CCAR RESPONSA Who Is a Rabbi? She'elah a New Congregation Has

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CCAR RESPONSA Who Is a Rabbi? She'elah a New Congregation Has CCAR RESPONSA 5759.3 Who Is a Rabbi? She'elah A new congregation has been formed in my city, founded by a woman who has attended the International Institute for Secular Humanistic Judaism (IISHJ), the rabbinical school of the Society for Humanistic Judaism. She serves as the congregation's rabbi, even though she has yet to be ordained by that school. She has been licensed by the state to perform weddings, and also does conversions. Should we accept these conversions as valid, even though they were supervised by someone other than an ordained rabbi? In general, what is our position with respect to individuals who have received private ordination or who claim to possess ordination from seminaries, schools or yeshivot with which we are unfamiliar? Do we recognize them as rabbis? Do we accept them as colleagues in our communities? Teshuvah 1. Conversions Supervised by a Layperson. Your first question has been addressed quite clearly by the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR). We hold that, while "a rabbinical beit din is desirable for giyur ," conversion should at any rate take place in the presence of a rabbi and no fewer than two lay leaders of the community.[1] We base this position upon considerations of both a halakhic and a practical nature. Our tradition teaches that conversion must take place in the presence of a beit din , a court of Jewish law.[2] The Rabbis derive this requirement through a midrash , the interpretation of biblical verses[3] in which the Hebrew root sh-p-t ("judgment") appears in connection with the word ger , or "proselyte."[4] The precise make-up of this court is a matter of dispute in the literature; some contend that the Torah itself requires that a beit din consist of no fewer than three judges,[5] while others believe that one judge is sufficient and that the requirement of three judges in cases other than penal law is a rabbinic stringency.[6] Both views agree, however, that the judges must be knowledgeable of the law and qualified for their task. Although the codified halakhah declares that any three individuals, including those with no special legal training,[7] may constitute a beit din , it justifies this provision on the assumption that among a gathering of three persons "it is impossible that there should not be one who knows something of the law."[8] It follows that the rule will change should this assumption prove inaccurate: "if there is not one among these three judges who has studied the law, they are disqualified from serving as a court."[9] In particular, the beit din which oversees a conversion must be composed of knowledgeable Jews.[10] Conversion, we stress, is much more than the stated desire to become a Jew. Choosing Judaism is a complex and demanding intellectual and emotional procedure. It involves, first of all, the study of Torah and Jewish practice (hoda`at hamitzvot ), a curriculum which is taught at least in part by the members of the court.[11] Our tradition also requires that we "examine" the prospective Jew-by-choice, to determine whether his or her decision to become a Jew is sincere, well thought out, and motivated for reasons we find acceptable.[12] The journey by which one enters into the Jewish people, the veritable creation of a brand new identity-indeed, "the proselyte is like a new-born child"[13]-should therefore be supervised by a specialist who possesses the Judaic education and counseling skills necessary for this important task. We would add, moreover, that issues of personal status are among the most sensitive that face our community. It is deeply in our interest that we as a people be able to agree, to the greatest extent possible, upon "who is a Jew", arriving at a consensus as to the standards by which we determine the Jewish identity of those who claim to possess it. "Conversions" performed by those who are unqualified to do so endanger this vital but fragile consensus, for they are likely to create a class of "second-class Jews" whose very Jewishness will be suspect in the eyes of many. It is for these reasons, to insure the quality and the validity of conversion procedures, that our Conference along with the rest of the organized Jewish community insists that the supervision of conversion be a rabbinic prerogative. In principle ( lekhatchilah ), therefore, conversion should not be supervised by a layperson. We deal here, however, with a situation of "after the fact" ( bedi`avad ), with conversion ceremonies that have already taken place, with individuals who perhaps have been accepted as Jews-by-choice in your community. And in such a case, the halakhic tradition permits us to acknowledge the conversions, for although it ought to take place in the presence of a knowledgeable beit din , a conversion ritual administered by three unlearned judges ( hedyotot ) is nonetheless valid.