rogozin’s life. It integrates Rogozin’s sorrow over the dissolution of the Soviet Union, his involvement in defending the rights of Russian compatriots abroad, his acquaintance with General Lebed who played an important role in his political career and last but not least his involvement in the Transnistrian conflict in the capacity of government official.

One of the first instances in which Rogozin was confronted with the endangerment of the rights of Russians abroad was in 1992 during the Transnistrian conflict. The war of Transnistria followed a series of armed clashes between Transnistrian separatists and the Moldovan army, in which the separatists were supported by Russia and Cossacks from both Russian and Ukraine. Moldovan military forces were allegedly supported by Romanian nationalists who tried to establish a Great Romanian Empire. Russians, Moldavians and have lived on both sides of the Dniester river for centuries and before the collapse of the Soviet Union they were able to live together in peace. However, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the local social dynamics were politicised and changed sincerely. It was only after the resolution on using Romanian military aid against Transnistrian separatists when Russia understood the issue was pressing and their compatriots were in need of support. Although the Russian government under president Yeltsin was uncertain how to respond to

174 Rogozin, The hawks of peace, 97. 58

the matter at stake and was preoccupied with dividing the inheritance of the Soviet Union, the civilians of Transnistria appealed to General Lebed, commander-in-chief of the 14th Army stationed in Transnistria’s capital Tiraspol, to protect them from the Moldavian-Romanian aggressors. Throughout early 1992 the conflict intensified, until a ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 July 1992. It effectively meant Moldova did not exercise effective control over Transnistrian authorities.175

Rogozin travelled to the area in May 1992 and stayed there up until the ceasefire agreement was signed.176 The conflict launched Rogozin’s fellow combatant General Lebed into politics and Rogozin too used the conflict to shape his future identity as a politician. He had been there to defend the rights of his compatriots during the war and continued to do so after the agreement was signed. Rogozin never stopped fighting for recognition of the international community of the right to self-determination for the Transnistrian people. Rogozin’s appointment by Putin as Special Presidential Representative for Transnistria on 21 March 2012 and his appointment as chairman of the Russia-Moldova inter-governmental cooperation commission on the same day177, give vent to the increasing prominence of Rogozin’s position in the discussion concerning the rights of Russian compatriots abroad.

According to Vladimir Socor of The Jamestown Foundation Rogozin’s assignment was highly unconventional. The Kremlin’s press office cited that Rogozin’s experience, as an international negotiator in his previous postings was the most important argument to appoint him as presidential representative to Transnistria. However, the appointment of Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister as special representative is in sharp contrast with respect to Russia’s previous interpretation of its role in the 5 + 2 negotiating format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, US, EU, Chisinau and Tiraspol).178 The negotiation body had been inactive from 2006 until 2011 and ‘Russia’s representation has always been handled by mid-level diplomats under supervision of State Secretary Grigory Karasinand of Russia’s security council’.179 So why did the Kremlin decide to appoint Rogozin who is notorious for his disruptive attitude?

A window of opportunity?

175 Rogozin, The hawks of peace, 86-101. 176 Ibidem, 84. 177 Vladimir Socor, ‘Dmitry Rogozin Appointed Special Presidential Representative for Transnistria’ in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, No. 59 (March, 2012), 1. 178 Andrey Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy Toward Transnistria. Between Multilateralism and Marginalization’ in: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2012), 54. 179 Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy Toward Transnistria’, 54. 59

The fact that the Kremlin decided to change the level of the institutional authority by sending its Deputy Prime Minister after a period of five years in which the negotiating body had been inactive, signalled a renewed interest in Russia’s near abroad and in particular in defending the rights of the Russian compatriots abroad. The decision to send Rogozin as a special presidential envoy however indicated Russia was not sincerely interested in resolving the issue. Rogozin’s appointment symbolized Russia’s increased assertiveness and its unwillingness to acknowledge the 5+2 format and all parties involved as rightful interlocutors.

Even the Meseberg Memorandum, in which Medvedev and Merkel stated that the EU and Russia would cooperate to achieve tangible progress within the 5+2 format in order to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, was no longer taken seriously despite Germany being Russia’s most important ally in the EU.180 Rogozin’s appointment discredited the Meseberg memorandum and harmed Russia’s position in Europe in general. The question why Rogozin was appointed at that particular moment on an issue of such great importance to the future cooperation between Russia and European member states remains unanswered. To get a better understanding of the rupture Rogozin’s appointment caused with regard to the development of the EU-Russia partnership, it is of importance to emphasize that the Trasnistrian settlement was considered a pilot project. The settlement could have contributed to the formation of a European security system that includes Russia and is functional. According to Andrey Devyatkov the ‘frozen’ conflict in Moldova – formerly at the periphery of European politics – became a test case.181 The Transnistrian settlement was a window of opportunity in EU- Russia relations, despite ongoing disputes with regard to energy relations, the Georgian conflict and Russian internal affairs.

EU-Russia relations deteriorated in the early 2000s and the partnership encountered normative differences. Although Putin set up a special State Commission on the Transnistrian Settlement in order to assist in developing a unified approach for mediators of the Transnistrian settlement, which resulted in the Kiev Document of 2002, the strong Western presence in Eastern Europe and especially its ambition to manage the expected settlement provoked the Kremlin’s renouncement of the developments and proposal of an alternative unilateral

180 Memorandum. Meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dmitri Medvedev on 4-5 June 2010 in Meseberg (2010), Russian Mission, Available at: http://www.russianmission.eu/sites/default/files/user/files/2010-06-05-meseberg- memorandum.pdf (Accessed on: 29 May 2015). 181 Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy toward Transnistria’, 53. 60

agreement: the Kozak Memorandum.182 Moscow adopted a proactive stance to maintain the regional status quo; the Kremlin was unwilling to give up its dominance over the region.183 The Transnistrian settlement became a threat to its control over the near abroad.

Russia’s changing approach with regard to the Transnistrian settlement did not mean Russia was fundamentally anti-Western. The Kiev Document of 2002 would not be the last time Russia and the EU would engage to come to an agreement. However, the fear of the fragmentation of the post-Soviet space, the urge of NATO expansion and above all the awareness of the inequality in the partnership between Russia and the EU caused by Brussels’s growing ambition to manage conflict in Eastern Europe, incited Russia’s turn towards an assertive and dismissive attitude in foreign politics. The 5+2 negotiating body would stay inactive until 2011 and it was only because of Angela Merkel’s personal involvement in the Meseberg process an institutional and political rapprochement was enabled.184

European disdain:

The Kremlin’s turn towards a more assertive policy on Transnistria in 2003 corresponds with the increasing assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy in general, as has been discussed above. The Kremlin’s willingness to reconsider a settlement on Transnistria in response to the German initiative shows that Russia is well aware of the importance of unilateral cooperation in order to prevent Russia from becoming isolated. Russia wants to be a prominent force on the world stage, but is only willing to cooperate if the country is being regarded as an equal partner to the West. NATO enlargement and Western predominance is no option and specifically with regard to the case of Transnistria, Russia is only willing to come to an agreement on the Transnistrian conflict if Moldova remains a neutral state.185 The Meseberg Memorandum is a good example of an agreement with Western forces in which equality between parties involved is a key issue. Germany has been pushing the EU to adopt a unified political approach toward Russia for a long time and the Meseberg agreement signed by Merkel and Medvedev in 2010 has institutionalized Germany’s role in it. The memorandum

182 John Löwenhardt (April 2004), The OSCE, Moldova and Russian diplomacy in 2003, Internationale Spectator, Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20040426_löwenhardt.pdf (Accessed on: 29 May 2015). 183 Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy Toward Transnistria’, 54. 184 Ibidem, 55. 185 Lavrov (29 March 2011), The Russian Federation is in favour a special status of Transnistria in a united Moldova (Лавров: РФ выступает за особый статус Приднестровья в единой Молдавии), Ria Novosti, Available at: http://ria.ru/politics/20110329/358925975.html (Accessed on: 29 May 2015). 61

established ‘an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee186, intended to promote an equal dialogue between Russia and the EU on key issues on European and world security and a successful Transnistrian settlement’.187

The potential of the Meseberg Memorandum was however immediately discredited after it was preconditioned by the EU. The EU imposed strict conditions on the Meseberg Memorandum by demanding that progress in Transnistria should precede the establishment of new unilateral institutions. Before any closer ‘strategic’ EU-Russia relations can be proclaimed, Russia needs to confirm its willingness with practical measures, as German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle put it:

‘We are waiting for the Russian Government to make the Transnistrian leadership flexible and more amenable to negotiation, which would signal Russian willingness to confirm its good will with practical measures.’188

Russia was once again confronted with the superior attitude of the West. Instead of coming to a closer cooperation between Russia and the EU based on equality, Russia first needed to meet the requirements of the EU in order to be conceived as a potential partner. Such an arrangement did not reflect the core idea of the Meseberg Memorandum. The West was still not prepared to renounce their unipolar worldview and its hegemonic features. According to the Kremlin only a multipolar global political constellation would suffice to come to terms with the challenges the world faces today. A global federation based on treaties among free nations. If the West was not willing to treat Russia as an equal partner, a donor country in the multipolar global system like themselves, it makes no sense to make an effort to come to an agreement and make concessions to meet the interests of ones future partner. This is the reason why Putin appointed Rogozin as presidential envoy to Transnistria in 2012. If Russia’s efforts to reach a settlement with the West are met with disdain, one can expect Russia to look after its other interests and redirect its policy accordingly. Rogozin’s appointment could besides being a reaction to Europe’s dismissive attitude towards Russia be regarded as an answer to the upsurge of nationalist tendencies in Russia, a topic that will be elaborately upon in the next chapter of this dissertation.

186 Memorandum. Meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dmitri Medvedev on 4-5 June 2010 in Meseberg (2010), Russian Mission, Available at: http://www.russianmission.eu/sites/default/files/user/files/2010-06-05-meseberg- memorandum.pdf (Accessed on: 29 May 2015). 187 Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy Toward Transnistria’, 55. 188 Ibidem. 62

Changing dynamic:

After Rogozin was appointed he officially continued Medvedev’s reasoning by stating that he was ready to continue the dialogue with Moldova to come to a settlement on the Transnistrian conflict.189 The tone of voice, however, changed considerably and the emphasis on the importance of the sovereignty of Moldova190, as a partner without any influence from a third party, reminded of the Kosak Memorandum of 2003 in which Moscow adopted a protective stance to maintain the regional status quo and extended the posting of the Russian troops until 2020. Rogozin also pointed at the plans of to host a U.S. military base near Bucharest in order to explain Russia’s military presence in the area.191 A threat to Russia’s interests in the region. This trend was intensified in anticipation to and as a result of the political crisis in Ukraine in 2014. Rogozin signed a number of government agreements with the head of Transnistria Yevgeni Shevchuk with regard to bilateral cooperation in the financial sector and other sectors like media, health and transport. Rogozin once more portrayed himself as a defender of the rights of Russian citizens living abroad and at the same time defined Russia’s role in the world as mediator in settling conflicts, in particular pointed at the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Exactly the role that belongs to a donor country in a multipolar political system. In an interview with the national public broadcaster, Rogozin explained why Russia decided to intensify its relationship with Transnistria:

"We are carefully observing how things are developing in the neighbouring Ukraine, what happens there, what forces are going to govern it. Under these circumstances, Russia as a guarantor state and as a mediator in settling the conflict aims to obtain a viable solution to further support Transnistria. Russia is determined to further defend Russian citizens living in Transnistria"192

The Transnistrian crisis could have contributed to the formation of a European security system that includes Russia and is functional, it was a test case and by all means a window of opportunity. Nonetheless, the promising rapprochement between Merkel and Medvedev in 2010 by means of the Meseberg Memorandum, proved to be insufficient to reach a settlement.

