REGULATION FALL 2010 That Established Literature

In Review dent assistants. Most newspaper accounts focus on anecdotes and particular cases The Power of Special Interests related to lobbying; this study offers enough data on interest groups to support Reviewed by John Samples valid conclusions. Surprisingly, about 40 percent of the regulated industries would control their advocates were government officials. Some LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: regulators. Gordon Tullock and later ana - officials may decide who wins the policy Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why lysts in the Virginia School proposed that struggle, but others are clearly part of the By Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. interest group efforts wasted resources by game. Citizens groups “or organizations rep - Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, creating monopolies sanctioned by the resenting an issue or cause without any and Beth L. Leech state. Lobbying itself wasted resources in direct connection to a business or profession” 360 pages; University of Chicago Press, the struggle over rents. In general, the econ - composed about a quarter of the sample 2009 omists’ critique of interest groups sug - for this study. Such groups were often major gested government failure might be more players on issues. Trade associations and THE CASE FOR GRIDLOCK: pervasive than market failure. individual businesses account - Democracy, Organized Power, Political scientists have ed for just over one-third, while and the Legal Foundations of been more divided about trade unions made up six per - American Government interest groups than econo - cent of the sample. By Marcus E. Ethridge mists. Pluralists saw politics Most Washington stories 223 pages; Lexington Books, 2010 as a struggle among groups; emphasize the victories of the winner wrote laws legiti - individual groups or indus - nterest groups have not always been as mated by government. Plural - tries. Baumgartner and his American as apple pie. James Madi - ists tended to approve of colleagues find that coalitions Ison’s Federalist No. 10 focused on fac - groups as a way to represent matter a lot; interests “rarely tions, “a number of citizens, whether citizens and control govern - lobby alone.” The urge to amounting to a majority or a minority of ment. Others argued that lob - association arises from the the whole, who are united and actuated by byists provided members of nature of things: policies have some common impulse of passion, or of Congress with information multiple consequences for interest, adverse to the rights of other cit - vital to their re-election efforts. diverse constituencies. These izens, or to the permanent and aggregate Some critics of pluralism coalitions comprise strange interests of the community.” Surely such a pointed out that not all inter - bedfellows in search of com - group should be suppressed. But no; Madi - ests — especially the poor — mon outcomes. Businesses son believed the costs of suppression in lib - were represented in the group and citizens groups are not erty would outweigh any benefits. He struggle. The struggle among always on opposite sides of argued the size of the new nation and com - groups obscured the reality of an issue. Although businesses petition among groups would preclude elite rule. Others argued that have more resources than cit - the dangers of a majority faction. Madison pluralism had replaced the izens groups, they oppose believed majorities would vote down any rule of law made by legislatures with each other depending on the issue. Business malign proposals by minority factions. groups competing for the favor of admin - is not an interest group or a unified force. The public and some scholars have dis - istrative agencies. Baumgartner and his group are not agreed with Madison on the latter point. naïve. Business groups in these data do Surveys indicate the public believes “special Empirical analysis In Lobbying and Policy have more resources in money and lobby - interests” have too much influence in Change , Frank Baumgartner and his co- ists. Yet their analyses find these resources Washington. Economists have offered authors offer new information about these have little relation to policy outcomes, either sophisticated analyses supporting a similar old debates. They randomly selected 98 for individual groups or for coalitions. They normative conclusion. Mancur Olson issues in which interest groups were consider several measures of financial argued that the economics of organiza - involved and followed them from 1999 to power, including campaign contributions tion foster policies that favor particularis - 2002. The authors then identified the and lobbying outlays. This finding counters tic groups over the larger public. The Chica - “sides” on each issue; a side was “a set of the expectations of most people, but cam - go School emphasized the likelihood that actors sharing a policy goal.” For the 98 paign finance scholars have long found lit - issues, they found 214 sides comprising tle relation between donations and con - John Samples is director of Cato’s Center for Representative Government and adjunct professor 2,221 advocates. The data collection gressional actions. Baumgartner’s group of political science at Johns Hopkins University. involved the authors and dozens of stu - offers the broadest and best support for 48 REGULATION FALL 2010 that established literature. They do note politics often bemoan the gridlock Baum - humanly possible. Baumgartner’s analysis that while money does not lead to victory or gartner sees as endemic to American pol - supports Ethridge’s conclusion. Baum - even offer much influence, it does assure a itics. Baumgartner offers no normative gartner’s picture of gridlock suggests the place in the Washington game. The issues evaluation of the power of the status quo. constraints on powerful interests imposed of the poor, they argue, are absent from the The book’s analysis indicates that com - by divided government. congressional agenda. plexity and multidimensionality of issues, Yet Baumgartner’s rather benign view combined with limited knowledge, pre - of interest groups contravenes Ethridge’s Power of the status quo Baumgartner et clude most change in policies. emphasis on rent seeking. The two may be al. found for most of these issues that not talking about two different arenas of pol - much happened during the time period Constitution vs. Progressivism In The Case itics. Baumgartner’s sample of interest they observed. If lobbyists are supposed to for Gridlock , Marcus Ethridge describes groups focused on Congress, although foster change, “they are a surprisingly inef - other virtues of this stasis. Ethridge con - perhaps half of their issues involved an fectual lot.” The power of the status quo trasts American constitutionalism with agency official. Ethridge emphasizes the informs almost every page of Lobbying and its Progressive critics. The former made it damage done in administrative venues. Policy Change . Groups that defend the pol - difficult to legislate as a way to control Certainly more data-intensive research icy status quo usually have an easy time. government. The latter denounced grid - should be done on administrative venues. Often they need not even mobilize in lock and looked for ways to circumvent the Perhaps such arenas do not attract the response to active challenges. constitutional design. Progressives hoped broad “sides” in struggle that Baumgart - The status quo persists for ner found. If not, and if power - several reasons. Policymakers ful groups dominate agencies, have limited attention and hear Baumgartner’s rather benign view Ethridge’s call for a return to many arguments favoring of interest groups contravenes the Constitutional Principle changes. Demand for change (and gridlock) looks all the quickly outstrips supply. Many Ethridge’s emphasis on rent seeking. more convincing. issues have been fought over These books have different for many years; the sides in strengths. Baumgartner and his these struggles are familiar with all the for a politics of expertise in which men of colleagues have collected more and better arguments on all sides, creating a grid - science molded society from Washington data on interest groups than we have had lock of advocacy as well as lobbying. bureaus. The rule of experts would be in before. This foundation lends credibility to Defenders of the status quo do well by service to the public good, where gridlock their analysis and conclusions. Ethridge arguing change will bring uncertain results was said to advance only selfish interests. offers a good analysis of an overlooked largely because losses loom larger than Ethridge argues, in contrast, that topic — administrative law — and its gains to policymakers. Policymakers in interest groups have more influence over importance for public policy. Both books this study seem to accord the current order policies made in administrative agencies. persuasively challenge what most people a presumption of continuity absent over - Organization counts, and the general believe about politics. For that reason, whelming evidence of the need for change. public is unorganized. Inevitably, interest both deserve readers concerned about the Yet, when the status quo falters, it is groups seek and obtain privileges from origins and consequences of regulation “not uncommon for a significant change to agencies staffed with Progressive expert - in the United States. R sweep aside years of equilibrium.” For exam - ise. The Progressive effort to circumvent Readings ple, the sulfur content allowed in gasoline

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