[14] Let us be clear: we are under no obligation to recognize the validity of any "conversion" merely because a ritual bearing that name was performed by a group of three persons claiming to be a beit din . We are entitled to withhold our recognition of the conversion, for example, when we have serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the "court" or the fitness of its members to serve as "judges."[15] Yet such objections do not apply here. Although we have our religious differences with Humanistic Judaism,[16] we have no reason to doubt the Jewishness or the Judaic sincerity of those who practice it. Similarly, we have every reason to believe that the individuals who have converted with this person demonstrate a genuine desire to live a Jewish life as it is understood by their community. They have made a carefully considered and public decision to take their place in the covenant of Israel, joining their fate to that of the Jewish people. For our part, we do not want to erect barriers to their entry. On the contrary: as Reform Jews, whose movement has distinguished itself by its encouragement of those who wish to choose Judaism, we ought to welcome them actively into our midst. Thus, our advice is two-fold. We urge you to advocate in your community that conversions to Judaism be supervised and guided solely by ordained rabbis. Such a standard reflects honor to the Torah and the seriousness with which we take the conversion procedure. It will also forestall difficulties by helping to insure that the validity of conversions is accepted by most of the Jewish population. Yet to reject the individuals already converted by this person would serve no purpose save to embarrass them, sowing the seeds of bitterness and divisiveness within the community. Out of concern for Jewish unity and communal peace, and in recognition of their evident sincerity, you should rather accept them as full-fledged members of the Jewish people. 2. Rabbis with "Suspect Ordination." Your second question asks: "who is a rabbi?" How we are to evaluate the rabbinical credentials of those who have received private ordination? What of those who have graduated from rabbinical schools with which we are unfamiliar or which we regard as inferior in quality? Do we accept these individuals as our colleagues, as rabbis in our communities? We might begin by considering the nature of the ordination by which we bestow the title "rabbi." As we know that institution today, "ordination" is but the symbolic representation of the ancient semikhah described in the Talmudic sources.[17] Ancient ordination, according to halakhic theory, formed a new link in the chain of semikhah from teacher to student that stretched back all the way to Moses. The musmakh , or ordained judge, was therefore the legal successor to the seventy elders who stood with Moses on Sinai, and he was entitled to exercise the full range of legislative, judicial, and executive power pertaining to that exalted station. Among these was the power to enforce his decisions upon litigants even against their will, that is, if they had not agreed in advance to accept him as their judge. The musmakhim who constituted the High Court ( beit din hagadol ) could issue ordinances ( takanot ) that were binding upon all Israel. This semikhah was never practiced outside of the land of Israel; the Babylonian amoraim (sages of the Talmudic period) did not possess it, unless they received semikhah in the land of Israel. At best, the Babylonian "rabbis" (for without semikhah they did not take that title, but were rather called rav ) could regard themselves as "agents" of the rabbis of Eretz Yisrael , who commissioned them to exercise legal authority ( sheluchotayhu avdinan , "we perform their agency")[18] within carefully circumscribed boundaries. Today's rabbis, too, function as the agents of the rabbis of old. Although we do not wield the full legal power which they enjoyed-"today, we are all lay judges ( hedyotot) ; we do not exercise the Toraitic power of jurisdiction"[19]--tradition suggests that they have empowered us to act in their name on matters that occur frequently in the legal life of our community or that are important enough to demand a response from contemporary authorities.[20] The " semikhah " that we practice today does not confer this ancient grant of jurisdiction upon the recipient. It is merely an attestation by a teacher that the recipient, his student, "has attained the requisite knowledge to rule on matters of Jewish law ( higi`a lehora'ah ) and does so with the permission ( reshut ) of the rabbi who has ordained him."[21] Thus, our ordination does not endow its recipient with the authority to issue rulings that our people must accept.
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