189 Rogozin: Transnistria is ready to hold dialogue with Moldova, Political Activity, Available at: http://amethystmyst.ru/rogozin-transnistria-is-ready-to-hold-dialogue-with-moldova/, (Accessed on: 29 May 2015). 190 Ibidem. 191 U.S. Embassy Bucharest Statement on Military Relations with Romania (2013), Embassy of the United States Bucharest, Available at: http://romania.usembassy.gov/policy/media/pr-09162013.html (Accessed on: 29 May 2015). 192 Russia decided to further support Transnistria (Rogozin)(2014), National Public Broadcaster “Teleradio Moldova” , Available at: http://www.trm.md/en/politic/rusia-hotarata-sa-sprijine-in-continuare-transnistria-rogozin/ (Accessed on: 18 June 2015). 63

Relations even deteriorated further after the West was not willing to face Russia as an equal partner. This proved to be the turning point in the course of the Transnistrian crisis. The ‘window of opportunities’ to improve EU-Russia relations closed and the appointment of Rogozin was the beginning of a period of mounting tensions between Russia and the EU.

The Transnistrian crisis has provided us with a deeper insight in the development of Russia’s foreign policy and the development of Russia-EU relations in particular. However the reason for Rogozin’s appointment as Special Presidential Representative to Transnistria needs some additional explanation. To be able to understand why Rogozin was appointed as special envoy, I will return to the period from his dismissal as party leader of Rodina in 2006 up to his appointment as Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2008. Subsequently his time in Brussels and the reason for his appointment after his alleged political elimination in 2006 will be discussed. Rogozin’s employment as ambassador to NATO will not only provide the opportunity to discuss the relationship between Russia and NATO at that time but will also lead up to his recall to Moscow in order to serve as Deputy Prime Minister from December 2011 onwards, which I already shortly discussed in the delineation of the Transnistrian case.

Political intermezzo?

According to Rogozin and Ray Fich – who wrote a small biography on Rogozin - the years after his dismissal as party leader of Rodina had been a period of seclusion in which Rogozin hardly acted publicly. He had been defeated, was dismissed by his own party and his political career had turned for the worst after the Kremlin eliminated him. An article on the website of Lenta ‘Dmitry Rogozin, Vice Prime Minister of the Russian Federation’ written after his appointment in December 2011, sheds a different light on the period and is much more in line with the general idea of his career and personality. It seems as if Rogozin deliberately left out this period since it shows that he, despite being rebuffed by the Kremlin for his assertive and hostile attitude towards the powers-that-be, was not willing to acquiesce in his demotion as politician. He kept on fighting and did not simply obey orders. A story not worth mentioning in the biography written and published right after his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister.

Rogozin continued his political activities after his resignation as party leader of Rodina and already in October 2006 became a member of the Public Council for the preparation of the Russian March, scheduled for November 4. In close cooperation with the Movement Against

64

Illegal Immigration (DPNI) Rogozin wanted to organize a nationalist march in Moscow but was not granted permission to do so by the city authorities.193 Despite of the fact that the march was cancelled, Rogozin demonstrated he was not willing to simply withdraw from politics. In December 2006 Rogozin was elected chairman of ‘Homeland. Congress of Russian Communities’, an organization erected on the ruins of the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO). The movement did however not turn into a political party after all and Rogozin withdrew from it as its chairman.194 In April 2007 Rogozin announced he wanted to create a new political party called ‘Great Russia’. Although he did not rule out the possibility for him to become its party leader, Rogozin knew that his direct involvement in the party would render it impossible for the organization to actually register as an official political party and participate in the parliamentary elections. His assumption was confirmed after Rogozin decided to lead the regional branch of Great Russia in Voronezh. The party was denied permission to participate in the elections due to an insufficient amount of official members195. Political analysts however stress that the denial of Great Russia to participate was a sheer political decision, the Kremlin wanted to prevent Rogozin’s return to the political arena.196

Rogozin’s involvement in the party ‘Patriots of Russia’ in July 2007, together with his old comrade Glazyev, and especially the statement of its party leader Gennady Seleznev that the party was ‘ready to accept a well-known non-party right wing politician in their ranks’197 confirmed Rogozin’s status among right-wing movements. Despite his removal as party leader of Rodina in 2006, Rogozin was still conceived as the protagonist and leader of the nationalist patriotic currency in Russian politics. His prominent position combined with the increasing nationalist patriotic tendencies in society was the cause for the Kremlin’s persistence in refusing Rogozin’s return as the leader of the nationalist opposition. In September 2007 Rogozin, Simigin, Glazyev and the leader of ‘Revival of Russia’ decided to form an electoral coalition ‘Motherland – Patriots of Russia’ and participate in the Duma

193 Moscow authorities ban ‘Right March (2006), Polit.ru, Available at: http://polit.ru/article/2006/10/19/faright/ (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 194 Mikhail Moshkin, Congress Resurrect (Конгресс воскрес), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Available at: http://www.ng.ru/politics/2006-12-11/1_kongress.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 195 Dmitry Rogozin. Vice Prime Minister (Рогозин, Дмитрий. Заместитель председателя правительства РФ), Lenta.ru, Available at: http://lenta.ru/lib/14159797/full.htm (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 196 Viktor Chamraev, Farewell to "Great Russia". Dmitry Rogozin was not allowed to return to politics. (Прощай, "Великая Россия". Дмитрию Рогозину не разрешили вернуться в большую политику), Kommersant, Available at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/789575 (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 197 Dmitry Rogozin. Vice Prime Minister (Рогозин, Дмитрий. Заместитель председателя правительства РФ), Lenta.ru, Available at: http://lenta.ru/lib/14159797/full.htm (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 65

elections.198 Rogozin was not included in the electoral list, but promised his support to the party. The result of the December Duma elections were however very disappointing. With only 0,89 per cent of the vote, Patriots of Russia did not win any seats in the parliament. Rogozin nevertheless decided not to wait for the result of the elections and already confirmed his position as Permanent Representative to NATO in November 2007.

Ambassador to NATO

A significant appointment:

In order to be able to answer the question why Rogozin was send to Brussels as ambassador to NATO after he fell out of favour with the Kremlin, I have described his course of action after being dismissed as party leader of Rodina in 2006. Rogozin was regarded as the voice of the nationalist patriotic political movements in Russia, which turned him into one of Russia’s most popular politicians at the time. The Kremlin was forced to act and found a use for him. They were keen to ensure themselves of Rogozin’s support base, invited him to join the powers-that-be and sent him to Brussels as ambassador to NATO.199 His appointment is generally regarded as a form of exile; a way to use his image as nationalist patriotic protagonist who was nominated by the Kremlin to serve Russia’s interests in NATO and at same time to keep him at a safe distance from Russia’s domestic political developments. In a way Rogozin’s appointment was intended as a means to distract from and not determine politics. A role he already fulfilled up until 2004 when he decided to use the nationalist tendencies in society to drive into power and by doing so renouncing his role as spoiler project to the powers-that-be.

This type of reasoning does no justice to the importance of Rogozin’s position as ambassador to NATO at this particular moment in time. The Kremlin’s decision to appoint Rogozin was both of interest to the domestic political developments, but also with regard to Russia’s revised position in the international political arena. A topic elaborated upon in the present chapter. Since the significance of Rogozin’s appointment as Deputy Prime Minister will be discussed in the next chapter, I will only discuss the meaning of Rogozin’s appointment as ambassador to NATO with regard to the relationship between Russia and NATO in particular and the Kremlin’s view on the international political discourse in general.

198 Dmitry Rogozin. Vice Prime Minister (Рогозин, Дмитрий. Заместитель председателя правительства РФ), Lenta.ru, Available at: http://lenta.ru/lib/14159797/full.htm (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 199 Judah, Fragile Empire, 133. 66

Russia-NATO relations:

Relations between Russia and NATO started immediately after the end of the Cold War, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.200 The council was established by the Allies on 20 December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries.201 The NACC embodied the new cooperative relationship with all countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the Cold War proposed during the summit meeting in London of July 1990. The relationship between Russia and NATO in the post-Cold War era proved to be difficult. Forsberg and Herd describe it as ‘a mismatch of expectations, commitments and perceptions torpedoed the prospect of a more stable cooperative partnership’.202 However, at the same time significant forms of cooperation have been established in the last two and a half decades. The Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea marked a new low in Russia-NATO relations: all practical civilian and military cooperation under the NATO-Russia Council was suspended in April 2014 and NATO leaders condemned Russia’s alleged military intervention in Ukraine during the Wales Summit in September 2014. It was about time Russia would comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.203 What the outcome of the current crisis will be is not clear, it however forces us to have a closer look at the development of the NATO-Russia relations in order to understand what influence the situation has on the sustainability of the partnership. Rogozin’s appointment as ambassador to NATO in 2008 is characteristic for the situation the relationship was in at that particular moment. A situation that would only further deteriorate as time passed.

Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herdhave examined Russia-NATO relations extensively and claim in their article ‘Russia and NATO: from Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors’ that the ‘dissonance at the heart of the relationship is best understood as the consequence of Russia’s attempt to navigate its way trough a strategic trilemma and current divorce signals Russia’s failure to do so’.204 Russia strives to replace the US’s power vertical with a democratic multipolar system and a new version of interdependence, it seeks confirmation for

200 NATO - NATO’s relations with Russia (24 April 2015) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm? (viewed: 01 June 2015) 201 NATO - The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (archived) (20 October 2011) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm (viewed: 01 June 2015) 202 Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, ‘Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors’ in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 41. 203 NATO - NATO’s relations with Russia (24 April 2015) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm? (viewed: 01 June 2015) 204 Forsberg and Herd, ‘Russia and NATO’, 41. 67

its emergence as an independent pole in the post-Western global order and while achieving both objectives it wants to preserve its traditional and historical managerial role in the Russian world and maintaining great power peace at the same time.205 The objectives have caused NATO-Russia relations to fluctuate strongly over time.

The first period in Russia-NATO relations can be described as the ‘romantic’ phase, the manifestation of the ‘hand of friendship’.206 Both NATO and Russia agreed it was ‘time to step beyond cold war divisions and convert their shared optimism into a partnership that would generate stable cooperative international relations’.207 Nevertheless, the political declarations fell short in diminishing the inbuilt scepticism towards the relationship. Already in late 1993 Russia slowly started to renounce the Western discourse centred on market- democratic policies and proclaimed a more pragmatic nationalist course. Russia carried out market-oriented reforms with a disastrous effect on the political and economical situation of the country. Russia needed to change its course of action to survive. NATO’s announcement regarding its willingness to enlarge the Alliance during the Brussels summit of January 1994 confounded Russia’s trust in the intentions of the West even further. NATO’s intention to expand into Central and Eastern Europe – former Soviet republics included – was conceived as a threat. NATO was trying to encircle Russia, Yeltsin felt betrayed.208 Russia’s foreign policy of 1996 was fully directed against NATO enlargement; the romantic phase came to an end.

The Founding Act of 1997 was intended to smoothen the relation and revive the aspirations of the NATO-Russia partnership. According to President Clinton it marked an historical change in the relationship between NATO and Russia and President Chirac too praised the treaty for opening a new chapter in the history of Europe, a chapter without precedent in that it expresses a common vision on the future. The opening statement of the Founding Act underlined this endeavour:

‘NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided

205 Forsberg and Herd, ‘Russia and NATO’, 43. 206 The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (archived) (2011), NATO, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm (Accessed on: 01 June 2015). 207 Forsberg and Herd, ‘Russia and NATO’, 43. 208 Ibidem, 45. 68

Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.’209

Despite the promising rhetoric, the actual significance of the Act remained doubtful. The enlargement issue had not been resolved properly and continued to have a negative impact on the partnership. Already in 1997 NATO member states decided to start the process of including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance.210 The situation was exacerbated by the NATO’s new strategic doctrine, adopted at the March 1999 Washington summit but reached a new critical moment after NATO decided to intervene in Yugoslavia in order to protect the Albanian minority in Kosovo. Despite Yeltsin’s objection against Western military intervention and the absence of a United Nations Security Council mandate for the air campaign, NATO proceeded and rejected Russia’s objections. The Kosovo campaign highlighted Russia’s weakness and its inability to influence strategic matters in Europe – either the political decision-making that initiated the war or its military conduct.211 The Permanent Joint Council established as part of the Founding Act in order to promote partnership and to mitigate fundamental disagreements over the enlargement issue, failed. Despite the commitment of NATO and Russia to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic affairs together, Russia soon found out it was dealing with a partnership based on inequality. Russia decided to withdraw from the Permanent Joint Council in order to demonstrate its dissatisfaction. The cooperation reached a new low.

Putin’s reinvigoration of Russia-NATO relations fails:

The relationship improved after Putin was elected president. Putin was not interested in a hostile position towards the West. He wanted to guarantee Russia’s status as a super power in Russia itself and propagate the idea of the country’s resurrection. In foreign politics he wanted to act as an ally and a friend to the West. It was time to leave the competitive attitude behind.212 Especially the meeting of the Permanent Joint Council on 13 September 2001 in which the members expressed their anger and indignation at the barbaric acts committed

209 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France (2009), NATO, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 210 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation (1997), NATO, Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm (Accessed on: 1 June 1997). 211 John Norris, Collision Course: NATO, Russian and Kosovo (Westport, 2005), 17. 212 Belkovsky, Vladimir, 168-9. 69

against the people of the United States of America and in which all members called for a joint fight against terrorism213, gave a new incentive to renew the partnership. The instatement of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the successor of the PJC was the result. Forsberg and Herd state that ‘Moscow’s terms for the renewed cooperation – unconditional compliance with international law, UN Charter and the Helsinki final Act – and the aims of the Council – coordination of joint approaches and decision-making – reflected a deep-seated Russian desire to base its NATO relationship on the principle of equality, reciprocity and parity, in which Russia’s status as a great power was acknowledged’.214 This time the cooperation was able to withstand strategic differences with regard to the war in Iraq of 2003 and the Rose and Orange revolutions of 2003 and 2004.

At the same time the enlargement issue started to predominate the relationship again. Moscow opposed the accession of the Baltic states. NATO, however, started patrolling the air space of the Baltic States and ignored Russia’s protests.215 The speech of Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov at the Munich Security Conference in 2004 demonstrated the rising tensions between NATO and Russia, mainly directed at the unequal character of the partnership:

‘I would like to remind the representatives of the Alliance that with its expansion they are beginning to operate in the zone of vitally important interests of our country; and ought to strive actually, not just in words, to consider our concerns both in the field of politics and in the area of security, if, of course, the alliance's desire for partnership is sincere. And additional transparency is required not only of Russia, but of the Alliance as well.’216

The negative trend in NATO-Russia relations continued in the subsequent period and led to a new low: Putin’s speech during the Munich Security Conference of 2007. A watershed moment in Russia-NATO relations, which highlighted Russia’s new approach towards international political issues. Putin openly criticised the injustice of the international political system, dominated by the Western powers. He valued the idea of an international community that ensured global security with democracy as its acceptable form of government. He warned however for the hegemonic use of the term ‘democracy’ and emphasised that a hegemonic

213 Meeting in extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial level (2001), NATO, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_18861.htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 214 Forsberg and Herd, ‘Russia and NATO’, 47. 215 Ibidem, 48. 216 Speech by Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov at the 40th Munich Security Conference "International Security Issues in the Context of Russia-NATO Relations" (Munich, Germany, February 6-8, 2004) (2004), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Available at: http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/801863C8B5BB9246C3256EC9001D1A01?OpenDocument (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 70

unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War had never been established and did not answer to the current needs of the international community. Putin criticised U.S. attempts to become a global hegemon and for neglecting international law. It was about time to rethink the architecture of global security and NATO’s role in it. NATO’s enlargement had provoked mutual distrust on several occasions and had in no way contributed to the strengthening of global security.

An (un)expected comeback:

Rogozin’s appointment as ambassador to NATO came as a surprise to many. Question was if his assignment needed to regarded as an affront to the West and a sign of a more aggressive Russian foreign policy? Why was an avowed nationalist appointed by Putin to represent Russia at NATO?217 Rogozin’s predecessors Sergey Kislyak (1998-2003) – who previously was second Secretary to the UN, First Secretary Councillor at the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Washington, worked in several positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was ambassador to Belgium while also serving as Permanent Representative to NATO - and Konstantin Totsky (2003-2008) – previously chief of Russia’s Border Guards and working for the FSB – were both true diplomats, civil servants who had build a career within the governmental institutions. Rogozin’s appointment marked a clear break with the past. Regarded as a firebrand nationalist and careerist politician who had fallen out with the Kremlin after his party was disqualified from Moscow city council elections, his appointment clearly demonstrated what significance was acknowledged to the position in Brussels.

By 2007 Putin had already selected Medvedev as caretaker president for the 2008 elections. Since Medvedev represented a more liberal policy and the conservative nationalist tendencies in Russian society grew stronger, the Kremlin needed to respond and decided to conduct a foreign policy that, almost by necessity, become more strident and conservative.218 The deterioration of the relationship between NATO and Russia as described above has convinced the Russian leadership that the ambassadorial position to NATO had only a marginal political value and therefore needed to be used for domestic political interests. Russia’s political legitimacy was partly build on the notion that the country needed to defend itself against an everlasting foreign military threat and the Western intention upon gaining access to Russia’s rich natural resources. Rogozin was useful for the Kremlin since he would never miss an

217 Finch, Biographical Sketch, 29. 218 Ibidem, 29. 71

opportunity to criticise the Alliance and elaborate upon the threats the Russian people is confronted with. The Kremlin clearly lacked confidence NATO-Russia relations would ever prove useful. Rogozin couldn’t harm their case politically in Brussels and would at the same time prove helpful to their domestic interests.

In order to be appointed as ambassador to NATO Rogozin had to put in considerable effort to make amends with the Kremlin, to be allowed back in from the cold.219 Rogozin’s appointment to NATO was in no way a definite rejection of the Alliance. Putin was by no means ready to permanently disrupt relations and by appointing an ambitious politician who was well aware of the fact he couldn’t afford to slip up since it would drastically undermine his (future) position, Putin was assured of a reasonably docile ambassador who would only use his power in accordance to the interests of the Kremlin, both in domestic and foreign affairs.

Calling for support:

For Rogozin personally his appointment as ambassador to NATO also required some explanation to his supporters. Instead of pursuing his independent stance towards the Kremlin, he now needed to justify his decision to accept the Kremlin’s offer to become part of the power elite. Rogozin stated that the job of Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO provided him with a unique opportunity to put his ideas of peace consolidation in Eurasia in practice. Moreover, the position did not precipitate a change in his personal views or detract from his principles. The central argument for the acceptance was the fact that being in opposition is not the natural state for true, professional patriots, unless there is truly something wrong in the country of course.220 In an official statement on his appointment Rogozin stated as follows:

‘Dear friends!

Today the President of the Russian Federation signed a Decree appointing me the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). I regard this decision of the state leader to be an offer of an interesting and responsible job that is of high importance to my country.

219 Pavel Felgenhauer, Moscow may dispatch firebrand nationalist to NATO (2007), Jamestown, Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33125&no_cache=1 (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 220 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 314. 72

I assume that the Decree arrived unexpectedly for many of you. Our relations with the party in power have not been trouble-free lately. However, the fact that our political views and professional qualities are on demand meets my desire to serve my country and to contribute to the prosperity of the Motherland.

I call to my comrades, colleagues and supporters: do not be afraid to integrate into the structures of power, primarily into its executive branches, where you can make an impact on the evolution of power from within. In this crucial time, when our Motherland is in transition and when it is being determined whether our country can eventually regain the status of a great power, the patriot must not stay aside.’221

Rogozin’s call for his comrades, colleagues and supporters to not be afraid to integrate into the structures of power, is a clear sign of the role Rogozin was expected to fulfil. By becoming part of the executive branch of the government and call for his supporters to do the same, Rogozin gave a clear sign to the Kremlin he was prepared to serve their interests and obtain support from nationalist and patriotic inclined voters to support the government in a time where nationalist sentiments gained prominence. Rogozin was not only of use to the foreign interests of Russia, but even more to the domestic interests of the Kremlin. From the nationalist perspective, Rogozin’s tenure at NATO was an unqualified success.

The Georgian War:

Immediately after Rogozin’s instalment he was confronted with the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008. It proved to be a conflict that redefined the relationship between Russia and NATO, but at the same time provided Rogozin with an international podium on which he could display his thoughts and prove himself as the bulldog protector of the rights of Russians abroad. Putin’s speech during the Munich security conference in February 2007 already demonstrated the negative trend of the NATO-Russia relationship and NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 only further deteriorated the relationship. Although France and Germany both objected Georgia’s and Ukraine’s participation in the admission programme for future member states of NATO, the final declaration stated clearly that Ukraine and Georgia ‘will be members of NATO’.222 The relationship balanced between confrontation and reassurance. Putin stated that if Georgia and Ukraine were integrated in NATO, Russia would

221 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 315. 222 Vladimir Putin, Text of Putin’s speech at NATO Summit (2008), Unian Information Agency, Available at: http://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putins-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 73

undertake ‘necessary measures’.223 The Georgian conflict of August 2008 was the climax of the deteriorating trend in the relationship between NATO and Russia.224 In a reaction to the Georgian crisis NATO stated:

‘Russian military action has been disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. We call on Russia to take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the areas it is supposed to leave under the six-principle agreement signed by President Saakashvili and President Medvedev1. The Alliance is considering seriously the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO- Russia relationship. (...) We have determined that we cannot continue with business as usual. We call on Moscow to demonstrate – both in word and deed – its continued commitment to the principles upon which we agreed to base our relationship.’225

Russia’s reaction on NATO’s allegations was fierce: Medvedev suspended Russia’s military cooperation with NATO and threatened to cut ties completely. Germany and France were not willing to continue this development and started deescalating tensions by convincing NATO defence ministers to continue their cooperation with Russia on subjects such as counterterrorism, Afghanistan, the CFE Treaty and nuclear weapons. Russia continued to give logistical support to NATO related to the Afghanistan operation, but after NATO started to defence planning for the Baltic States the situation deteriorated again. Although ’s ‘Reset policy’ signalled hope, both NATO and Russia increasingly differed in its conception on key issues.

Rogozin was spending holidays in Tuscany when the war broke out in Georgia in August 2008. The five-day conflict centred on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two ‘breakaway provinces’ in Georgia who are supported by Russia. The Kremlin officially recognized both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states on 26 August 2008 and employed peacekeeping operations in the region. Rogozin expected the Georgian government to ‘internationalise the armed conflict and persuade the Allied NATO Armed Forces to take Georgian side. His duty was quite the opposite – to restrain NATO from making rushed

223 Vladimir Putin, Text of Putin’s speech at NATO Summit (2008), Unian Information Agency, Available at: http://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putins-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 224 Forsberg and Herd, ‘Russia and NATO’, 49. 225 Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels (2008), NATO, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_29950.htm (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 74

decisions and stop Georgian adventurers from provoking a third world war’.226 Rogozin clearly understood the importance of effective information operations and used his position in Brussels to not only inform diplomats from NATO member states but also the general public on the Russian side of the story. Rogozin wanted to set the record straight and prove to the world that Russia had acted within the borders of international law. In a statement he gave to journalist Lyudmila Shcherbina from Interfax just before taking off with a plane to Brussels, Rogozin commented on Russia’s position:

‘Today, Saakashvili committed the last one of his many mistakes. The assault on Russian peacekeeping contingent on duty is paramount to an armed attack on the Russian Federtion. This is an act of aggression and we will respond to it with harsh military actions. The bombing of the paecefull city in the middle of the night was a barbarous action, undertaken with an aim to murder as many as innocent people as possible, particularly women, children and elderly. It is an act of ethnic cleansing and should be classified as a war crime. Russia’s duty is to put an end to the slaughter and to punish the aggressors using armed force against them.’227

Rogozin wanted to point out Russia had no alternative but to draw armed forces into South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An operation that would be limited in time and locality, purely aimed at achieving peace in and with Georgia. Russia had no intention to occupy the Georgian territory or to change the political regime.228 The Kremlin and Rogozin in particular had one clear objective: for NATO not to interfere in the conflict. A red line had been drawn and NATO had not dared to step over it.229

In order to be able to explain what this event meant for the Russia-NATO relations, I will shortly get back to the general overview of the political circumstances this conflict took place in. Despite of the coloured revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia’s confidence was high. Oil prices were still rising, the poverty rate in Russia had fallen and Russia had been able to pay off international debts. In Europe, Russia courted special bilateral relationships with EU member states in order to undermine a common Western front and play a game of divide and rule inside the EU.230 Globally, Russia reached out to Venezuela, Iran and Syria and was even able to intensify relations with China in order to counter Western

226 Rogozin, The Hawks of Peace, 337. 227 Ibidem, 338. 228 Ibidem, 339. 229 Finch, Biographical Sketch, 32. 230 Judah, Fragile Empire, 162. 75

dominance in the UN Security Council. Central to the 2007-8 period was Russia’s conviction it was of strategic importance to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from becoming NATO member states. It signalled a turn in Russia’s relations with the West; the establishment was convinced Russia now had the resources to defeat NATO expansion.231 It was time to defend its sphere of influence and counter Western dominance. Russia had started the so-called ‘short Cold War’.

Without further elaborating on the challenge Saakashvili – generally regarded as a successful liberal reformer able to eliminate petty corruption and gangsterism and therefore a threat to the Putin model – he took the decision on the night of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games to attack and occupy South Ossetia. Within five days the Georgian armed forces were defeated. The consequences were twofold: they not only lost the South Ossetian and Abkhazian territory, but above all lost its integrity in international affairs after falsely announcing a Russian invasion. Russia had given a clear signal to the world. It did not accept Western interference in its sphere of influence and was able to ‘crush, invade and depose the leadership of American client states without consequences’.232 Rogozin played an important role in this process. At the same time the arguments put forward to explain Russia’s position in the conflict were understandable. After the Bucharest summit in which NATO promised Georgia and Ukraine to become member states of the Alliance, Saakashvili was told he first had to resolve the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since it was impossible to accept a country that had frozen conflicts on its territory.233 Saakashvili had already rigged the referendum on the admission question by declining the provinces participation in the vote. Russia saw Saakashvili’s blitzkrieg on Tsinkhvali as a way to meet the conditions of NATO.

Russia had to act for two reasons and Rogozin was able to explain Russia’s reasoning convincingly to both NATO and the international media: first, no country can be indifferent when civilians are attacked and when refugees are fleeing into its territory, and secondly, no army can forgive another country for launching an attack on its peacekeepers and shooting its soldiers at point-blank range.234 Saakashvili was convinced Russia would not risk tensions with the US. The opposite was true. Putin had sent a crystal clear message to the world and the Russian people applauded him for doing so. Putin’s popularity went trough the roof.

231 Judah, Fragile Empire, 162. 232 Ibidem, 164. 233 Dmitry Rogozin, Russia, NATO, and the Future of European Security (London, 2009), 5. 234 Rogozin, Russia, NATO, and the Future of European Security, 5. 76

Russia was back. The non-accession of Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance immediately marked Rogozin’s top achievements during his disposition as ambassador to NATO.

Serving international and domestic interests:

Although the ‘short Cold War’ marked a low in Russia – NATO relations and despite the harsh rhetoric, Rogozin has not only been a fierce opponent of NATO and has even helped to develop some new areas of NATO-Russia cooperation.235 Russia and NATO still joined forces with regard to combating terrorism, counter-piracy, search-and-rescue at sea, logistics and military academic exchanges, which supports the argument that Russia did not want to break all ties with the Western world but just demanded to be treated as an equal partner in the global political arena. Russian domestic politics however played a significant role in Rogozin’s appearance. In order to secure his support within the Russian leadership and the Russian people in general, he couldn’t afford to be seen as a genuine ally of the West. Finch even states that ‘domestic political considerations took precedence over genuine dialogue, and since the Kremlin continued to derive political legitimacy from its perceived ability to protect Russia from the Alliance, greater cooperation may have never been Rogozin’s mission’.236 He has done little to strengthen the cooperation and disturbed the relationship even further by openly criticising NATO in the media.

Rogozin has broadly elaborated upon his vision on NATO itself and the Russia-NATO relations in particular. Although he is generally conceived as a bully and notorious for recalcitrance and constant criticism with regard to NATO, Rogozin is in no way dismissive towards Russia-NATO relations. In fact, Rogozin is very outspoken about the strong relations between Russia and the West, Europe in particular. According to him ‘Russia is part of Europe and Russia and Europe should be considered two ends of the thread that binds the entire European continent together’.237 The West needs to look upon Russia as an integral part of Europe and Russia too must recognise the advantages of the alliance with European countries.238 The future of a Russia-free Europe is not enviable. ‘The future of Russia-free Europe is terrifying’.239 Although relations have never been easy, Rogozin is optimistic about Russia’s and Europe’s integration into a single security system:

235 Russia – NATO cooperation mainly focussed on logistics and combating terrorism. 236 Finch, Biographical Sketch, 32. 237 Rogozin, Hawks of Peace, 316. 238 Ibidem, 324. 239 Ibidem. 77

‘Russia does not need to join NATO, and NATO does not need to join Russia. But why can’t we take the shared common perimeter of security under our protection and establish the wholesome European security system? Cooperation must be based on the principle of equality, integrity, safety and mutual trust.’240

The emphasis on the importance of a relationship based on equality is something that has already been discussed above. Both Putin and Surkov have extensively elaborated upon this specific theme and it even became a central notion in Russia’s foreign policy. Sovereignty was inextricably linked to and even a prerequisite for Russia to be able to contribute to the establishment of a wholesome European security system. A view fully shared by Rogozin. According to Rogozin Russia is not willing to give up one ounce of its sovereignty and is not going to forfeit the rights and guarantees of safeguarding its independence. It has its own means and methods to ensure her national security. Apart from the difference in political and economic approaches in Europe and Russia, Rogozin is convinced of the importance of ‘concerted actions along both perimeters of Europe in order to protect both European houses’.241 Russia is well aware of the fact that if it remains a strong and independent power, NATO will never be at war with Russia since the Western world values its comfortable and trouble-free world too highly.

The course of action undertaken by the West and above all the inertia of its confrontational mentality, have amazed Rogozin. While Russia tried to reach out to the West in order to smoothen the relationship and show its true willingness to cooperate, the West only exported ‘colour revolutions, erected anti-Russian bastions which encircled Russia and even tried to bypass Russian pipelines by initiating for example the Nabucco project’.242 Rogozin is convinced of the fact that by extending NATO’s and EU’s borders to the east, its thinning Europe’s spirit of identity and weakens its position considerably. Russia should be conceived as Europe’s most natural and reliable ally of the Western cultural elite. NATO’s enlargement policy did not reinforce but weaken global security. It is about time NATO goes back to its original objective – a military alliance established to improve global security - and starts thinking about a new attitude towards its partners. Enlargement will only increase the area of responsibility for the Alliance, but its capabilities, its military potential is not increased.

240 Rogozin, Hawks of Peace, 322. 241 Ibidem, 321. 242 Ibidem, 316. 78

Enlargement does not increase security.243 Rogozin emphasises Russia wants to build a security architecture on the principle of equal security and no security at the expense of others.244

Instead of focussing on Rogozin’s daily tasks and achievements during his stay in Brussels, I have chosen to elaborate upon both the domestic and foreign circumstances in which he was appointed permanent representative to NATO. The question why the Kremlin appointed the protagonist of the nationalist patriotic movement as ambassador to NATO can best be explained by looking at the changing domestic ideological reality and the way in which this was translated to Russia’s foreign policy. By simply considering it an insult to the Alliance and purely focussing on Rogozin’s course of action within NATO, one would ignore the actual meaning of his appointment. I have tried to show what kind of influence the increasing self-awareness and self-confidence of the Russian state had on its foreign policy, which became overtly more assertive over time but did not reject the importance of international cooperation. At the same time, I have discussed Russia’s domestic societal and political developments and explained why the Kremlin was forced to reinstate Rogozin - not only as a protagonist of the nationalist patriotic movement but also as a defender of the rights of Russians abroad – and even provide him with a prominent position to enable him to secure the votes of his supporters for the Kremlin. Rogozin proved to be an asset for the powers-that-be. Despite the fact that some analysts considered Rogozin’s appointment a political exile and above all a means to distract him from determine domestic politics, the Georgian war and the increasing nationalist tendencies in Russia ensured Rogozin’s prominence in Russia’s political arena. After the popular protests of the winter of 2011-12, the Kremlin had no other choice than to grant him a prominent position in the Russian government. Rogozin’s star was rising, his faith had turned.

243 Rogozin, Russia, NATO, and the Future of European Security, 4. 244 Ibidem, 6. 79

Chapter 3: Rising to power

Rogozin’s return to Moscow

On 23 December 2011 Dmitry Rogozin was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the military-industrial complex by former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In May 2012 Rogozin was reappointed in Prime Minister Medvedev’s cabinet; his areas of responsibility included the armed forces, the defence industry, arms technology development and the atomic industry. After having served almost four years in Brussels as Presidential Representative to NATO, Rogozin returned to the domestic political arena. Not as a leader of the nationalist opposition, but as a member of the federal government. The moment of his appointment – in the midst of a series of oppositional protests directed against United Russia and the announced transfer of power between Medvedev and Putin – is significant in explaining Rogozin’s role in the government. Rogozin’s prominent position in Russia’s domestic politics provides us with the opportunity to have a closer look at the changing political and societal dynamics in Russia in the last couple of years. In order to do so, this chapter mainly focuses on answering the questions what Rogozin’s role in the government is and how he is related to other right-wing politicians that might come up us as a nationalist alternative to the powers-that-be. The future of Rogozin’s political career is impossible to predict, the analysis of his current position combined with our insights in societal and political developments however enable me to discuss possible scenarios. Since the developments discussed in this chapter are still ongoing, it is impossible to draw comprehensive conclusions. This account should rather be seen as a preliminary status update of the current state of affairs.

Public protest:

Before being able to answer the question what Rogozin’s role in the government is, I would like to shed some light on the political and societal circumstances Rogozin was appointed in. Although the end of December normally signals the start of a two week holiday-period to celebrate the New Year and a political appointment in this period of time is generally ill- suited, Rogozin’s appointment in 2011 had a clear strategic purpose. After the rikorovka245 was announced, the Russian people realised the parliamentary and presidential elections were only there to validate Putin’s decision to return to power246. They decided to stage public

245 The swap of Medvedev and Putin, pointing at a defensive chess manoeuvre where the king is swapped with the rook. 246 Judah, Fragile Empire, 192-194. 80

protests in order express their concerns. The castling proved that politics was still a matter of a tiny power circle and despite Medvedev’s devotion to the modernization of Russia, Putin’s return predicted stagnation. The rokirovka and the irregularities during the parliamentary elections confirmed that instead of a vertical of power, the regime had erected a vertical of loyalty which would cause social stagnation and anti-meritocratic tendencies in the country.247 The middle-class was agitated about the prospects for their country and came into action. Important to note is that the protesters wanted change, but not at any price.

Putin’s popularity started to crumble. The population seemed to be exhausted by the image of Putin and the lack of a narrative started to undermine his telepopulism.248 The winter 2011-12 election cycle contributed to this development. The parliamentary elections turned out to be an outright failure for United Russia. Instead of a resounding victory, United Russia was only able to obtain 52 per cent of the seats in the Duma. Putin had not been able to convince the Russian people and had in spite of the ballot stuffing and the lack of real competitors in the elections only been able to secure the parliament with a small margin. A large but broadly aspirational section of the population had broken off from the Putin majority.249

As a result of the disappointing results at the parliamentary elections and the increasing fervour of the demonstrators the course of action of the Kremlin changed. At first Medvedev promised reforms to give the impression the government was willing to make some concessions to the demonstrators. At the same time, however, the Kremlin started to organize anti-orange protests to show that the support base for Putin remained big and started to display the protestors as social racists. The Kremlin wanted to make the Russian population believe it was dealing with ‘mink-wearing revolutionaries who acted over the heads of the people, totally disregarding their interests.250 This was a revolution of the rich who wanted – with support of Western powers – to torn the Russian society apart. The Kremlin propaganda went in overdrive. Putin’s only objection was to jump the hurdle of the March 2012 presidential election; he was however facing a new generation of opposition movements in a changing Russia. The demonstrations ended the Putin consensus and the Putin majority.251 They exposed all was not well and unravelled the managed democracy. It was about time the Kremlin formulated answers to counter the threat of the new opposition.

247 Judah, Fragile Empire, 185. 248 Ibidem, 47. 249 Ibidem, 233. 250 Ibidem, 243-244. 251 Ibidem, 249. 81

Russia’s changing identity framework:

A new generation of opposition movements also reflected Russia’s changing identity framework. Russia’s identity debate on the national composition of the country has taken central stage over the past decade and is according to Laruelle now increasingly discussed in the public space in a defensive way: ‘Russia’s historical territorial expansion and its imperial legacy, once celebrated as the core of nationalist feelings, has been replaced by a narrative about the risk of losing Russia’s Russianness’.252 It is significant that ideas once impeached as nationalistic, have slowly started to predominate the public debate from the mid-1990s up to the end of the 2000s. This development drastically shifted the overall narrative of Russia’s national identity.253 The changing identity framework cannot be separated from the development of cultural, social and above all political values in society. The uprise of the Natsdem narrative – a political movement that is simultaneously pro-European and democratic but also xenophobic254 - in the Russian political sphere was by no means surprising and did not specifically come forth from the December 2011 protests. Its prominence however reflects the fundamental shift in Russia’s society.

Alexei Navalny is the protagonist of the new generation oppositionists; he became the leader of the ‘other’ Russia. Navalny has used the blogosphere as an alternative mass media to present his anticorruption efforts on the Internet in order to expose the bankruptcy of the dictatorship of law.255 Despite being prosecuted and not long after even arrested for his alleged involvement in an illegal timber procurement scheme, Navalny participated in the September 2013 mayoral elections in Moscow. The courts ruling to sentence him to five years in prison, which was later changed into a probation sentence that would forbid Navalny from running in the next presidential elections, could not prevent him from influencing Russia’s political landscape. His victory in Moscow’s mayoral elections – Navalny received 27 per cent of the votes – was a clear sign that the Kremlin could not control the new opposition as it had done in the last decade with politicians like Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and Rogozin. Navalny’s uprising was however also characteristic for another development in the Russian political space: the predomination of a new ideological trend of national-democrats called Natsdem.

252 Marlene Laruelle, ‘Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling “nationalism” and “liberalism”’ in: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, 285. 253 Laruelle, ‘Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling “nationalism” and “liberalism”’, 285. 254 Ibidem, 276. 255 Judah, Fragile Empire, 217-218. 82

Natsdem is supported by the urban middle class and reflects the recent transformation of Russian society. Although the uprising of the national-democratic movement in Russia is mainly considered to be of significance to the anti-Putin political factions in society, the development has also changed the political course of the Kremlin. Rogozin’s rise to power could be regarded as a consequence of this development. Laruelle emphasised that Russia’s current xenophobic discourse gained broad support among a population normally split by ideological, lifestyle, income, social, and age differences.256

Rogozin contributed considerably to the normalization of it xenophobic ideas during his time as party leader of Rodina. Because of the adoption of the xenophobe and nationalist tone of voice by the Kremlin, the opposition has been forced to change both its strategies and narratives. The more the Kremlin occupied the ‘discursive field of nationalism via state- backed patriotism’257, the more the nationalist movements had to find a new tone of voice. Coming forth from a young middle-class generation that was well connected to the West and was used to travel abroad, they started to advocate the Europeanization of Russian nationalist values.258 The prominence of Natsdem is a consequence of this particular development. Despite some attempts, the Natsdem movement has never been turned into a political party since the interests of the groups involved in the movement were too diverse.

The inability to create a single party is characteristic for the composition of Russia’s society. It remains too diverse to be casted into a single form of nationalism and it proved impossible, even for the Kremlin, to monopolize the nationalist narrative. Although Natsdem and Navalny in particular have not been able to offer a conclusive idea on how to connect the principles of nationalism and liberalism (the most prominent element of the Europeanization process), they have contributed to Russia’s political debate. They demonstrated that ‘nationalism’ is not a product of the Putin regime, but a flexible, ideological instrument that can be a part of almost any political toolkit.259 Nationalist movements will remain legitimate actors in the ‘big politics’ scene over the years to come.

State managed nationalism:

256 Judah, Fragile Empire, 286. 257 Ibidem, 287. 258 Ibidem. 259 Laruelle, ‘Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling “nationalism” and “liberalism”’, 293. 83

In the preceding paragraphs I have elaborated upon the social and political context in which the nationalist and Natsdem in particular started to predominate the political spectrum. A fundamental shift which sheds light on the recent development of the Russian society. It is probable that the developments have influenced the Kremlin’s decision to demand Rogozin’s return to the domestic political arena and appoint him Deputy Prime Minister. Rogozin contributed to the normalization of nationalism and xenophobia in Russia as party leader of Rodina, and was supposed to become a competitor to Natsdem after his return from Brussels. According to Laruelle, Rogozin, who links the old generation of ‘official nationalism’ to far right movements, needed to occupy a relatively similar niche to Natsdem.260 Rogozin intended to modernize Russian nationalism defined by anti-migrant xenophobia. In contrast to Navalny, Rogozin rejected pro-European liberalism, arguing for modest domestic reforms and the pursuit of a great power status internationally.261

Russia’s approach towards nationalism has been manifold and greatly influenced its domestic and foreign policy. Therefore the Kremlin was keen to control the nationalist tendencies in Russia as much as possible to prevent it from becoming an influential independent political force. In order to understand to what extent and with which intentions the Kremlin availed itself of nationalism, I once again need to point at the many-layered pie principle discussed in chapter one. Russia’s political structure has been established to enable the Kremlin to control and utilise politics for its own purposes. The same goes fore the way in which the state approaches nationalism. According to Luke March Russian authorities’ nationalism is relatively moderate in its content and mainly services the elite’s interests:

’Nationalism is moderate in its content relative to historical and contemporary forms of Russian nationalism. This is because its aim is not the expression of nationalism per se, but its control and utilisation for regime goals. ... On the one hand, the Kremlin periodically co-opts and mobilises nationalism (even extreme forms); on the other, it repeatedly suppresses nationalism when its political implications become destabilising. Such an approach prevents nationalism from either of extreme or moderate orientation, becoming an influential, independent force in Russian politics, for good or for ill’.262

260 Laruelle, ‘Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling “nationalism” and “liberalism”’, 292. 261 Ibidem. 262 Luke March, ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’’ in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 3, 402. 84

Without denying the existence of bottom-up nationalist initiatives in Russian society, March mainly elaborates upon the existence of state ‘managed nationalism’ and its paramount importance for the interests of Russia’s elite in domestic and international affairs. Although nationalism forms a threat if it becomes too autonomous and dynamic, the elite lacks an alternative legitimating ideology apart from nationalism, which increases the temptation to ‘ride the nationalist tiger’.263

With regard to the increasing centralization of nationalist sentiments in Russia’s societal and political context and its influence on Russia’s foreign policy, March emphasises that the nationalist rhetoric is primarily for domestic use. He values a New Cold War unlikely. The ongoing crisis in and the annexation of Crimea, however, put this observation in different perspective. Nevertheless, this too seems to be part of the state managed nationalist trajectory. Next to the influence of the current crisis on Russia’s position in the international political context, Putin’s decision to annex Crimea and mobilize forces to protect the interests of Russian citizens in Eastern Ukraine had a great impact on the domestic political situation and increased his popularity to a historic high. Russia wanted to reassure its international image as a world power, but above all needed to secure its domestic control. State managed nationalism was above all formulated as an answer to the bottom-up initiatives in Russia that threatened the position of the Russian elite from the winter of 2011 onwards.

Legitimizing power:

The concept of state managed nationalism fits into Harley Balzer’s theory on Russia’s ‘managed pluralism’ which is based on the idea that the ‘general trend in Russia is toward the increased control of society by the state, with limited tolerance for alternative modes of expression-so long as they don't cross arbitrary and constantly changing boundaries established by the Kremlin’.264 Edwin Bacon’s qualification of the system as ‘snatch-squad authoritarianism’ in which the powers-that-be do not destroy its pluralistic outlook but interfere in its composition to prevent anti-regime opposition movements from emerging, is according to March equally applicable to the idea of state managed nationalism. The state only permits forms of nationalism that are not fundamentally challenging the authoritarian

263 March, ‘Nationalism for Export?’, 403. 264 Lilia Shevtsova and Andrew Kuchins (2003), Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin’s Emerging Regime (2003), Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/05/06/managed-pluralism-vladimir-putin-s-emerging-regime/p0z (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 85

state.265 The popular protests in the winter of 2011-12 and Navalny’s victory in the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections proved that the elite had not been able to eliminate the opposition. They lacked a grand systematic plan for Russia’s transformation266 and ‘failed to ensure social mobilization or cohesion by purely emphasizing the importance of a stable political course’267. The elite was according to Shlapentokh in need of ideas to motivate and consolidate the population. They were aware of their ideological nudity, prompting a lack of confidence in their own legitimacy, and had been in search of a national idea from 1996 onwards268. With the recent popular uprising, the need to counter the opposition’s challenge of their legitimacy became even more important.

March emphasizes that the Kremlin’s focus on Russia’s ‘national idea’ is not primarily directed towards the expression of true nationalism, but especially towards its functionality: ‘by expressing nationalism, the elite is able to monopolize and channel it in order to support the legitimization of their position’.269 Traditionally nationalism was more concerned with domestic political developments, foreign politics had a more independent stance. In the last couple of years foreign politics have however increasingly been used in support of the Kremlin’s domestic interests. Rogozin’s role in Russia’s power structure and his involvement in the Ukraine crisis is characteristic for this development.

A worthy competitor:

Distinctive for Russia’s political nationalism is the vagueness of its nature. Caused by the Kremlin’s desire to maintain its domestic and foreign policy disconnected from its increasing nationalist image, state nationalism lacked persuasiveness to mobilise the Russian people. State nationalism became a hollow phrase. These circumstances provoked a reaction from society: different social groups started to fill the gap and created alternative narratives.270 As a result, Russia’s elite needed to create a dual policy in which it both stimulated and repressed nationalist tendencies. Rodina’s removal from the 2005 Moscow Duma elections based on the Kremlin’s concern Rogozin would independently exploit social discontent and become a Russian Saakashvili and his subsequent appointment as permanent representative to NATO

265 March, ‘Nationalism for Export?’, 404. 266 Andrey Okara, Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or PR Project? (2007), Russia in Global Affairs, Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9123 (Accessed on: 21 June 2015). 267 March, ‘Nationalism for Export?’, 404. 268 Ibidem, 405. 269 Ibidem, 406. 270 Ibidem, 410. 86

was a clear example of the Kremlin’s approach.271 The elite clearly tried to integrate nationalist popular uprising within its hierarchical political system in order to secure its position. Instead of valuing Russia’s elite as increasingly nationalist, one should look at the elite’s pragmatic approach towards different tendencies is Russian society: the Kremlin was ideological flexible and adapted its tone of voice to the dominant sentiments in society. Political nationalism was entirely subordinated to short-term domestic political imperatives.272

Appointed as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Rogozin became responsible for ensuring national defence and mobilisation readiness, as well as management of the country’s material reserves; implementing government policy in the development of the defence, nuclear, rocket/spacecraft, shipbuilding, aircraft as well as radio electronics industries; implementation of the state arms procurement programme, state defence contracts and programmes for the development of the defence, nuclear, rocket/spacecraft, shipbuilding, aircraft as well as radio electronics industries; nuclear oversight; export control with respect to products, information, works and services and products of intellectual activity which could be used for production of weapons of mass destruction, delivery vehicles for such weapons or other armaments and military hardware; implementing a well-coordinated defence policy within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty; state policy with regard to international military technical cooperation; state policy with regard to civil defence and protection of the population and territory in emergencies; development of scientific research aimed at strategic military technical and defence planning; upgrading facilities along Russia’s state border; and drafting proposals on creating a system for young Russians’ preparation for military service.273 His official position, although being appointed as Deputy Prime Minister, was initially considered marginal. He was assigned to modernize the force structures in Russia, a task nobody had been able to fulfil in previous decades.274 Specialists therefore questioned whether Rogozin was appointed as a pioneer to test new territory in order to actually reform the military industry or he was assigned to task he could not but fail in order to cease his position of strength and eliminate him as a possible threat to Putin?

Clearly Rogozin had been asked to join the government as a response to the popular uprising

271 Ibidem, 417. 272 March, ‘Nationalism for Export?’, 421. 273 The Russian Government – Responsibilities, Official website of the Russian government, Available at: http://government.ru/en/gov/responsibilities/#170 (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 274 Russia’s military industrial complex is generally regarded as a highly fractured network of privatized Soviet industries and labs know for its slow and inefficient production of new weapons systems a for being a corrupt, expensive supplier of new weapons. 87

of the winter of 2011-12 and the increasing nationalist tendencies in Russian society. Rogozin had been the figurehead of the patriotic-nationalist movement in Russia for years and needed to be included in the Kremlin’s hierarchical political system. Rogozin’s appointment is exemplary for the elite’s political nationalism and its subordination to short term domestic political imperatives. Rogozin was not appointed as Minister of Defence and although being regarded as the curator of all force structures in Russia, he had not been provided with real executive power with regard to actual military action that would make him a liability. Rogozin needed to be the Kremlin’s cover story, without becoming a threat. His appointment as Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Transnistria by Medvedev in March 2012275 served this purpose: the Russian people was reminded of Rogozin’s past as protagonist of the patriotic-nationalist movement and his previous involvement in the defence of Russia’s interests abroad. Now serving as Deputy Prime Minister appointed as presidential representative, the Kremlin gave a clear signal to the growing number of patriotic-nationalist supporters in Russia that the government intended to meet their needs and identified them as a serious voice in Russian society.

Riding the nationalist tiger:

Apart from the overarching story on the development of Russia’s power structure and the subsequent marginalization of Rogozin’s position as Deputy Prime Minister, I would like to focus on two topics that support the idea of Rogozin as a leading politician in contemporary Russia: the re-emergence of the nationalist-patriotic party Rodina and Rogozin’s role in the Ukraine crisis. Both provide insight in Rogozin’s shadow-influence on Russia’s political developments and his increasing prominence in the power structure. Rogozin’s involvement in Rodina has been extensively discussed in the previous chapter. Established in August 2003, Rodina won a staggering 9.2 per cent of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Launched as a spoiler party, Rodina initially supported the policies of president Putin. However, from early 2005 onwards the party increasingly started to demonstrate an assertive attitude towards the Kremlin culminating in Rogozin’s hunger strike to protest against the Kremlin’s welfare reforms and a petition to ban Jewish organisations from Russia. Rogozin openly accused the Kremlin of waging a dirty war against his bloc. Rodina’s became a

275 News on Dmitry Rogozin, Official website of the Kremlin, Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/238/events (Accessed on: 1 June 2015) 88

potential threat to United Russia because of its increasing electoral support. After being barred from the Moscow Duma elections on 6 November 2005 following an accusation of conducting a campaign inciting racial hatred, Rogozin decided to step down as party leader in March 2006. Rodina merged with the Russian Pensioners’ Party and the Russian Party of Life into A Just Russia, which would serve as Medvedev’s political vehicle for his parliamentary election campaign in 2007-8. It seemed to be the end of Rodina and Rogozin’s political career.

Rogozin’s appointment as the Russian ambassador to NATO turned not only his faith but would in the long run also prove crucial for Rodina’s revival. On 29 September 2012 Rodina was reinstated by Alexei Zhuravlyov, a former member of United Russia and on 21 December (Rogozin’s birthday) the Ministry of Justice officially registered Rodina as a political party. Given the societal and political circumstances at the time, Rodina was generally expected to resume its role as spoiler party. Rogozin’s prominence in the political arena and the increasing nationalist tendencies in the country support the idea that Rodina is re-established in order to serve as Rogozin’s political vehicle in case the Kremlin is forced to undertake action to answer to the demands of society. As March rightfully mentioned, the Kremlin is forced to ‘ride the nationalist tiger’276 and risks not being able to control it.

Rodina’s core idea is to worship the Russian state, both it’s Tsarist and Stalinist incarnations.277 Founded as a grassroots movement driven by anger toward the elite, Rodina became a political body able to incorporate people of diverse ages and educational and professional backgrounds who were fed up with corruption, incompetence and the moral promiscuity of the elites.278 The party’s goal is to restore the nation to prosperity and greatness by destroying the oligarchs. Despite Rodina’s fierce anti-establishment approach, it strongly supports president Putin since his political course is designed to strengthen Russia. A true patriot must support the government. Rodina’s affiliation with the All-Russian People’s Front was a clear sign of its support to the Kremlin, its idea to work through United Russia to

276 March, ‘Nationalism for Export?’, 403. 277 Vladimir Frolov (2012), Russia has its own tea party with Rodina, The Moscow Times, Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-has-its-own-tea-party-with-rodina/469395.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 278 Frolov, Russia has its own tea party with Rodina, Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia- has-its-own-tea-party-with-rodina/469395.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 89

place deputies in the Duma and introduce legislation279 is however inappropriate since it contradicts Rodina’s anti-establishment argument.

The All-Russian People’s Front intended to ‘allow organizations and "non-affiliated United Russia supporters" to assist United Russia in creating its platform and its party (candidate) lists for future elections. This would allow ‘everyone who is united in their common desire to strengthen our country, united by the idea of finding optimal solutions to the challenges before us – to benefit from this single platform’.280 United Russia has since clarified that up to 25% of its party lists will be named by the new organization’.281 Russia’s major opposition parties were appalled by the next attempt of the Kremlin to centralize power and even involve major state-owned companies to secure its support within society by asking their employees for their support. The establishment of the front is generally regarded as Putin’s reaction to the allegations of corruption against United Russia. As has been discussed in the first chapter with regard to the many-layered pie principle, creating a new movement is a logical reaction of the Kremlin when their existing political vehicle does no longer suffice. Navalny’s characterization of United Russia as the party of villains and thieves, has affected the efficacy of the party as power tool. Putin, despite having functioned as party leader, has never become a party member and is therefore politically ‘mobile’ and capable of changing his political vehicle. By creating the popular front, Putin was able do distance himself from United Russia, re-establish his image as president standing above party politics and at the same time create a moment in which he could develop and test his future political vehicle, fully depending of the ongoing societal and political developments.

Rodina is of value to Putin since it, within the popular front, provides him with a fiery, mobilizing ideology absent in United Russia. Vladimir Frolov even states that ‘Rodina’s “patriotic fundamentalism” is a potent mixture to fire up Putin’s apathetic political base of provincial voters heavily dependent on government largesse. Rodina could also be a perfect weapon for cleansing the ruling elites of pro-Western liberals and opposition

279 Jordan Bryant and Garrison Golubock (2013), Rodina. A returning force for Russian nationalism, The School of Russian and Asian Studies, Available at: http://www.sras.org/rodina (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 280 Danya Spencer (2011), The All-Russia People's Front A Broad and Controversial Coalition, The School of Russian and Asian Studies, Available at: http://www.sras.org/declaration_of_the_formation_of_the_all_russia_people_front (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 281 Spencer (2011), The All-Russia People's Front A Broad and Controversial Coalition, The School of Russian and Asian Studies, Available at: http://www.sras.org/declaration_of_the_formation_of_the_all_russia_people_front (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 90

sympathizers’.282 The idea, however, that Rodina could well be Putin’s future political vehicle for his re-election in 2018, forces us to have a closer look at Rogozin’s role within Russia’s power structure. Despite Rodina’s support for the president, it’s of importance to point out that the Russian state itself is central to its ideology, Putin as a person is interchangeable for the party. If Putin decides to choose Rodina as his future power base, he needs to be aware of the dangers of riding the nationalist tiger.

Rogozin’s ever-recurring political ambition:

Rogozin, who is generally conceived as the informal leader of Rodina, is according to political analysts keen on retaining the national-patriotic niche.283 Rodina’s increasing prominence in Russia’s political arena provides Rogozin with the opportunity to rise to power. The fact that he is now part of the government, in contrast to his position as leading oppositionist in 2004-6, increases his chances of success. Rogozin is way to ambitious to remain a second-rate politician for the rest of his career. Rodina re-emerged after the government decided to liberalize the political regulations in direct response to the popular protests. Rodina was again established as a spoiler party within the Kremlin’s hierarchical power structure in order to weaken the opposition and serve the elite’s domestic interests. As I discussed above, the party’s potential was way bigger. Its return could also have a serious influence on Russia’s domestic political composition. Rodina’s renewed independence weakened A Just Russia, the country’s third biggest fraction in the State Duma, but also positioned itself to be able to draw members from the fourth biggest fraction of the Liberal- Democrats in case their aging party leader Zhirinovsky would leave politics. Rodina could not only change Russia’s political composition, but was above all ensured of a vast voters potential.

Rogozin’s role in the Ukraine crisis:

Next to Rodina’s increasing prominence and Rogozin’s part in it as the party’s informal leader, his role in Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine reveals Rogozin’s strengthened position in power. In the introduction of the current thesis, I already elaborated upon

282 Frolov, Russia has its own tea party with Rodina, Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia- has-its-own-tea-party-with-rodina/469395.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 283 Natalia Bespalova (2013), Rogozin leads Rodina’s militarized party congress, Russia beyond the Headlines, Available at: http://rbth.co.uk/politics/2013/06/14/rogozin_leads_rodinas_militarized_party_congress_27073.html (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 91

Rogozin’s qualification by the West as one of the ‘key ideologists and architects’ of Russia’s Ukraine policy. Rogozin has, as ‘curator’ of all force structures in Russia, been titled the main visionary and executor behind aggression towards Ukraine.284 Although the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is ongoing and both Russia and the West have employed information warfare that makes it nearly impossible to prove Rogozin’s actual involvement, there is some information that could link him indirectly to the events. Especially Rogozin’s involvement in the Izborsk club and the involvement of Rodina party leader Alexei Zhuravlev in the annexation of Crimea are of interest to us. The evidence is somewhat circumstantial, but of value when considered within the right perspective. The above mentioned delineation of Russia’s present political developments and Rogozin’s role in it, make the story on Rogozin’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis compelling.

The Izborsk club was founded Albert Prokhanov in September 2012, named after the place where the first meeting took place, and was supposed to be an alternative to the liberal project represented the ideas of the right part of the ideological spectrum. Although Rogozin is formally not a club member, he is regarded the leader of the club that helped to unite a number of influential nationalists such as Alexander Prokhanov, Mikhail Leontyev, Mikhail Shevchenka, Alexander Dugin, Nikolay Starikov and Vitaly Averyanov.285 The club is notorious for developing and publishing a wide variety of state development strategies and its direct influence on government decisions.286 Their manifesto ‘Saving Ukraine’, published in the Russian weekly Zavtra on 12 February 2014, has for example provided the ideological basis for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

The Izborsk club warned for the use of popular protests by Western forces to reverse president Yanukovich’s decision not to join the European Union. A coup by Ukrainian fascist forces was imminent and would not only cause a civil war in Ukraine but also threaten the Russian interests. In case a coup would succeed, Russia was about to lose Sevastopol as the base of the Black Sea Fleet; Russians in eastern and southern Ukraine would be purged, producing a flood of refugees; Russia would lose manufacturing capacities in Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk,

284 Marius Laurinavičius (2014), Dmitry Rogozin’s clan: Visionaries and executors behind aggression towards Ukraine, DELFI, Available at: http://en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/dmitry-rogozins-clan-visionaries-and-executors-behind- aggression-towards-ukraine.d?id=65585356#ixzz3bpqpENL1 (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 285 Official website of the Izborsk Club, Available at: http://www.dynacon.ru/lpr/izborsk.php (Accessed on: 21 June 2015). 286 Laurinavičius (2014), Dmitry Rogozin’s clan: Visionaries and executors behind aggression towards Ukraine, DELFI, Available at: http://en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/dmitry-rogozins-clan-visionaries-and-executors-behind-aggression- towards-ukraine.d?id=65585356#ixzz3bpqpENL1 (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 92

Kharkov for the military; the Russian speaking population would be suppressed by forcible Ukrainianization; the US and NATO would establish military bases in Ukraine and Crimea; and spread popular protests into non-Russian ethnic cities in the Russian Federation.287 If the Russian government was not willing to interfere, the situation could have a catastrophic influence on Russia’s future.288 Putin’s eventual course of action is remarkably similar to the Izborsk club’s recommendations. As founder and alleged leader of the club, Rogozin had been regarded as the main visionair behind Russia’s Ukraine policy.

Besides Rogozin’s influence on Russia’s Ukraine policy via his involvement in the Izborsk club, Rogozin’s lieutenant and acting party leader of Rodina Alexei Zhuravlev connected him directly to the Ukrainian crisis. In a post of 31 January 2014 on his page289, Zhuravlev announced he had arrived in Simferopol to participate in the founding congress of the Slavic Anti-Fascist Front – an organization that wants to liberate Ukraine from Nazi influences290 - and meet with the leadership of the Supreme Council of Crimea and the representatives of the party ‘Russian Unity’ of . Although there is no evidence proving the close affiliation between Rodina and Russian Unity, Zhuravlev’s and Aksyonov’s cooperation is plausible. Kaurinavicius states that Zhuravlev made a public announcement on February 25 on the general ant-fascist reserve mobilization planning to protect Sevastopol and other Crimean cities. On the same day Zhuravlev flew to Crimea and on the night of 26-27 February armed men invaded the Crimean Parliament. Not long after Aksyanov was appointed as Crimea’s new prime minister.291

Aksyanov was a marginal figure in local politics, but as soon as the protesters in Kiev started seizing government buildings in January 2014 he created an army on the Crimean

287 Paul Craig Roberts (2014), Russia under Attack, Foreign Policy Journal, Available at: http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/02/14/russia-under-attack/ (Accessed on: 1 June 2014). 288 Russia’s “Save Ukraine” Memorandum: Prevent the Ukraine from “Going Fascist” (2014), Global Research News, Available at: http://abundanthope.net/pages/Political_Information_43/Russia-s-Save-Ukraine-Memorandum-Prevent-the- Ukraine-from-Going-Fascist_printer.shtml (Accessed on: 1 June 2014). 289 Official Facebook-page Zhuravlev – post of 31 January 2014: https://www.facebook.com/zhuravlev.rodina?fref=ts (viewed: 01 June 2015) 290 MP Zhuravlev left for Ukraine to create Slavic Anti-Fascist Front (Депутат Журавлев уехал на Украину создавать Славянский антифашистский фронт) (2014), National focus. Guild of ethnic journalism (Национальный акцент. Гильдия межэтнической журналистики), Available at: http://nazaccent.ru/content/10472-deputat-zhuravlev-uehal-na- ukrainu-sozdavat.html (Accessed on: 21 June 2015). 291 Marius Laurinavičius (2014), Aggression in Ukraine: what consequences await its architects?, Available at: http://en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/aggression-in-ukraine-what-consequences-await-its- architects.d?id=65650128#ixzz3bptRRYEi (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 93

peninsula.292 Within no time he became a valuable ally to Moscow; his written appeal to president Putin signified the start of the Russian occupation. Not long after Aksyanov was elected Prime Minister and retained his position after the annexation of Crimea. Although there is no written evidence of Aksyanov’s and Zhuravlev’s cooperation and certainly not of Rogozin’s support to Aksyanov, it is unthinkable that Zhuravlev acted on his own, without any guidance from Rogozin, given his position in and the importance of Rodina. The party’s involvement is conceivable, since this is exactly the kind of thing both Rodina and Rogozin have done for many years and fits well within their identity framework of protectors of the rights of Russians abroad. The fact that Rogozin was one of the first politicians who received a personal boycott due to his involvement in the Ukrainian crisis is understandable if we consider to above mentioned arguments.

Although it’s probable that the reestablishment of Rodina in 2012 was intended as a political vehicle for president Putin and his re-election campaign of 2018, or as a party like A Just Russia once had been for Medvedev to drive Rogozin into power, or even as a spoiler party to steal votes from a possible nationalist opposition parties - all within the many-layered pie principle in which the Kremlin was able to control the political arena and manage the different political movements in their own best interests - the long period of social upheaval from 2006 onwards and the elite’s inability to formulate a suitable answer, gives reason to question the competence of the Kremlin to sufficiently control the political powers in Russia. The elite has been confronted with a new generation of oppositionists inflicted with a nationalist conviction and has been forced to ride the nationalist tiger. The Kremlin’s control over its political system – a managed pluralistic entity – is currently less rigid than it has been in the past, despite the Kremlin’s convulsive attempts to restrain the system. There is room for manoeuvre and given the ambition of politicians like Rogozin, the system is increasingly unstable and even endangered. Rogozin is and has been loyal to the powers-that-be, but as soon as the opportunity presents itself it is not unthinkable Rogozin will once again try his luck and fight for a position in power.

292 Simon Shuster (2014), Putin’s Man in Crimea Is Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare, TIME, Available at: http://time.com/19097/putin-crimea-russia-ukraine-aksyonov/ (Accessed on: 1 June 2015). 94

Conclusion The future course of Russia’s political development is unpredictable. And so is Rogozin’s political career. Nevertheless, by answering the question what the development of Dmitry Rogozin’s career tells us about the evolution of Russia’s political system and to what extent the upsurge of nationalist-patriotic sentiments influenced both Russia’s domestic political constellation and Rogozin’s career, I have tried to elucidate the complex reality of the Russian political context by embedding a delineation of Rogozin’s political career in an in-debt description of the development of Russia’s political system. It touches upon the identity crisis Russia went trough and it’s quest to find new foundations for its political existence. Not so much with regard to the substantive debate on the nature of Russian nationalism or by discussing the most prominent voices in Russia’s nationalist debate and elaborating upon Rogozin’s relationship with them, but purely directed towards Rogozin’s involvement in and anticipation to societal and political sentiments on the matter during his political career. Conceived as the protagonist of the nationalist-patriotic movement, Rogozin slowly rose to the forefront in the Russian political arena as the nationalist tendencies in Russian society grew stronger over time.

In analysing the constellation of Russia’s political system and Rogozin’s role in it, I started by elaborating upon the political transition Russia went trough at the beginning of the 1990s and the involvement of the old political elite in (re)constructing Russia’s political landscape. Andrew Wilson’s characterization of Russia’s political system as a ‘many-layered pie’ served as the guiding principle. By explaining Rogozin’s position in KRO, his involvement in General Lebed’s candidacy during the presidential elections of 1996 and his initiating role in the creation and ultimate demise of Rodina, I have not only emphasized upon Rogozin’s willingness to support and even create spoiler parties in accordance to the Kremlin’s needs, but also pointed at Rogozin’s boundless political ambition which on the one hand assured his loyal cooperation with the political elite, but also persuaded him to go against their interests and prioritize his own dream to rise to power.

A striking example is Rogozin’s involvement in Rodina. Established as a spoiler party closely affiliated and subordinated to the Kremlin, Rodina played an important role in safeguarding the Kremlin’s dominance over the parliament and preventing the Communist Party from gaining prominence. After the elections Rodina, however, transformed into an opposition party and was no longer willing to function as the president’s special task force. The moment

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of Rogozin’s decision to shake off the Kremlin’s dominance was understandable; Russia was ravaged by domestic and international unrest and Rogozin saw a chance to rise to power. Rogozin was however also blinded by his ambition and did not properly value Putin’s ‘great turn’ in 2003: a clear message had been sent out by the president not to interfere in politics. Rodina’s leadership had inadequately appreciated Putin’s political power and misjudged Russia political reality at the time. Rogozin was soon forced to resign as party leader and not long after Rodina too ceased to exist. Rogozin overstepped his game, his political career seemed to be over.

Rogozin’s political revival in 2008 was remarkable but not wholly incomprehensible. After his elimination as party leader of Rodina in 2006, Rogozin remained active in nationalist- patriotic political organizations. He therefore was still conceived as the protagonist and leader of the nationalist-patriotic movement in Russia, while the nationalist-patriotic tendencies in society grew stronger. Therefore it seems fair to assume the Kremlin was keen to ensure itself of Rogozin’s support base in society and invited him to join the powers-that-be in the capacity of Ambassador to NATO. Rogozin’s appointment fits into a new course in Russian politics that expressed the increased self-confidence of the Russian leadership with its increased assertiveness in foreign affairs.

Rogozin’s appointment as Ambassador to NATO coincided with Putin’s endorsement of Medvedev as his successor. Question is why Putin chose two politicians so different from each other to represent the Kremlin’s position in both the domestic and international political realm? The answer to this question touches upon Putin’s awareness of the significance of continuing to cooperate with Western powers and places not only Rogozin’s appointment but also the assertive stance in foreign politics as a whole in perspective. Putin acknowledged the importance of a body able to perpetuate global security and defended the importance of a universal international law, based on a multipolar principle. As long as the West was not willing to cooperate with Russia on the basis of equality and solely reasoned from an unipolar perspective, Russia was not willing to cooperate. Only the UN Security Council had the potential to become the platform on which nations could properly defend global security based on universal international law. Rogozin’s appointment as Ambassador to NATO was a clear sign the Kremlin did not regard this platform suitable to come to terms. Russia has over and over again tried to approach the West, their attempts were however met with disdain. The Transnistrian case is exemplary for this development.

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The importance of a relationship with the West based on equality became central to Russia’s foreign policy. Sovereignty was inextricably linked to and became even a prerequisite for Russia’s ability to contribute to the establishment of a wholesome European security system. Rogozin fully shared this view and emphasised that Russia was not willing to give up one ounce of it sovereignty and is not going to forfeit the rights and guarantees of safeguarding its independence. Russia’s growing self-awareness and self-confidence were increasingly translated into an assertive foreign policy. Rogozin’s appointment as Ambassador to NATO was a reaction of the Kremlin to the Western obstinacy to accept and acknowledge Russia as an equal partner.

By simply considering his appointment an insult to the Alliance, one would ignore its actual meaning. Probably the most important reason for Rogozin’s nomination as Ambassador to NATO is the influence it had on Russia’s domestic political situation. The appointment of one of Russia’s protagonists of the nationalist-patriotic movement gave Putin some leverage with respect to the upsurge of nationalist tendencies in Russian domestic politics. The Kremlin was keen to ensure itself of Rogozin’s support base in society, but it seemed as if they tried to provide him with a position in which his influence on domestic politics would only be limited. By the outbreak of the Georgian War, however, changed the situation considerably. Rogozin became a prominent government official, successfully dealing with one of Russia’s most pressing dossiers in foreign affairs. The plan to instate the protagonist of the nationalist- patriotic movement as Ambassador to NATO in order to distract him from politics and not determine politics, failed.

Rogozin proved to be a strong asset for the powers-that-be and as the domestic and societal unrest increased and the nationalist-patriotic movement grew stronger, the Kremlin had no choice but to grant him a prominent position in power. The popular protests in the Winter of 2011-12 compelled the Kremlin to appoint Rogozin as Deputy Prime Minister in December 2011. The moment of his appointment is significant in explaining Rogozin’s role in the government. Putin’s only objection was to jump the hurdle of the March 2012 presidential election; he was however facing a new opposition movement in a changing Russia. The Kremlin needed to formulate answers in order to counter the threat of the new opposition. Rogozin’s appointment was intended to convince the general public - not so much the young middle-class gathered on the Bolotnaya square – that the Kremlin was well aware of the

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growing nationalist sentiments in society and anticipated to it by changing the composition of the government.

The predomination of Natsdem, symbolised by Navalny’s success during the 2013 Moscow mayoral election, changed the political course of the Kremlin. Putin had not been able to control the opposition or ensure social mobilization or cohesion by purely emphasising the importance of a stable political course like he had done in the past. The Kremlin was in need of ideas to motivate and consolidate popular support for the government in order not to lose its legitimacy. The Kremlin in the previous years increasingly stressed nationalist ideas, however, this state nationalism lacked persuasiveness to mobilize the Russian people and became a hollow phrase. The Kremlin was ideological flexible and adapted its tone of voice to the dominant sentiments in society. Its approach was purely pragmatic. Different social groups had filled the gap the Kremlin left by its inability to create a clear ideological base, which made the nationalist tendencies even more dangerous since they became difficult to control. The elite’s attempt to monopolize nationalism had failed and despite of the attempt to rule politics within the many-layered pie principle, they increasingly lost control.

Rogozin’s rise to power is a consequence for this development. The Kremlin started to integrate a strong nationalist tone of voice within its hierarchical political system. Rogozin returned to Moscow to ward off the political threat of the Natsdem movement and to provide the voters with a real alternative. Not as a member of the opposition, but as a member of the Russian government. Despite the fact that the Kremlin hoped to implement ‘state nationalism’ in which the government only permits forms of nationalism that are not fundamentally challenging the authoritarian state, their decision to reinstate Rogozin as Deputy Prime Minister and reinvigorate Rodina could endanger their position considerably. I have elaborated upon the idea of the recreation of Rodina as a new political vehicle for Putin’s presidential election campaign in 2018. Rogozin’s current prominent position and the increasing sentiment of Russian nationalism, combined with Rogozin’s political ambition, could however endanger Putin’s. The government tried to give a clear signal nationalist- patriotic movements in Russia that the government intended to meet their needs and identified them as a serious voice in Russian society. However, by appointing Rogozin they decided to ride the nationalist tiger, with a fair chance to lose control if the nationalist-patriotic grow stronger.

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Rogozin’s present involvement in the Ukrainian crisis serves the governments interest by demonstrating the government’s direct involved in defending the rights of Russians abroad and by doing so responding to nationalist tendencies in Russian society. On the other hand, it enables Rogozin to retain his national-patriotic niche which only further supports his position in power. Rodina’s increasing prominence in Russia’s political arena provides Rogozin with the opportunity to rise to power. The fact that he is already part of the government increases his chance to do so in comparison to his attempt in 2004-6. Although Rodina re-established to serve the needs of the Kremlin within the many-layered pie principle and will probably do so, the long period of social upheaval from 2006 onwards and the elite’s inability to formulate a suitable answer to it, gives reason to question the competence of the Kremlin to sufficiently control the political developments in Russia. The elite has been confronted with a new generation of oppositionists inflicted with a nationalist conviction and has been forced to ride the nationalist tiger. The Kremlin’s control over its political system is currently less rigid than it has been in the past. If nationalist sentiments further increase, it could encourage Rogozin to ride the nationalist wave and resume his struggle for power. Question is whether Rogozin will openly fight Putin and the powers-that-be and become their arch-enemy or fight for power along gradual lines. Given his experience from 2006 and the Kremlin’s continuing ability to control the political system, I expect Rogozin to choose the latter.

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